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Monday, November 11, 2019

Lost Grant -presumption - when not - it could not be made, if there was no person competent to be the recipient of such a grant, as where the right is claimed by a fluctuating body of persons. likewise be no scope for this presumption, if there is no person capable of making a grant: Suit for Declaration of title and possession and injunction against forest department H.H. Sri Sundara Ramanuja Periya Jeer Swamigal of Periya Jeer Swamigal Mutt, Tirupati and five others (hereinafter referred to as “devotees”) filed O.S.No.178 of 1982 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Madurai for a declaration that the entire forest area in Alagar Hills belongs to Sri Arulmighu Kallalagar also called Sri Sundarajasami or Sundara Bahu or Paramasamy, the Presiding Deity of the Respondent-temple. A consequential relief of possession of the said forest area was also sought. O.S. No.171 of 1987 was filed by Arulmigu Kallalagar Thirukoil Alagar Koil (for short “the Respondent”) in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Madurai for a direction to the Government of Tamil Nadu (for short “the Appellant”) to deliver possession of the schedule mentioned property i.e. Alagar hills. Relief of permanent injunction restraining the Defendant i.e. the Appellant-herein and the Chief Conservator of Forest Department from disturbing the underground water reserves by digging wells or in any other manner was also sought. = Apex court held that We have carefully examined those documents which only show that honey and other forest produce were being collected by those who were permitted by the Respondent-temple. The right, title or possession of the temple over Alagar hills cannot be determined on the basis of the above documents. - The circumstances in which the presumption of lost grant can be made has been settled by this Court in a judgment reported in Sri Manohar Das Mohanta v. Charu Chandra Pal & Ors. as under ; “7. The circumstances and conditions under which a presumption of lost grant could be made are well settled. When a person was found in possession and enjoyment of land for a considerable period of time under an assertion of title without challenge, Courts in England were inclined to ascribe a legal origin to such possession, and when on the facts a title by prescription could not be sustained, it was held that a presumption could be made that the possession was referable to a grant by the owner entitled to the land, but that such grant had been lost. It was a presumption made for securing ancient and continued possession, which could not otherwise be reasonably accounted for. But it was not a presumptio juris et de jure, and the Courts were not bound to raise it, if the facts in evidence went against it. “It cannot be the duty of a Judge to presume a grant of the nonexistence of which he is convinced” observed Farwell, J.in Attorney-General v. Simpson [(1901) 2 Ch D 671, 698]. So also the presumption was not made if there was any legal impediment to the making of it. Thus, it has been held that it could not be made, if there was no person competent to be the recipient of such a grant, as where the right is claimed by a fluctuating body of persons. That was held in Raja Braja Sundar Deb v. Moni Behara [1951 SCR 431, 446] . There will likewise be no scope for this presumption, if there is no person capable of making a grant: (Vide Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. IV, p. 574, para 1074); or if the grant would have been illegal and beyond the powers of the grantor. We do not agree that the respondent was in continuous possession under an assertion of title as there is no evidence on record to reach such a conclusion. The presumption of lost grant is therefore not permissible. The finding recorded by the High Court that there is adequate material to hold that Alagar hills belong to the temple is erroneous. The trial Court is right in holding that the Respondent miserably failed in producing any material to prove its title. we were informed that the parties were attempting a settlement. This Court directed the Member Secretary, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board (HR & CE) to convene a meeting with all the stakeholders to facilitate a settlement. A meeting was conducted on 03.08.2019 in the Office of the Commissioner, HR & CE in which all the stakeholders participated. The significant proposals of the Respondent were that the title in respect of the Alagar Hills should be with that of the presiding deity of the Respondent-temple and that the income from the forest shall be shared equally by the Respondent-temple and the Forest Department. The Appellant did not accept the said proposals. After joint inspection by the Forest Department and the HR & CE Department, the Appellant was willing to divert an area of 18.3032 hectares of land including the various religious spots for ease of movement of the devotees. The Forest Department was willing to permit 50 ft. of pathway to reach all the spots and shrines from the foothill. The Forest Department was of the view that the temple should undertake very strict vigil on the ecosystem and environment and no non-forest activities shall be permitted within the 18.3032 hectares, except religious activities. We are in agreement with the proposal made by the Appellant. The Forest Department shall permit 50 ft. of pathway to reach all the spots and shrines from the foothills for which the earmarked area of 18.3032 hectares of land can be used. No non-forest activities shall be permitted to be undertaken by anybody, including the Respondent-temple administration within the 18.3032 hectares of land which is diverted for ease of movement of devotees to reach all the spots and shrines from the foothill.

Lost Grant -presumption - when not -  it could not be made, if there was no person competent to be the recipient of such a grant, as where the right is claimed by a fluctuating body of persons.  likewise be no scope for this presumption, if there is no person capable of making a grant:

Suit for Declaration of title and possession and injunction against forest department
 H.H. Sri Sundara Ramanuja Periya Jeer Swamigal of Periya Jeer Swamigal Mutt, Tirupati and five others (hereinafter referred to as “devotees”) filed O.S.No.178 of 1982 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Madurai for a declaration that the entire forest area in Alagar Hills belongs to Sri Arulmighu Kallalagar also called Sri Sundarajasami or Sundara Bahu or Paramasamy, the Presiding Deity of the
Respondent-temple. 
A consequential relief of possession of the said forest area was also sought. O.S. No.171 of 1987
was filed by Arulmigu Kallalagar Thirukoil Alagar Koil (for short “the Respondent”) in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Madurai for a direction to the Government of Tamil Nadu (for short “the Appellant”) to deliver possession of the schedule mentioned property i.e. Alagar hills. Relief of permanent injunction restraining the Defendant i.e. the Appellant-herein and the Chief Conservator of Forest Department from disturbing the underground water reserves by digging wells
or in any other manner was also sought. =
Apex court held that  
We have carefully examined those documents  which only show that
honey and other forest produce were being collected by those who were permitted by the Respondent-temple. The right, title or possession of the temple over Alagar hills cannot be determined on the basis of the above documents. -

The circumstances in which the presumption of lost grant can be made has been settled by
this Court in a judgment reported in Sri Manohar Das Mohanta v. Charu Chandra Pal & Ors.
 as under ;
“7. The circumstances and conditions under which a
presumption of lost grant could be made are well
settled. When a person was found in possession and
enjoyment of land for a considerable period of time
under an assertion of title without challenge, Courts in
England were inclined to ascribe a legal origin to such
possession, and when on the facts a title by
prescription could not be sustained, it was held that a
presumption could be made that the possession was
referable to a grant by the owner entitled to the land,
but that such grant had been lost. It was a
presumption made for securing ancient and continued
possession, which could not otherwise be reasonably
accounted for. But it was not a presumptio juris et de
jure, and the Courts were not bound to raise it, if the
facts in evidence went against it. 
“It cannot be the duty of a Judge to presume a grant of the nonexistence of which he is convinced” observed Farwell, J.in Attorney-General v. Simpson [(1901) 2 Ch D 671,
698]. So also the presumption was not made if there
was any legal impediment to the making of it. Thus, it
has been held that it could not be made, if there was
no person competent to be the recipient of such a
grant, as where the right is claimed by a fluctuating
body of persons. That was held in Raja Braja Sundar
Deb v. Moni Behara [1951 SCR 431, 446] . There will
likewise be no scope for this presumption, if there is no
person capable of making a grant: (Vide Halsbury's
Laws of England, Vol. IV, p. 574, para 1074); or if the
grant would have been illegal and beyond the powers
of the grantor.
We do not agree that the respondent was in continuous possession under an assertion of title as there is no evidence on record to reach such a conclusion. The presumption of lost grant is therefore not permissible.
The finding recorded by the High Court that there is adequate material to hold that Alagar hills belong to the temple is erroneous. The trial Court is right in holding that
the Respondent miserably failed in producing any material to prove its title.

 we were informed that the parties were attempting a settlement. This Court directed the Member
Secretary, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Board (HR & CE) to convene a meeting with all the stakeholders to facilitate a settlement. A meeting was conducted on 03.08.2019 in the Office of the Commissioner, HR & CE in which all the stakeholders participated. 
The significant proposals of the Respondent were that the title in respect of the Alagar Hills should be with that of the presiding deity of the Respondent-temple and that the income from the forest shall be shared equally by the Respondent-temple and the Forest Department. The Appellant did not accept the said proposals. After joint inspection by the Forest Department and the HR & CE Department, the Appellant was willing to divert an area of 18.3032 hectares of land including the various religious
spots for ease of movement of the devotees. The Forest Department was willing to permit 50 ft. of pathway to reach all the spots and shrines from the foothill. The Forest Department was of the view that the temple should undertake very strict vigil on the ecosystem and environment and no non-forest activities shall be permitted within the 18.3032 hectares, except religious activities. We
are in agreement with the proposal made by the Appellant. The Forest Department shall permit 50 ft. of pathway to reach all the spots and shrines from the foothills for which the earmarked area of 18.3032 hectares of land can be used. No non-forest activities shall be permitted to be
undertaken by anybody, including the Respondent-temple administration within the 18.3032 hectares of land which is diverted for ease of movement of devotees to reach all the spots and shrines from the foothill.

Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal Nos. 559- 560 of 2008
The Government of Tamil Nadu & Anr. Etc. Etc.
.... Appellant(s)
Versus
Arulmighu Kallalagar Thirukoil Alagar Koil
& Ors. Etc. Etc.
…. Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
1. H.H. Sri Sundara Ramanuja Periya Jeer Swamigal of
Periya Jeer Swamigal Mutt, Tirupati and five others
(hereinafter referred to as “devotees”) filed O.S.No.178 of
1982 in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Madurai for a
declaration that the entire forest area in Alagar Hills belongs
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to Sri Arulmighu Kallalagar also called Sri Sundarajasami or
Sundara Bahu or Paramasamy, the Presiding Deity of the
Respondent-temple. A consequential relief of possession of
the said forest area was also sought. O.S. No.171 of 1987
was filed by Arulmigu Kallalagar Thirukoil Alagar Koil (for
short “the Respondent”) in the Court of Subordinate Judge,
Madurai for a direction to the Government of Tamil Nadu (for
short “the Appellant”) to deliver possession of the schedule
mentioned property i.e. Alagar hills. Relief of permanent
injunction restraining the Defendant i.e. the Appellant-herein
and the Chief Conservator of Forest Department from
disturbing the underground water reserves by digging wells
or in any other manner was also sought. The schedule
mentioned property is to an extent of 15,838.4 acres at
Sellappa Naickenpatti Village. O.S. No.171 of 1987 filed by
the Respondent, was dismissed by a judgment dated
14.03.1988 and O.S. No.178 of 1982 filed by the devotees
was dismissed on 28.09.1995. The Appeals filed against the
judgments of the trial Court were allowed by the High Court
of Judicature at Madras vide judgment dated 27.06.2003.
Aggrieved by the judgment, the Appellant approached this
Court by filing the above Appeals.
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2. In O.S. No.178 of 1982 filed by the devotees, it was
averred that the entire Alagar Malai was the property of Lord
Sri Kallalagar. The devotees further pleaded that from the
historical records and Sthalapurana that the Government
which was in management of the temple handed over the
temple to the Manager or the temple Committee members
but failed to hand over the forest area which is the subject
matter of the dispute. The devotees contended that the
provisions of the Madras Forest Act, 1882 (for short “the
Act”) were not complied with before declaring Alagar Hills as
a reserved forest. Claiming themselves to be members of
the Vaishnava Community who are deeply interested in the
preservation of the entire Alagarmalai as the property of
Lord Sri Arulmighu Kallalagar, the devotees filed a
comprehensive suit for declaration of title.
3. The Appellant filed a written statement contending that
the entirety of Alagar Hills belongs to the Government.
According to the Appellant, Alagar Hills have been classified
as reserved forest by the Government Notification No.187
dated 11.10.1883. It was argued that the entire suit
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schedule property i.e. Alagar Hills was in possession, control
and management of the Forest Department.
4. The trial Court dismissed the suit filed by the
Respondent by holding that no evidence was produced to
show that the suit property belonged to the Respondenttemple. The contention of the Government that the suit
property was declared as a reserved forest in 1881 was
accepted by the trial Court. The Notification dated
11.10.1883 under Section 25 of the Act was relied upon by
the trial Court to hold that the Respondent-temple cannot
claim any right over the forest land on Alagar Hills.
5. The suit filed by the devotees was also dismissed by
the trial Court on the ground that the Notification dated
11.10.1883 under Section 25 of the Act was valid and it was
issued after following the procedure prescribed by the Act.
The trial Court also held that no evidence has been produced
by the devotees to show that the temple had any right over
the Alagar Hills. As the issue was substantially the same as
that in O.S. No.171 of 1987, the trial Court held that O.S.
No.178 of 1982 is hit by res judicata.
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6. The High Court heard the Appeals filed against the two
judgments of the trial Court together and disposed them of
by a common judgment. The High Court framed the
following questions for determination:
“1. Whether Azhagar Hills belong to Azhagar
Temple?
2. Whether they were in the possession and
management of the first defendant Government in
their capacity as trustee and therefore, Section 10
of the Limitation Act would apply?
3. Whether the Government Order dated
11.10.1883 had been properly issued or is illegal
and invalid for non observance of the provisions of
the Tamil Nadu Forest Act, 1882? ”
7. The Applications filed by the Respondent under Order
41 Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) were
allowed and the documents produced by the Respondent
were marked as Exhibit A-46 to A-56. While referring to
Section 25 of the Act, the High Court held that there is no
order of reservation as contemplated in Section 25 of the
Act. It was further observed by the High Court that the
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procedure prescribed under Sections 6 and 8 of the Act was
not complied with. The Notification dated 11.10.1883 under
Section 25 of the Act was held to be illegal and void. It was
held that the suits were not barred by limitation as Section
10 of the Act would apply. The submission that the
Appellant had willfully suppressed material documents and
so the presumption of lost grant arises, was accepted by the
High Court. Being of the opinion that adequate material has
been produced by the Respondent-temple to prove its title of
the temple over Alagar Hills, the High Court held that the
Respondent was entitled to succeed. The entire land in
Alagar Hills which was hitherto being treated as a reserved
forest was directed to be reverted to the Respondenttemple.
8. We have heard Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, learned Additional
Advocate General for the State of Tamil Nadu, Mr. Mohan
Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondenttemple and Mr. V. Ramasubramanian, learned counsel for the
devotees.
9. It is the case of the Respondent that the entire land in
Alagar Hills belongs to the temple. The Appellant denied the
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title of the Respondent over the Alagar Hills. According to
the Appellant, Alagar Hills Reserved Forest was notified by
Notification No.187 of 11.10.1883. Merely because a temple
was situated at the foothill of the Alagar Hills, the
Respondent cannot claim title or possession over the
reserved forest. According to the Appellant, all the grazing
land and other leases, revenue and expenditure in the
Alagar Hills Reserved Forest have been under the control of
the Forest Department.
10. It is not necessary for us to delve into the events prior
to 1881 for the purpose of determining the controversy in
this case. We proceed to examine the material on record.
The first document of relevance is Proceeding No.85 dated
20.01.1881 of the Board of Revenue. The Conservator of
Forests, Colonel R.H. Beddome inspected the forest tracks
and found that the area of the hills and forest in Madura
Forest Division was 1,098 sq. miles. An area of 305.48 sq.
miles was selected for reservation. Alagarmalai having an
area of 20.37 sq. miles was included in the proposed
reserves. The recommendation of the Conservator of
Forests was sent to the Superintendent of Revenue Survey
7 | P a g e
by the Board of Revenue to prepare the outline map as
suggested by the Conservator of Forests. By Proceeding
No.626 dated 09.04.1881, the Board of Revenue proposed
20.37 sq. miles of Alagarmalai, “all Government property
and hill tracks” to be reserved for climatic reasons as well as
for fuel demands of the future. By an Order No.1284 dated
29.08.1881, the proposal made by the Committee to reserve
305.48 sq. miles in Madura District was approved. The
statement showing the area of reserves in Madura District is
annexed therewith, which includes Alagarmalai.
11. The Madras Forest Act, 1882 was promulgated for the
protection and management of forests in the Presidency of
Madras which came into efect on 01.01.1883. A Notification
was issued on 13.11.1883 under Section 25 of the Act,
declaring the blocks of forests described in the schedule
thereto as reserved forests. Alagarmalai is found at Serial
No.XXI. At this point, it is relevant to refer to Section 25 of
the Act which is as follows:
“ 25. The "Government may, by notification4 in the
3 (Official Gazette) declare any forest which has
been reserved by order of the Government
8 | P a g e
previous to the day on which this Act comes into
force to be a reserved forest under this Act:
Provided that if the rights of the Government or of
private persons to or over any land or forest
produce in such forest have not been inquired into,
settled and recorded in manner which the
Government thinks sufficient, the same shall be
inquired into settled and recorded in the manner
provided by this Act for reserved forest, before the
date on which the notification declaring the forest
to be reserved takes efect.
 All questions decided, orders issued and records
prepared in connection with the reservation of such
forest shall be deemed to have been decided,
issued and prepared hereunder, and the provisions
of this Act relating to reserved forest. shall apply to
such forests.”
12. For a better understanding of Section 25, it is
necessary to refer to the other relevant provisions of the Act.
Section 3 of the Act empowers the Government to constitute
9 | P a g e
a reserved forest. Section 4 provides that a notification shall
be published by the Government in the Official Gazette of
the district whenever it is proposed to constitute any land as
reserved forest by specifying the details of such land.
According to Section 6, the Forest Settlement Officer shall
publish a proclamation after issuing the notification under
Section 4 specifying the particulars of the property and
fixing the time for receiving objections from interested
persons. Section 16 of the Act postulates issuance of a
notification declaring the forest as reserved after disposal of
the claims pursuant to the proclamation under Section 6,
specifying the limitations of the forests which are intended
to be reserved from a date to be fixed by the notification. As
per Section 25, the Government may issue a notification in
the Official Gazette declaring the area which was already
reserved by the Government prior to the Act coming into
force to be a reserved forest under the Act. Unsettled claims
shall be considered before the notification takes efect,
according to the proviso to Section 25 of the Act.
13. While examining the contention of the Respondent that
the Notification dated 11.10.1883 was issued without
10 | P a g e
complying the requirements of Section 25 of the Act, the
High Court committed an error in finding that there is no
order of Reservation prior to 01.01.1883. The High Court
referred to Exhibit B-6 which contains Order No.187 issued
under Section 4 of the Act, to arrive at a conclusion that
there is no order of reservation. Exhibit B-6 also contains
the Notification dated 13.11.1883 by which certain blocks of
forest land described in the Schedule annexed thereto have
been declared as reserved forests. Serial No.XXI of the said
Schedule covers Alagar Hills which is the subject matter of
the suit. Order No.189 was issued under Section 4 of the Act
notifying the proposal to constitute certain area in Madura
District as reserved forest. The area mentioned therein
pertains to Aggamalais. Mr. F.E Robinson, Assistant
Collector, was appointed as the Forest Settlement Officer
and District Forest Officer of Madura to conduct the inquiry
under Section 4. The Notification pertaining to the suit
schedule land i.e. Alagarmalai was under Section 25 of the
Act whereas the Notification in respect of Aggamalais was
issued under Section 4 of the Act.
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14. The High Court mixed-up the two Notifications to hold
that a reservation was not made in respect of Alagarmalai
prior to the Act coming into force. Relying on Order No.189
pertaining to Aggamalais, the High Court erroneously held
that the notification under Section 4 of the Act relates to
Alagarmalais. On such basis the High Court held that there
was no order passed by the Government declaring the
Algarmalai as reserved forest prior to 01.01.1883 i.e. the
date on which the Act came into force. Proceeding No.1284
dated 23.08.1881 would clearly demonstrate that the
proposal for reserving forest area in Alagarmalai was
approved by the Government prior to the commencement of
the Act.
15. Due to the misconception that Order No.189 issued
under Section 4 of the Act is applicable to Alagarmalai, the
High Court proceeded further to hold that the inquiry under
Sections 6 and 8 have not been conducted. Section 6, as
stated above, provides for an inquiry to be conducted
pursuant to the notification issued under Section 4. Section
8 is connected to the inquiry to be conducted under Section
6. Neither Section 6 nor Section 8 are applicable to a
12 | P a g e
notification issued under Section 25 of the Act which deals
with forests which were already reserved by the Government
prior to the Act. Therefore, the finding of the High Court that
mandatory requirements of the Act were not complied with
before issuing Notification dated 11.10.1883 under Section
25 is not correct. The judgments relied upon by the High
Court in Sri Perarula Ramanuja Jeer Swami v. The
Secretary of State for India in Council through the
Collector of Tinnevelly
1
 and Mysore Balakrishna Rao v.
The Secretary of State for India in Council
2
 are not
applicable to the facts of this case.
16. As the suit filed by the respondent was not dismissed
as barred by limitation, it is not necessary for us to examine
the point relating to Section 10 of the Limitation Act.
Another point decided in favour of the Respondent is that
lost grant has to be presumed. On the basis that the
Respondent-temple had been in long and continuous
possession of Alagar hills, the High Court was of the opinion
that lost grant was to be presumed. The High Court
observed that the Respondent-temple had been exercising
1 (1910) VI Indian Cases 691
2 (1915) XXIX M.L.J. 276
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acts of ownership over the suit hills for several centuries.
The Application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 of the C.P.C. by
the Respondent was allowed and the documents produced
by them were marked as Exhibits A-46 to A-56. We have
carefully examined those documents which only show that
honey and other forest produce were being collected by
those who were permitted by the Respondent-temple. The
right, title or possession of the temple over Alagar hills
cannot be determined on the basis of the above documents.

