The compliance of proviso to Section 17 is a Precondition for maintainability of application under 42 Order 9 Rule 13. Application under Order 9 Rule 13 can be allowed only when sufficient cause is made out to set aside the ex­parte decree. The present is a case where no sufficient cause was made out to set aside the ex­parte decree.

 The compliance of proviso to Section 17 is a Precondition for maintainability of application under  Order 9 Rule 13. Application under Order 9 Rule 13 can be allowed only when sufficient cause is made out to set aside the ex­parte decree. The present is a case where no sufficient cause was made out to set aside the ex­parte decree. 

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.802-803 of 2021

(arising out of SLP(C)Nos.18118-18119 of 2019)

SUBODH KUMAR ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SHAMIM AHMED ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Leave granted

2.This appeal has been filed against the judgment of

the   High   Court   of   Uttarakhand   dated   13.12.2018

allowing   the   Writ   Petition   (M.S.)   No.418   of   2008

filed by respondent No.1 as well as the order dated

24.05.2019 rejecting the Review Petition filed by

the   appellant   to   review   the   judgment   dated

13.12.2018. 

2

3.The facts of the case giving rise to this appeal,

which are relevant for deciding the issues raised,

need to be carefully noticed. The High Court in the

impugned judgment although has noted few facts but

certain relevant facts have been missed by the High

Court which have bearing on the issues which had

arisen before the High Court. 

4.The facts of any case are the foundation on which

the   dispute   between   the   parties   arises.   The

arguments are built by the counsel for the parties

in reference to the foundational facts for applying

the legal principles to decide the dispute. A clear

grasp of foundational facts are essential. The law

is applied on facts and when essential facts are

missed, mis­application of law is bound to happen.

We   may   recall   prophetic   words   of   Mr.   Justice

Cardozo when he said: ­

"...More   and   more   we   lawyers   are

awakening   to   a   perception   of   the   truth

what   divides   and   distracts   us   in   the

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solution   of   a   legal   problem   is   not   so

much   uncertainty   about   the   law   as

uncertainty about the facts ­  the facts

which generate the law. Let the facts be

known   as   they   are,   and   the   law   will

sprout   from   the   seed   and   turn   its

branches toward the light.”

5.The   appellant   herein   shall   be   referred   as

‘landlord’ whereas the respondent No.1 Shamim Ahmed

as ‘tenant’. Dispute relates to a shop being shop

No.39(29) situated in Compound No.3, Civil Lines,

Roorkee,   District   Haridwar.   The   respondent   was

inducted   as   tenant   at   Rs.150/­   per   month   by

predecessor­in­title of the landlord. The landlord

purchased   the   shop   in   question   by   sale   deed   on

30.01.1991. The S.S.C case No.4 of 1994 was filed

by the landlord on 18.03.1994 claiming possession,

rent and mesne profit. The landlord’s case was that

the   notice   was   given   on   24.12.1993   demanding   the

amount   of   rent,   due   rent,   profit   etc.   Thereafter

the S.C.C. Case No.4 of 1994 was filed in the Court

of   Additional     Civil   Judge,   Senior   Division,

4

Roorkee.   On   14.07.1994,   the   tenant   was   served

summons. He prayed time to file a written Statement

till   24.08.1994.   The   tenant   filed   an   application

under Section 10 CPC to stay the suit as well as

the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Both

applications   were   rejected   and   the   Court   allowed

fifteen days time to file a written statement and

fixed   16.10.1995   for   hearing.   On   16.10.1995,   the

tenant again took time but did not file a written

statement.  Several other opportunities were given

to the tenant to file a written statement in which

he failed. On 24.02.1997, Court passed an order to

proceed   ex­parte.   On   18.03.1997,   the   plaintifflandlord was permitted to give ex­parte evidence.

The   application   44Ga   was   filed   by   the   tenant   to

recall the orders dated 24.02.1997 and 18.03.1997.

On   16.05.1997,   the   application   44Ga   was   rejected

observing   that   the   defendant   wants   to   delay   the

case regularly because he is a tenant and getting

the benefit of property. The application was found

5

to be mala fide. 

6.On   23.05.1997,   the   tenant   filed   an   application

under   Section   30(2)   of  the   U.P.   Urban   Buildings

(Regulation   of   Letting,   Rent   and   Eviction)   Act,

1972,   to   deposit   the   rent.   The   application   was

allowed on 23.05.1997 by the Court observing that

the   plaintiff   may   deposit   the   amount   on   his   own

risk.   On   07.07.1997,   the   amount   of   rent   from

01.03.1988  to 30.06.1997 amounting to Rs.16,800/­

was deposited by the tenant under Section 30(2).

7. Against the Order dated 16.05.1997, a revision was

filed   by   the   tenant   before   the   District   Judge,

which   too   was   rejected   on   22.08.1997.   On

18.10.1997, the tenant  further deposited Rs.750/­

as rent from 30.06.1997 to 30.11.1997. 

8.The S.C.C. case No.4 of 1994 filed by the landlord

was   allowed   by     ex­parte   judgement   dated

6

31.03.1998.  On 27.07.1998, the tenant had filed an

application for execution of ex­parte decree dated

31.03.1998 claiming a total amount of Rs.21,660/­.

The   tenant   thereafter   on   25.08.1998   filed   an

application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC along with

application under Section 5 of Limitation Act for

condoning the delay to recall the ex­parte decree

dated   31.03.1998.   Along   with   application   dated

25.08.1998   filed   under   Order   9   Rule   13   CPC,   no

deposit   was   made   by   the   tenant   as   required   by

Section   17   of   the   Provincial   Small   Cause   Courts

Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred to as “Act,1887”). 

9.On 25.11.1998, i.e., after filing the application

under   Order   9   Rule   13,   the   tenant   made   further

deposit of Rs.1950/­ as a rent from 30.11.1997 to

31.12.1998.   On   27.07.2002,   the   application   was

filed by the tenant praying that amount deposited

under Section 30(2) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 be

presumed to be deposited under Section 17 of the

7

Act, 1887, and the tenant  be granted  benefit of

Section 17. 

10. The   appellant   landlord   filed   a   detailed

objection dated 07.08.2002 opposing the application

dated 27.07.2002. The trial court vide order dated

19.04.2007   rejected   the   application   filed   by   the

tenant under Order 9 Rule 13 and Section 5 of the

Limitation Act. A revision was filed by the tenant

against   the   order   dated   19.04.2007   before   the

District   Judge,   who   rejected   the   same   by   order

dated   23.02.2008.   Aggrieved   by   the   order   dated

19.04.2007   of   the   trial   court   as   well   as   order

dated   23.02.2008   of   the   District   Judge   rejecting

the revision, a Writ Petition No.418 of 2008 was

filed by the tenant in the High Court. 

11. The   Writ   Petition   was   allowed   by   the   High

Court   by   the   impugned   judgment   dated   13.12.2018.

The High Court set aside the order dated 19.04.2007

8

of the trial court and 23.02.2008 of the Revisional

Court   and   remanded   the   matter   back   to   the   trial

court for reconsideration of  tenant's application

under   Order   9   Rule   13   CPC   and   Section   5   of   the

Limitation   Act   in   accordance   with   law.   The

appellant­landlord aggrieved by the judgment of the

High Court dated 13.12.2018 filed a special leave

petition   in   this   Court,   being   SLP(Civil)   Diary

No.15791 of 2019 which was dismissed and withdrawn

by   the   landlord   with   liberty   to   file   Review

Petition   before   the   High   Court.   Liberty   to   come

back   was   also   granted   by   this   Court   vide   Order

dated   10.05.2019.   After   the   Order   of   this   Court

dated 10.05.2019, a review application was filed by

the appellant­landlord before the High Court, which

too has been rejected on 24.05.2019. The appellantlandlord aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments dated

13.12.2018   and   24.05.2019   of   the   High   Court   has

come up in this appeal. 

9

12. After   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   dated

13.12.2018,   the   trial   court   in   pursuance   of   the

remand   order   has   allowed   the   application   under

Order 9 Rule 13 CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation

Act by order dated 24.05.2019.

13. We have heard Shri R.B.Singhal, learned senior

counsel appearing for the appellant and Dr. Sumant

Bharadwaj,   learned   counsel   appearing   for   the

respondent. 

14. Shri R.B. Singhal, learned senior counsel for

the appellant submitted that application of tenant

under Order 9 Rule 13 was rightly rejected for noncompliance   of   mandatory   provisions   of   Section   17

Proviso of the Act, 1887. It is submitted that as

per proviso to Section 17, the tenant was obliged

to deposit the decretal amount due on the date of

filing the application which has not been complied

with. The application has been rightly rejected by

10

the trial court. He has further submitted that the

application   to   give   the   benefit   of   the   amount

deposited under Section 30(2) of UP Act No.13 of

1972 was filed by the tenant on 27.07.2002 that is

after four years which could not have enured to the

benefit   of   the   tenant.   The   deposit   made   under

Section 30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 was in

the name of the appellant as well as the respondent

No.5, hence, the deposit also was not relevant for

giving   benefit   to   the   tenant   under   Section   17

proviso. The deposit under Section 30(2) being in

joint   name   which   could   not   be   withdrawn   by

landlord­ appellant alone, such deposit cannot help

the respondent tenant for compliance of Section 17

proviso. Even the deposits made under Section 30(2)

was not the deposit of the total amount due on the

date of filing the application under Order 9 Rule

13. 

