CIDCO has to adopt an appropriate procedure to levy the additional lease premium City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd., (‘CIDCO’ for short) issued letter dated 20.04.2016, (signed on 01.07.2016 to the respondent No.3 herein requiring them to pay the sum of Rs.14,05,60,587/­ (Rupees Fourteen Crores, Five Lakhs, Sixty Thousand, Five Hundred and Eighty Seven) towards additional lease premium up to 30.03.2007 so as to process the request of respondent No.3 for grant of ‘No dues Certificate’ in their favour which in turn was required to secure Occupation Certificate in respect of the building, from respondent No.4. - the appellant herein allotted plot bearing No.7, Sector 15, CIDCO, Belapur, Navi Mumbai, measuring 3176.25 sq.mtrs to M/s Mehak Developers Pvt. Ltd., the respondent No.3 herein in terms of the New Bombay Disposal of Land Regulations, 1975.The construction was required to be completed by the respondent No.3 as per the time frame agreed including the extended time period. Not putting up the construction within the time frame agreed was to attract payment of additional lease premium retrospectively from 06.08.2001 as per the agreed terms. The fact that the respondent No.3 completed construction of ‘A’ Wing of the building known as Arneja Chambers II within the initially extended period i.e. 31.12.2005 is not in dispute. The issue that has given rise to the instant dispute between the parties is relating to the construction put up as ‘B’ Wing of Arneja Chambers II, in the residual area. In that regard, the fact remains that as per time extended for completion of the construction, the same was to be completed on or before 31.12.2008 - the case of the appellant herein is that the construction as required had not been completed except for creation of certain documents in the nature of completion certificate dated 24.12.2008. The appellant contends that the respondent No.3 was, therefore, liable to pay the additional lease premium retrospectively from 06.08.2001 and as such the communication dated 20.04.2016/01.07.2016 was issued to respondent No.3 which is in accordance with the terms of allotment. It is the further contention on behalf of the appellant that there is no privity of contract between the respondents No.1 and 2 herein on the one hand and the appellant on the other. As such, in respect of the said communication issued to respondent No.3 the respondents No. 1 and 2 cannot raise any grievance. It is contended that the writ petition therefore ought not to have been entertained. - writ petition instituted by the respondents No.1 and 2 - against the High court order appeal preferred to the Apex court - whether in the present circumstance the demand for additional lease premium amounting to Rs.14,05,60,587/­ in the manner as has been demanded through the communication dated 20.04.2016/01.07.2016 is justified and as to whether the challenge to the same could have been raised by the respondents No.1 and 2 herein.- whether the High Court was justified in quashing the said communication as a final conclusion and directing issue of ‘No dues Certificate’ more so- Essentially when the plot was allotted on certain conditions and the same stipulated completion of the construction in a time frame to avoid liability and when the statutory provisions required the ‘No dues Certificate’ from the appellant so as to seek occupancy certificate from the respondent No.4 the primary procedure is for the respondent No.3 to submit necessary documents to the appellant to establish that the construction is put up within the time frame stipulated and to indicate that they are not liable to pay any additional lease premium. In the instant case we do not find that such procedure has been complied with -Even if the requirement was not complied and if the appellant was entitled to levy the additional lease premium the same was required to be done by adopting an appropriate procedure.- The High Court, in our view, shall have issued direction to the appellant Corporation to follow appropriate procedure in that regard and pass a reasoned order. - Remanded the matter for fresh consideration to the appellant -when a discretionary jurisdiction is being exercised by this Court the equities are also required to be worked out and balanced so as to protect the interest of all parties before the Court in the meanwhile. - pending reconsideration of the matter by the appellant, the respondents No.1 to 3 shall either jointly or severally deposit a sum of Rs.3,50,00,000/­ (Rupees Three Crores Fifty Lakhs) with the appellant towards provisional additional lease premium which would be subject to final decision. On the said amount being deposited the appellant shall issue a provisional ‘No dues Certificate’ limited for the purpose of enabling respondent No.3 to secure the occupancy certificate from the respondent No.4. On such provisional ‘No dues Certificate’ being submitted to the respondent No.4, the respondent No.4 shall process the application for issue of occupancy certificate for the ‘B’ Wing of the building Arneja Chambers II.