17. An adverse inference was drawn against the Appellant
for not producing the relevant material. The High Court was
of the opinion that the Appellant was guilty of suppression of
the documents which were available. Hence, the High Court
presumed lost grant. The circumstances in which the
presumption of lost grant can be made has been settled by
this Court in a judgment reported in Sri Manohar Das
Mohanta v. Charu Chandra Pal & Ors.
3
 as under ;
“7. The circumstances and conditions under which a
presumption of lost grant could be made are well
settled. When a person was found in possession and
enjoyment of land for a considerable period of time
under an assertion of title without challenge, Courts in
3 (1955) 1 SCR 1168
14 | P a g e
England were inclined to ascribe a legal origin to such
possession, and when on the facts a title by
prescription could not be sustained, it was held that a
presumption could be made that the possession was
referable to a grant by the owner entitled to the land,
but that such grant had been lost. It was a
presumption made for securing ancient and continued
possession, which could not otherwise be reasonably
accounted for. But it was not a presumptio juris et de
jure, and the Courts were not bound to raise it, if the
facts in evidence went against it. “It cannot be the
duty of a Judge to presume a grant of the nonexistence of which he is convinced” observed Farwell, J.
in Attorney-General v. Simpson [(1901) 2 Ch D 671,
698]. So also the presumption was not made if there
was any legal impediment to the making of it. Thus, it
has been held that it could not be made, if there was
no person competent to be the recipient of such a
grant, as where the right is claimed by a fluctuating
body of persons. That was held in Raja Braja Sundar
Deb v. Moni Behara [1951 SCR 431, 446] . There will
likewise be no scope for this presumption, if there is no
person capable of making a grant: (Vide Halsbury's
Laws of England, Vol. IV, p. 574, para 1074); or if the
grant would have been illegal and beyond the powers
of the grantor. (Vide Barker v. Richardson [4 B & Ald
579 : 106 ER 1048 at 1049] and Rochdale Canal
Company v. Radclife [18 QB 287 : 118 ER 108 at
118] ).”
15 | P a g e
18. We do not agree that the respondent was in continuous
possession under an assertion of title as there is no evidence
on record to reach such a conclusion. The presumption of
lost grant is therefore not permissible.
19. The finding recorded by the High Court that there is
adequate material to hold that Alagar hills belong to the
temple is erroneous. The trial Court is right in holding that
the Respondent miserably failed in producing any material to
prove its title.
20. On 02.04.2019, we were informed that the parties were
attempting a settlement. This Court directed the Member
Secretary, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments
Board (HR & CE) to convene a meeting with all the
stakeholders to facilitate a settlement. A meeting was
conducted on 03.08.2019 in the Office of the Commissioner,
HR & CE in which all the stakeholders participated. The
significant proposals of the Respondent were that the title in
respect of the Alagar Hills should be with that of the
presiding deity of the Respondent-temple and that the
income from the forest shall be shared equally by the
Respondent-temple and the Forest Department. The
16 | P a g e
Appellant did not accept the said proposals. After joint
inspection by the Forest Department and the HR & CE
Department, the Appellant was willing to divert an area of
18.3032 hectares of land including the various religious
spots for ease of movement of the devotees. The Forest
Department was willing to permit 50 ft. of pathway to reach
all the spots and shrines from the foothill. The Forest
Department was of the view that the temple should
undertake very strict vigil on the ecosystem and
environment and no non-forest activities shall be permitted
within the 18.3032 hectares, except religious activities. We
are in agreement with the proposal made by the Appellant.
The Forest Department shall permit 50 ft. of pathway to
reach all the spots and shrines from the foothills for which
the earmarked area of 18.3032 hectares of land can be
used. No non-forest activities shall be permitted to be
undertaken by anybody, including the Respondent-temple
administration within the 18.3032 hectares of land which is
diverted for ease of movement of devotees to reach all the
spots and shrines from the foothill.
17 | P a g e
21. In view of the above, the judgment of the High Court is
set aside and the Appeals are allowed.
 ..…..........................J.
 [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

 ..…..….....................J.
 [HEMANT GUPTA]
New Delhi,
November 06, 2019
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whether services rendered by the employees in the postal department in the capacity of Gramin Dak Sevaks (GDS) ought to be computed or notfor the purpose of calculation of the qualifying service of their pension after they got selected in regular posts in the said department. ? Apex court held that There is no provision under the law on thebasis of which any period of the service rendered by the respondents in the capacity of GDS could be added to their regular tenure in the postal department for the purpose of fulfilling the period of qualifying service on the question of grant of pension. We are also of the opinion that the authorities ought to consider their cases for exercising the power to relax the mandatory requirement of qualifying service underthe 1972 Rules if they find the conditions contained in Rule 88 stand fulfilled in any of these cases. We do not accept the stand of the appellants that just because thatexercise would be prolonged, recourse to Rule 88 oughtnot to be taken. The said Rules is not number specific,and if undue hardship is caused to a large number of employees, all of their cases ought to be considered. If in the cases of any of the respondents’ pension order hasalready been issued, the same shall not be disturbed, as has been directed in the case of Union of India & Ors. v Registrar & Anr. (supra). We, accordingly allow these appeals and set aside the judgments under appeal, subject to the following conditions:­ (i) In the event the Central Government or the postal department has already issued any order for pension to any of the respondents, then such pension should not be disturbed. In issuing this direction, we are following the course which was directed to be adopted by this Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Registrar & Anr.(supra). (ii) In respect of the other respondents, who have not been issued any order for pension, the concerned ministry may consider as to whether the minimum qualifying service Rule can be relaxed in their cases in terms of Rule 88 of the 1972 Rules

 whether services rendered by the employees in the postal department in the capacity of Gramin Dak Sevaks (GDS) ought to be computed or notfor the purpose of calculation of the  qualifying service of  their pension after they got selected in regular posts in the said department. ?

Apex court held that
 There is no provision under the law on thebasis of which any period of the service rendered by the respondents in the capacity of GDS could be added to their   regular   tenure   in   the   postal   department   for   the purpose of fulfilling the period of qualifying service on the question of grant of pension. 
We are also of the opinion that the authorities ought to consider their cases for exercising the power to relax the mandatory requirement of qualifying service underthe 1972 Rules if they find the conditions contained in Rule 88 stand fulfilled in any of these cases.  We do not accept the stand of the appellants that just because thatexercise would be prolonged, recourse to Rule 88 oughtnot to be taken. The said Rules is not number specific,and if undue hardship is caused to a large number of employees, all of their cases ought to be considered.  If in the cases of any of the respondents’ pension order hasalready been issued, the same shall not be disturbed, as has been directed in the case of Union of India & Ors. v Registrar  &  Anr.  (supra).   We, accordingly allow these appeals   and   set   aside   the   judgments   under   appeal, subject to the following conditions:­ 
(i)    In the event the Central Government or the postal   department   has   already   issued   any order for pension to any of the respondents, then such pension should not be disturbed. 
 In  issuing   this   direction,   we   are   following   the course which was directed to be adopted by this Court in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. Registrar & Anr.(supra).
 (ii)   In respect of the other respondents, who have not been issued any order for pension, the concerned ministry may consider as to whether the  minimum  qualifying  service   Rule can  be relaxed in their cases in terms of Rule 88 of the 1972 Rules

REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
   CIVIL APPEAL NO.8497/2019)
        (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 13042 OF 2014)
UNION OF INDIA & ORS.   ............. APPELLANTS
     VERSUS
GANDIBA BEHERA                   ..............RESPONDENT
        WITH
         
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8979/2014
   CIVIL APPEAL NO.8498/2019
        (Arising out of SLP(C)No.979/2015)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9886/2014
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8674/2015
   CIVIL APPEAL NO..................../2019
    (Arising out of SLP(C) CC. Nos. 20557­20558/2015)
         CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2825/2016
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5008/2016
   CIVIL APPEAL NO.8499/2019
 (Arising out of SLP(C)No. 16767/2016)
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8379/2016
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1580­1581/2017
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 109­110/2017
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10355/2016
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10801/2016
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9518­9520/2017
Special Leave Petition (C) (D) No. 13464/2018
  Special Leave Petition (C)No. 16615/2018
         Special Leave Petition (C) No. 3392/2019
  CIVIL APPEAL NO.8500/2019
          (arising out of SLP(C) No.32881/2018)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8501/2019
          (arising out of SLP(C) No.6544/2019)
    Special Leave Petition (C) (D) 18007/2019
                     
  J U D G M E N T
ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.
Records reveal that service is not complete in  S.L.P.
(C)   Diary   No.13464/2018,   S.L.P.(C)   No.16615/2018,
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S.L.P.(C)No.3392/2019   and   S.L.P.(C)   Diary
No.18007/2019.    Hence these maters are directed to be
de­tagged from this batch of appeals. Let these matters be
placed before the appropriate Bench after completion of
service.
2. Delay condoned and leave is granted in SLP (C) CC
Nos. 20557­20558 of 2015 and SLP (C) No.32881 of 2018.
         Leave is also granted in rest of the petitions for
Special Leave to Appeal.
3. All   these   appeals   have   reached   this   Court   from
decisions   of   different   Benches   of   the   Central
Administrative Tribunal and thereafter judgments of the
High Courts on a common question of law. The dispute in
these appeals is as to whether services rendered by the
employees in the postal department in the capacity of
Gramin Dak Sevaks (GDS) ought to be computed or not
for the purpose of calculation of the qualifying service of
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their pension after they got selected in regular posts in
the said department. The respective High Courts, whose
judgments are under appeal before us, have uniformly
held   in   favour   of   the   GDSs   who   subsequently   were
selected as regular employees of the postal department.
The   original   applicants   were   not   found   eligible   for
pension   as   their   services   fell   short   of   the   qualifying
period.   The   minimum   service   period   in   regular
employment in the said Department for being entitled to
pension is contained in Central Civil Services (Pension)
Rules, 1972 and it is 10 years. We shall refer to these
Rules henceforth as the 1972 Rules. In all these appeals,
service tenure of the respondents in regular posts fell
marginally short of the said period of 10 years. Clause 49
(1) of the 1972 Rules stipulates :­
“In the case of a Government servant retiring in
accordance with the provisions of these rules
before   completing   qualifying   service   of   ten
years, the amount of service gratuity shall be
calculated   at   the   rate   of   half   month’s
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emoluments   for   every   completed   six   monthly
period of qualifying service.”
4.   There have been separate Rules guiding the services
of Gramin Dak Sevaks who are also referred to as extradepartmental   agents   in   the   postal   department.     The
present Rules which has been cited before us is titled
Gramin Dak Sevaks (Conduct and Engagement) Rules,
2011  (the   2011   Rules).   There   was  P&T   Extra
Departmental Agents (Conduct & Service) Rules, 1964
which   prevailed   earlier   covering   the   same   field   before
replaced   by  Gramin   Dak   Sevaks   (Conduct   and
Employment) Rules, 2001. These Rules ultimately gave
way to the 2011 Rules. The GDSs have been identified in
different abbreviated designations over the period of time,
possibly   depending   on   the   nature   of   work   they   were
engaged in.  These are EDMC, ED­Packer, Departmental
runner, EDDA and GDS. The last of these designations
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being the short form of Gramin Dak Sevaks is what they
are known as at present.
5.   The lead case which has been argued before us
arises   from   an   application   instituted   by   one   Gandiba
Behera   registered   as   O.A.   No.   609/2010   before   the
Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench. The said
applicant was selected through regular process as a GDS
in Balasore division of the State of Orissa on 1st  April,
1968. He continued to work in that capacity until 25th
May, 1999, from which date, he was engaged in a Group
‘D’   post   in   regular   employment   through   the   proper
selection process. This status as a Group “D” employee
was   conferred   on   him   retrospectively,   by   way   of   a
memorandum issued by the authorities on 30th December
1999.   He   attained   the   age   of   superannuation   on   30th
June, 2008. His claim for pension was, however, denied
on   the   ground   of   not   having   completed   10   years   of
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minimum qualifying service in the Group ‘D’ post. The
Tribunal, by an order passed on 6th  July, 2011, upheld
the   applicant’s   plea   for   having   part   of   his   service
rendered in the capacity of GDS computed for meeting
the requirement of qualifying service, relying on an earlier
decision of the Tribunal delivered in O.A. No. 310 of 2010
(Sri   Gouranga   Ch.   Sahoo   Vs.   Union   of   India   and
Others). The Tribunal held and directed in the case of
Gandiba Behera:­
“It is not the case of the Respondents that the
above order of this Tribunal has meanwhile been
reviewed or reversed by any higher court.   In
view  of the above, I find no justifiable reason to
deviate   from   the   view   already   taken   by   this
Tribunal   in   the   case   of   Gouranga   Ch.   Sahoo
(supra).     Hence     the   respondents   are   hereby
directed to bring such of the shortfall period of
service from the ED employment of the applicant
to count for the purpose of minimum period of
ten   years   qualifying   service   and   accordingly
sanction and pay the pension and pensionary
benefits to the applicant from the date of his
retirement forthwith preferably within a period of
60 (sixty) days from the date of receipt copy of
this order; failing which, the applicant shall be
entitled   to   6%   on   the   arrear   pension   and
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pensionary dues from the date of his retirement
till actual payment is made and the Respondents
are free to recover the interest amount from the
officer   who   would   be   found   responsible   for
causing delay in payment.”     
         