15. It is submitted that 25.08.1998 is the date of

11

presenting   application   under   Order   9   Rule   13   and

the   tenant   had   deposited   only   the   amount   of

Rs.17,550/­   which   was   not   the   entire   decretal

amount payable by tenant. The execution­application

has already been filed by the landlord appellant on

27.07.1998   in   which   the   total   decretal   amount

claimed   was   Rs.21,660/­.   Thus,   even   assuming

without admitting that amount under Section 30(2)

can   be   adjusted,   the   amount   being   not   total

decretal amount, benefit under Section 17 proviso

could   not   be   extended   to   the   tenant   and   the

application   was   rightly   rejected.   It   is   further

submitted that there was no ground for allowing the

application under Order 9 Rule 13 since the order

to   proceed   ex­parte   against   the   tenant   was

unsuccessfully challenged by the tenant before the

Revisional Court. There was no genuine ground for

allowing the application under Order 9 Rule 13. The

High Court committed error in interfering with the

order of the trial court as well as the Revisional

12

Court.

16.   Dr.   Sumant   Bharadwaj,   appearing   for   the

respondent submits that the amount deposited under

Section 30(2) of U.P.Act No.13 of 1972 was entitled

to be given credit for the purposes of proviso to

Section   17   of   Act,   1887   and   the   High   Court   has

rightly   taken   the   view   that   the   amount   up   to

31.12.1998   having   already   been   deposited   under

Section 30(2), the application under Order 9 Rule

13 could not have been rejected for non­compliance

of proviso to Section 17. 

17. It   is   submitted   that   the   High   Court   has

rightly   taken   the   view   that   the   Court   below   had

adopted hypertechnical and pedantic approach while

considering the application under Order 9 Rule 13

and   Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act.   It   is

submitted that the tenant had deposited the entire

decretal amount under Section 30(2) which was due

13

at   the   time   of   filing   application   under   Order   9

Rule 13. The application filed by the tenant was

wrongly rejected by the trial court as well as the

Revisional   Court.   The   High   Court   has   done

substantial   justice   in   allowing   the   application

under Order 9 Rule 13.

18. We   have   considered   the   submissions   of   the

learned   counsel   for   the   parties   and   have   perused

the record.

19. From   the   submissions   of   the   learned   counsel

for the parties and materials on record, following

issues arise for consideration in this appeal:­

1)Whether   in   the   application   filed   by   the

respondent­tenant   under   Order   9   Rule   13,

CPC   on   25.08.1998,   the   requirements   as

contained in Proviso to Section 17 of the

Provincial   Small   Cause   Courts   Act,   1887,

were complied with?

14

2)Whether   the   respondent­tenant   had

deposited   the   entire   amount   due   on

25.08.1998 under Section 30(2) of U.P. Act

No.13 of 1972?

3) Whether the deposit of rent under Section

30(2) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 in the

present   case   can   be   treated   to   be

deposited   under proviso to Section 17 of

Act, 1887?

4)Whether   the   respondent­tenant   has   made

sufficient ground to allow the application

filed   under   Order   9   Rule   13   CPC   dated

25.08.1998?

5)Whether   the   High   Court   is   right   in   its

view   that   the   trial   court   and   the

Revisional   Court   has   taken   a   hyper­

15

technical   and   pedantic   approach   while

considering the application under Order 9

Rule   13   CPC   and   Section   5   of   the

Limitation Act filed by the respondent?

The   first,   second   and   third   questions   being

interrelated are taken together.

20. The S.C.C. suit No.4 of 1994 was filed by the

appellant landlord in March, 1994. The plaintiff’s

case was that he had purchased the property by the

sale   deed   dated   30.01.1991   after   due   permission

from   the   District   Judge,   Haridwar.   The   plaintiff

claimed   to   be   owner   of   the   property   w.e.f.

30.01.1991.   Defendant   Nos.2   to   5   had   also   joined

the plaintiff in the notice given to the respondent

terminating   the   tenancy.   There   was   categorical

pleading in the plaint that the U.P. Act No.13 of

1972 is not applicable since the subject property

was recent construction. It is useful to refer to

16

the pleadings in paragraph 5 of the plaint which is

to the following effect:­

"5. That U.P. Act 13 of 1972 is not

applicable   to   the   disputed   property.

It   is   the   recent   construction   and   is

subject   to   assessment   by   Municipal

Board,   Roorkee   and   the   first   such

assessment   thereon   came   into   effect

from 01.04.1984.”

21. We   may   notice   Section   17   and   its   proviso,

compliance   of   which   was   required   by   the   tenantrespondent while filing application under Order 9

Rule 13 CPC. Section 17 is as follows:­ 

"17.Application of the Code of Civil

procedure.­  (1)   The   procedure

prescribed   in   the   Code   of   Civil

Procedure,1908(5 of 1908), shall, save

in so far as is otherwise provided by

that   Code   or   by   this   Act,   be   the

procedure followed in a Court of Small

Causes   in   all   suits   cognizable   by   it

and in all proceedings arising out of

such suits;

Provided   that   an   applicant   for   an

order to set aside a decree passed  ex

parte  or   for   a   review   of   judgment

shall,   at   the   time   of   presenting   his

application,   either   deposit   in   the

Court   the   amount   due   from   him   under

17

the   decree   or   in   pursuance   of   the

judgment,   or   give   such   security   for

the   performance   of   the   decree   or

compliance   with   the   judgment   as   the

Court   may,   on   a   previous   application

made   by   him   in   this   behalf,   have

directed.

(2) Where a person has become liable

as   surety   under   the   proviso   to   subsection   (1),   the   security   may   be

realized in manner provided by Section

145   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,

1908 (5 of 1908).”

22. Proviso to Section 17 has been engrafted with

the   object   that   unscrupulous   tenants   who   do   not

appear in the Court in the suit proceedings should

not be allowed to file the application to recall

ex­parte   decree   unless   they   deposit   the   entire

amount or give security to the Court for compliance

of the decree. The proviso is to take care of those

tenants who deliberately do not appear in the suit

neccesiating the Court to pass ex­parte decree. The

object   is   to   protect   the   landlord   and   to   ensure

that the decree passed is satisfied by the tenant,

in event, the application under Order 9 Rule 13 is

18

ultimately rejected. Proviso gives two options to

an   applicant   against   whom   an   ex­parte   decree   has

been   passed   or   who   applied   for   review   of   the

judgment,     i.e.,   (a)   deposit   in   the   Court   the

amount   due   from   him   under   the   decree   or   in

pursuance of the decree; (b) give such security for

the   performance   of   the   decree   or   compliance   with

the   judgment   as   the   Court   made   on   the   previous

application   made   by   him   in   this   behalf   directed.

Thus, requirement of the deposit in the court the

entire amount can be waived only when the Court on

the previous application directs the tenant to give

such   security   for   performance   of   the   decree   or

compliance   with   the   judgment.   The   application

seeking waiver from deposit has been mentioned as

“a   previous   application”   i.e.   previous   to   the

application filed under Order 9 Rule 13. 

23. The   present   is   a   case   where   the   tenant   has

filed   an   application   under   Order   9   Rule   13   on

19

25.08.1998   to   recall   the   ex­parte   decree   dated

31.03.1998. There is no reference of any previous

application praying the Court to permit the tenant

to   give   security   to   satisfy   the   ex­parte   decree.

The   application   dated   25.08.1998   was   not

accompanied by the deposit of the amount due from

the tenant under the decree dated 31.03.1998. The

application   dated   25.08.1998,   thus,   was   not   in

accordance   with   proviso   to   Section   17.   When   the

condition precedent for presenting the application

under   Order   9   Rule   13   was   not   fulfilled,   the

application   under   Order   9   Rule   13   filed   by   the

tenant respondent did not deserve any consideration

and had rightly been rejected. 

24. This   Court   had   occasion   to   consider   Section

17(1)   proviso   of   the   Act,   1887,   and   application

filed   under   Order   9   Rule   13   in  Kedarnath   versus

Mohan Lal Kesarwari and others, (2002) 2   SCC 16.

In the above case, a suit was filed by the landlord

20

for recovery of arrears of rent and eviction under

Section   20(2)   of   Act   No.13   of   1972   which   was

triable by the Court of Small Causes. The suit was

decreed   ex­parte.   When   the   decree   was   put   in

execution, the tenant moved application under Order

9   Rule   13   seeking   setting   aside   ex­parte   decree.

Neither the amount due on the decree was deposited

nor an application was filed seeking direction from

the   Court   to   give   security.   The   facts   have   been

noted in paragraph 1 of the judgment, which is to

the following effect:­

"1.The   appellant­landlord   filed   a

suit   for   recovery   of   arrears   of   rent

and   for   eviction   against   the

respondent­tenants   on   the   ground

available   under   clause   (a)   of   subsection   (2)   of   Section   20   of   the

U.P.Urban   Buildings   (Regulation   of

Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972,

hereinafter   “the   U.P.Urban   Buildings

Act” for short. A suit of the nature

filed   by   the   appellant   being   triable

by   a   Court   of   Small   Causes,   as

provided   by   the   U.P.   Civil   Laws

Amendment   Act,   1972   was   filed   in   the

Court   of   Small   Causes,   Allahabad.   On

09.08.1996,   the   suit   came   to   be

decreed ex parte. The decree directed

21

the   respondent­tenants   to   pay   an

amount of Rs.8500 as pre­suit arrears

of   rent   and   a   further   amount

calculated   at   the   rate   of   Rs.250   per

month from the date of institution of

suit   to   the   date   of   recovery   of

possession. A decree for eviction was

also   passed.   The   decree   was   put   to

execution   and   on   21.02.1998   the

decree­holder obtained possession over

the   suit   premises   with   police   help.