CIDCO has to adopt an appropriate procedure to levy the additional lease premium 

City   and   Industrial   Development Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd., (‘CIDCO’ for short)  issued  letter   dated   20.04.2016, (signed on 01.07.2016  to the respondent No.3 herein requiring them to pay the sum of Rs.14,05,60,587/­   (Rupees   Fourteen   Crores,   Five   Lakhs,
Sixty Thousand, Five Hundred and Eighty Seven) towards additional lease premium up to 30.03.2007 so as to process the   request   of   respondent   No.3   for   grant   of   ‘No   dues Certificate’   in their favour which in turn was required to secure Occupation Certificate in respect of the building, from respondent   No.4.  - the appellant herein allotted plot bearing No.7, Sector 15, CIDCO, Belapur, Navi Mumbai, measuring 3176.25 sq.mtrs to   M/s   Mehak   Developers   Pvt.   Ltd.,   the   respondent   No.3 herein   in   terms   of   the   New   Bombay   Disposal   of   Land Regulations, 1975.The   construction   was   required   to   be completed by the  respondent No.3 as  per the  time frame agreed including the extended time period. Not putting up the construction within the time frame agreed was to attract payment   of   additional   lease   premium   retrospectively   from 06.08.2001   as   per   the   agreed   terms. The   fact   that   the respondent No.3 completed construction of ‘A’ Wing of the building known as Arneja Chambers II within the initially extended period i.e. 31.12.2005 is not in dispute. The issue that has given rise to the instant dispute between the parties is relating to the construction put up as ‘B’ Wing of Arneja Chambers II, in the residual area.  In that regard,   the   fact   remains   that   as   per   time   extended   for completion of the construction, the same was to be completed on or before 31.12.2008 - the case of the appellant herein  is that the  construction  as required had  not been completed except for creation of certain documents in the nature   of   completion   certificate   dated   24.12.2008.   The
appellant contends that the respondent No.3 was, therefore, liable   to   pay   the   additional   lease   premium   retrospectively from   06.08.2001   and   as   such   the   communication   dated
20.04.2016/01.07.2016 was issued to respondent No.3 which is in accordance with the terms of allotment.  It is the further contention on behalf of the appellant that there is no privity
of contract between the respondents No.1 and 2 herein on the one hand and the appellant on the other.  As such, in respect of the said communication issued to respondent No.3 the
respondents No. 1 and 2 cannot raise any grievance.   It is contended that the writ petition therefore ought not to have been entertained.    - writ petition   instituted   by   the   respondents   No.1   and   2 - against the High court order appeal preferred to the Apex court - whether in the present circumstance the demand for additional lease premium amounting to Rs.14,05,60,587/­ in
the   manner   as   has   been   demanded   through   the communication dated 20.04.2016/01.07.2016 is justified and as to whether the challenge to the same could have been
raised by the respondents No.1 and 2 herein.- whether the High Court was justified   in   quashing   the   said   communication   as   a   final conclusion and directing issue of ‘No dues Certificate’ more so-  Essentially when the plot was allotted on certain conditions   and   the   same   stipulated   completion   of   the construction in a time frame to avoid liability and when  the statutory provisions required the ‘No dues Certificate’ from the appellant so as to seek occupancy certificate from the respondent No.4 the primary procedure is for the respondent No.3   to   submit   necessary   documents   to   the   appellant   to establish that the construction is put up within the time
frame stipulated and to indicate that they are not liable to pay any additional lease premium.  In the instant case we do not find that such procedure has been complied with -Even if the requirement  was not complied and if the appellant was entitled to levy the additional lease premium the same was
required to be done by adopting an appropriate procedure.-  The High Court, in our view, shall have issued direction to the appellant Corporation to follow appropriate procedure in that regard and pass a reasoned order.  - Remanded the matter for fresh consideration to the appellant  -when a discretionary jurisdiction is being exercised by this Court the equities are also required to be worked out and balanced so as to protect the interest of all parties before the Court in the meanwhile. -  pending reconsideration of the matter by the appellant, the respondents No.1 to 3 shall either jointly or severally deposit a sum of Rs.3,50,00,000/­ (Rupees Three Crores Fifty Lakhs) with the appellant towards provisional additional lease premium which would be subject to final
decision.  On the said amount being deposited the appellant shall issue a provisional ‘No dues Certificate’ limited for the purpose of enabling respondent No.3 to secure the occupancy
certificate from the respondent No.4.  On such provisional ‘No dues Certificate’ being submitted to the respondent No.4, the respondent No.4 shall process the application for issue of occupancy certificate for the ‘B’ Wing of the building Arneja Chambers II. 


                    NON­ REPORTABLE
                   
             
   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
  CIVIL APPEAL NO.  8443              OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.8864 of 2019)
City & Industrial Development                        .… Appellant(s)
      Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd.           
Versus
Lambda Therapeutic Research                    ….Respondent(s)
Ltd.& Ors.     
   
J U D G M E N T
A.S. Bopanna,J.
       
           Leave granted.   
2.         The   appellant­   City   and   Industrial   Development
Corporation of Maharashtra Ltd., (‘CIDCO’ for short) is before
this Court in this appeal assailing the order dated 29.08.2018
passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Bombay   in
W.P.No.12674 of 2017.  The said order was passed in the writ
petition   instituted   by   the   respondents   No.1   and   2   herein
claiming   to   be   aggrieved   by   the   letter   dated   20.04.2016,
(signed on 01.07.2016) issued by the appellant herein to the

Page 1 of 18
respondent No.3 herein requiring them to pay the sum of
Rs.14,05,60,587/­   (Rupees   Fourteen   Crores,   Five   Lakhs,
Sixty Thousand, Five Hundred and Eighty Seven) towards
additional lease premium up to 30.03.2007 so as to process
the   request   of   respondent   No.3   for   grant   of   ‘No   dues
Certificate’   in their favour which in turn was required to
secure Occupation Certificate in respect of the building, from
respondent   No.4.     The   High   Court   having   considered   the
matter has quashed the demand made through the impugned
letter   dated   20.04.2016/01.07.2016   and   has   directed   the
appellant herein to issue ‘No dues Certificate’. The High Court
has further directed the respondent No.4 herein to process
the application for Occupation Certificate.   The appellant is
therefore, aggrieved by the order impugned herein.
3. The brief facts leading to the present situation is that
the appellant herein allotted plot bearing No.7, Sector 15,
CIDCO, Belapur, Navi Mumbai, measuring 3176.25 sq.mtrs
to   M/s   Mehak   Developers   Pvt.   Ltd.,   the   respondent   No.3
herein   in   terms   of   the   New   Bombay   Disposal   of   Land
Regulations, 1975.  The said allotment was governed by the

Page 2 of 18
terms and conditions contained in the Agreement of Lease
dated   04.08.1995.     The   construction   was   required   to   be
completed by the  respondent No.3 as  per the  time frame
agreed including the extended time period.   Not putting up
the construction within the time frame agreed was to attract
payment   of   additional   lease   premium   retrospectively   from
06.08.2001   as   per   the   agreed   terms.     The   fact   that   the
respondent No.3 completed construction of ‘A’ Wing of the
building known as Arneja Chambers II within the initially
extended period i.e. 31.12.2005 is not in dispute.
4. The issue that has given rise to the instant dispute
between the parties is relating to the construction put up as
‘B’ Wing of Arneja Chambers II, in the residual area.  In that
regard,   the   fact   remains   that   as   per   time   extended   for
completion of the construction, the same was to be completed
on or before 31.12.2008. Though the respondents No.1 and 2
herein who were the writ petitioners before the High Court
and respondent No.3 herein have sought to contend that the
construction was complete in all respects prior to 31.12.2008
and, therefore, they are entitled to seek for issue of ‘No dues