6.  The Orissa High Court by a judgment delivered on 3rd
January, 2014 in the writ petition brought by the Union
of India and the postal authorities found no reason to
interfere   with   the   Tribunal’s   order.     The   High   Court
directed compliance of the said order of the Tribunal,
mainly   relying   on   an   earlier   judgment   of   the   Court
delivered on 6th December, 2011 in W.P. (C) No. 11665 of
2011.
7.  In rest of the appeals, the factual disputes are similar
in nature. Points of law involved are also near­identical.
For these reasons, we do not consider it necessary to
individually deal with each of these cases. We, however,
give   below   the   key   factual   features   of   the   individual
appeals in a tabular form :­
8
S.
No.
Case Number Service Details of Original Applicants
1. Civil Appeal No. 8979
of 2014
08.08.1970–Joined as GDS. (Worked for 28
years)
31.12.1998 – Appointed to Group D post.
30.06.2008— Superannuated
Qualifying Service Period: 9 years, 6
months, 1 day.
2. SLP (C) No. 979 of
2015
11.08.1967 – Joined as GDS. (Worked for 29
years)
18.10.1996 – Appointed to Group D post.
31.07.2006 – Superannuated
Qualifying Service Period: 9 years, 8
months, 27 days.
3. Civil Appeal No. 9886
of 2014
14.08.1972 – Joined as GDS. (Worked for
27 years)
06.09.1999 – Promoted as Postman (Group
‘C’ post).
28.02.2009 – Superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 9 years, 5
months, 11 days.
4. Civil Appeal No. 8674
of 2015
14.09.1971 – Joined as GDS. (Worked for
28 years)
04.09.1999 – Appointed to Group D post.
30.11.2006 – Superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 7 years, 2
months, 13 days.
5. CC No. 20557-20558
of 2015 in SLP
(C) ....... of 2015
29.08.1981 – Joined as EDDA; (Worked for
16 years)
24.12.1997 – Appointed to Group D post.
31.05.2007 – Superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 9 years, 5
9
months, 23 days.
6. Civil Appeal No. 2825
of 2016
25.02.1972 – Joined as GDS. (Worked for
31 years)
08.03.2003 – Selected as Postman.
31.10.2012 – Superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 9 years, 7
months, 23 days.
7. Civil Appeal No. 5008
of 2016
21.02.1979—Joined as GDS. (Worked for
29 years)
13.06.2001—Joined as Postman.
31.10.2010—Superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 9 years, 4
months, 18 days.
8. SLP (C) No. 16767 of
2016
01.02.1963—Joined as GDS. (Worked for
29 years)
30.06.1992—Joined as Mail Peon.
31.01.2002—Superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 9 years, 7
months.
9. Civil Appeal No. 8379
of 2016
09.06.1967—Joined as EDMC. (Worked for
34 years)
12.09.1997—Assumed charge as Postman.
31.03.2007—Superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 9 years, 6
months, 20 days.
10. Civil Appeal Nos.
1580-1581 of 2017
10.01.1963—Joined as Extra Departmental
Runner. (Worked for 29 years)
27.02.1992—Joined Group D post.
31.12.2000—Superannuated.
Qualifying service period: 8 years, 10
months, 3 days.
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11. Civil Appeal Nos.
109-110 of 2017
22.06.1962—Joined as EDA. (Worked for
31 years)
15.11.1993—Joined Group D post.
31.03.1997—Superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 5 years, 4
months, 15 days.
12. Civil Appeal No.
10355 of 2016
Worked for 25 years as EDDA
09.11.2001—Selected and appointed as
Postman.
30.06.2011—Superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 9 years, 7
months, 21 days.
13. Civil Appeal No.
10801 of 2016
July 1972—Joined as EDMC. (Worked for
27 years)
15.09.1999—Joined Group D post.
31.05.2009—Superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 9 years, 8
months, 16 days.
14. 14(i) Civil Appeal
Nos. 9518-20 of 2017
14.07.1972—Joined as GDS. (Worked for
30 years)
25.11.2002—Joined Group D post.
30.06.2012—Superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 9 years, 7
months, 6 days.
14(ii) 05.11.1973—Joined as EDMCA. (Worked
for 23 years)
17.04.1997—Joined as Postman.
31.12.2006—Superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 9 years, 8
months, 15 days.
14(iii) 01.11.1971—Became EDM-I. (Worked for
28 years)
03.11.1999—Joined in Group D post.
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31.07.2009—Superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 9 years, 8
months, 29 days.
15. SLP (C) No. 32881 of
2018
25.01.1971—Joined as EDMP. (Worked for
28 years)
27.11.1999—Joined Group D post.
31.08.2009—Superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 9 years, 8
months, 19 days.
16. SLP (C) No. 6544 of
2019
21.07.1972—Joined as EDDA. (Worked for
31 years)
06.08.2003—Joined Group D post.
30.06.2011—superannuated.
Qualifying Service Period: 7 years, 10
months, 9 days.
8.   Learned counsel for the appellants has assailed the
decision of the Orissa High Court in the case of Gandiba
Behera  (supra) affirming the Tribunal’s order mainly on
the ground that service undertaken as GDS could not be
equated with regular service. Service of a GDS carries
lower working hours (between 3­5 hours). An incumbent
engaged as Gramin Dak Sevak (GDS) is also entitled to
pursue any other vocation simultaneously. It has also
12
been highlighted on behalf of the appellants that services
of Gramin Dak Sevaks are regulated by a different set of
rules and Court ought not to direct the administration or
executive authorities in the capacity of employer to create
an altogether new  service  Rule for a particular set of
employees.
9. In the case of Superintendent of Post Offices and
Others v. P.K. Rajamma [(1977) 3 SCC 94], it was laid
down that Extra­Departmental Agents connected with the
postal   departments   held   civil   posts.   That   finding   was
given while dealing with applicability of Article 311 of the
Constitution   in   relation   to   dismissal   orders   passed
against the Extra­Departmental Agents. In   the   case   of
Chet   Ram   vs.   Jit   Singh   [(2008)   14   SCC   427],   this
Court examined the question as to whether a GDS is a
government   servant   or   not.   This   issue   came   up   for
consideration before this Court in a dispute concerning
13
eligibility   of   a   GDS   to   become   a   member   of   Nagar
Panchayat   in   terms   of   the   Punjab   State   Election
Commission Act, 1994. The opinion of the Court was that
such   agents   were   government   servants   holding   civil
posts. The Constitution Bench judgment in the case of
D.S. Nakara  & Ors. vs. Union  of  India  [(1983)  1 SCC
305]  was   also   cited   on   behalf   of   the   respondents   in
support   of   their   stand   that   there   could   be   no
discrimination between two sets of pensioners.
10. A  set   of  GDSs   who  stood  absorbed   as  Group   ‘D’
employees   had   approached   this   Court   invoking   the
jurisdiction   of   the   Court   under   Article   32   of   the
Constitution of India seeking benefits akin to the ones
which   form   the   subject­matter   of   these   appeals.   That
petition   was   registered   as   Writ   Petition   (Civil)   No.
17/2009.   The   Rule   involved   in   that   writ   petition   was
Department   of   Posts,   (Multi­Tasking   Staff)
14
Recruitment Rules, 2010. There was specific provision
in the said Rules for declaring GDSs as holders of civil
posts but they were outside regular civil service. The said
writ petition was disposed of by an order passed on 9th
December,   2014   giving   the   writ   petitioners   liberty   to
approach the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal
Bench, New Delhi. Subsequently, three applications were
instituted   before   the   Principal   Bench   of   the   Tribunal.
These were registered as O.A. Nos. 749/2015, 3540/2015
and   O.A.   No.   613/2015.   The   applications   of   the
individual   GDSs   were   allowed   by   the   Tribunal.   The
decision in that regard was  delivered on 17th November
2016 (Vinod Kumar Saxena & Ors. Vs. Union of India
& Ors.) and the Tribunal directed :­
“(a)   For   all   Gramin   Dak   Sevaks,   who   have   been
absorbed as regular Group ‘D’ staff, the period spent
as Gramin Dak Sevak will be counted in toto for the
purpose of pensionary benefits.
(b) Pension will be granted under the provisions of
CCS   (Pension)   Rules,   1972   to   all   Gramin   Dak
15
Sevaks, who retire as Gramin Dak Sevak without
absorption as regular Group ‘D’ staff, but the period
to be counted for the purpose of pension will be
5/8th of the period spent as Gramin Dak Sevak. Rule
6 will accordingly be amended.
(c)   The   Gramin   Dak   Sevaks   (Conduct   and
Engagement) Rules, 2011 are held to be valid except
Rule 6, as stated above.
               
