“13. Primarily, the increase in land prices depends on four factors: situation of the land, nature of development in surrounding area, availability of land for development in the area, and the demand for land in the area. In rural areas, unless there is any prospect of development in the vicinity, increase in prices would be slow, steady and gradual, without any sudden spurts or jumps. On the other hand, in urban or semi-urban areas, where the development is faster, where the demand for land is high and where there is construction activity all around, the escalation in market price is at a much higher rate, as compared to rural areas. In some pockets in big cities, due to rapid development and high demand for land, the escalations in prices have touched even 30% to 50% or more per year, during the nineties. 14. On the other extreme, in remote rural areas where there was no chance of any development and hardly any buyers, the prices stagnated for years or rose marginally at a nominal rate of 1% or 2% per annum. There is thus a significant difference in increases in market value of lands in urban/semi-urban areas and increases in market value of 20 lands in the rural areas. Therefore, if the increase in market value in urban/semi-urban areas is about 10% to 15% per annum, the corresponding increases in rural areas would at best be only around half of it, that is, about 5% to 7.5% per annum. This rule of thumb refers to the general trend in the nineties, to be adopted in the absence of clear and specific evidence relating to increase in prices. Where there are special reasons for applying a higher rate of increase, or any specific evidence relating to the actual increase in prices, then the increase to be applied would depend upon the same.” 14. Guided by the rule of thumb stated in said decision, and even while considering that the lands in the instant case were agricultural in nature and away from the Highway, in our considered view, two aspects detailed hereinabove, definitely weigh in favour of the landholders.

“13. Primarily, the increase in land prices depends on four factors: situation of the land, nature of development in surrounding area, availability of land for development in the area, and the demand for land in the area. In rural areas, unless there is any prospect of development in the vicinity, increase in prices would be slow, steady and gradual, without any sudden spurts or jumps. On the other hand, in urban or semi-urban areas, where the development is faster, where the demand for land is high and where there is construction activity all around, the escalation in market price is at a much higher rate, as compared to rural areas. In some pockets in big cities, due to rapid development and high demand for land, the escalations in prices have touched even 30% to 50% or more per year, during the nineties. 14. On the other extreme, in remote rural areas where there was no chance of any development and hardly any buyers, the prices stagnated for years or rose marginally at a nominal rate of 1% or 2% per annum. There is thus a significant difference in increases in market value of lands in urban/semi-urban areas and increases in market value of 20 lands in the rural areas. Therefore, if the increase in market value in urban/semi-urban areas is about 10% to 15% per annum, the corresponding increases in rural areas would at best be only around half of it, that is, about 5% to 7.5% per annum. This rule of thumb refers to the general trend in the nineties, to be adopted in the absence of clear and specific evidence relating to increase in prices. Where there are special reasons for applying a higher rate of increase, or any specific evidence relating to the actual increase in prices, then the increase to be applied would depend upon the same.” 14. Guided by the rule of thumb stated in said decision, and even while considering that the lands in the instant case were agricultural in nature and away from the Highway, in our considered view, two aspects detailed hereinabove, definitely weigh in favour of the landholders. 

 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1330-1332 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.28052-28054 of 2018)

M/s Acquainted Realtors LLP etc. etc. …Appellant(s)

VERSUS

State of Haryana & Others …Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1333-1335 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 30125-30127 of 2018

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1336-1341 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.30478-30483 of 2018)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1342-1346 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.28643-28647 of 2018)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1347-1355 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.30207-30215 of 2018)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1356-1362 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.30223-30229 of 2018)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1363-1364 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.3213-3214 of 2019)

WITH

 2

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1365-1366 of 2021

( @ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.3264-3265 of 2019)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1367-1372 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No SLP(C) Nos.30217-30222 of 2018)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1373-1375 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.30231-30233 of 2018

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1376-1388 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.3791-3803 of 2019

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1389-1392 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.3476-3479 of 2019

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1393-1400 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.3481-3488 of 2019

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1401 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.5763 of 2019

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1402 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No(s) 5846 of 2021)

(@ Diary No.6357 of 2019)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1403 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No(s) 5847 of 2021)

(@ Diary No.15684 of 2019)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1404 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5848 of 2021)

(@ Diary No.15686 of 2019)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1405 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5849 of 2021)

(@ Diary No.15693 of 2019)

WITH

 3

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1406 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5850 of 2021)

(@ Diary No.15695 of 2019)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1407 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5851 of 2021)

(@ Diary No.15698 of 2019)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1408 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5852 of 2021)

(@ Diary No.15712 of 2019)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1409-1436 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.30821-30848 of 2018)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1501-1502 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.18975-18976 of 2019)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1503-1507 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos.17860-17864 of 2019)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 1437-1500 of 2021

(@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No(s). 5853-5916 of 2021)

(@ Diary No.45577 of 2018)

J U D G M E N T

Uday Umesh Lalit, J.

1. Delay condoned. Leave granted in all matters.

 4

2. These appeals challenge the judgment and order date 01.06.2018

passed by the High Court1

 in RFA No.384 of 2013 (O&M) [Tej Singh and

another v. State of Haryana and others], based on which the individual appeals

were disposed of.

3. The facts leading to the instant appeals, in brief, are as under:-

A) The proceedings for acquisition of lands were initiated vide

Notification dated 27.09.2005 issued under Section 4 of the Act2

 for the

purpose of setting up Industrial Model Township, Phase-VI, Manesar,

Gurgaon for the development of an integrated complex for industrial,

commercial, recreational and other public utilities.

B) The aforesaid Notification was followed by Declaration dated

02.06.2006 issued under Section 6 of the Act. The lands sought to be

acquired, admeasured 465 acres 5 Kanals 7 Marlas, the details of which as

tabulated by the High Court were:-

 “Scheme Villages Area

Kanal Marla

Transport Hub Bas Khusla 427 15

Bas Huria 177 8

Dhana 961 13

Kasan 458 10

Bas Lambi 829 18

Transport HubII

Dhana 509 7

Kasan 360 16”

1

 The High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh

2

 The Land Acquisition Act, 1894

 5

C) By Awards dated 24.01.2007, the Land Acquisition Collector assessed

the market value of the lands at the rate of Rs.12.50 lakhs per acre.

D) References initiated at the instance of land-holders were discussed by

the High Court in its decision under challenge as follows:

“Different reference courts at Gurugram dealt with the matter at

different points of time and the first award in question was dated

18.12.2010, pertaining to Village Dhana, wherein a sum of

Rs.46,07,890/- per acre was awarded as market value of the land

while deciding 2 reference petitions, which is subject matter of

RFA No.2453 of 2011 titled HSIIDC v. Ram Niwas and others.

Similarly, on 04.09.2012, 26 reference petitions were decided for

the said village, awarding the same amount of compensation,

which is subject matter of RFA No.384 of 2013 titled Tej Singh

v. State of Haryana and others. On 04.12.2012, another award

was passed for the said village, wherein also, same amount of

compensation was given, which is subject matter of RFA

No.2874 of 2013 titled Marwan and others v. State of Haryana

and others and which was followed by another award dated

22.03.2013, which is subject matter in RFA No.402 of 2016

titled Sunita Devi v. State of Haryana and others. On

09.05.2013, another award was passed wherein also, same

amount of compensation was granted, which is subject matter of

RFA No.6369 of 2013 titled Ranbir Singh v. State of Haryana.

However, vide award dated 07.10.2013, Reference Court

granted a sum of Rs.50,70,359/- which is subject matter of RFA

No.7913 of 2013 titled M/s Asylum Estate Pvt. Ltd. v. State of

Haryana and others, whereas vide award dated 23.11.2013,

which is subject matter of RFA No.2091 of 2014 titled Siri

Chand and others v. State of Haryana and others, a sum of

Rs.46,07,890/- which had been granted earlier, was maintained.

Another award was passed on 17.03.2015, which is subject

matter in RFA No.3743 of 2015 titled Udey Singh and others v.

State of Haryana and others for village Dhana wherein also

Rs.46,07,890/- was awarded.

For Village Kasan, vide award dated 03.10.2012, which is

subject matter of RFA No.2086 of 2013 titled Lal Singh v. State

 6

of Haryana and others, a sum of Rs.50,70,359/- was awarded

while deciding 24 reference petitions.

For land falling in Village Bas Huria, vide award dated

09.11.2011, which is subject matter of RFA No.3426 of 2014

titled Sarup and another v. State of Haryana and others, a sum of

Rs.46,07,890/- was granted. Reference Court vide award dated

10.11.2012, in RFA No.1971 of 2013 titled Sohan Lal and others

v. State of Haryana and others, has also granted same

compensation. Vide another award dated 29.04.2013, for Village

Bas Huria, which is subject matter of RFA No.7119 of 2013

titled HSIIDC and others v. Chunni Lal and others, same amount

of compensation was assessed. Thereafter, vide award passed on

01.09.2015, Reference Court, which is subject matter in RFA

No.16 of 2016 titled Jai Pal Singh and others v. State of Haryana

and others, fixed the compensation at the same amount.

Another Reference Court on 10.11.2012, while deciding 32

reference petitions, for Village Bas Lambi, which is subject

matter of RFA No.958 of 2013 titlted Balbir v. State of Haryana

and others, granted compensation of Rs.46,07,890/- whereby 829

kanals, 18 marlas of land was acquired.

For village Bas Khusla, while deciding 54 reference

petitions on 28.09.2013, a sum of Rs.68,32,893/- was granted by

applying the cumulative method, which is subject matter of RFA

No.4004 of 2014 titled HSIIDC v. Amar Pal and others.

Similarly, RFA No.4424 of 2015 titled Ishwar @ State of

Haryana and others, deals with award dated 01.10.2014 wherein

also, Rs.68,32,893/- was granted.

While assessing the market value, vide award dated

18.12.20110, for village Dhana, for the first time, the Reference

Court kept in mind compensation awarded in HSIIDC v. Pran

Sukh (2010) 11 SCC 175 whereby a sum of Rs.20 lacs has been

awarded as compensation for the notification dated 15.11.1994,

for setting up the Industrial Model Township, Phase-I, Manesar.

It was further noticed that for notification dated 07.03.2002 of

Village Dhana, besides land of Village Kasan, Bas Kusla, Bas

Huria, which was also for the development of Phase-III, one

Reference Court had awarded a sum of Rs.28,15,849/- by giving

increase of 12% on Rs.15 lacs, as had been assessed by this

Court. Since the Apex Court had enhanced the value @ Rs.20

 7

lacs in Pran Sukh’s case (supra), the same was relied upon by

granting 12% increase for the time-gap of 10 years, 10 months

and 12 days between the 2 notifications dated 15.11.1994 and the

one in question dated 27.09.2005, to assess the market value of

Rs.46,07,890/-. The apportionment claimed, as such, was also

decided in favour of the claimants and the claim of Gram

Panchayat was denied.

However, for the same Village Dhana, vide award dated

07.10.2013, another Reference Court relied upon the award

dated 03.10.2012 for Village Kasan, which is subject matter of

RFA No.2086 of 2013, to grant higher compensation of

Rs.50,70,359/-, on the ground that it was pertaining to the same

notification and the public purpose was the same, i.e., for

completing the infrastructural facilities and other public utilities

such as roads, water supply, sewerage, electrification etc.

Thus, it is apparent that for the same acquisition,

Rs.46,07,890/- and Rs.50,70,359/- have been awarded for

Village Dhana and similarly, for Village Kasan also,

Rs.50,70,359/- has been awarded. However, Village Bas Khusla,

Rs.68,32,893/- was awarded, without the Reference Court

having, in any manner, recorded a finding, as such, that the lands

situated in those villages were superior or were better placed and

without making any reference to the site-plans in question.”

E) For facility, the brief details of the orders in References and the

amounts awarded as compensation are tabulated:-

“Sr.

No.

Date Amount as compensation

per acre (in Lacs)

Re: Village Dhana

1 18.12.2010 46.07

2 04.09.2012 46.07

3 04.12.2012 46.07

4 22.03.2013 46.07

5 09.05.2013 46.07

6 07.10.2013 50.70

7 23.11.2013 46.07

8 17.03.2015 46.07

 8

 Re: Village Kasan

9 03.10.2012 50.70

 Re: Village Bas Huria

10 09.11.2011 46.07

11 10.11.2012 46.07

12 29.04.2013 46.07

13 01.09.2015 46.07

 Re: Vilage Bas Lambi

14 10.11.2012 46.07

 Re: Village Bas Kusla

15 28.09.2013 68.32

16 01.10.2014 68.32”

Thus, except for cases at serial Nos.6,9,15 and 16, the market value

was consistently fixed at Rs.46.07 lakhs per acre.

F) The acquiring body, namely, HSIIDC3

 as well as land-holders

approached the High Court by filing 114 Appeals and 19 cross Objections.

The High Court framed the following questions for consideration:

“(i) Whether cumulative increase was liable to be granted on the basis

of an Award for the notification dated 15.11.1994 for the acquisition

dated 27.09.2005 where there was a gap of 10 years and 10 months

between two notifications and whether the Awards are sustainable on

that account;

(i) Whether the sale deed dated 16.08.2004 in favour of M/s

Conway Developers Ltd., which was subject matter of consideration

in a bunch of appeals lead case in which was RFA No.3381 of 2013

‘HSIIDC v. Roshan Lal and others’ decided on 25.05.2018 are liable

to be taken into consideration pertaining to village Naurangpur which

was for Phase-V of the IMT Manesar, whereas the present acquisition

is for the Transport Hub, which is Phase-IV of the IMT Manesar.