Page 3 of 18
Certificate’ so as to secure the occupancy certificate without
levy of the additional lease premium, the case of the appellant
herein  is that the  construction  as required had  not been
completed except for creation of certain documents in the
nature   of   completion   certificate   dated   24.12.2008.   The
appellant contends that the respondent No.3 was, therefore,
liable   to   pay   the   additional   lease   premium   retrospectively
from   06.08.2001   and   as   such   the   communication   dated
20.04.2016/01.07.2016 was issued to respondent No.3 which
is in accordance with the terms of allotment.  It is the further
contention on behalf of the appellant that there is no privity
of contract between the respondents No.1 and 2 herein on the
one hand and the appellant on the other.  As such, in respect
of the said communication issued to respondent No.3 the
respondents No. 1 and 2 cannot raise any grievance.   It is
contended that the writ petition therefore ought not to have
been entertained.    
5. In the above background, we have heard Mr. Ajit S.
Bhasme,   learned   senior   advocate   for   the   appellant,   Mr.
Shyam Divan, learned senior advocate for respondents No.1

Page 4 of 18
and 2, Mr. V. Giri, learned senior advocate for respondent
No.3 and Mr. Suhas Kadam, learned advocate for respondent
No.4.  We have perused the appeal papers.
6. As noted, there is no dispute between the contesting
parties   with   regard   to  the   allotment   of  plot   made   by   the
appellant in favour of the respondent No.3, the completion of
the construction of ‘A’ Wing of the building Arneja Chambers
II within the initial extended period i.e. 31.12.2005 and the
permission having granted by the appellant to the respondent
No.3   for   putting   up   construction   of   the   ‘B’   Wing   of   the
building   Arneja   Chambers   II   in   the   residual   area.     The
extension of time for completion of construction of ‘B’ Wing
being granted upto 31.12.2008 is also not in dispute.   The
issue which however engages the consideration of the Court
is as to whether in the present circumstance the demand for
additional lease premium amounting to Rs.14,05,60,587/­ in
the   manner   as   has   been   demanded   through   the
communication dated 20.04.2016/01.07.2016 is justified and
as to whether the challenge to the same could have been
raised by the respondents No.1 and 2 herein.  The question

Page 5 of 18
ultimately is, in that background whether the High Court was
justified   in   quashing   the   said   communication   as   a   final
conclusion and directing issue of ‘No dues Certificate’ more so
when the respondents No.1 and 2 herein were before the
Court in that regard, while the demand contained therein was
made against the respondent No.3 and they had not assailed
the same.
7. The learned senior advocate for the appellant has at
the outset contended that there being no privity of contract
between the appellant and the respondents No.1 and 2, the
respondents   No.1   and   2   had   no   locus   to   assail   the
communication   dated   20.04.2016/01.07.2016   issued   to
respondent No.3.   The learned senior advocate representing
respondents No.1 and 2 would however seek to contend that
the respondent No.3 after having obtained the allotment of
the plot as also approval and extension of the period for
construction   had   completed   the   construction   as   on
31.12.2018 and in that view the respondents No.1 and 2 had
purchased the ‘B’ Wing of the building Arneja Chambers II
under the Sale Deed dated 16.06.2011 for a consideration of

Page 6 of 18
Rs. 7,21,00,000/­ (Rupees Seven Crores Twenty­One Lakhs).
In that regard a sum of Rs. 7,01,00,000/­ (Rupees Seven
Crores One Lakh) was paid to respondent No.3 and a sum of
Rs.20,00,000/­   (Rupees   Twenty   Lakhs)   was   deposited   in
terms of the mutual understanding between the parties.  In
such   circumstance   the   respondents   No.1   and   2   being   a
bonafide purchaser for valuable consideration had interest in
the property in issue and since the regulations required issue
of ‘No due Certificate’ for securing the Occupation Certificate
the respondents No.1 and 2 were left with no other alternative
but to approach the High Court and seek for the relief as has
been done.  The learned senior advocate for respondent No.3
would support the contention of respondents No.1 and 2 and
contended that as respondent No.3 was arrayed as a party to
the   petition   and   the   contention   on   their   behalf   was   also
available before the Court, the writ petition being entertained
by the High Court was in accordance with law. 
8. Having adverted to the said contention we find that
essentially   it  is  no   doubt  true  that   there  is  no   privity   of
contract between the appellant and the respondents No.1 and

Page 7 of 18
2  herein  if   looked   at  in   technical   terms.     However,   what
cannot be lost sight is that the construction in question is
put up by the respondent No.3 on a plot allotted by the
appellant and such building constructed has been purchased
by the respondents No.1 and 2 under registered Sale Deed
dated 16.06.2011 for a valuable sale consideration.  In that
circumstance the respondents No.1 and 2 are desirous of
occupying the building.  Though the right in that regard in a
normal   circumstance   is   to   be   exercised   and   the   specific
performance for possession with Occupation Certificate is to
be enforced against the respondent No.3 who is their vendor,
the   respondent   No.4   which   is   the   statutory   authority   for
issuing   the   Occupation   Certificate   was   also   arrayed   as   a
respondent.     The   respondents   No.1   and   2   while   seeking
appropriate directions against the respondent No.4, having
noticed that the impugned communication would come in
their way of securing Occupation Certificate have chosen to
assail the same.
9. Further the covenant contained in the Sale Deed dated
16.06.2011 between respondents No. 1 and 3 in para 6 (G)

