LAW FOR ALL : Section 304B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

Wednesday, June 2, 2021

Section 304B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

The prosecution’s case was that the deceased committed suicide by setting herself ablaze just after one year of her marriage and that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty and harassment on account of bringing less dowry by both the accused -The appellants were convicted by the Trial Court vide order dated 11.12.1997 for the offences under Sections 304B and 306, IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years for the offence punishable under Section 304B, IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence punishable under Section 306, IPC.-The High Court vide impugned judgment dated 06.11.2008, upheld the order of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants. The appellants have filed the present appeals by way of Special Leave, challenging the concurrent findings of the Courts below=

held that In the present case, the Trial Court and the High Court have concluded that the deceased committed suicide. However, we are of the considered opinion that the conclusion reached by the Courts below is based on assumptions, as there is no evidence on record to support the same. The reasoning of the Trial Court in this regard is as follows: 23 “Further, there is no direct evidence having been adduced by the prosecution the (sic) any of the accused caused death by sprinkling kerosene on the body of the deceased, the only possibility is that Meena Kumari put an end to her life by sprinkling kerosene on her body.” 35. In light of the fact that there was insufficient evidence to prove the factum of suicide beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption under Section 113A, Evidence Act, is not of much help for the prosecution. The essential ingredient of deceased committing suicide has not been proved by the prosecution by adducing sufficient evidence. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish that the death occurred due to suicide. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the finding of the Courts below convicting the appellants under Section 306, IPC merits interference by this Court.

under Section 304B, IPC read with Section 113B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:

i. Section 304B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand. ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113B, Evidence Act operates against the accused. iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304B, IPC cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives. iv. Section 304B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental. v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304B, IPC read with 113B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial. vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual andcursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution. vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304B, IPC read with Section 113B, Evidence Act. viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused. x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics. xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate punishment. xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach. 37. In light of the above findings, after perusing the relevant material and the evidence available, we find that the High Court and Trial Court have not committed any error in convicting the appellants under Section 304B, IPC as the appellants failed todischarge the burden under Section 113B, Evidence Act. However, upon appreciation of facts and circumstances we are of the opinion that the offence under Section 306, IPC is not made out. We therefore set aside the conviction and sentence under Section 306, IPC.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 17351736 OF 2010

SATBIR SINGH & ANOTHER …APPELLANTS

Versus

STATE OF HARYANA …RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

N. V. RAMANA, CJI.

1. The present appeals arise out of the impugned judgment dated

06.11.2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at

Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal Nos. 3SB of 1998 and 16SB of

1998, whereby the High Court dismissed the appeals preferred

by the appellants and upheld the order of conviction and

sentence passed by the Trial Court on 11.12.1997.

REPORTABLE

2. The case of the prosecution is that the deceased and accusedappellant no.1 were married on 01.07.1994. On 31.7.1995, at

about 4 or 4.30 P.M, some persons informed the complainant

that his daughter was ailing and admitted in the hospital. On

this information he, along with his wife and son, reached the

hospital and found that the deceased passed away due to burn

injuries. The prosecution’s case was that the deceased

committed suicide by setting herself ablaze just after one year

of her marriage and that soon before her death she was

subjected to cruelty and harassment on account of bringing

less dowry by both the accused.

3. The appellants were convicted by the Trial Court vide order

dated 11.12.1997 for the offences under Sections 304B and

306, IPC and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment

for seven years for the offence punishable under Section 304B,

IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for the

offence punishable under Section 306, IPC.

4. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants approached the High Court to

set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the

Trial Court. The High Court vide impugned judgment dated

06.11.2008, upheld the order of the Trial Court and dismissed

the appeal filed by the appellants. The appellants have filed the

present appeals by way of Special Leave, challenging the

concurrent findings of the Courts below.

5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants

submitted that the possibility of accidental fire has not been

ruled out in the present case. Moreover, most importantly, the

prosecution failed to prove that there was a demand for dowry.