(d) The claim of Gramin Dak Sevaks for parity with
regular   employees   regarding   pay   and   allowances
and other benefits available to regular employees,
stands rejected.”
11.     A Bench of this Court presided over by one of us
(Hon’ble Justice Ranjan Gogoi) has   examined a similar
question   in   Civil   Appeal   Nos.   13675­13676   of   2015
(Union   of   India   &   Ors.   Vs.   The   Registrar   &   Anr.)
decided on 24th November, 2015. The scope of the dispute
of that appeal would appear from the following passage of
the judgment:­
“The   respondent   no.   2   viz.   N.S.   Poonusamy
worked as an Extra Departmental Agent in the
Postal Department from the year 1968 to 1993.
He was regularized on 01.04.1993 and retired on
31.05.2002.   The   second   respondent   had
completed nine years and two months of service
but he was not granted any pension. Therefore,
he   approached   the   learned   Tribunal   which
16
directed that a scheme be framed to give some
benefit of service rendered by such employees as
Extra Departmental Agents so as to enable them
to earn the requisite period of qualifying service
for pension i.e. 10 years. Aggrieved, the Union of
India moved the High Court by way of a writ
petition out of which these appeals have arisen.”
12.     Such direction was issued by the Tribunal, interalia, on the basis of a circular of DoPT issued in the year
1991. The said circular provided that service rendered by
an Extra Departmental Agent to the extent of 50% of the
period thereof was to be added to the period of regular
service for the purpose of entitlement to pension.  During
pendency   of   the   appeal,   however,   the   Central
Government had issued order granting regular pension to
the Respondent No.2 in that appeal.                         
13.     Allowing the appeal of the Union of India, it was
held by this Court in that case:­
“The   appellant­Union   of   India   has   filed   an
additional affidavit on 26.10.2015 stating inter alia
that the Extra Departmental Agents covered by the
DOP&T   Circular,   1991,   are   full   time   casual
17
employees,   whereas   the   second   respondent   is   a
part time casual employee and under the Rules
governing his service framed in the year 1964 and
amended in the years 2001 and 2011, employees
like the respondent no. 2 are required to render
between three to five hours of service every day. At
the time of their appointment  they  are  required
to  give  an undertaking to the effect that they have
alternative   source   of   income   to   support   their
families.   The   need   for   appointment   of   such
employees, according to the Union of India, is to
reach out to the addresses in far flung villages in
the country where establishment and maintenance
of a regular post office is not a viable proposition.
Attention is also drawn to the provisions of the
aforesaid Rules to the effect that such employees
are not entitled to pension but would be entitled to
ex­gratia gratuity and such of the payments as may
be decided by the Government from time to time.
Considering   the   fact   that   the   DOP&T   Circular,
1991,   which   form   the   basis   of   the   impugned
direction of the learned Tribunal as affirmed by the
High Court, pertained to full time casual employees
to   which  category  the   second respondent does
not   belong   and   the   provisions   of   the   Rules
governing   the   conditions   of   service   of   the
respondent as noted above, we are of the view that
the impugned directions ought not to have been
passed by the learned Tribunal and approved by
the High Court. The matter pertains to policy and
involved financial implications. That apart, in view
of the facts placed before us, as noted above, we
deem   it   proper   to   interfere   with   the   impugned
directions   and   allow   these   appeals   filed   by   the
Union of India. We, however, make it clear that the
pension granted to the second respondent will not
be affected by this order and the said respondent
will   continue   to   enjoy   the   benefit   of   pension   in
accordance with the provisions of law.”
18
14.  The respondents have also referred to clause 6 of the
2011 Rules which stipulates:­
“The Sevaks shall not be entitled to any pension.
However,   they   shall   be   entitled   to   ex­gratia
gratuity or any other payment as may be decided
by the Government from time to time.”
This particular Rule, making service of this category
of employees non­pensionable however, has been struck
down as unconstitutional by the Principal Bench of the
Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi by a decision
delivered on 17th  November, 2016. We are apprised in
course of hearing of these appeals by the learned counsel
for the Central Government that the said decision of the
Tribunal has been challenged before the Delhi High Court
by the Union of India by way of a Writ Petition, registered
as W.P. (C) No. 832 of 2018. We are also informed that no
effective order has as yet been passed by the Delhi High
Court in the said writ petition. In the judgment giving rise
19
to Civil Appeal No. 109­110 of 2017, a similar provision
of the 1964 Rules, being Clause 4 thereof has also been
invalidated by the Punjab & Haryana High Court. Though
the fact that the service of GDS was not pensionable was
one of the factors considered by this Court in the case of
Union of India & Ors. Vs. Registrar & Anr. (supra), that
was not the main reason as to why the plea of the GDS
was turned down by this Court.   We have reproduced
above   the   relevant   passages   from   the   said   judgment
containing   the   reasoning   for   allowing   the   appeal.   For
adjudication of this set of appeals, thus the proceeding in
which the Rule making service of GDS non­pensionable
has  been struck  down is not of much relevance. The
controversy which we are dealing with in this judgment is
whether the period of service rendered by a regular staff
of the postal department while he was serving as GDS
20
would be computed for the purpose of determining his
qualifying service to entitle him to get pension.
15.   The case of  D.S.   Nakara (supra)  has been relied
upon on behalf of the respondents in support of their
contention   that   there   cannot   be   any   artificial
discrimination between two groups of pensioners. But the
factual context of the case of  D.S.   Nakara  (supra)   is
different.   The discrimination which was challenged in
that  case   related  to  two  sets   of  retired   Armed  Forces
personnel   who   were   categorised   on   the   basis   of   their
dates   of   retirement   and   one   set   had   better   terms   of
pension. The decisions in the cases of  P.K.   Rajamma
(supra) and  Chet   Ram  (supra) are  for the proposition
that the respondents held civil posts as GDS and were
government servants. But again ratio of these authorities
cannot be applied to combine the services rendered by
GDSs in posts guided by an altogether different service
21
rule with their services in regular employment. The other
authority on which reliance has been placed on behalf of
the respondents is a judgment of this Court delivered on
23rd August, 2017 in the case of Habib Khan v. State of
Uttarakhand and Others [2018 (1) SLR 724 (SC)]. That
case  arose   out  of  a  similar  dispute  involving  a  workcharged   employee   of   the   State   of   Uttarakhand   who
wanted   his   service   in   that   capacity   counted   for
computing the qualifying service in regular post on the
question of grant  of pension. This judgment was also
delivered by a two­Judge Bench of which Hon’ble Justice
Ranjan Gogoi, before His Lordship assumed the post of
Chief   Justice   of   India,   was   a   member.   The   aforesaid
decision   followed   an   earlier   judgment   of   this   Court
delivered in the case of Punjab State Electricity Board
and  Another  v.  Nakara  Singh  and  Another   [(2010)  4
SCC 317]. The latter case arose out of similar claims of
22
work   charged   employees   who   were   engaged   in   the
Irrigation and Power Department of the State of Punjab.
The relevant provision of the Punjab Civil Services Rules
allowed temporary or officiating service under the State
Government   without   interruption   followed   by
confirmation in the same or another post to be counted
in full as qualifying service but excluded the period of
service   in   work   charged   establishment.   The   aforesaid
Rule was struck down by the Full­Bench of the Punjab
and Haryana High Court. The decision of this Court in
the case of Nakara Singh  (supra) was however founded
on two circulars which permitted counting the period of
service   rendered   by   a   work   charged   employee   in   the
Central   Government   or   the   State   Government   for   the
purpose   of   computing   pensionary   benefits   as   an
employee   of   the   Punjab   State   Electricity   Board.   The
respondents in these appeals also cannot be held to be
23
work­charged employees. The said category of employees,
i.e. work­charged employees are engaged against specific
work   and   their  pay and  allowances   are  chargeable   to
such work. But the scope of respondents’ work as GDS
was part­time in nature. They had the  liberty to engage
themselves   in   other   vocations,   though   the   work   they
involved in carried an element of permanency.  The fact
that they were engaged as GDSs which constituted civil
posts   cannot   by   implication   treat   their   service   having
whole­time   characteristic   to   be   an   extension   of   their
service   rendered   in   the   capacity   of   GDSs.     The
subsequent service was guided by different service Rules
having   different   employment   characteristics.   The
selection of an employee in regular post cannot also be
pre­dated because of delay on the part of the authorities
in holding the selection process.   We do not agree with
the view of the High Court on this count in judgments
24
which form subject of appeal in Civil Appeal No. 5008 of
2016, SLP(C)No.16767 of 2016, Civil Appeal No. 8379 of
2016 and Civil Appeal No. 10801 of 2016. Service tenure
of an employee in a particular post cannot be artificially
extended in that manner in the absence of any specific
legal provision.
16.         In   the   case   of  Union   of   India   &   Ors.   v   the
Registrar & Anr. (supra),  a plea similar to that made by
the GDSs  for computation of service in that capacity was
specifically rejected. There is no specific Rule or even
administrative circular specifying computation of service
period   rendered   as   GDS   to   fill   up   the   gap   in   the
qualifying service requirement of the respondents in this
set   of   appeals.   The   only   circular   on   which   the
respondents laid stress on was the 1991 circular which
was considered in the case of Union of India & Ors. v.
Registrar  &  Anr.  (supra). As the post of GDS did not
25
constitute full­time employment, the benefits of the said
circular cannot aid the respondents. Thus, there being a
clear cut finding on similarly placed employees, we do not
think we can apply the ratio of the judgment delivered in
the   case   of  Habib   Khan  (supra)   in   support   of   the
respondents’ plea. An unreported judgment of Karnataka
High Court delivered on 17th  June, 2011 in the case of
W.P.  No. 81699/2011 Union  of  India  and Others  Vs.
Dattappa  has   also   been   cited   on   behalf   of   the
respondents. This judgment went in favour of counting
the   period   of   service   as   extra­departmental   Agent   for
qualifying service in relation to pension and the Division
Bench of the Karnataka High Court proceeded on the
basis that for all intents and purpose, the employment
was continuous in nature and it was not as if it was from
one   service   to   another.   But,   this   view   has   not   been
26
accepted by this Court in the case of Union of India &
Ors. Vs. Registrar & Anr. (supra).
17.  It is also the respondents’ case that under Clause
49(3) of the 1972 Rules, if they had served more than 9
years and 3 months in regular employment, they would
be entitled to have additional period computed for the
purpose of qualifying service.  Said Rule 49(3) specifies: ­
“In calculating the length of qualifying service,
fraction of a year equal to three months and
above shall be treated as a completed one halfyear and reckoned as qualifying service.”
Arguments were advanced that if within a period of
one year an employee had served more than six months,
then the total employment term ought to be computed as
twice the period of one half year in two tranches and one
year ought to be added to the service. But on a plain
reading   of   the   said   Rule,   in   our   view   such   an
interpretation cannot be given.   The Rule contemplates
27
one time benefit in case of service of more than 3 months
in fraction of a year.
18.  Rule 88 of the 1972 Rules empowers the concerned
ministry or the department to relax the operation of any
Rule to prevent undue hardship in a particular case. This
provision as embodied in Rule 88, provides:­
“88. Power to relax.
Where   any   Ministry   or   Department   of   the
Government   is   satisfied   that   the   operation   of
these   rules,   causes   undue   hardship   in   any
particular case, that Ministry or Department, as
the case may be, may, by order for reasons to be
recorded in writing, dispense with or relax the
requirements   of   that   rule   to   such   extent   and
subject to such exceptions and conditions as it
may consider necessary for dealing with the case
in a just and equitable manner:
Provided   that   no   such   order   shall   be   made
except with the concurrence  of the Department
of Pension & Pensioner’s Welfare.”
Exercise   of   power   under   the   said   Rules   however
comes   within   the   decision   making   domain   of   the
executive.   The   appellants’   case   has   been   that   if   such
28
power   to   relax   is   exercised   in   each   case   of   marginal
shortfall in qualifying service, that would constitute an
endless exercise.
19.     Having   regard   to   the   provisions   of   the   aforesaid
Rules relating to qualifying service requirement, in our
opinion the services rendered by the respondents as GDS
or other Extra­Departmental Agents cannot be factored in
for computing their qualifying services in regular posts
under the postal department on the question of grant of
pension. But we also find many of the respondents are
missing pension on account of marginal shortfall in their
regular service tenure. This should deserve sympathetic
consideration for grant of pension. But we cannot trace
our power or jurisdiction to any legal principle which
could permit us to fill up the shortfall by importing into
their service tenure, the period of work they rendered as
GDS or its variants. At the same time, we also find that
29
in the case of Union of India & Ors. v. The Registrar &
Anr.  (supra),   though   the   incumbent   therein   (being
respondent   no.2)   had   completed   nine   years   and   two
months of service, the Union of India had passed orders
granting him regular pension. This Court in the order
passed on 24th November 2015 had protected his pension
though the appeal of Union of India was allowed.
20. For the reasons we have already discussed, we are of
the opinion that the judgments under appeal cannot be
sustained.   There is no provision under the law on the
basis of which any period of the service rendered by the
respondents in the capacity of GDS could be added to
their   regular   tenure   in   the   postal   department   for   the
purpose of fulfilling the period of qualifying service on the
question of grant of pension.
21.  We are also of the opinion that the authorities ought
to consider their cases for exercising the power to relax
30
the mandatory requirement of qualifying service under
the 1972 Rules if they find the conditions contained in
Rule 88 stand fulfilled in any of these cases.  We do not
accept the stand of the appellants that just because that
exercise would be prolonged, recourse to Rule 88 ought
not to be taken. The said Rules is not number specific,
and if undue hardship is caused to a large number of
employees, all of their cases ought to be considered.  If in
the cases of any of the respondents’ pension order has
already been issued, the same shall not be disturbed, as
has been directed in the case of Union of India & Ors. v
Registrar  &  Anr.  (supra).   We, accordingly allow these
appeals   and   set   aside   the   judgments   under   appeal,
subject to the following conditions:­
(i)    In the event the Central Government or the
postal   department   has   already   issued   any
order for pension to any of the respondents,
then such pension should not be disturbed.  In
31
issuing   this   direction,   we   are   following   the
course which was directed to be adopted by
this Court in the case of Union of India & Ors.
v. Registrar & Anr.(supra).
(ii)   In respect of the other respondents, who
have not been issued any order for pension, the
concerned ministry may consider as to whether
the  minimum  qualifying  service   Rule can  be
relaxed in their cases in terms of Rule 88 of the
1972 Rules.
22. Interim orders passed in these appeals, if any, shall
stand dissolved.   All connected applications shall stand
disposed of.
23. There shall be no order as to costs.
  .........................................CJI
  (Ranjan Gogoi)
  ..........................................J
                      (Deepak Gupta)
..............................…........J
                    (Aniruddha Bose)
New Delhi
Dated: November  08, 2019.