The Court Amin certified the delivery

of possession to the executing court.

On   26.02.1998,   the   respondent­tenants

moved   an   application   under   Order   9

Rule   13   CPC   seeking   setting   aside   of

the   ex   parte   decree.   Neither   was   the

amount due under the decree deposited

nor   was   an   application   filed   seeking

direction   of   the   Court   to   give

security   for   the   performance   of   the

decree   in   lieu   of   depositing   the

decretal   amount.   On   14.10.1998,

arguments   were   heard   on   the

application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC.

The   Court   appointed   16.10.1998   for

orders.”

25. The   trial   court   had   rejected   the   application

forming an opinion that application under Order 9

Rule 13 has been filed without complying with the

proviso   to   Section   17   which   application   was   not

maintainable.   In   a   revision   filed   before   the

22

District   Judge,   the   delay   was   condoned   and   the

District Judge directed the trial court to accept

security   as   proposed   and   decide   the   application

under Order 9 Rule 13 on merits. The writ petition

before   the   High   Court   by   the   landlord   was

dismissed, thereafter the matter had come to this

Court.

26. This   Court,   after   noticing   Section   17,   has

extracted the statement of objects and reasons for

1935   amendment   in   Section   17.   Following   was

observed in paragraph 5 of the judgment: ­

"5...It is relevant to note that the

proviso to sub­section (1) of Section

17   has   undergone   a   material   change

through an amendment brought in by Act

9   of   1935.   Earlier   these   were   the

words ­ “security to the satisfaction

of   the   court   for   the   performance   of

the   decree   or   compliance   with   the

judgment,   as   the   court   may   direct”

whic have been deleted and substituted

by the present words ­ “such security

for   the   performance   of   the   decree   or

compliance   with   the   judgment   as   the

court   may,   on   a   previous   application

made   by   him   in   this   behalf,   have

23

directed”.   The   Statement   of   Objects

and Reasons for the 1935 amendment was

set out as under:

“The   Act   is   designed   to   remove

certain doubts which have arisen in

the interpretation of the proviso to

sub­section (1) of Section 17 of the

Provincial   Small   Cause   Courts   Act,

1887.   As   the   section   stands,   an

applicant   is   required   to   give

security to the satisfaction of the

court at the time of presenting his

application.   It   follows   that,   in

order   to   ascertain   what   security

satisfies   the   court,   the   applicant

must   already   have   made   an

application in that behalf. There is

some doubt whether the words 'as the

court   may   direct'   apply   to   the

deposit of the whole decretal amount

as well as to the giving of approved

security.   The   Act   is   intended   to

make   it   clear   that   the   preliminary

application   to   ascertin   what

security will satisfy the court must

be   made   and   decided   before   the

substantive   application   for   the

order   to   set   aside   the   decree,   and

that   it   always   is   open   to   the

applicant   to   adopt   the   alternative

course   of   depositing   the   total

decretal   amount.(Vide   Statement   of

Objects   and   Reasons,   Gazette   of

India, 1935, Part V, p.90).”

27. This   Court   has   held   that   compliance   of   the

proviso   to   Section   17   is   mandatory   for   making

24

application under Order 9 Rule 13. In paragraph 8

and 9, following was laid down: ­

"8. A bare reading of the provision

shows that the legislature has chosen

to   couch   the   language   of   the   proviso

in   a   mandatory   form   and   we   see   no

reason to interpret, construe and hold

the   nature   of   the   proviso   as

directory.   An   application   seeking   to

set aside an ex parte decree passed by

a   Court   of   Small   Causes   or   for   a

review   of   its   judgment   must   be

accompanied by a deposit in the court

of   the   amount   due   from   the   applicant

under   the   decree   or   in   pursuance   of

the   judgment.   The   provision   as   to

deposit   can   be   dispensed   with   by   the

court   in   its   discretion   subject   to   a

previous   application   by   the   applicant

seeking   direction   of   the   court   for

leave   to   furnish   security   and   the

nature   thereof.   The   proviso   does   not

provide   for   the   extent   of   time   by

which   such   application   for

dispensation   may   be   filed.   We   think

that it may be filed at any time up to

the   time   of   presentation   of

application for setting aside ex parte

decree or for review and the court may

treat   it   as   a   previous   application.

The obligation of the applicant is to

move   a   previous   application   for

dispensation. It is then for the court

to make a prompt order. The delay on

the   part   of   the   court   in   passing   an

appropriate   order   would   not   be   held

against the applicant because none can

25

be made to suffer for the fault of the

court.

9.   In   the   case   at   hand,   the

application for setting aside ex parte

decree was not accompanied by deposit

in   the   court   of   the   amount   due   and

payabl   by   the   applicant   under   the

decree.   The   applicant   also   did   not

move   any   application   for   dispensing

with deposit and seeking leave of the

court for furnishing such security for

the   performance   of   the   decree   as   the

court   may   have   directed.   The

application   for   setting   aside   the

decree   was   therefore   incompetent.   It

could   not   have   been   entertained   and

allowed.”

28. This   Court   held   that   the   trial   court   had

rightly rejected the application which was not in

compliance   with   Section   17   and   both   the   District

Judge   and   the   High   Court   committed   error   in

interfering with the order of the trial court. In

paragraph 10, following was held: ­

"10.   The   trial   court   was   therefore

right   in   rejecting   the   application.

The District Judge in exercise of its

revisional jurisdiction could not have

interfered with the order of the trial

court.   The   illegality   in   exercise   of

jurisdiction   by   the   District   Court

26

disposing of the revision petition was

brought   to   notice   of   the   High   Court

and it was a fit case where the High

Court ought to have in exercise of its

supervisory jurisdiction set aside the

order of the District Court by holding

the   application   filed   by   the

respondents   as   incompetent   and   hence

not entertainable. We need not examine

the   other   question   whether   a

sufficient   cause   for   condoning   the

delay   in   moving   the   application   for

leave of the court to furnish security

for   performance   was   made   out   or   not

and whether such an application moved

at   a   highly   belated   stage   and   hence

not being a “previous application” was

at all entertainable or not.”

29. On   the   date   when   the   application   was   filed

under   Order   9   Rule   13,   i.e.,   25.08.1998,   neither

any deposit was made by the tenant nor there was

any previous application seeking permission of the

Court   to   give   security.   Hence,   there   being   noncompliance   of   proviso   to   Section   17,   application

was liable to be rejected and the trial court vide

its order dated 19.04.2007 had rightly rejected the

application under Order 9 Rule 13.

27

30. We may also notice one more submission of the

learned counsel for the appellant, that the deposit

under Section 30(2) of the Act No.13 of 1972  which

was due on the date of filing of the application

under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was not the deposit of

the   entire   amount.   In   the   execution   application

filed on 27.07.1998 by the landlord to execute the

decree   dated   31.03.1998,   the   amount   which   was

claimed was Rs.21,660/­ which was due till then. 

31. The application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was

filed on 25.08.1998, i.e., subsequent to filing of

the   execution   application,   thus,   at   least   the

amount   of   Rs.21,660/­   was   due.   The   tenant

respondent has made a deposit under Section 30(2)

in July, 1997 of Rs.16,800/­ and again Rs.750/­ on

18.10.1997   which   was   rent   from   30.06.1997   to

30.11.1997. Thus, on the date when the application

was filed under Order 9 Rule 13, total deposit made

by   the   tenant   under   Section   30(2)   was   only

28

Rs.17,550/­ whereas the amount due as per execution

application   was   Rs.21,660/­.     It   was   only   on

25.11.1998,   i.e.,   much   after   filing   of   the

application   under   Order   9   Rule   13,   the   tenant

deposited   amount   of   Rs.1,950/­   as   a   rent   from

30.11.1997 to 31.12.1998. Thus, even according to

the own case of the respondent tenant on the date

when application under Order 9 Rule 13 was filed,

i.e.,   25.08.1998,   the   tenant   had   not   deposited

under Section 30(2) the total amount due, thus, by

no   stretch   of   imagination   the   tenant   could   have

claimed compliance of proviso to Section 17 of Act,

1887.

32. Now, we may proceed to consider as to whether

deposit   under   Section   30(2)   in   the   facts   of   the

present case could have enured to the benefit of

tenant for the purposes of deposit under Section 17

of Act, 1887. The deposit was made on an applicaion

under Section 30(2) filed by the respondent tenant.