Page 8 of 18
creates an inter­se liability on mutual understanding with
regard to the costs incurred for securing  ‘No dues Certificate’
from appellant which reads as hereunder;
“The Purchasers have deposited in escrow the a
sum   of   Rs.   20,00,000/­   (Rupees  Twenty   Lakhs
only) with M/s. Khaitan & Jayakar, Advocates &
Solicitors, which will be released to the Developers
as and when the Developers obtain the Occupancy
Certificate for the said premises from the NMMC
and upon receipt of approval for extension of time
period,   and   consequent   issue   of   No   dues
Certificate from CIDCO.   The costs incurred for
receipt, of approval for extension of time; period
which shall lead to issue of no dues Certificate
from CIDCO shall be borne by the Developers and
the Purchasers equal proportions.”
Therefore, if the said aspect of the matter is kept in view the
respondents   No.1   and   2,   to   the   limited   extent   can   be
considered   as   aggrieved   persons   for   examination   of   their
contention to the limited extent. The contentions to indicate
that the construction was completed before 31.12.2008 and
that   respondent   No.3   is   therefore   not   liable   to   pay   the
amount indicated in the impugned communication cannot
however be accepted at the instance of respondents No.1 and
2 since the fact of completion of construction within the time
frame is to be established by respondent No. 3 alone.  Hence

Page 9 of 18
the further examination herein is to be made keeping in view
this aspect as well. 
10. Having   arrived   at   the   above   conclusion   what   is
required to be taken note is that the respondent No.3 herein
had submitted an undertaking dated 19.05.2004 which reads
as hereunder:
“UNDERTAKING
We   M/s.   Mehak   Developers   undertake   to
apply for occupancy certificate for plot no.7,
Sector 15, C.B.D. by 31.12.2005 to N.M.M.C.
failing which we undertake to pay additional
lease   premium   as   applicable   from
06.08.2001   for   the   area   for   which   the
occupancy has not been applied for.
For Mehak Developers,
(Proprietor)
Add:­ 507, Sharda Chambers,
15,   New   Marine   Lines,
Mumbai – 400 020.”
11. Though   the   period   for   completion   indicated   in   the
undertaking is 31.12.2005, the undisputed position is that
the time has been extended upto 31.12.2008 and the issue is
as to whether the respondent No.3 has in fact completed the

Page 10 of 18
construction within the said period and whether that will be
sufficient to avoid the levy of additional lease premium.  The
extension   was   granted   through   the   communication   dated
31.07.2007 (Annexure P6).  The said extension is in terms of
the Regulations 6 and 7 contained in Regulations of 1975
which read as hereunder:
Regulations­6
“Completion of building, factory, structure or
other work within the prescribed time – The
Lessee   shall   complete   building,   factory
structure or other work for which the land
has been granted within the time prescribed
by the Managing Director.”
Regulation – 7
“Permission   for   extension   of   time   –   If   the
Intending   Lessee   obtains   development
permission   and   commences   construction
accordance with the conditions of agreement
to   lease   made   between   him   and   the
Corporation but has been unable to complete
the construction within the time stipulated
in the agreement to lease for reasons beyond
his   control,   the   Managing   Director   may
permit extension of  time for completion  of
buildings, factory, structure or other work on
payment of additional premium.”
12. The   respondent   No.3   has   relied   on   the   completion
certificate   dated   24.12.2008   issued   by   the   architects

Page 11 of 18
addressed   to   the   respondent   No.4   herein.     Though   the
respondent No.3 has sought to rely on the same, what is
required   to   be   taken   note   is   the   communication   dated
09.02.2009 addressed by the respondent No.4 to respondent
No.3 indicating the requirement to be complied for grant of
occupancy certificate.  What is inter alia sought therein is ‘No
dues   Certificate’   from   the   appellant   to   be   submitted   to
respondent   No.4.     The   same   would   indicate   that   the
respondent No.3 herein though claimed to have completed
the construction before 31.12.2008 had only sought for issue
of ‘No dues Certificate’ from the appellant herein through the
communication   dated   11.08.2010.     Subsequently,   a   letter
dated 31.01.2011 was issued, whereafter the reminder dated
04.05.2013 was sent by respondent No.3 to the appellant
seeking for ‘No dues Certificate’.  In the said reminder dated
04.05.2013 reference is made to the occupancy certificate
obtained for 78 per cent of the FSI which relates to ‘A’ Wing
and it has been indicated therein that the balance 22 per cent
was   completed   by   31.12.2008.     It   is   in   reply   to   the
said   letter   the   impugned   communication   dated
20.04.2016/01.07.2016 was issued. 

Page 12 of 18
13. In   the   present   circumstance   from   what   has   been
narrated   above   it   is   noticed   that   there   is   lacuna   in   the
manner in which the appellant has also dealt with the matter.
However,   neither   the   High   Court   nor   this   Court   while
exercising the limited jurisdiction of judicial review can enter
into   the   factual   aspects   to   determine   whether   the
construction in fact had been completed prior to 31.12.2018
before a decision is taken on that aspect by the appellant,
based on the available records and spot verification if need
be. This is more so when that aspect of the matter is disputed
by the appellant herein.   The respondents no doubt have
relied on the completion certificate dated 24.12.2008, which
as already taken note has been addressed to the respondent
No.4 and the copy of the same has been furnished to the
appellant while making a request for issue of the ‘No dues
Certificate’.  Essentially when the plot was allotted on certain
conditions   and   the   same   stipulated   completion   of   the
construction in a time frame to avoid liability and when  the
statutory provisions required the ‘No dues Certificate’ from
the appellant so as to seek occupancy certificate from the
respondent No.4 the primary procedure is for the respondent

Page 13 of 18
No.3   to   submit   necessary   documents   to   the   appellant   to
establish that the construction is put up within the time
frame stipulated and to indicate that they are not liable to
pay any additional lease premium.  In the instant case we do
not find that such procedure has been complied with.  Even if
the requirement  was not complied and if the appellant was
entitled to levy the additional lease premium the same was
required to be done by adopting an appropriate procedure.
Hence to that extent the observations of the High Court that
the Principle of Natural Justice has not been complied by the
appellant is justified.  However, such lapse in procedure was
not sufficient to nullify the demand in absolute terms.  The
High Court, in our view, shall have issued direction to the
appellant Corporation to follow appropriate procedure in that
regard and pass a reasoned order.  
14. Further, we take note that the demand made in the
impugned communication is for the period till 30.03.2007
though it is contended by the appellant that the construction
has not been completed as on 31.12.2008 nor would the
communication indicate as to when according to them the