32

Habitual Offenders Policy = a second warning only when the competent authority considers issuance of final orders but is also of the opinion that another chance should be given to the Airman. Habitual Offenders Policy, the habitual offenders can be considered for discharge from service under Rule 15 (2) (g) (ii)/ Rule 15(2)(k) read in conjunction with Rule 15(2) of the Air Force Rules, 1969 (hereinafter, ‘the Rules’), under the Clause “His Service No Longer Required Unsuitable for Retention in the Air Force”. The Respondent was cautioned and counselled to mend himself and desist from acts of indiscipline. He was also warned that any addition of another punishment entry would render him liable for discharge from service under Rule 15 (2) (g)(ii)/ Rule 15(2) (k) read in conjunction with Rule 15(2) of the Rules = As the Respondent was not showing any improvement, he was found to be a poor Airman material and not amenable to service discipline. The Respondent submitted his explanation on 05.08.2012 in which he admitted that he had indulged in acts of indiscipline due to bad company. He requested for a final chance to improve. After considering the explanation submitted by the Respondent, the Air Officer-in-Charge approved the discharge of the Respondent from service under Rule 15 (2) (g) (ii) of the Rules as he was found unsuitable for the Indian Air Force.= The Tribunal was of the opinion that the Respondent was given only one warning. As the second warning which is mandatory according to the Policy was not given to the Respondent, the Tribunal was of the view that the order of discharge was vitiated. The Tribunal failed to take into account the fact that para 2 (b) provides for a second warning only when the competent authority considers issuance of final orders but is also of the opinion that another chance should be given to the Airman. The requirement of the second warning letter would be only in such circumstances.= The Respondent was initially a potential habitual offender before he was considered as a habitual offender. He was entitled for a warning to be issued in 2008. Admittedly, there was a delay in issuance of the warning letter. Ultimately, the warning letter was issued on 18.04.2012. The Respondent did not mend himself for which reason a show cause notice was issued to him. Even in the explanation to the show cause notice, the Respondent did not dispute the allegations of misconduct made against him. He, in fact, admitted to having indulged in acts of indiscipline and sought for another opportunity to correct himself. The show cause notice issued to the Respondent is in accordance with the Habitual Offenders Policy. A second warning letter is not required when it is decided to pass a final order without giving another chance. There is no violation of the procedure prescribed by the Policy dated 16.12.1996. For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the Tribunal is set aside. Accordingly, the Appeals are allowed.


Habitual Offenders Policy = a second warning only when the competent authority considers issuance of final orders but is also of the opinion that another chance should be given to the Airman. 

Habitual Offenders Policy, the habitual offenders can be considered for discharge from service under Rule 15 (2) (g) (ii)/ Rule 15(2)(k) read in conjunction with Rule 15(2) of the Air Force Rules, 1969 (hereinafter, ‘the Rules’), under the Clause “His Service No Longer Required Unsuitable for
Retention in the Air Force”. The Respondent was cautioned and counselled to mend himself and desist from acts of indiscipline. He was also warned that any addition of another punishment entry would render him liable for discharge from service under Rule 15 (2) (g)(ii)/ Rule 15(2) (k) read in conjunction with Rule 15(2) of the Rules = As the Respondent was not showing
any improvement, he was found to be a poor Airman material and not amenable to service discipline. The Respondent submitted his explanation on 05.08.2012 in which he admitted that he had indulged in acts of indiscipline due to bad company. He requested for a final chance to improve. After considering the explanation submitted by the Respondent, the Air Officer-in-Charge
approved the discharge of the Respondent from service under Rule 15 (2) (g) (ii) of the Rules as he was found unsuitable for the Indian Air Force.= The Tribunal was of the opinion that the Respondent
was given only one warning. As the second warning which is mandatory according to the Policy was not given to the Respondent, the Tribunal was of the view that the order of discharge was vitiated. The Tribunal failed to take into account the fact that para 2 (b) provides for a second
warning only when the competent authority considers issuance of final orders but is also of the opinion that another chance should be given to the Airman. The requirement of the second warning letter would be only in such circumstances.=

The Respondent was initially a potential habitual offender before he was considered as a habitual offender. He was entitled for a warning to be issued in 2008. Admittedly, there was a delay in issuance of the warning letter. Ultimately, the warning letter was issued on 18.04.2012. The Respondent did not mend himself for which reason a show cause notice was issued to him. Even
in the explanation to the show cause notice, the Respondent did not dispute the allegations of misconduct made against him. 
He, in fact, admitted to having indulged in acts of indiscipline and sought for another opportunity to correct himself. 
The show cause notice issued to the Respondent is in accordance with the Habitual Offenders Policy. A second warning letter is not required when it is decided to pass a final order without giving another chance. There is no violation of the procedure prescribed by the Policy dated
16.12.1996.
 For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the Tribunal is set aside. Accordingly, the Appeals are allowed.

Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal Nos.4780-4781 of 2018
Union of India & Ors.
.... Appellant(s)
Versus
794898 T. Ex. Corporal Abhishek Pandey.
 …. Respondent (s)
J U D G M E N T
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
1. These Appeals are filed against the judgment of the
Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow
(hereinafter, ‘the Tribunal’) by which the order of discharge
of the Respondent dated 17.01.2013 was set aside. The
Tribunal directed the payment of back wages to the extent
of 25 per cent.
2. The Respondent was enrolled in the Indian Air Force on
28.09.2004. A warning was issued to the Respondent on
18.04.2012. By that time, there were seven entries of
punishment (3 Red Ink and 4 Black Ink) in the Conduct
Sheet of the Respondent. The Respondent was informed by
1
the said letter dated 18.04.2012 that he was already in the
category of habitual offender. In accordance with the
Habitual Offenders Policy, the habitual offenders can be
considered for discharge from service under Rule 15 (2) (g)
(ii)/ Rule 15(2)(k) read in conjunction with Rule 15(2) of the
Air Force Rules, 1969 (hereinafter, ‘the Rules’), under the
Clause “His Service No Longer Required Unsuitable for
Retention in the Air Force”. The Respondent was cautioned
and counselled to mend himself and desist from acts of
indiscipline. He was also warned that any addition of
another punishment entry would render him liable for
discharge from service under Rule 15 (2) (g)(ii)/ Rule 15(2)
(k) read in conjunction with Rule 15(2) of the Rules.
3. A notice was issued to the Respondent on 11.07.2012,
directing him to show cause as to why he should not be
discharged from service under Rule 15 (2) (g) (ii) of the
Rules. There was a reference to the warning letter dated
18.04.2012 in the show cause notice. Even after the
issuance of the warning letter dated 18.04.2012, the
Respondent indulged in acts of indiscipline on 10.06.2012
and was awarded ‘Severe Reprimand’ on 13.06.2012 by his
2 | P a g e
Commanding Officer. As the Respondent was not showing
any improvement, he was found to be a poor Airman
material and not amenable to service discipline. The
Respondent submitted his explanation on 05.08.2012 in
which he admitted that he had indulged in acts of
indiscipline due to bad company. He requested for a final
chance to improve. After considering the explanation
submitted by the Respondent, the Air Officer-in-Charge
approved the discharge of the Respondent from service
under Rule 15 (2) (g) (ii) of the Rules as he was found
unsuitable for the Indian Air Force.
4. The Respondent challenged his discharge before the
Tribunal by filing Original Application No.125 of 2013. He
relied upon a Policy dated 16.12.1996 governing the
habitual offenders/ potential habitual offenders. He
contended before the Tribunal that he was entitled for a
second warning before an order of discharge could have
been passed against him in accordance with the Policy. The
Tribunal accepted the submission made by the Respondent
and allowed the application. The order of discharge was set
aside. The Respondent was held to be entitled to all
3 | P a g e
consequential benefits, including back wages which were
restricted to 25 per cent. The Review Application filed by
the Appellant was rejected by the Tribunal.
5. The only point that arises for our consideration in the
present case is the interpretation of the Policy dealing with
habitual offenders. The Air Force Policy dated 16.12.1996
was issued by the Air Force Headquarters, prescribing the
procedure to be followed while processing the cases of
habitual offenders. According to the Policy, an Airman is
entitled to be issued a precautionary warning (being a
habitual offender). The Airman has to be informed that he
would be getting another opportunity to mend himself and
any addition of another punishment entry, either Red or
Black, would result in his discharge from the service. Para 2
(b) of the Policy provides that whenever the case of an
Airman is considered by the competent authority for final
orders and he is afforded one more chance, a warning letter
is required to be issued to him by his Commanding Officer
again. The said warning letter shall be treated as a second
time warning. Para 3 of the Policy postulates that habitual
offenders shall be served with a show cause notice calling
4 | P a g e
upon them to explain the reasons as to why the proposed
action of discharge from service shall not be taken against
them. The habitual offenders are entitled for an opportunity
to submit their explanation before an order of discharge is
passed.
6. The Tribunal was of the opinion that the Respondent
was given only one warning. As the second warning which
is mandatory according to the Policy was not given to the
Respondent, the Tribunal was of the view that the order of
discharge was vitiated. The Tribunal failed to take into
account the fact that para 2 (b) provides for a second
warning only when the competent authority considers
issuance of final orders but is also of the opinion that
another chance should be given to the Airman. The
requirement of the second warning letter would be only in
such circumstances.
7. The Respondent was initially a potential habitual
offender before he was considered as a habitual offender.
He was entitled for a warning to be issued in 2008.
Admittedly, there was a delay in issuance of the warning
letter. Ultimately, the warning letter was issued on
5 | P a g e
18.04.2012. The Respondent did not mend himself for
which reason a show cause notice was issued to him. Even
in the explanation to the show cause notice, the Respondent
did not dispute the allegations of misconduct made against
him. He, in fact, admitted to having indulged in acts of
indiscipline and sought for another opportunity to correct
himself. The show cause notice issued to the Respondent is
in accordance with the Habitual Offenders Policy. A second
warning letter is not required when it is decided to pass a
final order without giving another chance. There is no
violation of the procedure prescribed by the Policy dated
16.12.1996.
8. For the aforementioned reasons, the judgment of the
Tribunal is set aside. Accordingly, the Appeals are
allowed.
 ..…................................J
 [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
 ..…................................J
 [HEMANT GUPTA]
New Delhi,
November 08, 2019
6 | P a g e
7 | P a g e

whether the respondent is entitled to service element of disability pension from the date of discharge.? yes the applicant was discharged on 30th June, 1978 after completion of 10 years and 169 days of service. He was in low medical category since 1970. He was granted disability pension @50% on account of suffering from Viral Myocarditis post discharge, but the applicant was denied the benefit of service element of disability pension. It is the denial of this service element which led the applicant to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. - the objection is that applicant is not entitled to service element of disability pension as he was released on expiry of engagement before completion of pensionable qualifying service of 15 years and was not invalided out of service on account of disability, though he has been paid service gratuity and death-cum-retirement gratuity. - The learned Tribunal relied upon Regulation 101 of Navy (Pension) Regulations, 19643 to hold that since applicant has been invalided from service on account of disability, therefore, he is entitled to full disability pension including the service element. The reliance was also placed upon Regulation 107 of the Regulations which contemplates that where the individual has not rendered sufficient service to qualify for service pension, the personnel will be entitled to proportion of the minimum service pension appropriate to the individual’s ranks and group. It is the said order passed by the Tribunal which is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeals. -Apex court held that In the present case, we are concerned with the situation where the individual has completed his period of engagement in the low 8 medical category but not the qualifying service for pension in terms of Regulation 78 of the Regulations. The question is whether the applicant is entitled to service element of disability pension corresponding to the number of years he has put in the service of Navy.- The quantification of disability pension in the cases of an individual, who has not completed qualification service is dealt with in Regulation 107. Sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) of Regulation 107 deals with the situation where the individual has rendered sufficient service to qualify for a service pension i.e. 15 years of service in terms of Regulation 78. However, sub-clause (b) comes into play where the individual has not rendered sufficient service to qualify for service pension. In cases where the disability was suffered while flying or parachute jumping, the minimum service pension is appropriate to his rank and group but in all other cases, the service pension is restricted to minimum of two-thirds of the minimum service pension. For such reason, the disability element would be in addition to the service pension by cumulative reading of Regulation 78, Regulation 105B and Regulation 107 of the Regulations. The service pension is to be assessed on the basis of the minimum service pension laid down for an able individual of the same group in Regulation 107 of the Regulations. Learned counsel for the appellants refers to an order passed by this Court in Bhola Singh v. Union of India & Ors. 7 . We find that this Court has not referred to Regulation 105B as well as Regulation 107 of the Regulations to maintain an order of the High Court to deny service element of pension to an individual who has completed the initial fixed period of 10 years. Since the appeal has been decided without any reference to statutory regulations, we find that the reliance of the appellants on the said order is not helpful to the arguments advanced. We find that the reliance on the judgment of this court T.S. Das is not tenable for the reason that it was not the case of grant of disability pension. It was the case of grant of special pension. In view of the above, we find no merit in the present appeals, the same are dismissed. The appellants shall pay the arrears of service element preferably within a period of four months from today in terms of directions issued by the Tribunal.