3 Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Development Corporation 

 9

(ii) What is the relevant market value of the land situated in

Villages Dhana, Kasan, Bas Huria, Bas Khulsa and Bas Lambi as on

the date of Section 4 notification dated 27.09.2005.”

 Relying on the decision in General Manager, Oil and Natural Gas

Corporation Limited v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel and another4

 the High

Court answered the first question against the land-holders. While dealing

with the evidence on record the High Court relied upon its decision rendered

on 25.05.2018 in HSIIDC v. Roshan Lal and others. It was found in that

case that sale deed dated 17.08.2003 [Ext.P-13] was the most appropriate sale

instance, based on which valuation at Rs.48,46,000/- per acre was arrived at

for lands from Villages Naurangpur and Lakhnoula falling on the National

Highway whereas the lands falling inside and away from the Highway were

subjected to a cut of 10% and the market value for lands falling in the villages

Shikohpur, Nawada Fatehpur and Naharpur Kasan was arrived at

Rs.43,61,400/- per acre.

 Finding that the lands in the instant case were comparable with the

lands from Villages Shikohpur, Nawada Fatehpur and Naharpur Kasan, the

High Court fixed market value in respect of the lands concerning present

acquisition at Rs.43,61,400/-. The relevant discussion was as under:-

“50. The argument raised by Mr. Shailender Jain, Sr. Advocate

that the sale deed dated 16.08.2004, in favour of M/s Conway

4

 (2008) 14 SCC 745

 10

Developers Pvt. Ltd. which fall in Village Naurangpur, wherein

land was sold for Rs.57,60,000/- per acre should be the relevant

sale exemplar and should be taken into consideration to fix the

market value of the present 5 villages, though attractive at the

first blush, but is not liable to be accepted. While deciding the

cases of adjoining village, i.e. Naurangpur, Shikohpur, Nawada

Fatehpur, Naharpur Kasan and Lakhnoula, wherein land had

been acquired for Phase-II of the Industrial Model township, for

industrial, commercial, recreational and other public utilities, the

said sale deed had been taken into consideration for the

notification dated 17.09.2004 in RFA No.3381 of 2013 – HSIDC

now HSIIDC v. Roshan Lal and others, decided on 25.05.2018.

The market value of the 2 villages, namely, Lakhnoula and

Naurangpur has been assessed at Rs.48,46,000/- since they were

falling on the Highway for the notification dated 17.09.2004.

The land falling in the interior and away from the Highway, in

Villages Naharpur Kasan, Nawada Fatehpur and Shikohpur were

given Rs.43,61,400/- per acre. Even in the said case, it was

noticed that the location of the said sale deed had not been

brought on record on the siteplans and from the evidence, it

would be clear that it was falling on the main road on the

National Highway No.8 and abutting the same and was in favour

of a Developer. Accordingly, the sale deed was taken into

consideration for assessing the market value of the said villges,

especially Naurangpur and Lakhnoula, as such, which were

abutting the main highway also, as per the site-plan in question.

The market value, as such was found that it was hovering around

Rs.57 lacs, as such. However on the basis of sake deed dated

17.08.2003 (Ext.P13), in the said set of cases, whereby land

measuring 8 kanals 8 marlas wa sold in favour of M/s Reliance

Industries Ltd. in Village Lakhnoula with the frontage of 75.8

meters on the National Highway No.8 on its southern side, as

per the description given in the site plan, the value was , thus,

worked out at Rs.50,90,238/- per acre by granting 12%

enhancement Rs.6,10,828/-, keeping in view the development

which was taking place in the said area. The per acre value had

thus worked out at Rs.57,01,066/- and thereafter, 15% cut had

been applied to assess the market value at Rs.48,45,907/-

(rounded of to Rs.48,46,000/-) for the land falling on the

highway for Village Naurangpur and Lakhnoula. The lands

falling inside and away from the Highway were assessed by

granting another 10% cut and accordingly, for land falling in

 11

Village Shikohpur, Nawada Fatehpur and Naharpur Kasan, the

amount was further reduced to Rs.43,61,400/-.

51. The pleadings and evidence have already been discussed in

detail in the above paras and it is amply clear that the land in

question is located at a considerable distance ranging from 7 to

10 kms from National Highway aNo.8 and therefore, cannot be

granted the benefits of the land which is abutting the Highway

and closure to the main town of Gurgaon since Naurangpur is

situated ahead of Manesar towards Gurgaon. The argument that

the market value of the land adjoining villages could also be

taken into consideration while assessing the market value, would

not apply in the present case, as a perusal of the site plans would

go on to show that there are several revenue estates between the

lands which have been acquired of he 5 villages and village

Naurangpur. The site plan (Ext.P222 and Ext.R1, in RFA

No.384 of 2013 – Tej Singh’s case) would show that the land is

on the fag end of the development which is taking place on the

Highway and away from the National Highway. Village

Naharpur Kasan, Lakhnoula and Maneswar’s revenue estates

would come in between the lands of the acquired villags. The

distance though pleaded in several cases that it was close to the

National Highway No.8, has been clarified time and again by the

appellant-Corporation that it is ranging between 7-10 kms from

the National Highway. In such circumstances the sale deed in

favour of M/s Conway Developers

Pvt. Ltd. could not be safe exemplar for fixing the market value

and, therefore, the said judgment is rejected.

52. The issue of assessing the market value would, thus,

necessarily have to be on the basis of a closer sale deeds of the

villages in question or of the adjoining villages. As noticed

earlier, in RFA No.3381 of 2013 titled HSIDC now HSIIDC v.

Roshan Lal and others, the sale deed in favour of M/s Reliance

Industries was kept in mind for assessing the market value which

fell in the revenue estate of Village Lakhnoula. The land

acquired in Village Naharpur Kasan, market value was

accordingly, fixed at Rs.43,61,400/- after giving the necessary

cut. The said award, as such, can be treated as relevant piece of

evidence to assess the market value of he acquired land also

since Naharpur Kasan is the adjoining village. The difference

between the two notifications in question was for a period of one

 12

year as the earlier notification was dated 17.09.2004 whereas the

present notification is dated 27.09.2005. It has already been

noticed on an earlier occasion in Maqdan Pal-III (supra) that

major developments was taking place in the area in the form of

industry being encouraged and the big names had already come

in like Maruti Suzuki Ltd. The 10% increase, thus, can be

safely granted which would enhance the market value to

Rs.47,96,540/- per acre. However, the said benefit, as such, is

also not liable to be granted, keeping in view the location of the

land which is deeper inside and would not fetch the same value

though a period of one year might have gone by which the

subsequent Section 4 notification had been issued. Accordingly,

this Court is of the opinion that the market value for the lands of

the 5 villages in question, namely, Dhana, Kasan, Bas Huria, Bas

Lambi and Bas Khusla is liable to be assessed at the same

amount as what was granted to Naharpur Kasan, @

Rs.43,61,400/- per acre along with situatory benefits.”

Going by the location, the High Court found that the lands involved in

the instant acquisition were identical to the lands from Villages Shikohpur,

Nawada Fatehabad and Naharpur Kasan. It relied on site plan Ext.P22. It

also considered the difference of about a year between two notifications i.e. to

say the notification dated 17.09.2004 under Section 4 of the Act in the earlier

case and notification dated 27.09.2005 in the present case. It was observed

that logically 10% increase could safely be granted. However, considering

the location of the lands and being satisfied that there would not be any

difference in the value despite lapse of a year, it assessed the market value for

the lands in question at Rs.43,61,400/- per acre. 

 13

The appeals preferred by HSIIDC3

 were thus allowed while the

challenge raised by the landholders was rejected.

4. Being aggrieved, these appeals have been preferred by the

landholders. No appeal has been preferred by the State or the Acquiring Body

and thus, the scope of instant appeals is limited to consider whether the

landholders are entitled to any enhancement in compensation.

5. It was submitted on behalf of the land holders: -

(a) The lands in the instant appeals abutted the Kundli-ManesarPalwal Expressway, in respect of which notification under Section 4

of the Act was issued on 11.01.2005 i.e. even prior to the initiation of

acquisition in the instant case. The lands in the instant case, therefore,

had huge potential;

(b) Sale deed dated 28.04.2004 (Ext.P27 in the instant case) was

wrongly rejected by the High Court. This sale deed pertained to an

extent of 12 acres of land which was sold at the rate of Rs.1.13 crores

per acre;

(c) Even post acquisition sale deeds, namely, Ext.P11 to P14 and

P28 to P30 were erroneously rejected by the High Court and the

compensation for the lands in the instant case could easily have been

 14

arrived at by applying de-escalation on the post-acquisition sale

deeds; and

(d) Going by the valuation arrived at by this Court in Wazir and

another v. State of Haryana5

, cumulative annual increase at 12% per

annum could appropriately have been granted.

6. It was submitted on behalf of the State inter alia that the High Court

was right in relying upon Sale Deed dated 17.08.2003 to arrive at the

valuation in respect of villages Shikohpur, Nawada Fatehpur and Naharpur

Kasan and thereafter adopting same valuation for the lands involved in the

instant case.

7. It must be stated here at the outset that in respect of Phases II, III and

IV of the Industrial Model Township, Manesar, Gurgaon, acquisition

proceedings were initiated with regard to lands falling in villages Naharpur

Kasan, Kasan, Bas Kusla, Bas Haria, Dhana and Manesar by issuing

Notifications dated 06.03.2002, 07.03.2002 and 26.02.2002 under Section 4

of the Act. The High Court vide its decision dated 09.03.2018 in Madan Pal

III vs. State of Haryana6

 assessed the market value in respect of lands from

villages Naharpur Kasan, Kasan, Bas Kusla, Bas Haria, and Dhana (covered

5

 (2019) 13 SCC 101

6 2018 SCC Online P & H 2871

 15

by Phases II and III) at Rs.41.40 lakhs per acre; while compensation for lands

from village Manesar (covered by Phase IV) was assessed at Rs.62.10 lakhs

per acre. The appeals arising therefrom were decided by this Court vide its

Judgment dated 11.01.20197

 as modified by Order dated 08.02.20198

 in Civil

Appeal Nos.264-270 of 2019 and other connected matters (Wazir and

Another vs. State of Haryana5

) i.e., after the decision of the High Court

which is presently under appeal. The relevant operative directions issued by

this Court were:-

“32. In the circumstances, we direct:

32.1 In respect of lands under acquisition from Villages

Naharpur Kasan and Kasan the market value shall be

Rs.39,54,666 per acre. Additionally, all statutory benefits

would be payable.

32.2 In respect of lands under acquisition from Villages

Bas Kusla, Bas Haria and Dhana the market value shall be

Rs.29,77,333 per acre. Additionally, all statutory benefits

would be payable.

32.3 In respect of lands from Village Manesar the

market value shall be Rs.59,31,999 lakhs per acre.

Additionally, all statutory benefits would be payable.”

Pertinently, the decision of the High Court in HSIIDC v. Roshan Lal

and others, which was the basis of the decision in the present matters, had in

turn relied upon the assessment made by the High Court in its earlier decision

7

(2019) 13 SCC 101

8

(2019) 13 SCC 123

 16

dated 09.03.2018 in Madan Pal III v. State of Haryana6

. Since the

assessment in Madan Pal III vs. State of Haryana6 was scaled down by this

Court in Wazir and Another vs. State of Haryana5

, theoretically, the market

value arrived at by the High Court in HSIIDC v. Roshan Lal and others

would be on the higher side.

8. We, however proceed to consider the material on record to see

whether the landholders are right in their contentions and are entitled to

enhanced compensation.

9. Sale Deed dated 28.04.2004 (Exhibit P-27 in the instant case) was

considered by the High Court as under:-

“The sale deed dated 28.04.2004 by M/s Gillette India

whereby land measuring 12.08125 acres was sold in

Naharpur Kasan which is developed portion of the village

with a industrial unit running on it, which would be clear

from Schedule-II and therefore, the value of the said sale

deed in favour of Lotto Finance & Investment for a sum of

Rs.13.62 crores, would not be correct exemplar, which

could be taken into consideration to assess the market

value.”

Schedule II to the Sale Deed shows that apart from the land described

in Schedule I, constructed area, machinery including canteen, kitchen, offices,

7 air handling units, air colling units, centrifugal chillers of 400 tons each,

 17

LAN networking with extensive cabling, fire fighting implements also formed

part of the price.

This document was therefore rightly ruled out.

10. Post-acquisition sale deeds have, at times, been relied upon by Courts.

But in a case where pre-acquisition sale instances are otherwise found to be

adequate and appropriate, post-acquisition instances, by themselves, cannot

outweigh and discard such pre-acquisition sale instances. The pre-acquisition

pointer in the form of Sale Deed dated 17.08.2003 in favour of Reliance

Industries Limited with adequate frontage on National Highway was rightly

found to be appropriate. No fault can be found with such exercise.