Page 14 of 18
construction   was   completed.     That   apart   though   certain
details were indicated with regard to the construction in the
reminder letter dated 24.05.2013, in response to which the
impugned communication is issued, there is no reference to
the details therein.  Hence, despite the manner in which the
impugned   communication   dated   20.04.2016/01.07.2016
issued not being sustainable and the quashing of the same as
made by the High Court is justified, the appropriate course
that ought to have been followed by the High Court is to remit
the   matter   to   the   appellant   herein   by   directing   them   to
provide opportunity to the respondent No.3 to file necessary
documents   in   support   of   the   completion   certificate   dated
24.12.2008   issued   by   the   Architect   so   as   to   enable   the
appellant to make a factual determination and to arrive at an
appropriate conclusion afresh by taking into consideration all
aspects   of   the   matter.     Hence   in   that   view   it   would   be
appropriate for us to order accordingly.
15. Notwithstanding the said conclusion what cannot be
overlooked is also the fact that the respondents No.1 and 2
who   had   made   a   sizeable   investment   to   purchase   the

Page 15 of 18
property are the ones who would be ultimately affected and
when a discretionary jurisdiction is being exercised by this
Court the equities are also required to be worked out and
balanced so as to protect the interest of all parties before the
Court in the meanwhile.  Hence pending such reconsideration
an avenue is to be created for the respondent No.4 to issue
the occupancy certificate so as to enable the respondents
No.1 and 2 to occupy and at the same time the interest of the
appellant is also required to be secured. 
16.      Therefore, pending reconsideration of the matter by
the appellant, the respondents No.1 to 3 shall either jointly or
severally deposit a sum of Rs.3,50,00,000/­ (Rupees Three
Crores Fifty Lakhs) with the appellant towards provisional
additional lease premium which would be subject to final
decision.  On the said amount being deposited the appellant
shall issue a provisional ‘No dues Certificate’ limited for the
purpose of enabling respondent No.3 to secure the occupancy
certificate from the respondent No.4.  On such provisional ‘No
dues Certificate’ being submitted to the respondent No.4, the
respondent No.4 shall process the application for issue of

Page 16 of 18
occupancy certificate for the ‘B’ Wing of the building Arneja
Chambers II. 
17. Insofar as the claim of the appellant for an additional
lease premium in the event of the respondent No.3 does not
satisfy   the   construction   was   completed   before   the
31.12.2008, the appellant shall provide opportunity and pass
fresh orders in that regard.  If the appellant is satisfied that
the   construction   is   completed   in   terms   of   the   extension
granted and if it is found they are not liable for the levy of
additional   lease  premium  the   amount   of   Rs.3,50,00,000/­
(Rupees Three Crores Fifty Lakhs) as indicated above shall be
returned to the parties who deposits the same.  On the other
hand, on determination it is concluded that the respondent
No.3   is   due   to   pay   any   additional   lease   premium,   the
appellant would be entitled to recover the same from the
respondent No.3 and until the said aspect attains finality,
there   shall   be   charge   over   the   property   purchased   by
respondents No.1 and 2.  Ultimately if the amount is held to
be due from the respondent No.3 and if the same is not paid,
the   appellant   will   have   the   liberty   of   withdrawing   the

Page 17 of 18
provisional   “No   dues   Certificate”   issued   pursuant   to   the
direction of this Court and intimate respondent No.4 in that
regard for appropriate action. Needless to mention that if the
interim amount of Rs.3,50,00,000/­ (Rupees Three Crores
Fifty Lakhs) is deposited by respondents No.1 and 2, they
would   be   entitled   to   work   out   their  inter­se  right   against
respondent No.3.
18. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part, in terms of
the observations and directions contained in para 16 and 17
supra.   It is made clear that we have not expressed any
opinion on the merits of the matter. There shall be no order
as to costs.  All pending applications shall stand disposed of.
….……………………….J.
                                          (R. BANUMATHI)
        ….……………………….J.
                                          (A.S. BOPANNA)
….……………………….J.
                                              (HRISHIKESH ROY)
New Delhi,
November 06, 2019

Page 18 of 18

AYODHYA JUDGEMENT -―Whether the disputed structure is the birth-place of Lord Ram according to the faith and belief of the Hindu devotees‖.