29

The   Court   while   allowing   the   application   on

23.05.1997 had passed the following order:­

"           ORDER

    4Kh   application   u/s   30(2)   of   Act

No.XIII   of   1972   is   allowed   without

prejudice to the respective contentions

of   the   parties.   The   plaintiff   may

deposit   the   amount   if   he   so   likes   at

his own risk. The parties shall be free

to agitate the question of validity of

deposit   in   the   S.C.C.   Suit   pending.

File be consigned.”

33. Thus,   the   deposit   by   respondent­tenant   under

Section   30(2)   was   under   his   own   risk   and   the

parties   were   free   to   agitate   the   question   of

validity of deposit in the S.C.C. suit which was

pending on that day.

34. We have noted the pleadings in the suit that

the   plaintiff­landlord   has   come   up   with   the   case

that Act No. 13 of 1972 is not applicable. In the

pleadings of the suit, the plaintiff­appellant has

claimed the exemption from the operation of the Act

30

13   of   1972,   ten   years   of   construction   being   not

completed.   Section   2   of   Act   No.   13   of   1972

provides:­

"2. Exemptions from operation of Act.

(1).....    ..... .....

(2)  Except as provided in sub­section

(5)   of   Section   12,   sub­section   (1­A)

of   Section   21,   sub­section   (2)   of

Section 24, Sections 24­A, 24­B, 24­C

or   sub­section   (3)   of   Section   29,

nothing in this Act shall apply to a

building during a period of ten years

from   the   date   on   which   its

construction is completed]:

Provided   that   where   any   building

is   constructed   substantially   out   of

funds   obtained   by   way   of   loan   or

advance   from   the   State   Government   or

the   Life   Insurance   Corporation   of

India   or   a   bank   or   a   co­operative

society or the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam

Vikas   Parishad,   and   the   period   of

repayment   of   such   loan   or   advance

exceeds   the   aforesaid   period   of   ten

years then the reference in this subsection   to   the   period   of   ten   years

shall be deemed to be a reference to

the   period   of   fifteen   years   or   the

period ending with the date of actual

repayment   of   such   loan   or   advance

(including   interest),   whichever   is

shorter.:

Provided   further   that   where

31

construction   of   a   building   is

completed on or after April 26, 1985

then the reference in this sub­section

to   the   period   of   ten   years   shall   be

deemed to be a reference to a period

of forty years from the date on which

its construction is completed."

35. When the plaintiff had claimed exemption from

the operation of the  Act No.  13 of 1972, it was

specific pleading as noted above, how deposit can

be made under Section 30 of the Act by the tenant

respondent.   Section   2   begin   with   the   expression

that 'Nothing in this Act shall apply'. When there

is   exemption   from   the   applicability   of   the   Act

No.13 of 1972 as pleaded by the plaintiff, Section

30 of the Act shall also not be applicable. When

Section   30   itself   is   not   applicable   to   the

building,   the   deposit   claimed   to   be   made   under

Section   30(2)   is   wholly   irrelevant,   for   any

purposes   including   for   purposes   of   proviso   to

Section 17 of Act, 1887.

32

36. The   High   Court   in   the   impugned   judgment   has

relied on two earlier judgments of the High Court

for coming to the conclusion that the deposit of

Section 30(2) of Act No. 13 of 1972 can be adjusted

against the amount required to be deposited as per

Section 17 proviso of Act, 1887. The High Court has

referred to the judgment of the High Court in Prem

Chandra   Mishra   versus   IInd   Additional   District

Judge, Etah, Writ Petition No.12103 of 1996 decided

on 11.09.2008 reported in (2008) 9 ADJ 13. 

37. In   the   case   of  Prem   Chandra   Mishra,  certian

amount was deposited by the tenant on first date of

hearing, some amount was also deposited under Order

15 Rule 5 CPC by the tenant. The amount which was

deposited under Section 20(4) of the Act No.13 of

1972 as well as Order 15  Rule 5 CPC which could

have been deemed to have been paid on the date of

such deposit. Following are the observations of the

High Court: ­

33

"...Question   arising   in   the   present

case   is   that   Revisional   Court   has

recorded finding of fact which has not

at all been assailed before this Court

that entire amount which is due from

tenant   under   decree   qua   the   same

deposit   is   already   there   even   before

passing   of   decree   and   once   entire

amount in question is there can even

in this contingency application under

Section   17(1)   of   Provincial   Small

Cause Courts Act 1887 can be dismissed

for   non­compliance   of   provision   of

proviso.   Amount   in   question   under

Section   20(4)   of   U.P.   Act   No.   13   of

1972 is permitted to be deposited in

any   suit   for   eviction   on   the   ground

mentioned in Clause (a) of sub­Section

(2) of Section 20 by the tenant on the

first   hearing   of   the   suit

unconditionally   and   amount   which   is

already   deposited   under   Sub­Section

(1) of Section 30 of U.P. Act No. XIII

of 1972 is liable to be deducted for

enabling tenant to save eviction. SubSection   (6)   of   Section   20   clearly

provide   that   any   amount   deposited   by

the   tenant   under   Sub­Section   (4)   or

under Rule 5 of Order VX of the First

Schedule   to   the   Code   of   Civil

Procedure, 1908 shall be paid to the

landlord forthwith on his application

without   prejudice   to   the   parties

pleadings and subject to the ultimate

decision in the suits. Similarly SubSection   (4)   of   Section   30   provides

that   on   any   deposit   which   are   made

under   Section   30   the   amount   in

question which has been deposited can

34

be withdrawn on an application made in

this   behalf   and   further   sub­Section

(6)   of   Section   30   provides   that   any

deposit   made,   same   shall   be   deemed

that the person depositing it has paid

it on the date of such deposit to the

person in whose favour it is deposited

in the case referred to in sub­section

(1)   or   to   the   landlord   in   the   case

referred to in sub­section (2). Thus,

deposits   which   are   made   under   SubSection   (4)   of   Section   20   and   under

Section 30 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972

and under Order XV Rule 5 C.P.C. are

in   custody   of   the   Court   and   said

amount in question can at any point of

time, be withdrawn by the landlord in

question, and are readily available to

the landlord...”

38. The High Court in the above case came to the

following conclusion: ­

"...Facts of the present case are

on   better   footing,   inasmuch   as   here

Revisional   Court   has   recorded

categorical   finding   that   as   per

exparte decree. Tenant was required to

deposit   Rs.   5338.75/­   in   cash   which

was   inclusive   of   rent   claimed   by

plaintiff and other expenses and total

which   has   been   deposited   by   him   was

over and above the amount which was to

be paid by him under decree i.e. more

than Rs. 5800/­.

35

In   the   present   case   admitted

position is that after ex parte decree

has been passed application to recall

ex­parte decree was made on 24.05.1993

and   alongwith   the   same   application

under the proviso to Section 17(1) has

not   at   all   been   moved.   Said

application   was   admittedly   moved

subsequent   to   the   same   on   25.02.1994

and   in   the   said   application   mention

was   made   by   him   that   he   has   already

deposited the rent, cost of suit and

interest   of   JSCC   suit   much   earlier

before passing of exparte decree. Said

application   which   has   been   moved   on

behalf of tenant was not stating any

thing new rather it was sought to be

stated   by   the   tenant   that   in   the

present   case   decretal   amount   is

already   with   the   court   as   he   has

already paid arrears of rent, cost of

suit   and   interest   of   JSCC   suit   much

before   passing   of   exparte   decree   and

same   may   be   taken   into   consideration

while   entertaining   application.

Distinction will have to be drawn qua

the   cases   wherein   entire   amount   as

mentioned in the proviso to Section 17

of   Provincial   Small   Cause   Courts   Act

1887   already   stands   deposited   even

before   passing   of   exparte   decree.   In

the   said   event   of   entire   amount   in

question   being   prior   deposited,

information has to be furnished before

Judge   Small   Causes   Court,   then   said

fact on verification can be treated as

sufficient   compliance   as   provided

under the proviso to Section 17 (1) of

36

Provincial   Small   Cause   Courts   Act

1887, inasmuch as nothing new has been

sought to be done after expiry of the

period   rather   only   information   has

been furnished that said condition has

already   been   complied   with   and

interest   of   landlord   is   fully

protected   as   per   object   and   the

purpose   of   Section   17.   Tenant   cannot

be   asked   to   make   deposit   for   second

time   and   furnish   security   for   the

second time in the backdrop that prior

to passing of decree entire amount due

under   decree   or   judgment   has   already

been deposited. Judge Small Causes can

make   inquiry   in   the   matter   of   this

fact on being apprised as to whether

decretal   amount   is   there   or   not   but

where   decree   in   question   has   been

passed   and   decretal   amount   mentioned

as above is not at all there then law

laid   down   by   Hon'ble   Apex   Court   in

Kedarnath's   case   (supra)   has   to   be

followed in its word and spirit. 

Facts   narrated   above   clearly

makes   Kedarnath's   case   (supra)

distinguishable.   In   the   facts   of   the

present   case   as   finding   of   fact   is

that entire amount has been deposited

which   was   over   and   above   to   the

decretal   amount   and   Revisional   Court

has allowed the same then there being

no failure of justice, then there is

hardly   any   scope   of   interference.

Consequently, in terms of observations

made   above,   present   writ   petition   is

dismissed.”