whether the respondent  is entitled to service element of disability pension from the date of discharge.? yes
the applicant was discharged on 30th June, 1978 after completion of 10 years and 169 days of service. He was in low medical category since 1970. He was granted disability pension @50% on account of suffering from Viral Myocarditis post discharge, but the applicant was denied the benefit of service element of disability pension. It is the denial of this service element which led the applicant to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. - the objection is that applicant is not entitled to service element of disability pension as he was released on expiry of engagement before completion of pensionable qualifying service of 15 years and was not invalided out of service on account of disability, though he has been paid service gratuity and death-cum-retirement gratuity. - The learned Tribunal relied upon Regulation 101 of Navy (Pension) Regulations, 19643 to hold that since applicant has been invalided from service on account of disability, therefore, he is entitled to full disability pension including the service element. The reliance was also placed upon Regulation 107 of the Regulations which contemplates that where the individual has not rendered sufficient service to qualify for service pension, the personnel will be entitled to proportion of the minimum service pension appropriate to the individual’s ranks and group. It is the said order passed by the Tribunal which is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeals. -Apex court held that In the present case, we are concerned with the situation where the individual has completed his period of engagement in the low 8 medical category but not the qualifying service for pension in terms of Regulation 78 of the Regulations. The question is 
whether the applicant is entitled to service element of disability pension corresponding to the number of years he has put in the service of Navy.- 
The quantification of disability pension in the cases of an individual, who has not completed qualification service is dealt with in Regulation 107. Sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) of Regulation 107 deals with the situation where the individual has rendered sufficient service to qualify for a service pension i.e. 15 years of service in terms of Regulation 78. However, sub-clause (b) comes into play where the individual has not rendered sufficient service to qualify for service pension. In cases where the disability was suffered while flying or parachute jumping, the minimum service pension is appropriate to his rank and group but in all other cases, the service pension is restricted to minimum of two-thirds of the minimum service pension. For such reason, the disability element would be in addition to the service pension by cumulative reading of Regulation 78, Regulation 105B and Regulation 107 of the Regulations. The service pension is to be assessed on the basis of the minimum service pension laid down for an able individual of the same group in Regulation 107 of the Regulations. Learned counsel for the appellants refers to an order passed by this Court in Bhola Singh v. Union of India & Ors.  We find that  this Court has not referred to Regulation 105B as well as Regulation 107 of the Regulations to maintain an order of the High Court to deny service element of pension to an individual who has completed the initial fixed period of 10 years. Since the appeal has been decided without any reference to statutory regulations, we find that the reliance of the appellants on the said order is not helpful to the arguments advanced. We find that the reliance on the judgment of this court T.S. Das is not tenable for the reason that it was not the case of grant of disability pension. It was the case of grant of special pension.  In view of the above, we find no merit in the present appeals, the same are dismissed. The appellants shall pay the arrears of service element preferably within a period of four months from today in terms of directions issued by the Tribunal. 





REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4714-4715 OF 2012
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
V.R. NANUKUTTAN NAIR .....RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1) The challenge in the present appeals is to the orders passed by the
Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi1
 on 26th October,
2010 and April 12, 2011 holding that the respondent2
 is entitled to
service element of disability pension from the date of discharge.
2) The facts in brief are that the applicant was discharged on 30th
June, 1978 after completion of 10 years and 169 days of service.
He was in low medical category since 1970. He was granted
disability pension @50% on account of suffering from Viral
Myocarditis post discharge, but the applicant was denied the
benefit of service element of disability pension. It is the denial of
this service element which led the applicant to invoke the
1 for short, ‘Tribunal’
2 hereinafter referred to as the ‘applicant’
1
jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
3) The stand of the appellants before the Tribunal was that the
applicant is not entitled to service element of disability pension as
he was released on expiry of engagement before completion of
pensionable qualifying service of 15 years and was not invalided
out of service on account of disability, though he has been paid
service gratuity and death-cum-retirement gratuity.
4) The learned Tribunal relied upon Regulation 101 of Navy (Pension)
Regulations, 19643
 to hold that since applicant has been invalided
from service on account of disability, therefore, he is entitled to full
disability pension including the service element. The reliance was
also placed upon Regulation 107 of the Regulations which
contemplates that where the individual has not rendered sufficient
service to qualify for service pension, the personnel will be entitled
to proportion of the minimum service pension appropriate to the
individual’s ranks and group. It is the said order passed by the
Tribunal which is the subject matter of challenge in the present
appeals.
5) Ms. Divan, learned Additional Solicitor General for the appellants
argued that the applicant was not boarded out of service on
account of disability but on account of completion of the
engagement. The learned ASG traced the history of the grant of
disability pension. It is submitted that disability pension was
3 for short, ‘Regulations’
2
initially granted when a member of the Armed Forces could not be
retained in the Force on account of disability, attributed to or
aggravated by military service. Such course was creating hardship
to the personnel boarded out on account of injury suffered due to
military service. Therefore, the concept of disability pension was
introduced. The disability pension has two components i.e. service
element and the disability element. The disability element is
related to disability whereas; the service element is to be granted
as per the rules and regulations applicable. The qualification
service for earning pension is 15 years; therefore, an individual
who has not rendered 15 years of qualifying service and was not
boarded out on account of disability is not entitled to service
element of pension.
6) It is argued that Regulation 105B of the Regulations would be
applicable if an individual is not invalided out of service on account
of disability and has not opted for continuation in the Armed
Forces. The said Regulation provides that on completion of period
of engagement, apart from service pension admissible which is on
completion of 15 years of service, a disability element is also
granted.
7) It is argued that initially, the Regulations contemplated 10 years of
engagement with another 10 years as reservist. Therefore, an
individual would not be entitled to pension merely upon completion
of 10 years of active service but would become entitled to service
3
pension upon completion of 15 years of service including 5 years
as reservist. It is argued that such situation has undergone change
when on 3rd July, 1976, the Government of India contemplated 10
years as initial period of engagement, with the option of reengagement of the existing sailors on completion of 10 years of
engagement. It is argued that the period of engagement in case of
the applicant was 10 years approximately, therefore, he has not
completed the qualifying service of 15 years in terms of Regulation
78 of the Regulations. Thus, he is not entitled to service element as
the same is payable only after completion of 15 years other than to
an individual who is boarded out from service on account of
disability. The reliance is placed upon a judgment of this Court
reported as T.S. Das & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr.
4 wherein,
the Court held as under:
“29. As aforesaid, on introducing the new policy on 3-7-
1976, the Fleet Reserve was discontinued and instead the
Sailors in service at the relevant time were given an
option to continue in active service for a further term of 5
years. Some of the Sailors opted to continue till
completion of 15 years, who, then became eligible for
“service pension” having qualifying service.
30. The quintessence for grant of reservist pension, as
per Regulation 92, is completion of the prescribed Naval
and Reserve qualifying service of 10 years “each”. Merely
upon completion of 10 years of active service as a Sailor
or for that matter continued beyond that period, but
falling short of 15 years or qualifying Reserve Service, the
Sailor concerned cannot claim benefit under Regulation 92
for grant of reservist pension. For, to qualify for the
reservist pension, he must be drafted to the Fleet Reserve
Service for a period of 10 years. In terms of Regulation 6
4 (2017) 4 SCC 218
4
of the Indian Fleet Reserve Regulations, there can be no
claim to join the Fleet Reserve as a matter of right. None
of the applicants were drafted to the Fleet Reserve Service
after completion of their active service. Hence, the
applicants before the Tribunal, could not have claimed the
relief of reservist pension. …”
8) On the other hand, learned counsel for the applicant supported the
order of the Tribunal to contend that Regulation 105B of the
Regulations was introduced to clarify that the benefit of disability
element who has completed the period of engagement shall be in
addition to the service pension. The provision was to grant benefit
and not to deny the benefit of the service element. It was inserted
to avoid payment of service element twice i.e. as part of disability
pension and again as service pension. In respect of an individual
who has either been invalided out of service or has completed less
than 15 years of qualifying service for pension, the disability
pension including service element is computable and payable in
terms of Regulation 107 of the Regulations. Such Regulation deals
with an individual who has not rendered sufficient service to qualify
for service pension. The service element is granted in proportion
to the minimum service pension appropriate to an individual’s rank
and group, in which the number of his completed years of
qualifying service bears to 15, but in no case less than two-thirds of
the minimum service pension. Such Regulation would be rendered
otiose, if the argument of the appellants is to be accepted.
9) The relevant clauses from the pension Regulation read as under:
5
“78. Minimum qualifying service for pension. - Unless
otherwise provided, the minimum service which qualifies
for service pension is fifteen years.
xx xx xx
101. Conditions for the grant of disability pension. – Unless
otherwise specifically provided, a disability pension may
be granted to a person who is invalided from service on
account of a disability which is attributable to or
aggravated by service and is assessed at twenty per cent,
or over.
101A. Individuals discharged on account of their being
permanently in low medical category. – Individuals who
are placed in a lower medical category (other than ‘E’)
permanently and who are discharged because no
alternative employment suitable to their low medical
category could be provided shall be deemed to have been
invalided from service for the purpose of the Rules laid
down in Appendix V of these Regulations.
101B. Reservists discharged on account of being placed in
a low medical category. – (1) A reservist who is placed
permanently in a lower medical category (other than ‘E’)
and is discharged from the Fleet Reserve on that account
will be deemed to have been invalided out of service for
the purpose of the rules laid down in Appendix ‘V’ of these
regulations.
(2) An individual who is found to be ineligible for the grant
of disability pension shall be paid service gratuity as
admissible under regulation 89.
xx xx xx
105B. Disability at the time of discharge. – (1) A sailor,
who is discharged from service after he has completed the
period of his engagement and is, at the time of discharge
found to be suffering from a disability attributable to or
aggravated by naval service may at the discretion of the
competent authority be granted in addition to the service
pension admissible, a disability element as if he has been
discharged on account of that disability.
xx xx xx
6
(3) The provisions in sub-regulations (1) and (2) shall also
apply to sailors discharged from service on completion of
the period of their engagement and who have earned only
a service gratuity.
xx xx xx
107. Amount of disability pension. – In cases where the
accepted degree of disablement is twenty per cent, or
over, the monthly rates of disability pension consisting of
service and disability elements, shall be as follows,
namely:
(1) Service element
(a) Where the individual has
rendered sufficient service to
qualify for a service pension.
Service pension admissible
in accordance with his
rank and group last held,
and length of service.
(b) Where the individual has not
rendered sufficient service to
qualify for service pension.
(i) If the disability was
sustained while on flying
or parachute jumping duty
in an aircraft or while
being carried on duty in an
aircraft under proper
authority, the minimum
service pension
appropriate to his rank
and group.
(ii) In all other cases, that
proportion of the minimum
service pension
appropriate to the
individual’s rank and
group which the number of
his completed years of
qualifying service bears to
fifteen but in no case less
than two-thirds of the
minimum service pension.
Provided that for the purpose of this clause, service
rendered before the age of seventeen years shall be
treated as qualifying service.
Explanation. – The service element shall be assessed –
(i) in the case of ordinary seaman or equivalent, on the
basis of the minimum service pension laid down for able
seaman or equivalent of the same group.
7
xx xx xx
Appendix V – Nature, Assessment and Attributability of
Disability and Entitlement to Disability Pension.
1. xx xx xx
2. Invalidment from service is a necessary condition for
the grant of disability pension. An individual who at the
time of his release under the Release Regulations is in a
lower medical category than that in which he was
recruited will be treated as invalided from service. Sailors
who are placed permanently in a medical category other
than ‘A’ and are discharged because no alternative
employment suitable to their low medical category can be
provided as well as those who having been retained in
alternative employment but are discharged before the
completion of their engagement will be deemed to have
bene invalided out of service.”
10) We have heard learned counsel for the parties and find no merit in
the present appeals.
11) The disability pension has two elements: disability element and the
service element. The disability element is in relation to the extent
of disability suffered by an individual whereas the service element
is to be granted keeping in view of rules and regulations. Service
pension and service element are synonymous. The expression
service element is used in the case of payment of disability pension
whereas, service pension is used for the pension payable on
account of services rendered.
12) In the present case, we are concerned with the situation where the
individual has completed his period of engagement in the low
8
medical category but not the qualifying service for pension in terms
of Regulation 78 of the Regulations. The question is whether the
applicant is entitled to service element of disability pension
corresponding to the number of years he has put in the service of
Navy.
13) We do not find any merit in the argument that as per Clause (1) of
Regulation 105B, the service element is admissible only if the
following conditions are satisfied:
(i) That discharge was on account of disability attributable to or
aggravated by Naval Service.
(ii) The individual is entitled to service pension only on completion
of 15 years of service in terms of Regulation 78.
14) In terms of Regulation 101A of the Regulations, an individual who is
placed in lower medical category and is discharged because no
alternative employment suitable to his low medical category and
an individual who at the time of his release under the Release
Regulations is in a lower medical category than that in which he
was recruited will be treated as invalided from service in terms of
Clause 2 of Appendix V of the Regulations. Therefore, in terms of
such Regulations, individuals who are invalided out of service on
account of disability for the reason that no alternative employment
suitable to their low medical category or an individual who at the
time of his release under the Release Regulations is in a lower
medical category, are entitled to disability pension.
9
15) Clause 1 and 2 of Regulation 105B are applicable to sailors who are
discharged from service on completion of the period of
engagement and who have earned only a service gratuity in terms
of Clause (3) of the said Regulation. Clause 1 pertain to the grant
of service pension in addition to the disability element. Therefore,
in terms of Clause 3, service element would be payable to an
individual who has been paid service gratuity.
16) We find that the purpose of the Regulation 105B is to exclude dual
payment of the service element of disability pension, when an
individual is entitled to service pension as well. In the absence of
such Regulation, an individual would be entitled to disability
pension including the service pension. Therefore, the service
element cannot be granted again as part of disability pension. It is
to avoid the payment of service element twice over. The
Regulation 105B has not used the expression ‘on completion of
qualifying service’. The interpretation as argued by the learned
ASG leads to addition of words in Regulation 105B which is not
permissible as the Regulations have to be interpreted harmoniously
and not by adding words to the Regulations. A person who has
completed the period of engagement is entitled to disability
element apart from service pension. The expression ‘service
pension’ admissible is not restricted to the qualifying service
provided under Regulation 78. It is not for the Courts to remedy the
defect in the Statute. The reference may be made to an early
10
judgment of this Court reported as Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam
Sunder Haldar
5
, wherein it was held as under:-
“9. …It must always be borne in mind, as said by Lord
Halsbury in Commissioner for Special Purposes of Income
Tax v. Pemsel [LR (1891) AC 531 at p 549], that it is not
competent to any court to proceed upon the assumption
that the legislature has made a mistake. The Court must
proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what
it has said. Even if there is some defect in the phraseology
used by the legislature the court cannot, as pointed out
in Crawford v. Spooner [6 Moo PC 1: 4 MIA 179] , aid the
legislature's defective phrasing of an Act or add and
amend or, by construction, make up deficiencies which are
left in the Act. Even where there is a casus omissus, it is,
as said by Lord Russell of Killowen in Hansraj
Gupta v. Official Liquidator of Dehra Dun-Mussoorie
Electric Tramway Co., Ltd. [(1933) LR 60 IA 13; AIR (1933)
PC 63] , for others than the courts to remedy the defect. In
our view it is not right to give to the word “decree” a
meaning other than its ordinary accepted meaning and we
are bound to say, in spite of our profound respect for the
opinions of the learned Judges who decided them, that the
several cases relied on by the respondent were not
correctly decided.”
17) In another judgment reported as Petroleum and Natural Gas
Regulatory Board v. Indraprastha Gas Limited & Ors.
6
, this
Court held:
“35. After so stating the Court has referred to the observations made by Lord Diplock in Duport Steels Ltd. [Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs, (1980) 1 WLR 142 : (1980) 1 All ER
529 (HL)] wherein it has been ruled thus: (All ER p. 541hj)
“… the role of the judiciary is confined to ascertaining from the words that Parliament has approved as expressing its intention what that inten5 AIR 1953 SC 148
6 (2015) 9 SCC 209
11
tion was, and to giving effect to it. Where the
meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is not for the Judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for failing to give
effect to its plain meaning because they themselves consider that the consequences of doing
so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral. In controversial matters such as are involved in industrial relations there is room for differences of opinion as to what is expedient, what
is just and what is morally justifiable. Under our
Constitution it is Parliament's opinion on these
matters that is paramount.”
(emphasis supplied)
36. Recently, in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases [(2014) 2 SCC 62 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri)
721] , while interpreting Section 468 CrPC, the Court has
opined: (SCC p. 99, para 45)
“45. It is argued that a legislative casus omissus
cannot be supplied by judicial interpretation. It is
submitted that to read Section 468 CrPC to mean
that the period of limitation as period within
which a complaint/charge-sheet is to be filed,
would amount to adding words to Sections 467
and 468. It is further submitted that if the legislature has left a lacuna, it is not open to the court
to fill it on some presumed intention of the legislature. Reliance is placed on Shiv Shakti Coop.
Housing Society [Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, (2003) 6 SCC
659] , Bharat Aluminium [(2012) 9 SCC 552 :
(2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] and several other judgments of this Court where doctrine of casus omissus is discussed. In our opinion, there is no scope
for application of doctrine of casus omissus to
this case. It is not possible to hold that the legislature has omitted to incorporate something
which this Court is trying to supply. The primary
purpose of construction of the statute is to ascertain the intention of the legislature and then give
effect to that intention. After ascertaining the legislative intention as reflected in the Forty-second
Report of the Law Commission and the Report of
the JPC, this Court is only harmoniously construing the provisions of Chapter XXXVI along with
12
other relevant provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code to give effect to the legislative intent
and to ensure that its interpretation does not lead
to any absurdity. It is not possible to say that the
legislature has kept a lacuna which we are trying
to fill up by judicial interpretative process so as to
encroach upon the domain of the legislature. The
authorities cited on doctrine of casus omissus
are, therefore, not relevant for the present case.”
xx xx xx
38. We must take note of certain situations where the
Court in order to reconcile the relevant provision has supplied words and the exercise has been done to advance
the remedy intended by the statute. In Surjit Singh
Kalra v. Union of India [(1991) 2 SCC 87] , a three-Judge
Bench perceiving the anomaly, held: (SCC p. 98, para 19)
“19. True it is not permissible to read words in a
statute which are not there, but ‘where the alternative lies between either supplying by implication words which appear to have been accidentally omitted, or adopting a construction which
deprives certain existing words of all meaning, it
is permissible to supply the words’
(Craies Statute Law, 7th Edn., p. 109). Similar are
the observations in Hameedia Hardware
Stores v. B. Mohan Lal Sowcar [(1988) 2 SCC 513
at pp. 524-25] where it was observed that the
court construing a provision should not easily
read into it words which have not been expressly
enacted but having regard to the context in
which a provision appears and the object of the
statute in which the said provision is enacted the
court should construe it in a harmonious way to
make it meaningful. An attempt must always be
made so to reconcile the relevant provisions as to
advance the remedy intended by the statute.
(See Siraj-ul-Haq Khan v. Sunni Central Board of
Waqf [AIR 1959 SC 198 : 1959 SCR 1287].)”
18) It, thus, transpires that by judicial interpretation, words cannot be
added to a statute, which would include the Rules, Regulations and
Instructions issued under a Statute, as an excuse to give effect to
13
its plain meaning of the language of the regulations. If the
legislature has left a lacuna, it is not open to the Court to fill it on
some presumed intention of the legislature. But where the Courts
find that the words appear to have been accidentally omitted, or if
adopting a construction deprives certain existing words of all
meaning, it is permissible to supply additional words but should not
easily read words which have not been expressly enacted. The
Court should construct the provisions harmoniously having regard
to the context and the object of the statute in which a provision
appears, to make it meaningful. An attempt must always be made
so to reconcile the relevant provisions, so as to advance the
remedy intended by the statute. Thus, it is not possible to read
completion of qualifying service in Regulation 105B of the
Regulations.
19) In view of the principles of interpretation relating to Casus
Omissus, we find that a reading of the Regulations does not lead to
an inference that the service element should be limited to an
individual who has completed minimum 15 years of engagement.
Regulation 78 cannot be read into Regulation 105B when no such
qualification is provided in Regulation 105B.
20) Still further, the Regulation 107 providing service element in the
event of an individual who has not completed the qualifying
service will become otiose. A reading of all the regulations
harmoniously and keeping in view the object of grant of disability
14
pension, we find that the interpretation which advances the object
and purpose of the grant of disability needs to be accepted being a
beneficial provision for a class of individuals who have suffered
disability in the course of duty.
21) The quantification of disability pension in the cases of an
individual, who has not completed qualification service is dealt with
in Regulation 107. Sub-clause (a) of Clause (1) of Regulation 107
deals with the situation where the individual has rendered
sufficient service to qualify for a service pension i.e. 15 years of
service in terms of Regulation 78. However, sub-clause (b) comes
into play where the individual has not rendered sufficient service to
qualify for service pension. In cases where the disability was
suffered while flying or parachute jumping, the minimum service
pension is appropriate to his rank and group but in all other cases,
the service pension is restricted to minimum of two-thirds of the
minimum service pension. For such reason, the disability element
would be in addition to the service pension by cumulative reading
of Regulation 78, Regulation 105B and Regulation 107 of the
Regulations. The service pension is to be assessed on the basis of
the minimum service pension laid down for an able individual of
the same group in Regulation 107 of the Regulations.
22) Learned counsel for the appellants refers to an order passed by
this Court in Bhola Singh v. Union of India & Ors.
7
. We find that
7 Civil Appeal No. 4486 of 2002 decided on 10th August, 2010.
15
this Court has not referred to Regulation 105B as well as
Regulation 107 of the Regulations to maintain an order of the High
Court to deny service element of pension to an individual who has
completed the initial fixed period of 10 years. Since the appeal has
been decided without any reference to statutory regulations, we
find that the reliance of the appellants on the said order is not
helpful to the arguments advanced. We find that the reliance on
the judgment of this court T.S. Das is not tenable for the reason
that it was not the case of grant of disability pension. It was the
case of grant of special pension.
23) In view of the above, we find no merit in the present appeals, the
same are dismissed. The appellants shall pay the arrears of service
element preferably within a period of four months from today in
terms of directions issued by the Tribunal.
.............................................J.
(L. NAGESWARA RAO)
.............................................J.
(HEMANT GUPTA)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 07, 2019.
16