11. While answering question No.1 against the landholders, the High

Court relied upon following observations in the decision in ONGC Ltd.4

“15. Normally, recourse is taken to the mode of

determining the market value by providing appropriate

escalation over the proved market value of nearby lands in

previous years (as evidenced by sale transactions or

acquisitions), where there is no evidence of any

contemporaneous sale transactions or acquisitions of

comparable lands in the neighbourhood. The said method is

reasonably safe where the relied-on sale

transactions/acquisitions precede the subject acquisition by

only a few years, that is, up to four to five years. Beyond

that it may be unsafe, even if it relates to a neighbouring

land. What may be a reliable standard if the gap is of only a

few years, may become unsafe and unreliable standard

where the gap is larger. For example, for determining the

market value of a land acquired in 1992, adopting the

annual increase method with reference to a sale or

acquisition in 1970 or 1980 may have many pitfalls. This is

because, over the course of years, the “rate” of annual

 18

increase may itself undergo drastic change apart from the

likelihood of occurrence of varying periods of stagnation in

prices or sudden spurts in prices affecting the very standard

of increase.”

Wazir and another vs. State of Haryana5

had considered the value by

annual increase as one of the alternatives. Secondly, the rate adopted in that

case was only 8%. The valuation in Wazir and another vs. State of

Haryana5

, by itself, cannot therefore be taken as the basis in preference to

what could possibly be concluded on the basis of Sale Deeds on record. The

submission therefore does not merit acceptance.

12. However, two aspects of the matter are quite striking and distinguish

the instant acquisition from the one that was under consideration in HSIIDC

vs. Roshan Lal and others.

A) The notification for acquiring the lands for Kondli Manesar

Palwal Expressway was issued prior in point of time. It is true that

according to the record, except for certain exits, the Expressway

would otherwise be unapproachable as stated by PW3 Ranbir Singh

Yadav, Assistant Manager, HSIIDC. However, a dimension

distinguishing the instant case certainly got added in that, even if there

was to be no direct approach to the acquired lands from the

Expressway, in terms of potential, the lands in the instant case

definitely got closer to development. 

 19

B) Secondly, the acquisition in the case of HSIIDC vs. Roshan

Lal and others was a year before the present acquisition. If the lands

in both cases were otherwise identical in material terms, the valuation

found with respect to the former in the year 2004, must have

undergone some upward change when the valuation of the latter set of

lands is to be considered for the year 2005.

13. The High Court was right to a certain extent that there was nothing on

record to indicate such upward movement. At this stage, we may refer to the

principles laid down by this Court in ONGC Ltd.4

:-

“13. Primarily, the increase in land prices depends on four

factors: situation of the land, nature of development in

surrounding area, availability of land for development in

the area, and the demand for land in the area. In rural areas,

unless there is any prospect of development in the vicinity,

increase in prices would be slow, steady and gradual,

without any sudden spurts or jumps. On the other hand, in

urban or semi-urban areas, where the development is faster,

where the demand for land is high and where there is

construction activity all around, the escalation in market

price is at a much higher rate, as compared to rural areas. In

some pockets in big cities, due to rapid development and

high demand for land, the escalations in prices have

touched even 30% to 50% or more per year, during the

nineties.

14. On the other extreme, in remote rural areas where there

was no chance of any development and hardly any buyers,

the prices stagnated for years or rose marginally at a

nominal rate of 1% or 2% per annum. There is thus a

significant difference in increases in market value of lands

in urban/semi-urban areas and increases in market value of

 20

lands in the rural areas. Therefore, if the increase in market

value in urban/semi-urban areas is about 10% to 15% per

annum, the corresponding increases in rural areas would at

best be only around half of it, that is, about 5% to 7.5% per

annum. This rule of thumb refers to the general trend in the

nineties, to be adopted in the absence of clear and specific

evidence relating to increase in prices. Where there are

special reasons for applying a higher rate of increase, or

any specific evidence relating to the actual increase in

prices, then the increase to be applied would depend upon

the same.”

14. Guided by the rule of thumb stated in said decision, and even while

considering that the lands in the instant case were agricultural in nature and

away from the Highway, in our considered view, two aspects detailed

hereinabove, definitely weigh in favour of the landholders. At the same time,

it cannot be ignored that the values arrived at in HSIIDC vs. Roshan Lal and

others (in the light of subsequent decision in Wazir and another vs. State of

Haryana5

) were themselves on the higher side. Although, the decision in

HSIIDC vs. Roshan Lal and others was not challenged by the State, the fact

remains that the values assessed is that decision were theoretically on a higher

scale and the landholders, on that score, have received an advantage.

15. In the totality of circumstances, in our view, the landholders must be

held entitled to 8% flat increase over the market value assessed in HSIIDC

vs. Roshan Lal and others. in respect of lands from villages which were

found to be comparable. The landholders must therefore get enhancement to

 21

the tune of 8% over Rs.43,61,400 per acre that is to say Rs.47,10,312 per acre

(rounded of to Rs.47,10,500 per acre). Needless to say that they shall also be

entitled to all the statutory benefits.

16. These appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above, without any

order as to costs.

………..…..……..……J.

 (Uday Umesh Lalit)

 ..………….……………J.

 (Vineet Saran)

New Delhi;

April 08, 2021

We, therefore, allow the instant applications and direct:- a) The amount of compensation fixed at Rs.29,77,333/- per acre in respect of lands from the concerned villages as held in the Judgment in Wazir vs. State of Haryana2 remains unchanged. 16 b) As the compensation at the rate of Rs.37,40,000/- per acre has been received by the landholders from the concerned villages in the circumstances stated hereinabove, such landholders need not return the amounts over and above what has been found due to them. c) To the extent as indicated above, direction (e) in the Judgment in Wazir vs. State of Haryana2 , stands modified. d) The subsequent allotees of the lands in question will not be entitled to maintain any action for refund only on account of Orders passed in these proceedings.

We, therefore, allow the instant applications and direct:- a) The amount of compensation fixed at Rs.29,77,333/- per acre in respect of lands from the concerned villages as held in the Judgment in Wazir vs. State of Haryana2 remains unchanged. 16 b) As the compensation at the rate of Rs.37,40,000/- per acre has been received by the landholders from the concerned villages in the circumstances stated hereinabove, such landholders need not return the amounts over and above what has been found due to them. c) To the extent as indicated above, direction (e) in the Judgment in Wazir vs. State of Haryana2 , stands modified. d) The subsequent allotees of the lands in question will not be entitled to maintain any action for refund only on account of Orders passed in these proceedings. 

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NOS. 926-930 OF 2019

IN

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.363, 388, 413, 475 & 485 OF 2019

(ARISING OUT OF CIVIL APPEAL NOS.343-592 OF 2019)

HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL AND

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPEMNT …APPLICANT(S)/

CORPORATION LIMITED & ORS. PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

RAMESHWAR DASS (DEAD) & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

IA No.118262 of 2019 in

SLP (C) Nos.22234 -22241 of 2018

O R D E R

Uday Umesh Lalit, J.

1. Miscellaneous Application Nos.926-930 of 2019 and I.A.

No.118262 of 2019 are preferred by landholders from villages Bas Khusla, 

2

Bas Haria and Dhana (‘the concerned villages’, for short) seeking

clarification with regard to the Judgment1 passed by this Court in Civil

Appeal Nos.264 – 270 of 2019 and other connected matters (Wazir vs.

State of Haryana2

).

2. The facts leading to the aforesaid Judgment have been set out in

sufficient detail in the Judgment and for the purposes of these applications,

the relevant facts are: -

A) In respect of acquisition initiated pursuant to notifications dated

06.03.2002, 07.03.2002 and 26.02.2002 issued under Section 4 of the Act3

with regard to Phases II, III and IV respectively of Industrial Model

Township, Manesar, Gurgaon, corresponding awards were made by the

Sub-Divisional Officer (C)-cum-Land Acquisition Collector, Gurgaon on

22.07.2003, 24.12.2003 and 20.05.2004.

B) While dealing with the References preferred under Section 18 of

the Act, by orders dated 16.12.2009 and 27.01.2010 compensation in

respect of lands covered under Phases II and III respectively was assessed

at Rs.28,15,356/- per acre and Rs.28,15,849/- per acre respectively.

1

 Dated 11.01.2019 as modified by Order dated 08.02.2019.

2

(2019) 13 SCC 101

3

 The Land Acquisition Act, 1894

3

C) By order dated 17.08.2010 passed in Haryana State Industrial

Development Corporation vs. Pran Sukh & Ors.4

, in relation to

acquisition of some other lands from villages Manesar, Naharpur Kasan,

Khoh and Kasan, this Court assessed the compensation at the rate of Rs.20

lakhs per acre. In that case the notification under Section 4 of the Act was

issued on 15.11.1994.

D) Relying on the decision of this Court in Pran Sukh4

, the Reference

Court by order dated 30.11.2010 assessed the compensation at

Rs.37,40,230/- per acre in respect of land from Phase IV in the instant

acquisition.

E) The matters concerning acquisition for Phases II and III of the

instant case, were considered by the High Court in RFA No.2373 of 2010

(Madan Pal vs. State of Haryana) and the landholders were held entitled

to the compensation at the rate of Rs.37,40,000/- per acre along with other

statutory benefits. This decision of the High Court was subject matter of

challenge in this Court at the instance of HSIDC5 and some landowners.

While issuing notices by its order dated 10.08.2011, this Court directed: -

4

 (2010) 11 SCC 175

5 Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. now Haryana State Industrial

and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd. 

4

“The Haryana State Industrial Development Corporation

shall, within four months from today, deposit the amount of

compensation at the rate of Rs.28,15,356/- per acre along

with other statutory benefits in terms of judgment dated

27.1.2010 of Additional District Judge, Gurgaon.

With a view to obviate intervention of middle man in the

matter of payment of compensation to the land owners we

direct that:

1. The Land Acquisition Collector shall depute an

officer not below the rank of Tehsildar of the area, who

shall contact the landowners and/or legal representatives

and apprise them about their entitlement to receive

compensation determined by the Reference Court.

2. The concerned officials shall also ask the landowners

and/ or legal representatives to open bank accounts if

they have already not done so. This exercise must be

completed within one month from the date of receipt of

copy of this order.

3. The concerned Tehsildar shall give the list of

landowners and/or their legal representatives along with

their bank account numbers to the Land Acquisition

Collector within fifteen days.

4. Within next fifteen days, the Land Acquisition

Collector shall deposit the amount of compensation in

the accounts of the landowners and/or legal

representatives. Fifty per cent of this amount be

deposited in the form of Fixed Deposit Receipt, the

validity of which shall be one year in the first instance.”

F) As there was no compliance of the aforesaid directions, Contempt

Petition (Civil) Nos.70-75 of 2012 and other connected petitions were

preferred. While dealing with the Contempt Petitions, this Court in its

Order dated 07.05.2012 observed:-

“We have heard Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior

counsel appearing for the applicants and Shri Gopal 

5

Subramanium, learned senior counsel appearing for the

respondents and perused the record.

In our view, the explanation given by the respondents for

non-compliance of the directions contained in order dated

10.08.2011 is not satisfactory. However, we accept the oral

request made by learned senior counsel appearing on their

behalf and grant them six weeks further time to deposit the

amount in terms of order dated 10.08.2011.”

Thereafter, the Contempt Petitions were disposed of on 05.09.2012

after recording:-

“Shri H.P. Raval, learned Additional Solicitor General

appearing for the non petitioners, invited our attention to

affidavit dated 18.7.2012 of non petitioner no.1.

Shri Jasbir Malik, learned counsel for the petitioners, fairly

admitted that his clients have received fifty per cent amount

in terms of the directions given by the Court and remaining

fifty per cent has been deposited in the fixed deposits.

In view of the above development, the contempt petitions

are disposed of as infructuous.”

G) The appeals from the decision of the High Court were finally

disposed of by this Court by its decision dated 02.07.2013 (Haryana State

Industrial Development Corporation Limited vs. UDAL and Others

6

).

This Court found that the High Court had erred in granting annual increase

at a flat rate of 12 % over the compensation determined by this Court in

Pran Sukh4

and that it had not considered Ex. PW9/A dated 23.11.1999.

This Court, therefore, remitted the matters to the High Court for fresh

6

 (2013) 14 SCC 506

6

consideration without being influenced by any observations made by this

Court. The relevant paragraphs from the decision were as under:-

“33. In view of the above conclusions, we do not consider

it necessary to deal with the other points argued by the

learned counsel for the parties/intervenors and feel that the

ends of justice will be served by setting aside the impugned

judgment and remitting the matters to the High Court for

fresh disposal of the appeals and cross-objections filed by

the parties subject to the rider that the State

Government/HSIIDC shall pay the balance of Rs 37,40,000

to the landowners along with other statutory benefits.

34. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned

judgment1

is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High

Court for fresh disposal of the appeals filed by the parties

under Section 54 of the Act as also the cross-objections.

The parties shall be free to urge all points in support of

their respective cause and the High Court shall decide the

matter uninfluenced by the observations contained in this

judgment.

… … …

36. The State Government/HSIIDC shall pay the balance of

compensation determined by the High Court i.e. Rs

37,40,000−Rs 28,15,356 = Rs 9,24,644 per acre to the

landowners and/or their legal representatives along with all

statutory benefits within a period of four months from

today. The payment shall be made to the landowners and/or

their legal representatives by following the procedure laid

down in the interim orders passed by this Court.”

7

H) Post remand, the matters were dealt with by the High Court by its

decision dated 06.10.2015 (Madan Pal (II) vs. State of Haryana7

and

other connected matters). The High Court was of the view that the

beneficiaies of acquisition, such as Maruti Suzuki India Limited ought to

have been given a chance to place relevant material before the Court. It,

therefore, remitted the matters back to the Reference Court for fresh

disposal giving liberty to all the concerned parties to produce relevant

evidence in support of their submissions.