The facts, evidence and oral arguments of the present case have
traversed the realms of history, archaeology, religion and the law. The law must
stand apart from political contestations over history, ideology and religion. For a
case replete with references to archaeological foundations, we must remember
that it is the law which provides the edifice upon which our multicultural society
rests. The law forms the ground upon which, multiple strands of history, ideology
and religion can compete. By determining their limits, this Court as the final
arbiter must preserve the sense of balance that the beliefs of one citizen do not
interfere with or dominate the freedoms and beliefs of another. On 15 August
1947, India as a nation realised the vision of self-determination. On 26 January
1950 we gave ourselves the Constitution of India, as an unwavering commitment
to the values which define our society. At the heart of the Constitution is a
commitment to equality upheld and enforced by the rule of law. Under our
Constitution, citizens of all faiths, beliefs and creeds seeking divine provenance
are both subject to the law and equal before the law. Every judge of this Court is
not merely tasked with but sworn to uphold the Constitution and its values. The
Constitution does not make a distinction between the faith and belief of one
religion and another. All forms of belief, worship and prayer are equal. Those
whose duty it is to interpret the Constitution, enforce it and engage with it can
ignore this only to the peril of our society and nation. The Constitution speaks to
the judges who interpret it, to those who govern who must enforce it, but above
all, to the citizens who engage with it as an inseparable feature of their lives.
PART P
921
796. In the present case, this Court is tasked with an adjudicatory task of unique
dimension. The dispute is over immovable property. The court does not decide
title on the basis of faith or belief but on the basis of evidence. The law provides
us with parameters as clear but as profound as ownership and possession. In
deciding title to the disputed property, the court applies settled principles of
evidence to adjudicate upon which party has established a claim to the
immovable property.
797. On the balance of probabilities, there is clear evidence to indicate that the
worship by the Hindus in the outer courtyard continued unimpeded in spite of the
setting up of a grill-brick wall in 1857. Their possession of the outer courtyard
stands established together with the incidents attaching to their control over it.
798. As regards the inner courtyard, there is evidence on a preponderance of
probabilities to establish worship by the Hindus prior to the annexation of Oudh
by the British in 1857. The Muslims have offered no evidence to indicate that they
were in exclusive possession of the inner structure prior to 1857 since the date of
the construction in the sixteenth century. After the setting up of the grill-brick wall,
the structure of the mosque continued to exist and there is evidence to indicate
that namaz was offered within its precincts. The report of the Waqf Inspector of
December 1949 indicates that Muslims were being obstructed in free and
unimpeded access to mosque for the purposes of offering namaz. However,
there is evidence to show that namaz was offered in the structure of the mosque
and the last Friday namaz was on 16 December 1949. The exclusion of the
Muslims from worship and possession took place on the intervening night
PART P
922
between 22/23 December 1949 when the mosque was desecrated by the
installation of Hindu idols. The ouster of the Muslims on that occasion was not
through any lawful authority but through an act which was calculated to deprive
them of their place of worship. After the proceedings under Section 145 of CrPC
1898 were initiated and a receiver was appointed following the attachment of the
inner courtyard, worship of the Hindu idols was permitted. During the pendency of
the suits, the entire structure of the mosque was brought down in a calculated act
of destroying a place of public worship. The Muslims have been wrongly deprived
of a mosque which had been constructed well over 450 years ago.
799. We have already concluded that the three-way bifurcation by the High
Court was legally unsustainable. Even as a matter of maintaining public peace
and tranquillity, the solution which commended itself to the High Court is not
feasible. The disputed site admeasures all of 1500 square yards. Dividing the
land will not subserve the interest of either of the parties or secure a lasting
sense of peace and tranquillity.
800. Suit 5 has been held to be maintainable at the behest of the first plaintiff
(the deity of Lord Ram) who is a juristic person. The third plaintiff (next friend) has
been held to be entitled to represent the the first plaintiff. We are of the view that
on the one hand a decree must ensue in Suit 5, Suit 4 must also be partly
decreed by directing the allotment of alternate land to the Muslims for the
construction of a mosque and associated activities. The allotment of land to the
Muslims is necessary because though on a balance of probabilities, the evidence
PART P
923
in respect of the possessory claim of the Hindus to the composite whole of the
disputed property stands on a better footing than the evidence adduced by the
Muslims, the Muslims were dispossessed upon the desecration of the mosque on
22/23 December 1949 which was ultimately destroyed on 6 December 1992.
There was no abandonment of the mosque by the Muslims. This Court in the
exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution must ensure that a
wrong committed must be remedied. Justice would not prevail if the Court were to
overlook the entitlement of the Muslims who have been deprived of the structure
of the mosque through means which should not have been employed in a secular
nation committed to the rule of law. The Constitution postulates the equality of all
faiths. Tolerance and mutual co-existnce nourish the secular commitment of our
nation and its people.
801. The area of the composite site admeasures about 1500 square yards.
While determining the area of land to be allotted, it is necessary to provide
restitution to the Muslim community for the unlawful destruction of their place of
worship. Having weighed the nature of the relief which should be granted to the
Muslims, we direct that land admeasuring 5 acres be allotted to the Sunni Central
Waqf Board either by the Central Government out of the acquired land or by the
Government of Uttar Pradesh within the city of Ayodhya. This exercise, and the
consequent handing over of the land to the Sunni Central Waqf Board, shall be
conducted simultaneously with the handing over of the disputed site comprising
of the inner and outer courtyards as a consequence of the decree in Suit 5. Suit 4
shall stand decreed in the above terms.
PART P
924
802. Section 6 of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act 1993
empowers the Central Government to direct that the right, title and interest in
relation to the area or any part thereof, instead of continuing to vest in the Central
Government shall vest in the authority or body or trustees of any trust which is
willing to comply with the terms and conditions as government may impose.407
Section 7(1) provides that the property vested in the Central Government under
Section 3, shall be maintained by the government or by any person or trustees of
any trust, authorities in this behalf.408
803. We are of the view that it would be necessary to direct the Central
Government to frame a scheme in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by
Sections 6 and 7 to set up a trust or any other appropriate mechanism to whom
the land would be handed over in terms of the decree in Suit 5. The scheme shall
incorporate all provisions necessary to vest power and authority in relation to the
management of the trust or the body chosen for the vesting of the land.