Lastly, the prosecution has failed to prove that the demand,

assuming there was one, was made proximate to the death of

the deceasedvictim.

6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondentState submitted that the appellants had not been able to show

any material which would merit the interference of this Court in

the concurrent findings of the Courts below. The counsel

especially emphasized upon the fact that the suspicious death

of the deceased victim occurred within almost 1 year of

marriage. Moreover, the witnesses have stated the specific

instances of demand for dowry with consistency.

7. Having heard counsel appearing on either side and perusing

the material on record, this Court needs to answer following

questions:

I. Whether the Trial Court, and the High Court, was correct in

convicting the accused on the charge under Section 304B, IPC?

II. Whether the Trial Court, and the High Court, was correct in

convicting the accused on the charge under Section 306, IPC?

ISSUE I

8. At the outset, it is pertinent to analyze the law on dowry death.

Section 304B IPC, which defines, and provides the punishment

for dowry demand, reads as under:

“304B. Dowry death. —(1) Where the death of

a woman is caused by any burns or bodily

injury or occurs otherwise than under normal

circumstances within seven years of her

marriage and it is shown that soon before her

death she was subjected to cruelty or

harassment by her husband or any relative of

her husband for, or in connection with, any

demand for dowry, such death shall be called

‘dowry death’, and such husband or relative

shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation. —For the purpose of this subsection, ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning

as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act,

1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be

punished with imprisonment for a term which

shall not be less than seven years but which

may extend to imprisonment for life.”

Section 304B (1) defines ‘dowry death’ of a woman. It provides

that ‘dowry death’ is where death of a woman is caused by

burning or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under

normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage, and it

is shown that soon before her death, she was subjected to

cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her

husband, in connection with demand for dowry. Subclause (2)

provides for punishment for those who cause dowry death.

Accordingly, in Major Singh v. State of Punjab, (2015) 5 SCC

201, a threeJudge Bench of this Court held as follows:

“10. To sustain the conviction under Section

304B IPC, the following essential

ingredients are to be established:

(i) the death of a woman should be caused by

burns or bodily injury or otherwise than

under a ‘normal circumstance’;

(ii) such a death should have occurred within

seven years of her marriage;

(iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty

or harassment by her husband or any

relative of her husband;

(iv) such cruelty or harassment should be for

or in connection with demand of dowry; and

(v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to

have been meted out to the woman soon

before her death.”

9. The first contentious part that exists in the interpretation of

Section 304B, IPC relates to the phrase “soon before” used in

the Section. Being a criminal statute, generally it is to be

interpreted strictly. However, where strict interpretation leads

to absurdity or goes against the spirit of legislation, the courts

may in appropriate cases place reliance upon the genuine

import of the words, taken in their usual sense to resolve such

ambiguities. [refer Commissioner of Customs (Import),

Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company, (2018) 9 SCC 1, State

of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, 2020 SCC

OnLine SC 412]. At this juncture, it is therefore necessary to

undertake a study of the legislative history of this Section, in

order to determine the intention of the legislature behind the

inclusion of Section 304B, IPC.

10. Section 304B, IPC is one among many legislative initiatives

undertaken by Parliament to remedy a longstanding social evil.

The pestiferous nature of dowry harassment, wherein married

women are being subjected to cruelty because of covetous

demands by husband and his relatives has not gone unnoticed.

The Parliament enacted the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 as a

first step to eradicate this social evil. Further, as the measures

were found to be insufficient, the Criminal Law (Second

Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act 46 of 1983) was passed wherein

Chapter XXA was introduced in the IPC, containing Section

498A.