I) The ruling of the High Court was not accepted by this Court and in

its decision in Satish Kumar Gupta and Others Vs. State of Haryana and

Others8

, this Court held that the post-acquisition allottees could not be

treated as a necessary or proper party for determining matters concerning

compensation. It, therefore, set aside the view taken by the High Court in

Madan Pal (II)7

and remanded the matters back to the High Court for a

fresh decision.

J) Consequently, by its decision in Madan Pal (III) vs. State of

Haryana and Another etc.

9

the High Court assessed the compensation in

respect of lands from all the villages at Rs.41.40 lakhs per acre which

7

2015 SCC OnLine P&H 20321

8

 (2017) 4 SCC 760

9

2018 SCC OnLine P&H 2871

8

decision was subject matter of challenge before this Court; and by the

Judgment in Civil Appeal Nos.264-270 of 2019 and other connected

matters (Wazir vs. State of Haryana2

) this Court concluded: -

“32. In the circumstances, we direct:

a) In respect of lands under acquisition from villages

Naharpur Kasan and Kasan, the market value shall be

Rs.39,54,666/- per acre. Additionally, all statutory benefits

would be payable.

b) In respect of lands under acquisition from Villages Bas

Kusla, Bas Haria and Dhana, the market value shall be

Rs.29,77,333/- per acre. Additionally, all statutory benefits

would be payable.

c) In respect of lands from village Manesar the market

value shall be Rs.59,31,999/- per acre. Additionally, all

statutory benefits would be payable.

d) M/s. Kohli Holdings Private Limited shall not be entitled

to any severance charges.

e) If any sum in excess of what has been found in this

Judgment to be the entitlement of any landowner from any

of the villages under acquisition was made over to him, the

same shall be returned by the landowner to the State by

30th June, 2019. If the excess sum is returned by 30th June,

2019, no interest on said sum shall be payable by the

landowner. However, if the sum is not returned by said

date, the said sum shall carry interest @ 9% per annum

from 1st July, 2019 till realisation and can be realised in a

manner known to law.”

3. The compensation in respect of lands from the concerned villages

was thus assessed at Rs.29,77,333/- per acre.

4. This has led to the filing of instant applications, submitting inter

alia:-

9

a) The lands coming from all the villages were always considered by

the Reference Court and the High Court without any inter se distinction

between two sets of villages.

b) Paragraph 36 of the decision in HSIDC vs. UDAL6 contemplated

award of compensation at the minimum rate of Rs.37,40,000/- per acre.

c) After the decision of this Court in HSIDC vs. UDAL6 the only issue

was to consider whether landholders were entitled to increased

compensation and that there could not be any decrease in the rate of

compensation.

d) In view of Orders dated 10.08.2011, 07.05.2012 and 05.09.2012 all

the landholders had received compensation at the rate of Rs.28,15,356/-

per acre with other statutory benefits. Moreover, in terms of paragraph 36

of the decision of this Court in HSIDC vs. UDAL6

, additional compensation

at the rate of Rs.9,24,644/- per acre was also received by the landholders.

e) The landholders spent all the compensation money that they

received and it would be impossible for them to pay the difference as

directed by this Court in terms of the Judgment in Wazir vs. State of

Haryana2

.

f) The burden of additional compensation paid to the landholders in

terms of the paragraph 36 of the decision in HSIDC vs. UDAL6

, was passed 

10

on by the authorities and recovered from the subsequent allottees of the

land.

5. After considering rival submissions, this Court framed some

questions with respect to which response from HSIIDC was called for,

which response was to the following effect: -

“Query (a) What is the extent of land from three

villages for which the compensation has

been determined @ Rs.29,77,333/- per

acre by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Ans. The extent of land covered from three

villages i.e. Bas Haria, Bas Khusla and

Dhana is 980.70625 acres.

Sr. No. Name of village Area of land

acquired (in acres)

1 Bas Haria 133.88125

2 Bas Khusla 435.50625

3 Dhana 411.31875

Total 980.70625

Query (b) How much compensation was paid to

each of the individual landholders

coming from these three villages.

(Rs. In Crores)

Ans. (i) Paid enhanced

compensation to each

of individual

landholder (Area

912.439 acre) Copy

of summary of

enhanced

compensation paid to

the landowners is

annexed herewith

and marked as

Annexure A-1 [Page

749.50

11

no.4 to 130]

(ii) Balance enhanced

compensation

payable out of

912.439 acre of land

is in process and to

be released shortly.

Copy of summary of

enhanced

compensation

payable to the

landowners is

annexed herewith

and marked as

Annexure A-2. [Page

No.131 to 169]

51.17

(ii) Amount pending

decision of ADJ

Court / DRO u/s 30

& 28 (A) of Land

Acquisition Act,

1894 (balance area

68.26725 acres)

Copy of details of

pending payments of

enhanced

compensation is

annexed herewith

and marked as

Annexure A-3. [Page

No.170 to 171.]

124.59

Total 925.26

Query (c) Whether the entire extent of land coming

from these villages has been allotted to

any of the allottees and if so at what rate.

Ans. The entire extent of salable land coming

from these three villages (except 3.75

acre) has been allotted at different stages/

rates and the average weighted selling

rate per sqm. is Rs.2784/-.

Query (d) What was the sum demanded by way of

additional compensation from the allottee

in question after the compensation in 

12

terms of para 36 of judgment in (2013)

14 SCC 506 was made over.

Ans. The sum demanded by way of additional

compensation from the allottees in

question in plots falling in these villages

is Rs.921.41 Crore + proportionate

interest of Rs.135.99 Crore from the date

of payment to the DRO-cum-LAC, till

the date of demand notice of recovery

issued to the allottees after the judgment

in 2013.”

6. In reply to the details submitted by HSIIDC, one of the applicants

has responded as under:-

“5. … In this affidavit in para 2 the HSIIDC has disclosed

that the total land acquired in 3 villages was 980.70625

acres. In para 2 itself in reply to Query (b) the HSIIDC has

disclosed that they paid a sum of Rs.925.26 crores to the

land owners for the said acquisition. Similarly, in the same

para in reply to Query (c) the HSIIDC has disclosed that

the entire extent of saleable land coming from the said 3

villages had been allotted at an average rate of Rs.2784 per

sq.meter. Thus, calculated at the said rate a sum of

Rs.1100.25 crore (i.e. Rs.2784 X 976.95 X 4046). Against

Query (d) the HSIIDC has disclosed that a total sum of

Rs.1057.40 crore (i.e. Rs.921.41 crore + Rs.135.99 crore)

has been collected by it by way of additional compensation

pursuant to para 36 of judgment (2013) 14 SCC 506.

6. It is submitted that as per its own disclosure by

HSIIDC, a sum of Rs.2157.65 crore (i.e. Rs.1100.25 crore

+ Rs.1057.40 crore) has been collected by HSIIDC from

the subsequent allottees and whereas, only a sum of

Rs.925.26 crore has been paid by HSIIDC to the land

owners pursuant to various orders of the hon’ble courts

including para 36 of judgment (2013) 14 SCC 506. Thus,

admittedly a sum of Rs.2157.65 crore has been collected by

HSIIDC for the acquired land from the subsequent

allottees. Thus, as per its own admission, HSIIDC has

earned a profit of Rs.1232.39 crore (Rs.2157.65 crore –

Rs.925.26 crore) from the acquired land in the said 3

villages. 

13

7. In view of the above, it is clear that if the land owners

are not directed to refund the excess amount of

compensation as determined by this Hon’ble Court vide

order dt.11-1-2019 as amended by order dt.8-2-2019, no

prejudice or financial loss will be caused to the HSIIDC,

whereas, if the land owners are directed to refund the

excess amount paid to them they will be driven to misery

and penury as explained in additional affidavit dt.11-12-

2019 filed by one of the applicants.”

7. The submissions that after the decision of this Court in HSIDC vs.

UDAL6

, the only issue pertained to the upward revision in the

compensation payable to the landholders and that there could be no

occasion to scale down the rate of compensation, are not correct.

Paragraph 34 of the decision in HSIDC vs. UDAL6 expressly left all the

points to be decided afresh uninfluenced by any of the observations

made in said decision. The appeals preferred by HSIDC, therefore, had

to be considered on their own merits and in the process, if the facts on

record justified, there could be fixation of compensation at a reduced rate

for the lands from the concerned villages. We, therefore, reject

submissions (a), (b) and (c).

8. However, the fact remains that during the pendency of challenge

against the decision of the High Court in Madan Pal vs. State of

Haryana, in terms of orders dated 10.08.2011, 07.05.2012 and

05.09.2012 passed by this Court, compensation at the rate of

Rs.28,15,356/- per acre was released to landholders from all the villages 

14

including the concerned villages. Further, paragraph 36 of the decision

in HSIDC vs. UDAL6 directed that the balance at the rate of Rs.9,24,644/-

per acre be made over to all the landholders including those from the

concerned villages. Consequently, everyone has received compensation

at the rate of Rs.37,40,000/- per acre. The compensation finally awarded

in Wazir vs. State of Haryana2

for villages other than the concerned

villages, being greater than the figure of Rs.37,40,000/- per acre, no

difficulty arises on that score. But, with respect to the lands from the

concerned villages, the anomaly definitely stares in the face.

9. The record now indicates that about Rs.750 crores have already

been made over as compensation to the landholders from the concerned

villages at the rate of Rs.37,40,000/- per acre. As against their

entitlement of Rs.29,7,333/- per acre as found in Wazir vs. State of

Haryana2

, the landholders have thus received Rs.7,62,667/- per acre

over and above their entitlement. On a rough estimate, an amount of

Rs.152 crores out of the disbursed sum of Rs.750 crores is thus beyond

their entitlement.

It is also clear that the concerned authorities have passed on the

entire burden to the subsequent allottees of the acquired land and have 

15

received amounts in excess of what have been made over to the

landholders of the concerned villages by way of compensation.

10. The compensation as aforesaid, was made over to the landholders

from the concerned villages, without they being required to furnish any

security. Any adjustment in terms of direction (e) in the Judgment in

Wazir vs. State of Haryana2

, at this length of time, will thus entail in

recovery of money from the landholders through revenue recovery

proceedings and in recalculating and conferring the corresponding

benefits upon the allottees of the acquired land.

11. Considering the entirety of circumstances, in our view, the instant

case calls for exercise of powers vested in this Court under Article 142

of the Constitution of India, to relieve the landholders from the burden of

returning the amounts over and above their entitlement.

12. We, therefore, allow the instant applications and direct:-

a) The amount of compensation fixed at Rs.29,77,333/- per

acre in respect of lands from the concerned villages as held

in the Judgment in Wazir vs. State of Haryana2 remains

unchanged. 

16

b) As the compensation at the rate of Rs.37,40,000/- per acre

has been received by the landholders from the concerned

villages in the circumstances stated hereinabove, such

landholders need not return the amounts over and above

what has been found due to them.

c) To the extent as indicated above, direction (e) in the

Judgment in Wazir vs. State of Haryana2

, stands modified.

d) The subsequent allotees of the lands in question will not be

entitled to maintain any action for refund only on account of

Orders passed in these proceedings.

13. The instant applications are disposed of in aforesaid terms without

any order as to costs.

……………..…………………..J.

[Uday Umesh Lalit]

………..………………………..J.

[Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

New Delhi;

April 08, 2021.

17

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SLP (Civil) No.5987 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP(C) Diary No.14296 of 2019)

MUKESH KUMAR …. PETITIONER

VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA THROUGH COLLECTOR,

GURGAON & ORS. …. RESPONDENTS

WITH

SLP (Civil) Nos.22234-22241 of 2018

SLP (Civil) No.5992 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP(C) Diary No.14297 of 2019)

SLP (C) No. 5998 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) Diary No.15662 of 2019)

SLP (C) No.5995 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) Diary No.15663 of 2019)

SLP (C) No.5986 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) Diary No.15664 of 2019)

SLP (C) No.5993 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) Diary No.15665 of 2019)

SLP (C) No.5990 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) Diary No.15666 of 2019)

SLP (C) No.5999 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) Diary No.15667 of 2019)

18

SLP (C) No.6000 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) Diary No.15668 of 2019)

SLP (C) No.6001 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) Diary No.15669 of 2019)

SLP (C) No.5997 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) Diary No.15691 of 2019)

SLP (C) No.5989 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) Diary No.15700 of 2019)

SLP (C) No.5988 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) Diary No.15702 of 2019)

SLP (C) No.5994 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) Diary No.15939 of 2019)

SLP (C) No.5996 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (C) Diary No.15943 of 2019)

O R D E R

Uday Umesh Lalit, J.

1. These special leave petitions filed by various land holders seek to

challenge the decision dated 09.03.2018 passed by the High Court of

Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in RFA No.2373 of 2010 (O&M) and

other connected matters) i.e. in Madan Pal-III v. State of Haryana and

another9

. This decision of the High Court was subject matter of challenge

in this Court which was dealt with by the Judgment in Wazir v. State of

Haryana2

.

19

2. In all these cases there has been delay in preferring special leave

petitions. However, considering the facts on record, we condone the delay.

3. The Judgment passed by this Court in Wazir v. State of Haryana

2

as explained by the instant Order in M.A. Nos.926-930 of 2019 and IA

No.118262 of 2019 herein above is to apply to all cases of land holders

from the concerned villages under the present acquisition.