407 6. Power of Central Government to direct vesting of the area in another authority or body or trust.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 7, the Central Government may, if it is satisfied that
any authority or other body, or trustees of any trust, set up on or after the commencement of this Act is or are
willing to comply with such terms and conditions as that Government may think fit to impose, direct by notification
in the Official Gazette, that the right, title and interest or any of them in reason to the area or any part thereof,
instead of continuing to vest in the Central Government, vest in that authority or body or trustees of that trust
either on the date of the notification or on such later date as may be specified in the notification.
(2) When any right, title and interest in relation to the area or part thereof vest in the authority or body or trustees
referred to in sub-section (1), such rights of the Central Government in relation to such area or part thereof, shall,
on and from the date of such vesting, be deemed to have become the rights of that authority or body or trustees
of that trust.
(3) The provision of Sections 4, 5, 7 and 11 shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to such authority or body or
trustees as they apply in relation to the Central Government and for this purpose references therein to the Central
Government shall be construed as references to such authority or body or trustees.
408 7. Management of property by Government.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or
instrument or order of any court, tribunal or other authority to the contrary, on and from the commencement of
this Act, the property vested in the Central Government under Section 3 shall be managed by the Central
Government or by a person or body of persons or trustees of any trust authorised by that Government in this
behalf.
(2) In managing the property vested in the Central Government under Section 3, the Central Government or the
authorised person shall ensure that the position existing before the commencement of this Act in the area on
which the structure (including the premises of the inner and outer courtyards of such structure), commonly known
as the Ram Janma Bhumi-Babri Masjid stood in village Kot Ramchandra in Ayodhya, in Pargana Haveli Avadh, in
tehsil Faizabad Sadar, in the district of Faizabad of the State of Uttar Pradesh is maintained.
PART Q
925
804. Suit 3 filed by Nirmohi Akhara has been held to be barred by limitation. We
have also rejected the objection of Nirmohi Akhara and of the Sunni Central Waqf
Board to the maintainability of Suit 5 which was based on their plea that Nirmohi
Akhara is a shebait. Nirmohi Akhara‘s claim to be a shebait stands rejected.
However, having regard to the historical presence of Nirmohi Akhara at the
disputed site and their role, it is necessary for this Court to take recourse to its
powers under Article 142 to do complete justice. Hence, we direct that in framing
the scheme, an appropriate role in the management would be assigned to the
Nirmohi Akhara.
Q. Reliefs and directions
805. We accordingly order and direct as follows:
1 (i) Suit 3 instituted by Nirmohi Akhara is held to be barred by limitation
and shall accordingly stand dismissed;
(ii) Suit 4 instituted by the Sunni Central Waqf Board and other plaintiffs
is held to be within limitation. The judgment of the High Court
holding Suit 4 to be barred by limitation is reversed; and
(iii) Suit 5 is held to be within limitation.
2 Suit 5 is held to be maintainable at the behest of the first plaintiff who is
represented by the third plaintiff. There shall be a decree in terms of prayer
clauses (A) and (B) of the suit, subject to the following directions:
PART Q
926
(i) The Central Government shall, within a period of three months from the
date of this judgment, formulate a scheme pursuant to the powers vested
in it under Sections 6 and 7 of the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya
Act 1993. The scheme shall envisage the setting up of a trust with a Board
of Trustees or any other appropriate body under Section 6. The scheme to
be framed by the Central Government shall make necessary provisions in
regard to the functioning of the trust or body including on matters relating
to the management of the trust, the powers of the trustees including the
construction of a temple and all necessary, incidental and supplemental
matters;
(ii) Possession of the inner and outer courtyards shall be handed over to the
Board of Trustees of the Trust or to the body so constituted. The Central
Government will be at liberty to make suitable provisions in respect of the
rest of the acquired land by handing it over to the Trust or body for
management and development in terms of the scheme framed in
accordance with the above directions; and
(iii) Possession of the disputed property shall continue to vest in the statutory
receiver under the Central Government, untill in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 6 of the Ayodhya Act of 1993, a notification is issued vesting
the property in the trust or other body.
3 (i) Simultaneously, with the handing over of the disputed property to the Trust
or body under clause 2 above, a suitable plot of land admeasuring 5 acres
PART Q
927
shall be handed over to the Sunni Central Waqf Board, the plaintiff in Suit
4.
(ii) The land shall be allotted either by:
(a) The Central Government out of the land acquired under the Ayodhya
Act 1993; or
(b) The State Government at a suitable prominent place in Ayodhya;
The Central Government and the State Government shall act in consultation with
each other to effectuate the above allotment in the period stipulated.
(iii) The Sunni Central Waqf Board would be at liberty, on the allotment of the
land to take all necessary steps for the construction of a mosque on the
land so allotted together with other associated facilities;
(iv) Suit 4 shall stand decreed to this extent in terms of the above directions; and
(v) The directions for the allotment of land to the Sunni Central Waqf Board in
Suit 4 are issued in pursuance of the powers vested in this Court under
Article 142 of the Constitution.
4 In exercise of the powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution, we direct that in the scheme to be framed by the Central
Government, appropriate representation may be given in the Trust or body, to the
Nirmohi Akhara in such manner as the Central Government deems fit.
5 The right of the plaintiff in Suit 1 to worship at the disputed property is
affirmed subject to any restrictions imposed by the relevant authorities with
PART Q
928
respect to the maintenance of peace and order and the performance of orderly
worship.
806. All the appeals shall stand disposed of in the above terms. Parties are left
to bear their own costs.

https://advocatemmmohan.com/2019/11/09/ayodhya-judgement/

when both incidents are independent - acquital of one . incident would not help the accused in another incident due to self contradictory versions of accused - reasonable delay in lodging FIR is not amount to delay in FIR - previous enimty not necessary when other findings are concurret by both courts below

when both incidents are independent - acquital of one . incident would not help the accused in another incident due to self contradictory versions  of accused - reasonable delay in lodging FIR is not amount to delay in FIR - previous enimty not necessary when other findings are concurret by both courts below

the defence had taken self­contradictory stand.   
First, it was asserted that Mohar Pal sustained injuries in the first incident which had occurred at
6.30 p.m. on the same evening.  However, no evidence in support of that plea was forthcoming.  Then, the alternative plea taken by the defence was that Mohar Pal was, in fact, injured at some
other place near Anaj Mandi and was brought in a three­wheeler to the hospital.  Even this plea of the accused has been held to be figment   of   imagination   and   without   any   evidence   in   support
thereof.     
On   the   other   hand,   the   prosecution   has   produced evidence in the form of human blood soiled mud from the spot near the hospital where the incident in question had occurred as stated by Bishan Singh (PW­1) and Baljit Singh (PW­2). 
Even the fact that the accused have been acquitted in the cross­cases filed with regard to the first incident which took place at 6.30 p.m. on the same evening will not take the matter any further for the appellants.   
That was an independent incident whereas the finding of guilt recorded against the appellants is
concerning the incident which had taken place at 8.30 p.m. near the Government Hospital, Palwal as proved by the prosecution witnesses.   In fact, the incident at 8.30 p.m. was the counter blast of the fight which had taken place between two groups at 6.30 p.m. and the previous enmity between them.  The fact that there   is   no   evidence   about   the   previous   enmity   and   that   no
evidence is produced by the prosecution in that regard, in our view, cannot be the basis to reverse the concurrent view taken by two   Courts   below   ­   recording   finding   of   guilt   against   the
appellants for commission of offence to assault Mohar Pal near the Government Hospital, Palwal at around 8.30 p.m. on 25th April, 1998. 