37

39. The perusal of the judgment indicate that the

said was a case where applicability of Act No. 13

of   1972   was   not   questioned   and   the   deposit   made

under Section 20(4) as well as Order 15 Rule 5 CPC

were relied for the purposes of Section 17. 

40. In the present case, the plaintiff has come up

with   the   case   that   Act   No.13   of   1972   is   not

applicable   in   the   building   in   question.   When   Act

No.13   of   1972   is   not   applicable,   there   is   no

question   of   deposit   under   Section   30   nor   deposit

under Section 30 can be said to be valid deposit.

Thus, judgment of the Allahabad High Court, which

has   been   relied   in   the   impugned   judgment,   is

clearly distinguishable. 

41. We have our own doubts about the correctness

of the view taken by Allahabad High Court in the

above judgment, but for the purposes of the present

case, we need not dwelve any further since in the

38

present case, Act No.13 of 1972 is not applicable.

The   deposit   under   Section   30   is   of   no   avail   and

further, as held above, there was no deposit of the

entire   amount   due   on   the   date   of   filing   the

application  under Order 9 Rule 13 by the tenant. 

42. In   view   of   the   foregoing   discussions,   our

answer to question Nos.1,2 and 3 are as follow:­

1)   In   the   application   filed   by   the   tenant   on

25.08.1998 under Order 9 Rule 13, there was no

compliance   of   Section   17   of   1887   Act   and   the

application was incompetent.

2) The respondent­tenant had not deposited the

entire   amount   due   on   25.08.1998   even   under

Section 30(2) of Act No.13 of 1972.

3)   The   deposit   of   rent   under   Section   30(2)   of

the Act No.13 of 1972 in the present case can

39

not be treated to be deposit for the purposes of

proviso under Section 17 of the Act, 1887.

Now we come to the question No.4

43. Even if for the arguments sake, we proceed on

the assumption that in the present case, there is a

compliance   of   proviso   to   Section   17,   whether

application under Order 9 Rule 13 in the facts of

the present case was rightly rejected by the trial

court is a question to be considered. 

44. We have noticed above that prior to ex­parte

decree   dated   31.03.1998,   trial   court   had   already

passed two orders to proceed ex­parte on 24.02.1997

and 18.03.1997. The tenant respondent had filed an

application   44Ga   to   recall   the   orders   dated

24.02.1997  and 18.03.1997 which applications were

rejected   on   16.05.1997.   While   rejecting   the

application 44Ga filed by the tenant to recall the

40

ex­parte   order.   Following   was   said   by   the   trial

court while rejecting the application: ­

"...The   defendant   wants   to   delay   the

case regularly because he is a tenant

and getting benefit from the property.

The application is based on malafide.

The defendant is failed to explain any

legal   and   genuine   cause   for   his

absence. It is not reasonable to grant

any other opportunity. The application

is rejected. The plaintiff present his

exparte evidence on 25.05.1997.”

45. The   tenant's   application   to   recall   the

exparte   order   was   rejected   by   recording   the

findings   as   noted   above.   The   trial   court   while

rejecting the application under Order 9 Rule 13 has

considered the entire sequence of events and facts.

The   trial   court   while   rejecting   the   application

under   Order   9   Rule   13   vide   its   order   dated

19.04.2007   has   recorded   categorical   finding   that

there is no compliance of proviso to Section 17,

the   decretal   amount   having   not   been   deposited   at

the time of filing application under Order 9 Rule

13. 

41

46. We may also notice the order of the District

Judge   by   which   he   rejected   the   revision   petition

filed   by   the   tenant   against   the   order   dated

19.04.2007. District Judge in judgment noted that

the tenant was provided with several opportunities

to file written statement.

47. We are, thus, of the considered opinion that

there was no valid ground on which the High Court

could have interfered with the order of the trial

court rejecting the application under Order 9 Rule

13   filed   by   the   tenant   to   recall   the   ex­parte

decree. We may further hold that even in the case

where there is a compliance of proviso to Section

17, the application filed under Order 9 Rule 13 to

set aside the decree passed ex­parte or for review

of   the   judgment   cannot   be   automatically   granted.

The compliance of proviso to Section 17 is a Precondition for maintainability of application under

42

Order 9 Rule 13. Application under Order 9 Rule 13

can be allowed only when sufficient cause is made

out to set aside the ex­parte decree. The present

is a case where no sufficient cause was made out to

set aside the ex­parte decree. 

48. As noted above, the tenant had unsuccessfully

challenged the orders passed by the trial court on

24.02.1997 and 18.03.1997 to proceed ex­parte. The

application   of   the   tenant   to   recall   the   orders

dated 24.02.1997 and 18.03.1997 was rejected by the

trial court with a clear finding that the tenant

wants to delay the case regularly because he is the

tenant   and   getting   benefit   of   the   property.   The

application of the tenant was held to be mala fide.

49. The High Court without even adverting to the

earlier order of the trial court dated 16.05.1997,

where   categorical   findings   had   been   recorded

against the tenant, choose to allow the application

43

under Order 9 Rule 13 filed by the tenant to recall

ex­parte decree, which cannot be said to be correct

exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution. 

50. We,   thus,   answer   question   No.4   in   the

following words:

    The tenant­respondent has not made out any

sufficient   ground   to   allow   the   application

under   Order   9   Rule   13   and   the   High   Court

committed error in interfering with the order

of the trial court rejecting such application

which   was   also   confirmed   by   the   District

Judge.

QUESTION NO.5

51. The   High   Court   in   its   impugned   judgment   has

referred   to   judgment   of   this   Court   in  Kailash

versus Nanku and others, reported in (2005) 4 SCC

480,where this Court has laid down that all rules

44

of procedure are the hand made of justice. In the

above case, this Court was considering the power of

the Court to permit extension of time for filing of

written   statement   beyond   a   time   as   fixed   under

Order 8 Rule 1 CPC. The observations in paragraphs

28   and   29,   which   have   been   relied   by   the   High

Court, where in reference to Order 8 Rule 1 CPC,

this Court held that provisions under Order 8 Rule

1 CPC are directory.

52. The above judgment was not applicable in the

facts of the present case. Present was not a case

where there was any procedural breach at the part

of tenant­respondent. The tenant­respondent has not

complied   with   condition   precedent   for

maintainability   of   the   application   under   Order   9

Rule 13 as laid down in Section 17 proviso. 

53. The High Court in paragraph 20 of the judgment

has made following observations:­

45

   "20. Since the learned Courts below

have   adopted   a   hyper­technical   and

pedantic   approach   while   considering

the applications under Order 9 Rule 13

C.P.C.   and   Section   5   of   Limitation

Act,   filed   by   the   petitioner,

therefore   the   impugned   orders   are

liable to be quashed.”

54. The   above   observations   of   the   High   Court

cannot   be   approved.   The   trial   court   has   rejected

the application of tenant under Order 9 Rule 13 not

adopting any hyper­technical and pedantic approach

rather on the finding that there was non­compliance

of proviso to Section 17 of the Act, 1887, hence,

the   application   deserves   to   be   rejected.

Requirement under proviso to Section 17 can neither

be said to be hypertechnical  nor  pedantic but the

same   was   the   requirement   of   law   and   condition

precedent for maintainability of application under

Order 9 Rule 13.

46

55. The question no.5 is answered as follows:

     The High Court is not right in its view that

trial   court   and   Revisional   Court   has   taken

hypertechnical   and   pedantic   approach   while

considering the application under Order 9 Rule 13

of CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

56. In view of the foregoing discussions, we are

unable to sustain the judgment of the High Court

dated 13.12.2018. The judgment dated 13.12.2018 as

well   as   the   order   dated   24.05.2019   rejecting   the

review application as well as consequential order

passed by the trial court dated 24.05.2019 are set

aside.   The   order   of   the   trial   court   dated

19.04.2007 rejecting the application under Order 9

Rule 13 of the respondent is upheld. 

57. In   view   of   the   facts   of   the   present   case

especially the fact that the appellant has not been

able to reap the benefit of the decree which was

47

passed in his favour on 31.03.1998, we direct the

Executing Court to execute the decree and put the

appellant in possession along with the payment of

entire decretal amount up to date within a period

of three months from the date the copy of judgment

is produced before the Executing Court. 

58. The   appeals   are   allowed   with   costs   of

Rs.25,000/­   to   be   paid   by   the   respondent   to   the

appellant before the Executing Court.

......................J.

( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

......................J.