4. Since all the issues already stand dealt with by the Judgment in

Wazir v. State of Haryana2

, nothing further need be done in the present

petitions except to state that these cases shall be governed in every respect

by the directions issued by this Court in its Judgment in Wazir v. State of

Haryana2

, as explained by the instant Order.

5. The petitions stand disposed of in above terms.

……………..…………………..J.

[Uday Umesh Lalit]

………..………………………..J.

[Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

New Delhi;

April 08, 2021.

Tender Call Notice=By this TCN, sealed tenders in a two-bid system (technical and financial) are invited from eligible registered diet preparation and catering firms/suppliers etc. having a valid labour licence and a food licence with a minimum of three years of relevant experience in the field of preparation and distribution of therapeutic and non-therapeutic diet to government or private health institutions having a minimum of 200 beds 1 for the year 2019-2020. = The requirement of this Act that its applicability be extended only to establishments in which there are 20 or more workmen can be done away with by the appropriate government under the proviso, making it clear that this is not an inflexible requirement. In any case, the acceptance of such argument would amount to second-guessing the authority’s interpretation of its own TCN which, as has been stated hereinabove, cannot be so second-guessed unless it is arbitrary, perverse or mala fide.

Tender Call Notice=By this TCN, sealed tenders in a two-bid system (technical and financial) are invited from eligible registered diet preparation and catering firms/suppliers etc. having a valid labour licence and a food licence with a minimum of three years of relevant experience in the field of preparation and distribution of therapeutic and non-therapeutic diet to government or private health institutions having a minimum of 200 beds 1 for the year 2019-2020. = The requirement of this Act that its applicability be extended only to establishments in which there are 20 or more workmen can be done away with by the appropriate government under the proviso, making it clear that this is not an inflexible requirement. In any case, the acceptance of such argument would amount to second-guessing the authority’s interpretation of its own TCN which, as has been stated hereinabove, cannot be so second-guessed unless it is arbitrary, perverse or mala fide.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1517-1518 OF 2021

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.4222-4223 OF 2021]

M/S UTKAL SUPPLIERS ...APPELLANT

VERSUS

M/S MAA KANAK DURGA

ENTERPRISES & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

R.F. Nariman, J

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals arise out of a Tender Call Notice [“TCN”] dated

30.12.2019 issued by Respondent No.4, viz., the Office of the

Superintendent, SCB Medical College and Hospital, Cuttack. By this

TCN, sealed tenders in a two-bid system (technical and financial) are

invited from eligible registered diet preparation and catering

firms/suppliers etc. having a valid labour licence and a food licence with

a minimum of three years of relevant experience in the field of

preparation and distribution of therapeutic and non-therapeutic diet to

government or private health institutions having a minimum of 200 beds

1

for the year 2019-2020. In the “Terms of Reference” attached to the TCN,

clauses VI.3.3 and VI.3.9 are important and are set out hereunder:

“VI.3 Eligibility criteria:

xxx xxx xxx

3. The bidder should have a minimum of 3 years’ experience

in diet preparation and its supply/services in Govt. or Private

Health Institutions only having minimum 200 no. of beds.

xxx xxx xxx

9. The bidder should have valid labour licence (registration

no. & date) of Labour Department.”

Further, under clause VI.13, the right to reject any bid is set out as

follows:

“VI.13 Right to Accept or Reject the Bid:

The Hospital Administration reserves the right to accept or

reject any bid and the bidding process and reject all such

bids at any time prior to award of contract, without showing

any reason thereby.”

Equally, under clause VI.16, the administration of the SCB Medical

College and Hospital reserves under its sole discretion to disqualify any

bid document if any of the documents enumerated in the said clause

have not been submitted by the bidder. Clause VI.16(f) reads as follows:

“VI.16 Disqualification:

The Administration of the SCB Medical College Hospital,

seeking this bid, reserves under its sole discretion to

disqualify any bid document if the following documents have

not submitted by the bidder:

xxx xxx xxx

f) Labour License from competent authority”

2

Under clause VI.20, sub-clause (6) states:

“VI.20 General Information to Bidder:

xxx xxx xxx

6. The agency would recruit required number of staff for

cooking and serving so that diet can be supplied to the

indoor patients in time. List of personnel with their Aadhar

card copy should be submitted to the office positively.”

3. Pursuant to the aforesaid, four bids were received by the Tender

Committee – from the Appellant, Respondent no.1, Respondent no.5 and

Respondent no.6. Vide the Technical Committee meeting dated

17.02.2020, Respondent no.1 and Respondent no.6 were held to be

disqualified inter alia for the reason that they had not submitted a valid

labour licence, i.e., a contract labour licence from the competent

authority, as per the TCN requirement. The Appellant and Respondent

no.5 were shortlisted for opening of financial bids.

4. At this stage, Respondent no.1 filed a writ petition on 19.02.2020

apprehending that it may be disqualified. This writ petition was dismissed

as being premature on 20.02.2020.

5. On 24.02.2020, the Tender Committee opened the financial bids of

the Appellant and Respondent no.5, and found the Appellant to be the

lowest bidder, quoting an average cost of Rs.82/- per patient per day.

3

6. Meanwhile, Respondent no.1 filed a writ petition dated 13.03.2020,

praying that the Tender Committee proceedings be set aside and that

Respondent no.1 be awarded the tender.

7. By a work order dated 27.11.2020, the Appellant was awarded the

tender at the approved rate. Pursuant thereto, an agreement dated

27.11.2020 was entered into between the Appellant and Respondent

no.4 for a period of one year. The High Court, by the impugned judgment

dated 23.03.2021, referred to the facts and thereafter held:

“9. As mentioned above, Clause 9 of the eligibility criteria is

candid and clear requiring valid license of Labour

Department. The said stipulation never mandates the license

to be issued under the Contract Labour (Regulation and

Abolition) Act, 1970. In the wake of the purpose, which is to

supply diet, therapeutic and non- therapeutic to the patients

to the hospital, we fail to concede to the submissions of

requirement of labour license under the Contract Labour

(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. Rather the submission

of the Petitioner that, the same is required under the Odisha

Shops and Commercial Establishments Act appears more

acceptable. Therefore, the contention of the Opposite Parties

requiring the labour license under the Contract Labour

(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 does not seem justified

in view of the stipulation made in the TCN. When the

submission of labour license (registration no. and date) by

the Petitioner under the Odisha Shops and Commercial

Establishments Act is not disputed, in our considered opinion

the same satisfies the requirement sought for at Clause 9.

10. Coming to the other shortfall as contended by the

Opposite Parties regarding lack of three years’ experience in

terms of Clause 3 of the eligibility criteria, the admitted case

of the parties are that the Petitioner has submitted the

certificate issued by All India Institute of Medical Science,

Bhubaneswar relating to experience of providing patient

dietary service in AIIMS since 8th August, 2015 till 26th

4

October, 2018. This has been negatived by the Opposite

Party No.3 by saying that the period of service of the

Petitioner in AIIMS, Bhubaneswar was not in chronological

order and the certificate furnished by the Petitioner was

having gap period of extension order from 6th August, 2017

to 31st July, 2018. Such analysis of Opposite Parties in our

considered view is flimsy on the face of Annexure-9 which is

the experience certificate issued in favour of the Petitioner

by the AIIMS, Bhubaneswar. Moreover, the period of

experience from 8th August, 2015 to 26th October, 2018

when exceeds three years period, the same appears to be

satisfying the requirement of Clause-3 without any

hesitation.”

xxx xxx xxx

“13. It is admitted by the Opposite Parties that in the

meantime during pendency of the writ petition, Opposite

Party No.5 has been issued with the work order on 27th

November, 2020 and he commenced with the supply of work

with effect from 1st December, 2020. This undoubtedly a

development made during pendency of the writ petition and

as such is governed by the principle of lis pendens and of

course such development happened in the meantime is

subject to final result of the writ petition.

14. In view of the discussions made above as the bid of the

Petitioner is found rejected illegally and contrary to the

conditions of the TCN and the Petitioner specifically states

that he was the lowest in the financial bid which the Opposite

Parties has not replied cleverly, the action of Opposite

Parties in rejecting the bid of the Petitioner and selecting

Opposite Party No.5 for the purpose to grant him

the contract, the same can safely be opined as mala fide

action of the Opposite Parties. Accordingly, the grant of

contract in order dated 27th November, 2020 under

Annexure-F/3 is quashed.

15. In the result while quashing Annexure-F/3, Opposite

Party Nos.1 to 3 are directed to issue work order in favour of

the Petitioner in the event his financial bid is found lower

than Opposite Party No.5 to commence the supply work with

effect from 1st March, 2021. Needless to say that Opposite

Party No.5 may continue his supply till 28th February, 2021.”

5

8. Shri Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Advocate, appearing on

behalf of the Appellant, has argued that the High Court could not have

second-guessed the authority’s reading of its own tender and held that a

registration certificate granted under the Orissa Shops and Commercial

Establishments Act, 1956 [“Orissa Act”] could replace a labour licence

under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970

[“Contract Labour Act”], as required by the authority. He also argued

that the minimum three years’ experience, as per the requirement

contained in clause VI.3.3 was missing, as the experience certificate

furnished by Respondent no.1 had a gap period from 06.08.2017 to

31.07.2018 which could not be made up and which was wrongly sought

to be made up by the High Court. He also argued that it was perverse to

hold that the action of the authority in granting the contract in favour of

the Appellant was mala fide, and further went on to argue that after

quashing the work order in favour of the Appellant, the High Court

exceeded its jurisdiction in directing the authority to grant the work order

to Respondent no.1.

9. Shri Aditya Kumar Chaudhary, learned counsel appearing on

behalf of Respondent no.1 countered each of the aforesaid submissions.

He pointed out that under Section 1(4) of the Contract Labour Act, the

Act would apply only to an establishment in which 20 or more workmen

6

are employed. As the TCN did not require that establishments/firms etc.

that applied have 20 or more workmen, it is obvious that it is not this Act

that was the subject matter of clause VI.3.9 but it was the Orissa Act, the

registration certificate under which was produced to the satisfaction of

the High Court by Respondent no.1. He also countered the argument

that three years’ experience was not made out in the case of Respondent

no.1 and referred to certain certificates issued by the All India Institute of

Medical Sciences, Bhubaneswar, which made it clear that it had such

experience. He argued that in the present case, the High Court had not

exceeded the parameters of judicial review as it found mala fides

attributable to the authority and also argued that the contract was to be

awarded to Respondent no.1 only if it was found that its financial bid was

lower than that of the Appellant.

10. Having heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant

and Respondent no.1, what is clear is that the authority concerned read

its own TCN to refer to the licence to be submitted by bidders as the

labour licence under the Contract Labour Act. This is also clear from a

reading of the tender document as a whole, and in particular, clauses

VI.20.6, VI.20.20 and VI.20.21, which read as follows:

“VI.20 General Information to Bidder:

xxx xxx xxx

6. The agency would recruit required number of staff for

cooking and serving so that the diet can be supplied to

7

indoor patients in time. List of personnel with their Aadhar

card copy should be submitted to the office positively.

xxx xxx xxx

20. The behaviour of the staff of the agency towards the

patients/attendants should be conducive and disciplinary

action would be taken by the Hospital Administration against

the staff of the said agency violating the behavioural norm in

consultation with the concerned agency.

21. The agency would be responsible to make alternative

arrangements in cases of situations such as staff strike, local

strike [Bandh/Hartal] etc. ensuring that the patients get diet

in the appropriate time.”

Sub-clauses (20) and (21), in particular, make it clear that the staff

employed would be employed by the agency as contract labour, the

agency being responsible to make alternative arrangements in cases

where their staff goes on strike.

11. This Court has repeatedly held that judicial review in these matters

is equivalent to judicial restraint in these matters. What is reviewed is not

the decision itself but the manner in which it was made. The writ court

does not have the expertise to correct such decisions by substituting its

own decision for the decision of the authority. This has clearly been held

in the celebrated case of Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC

651, paragraph 94 of which states as follows:

“94. The principles deducible from the above are:

(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in

administrative action.

8

(2) The court does not sit as a court of appeal but

merely reviews the manner in which the decision

was made.

(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct

the administrative decision. If a review of the

administrative decision is permitted it will be

substituting its own decision, without the necessary

expertise which itself may be fallible.

(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be

open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to

tender is in the realm of contract. Normally

speaking, the decision to accept the tender or

award the contract is reached by process of

negotiations through several tiers. More often than

not, such decisions are made qualitatively by

experts.

(5) The Government must have freedom of contract.

In other words, a fair play in the joints is a

necessary concomitant for an administrative body

functioning in an administrative sphere or quasiadministrative sphere. However, the decision must

not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury

principle of reasonableness (including its other facts

pointed out above) but must be free from

arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by

mala fides.

(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy

administrative burden on the administration and

lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.

xxx xxx xxx”

12. Equally, this Court in Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro

Rail Corpn. Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818 [“Afcons”], has laid down:

“14. We must reiterate the words of caution that this Court

has stated right from the time when Ramana Dayaram

Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [Ramana

Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India,

(1979) 3 SCC 489] was decided almost 40 years ago,

9

namely, that the words used in the tender documents cannot

be ignored or treated as redundant or superfluous — they

must be given meaning and their necessary significance. In

this context, the use of the word “metro” in Clause 4.2(a) of

Section III of the bid documents and its connotation in

ordinary parlance cannot be overlooked.