11. However, despite the above measures, the issue of dowry

harassment was still prevalent. Additionally, there was a

growing trend of deaths of young brides in suspicious

circumstances following demands of dowry. The need for a

stringent law to curb dowry deaths was suo motu taken up by

the Law Commission in its 91st Law Commission Report. The

Law Commission recognized that the IPC, as it existed at that

relevant time, was insufficient to tackle the issue of dowry

deaths due to the nature and modus of the crime. They

observed as under:

“1.3 If, in a particular incident of dowry

death, the facts are such as to satisfy the

legal ingredients of an offence already

known to the law, and if those facts can be

proved without much difficulty, the existing

criminal law can be resorted to for bringing

the offender to book. IN practice, however,

two main impediments arise

(i) either the facts do not fully fit into

the pigeonhole of any known offence; or

(ii) the peculiarities of the situation are

such that proof of directly incriminating

facts is thereby rendered difficult.”

(emphasis supplied)

12. Taking into consideration the aforesaid Law Commission

Report, and the continuing issues relating to dowry related

offences, the Parliament introduced amendments to the Dowry

Prohibition Act, as well as the IPC by enacting Dowry

Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act 43 of 1986). By way of

this amendment, Section 304B, IPC was specifically

introduced in the IPC, as a stringent provision to curb the

menace of dowry death in India. Shrimati Margaret Alva, who

presented the Amendment Bill before Rajya Sabha observed as

follows:

“This is a social evil and social legislation,

as I said cannot correct every thing. We are

trying to see how and where we can make it

a little more difficult and therefore we have

increased the punishment. We have also

provided for certain presumptions because

upto now one of our main problem has been

the question of evidence. Because the bride

is generally burnt or the wife is burnt

behind closed doors in her inlaw’s home.

You have never really heard of a girl

being burnt while cooking in her

mother’s house or her husband’s house.

It is always in the motherinlaw’s house

that she catches fire and is burnt in the

kitchen. Therefore, getting evidence

immediately becomes a great bit

problem. Therefore, we have brought in a

couple of amendments which give

certain presumptions where the burden

of proof shifts to the husband and to his

people to show that it was not a dowry

death or that it was not deliberately

done.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. There is no denying that such social evil is persisting even

today. A study titled “Global study on Homicide: Genderrelated

killing of women and girls”, published by the United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime, highlighted that in 2018 female

dowry deaths account for 40 to 50 percent of all female

homicides recorded annually in India. The dismal truth is that

from the period 1999 to 2016, these figures have remained

constant. In fact, the latest data furnished by the National

Crime Records Bureau indicates that in 2019 itself, 7115 cases

were registered under Section 304B, IPC alone.

14. Considering the significance of such a legislation, a strict

interpretation would defeat the very object for which it was

enacted. Therefore, it is safe to deduce that when the legislature

used the words, “soon before” they did not mean “immediately

before”. Rather, they left its determination in the hands of the

courts. The factum of cruelty or harassment differs from case to

case. Even the spectrum of cruelty is quite varied, as it can

range from physical, verbal or even emotional. This list is

certainly not exhaustive. No straitjacket formulae can therefore

be laid down by this Court to define what exacts the phrase

“soon before” entails. The aforesaid position was emphasized by

this Court, in the case of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000)

5 SCC 207, wherein the threeJudge Bench held that:

“15. … “Soon before” is a relative term which

is required to be considered under specific

circumstances of each case and no

straitjacket formula can be laid down by

fixing any timelimit. … In relation to dowry

deaths, the circumstances showing the

existence of cruelty or harassment to the

deceased are not restricted to a particular

instance but normally refer to a course of

conduct. Such conduct may be spread

over a period of time. …. Proximate and

live link between the effect of cruelty

based on dowry demand and the

consequential death is required to be

proved by the prosecution. The demand of

dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon

such demand and the date of death should

not be too remote in time which, under

the circumstances, be treated as having

become stale enough.”

(emphasis supplied)

A similar view was taken by this Court in Rajinder Singh v.

State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477.

15. Therefore, Courts should use their discretion to determine if the

period between the cruelty or harassment and the death of the

victim would come within the term “soon before”. What is

pivotal to the above determination, is the establishment of a

“proximate and live link” between the cruelty and the

consequential death of the victim.