 ( R. SUBHASH REDDY )

New Delhi,

March 03, 2021.

an application under Section 311 could not be rejected on the sole ground that the case had been pending for an inordinate amount of time (ten years there). Rather, it noted that “the length/duration of a case cannot displace the basic requirement of ensuring the just decision after taking all the necessary and material evidence on record. In other words, the age of a case, by itself, cannot be decisive of the matter when a prayer is made for examination of a material witness”. In the present case, the prosecution has sought to produce a copy of the relevant document pertaining to the approval granted by the Board of TANGEDCO on the record and to have it marked as an exhibit in the evidence, for which purpose PWs 1 and 11 were sought to be recalled. In its applications, the prosecution noted that these witnesses were required to mark the relevant document, which was crucial for the decision of the case since the respondent had taken a defense that this document had been signed by the Chairman of TANGEDCO without the Board’s approval. In explaining the delay in filing the applications, the prosecution noted that it was due to the transfer of Special Public Prosecutor who was conducting the case Undoubtedly, we note that the respondent must have an opportunity to crossexamine these witnesses. Hence, we are not expressing any view on the merits of the submissions which were urged on behalf of the respondent by Mr Senthil Jagadeesan, in regard to the depositions of PWs 1 and 11, since these will have to be evaluated by the learned trial Judge. However, we are of the view that the rejection of the applications for recall under Section 311 was not in order. We accordingly allow the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 24 June 2019. The applications filed by the prosecution for recall of PWs 1 and 11 shall accordingly stand allowed. The respondent would also be at liberty to cross-examine these witnesses

 an application under Section 311 could not be rejected on the sole ground that the case had been pending for an inordinate amount of time (ten years there). Rather, it noted that “the length/duration of a case cannot displace the basic requirement of ensuring the just decision after taking all the necessary and material evidence on record. In other words, the age of a case, by itself, cannot be decisive of the matter when a prayer is made for examination of a material witness”. In the present case, the prosecution has sought to produce a copy of the relevant document pertaining to the approval granted by the Board of TANGEDCO on the record and to have it marked as an exhibit in the evidence, for which purpose PWs 1 and 11 were sought to be recalled. In its applications, the prosecution noted that these witnesses were required to mark the relevant document, which was crucial for the decision of the case since the respondent had taken a defense that this document had been signed by the Chairman of TANGEDCO without the Board’s approval. In explaining the delay in filing the applications, the prosecution noted that it was due to the transfer of Special Public Prosecutor who was conducting the case Undoubtedly, we note that the respondent must have an opportunity to crossexamine these witnesses. Hence, we are not expressing any view on the merits of the submissions which were urged on behalf of the respondent by Mr Senthil Jagadeesan, in regard to the depositions of PWs 1 and 11, since these will have to be evaluated by the learned trial Judge. However, we are of the view that the rejection of the applications for recall under Section 311 was not in order. We accordingly allow the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 24 June 2019. The applications filed by the prosecution for recall of PWs 1 and 11 shall accordingly stand allowed. The respondent would also be at liberty to cross-examine these witnesses

1

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal Nos 231-232 of 2021

(Arising out of SLP (Crl) Nos 3104-3105 of 2020)

The State represented by the

Deputy Superintendent of Police .... Appellant(s)

Versus

Tr N Seenivasagan ....Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

1 Leave granted.

2 These appeals arise out of a judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of the

High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 24 June 2019.

3 The appellant is the State represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police,

Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Chennai City–IV. On 13 July 2010, FIR No 14 of

2010 was registered against the respondent (Accused No 1) and another

accused (who has since passed away) under the Prevention of Corruption Act,

19881

. The respondent was a Chief Engineer in the Tamil Nadu Generation and

Distribution Company Limited2

. It is alleged that he demanded a bribe for

revoking the suspension of an employee. On 28 June 2011, the Chairman cum

1 “PC Act”

2 “TANGEDCO”

2

Managing Director of TANGEDCO accorded sanction to prosecute the respondent

and the co-accused under the PC Act. On behalf of the appellant, it has been

urged that this sanction was accorded by the Chairman on behalf of the Board of

TANGEDCO.

4 On the completion of the investigation, the investigating officer filed a final

report under Section 173(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 19733

 on 27 July

2011 against the respondent and the co-accused under Sections 7, 12 and 13(2)

read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. During the trial in CC No. 9 of 2011, the

prosecution examined witnesses PW-1 to PW-12, and through them marked

Exhibits P-1 to P-11 and MO-1 to MO-10.

5 Insofar as it is material for this matter, it is necessary to note that PW-1, the

Chairman of TANGEDCO, was examined in-Chief on 6 June 2013. PW-1 was

cross-examined by the respondent on 18 March 2014, and was re-called on 17

July 2014 at the behest of the co-accused for further cross-examination. The

examination in-Chief of PW-11, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, was

recorded on 1 February 2017. Thereafter, he was cross-examined on 13

February 2017, and subsequently re-called and cross-examined again on 27

February 2017. The evidence from the prosecution’s side was closed on 31

October 2017, and the case was posted for final arguments.

6 The arguments on behalf of the prosecution commenced on 7 December 2017.

The arguments of the defense commenced on 16 December 2017, and

concluded on 16 February 2018. The case was posted for the final submissions

of the prosecution on 27 February 2018, and appears to have been adjourned on

thirty-three occasions until 26 October 2018. In the meantime, the presiding

officer was transferred on 25 June 2018, as a result of which the arguments

3 “CrPC”

3

could not be finally concluded. Even after 26 October 2018, the case was

adjourned on thirty-five occasions, following which it was posted on 11 March

2019 for the prosecution to submit its written arguments.

7 However, on 11 February 2019, the prosecution filed Criminal MP Nos 224 and

225 of 2019 under Section 311 of CrPC for recalling PWs 1 and 11, to enable the

appellant to mark as an exhibit in evidence, the approval dated 26 June 2011 of

the Board of TANGEDCO for sanctioning the prosecution of the respondent and

the co-accused. The respondent opposed these applications. The Trial Judge

passed an order dated 19 February 2019 by which the applications under

Section 311 were dismissed.

8 The prosecution thereafter filed Criminal OP Nos 7694 and 7816 of 2019 under

Section 482 of CrPC before the High Court challenging this order. These have

been dismissed by the High Court by the impugned order dated 24 June 2019.

After noting the earlier evidence of PWs 1 and 11, the High Court held that the

applications had been filed by the prosecution belatedly. The appellant has,

thus, travelled to this Court.

9 On 9 July 2020, this Court passed the following order, inter alia, condoning the

delay and recording the submissions urged on behalf of the appellant:

“1 Delay condoned.

2 Mr M Yogesh Kanna, appearing on behalf of the petitioner

submits that Annexure P-4 to the Special Leave Petition,

which is the order of sanction dated 28 June 2011, has

been marked as Exhibit P-1 in the trial. Referring to the

contents of the order of sanction, learned counsel

submits that there is a reference in the order to the fact

that the appointing authority is the Board and that the

papers for grant of sanction had been placed before the

Board. Learned counsel submitted that the prosecution

only seeks to mark as an exhibit the proceedings which

took place before the Board.

4

3 Issue notice, returnable in six weeks.

4 Dasti, in addition, is permitted.

5 In the meantime, for a period of eight weeks from today,

there shall be a stay of the further proceedings in the

pending trial, namely, CC No 9 of 2011, pending before

the Special Judge, Special Court for the Cases under

Prevention of Corruption Act at Chennai.”

10 In pursuance of the order issuing notice, Mr Senthil Jagadeesan, learned counsel,

has entered appearance on behalf of the respondent and has filed a counteraffidavit.

11 Mr M Yogesh Kanna, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant,

submits that the order of sanction dated 28 June 2011 has already been marked

as Exhibit P-1 during the course of the trial. Essentially, the submission of the

prosecution is that the purpose of recalling PWs 1 and 11 was to place on the

record and mark in evidence a copy of the reference which was made to the

Board of TANGEDCO, where the respondent was employed as a Chief Engineer.

Learned counsel submits that having due regard to the ambit of Section 311, the

applications ought to have been allowed, particularly in view of the fact that the

final arguments could not be concluded in view of the intervening transfer of the

judicial officer and the case is still pending. It was further submitted that having

regard to the nature and scope of the proceedings which arise out of the

provisions of the PC Act, it would be appropriate and in the interests of justice if

liberty is granted to the prosecution to place the relevant document pertaining

to the approval granted by the Board of TANGEDCO on the record.

12 On the other hand, Mr Senthil Jagadeesan has drawn the attention of the Court

to the depositions of PW-1 and PW-11. Adverting also to the purported Board

Minutes at Annexure P-2 (a photocopy of which has been filed at Annexure R-2 of

5

the counter-affidavit), it has been submitted that the document, as a matter of

fact, does not have the signatures of the members of the Board. Moreover, it

has been urged that PW-1, who is the Chairman of TANGEDCO, during the course

of his deposition, submitted that he had granted sanction for the prosecution of

the respondent and the co-accused without reference to the Board, and that he

was entitled to do so in accordance with the provisions of the PC Act.

13 In our view, having due regard to the nature and ambit of Section 311 of the

CrPC, it was appropriate and proper that the applications filed by the prosecution

ought to have been allowed. Section 311 provides that any Court may, at any

stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the CrPC, summon any

person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not

summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined

and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such

person “if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the

case”. The true test, therefore, is whether it appears to the Court that the

evidence of such person who is sought to be recalled is essential to the just

decision of the case.