15. We may add that the owner or the employer of a project,

having authored the tender documents, is the best person to

understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its

documents. The constitutional courts must defer to this

understanding and appreciation of the tender documents,

unless there is mala fide or perversity in the understanding

or appreciation or in the application of the terms of the

tender conditions. It is possible that the owner or employer of

a project may give an interpretation to the tender documents

that is not acceptable to the constitutional courts but that by

itself is not a reason for interfering with the interpretation

given.”

This view of the law has been subsequently followed repeatedly – see

Montecarlo Ltd. v. NTPC Ltd., (2016) 15 SCC 272 [at paragraph 25],

Caretel Infotech Ltd. v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., (2019) 14

SCC 81 [at paragraphs 38 and 39], and State of Madhya Pradesh v.

U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1001 [at

paragraphs 24 to 26].

13. In Galaxy Transport Agencies v. New J.K. Roadways, 2020

SCC OnLine SC 1035, after referring to paragraph 15 of Afcons (supra),

it was held:

“15. In the judgment in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. AMR Dev

Prabha, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 335, under the heading

“Deference to authority’s interpretation”, this Court stated:

10

“51. Lastly, we deem it necessary to deal with

another fundamental problem. It is obvious that

Respondent No. 1 seeks to only enforce terms of

the NIT. Inherent in such exercise is interpretation of

contractual terms. However, it must be noted that

judicial interpretation of contracts in the sphere of

commerce stands on a distinct footing than while

interpreting statutes.

52. In the present facts, it is clear that BCCL and

India have laid recourse to Clauses of the NIT,

whether it be to justify condonation of delay of

Respondent No. 6 in submitting performance bank

guarantees or their decision to resume auction on

grounds of technical failure. BCCL having authored

these documents, is better placed to appreciate

their requirements and interpret them. (Afcons

Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation

Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818)

53. The High Court ought to have deferred to this

understanding, unless it was patently perverse or

mala fide. Given how BCCL's interpretation of these

clauses was plausible and not absurd, solely

differences in opinion of contractual interpretation

ought not to have been grounds for the High Court

to come to a finding that the appellant committed

illegality.”

(emphasis in original)

16. Further, in the recent judgment in Silppi Constructions

Contractors v. Union of India, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1133,

this Court held as follows:

“20. The essence of the law laid down in the

judgments referred to above is the exercise of

restraint and caution; the need for overwhelming

public interest to justify judicial intervention in

matters of contract involving the state

instrumentalities; the courts should give way to the

opinion of the experts unless the decision is totally

arbitrary or unreasonable; the court does not sit like

a court of appeal over the appropriate authority; the

court must realise that the authority floating the

tender is the best judge of its requirements and,

therefore, the court's interference should be

11

minimal. The authority which floats the contract or

tender, and has authored the tender documents is

the best judge as to how the documents have to be

interpreted. If two interpretations are possible then

the interpretation of the author must be accepted.

The courts will only interfere to prevent

arbitrariness, irrationality, bias, mala fides or

perversity. With this approach in mind we shall deal

with the present case.”

(emphasis in original)

17. In accordance with these judgments and noting that the

interpretation of the tendering authority in this case cannot

be said to be a perverse one, the Division Bench ought not

to have interfered with it by giving its own interpretation and

not giving proper credence to the word “both” appearing in

Condition No. 31 of the N.I.T. For this reason, the Division

Bench’s conclusion that JK Roadways was wrongly declared

to be ineligible, is set aside.”

14. The High Court has not adverted to any of these decisions, and in

second-guessing the authority’s requirement of a licence under the

Contract Labour Act, has clearly overstepped the bounds of judicial

review in such matters. In any case, a registration certificate under

Section 4 of the Orissa Act cannot possibly be the equivalent of a valid

labour licence issued by the labour department. Section 4 of the Orissa

Act reads as follows:

“4. Registration of establishment.–(1) Within the period

specified in sub-section (4), the employer of every

establishment shall send to the Inspector of the area

concerned, a statement in the prescribed form, together with

such fees as may be prescribed, containing–

(a) the name of the employer arid the manager,

if any;

(b) the postal address of the establishment;

12

(c) the name, if any, of the establishment;

(d) the category of the establishment, that is

whether it be a shop, commercial establishment,

hotel, restaurant, cafe, boarding or eating house,

theatre or other place of public amusement of

entertainment; and

(e) such other particulars as may be prescribed.

(2) No adolescent shall be allowed to work in any

employment for more than six hours in a day.

(3) In the event of any doubt or difference of opinion between

an employer and the Inspector as to the category to which

an establishment should belong, the Inspector shall refer the

matter-to the Chief Inspector who shall, after such enquiry as

may be prescribed, decide the category of such

establishment and his decision shall be final for the purpose

of this Act.

(4) Within thirty days from the date mentioned in Column (2)

below in respect of an establishment mentioned in Column

(1), the statement together with fees shall be sent to the

Inspector under sub-section (1)–

Establishment Date from which the

period of 30 days to

commence

(1) (2)

(i) Establishment existing

on the date on which this

Act comes into force

The date on which this Act

comes into force.

(ii) New establishments The date on which the

establishment commences

its work.

A reading of this Section would show that the registration of an

establishment under the Orissa Act is to categorise the establishment as

a shop, commercial establishment, hotel, etc. and not for the purpose of

issuing a labour licence which, in the context of the present TCN, can

only be a labour licence under the Contract Labour Act.

13

15. The argument of Respondent no.1 with reference to Section 1(4) of

Contract Labour Act is wholly misplaced. Section 1(4) of the said Act

reads as follows:

“1. Short title, extent, commencement and application.—

xxx xxx xxx

(4) It applies—

(a) to every establishment in which twenty or more

workmen are employed or were employed on any

day of the preceding twelve months as contract

labour;

(b) to every contractor who employs or who

employed on any day of the preceding twelve

months twenty or more workmen:

Provided that the appropriate Government may, after giving

not less than two months’ notice of its intention so to do, by

notification in the Official Gazette, apply the provisions of this

Act to any establishment or contractor employing such

number of workmen less than twenty as may be specified in

the notification.”

The requirement of this Act that its applicability be extended only to

establishments in which there are 20 or more workmen can be done

away with by the appropriate government under the proviso, making it

clear that this is not an inflexible requirement. In any case, the

acceptance of such argument would amount to second-guessing the

authority’s interpretation of its own TCN which, as has been stated

hereinabove, cannot be so second-guessed unless it is arbitrary,

perverse or mala fide.

14

16. The High Court’s characterising the action of accepting the

Appellant’s tender as mala fide is itself open to question. The plea of

mala fide made in the writ petition reads as follows:

“22. That, in the meantime the petitioner ascertained that

the tender inviting authorities have connived with the Opp.

Party No. 4 to 6 and it is also ascertained that Opp. Party

No. 4 to 6 belong to one establishment and are supplying the

same contract to the SCB, so accordingly, with a malafide

intention both have connived and a pre-planned attempt has

been made to oust the petitioner on a flimsy ground. The

entire exercise has been done by Opp. Party No. 3 to award

the contract to Opp. Party No. 5 as they are still continuing

the aforesaid work and the entire endeavour of the Opp.

Party No. 3 is to create some litigation so that, the opposite

parties can continue during pendency of the writ application.”

This plea was answered by the authority in its counter affidavit filed

before the High Court as follows:

“15. That in reply to the averments made in paragraphs 22 to

25 of the writ petition it is humbly and respectfully submitted

that, the bidding process has been concluded in a

transparent manner adhering to the required guidelines

made thereto.

It is further stated that the petitioner failed to comply with two

basic requirements under eligibility criteria stipulated in the

tender conditions i.e. (i) submission of valid Labour licence;

(ii) submission of proper certificate of continuous three years’

experience in diet preparation and supply to

Government/Reputed Private Health Institution having

minimum 200 bed strength. As a result, the Tender

Committee disqualified the bid of the petitioner.

It is further submitted that after thorough examination of the

documents, M/s. Utkal Suppliers (O.P. No. 5) came out to be

the L-1 bidder in the tender process and the same was sent

to the higher authorities for detailed examination of technical

and financial bids. SLPC being the competent authority as

per F.D. Notification No.22393/Fdt.08.06.2012 after due

15

examination of records has recommended to place the work

order with the L-1 bidder. Accordingly, the work order has

been issued in favour of the L-1 bidder (O.P. No. 5) vide this

office letter No. 23347 dated 27.11.2020 and the selected

firm has taken up diet services work in the hospital w.e.f.

01.12.2020.”

A reference to the aforesaid pleadings would also go to show that except

for an incantation of the expression mala fide, no mala fide has in fact

been made out on the facts of this case.

17. The High Court’s judgment is consequently set aside and the

appeals are allowed. The Appellant is to be put back, within one week

from the date of this judgment, to complete performance under the

agreement entered into between the Appellant and the authority on

27.11.2020.

………………….......................J.

 [ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN]

………………….......................J.

 [B.R. GAVAI]

New Delhi;

April 09, 2021.

16

specific performance = four suits for specific performance of the agreements of sale dated 20.03.1991 and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) dated 24.01.1994. In addition, the Appellants prayed for a direction to the Respondents to deliver vacant possession of the schedule property, a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Respondents from alienating or encumbering the suit property and a decree of mandatory injunction to deposit the title deeds with the Court.=As per the terms of the agreement, the sale was to be concluded within a period of four months. The Respondents would produce the encumbrance certificate much before the execution and registration of the sale deeds. The Respondents should also obtain the income tax clearance certificate under Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. To comply with the obligation stipulated in the agreement, the first Respondent applied to the Income Tax authorities for permission to alienate the property. The Income Tax authorities passed an order for compulsory acquisition of property on 25.06.1991.=A suit for specific performance cannot be dismissed on the sole ground of delay or laches. However, an exception to this rule is where an immovable property is to be sold within a certain period, time being of the essence, and it is not found that owing to some default on the part of the plaintiff, the sale could not take place within the stipulated time. Once a suit for specific performance has been filed, any delay as a result of the Court process cannot be put against the plaintiff as a matter of law in decreeing specific performance. However, it is within the discretion of the Court, regard being had to the facts of each case, as to whether some additional amount ought or ought not to be paid by the plaintiff once a decree of specific performance is passed in its favour even at the appellate stage6 . We are in agreement with the Appellants that they did not file the civil suits immediately after the disposal of the Writ Petition in 1998 due to the pendency of Writ Appeals. Escalation of prices cannot be the sole ground to deny specific performance7 . We are of the considered view that the Respondents are not entitled for any additional amount as 90 per cent of the sale consideration was paid by the Appellants before 1994. It is not necessary for us to deal with the submission of the Appellants regarding the applicability of the amendment to the Specific Relief Act, 1963, in view of the conclusion that we have reached in favour of the Appellants.

specific performance = four suits for specific performance of the agreements of sale dated 20.03.1991 and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) dated 24.01.1994. In addition, the Appellants prayed for a direction to the Respondents to deliver vacant possession of the schedule property, a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Respondents from alienating or encumbering the suit property and a decree of mandatory injunction to deposit the title deeds with the Court.=As per the terms of the agreement, the sale was to be concluded within a period of four months. The Respondents would produce the encumbrance certificate much before the execution and registration of the sale deeds. The Respondents should also obtain the income tax clearance certificate under Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. To comply with the obligation stipulated in the agreement, the first Respondent applied to the Income Tax authorities for permission to alienate the property. The Income Tax authorities passed an order for compulsory acquisition of property on 25.06.1991.=A suit for specific performance cannot be dismissed on the sole ground of delay or laches. However, an exception to this rule is where an immovable property is to be sold within a certain period, time being of the essence, and it is not found that owing to some default on the part of the plaintiff, the sale could not take place within the stipulated time. Once a suit for specific performance has been filed, any delay as a result of the Court process cannot be put against the plaintiff as a matter of law in decreeing specific performance. However, it is within the discretion of the Court, regard being had to the facts of each case, as to whether some additional amount ought or ought not to be  paid by the plaintiff once a decree of specific performance is passed in its favour even at the appellate stage6 . We are in agreement with the Appellants that they did not file the civil suits immediately after the disposal of the Writ Petition in 1998 due to the pendency of Writ Appeals. Escalation of prices cannot be the sole ground to deny specific performance7 . We are of the considered view that the Respondents are not entitled for any additional amount as 90 per cent of the sale consideration was paid by the Appellants before 1994. It is not necessary for us to deal with the submission of the Appellants regarding the applicability of the amendment to the Specific Relief Act, 1963, in view of the conclusion that we have reached in favour of the Appellants.

Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal Nos.3523-3526 of 2010

A.R. MADANA GOPAL ETC.ETC.

.... Appellant(s)

Versus

M/S RAMNATH PUBLICATIONS PVT. LTD. AND ANR.

…. Respondent (s)

J U D G M E N T

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

1. These Appeals are filed against the judgment of the Division

Bench of the Madras High Court by which a decree for specific

performance passed by the learned Single Judge was reversed.