16. When the prosecution shows that ‘soon before her death such

woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or

harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry’, a

presumption of causation arises against the accused under

Section 113B of the Evidence Act. Thereafter, the accused has

to rebut this statutory presumption. Section 113B, Evidence

Act reads as under:

“113B. Presumption as to dowry death—When the

question is whether a person has committed the

dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon

before her death such woman has been subjected by

such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in

connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court

shall presume that such person had caused the

dowry death.

Explanation. For the purpose of this section,

“dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in

section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)”

17. This Court, in the case of Bansi Lal v. State of

Haryana, (2011) 11 SCC 359, emphasized the mandatory

application of the presumption under Section 113B of the

Evidence Act once the ingredients of Section 304B of IPC stood

proved:

“19. It may be mentioned herein that the

legislature in its wisdom has used the word

‘shall’ thus, making a mandatory application

on the part of the court to presume that

death had been committed by the person who

had subjected her to cruelty or harassment in

connection with any demand of dowry. …

Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the

accused to rebut the presumption and in case of

Section 113B relatable to Section 304B IPC,

the onus to prove shifts exclusively and heavily

on the accused. …

20. Therefore, in case the essential

ingredients of such death have been

established by the prosecution, it is the duty

of the court to raise a presumption that the

accused has caused the dowry death.”

(emphasis supplied)

18. Therefore, once all the essential ingredients are established by

the prosecution, the presumption under Section 113B,

Evidence Act mandatorily operates against the accused. This

presumption of causality that arises can be rebutted by the

accused.

19. The usage of rebuttable presumption of causality, under

Section 113B, Evidence Act, creates a greater responsibility on

Judges, defense and prosecution. They need to be extra careful

during conducting criminal trials relating to Section 304B,

IPC. In order to address this precarious situation, procedural

law has some safeguards, which merits mentioning herein.

20. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record

the statement of an accused under Section 313, CrPC in a very

casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning

the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the

examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be

treated as a mere procedural formality, as it is based on the

fundamental principle of fairness. This provision incorporates

the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem”,

as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the

incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it

imposes an obligation on the part of the Court to question the

accused fairly, with care and caution. The Court must put

incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his

response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to

prepare his defense, since the inception of the trial, with due

caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section

304B, IPC read with Section 113B, Evidence Act.

21. Section 232, CrPC assumes importance, which reads as, “If,

after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the

accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the

point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the

accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order

of acquittal”. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is

not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232,

CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence

evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as

per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is

also an invaluable right provided to the accused. Existence of

such procedural right cohesively sits with the rebuttable

presumption as provided under Section 113B, Evidence Act.

22. The second contentious part relating to Section 304B, IPC is

that it does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing

death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental, as was done

earlier. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact

that death occurring “otherwise than under normal

circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or

accidental. However, the Section 304B, IPC endeavors to also

address those situations wherein murders or suicide are

masqueraded as accidents.

23. Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 304B IPC are

fulfilled, any death whether caused by burns or by bodily injury

or occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances shall,

as per the legislative mandate, be called a "dowry death" and

the woman's husband or his relative "shall be deemed to have

caused her death" unless proved otherwise. The section clearly

specifies what constitutes the offence of dowry death and also

identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who has or

have caused the dowry death. [refer Maya Devi v. State of

Haryana, (2015) 17 SCC 405, Shanti v. State of Haryana,

(1991) 1 SCC 371]

24. After having observed the law on Section 304B, IPC, we may

now turn to the merits of this case. It is clear that the

submissions of the counsel for the appellants must be rejected.

It is an admitted fact that the deceased and accused were

married on 01.07.1994, and the death of the lady occurred on

31.07.1995.

25. With respect to the cause of death, the doctor (P.W.3) found the

smell of kerosene oil on the body of the deceased who had

suffered 85% burn injuries. Therefore, in the present case, the

deceased victim succumbed to burns. As the death was

relatable to burn injuries within seven years of marriage, it

clearly satisfies the first two ingredients of the offence.