14 In Manju Devi v State of Rajasthan4

, a two-Judge bench of this Court noted

that an application under Section 311 could not be rejected on the sole ground

that the case had been pending for an inordinate amount of time (ten years

there). Rather, it noted that “the length/duration of a case cannot displace the

basic requirement of ensuring the just decision after taking all the necessary and

material evidence on record. In other words, the age of a case, by itself, cannot

be decisive of the matter when a prayer is made for examination of a material

witness”. Speaking for the Court, Justice Dinesh Maheshwari expounded on the

principles underlying Section 311 in the following terms:

4 (2019) 6 SCC 203

6

“10. It needs hardly any emphasis that the discretionary

powers like those under Section 311 CrPC are essentially

intended to ensure that every necessary and appropriate

measure is taken by the Court to keep the record straight

and to clear any ambiguity insofar as the evidence is

concerned as also to ensure that no prejudice is caused

to anyone. The principles underlying Section 311 CrPC

and amplitude of the powers of the court thereunder

have been explained by this Court in several decisions

[ Vide Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India, 1991 Supp

(1) SCC 271 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 595; Zahira Habibulla H.

Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 4 SCC 158 : 2004 SCC

(Cri) 999; Mina Lalita Baruwa v. State of Orissa, (2013) 16

SCC 173 : (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 218; Rajaram Prasad Yadav

v. State of Bihar, (2013) 14 SCC 461 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri)

256 and Natasha Singh v. CBI, (2013) 5 SCC 741 : (2013)

4 SCC (Cri) 828] . In Natasha Singh v. CBI [Natasha Singh

v. CBI, (2013) 5 SCC 741 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 828] ,

though the application for examination of witnesses was

filed by the accused but, on the principles relating to the

exercise of powers under Section 311, this Court

observed, inter alia, as under: (SCC pp. 746 & 748-49,

paras 8 &15)

“8. Section 311 CrPC empowers the court to summon a

material witness, or to examine a person present at “any

stage” of “any enquiry”, or “trial”, or “any other

proceedings” under CrPC, or to summon any person as a

witness, or to recall and re-examine any person who has

already been examined if his evidence appears to it, to

be essential to the arrival of a just decision of the case.

Undoubtedly, CrPC has conferred a very wide

discretionary power upon the court in this respect, but

such a discretion is to be exercised judiciously and not

arbitrarily. The power of the court in this context is very

wide, and in exercise of the same, it may summon any

person as a witness at any stage of the trial, or other

proceedings. The court is competent to exercise such

power even suo motu if no such application has been

filed by either of the parties. However, the court must

satisfy itself, that it was in fact essential to examine such

a witness, or to recall him for further examination in

order to arrive at a just decision of the case.

***

15. The scope and object of the provision is to enable the

court to determine the truth and to render a just decision

after discovering all relevant facts and obtaining proper

proof of such facts, to arrive at a just decision of the

case. Power must be exercised judiciously and not

capriciously or arbitrarily, as any improper or capricious

exercise of such power may lead to undesirable results.

An application under Section 311 CrPC must not be

allowed only to fill up a lacuna in the case of the

7

prosecution, or of the defence, or to the disadvantage of

the accused, or to cause serious prejudice to the defence

of the accused, or to give an unfair advantage to the

opposite party. Further, the additional evidence must not

be received as a disguise for retrial, or to change the

nature of the case against either of the parties. Such a

power must be exercised, provided that the evidence

that is likely to be tendered by a witness, is germane to

the issue involved. An opportunity of rebuttal however,

must be given to the other party. The power conferred

under Section 311 CrPC must therefore, be invoked by

the court only in order to meet the ends of justice, for

strong and valid reasons, and the same must be

exercised with great caution and circumspection. The

very use of words such as “any court”, “at any stage”, or

“or any enquiry, trial or other proceedings”, “any person”

and “any such person” clearly spells out that the

provisions of this section have been expressed in the

widest possible terms, and do not limit the discretion of

the court in any way. There is thus no escape if the fresh

evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision

of the case. The determinative factor should therefore

be, whether the summoning/recalling of the said witness

is in fact, essential to the just decision of the case.”

(emphasis in original)”

15 In the present case, the prosecution has sought to produce a copy of the

relevant document pertaining to the approval granted by the Board of

TANGEDCO on the record and to have it marked as an exhibit in the evidence,

for which purpose PWs 1 and 11 were sought to be recalled. In its applications,

the prosecution noted that these witnesses were required to mark the relevant

document, which was crucial for the decision of the case since the respondent

had taken a defense that this document had been signed by the Chairman of

TANGEDCO without the Board’s approval. In explaining the delay in filing the

applications, the prosecution noted that it was due to the transfer of Special

Public Prosecutor who was conducting the case. The relevant parts of the

prosecution’s application are reproduced below:

“It is submitted that the case was conducted by

Additional Legal Adviser Tr.T.Panneerselvam and he was

transferred as Deputy Director of Prosecution,

Kancheepuram District and hence Tr.Pandiarajan, ADLA,

8

HQ, DVAC, Chennai is posted as Special Public Prosecutor

for conduction this case.

…

It is submitted that the Exhibit.Pl, the order of sanction

itself shows that the order was issued by the Board. But

the defence has taken a stand that the order was not

issued by the Board and the same was issued by the

Chairman who was not competent person to accord the

sanction.

It is submitted that at the time of filing the charge sheet

the Investigation Officer has obtained the Approval Order

of the Board and not submitted it before this Hon'ble

Court.

It is submitted that in support of the contention of the

prosecution it is necessary to mark the documents

pertaining to the Board of TANGEDCO to satisfy this

Hon'ble Court for just decision of the case that the

sanction was accorded in accordance with law and rules

and regulations stated in the TANGEDCO.

…

It is submitted that recalling PW1 and PW11 for marking

the documents pertaining to the Sanction cannot be

termed as lacuna or to fill up the gap. But only to help

this Hon'ble Court for arriving just decision of the case.”

16 Undoubtedly, we note that the respondent must have an opportunity to crossexamine these witnesses. Hence, we are not expressing any view on the merits

of the submissions which were urged on behalf of the respondent by Mr Senthil

Jagadeesan, in regard to the depositions of PWs 1 and 11, since these will have

to be evaluated by the learned trial Judge. However, we are of the view that the

rejection of the applications for recall under Section 311 was not in order. We

accordingly allow the appeals and set aside the impugned judgment and order of

the High Court dated 24 June 2019. The applications filed by the prosecution for

recall of PWs 1 and 11 shall accordingly stand allowed. The respondent would

also be at liberty to cross-examine these witnesses. 

9

17 Having regard to the pendency of the trial for a long period of time, we order

and direct that the trial be completed by 31 July 2021.

18 Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

 …………...…...….......………………........J.

 [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

…..…..…....…........……………….…........J.

 [M R Shah]

New Delhi;

March 01, 2021

-S-

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ITEM NO.4 Court 6 (Video Conferencing) SECTION II-C

 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) Nos.3104-3105/2020

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 24-06-2019

in CRLOP No. 7694/2019 and CRLOP No. 7816/2019 passed by the High

Court of Judicature at Madras)

THE STATE REPRESENTED BY THE

DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE Petitioner(s)

 VERSUS

TR. N. SEENIVASAGAN Respondent(s)

(WITH I.R., IA No. 54976/2020 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)

Date : 01-03-2021 These petitions were called on for hearing today.

CORAM : HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.R. SHAH

For Petitioner(s) Mr. M. Yogesh Kanna, AOR

Mr. Raja Rajeshwaran S, Adv.

Mr. Aditya Chadha, Adv.

Ms. Uma Prasuna Bachu, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Mr. Senthil Jagadeesan, AOR

Ms. Mrinal Kanwar, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

 O R D E R

1 Leave granted.

2 The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

3 Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.

 (SANJAY KUMAR-I) (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR)

 AR-CUM-PS COURT MASTER

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

When it was noticed that the deceased has suffered 90 per cent injuries and was in a fit condition to make a declaration, he sent a request to the concerned Magistrate, upon which, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yamuna Nagar, Jagadhri, recorded the statement of the deceased, Pooja Rani, which was exhibited as Ex-PL. In her dying declaration, she has clearly stated that the appellant has poured Kerosene Oil on her and set her ablaze. Though, the family members of the appellant were also chargesheeted, they were subsequently discharged vide Order dated 12.08.2008. On information given to the parents of the deceased, they have come to hospital. The deceased, Pooja Rani was admitted in the hospital on 20.03.2008 and ultimately, succumbed to injuries on 27.03.2008. It is also clear from the material evidence, placed before this Court, that though the family members of the deceased were in the hospital, they were sent out, when the dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate, who was also examined on behalf of the prosecution as PW-16

 When it was noticed that the deceased has suffered 90 per cent injuries and was in a fit condition to make a declaration, he sent a request to the concerned Magistrate, upon which, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yamuna Nagar, Jagadhri, recorded the statement of the deceased, Pooja  Rani, which was exhibited as Ex-PL. In her dying declaration, she has clearly stated that the appellant has poured Kerosene Oil on her and set her ablaze. Though, the family members of the appellant were also chargesheeted, they were subsequently discharged vide Order dated 12.08.2008. On information given to the parents of the deceased, they have come to hospital. The deceased, Pooja Rani was admitted in the hospital on 20.03.2008 and ultimately, succumbed to injuries on 27.03.2008. It is also clear from the material evidence, placed before this Court, that though the family members of the deceased were in the hospital, they were sent out, when the dying declaration was recorded by the Magistrate, who was also examined on behalf of the prosecution as PW-16

CR.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.5802/2018

REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.261 OF 2021

(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.5802 of 2018)

Satpal ....Appellant(s)

 vs.