2. The Appellants filed four suits for specific performance of

the agreements of sale dated 20.03.1991 and Memoranda of

Understanding (MOU) dated 24.01.1994. In addition, the

Appellants prayed for a direction to the Respondents to deliver

vacant possession of the schedule property, a decree of

permanent injunction restraining the Respondents from alienating

or encumbering the suit property and a decree of mandatory

injunction to deposit the title deeds with the Court. It was alleged

in the plaints that the Respondent entered into separate

1 | P a g e

agreements with the Appellants who belong to the same family for

sale of property situated at Door No.325, Arcot Road, Vadapalani,

Chennai on 20.03.1991. As per the terms of the agreement, the

sale was to be concluded within a period of four months. The

Respondents would produce the encumbrance certificate much

before the execution and registration of the sale deeds. The

Respondents should also obtain the income tax clearance

certificate under Section 230-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961. To

comply with the obligation stipulated in the agreement, the first

Respondent applied to the Income Tax authorities for permission

to alienate the property. The Income Tax authorities passed an

order for compulsory acquisition of property on 25.06.1991.

3. The Writ Petition filed by the Respondents challenging the

order of the Income Tax authority was allowed by the Madras High

Court by its judgment dated 21.12.1992. The authorities were

directed to reconsider the matter afresh. The Income Tax

authorities passed another order on 22.02.1993 directing

purchase of the property. The said order was challenged in the

High Court and an interim order of injunction was passed on

10.03.1993. The parties were directed to maintain status quo and

not to change the nature of the property. In view of the

developments after the agreements relating to the orders passed

by the Income Tax authorities and the pendency of the Writ

2 | P a g e

Petitions challenging those orders, the Appellants and the

Respondents entered into four separate MOUs on 24.01.1994.

The recitals of the MOUs would show that they were in addition

and not in substitution of the agreements dated 20.03.1991. It

was agreed that the Respondents shall continue to keep the

original title deeds until completion of the sale by registration of

the sale deeds. The original title deeds would be handed over to

the Appellants at the time of registration. It was also recorded in

the Memorandum that certain amounts were paid by the

Appellants and the balance of the sale price shall be paid to the

Respondents at the time of registration of the sale deeds

immediately after the disposal of the Writ Petitions in their favour.

4. The Writ Petitions filed against the compulsory acquisition

by the Income Tax authorities were disposed of on 11.09.1998.

The judgment of the learned Single Judge of the High Court

allowing the Writ Petitions was challenged by the Income Tax

department by way of filing of an appeal. When the Appellants

made a demand for execution of sale deeds, the Respondents

informed them that it can be done only after disposal of the Writ

Appeal. Indian Bank filed a suit for recovery of its dues from the

Respondents. As the Respondents were not executing the sale

deeds in spite of repeated requests, the Appellants filed separate

suits for specific performance.

3 | P a g e

5. In the written statement filed by the Respondents, it was

submitted that the MOU dated 22.01.1994 substituted the suit

agreements dated 20.03.1991. It was contended on behalf of the

Respondents that the suit was time barred. Time was the

essence of the agreement dated 20.03.1991 as it was agreed

between the parties that the sale should be concluded within a

period of four months. Though, the Writ Petition filed against the

order of the Income Tax Department was allowed in the year 1998,

the Appellants maintained silence for more than two years before

filing the suits in 2000 which clearly shows that they were neither

ready nor willing to perform their part of the agreement.

6. All the four suits were tried together and a learned Single

Judge of the High Court decreed the suits on 17.07.2003. The

Appellants were directed to deposit the balance sale consideration

along with interest at the rate of 12 per cent within eight weeks

from the date of decree and upon such deposit, the Respondents

were directed to execute the sale deeds in favour of the

Appellants. Thereafter, the Respondents were directed to deliver

possession of the property to the Appellants. The Appellants

deposited the balance consideration on 01.08.2003. The

Respondents filed original suit appeals against the judgment of

the learned Single Judge which were allowed by a Division Bench

of the High Court on 25.07.2008. The judgment of the Division

4 | P a g e

Bench setting aside the decrees passed in favour of the Appellants

is the subject matter in the present Appeals.

7. While decreeing the suit filed by the Appellants, the learned

Single Judge of the High Court expressed his opinion that it cannot

be said that the Appellants did not evince any interest in

performing their part of the agreement nor can it be said that they

did not have sufficient funds. It was further held that the

Appellants were always ready and willing to perform their part of

the contract by depositing the balance sale consideration. He

further observed that the major portion of the sale consideration

was already paid. According to the learned Single Judge, the suit

was filed within a period of three years from the date of the

disposal of the Writ Petitions and therefore, cannot be said to be

barred by limitation. The MOUs dated 24.01.1994 were held to be

in addition to the agreements dated 20.03.1991. On the above

findings, the learned Single Judge decreed the suit. The relief

claimed by the Appellants for award of damages was, however,

not granted. The learned Single Judge awarded interest on the

balance sale consideration at the rate of 12 per cent.

8. A Division Bench of the High Court set aside the judgment

and decree of the learned Single Judge by holding that the

Appellants failed to deposit the balance consideration immediately

after the disposal of the Writ Petition. Though, the Writ Petition

5 | P a g e

was disposed of on 11.09.1998, the suits were filed between

October to December, 2000. No notices were issued by the

Appellants seeking execution of sale deeds nor did they purchase

the stamp papers. According to the Division Bench the above

factors would indicate that the Appellants were not ready and

willing to perform their part of the agreement along with the fact

that they kept quiet for two years and three months after the

disposal of the Writ Petitions. That apart, conduct of the

Appellants was commented upon by the Division Bench of the

High Court to conclude that they are not entitled to the relief of

specific performance. The Division Bench found fault with the

Appellants for not pleading and proving how they got the

possession of a part of the property. The claim of the Appellants

for vacant possession of the property was found to be frivolous as

the Appellants continued to be in possession of a part of the

property. The attempt made by the Appellants to trespass into

the ground floor of the property where the Indian Bank was having

its office disentitled them from seeking the equitable relief of

specific performance.

9. We have heard Mr. Raghavendra S. Srivatsa, Advocate for

the Appellants and Mr. P.S. Narasimha, learned Senior Counsel for

the Respondents. The contention of the Appellants is that the

agreements and the MOUs have to be read together. It was

6 | P a g e

argued on behalf of the Appellants that the sale consideration of

all the four agreements for purchase of the property is Rs. 37/-

lakhs out of which Rs. 34/- lakhs was paid by August, 1994. Mr.

Srivatsa, submitted that the demand made by the Appellants for

execution of the sale deeds was rejected by the Respondents on

the ground that the Writ Appeal filed by the Income Tax

Department against the judgment of the High Court dated

11.09.1998 was pending. It was only on receipt of information by

the Appellants that the property was already encumbered, that

the Appellants filed suits for specific performance. According to

the Appellants, it cannot be said that there was any delay in filing

the suits. The Appellants were always ready and willing to

perform their part of the agreement. The Appellants asserted that

the interpretation of the MOU is contrary to well settled law of this

Court. The Division Bench of the High Court placed undue

emphasis on the word “immediately” to conclude that the

Appellants failed to pay the balance consideration immediately

after the disposal of the Writ Petition. By placing reliance on the

judgments of this Court in State of Bihar v. Tata Iron

1

, Anglo

American Metallurgical Coal Pty Ltd. v. MMTC Ltd.

2 and

Khardah Company Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (India) Private

Limited

3

, Mr. Srivatsa submitted that the intention of the parties

1 (2019) 7 SCC 99

2 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1030

3 (1963) 3 SCR 183

7 | P a g e

must be ascertained from the language used in the agreement by

reading it as a whole and in the light of the surrounding

circumstances. He submitted that the relevant clause in the

agreement obligates the Appellants to pay the balance sale

consideration at the time of registration of sale deeds,

immediately after the disposal of the Writ Petition. According to

Mr. Srivatsa, the High Court ignored the crucial words “at the time

of registration of the sale deeds” and committed an error in

relying upon the word “immediately” to find that the Appellants

were in default. The pendency of the Writ Appeal filed by the

Income Tax Department was the reason for the Appellants not

taking any steps to file the suits immediately after the disposal of

the Writ Petitions. Seeking support from the judgments of this

Court in K.S.Vidyanadam and Others v. Vairavan

4 and

Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi

5

, Mr. Srivatsa

contended that the Appellants are entitled for the relief of specific

performance as they have paid a major portion of the

consideration, possession in part was handed over to them and

the suit was filed within the period of limitation. It was further

submitted on behalf of the Appellants that specific performance is

no longer a discretionary relief in view of the insertion of Section

10-A in the Specific Relief Act, 1963. It was argued that the

4 (1997) 3 SCC 1

5 (2011) 12 SCC 18

8 | P a g e

amendment should be made applicable to all pending proceedings

including appeals.

10. Mr. Narasimha, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondents

contended that time is the essence of the agreements dated

20.03.1991 and the MOUs dated 24.01.1994. Though, the Writ

Petitions were disposed of on 11.09.1998, the Appellants filed the

suit only between October and December, 2000. The Appellants

had not issued any notices to the Respondents to execute sale

deeds after the disposal of the Writ Petitions. The Appellants also

did not discharge their obligation of paying balance sale

consideration. The delay of two years and three months after the

disposal of the Writ Petition is fatal and the Appellants are not

entitled for the relief claimed for. It was argued on behalf of the

Respondents that the escalation in prices of properties in Chennai

is a relevant factor. Mr. Narasimha, supported the judgment of

the Division Bench of the High Court by arguing that the

Appellants were not put in possession of the property at the time

of the agreement. There is no covenant in the MOU that the

possession shall be given to the Appellants. The Appellants have

not explained as to how they got possession of the first floor. The

Appellants highhandedly made attempts to disturb the possession

of the Indian Bank from a portion of the building. As the First

Appellate Court is the last Court on findings of fact, this Court

9 | P a g e

should refrain from interfering with the judgment of the Division

Bench of the High Court.

11. There is no dispute about the agreements dated 20.03.1991

and the MOUs between the parties. It is also a fact that Income

Tax Department wanted to compulsorily acquire the property, due

to which Writ Petitions were filed which were disposed of on

11.09.1998. Writ Appeals filed by the Department were pending

on the date of filing of the suit. The relevant clause in the MOU is

that the Appellants shall pay the balance sale consideration at the

time of registration of sale deeds immediately after the disposal of

the Writ Petition. The Division Bench of the High Court in the

impugned judgment held that the Appellants were not ready and

willing to perform their part of the agreement by not depositing

the balance sale consideration immediately after the disposal of

the Writ Petition. The High Court lost sight of the words “at the

time of registration of sale” in clause 3 of MOUs. A plain reading

of clause 3 in the MOU’s would show that the Appellants were

required to pay the balance sale consideration at the time of the

registration of the sale deeds immediately when the Writ Petition

is disposed of upholding the sale agreement. The High Court

further found fault with the Appellants in waiting for 2 years and 3

months after the disposal of the Writ Petition for filing the suits.

The High Court refused to grant relief of specific performance to

10 | P a g e

the Appellants on the ground that there was total inaction on the

part of the Appellants for more than two years after the parties

entered into the MOU. Though, it was pleaded by the Appellants

in the suits that they were always ready and willing to perform

their part of the agreement, the High Court was of the opinion that

they did not prove the same as they did not pay the balance sale

consideration immediately after the disposal of the Writ petition.

We find force in the submission made on behalf of the Appellants

that payment of balance consideration has to be done only at the

time of the registration of the sale deeds. Admittedly, no steps

were taken for the registration of the sale deeds. The finding of

the Division Bench of the High Court that the Appellants were not

ready and willing to perform their part of the contract by not

paying the balance consideration immediately after disposal of the

Writ Petition is erroneous.

12. The Division Bench of the High Court agreed with the

contention of the Appellants that mere fixation of time within

which the contract was to be performed does not make the

stipulation as to time being of the essence of the contract.

However, the Appellants were found guilty of total inaction on

their part. The sole ground for denial of relief to the Appellants is

non payment of balance consideration immediately after disposal

11 | P a g e

of the Writ Petition. The said conclusion is the result of a faulty

interpretation of clause 3 of the MOUs as stated earlier.

13. The High Court highlighted the conduct of the Appellants to

deny relief. The failure of the Appellants in not pleading and

proving how they were put in possession of a part of the property,

the frivolous complaint about vacant possession not being given

by the Respondents and the attempt made by the Appellants to

take forcible possession of a part of the property were commented

upon to hold that the Appellants were disentitled to equitable

relief. There is not dispute that the Appellants were in possession

of the first floor of the property. Details about the manner in

which possession was given to the Appellants not being pleaded

cannot be a ground to deny relief. The contention of the

Appellants before the High Court was that the Respondents should

demolish the super structure and hand over vacant possession of

the land. The High Court observed that the Appellants who were in

possession of a part of the property cannot make such an inane

plea. According to the terms of the agreement, the Respondents

had to hand over vacant possession of the land. The Appellants

submitted that no steps were taken to demolish the structure to

highlight the inaction on the part of the Respondents. By no

stretch of imagination, can it be said that the Appellants can be

denied relief on this account. Yet another reason given by the

12 | P a g e

Division Bench of the High Court is that the Appellants made an

attempt to trespass into the ground floor where the Indian Bank

was a tenant. The contention of the Appellants is that the Indian

Bank was not a tenant in the ground floor but only a creditor of

the Respondents. Admittedly, the Indian Bank sued the

Respondents for recovery of the loan by the sale of the

hypothecated goods stored in the ground floor. It was also

contended on behalf of the Appellants that a police complaint was

preferred by them against the Respondents for causing

disturbance to their possession. The Appellants cannot be said to

be disentitled for a relief of specific performance on the ground

that their conduct on this count is blameworthy.