26. Coming to the issue of dowry demand, the evidence on record

indicates that when the brother of the deceased (P.W.7) visited

her in the matrimonial house after one month of marriage on

the occasion of Raksha Bandhan, the deceased had disclosed

that the accused, husband and motherinlaw, used to

physically harass her on the account of bringing insufficient

dowry. Furthermore, the accused persons had made a specific

demand of a scooter. Pursuant to this disclosure, she was

brought back to her paternal house where this fact was

disclosed to father of the deceased (P.W.6). It is pertinent to

note that, only a month prior to her death, the deceased had

returned to her matrimonial house. However, the accused still

used to harass the deceased for dowry. The aforesaid fact was

revealed by the deceased to her father, when she had come to

visit him.

27. It must be emphasized herein that, just a week before the

death, on the occasion of Teej festival, another brother of the

deceased (P.W.10) had visited her while she was in her

matrimonial home. The deceased had reiterated her plight to

her brother. Thereafter, on 31.07.1995, the father of the

deceased was informed by some villagers that his daughter has

been admitted in the hospital. Upon reaching, the father

discovered that the deceased succumbed to burn injuries. The

aforesaid chain of circumstances proves that there existed a live

and proximate link between the instances of demand of dowry

and the death of the deceased. The Trial Court, and the High

Court, upon a close appreciation of the aforesaid witnesses

came to the conclusion that the statements were corroborative

and consistent. They found the witnesses to be reliable and on

the basis of the same held that the deceased was subjected to

cruelty soon before her death as she failed to bring sufficient

dowry. We are in complete agreement with the aforesaid finding

of the Trial Court and the High Court.

28. From the above analysis, it is clear that the prosecution was

able to successfully prove that the death of the deceased due to

burn injuries took place within approximately one year of her

marriage. It has further been proved that soon before her death

she was subjected to harassment and cruelty pursuant to

demands of dowry. Since the ingredients of Section 304B, IPC

stand satisfied, the presumption under 113B, Evidence Act

operates against the appellants, who are deemed to have

caused the offence specified under Section 304B of IPC.

29. The burden therefore shifts on the accused to rebut the

aforesaid presumption. The counsel for the appellants has

canvassed before us that it was a case of accidental death, and

hence no liability can be fixed upon them. However, in the

present case, the accused persons failed to place any evidence

on record to prove that the death was accidental or

unconnected with the accused persons.

30. Here, it ought to be noted that, according to the evidence of the

doctor, the entire body of the deceased was doused with

kerosene oil. Therefore, the possibility of an accident can be

safely ruled out. As the Trial Court concluded:

“All these circumstances go to prove that either

deceased committed suicide by sprinkling

kerosene oil on her body or she was burnt by

sprinkling kerosene on her body either by the

accused or by somebody else and the plea of

accident tried to be made out by the learned

counsel for the accused, is not at all proved.”

31. Therefore, the presumption adumbrated in Section 113B,

Evidence Act takes full effect in this particular case, which has

not been rebutted by the accusedappellants herein. The

appellants have failed to make out a case for us to interfere in

the concurrent opinions of the Courts below, convicting the

accusedappellants under Section 304B, IPC.

ISSUE II

32. Apart from their conviction under Section 304B, IPC, the

appellants have also additionally challenged their conviction

under Section 306, IPC. Section 306, IPC relates to the

abetment of suicide and is extracted below:

“306. Abetment of suicide. —If any person

commits suicide, whoever abets the

commission of such suicide, shall be

punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to

ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

33. A bare reading of the provision indicates that for the offence

under Section 306, IPC the prosecution needs to first establish

that a suicide has been committed. Secondly, the prosecution

must also prove that the person who is said to have abetted the

commission of suicide, has played an active role in the same.