State of Haryana ....Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

R.SUBHASH REDDY,J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal has been filed by the accused in

Session Case No.20 of 2008, on the file of the learned

Additional Sessions Judge, Yamuna Nagar at Jagadhri,

aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 05th

September, 2016, passed by the High Court of Punjab and

Haryana at Chandigarh, whereby, his conviction and

order of sentence, for offence under Section 302 of the

Indian Penal Code (IPC), was confirmed.

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CR.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.5802/2018

3. On information received from J. P. Hospital,

Yamuna Nagar, regarding admission of the deceased,

Pooja Rani, on account of burn injuries, a case was

registered in FIR No. 112 on 20.03.2008, initially

under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian

Penal Code and on death of Pooja Rani i.e. on

27.03.2008, Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code was

added. On receipt of information, Mr. Ishwar Singh,

A.S.I. of Police Station City, Yamuna Nagar, went to

the J. P. Hospital along with other police officials

and noticed that the deceased suffered 90 per cent

injuries and at that stage, she was declared fit to

make statement. On the request of the police, Ms. Kumud

Gugnani, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yamuna

Nagar, Jagadhri, recorded the statement of deceased,

Pooja Rani.

4. In the declaration, recorded by the Judicial

Magistrate, First Class, Yamuna Nagar, Jagadhri, the

deceased has stated that the appellant / accused has

poured kerosene oil and set her ablaze. After

investigation, Charge-Sheet was filed against the

appellant / accused and three others namely Kamlesh,

Mitter Sain and Anjali, mother-in-law, brother-in-law

2

CR.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.5802/2018

and sister-in-law respectively of the deceased.

However, vide order dated 12.08.2008, the other accused

persons were discharged and charge was framed against

the appellant herein, for offence punishable under

Section 302 of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty

and claimed trial.

5. To prove the charge framed by the appellant

herein, the prosecution examined C. Narender Kumar as

PW-1, C. Ram Kumar as PW-2, Jai Pal, ASI as PW-3, EHC

Prem Singh as PW-4, Varsha Rani as PW-5, Kashmiri Lal

as PW-6, Pyara Singh, Inspector as PW-7, Jai Kishan,

ASI as PW-8, Dr. Manisha Singh as PW-9, EHC Satwinder

Singh as PW-10, Raj Kumar, SI as PW-11, Lal Singh, ASI

as PW-12, Dr. Amit Goel as PW-13, Balraj Singh, ASI as

PW-14, Ishwar Singh, ASI as PW-15 and Kumud Gugnani as

PW-16.

6. When the statement of the appellant under Section

313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) was

recorded, the appellant denied the allegations levelled

against him and pleaded that he was falsely implicated

inasmuch as the deceased, Pooja Rani, was under a

misconception that he had illicit relations with Anjali

3

CR.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.5802/2018

(sister-in-law). On behalf of the appellant / accused,

no witnesses were examined.

7. The Trial Court, by appreciating oral and

documentary evidence on record, by judgment and order

dated 03.11.2009, convicted the appellant for offence,

punishable under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced

him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to

pay fine of Rs.10,000/- with a default clause to

undergo further rigorous imprisonment of two years.

8. Aggrieved by the conviction recorded and sentence

imposed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,

Yamuna Nagar, Jagadhri, the appellant herein, preferred

Criminal Appeal No. D-147-DB of 2010 before the High

Court of Punjab and Haryana, at Chandigarh. The High

Court, vide impugned judgment and order dated 05th

September, 2016, dismissed the appeal by confirming the

conviction recorded and sentence imposed on the

appellant.

9. We have heard Mrs. Nanita Sharma, learned counsel

appearing for the appellant and Mr. Deepak Thukral,

learned Dy. A.G., appearing for the respondent-State.

4

CR.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.5802/2018

10. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended

that though, the evidence on record led by the

prosecution, is not sufficient to prove the guilt of

the accused, the Trial Court has erroneously convicted

the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC

and the same was confirmed by the High Court without

considering various grounds, raised on behalf of the

appellant. It is, further, contended by the learned

counsel that the conviction is mainly based on the

dying declaration, recorded by the Magistrate, who was

examined as PW-16. It is submitted that the dying

declaration was tutored one and the same was made at

the instance of family members of the deceased, who

were there with the deceased in hospital at the

relevant time. It is submitted that, in fact, when the

deceased made attempt to commit suicide, the appellant

has tried his best to extinguish the fire. Lastly, he

has submitted that the conviction, recorded by the

Trial Court, as confirmed by the High Court, is fit to

be set aside by this Court.

11. On the other hand, the learned Dy. A.G., appearing

for the State, has contended that the prosecution has

proved the guilt of the accused for offence under

5

CR.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.5802/2018

Section 302 of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt. It is

submitted that immediately on receipt of information,

Mr. Ishwar Singh, ASI went to the hospital, along with

other police officials and found that the deceased has

suffered 90 per cent injuries, but she was in a fit

condition to make statement. It is submitted that, on

request, Ms. Kumud Gugnani, the then Judicial

Magistrate, First Class, Yamuna Nagar, Jagadhri,

recorded the statement of deceased, Pooja Rani under

Exhibit ‘Ex-PL’, wherein she stated that she was

married to the appellant three years prior to the

incident and that the appellant was under the influence

of his brother’s wife and used to act on her

instigation. In the statement recorded, the deceased

clearly stated that the appellant has poured kerosene

oil on her and set her ablaze. It is submitted that

merely because her family members have reached the

hospital, on coming to know of the burn injuries,

suffered by the deceased, it cannot be said that the

declaration made by the deceased before the Magistrate

was a tutored one. It is submitted that at the time of

recording of statement of deceased, all the family

members were sent out and the statement was recorded,

6

CR.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.5802/2018

as deposed by the deceased. It is submitted that if the

entire evidence is considered, it clearly proves the

case of the prosecution for offence under Section 302

of the IPC. It is submitted that the evidence on record

is properly appreciated by the Trial Court as well as

the High Court, and in view of the concurrent findings,

recorded by both the Courts below, no case is made out

to interfere with the same.

12. Having heard learned counsels on both sides, we

have perused the impugned judgment, judgment of the

Trial Court and other material evidence placed on

record.

13. In this case, it is to be noticed that, at first

instance, on coming to know that the deceased, Pooja

Rani, was admitted to hospital with the burn injuries,

as informed by the police, the ASI went to the hospital

along with other police officials. When it was noticed

that the deceased has suffered 90 per cent injuries and

was in a fit condition to make a declaration, he sent a

request to the concerned Magistrate, upon which, the

Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Yamuna Nagar,

Jagadhri, recorded the statement of the deceased, Pooja

7

CR.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.5802/2018

Rani, which was exhibited as Ex-PL. In her dying

declaration, she has clearly stated that the appellant

has poured Kerosene Oil on her and set her ablaze.

Though, the family members of the appellant were also

chargesheeted, they were subsequently discharged vide

Order dated 12.08.2008. On information given to the

parents of the deceased, they have come to hospital.

The deceased, Pooja Rani was admitted in the hospital

on 20.03.2008 and ultimately, succumbed to injuries on

27.03.2008. It is also clear from the material

evidence, placed before this Court, that though the

family members of the deceased were in the hospital,

they were sent out, when the dying declaration was

recorded by the Magistrate, who was also examined on

behalf of the prosecution as PW-16.

14. If we look at dying declaration, recorded by the

Magistrate, it looks natural and no reason to

disbelieve the same. In addition to the dying

declaration, the statements of PW-5 and PW-6, who are

mother and maternal uncle respectively of the deceased,

corroborate the case of prosecution. It is clear from

their statements that the deceased was tortured at the

hands of the appellant and his family members. The

8

CR.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.5802/2018

Magistrate, in her deposition, has clearly stated that

the relatives of deceased, Pooja Rani, were not there

at the time of recording dying declaration of the

deceased.

15. Further, it is also relevant to notice here,

though the appellant has stated in his statement,

recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., that many

persons from the neighbourhood came to the house of the

appellant at the time of incident, no one was examined

on his behalf.

16. If the dying declaration, recorded by PW-16, is

considered along with the depositions of PW-5, PW-6 and

other witnesses, who were examined on behalf of the

prosecution, it clearly establishes the guilt of the

appellant, beyond reasonable doubt, as such, we find no

merit in any of the contentions, advanced by the

learned counsel for the appellant. Further, merely

because the parents and other relatives of the deceased

were present in the Hospital, when the statement of the

deceased was recorded, it cannot be said that the said

statement was a tutored one. It is quite natural that

when such an incident happens, the parents and other

9

CR.A.@SLP(Crl.)No.5802/2018

relatives try to reach the hospital immediately. Merely

because they were in the hospital, the same is no

ground to disbelieve the dying declaration, recorded by

the Magistrate, who was examined as PW-16.

17. For the above stated reasons and the reasons

recorded by the High Court, we are of the view that

there is no error committed in the impugned judgment

and order, so as to interfere with the same in this

Appeal. This Criminal Appeal is devoid of merits and

the same is accordingly dismissed.

 ..........................J.

 (ASHOK BHUSHAN)

 ..........................J.

 (R. SUBHASH REDDY)

NEW DELHI;

March 03, 2021

10