14. A suit for specific performance cannot be dismissed on the

sole ground of delay or laches. However, an exception to this rule

is where an immovable property is to be sold within a certain

period, time being of the essence, and it is not found that owing to

some default on the part of the plaintiff, the sale could not take

place within the stipulated time. Once a suit for specific

performance has been filed, any delay as a result of the Court

process cannot be put against the plaintiff as a matter of law in

decreeing specific performance. However, it is within the

discretion of the Court, regard being had to the facts of each case,

as to whether some additional amount ought or ought not to be

13 | P a g e

paid by the plaintiff once a decree of specific performance is

passed in its favour even at the appellate stage6

. We are in

agreement with the Appellants that they did not file the civil suits

immediately after the disposal of the Writ Petition in 1998 due to

the pendency of Writ Appeals. Escalation of prices cannot be the

sole ground to deny specific performance7

. We are of the

considered view that the Respondents are not entitled for any

additional amount as 90 per cent of the sale consideration was

paid by the Appellants before 1994. It is not necessary for us to

deal with the submission of the Appellants regarding the

applicability of the amendment to the Specific Relief Act, 1963, in

view of the conclusion that we have reached in favour of the

Appellants.

15. For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the

Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and the judgment

and decree passed by the learned Single Judge is restored. The

Appeals are allowed, accordingly.

 ................................J.

 [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

 ...............................J.

 [S. RAVINDRA BHAT]

New Delhi,

April 09, 2021

6 Ferrodous Estates (Pvt) Ltd. v. P. Gopirathnam (Dead) and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine

SC 825

7 Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corpn. (P) Ltd ., (2002) 8 SCC 146

14 | P a g e

compassionate appointment = cannot be given compassionate appointment at this point of time. The application for compassionate appointment of the son was filed by the Respondent in the year 2013 which is more than 10 years after the Respondent’s husband had gone missing. As the object of compassionate appointment is for providing immediate succour to the family of a deceased employee, the Respondent’s son is not entitled for compassionate appointment after the passage of a long period of time since his father has gone missing.= Respondent filed a suit in the Court of the Additional Munsif, Hazaribagh seeking a declaration of civil death of her missing husband. The said suit was decreed with effect from the date of filing of the suit i.e. 23.12.2009 by a judgment dated 13.07.2012. The Respondent made a representation on 17.01.2013 seeking compassionate appointment for her son which was rejected on 03.05.2013. The request for compassionate appointment was rejected by Appellant No. 1 on the ground that the Respondent’s husband was already dismissed from service and therefore, the request for compassionate appointment could not be entertained =We are in agreement with the High Court that the reasons given by the employer for denying compassionate appointment to the Respondent’s son are not justified. There is no bar in the National Coal Wage Agreement for appointment of the son of an employee who has suffered civil death. In addition, merely because the respondent is working, her son cannot be denied compassionate appointment as per the relevant clauses of the National Coal Wage Agreement. However, the Respondent’s husband is missing since 2002. Two sons of the Respondent who are the dependents of her husband as per the records, are also shown as dependents of the Respondent. It cannot be said that 1 Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 1 there was any financial crisis created immediately after Respondent’s husband went missing in view of the employment of the Respondent. Though the reasons given by the employer to deny the relief sought by the Respondent are not sustainable, we are convinced that the Respondent’s son cannot be given compassionate appointment at this point of time. The application for compassionate appointment of the son was filed by the Respondent in the year 2013 which is more than 10 years after the Respondent’s husband had gone missing. As the object of compassionate appointment is for providing immediate succour to the family of a deceased employee, the Respondent’s son is not entitled for compassionate appointment after the passage of a long period of time since his father has gone missing.

compassionate appointment = cannot be given compassionate appointment at this point of time. The application for compassionate appointment of the son was filed by the Respondent in the year 2013 which is more than 10 years after the Respondent’s husband had gone missing. As the object of compassionate appointment is for providing immediate succour to the family of a deceased employee, the Respondent’s son is not entitled for compassionate appointment after the passage of a long period of time since his father has gone missing.= 

Respondent filed a suit in the Court of the Additional Munsif, Hazaribagh seeking a declaration of civil death of her missing husband. The said suit was decreed with effect from the date of filing of the suit i.e. 23.12.2009 by a judgment dated 13.07.2012. The Respondent made a representation on 17.01.2013 seeking compassionate appointment for her son which was rejected on 03.05.2013. The request for compassionate appointment was rejected by Appellant No. 1 on the ground that the Respondent’s husband was already dismissed from service and therefore, the request for compassionate appointment could not be entertained =We are in agreement with the High Court that the reasons given by the employer for denying compassionate appointment to the Respondent’s son are not justified. There is no bar in the National Coal Wage Agreement for appointment of the son of an employee who has suffered civil death. In addition, merely because the respondent is working, her son cannot be denied compassionate appointment as per the relevant clauses of the National Coal Wage Agreement. However, the Respondent’s husband is missing since 2002. Two sons of the Respondent who are the dependents of her husband as per the records, are also shown as dependents of the Respondent. It cannot be said that 1 Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 1 there was any financial crisis created immediately after Respondent’s husband went missing in view of the employment of the Respondent. Though the reasons given by the employer to deny the relief sought by the Respondent are not sustainable, we are convinced that the Respondent’s son cannot be given compassionate appointment at this point of time. The application for compassionate appointment of the son was filed by the Respondent in the year 2013 which is more than 10 years after the Respondent’s husband had gone missing. As the object of compassionate appointment is for providing immediate succour to the family of a deceased employee, the Respondent’s son is not entitled for compassionate appointment after the passage of a long period of time since his father has gone missing.

 Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No.897 of 2021

 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 10514 of 2020)

Central Coalfields Limited

Through its Chairman and

Managing Director & Ors. .... Appellant(s)

Versus

Smt. Parden Oraon …. Respondent (s)

J U D G M E N T

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

1. The respondent requested the appellants to appoint her

son in the place of his father who was missing since 2002 which

was rejected. Aggrieved thereby, the Respondent filed a writ

petition in the High Court of Jharkhand. The writ petition was

allowed and the appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by

the Division Bench of the High Court. Hence this appeal.

2. The husband of the respondent was an Operator, Helper

Category (Category II) at Gidi Washery. The Respondent

informed the officer in-charge of Bhurkunda Thana, Hazaribagh

that her husband was missing since 03.10.2002. A copy of the

1 | P a g e

said information was communicated to the Regional Officer of

the Gidi Washery. A charge-sheet was issued by Appellant No. 1

to the Respondent’s husband for desertion of duty since

01.10.2002 and an inquiry was conducted in which the

Respondent participated on behalf of her husband. On the basis

of Inquiry Officer’s report, the Appellant No. 1 terminated the

services of the Respondent’s husband with effect from

21.09.2004.

3. The Respondent filed a suit in the Court of the Additional

Munsif, Hazaribagh seeking a declaration of civil death of her

missing husband. The said suit was decreed with effect from the

date of filing of the suit i.e. 23.12.2009 by a judgment dated

13.07.2012. The Respondent made a representation on

17.01.2013 seeking compassionate appointment for her son

which was rejected on 03.05.2013. The request for

compassionate appointment was rejected by Appellant No. 1 on

the ground that the Respondent’s husband was already

dismissed from service and therefore, the request for

compassionate appointment could not be entertained.

4. Challenging the rejection of the request for compassionate

appointment of her son, the Respondent filed a writ petition

before the High Court which was allowed by a judgment dated

03.08.2015. The High Court held that the proceedings leading to

2 | P a g e

the termination of the Respondent’s husband from service

cannot be sustained in the eye of law. On the said basis, the

order of termination of Respondent’s husband from service was

quashed. The rejection of the claim of compassionate

appointment of her son was also quashed and the first appellant

was directed to consider the claim of compassionate

appointment of the Respondent’s son in accordance with law. By

an order dated 03.08.2016 the first Appellant decided that there

was no merit in the request for appointment of Respondent’s

son. It was observed in the order of rejection dated 03.08.2016

that the Respondent was in employment and both her sons were

shown as her dependents. It was further noted that the

Respondent’s husband was missing since 03.10.2002 and the

Respondent’s son was not entitled to seek compassionate

appointment which is normally provided as a succour to the

family of a deceased employee in harness. Another reason given

for rejecting the request for compassionate appointment was

that a decision was taken in the meeting of Directors (Personnel)

on 19.10.2013 that compassionate appointment cannot be

provided to the dependents of missing employees (Deemed

death).

5. The High Court through its judgment dated 16.08.2018 set

aside the order dated 03.08.2016 by holding that the note of

3 | P a g e

discussions of the Directors meet held at Jaipur cannot be

considered as policy decision and it cannot be the basis for

rejection of the claim for compassionate appointment. The High

Court was of the view that the parties are bound by the National

Coal Wage Agreement. In respect of the Respondent’s

employment being the reason for rejection of request for

compassionate appointment, the High Court observed that there

is no policy decision of the appellant company not to offer

compassionate appointment in cases of double employment. As

the order of termination of services of Respondent’s husband

was quashed by the High Court, Respondent’s son was held to be

entitled for appointment. The Division Bench of the High Court

dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants. The National Coal

Wage Agreement was examined in detail by the Division Bench

to come to a conclusion that civil death of employee cannot be a

disqualification for compassionate appointment of the member

of his family. The contention of the Appellant that the decision

was taken by the Directors (Personnel) not to provide

employment to the children of employees who have suffered civil

death was not accepted by the Division Bench as it could not be

termed as a policy decision. The High Court observed that

there is no delay in seeking compassionate appointment after

having obtained a decree from the Civil Court declaring the

4 | P a g e

Respondent’s husband to have suffered civil death. The Division

Bench upheld the finding of the Single Judge of the High Court

that there is no clause in the National Coal Wage Agreement

which prevents a claim for compassionate appointment on the

ground that another member of the family is in service.

6. The contention of the Appellant is that there is no right for

compassionate appointment available to the surviving family

members of the deceased employee in harness and one must

seek appointment on compassionate basis in accordance with

the relevant rules, regulations and schemes. It was submitted on

behalf of the Appellants that the Respondent’s husband was

missing since 2002. The suit filed by the Respondent seeking for

declaration of civil death of her husband was in 2009. The

request for compassionate appointment was made much later in

2013. In view of the delay in making a claim for compassionate

appointment, the very purpose of providing compassionate

appointment owing to the death of the breadwinner is not

served. In addition, the Respondent was in service of the

Appellant. It was also argued that though the National Coal Wage

Agreement does not contain any clause relating to the

dependents of the employee who suffered civil death to be

ineligible for compassionate appointment, the decision taken by

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the Directors (Personnel) in 2013 should be treated as a policy

decision governing compassionate appointment.

7. On behalf of the Respondent, it was submitted that there is

no provision in the National Coal Wage Agreement that a family

member of an employee who suffered civil death is not eligible

for compassionate appointment. There is also no provision that

the Respondent’s son cannot be given compassionate

appointment on the ground that she is working in the company.

The Respondent submitted that she was diligent in participating

in the departmental inquiry initiated against her husband and in

filing the civil suit for declaration of civil death of her husband

immediately on completion of 7 years from 2002. According to

the Respondent, the order of termination of services of her

husband was set aside by the High Court which has become

final. In any event, the respondent has retired from service in

2018 and her son needs the employment to take care of his

family.

8. The whole object of granting compassionate appointment

is to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis which arises

due to the death of the sole breadwinner. The mere death of an

employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of

livelihood. The authority concerned has to examine the financial

condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is

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satisfied that but for the provision of employment, the family will

not be able to meet the crisis that the job is offered to the

eligible member of the family1

. It was further asseverated in the

said judgment that compassionate employment cannot be

granted after a lapse of reasonable period as the consideration

of such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised

at any time in the future. It was further held that the object of

compassionate appointment is to enable the family to get over

the financial crisis that it faces at the time of the death of sole

breadwinner, compassionate appointment cannot be claimed or

offered after a signficant lapse of time and after the crisis is over.

9. We are in agreement with the High Court that the reasons

given by the employer for denying compassionate appointment

to the Respondent’s son are not justified. There is no bar in the

National Coal Wage Agreement for appointment of the son of an

employee who has suffered civil death. In addition, merely

because the respondent is working, her son cannot be denied

compassionate appointment as per the relevant clauses of the

National Coal Wage Agreement. However, the Respondent’s

husband is missing since 2002. Two sons of the Respondent who

are the dependents of her husband as per the records, are also

shown as dependents of the Respondent. It cannot be said that

1 Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs. State of Haryana, (1994) 4 SCC 138

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there was any financial crisis created immediately after

Respondent’s husband went missing in view of the employment

of the Respondent. Though the reasons given by the employer

to deny the relief sought by the Respondent are not sustainable,

we are convinced that the Respondent’s son cannot be given

compassionate appointment at this point of time. The

application for compassionate appointment of the son was filed

by the Respondent in the year 2013 which is more than 10 years

after the Respondent’s husband had gone missing. As the object

of compassionate appointment is for providing immediate

succour to the family of a deceased employee, the Respondent’s

son is not entitled for compassionate appointment after the

passage of a long period of time since his father has gone

missing.

10. For the aforementioned reasons, we allow the appeal and

set aside the judgment of the High Court.

 .....................................J.

 [ L. NAGESWARA RAO ]

 .....................................J.

 [ S. RAVINDRA BHAT ]

New Delhi,

April 9, 2021.

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