With respect to this latter requirement, Section 113A, Evidence

Act creates a presumption against the husband and/or his

relative with respect to the abetment of suicide of a married

woman, under certain conditions. Not going into the other

conditions, a perusal of the provision indicates that such

presumption shall be attracted only if the factum of suicide has

been established by the prosecution first. The necessary

ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306, I.P.C.

were considered by this court in Wazir Chand v. State of

Haryana, (1989) 1 SCC 244, wherein this Court held that:

“5. …Reading Sections 306 and 307 (sic 107)

together it is clear that if any person instigates any

other person to commit suicide and as a result of

such instigation the other person commits suicide,

the person causing the instigation is liable to be

punished under Section 306 of the Penal Code,

1860 for abetting the commission of suicide. A

plain reading of this provision shows that

before a person can be convicted of abetting

the suicide of any other person, it must be

established that such other person committed

suicide.”

(emphasis supplied)

34. In the present case, the Trial Court and the High Court have

concluded that the deceased committed suicide. However, we

are of the considered opinion that the conclusion reached by

the Courts below is based on assumptions, as there is no

evidence on record to support the same. The reasoning of the

Trial Court in this regard is as follows:

“Further, there is no direct evidence having

been adduced by the prosecution the (sic)

any of the accused caused death by

sprinkling kerosene on the body of the

deceased, the only possibility is that Meena

Kumari put an end to her life by sprinkling

kerosene on her body.”

35. In light of the fact that there was insufficient evidence to prove

the factum of suicide beyond reasonable doubt, the

presumption under Section 113A, Evidence Act, is not of much

help for the prosecution. The essential ingredient of deceased

committing suicide has not been proved by the prosecution by

adducing sufficient evidence. In the present case, the

prosecution has failed to establish that the death occurred due

to suicide. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the finding of

the Courts below convicting the appellants under Section 306,

IPC merits interference by this Court.

CONCLUSIONS

36. At the cost of repetition, the law under Section 304B, IPC read

with Section 113B, Evidence Act can be summarized below:

i. Section 304B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the

legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and

dowry demand.

ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the

necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section

304B, IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable

presumption of causality, provided under Section 113B,

Evidence Act operates against the accused.

iii. The phrase “soon before” as appearing in Section 304B, IPC

cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The

prosecution must establish existence of “proximate and live

link” between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for

dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.

iv. Section 304B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in

categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The

reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death

occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in

cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304B, IPC read with

113B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should

be careful during conduction of trial.

vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record

the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and

cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused

as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of

an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a

mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental

principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the

valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it

enables the accused to offer an explanation for the

incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it

imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused

fairly, with care and caution.

vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the

accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the

counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the

inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping in

consideration the peculiarities of Section 304B, IPC read with

Section 113B, Evidence Act.

viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence

for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the

prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers

that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence,

the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion

must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best

efforts.

ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to

be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must

move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’,

calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the

procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an

invaluable right provided to the accused.

x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other

important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In

this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should

not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.

xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the

guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and

imposing appropriate punishment.

xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is

increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that

sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even

though they have no active role in commission of the offence

and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court

need to be cautious in its approach.

37. In light of the above findings, after perusing the relevant

material and the evidence available, we find that the High Court

and Trial Court have not committed any error in convicting the

appellants under Section 304B, IPC as the appellants failed to

discharge the burden under Section 113B, Evidence Act.

However, upon appreciation of facts and circumstances we are

of the opinion that the offence under Section 306, IPC is not

made out. We therefore set aside the conviction and sentence

under Section 306, IPC.

38. Appeals allowed to the above extent. Pending applications, if

any, stand disposed of.

………………………..CJI.

(N.V. RAMANA)

…………………………. J.

(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

NEW DELHI;

MAY 28, 2021

LAW FOR ALL

LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

Wednesday, June 2, 2021

Section 304B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

Wednesday, June 2, 2021

Section 304­B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.

Section 304B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring “otherwise than under normal circumstances” can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.