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.764 OF 2009
Rohtas & Anr. … Appellants
Versus
The State of Haryana … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This   appeal   takes   exception   to   the   judgment   and   order
dated 13th March, 2008 passed by the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No.241­DB of 1999,
whereby the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellants
Rohtas (Accused No.1) and Surender Singh (Accused No.2) for
offences punishable under Section 302/34 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (IPC) by the Trial Court came to be confirmed.
2. Initially, six accused were tried for the offence registered as
FIR No.298 on 26th  April, 1998 at Police Station, City Palwal.
2
Bishan Singh (PW­1) reported the matter to the police station
whose statement came to be recorded on 25th  April, 1998 at
about 11.30 p.m., alleging that at about 6.30 p.m. a quarrel had
taken place between two groups.  He was member of one of the
groups   whereas   Roop   Chand   (Accused   No.4)   was   member   of
another group that had assaulted his brother Ved Prakash and
nephew Anil Kumar.  They had sustained injuries and were taken
to Government Hospital, Palwal by Bishan Singh (PW­1), Rati
Chand   (father   of   Anil   Kumar)   and   Baljit   Singh   (PW­2)   for
treatment.  At about 8.30 p.m., when they were standing at the
gate   of   Government   Hospital   Palwal,   his   brother   Mohar   Pal
arrived there on a motorcycle.  He was told to bring money from a
commission agent at Anaj Mandi, Palwal.  When Mohar Pal was
leaving towards Anaj Mandi, at a distance of about ten paces
from the gate of the hospital, all the six accused persons came
from the front side and stopped his motorcycle.  Soon thereafter,
appellants Rohtas (Accused No.1) and Surender Singh (Accused
No.2)   both   inflicted     knife   blows   one   after   the   other   in   the
stomach   of   Mohar   Pal.     Immediately   thereafter,   Mohar   Pal
attempted to run away by raising alarm “mar diya, mar diya”.
Billu (Accused No.5) and Rajender (Accused No.3) caught hold of
Mohar Pal and Dev Kumar (Accused No.6) gave one knife blow in
3
the abdomen of Mohar Pal.   Similarly, Roop Chand (Accused
No.4) gave knife blow in the abdomen of Mohar Pal.  He also gave
a knife blow on the waist of Mohar Pal as a result of which Mohar
Pal fell down.  It is stated that Bishan Singh, Ravi, Ved Prakash,
Anil and Baljit Singh (PW­2), who were present at the scene, ran
towards the spot and on seeing them, the accused persons ran
away.   Thereafter, Mohar Pal was immediately removed to the
hospital in injured condition where he succumbed to the injuries
and   was   declared   dead.     On   the   basis   of   this   FIR,   the
investigation was taken over by ASI Gian Singh (PW­6). 
3. After   completion   of   investigation,   charge­sheet   was   filed
against   six   accused   persons   for   offence   punishable   under
Sections 148, 302 and 149 IPC.  The trial commenced before the
Additional   Sessions   Judge  (I),  Faridabad   being   Sessions  Case
No.40 of 1998.  Both sides produced witnesses.  According to the
accused persons, they were falsely implicated.  Further, it is their
stand that Mohar Pal was injured in the previous incident which
had taken place at 6.30 p.m. on the same evening.   He was
member of the aggressor party.   During the fight which took
place, he must have sustained injuries at the hands of opposite
party.  It was also the case of the accused that Mohar Pal had
4
suffered injuries at some other place near Anaj Mandi and he was
brought to the hospital in a three­wheeler.  In other words, the
incident did not happen near the hospital. 
4. On the basis of such alternative plea, the accused persons
denied their involvement in the commission of the offence.  After
completion   of   the   trial   and   recording   of   statements   of   the
concerned accused persons under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal   Procedure,   the   Trial   Court   finally   convicted   Rohtas
(Accused   No.1),   Surender   Singh   (Accused   No.2),   Roop   Chand
(Accused  No.4)  and  Dev  Kumar  (Accused No.6)  but  acquitted
Rajender (Accused No.3) and Billu (Accused No.5) by giving them
benefit of doubt.  The Trial Court accordingly convicted the four
accused   under   Section   302   read   with   Section   34   IPC   and
sentenced them to undergo life imprisonment and to pay fine of
Rs.30,000/­ each to the widow of deceased Mohar Pal, in default
to undergo further rigorous imprisonment for two years.   This
decision was carried in appeal by Accused Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 6
being Criminal Appeal No.241­DB of 1999 before the High Court
of  Punjab  and Haryana  at Chandigarh.   The High  Court, on
reappreciation of the evidence on record, affirmed the finding of
guilt against the appellants Rohtas (Accused No.1) and Surender
5
Singh (Accused No.2) but acquitted Roop Chand (Accused No.4)
and Dev Kumar (Accused No.6) by giving them benefit of doubt.
As   regards   the   appellants,   the   High   Court,   vide   impugned
judgment, opined that the evidence on record clearly established
their involvement in the commission of the offence and causing
death of Mohar Pal by inflicting knife blow injuries to which he
eventually succumbed.
5. Resultantly,   the   appellants,   Rohtas   (Accused   No.1)   and
Surender Singh (Accused No.2) have assailed the finding of guilt
recorded against them by way of this appeal, arising from special
leave petition.
6. Neither the State nor the complainant had challenged the
acquittal of Rajender (Accused No.3) and Billu (Accused No.5) by
the Trial Court nor the acquittal of Roop Chand (Accused No.4)
and   Dev   Kumar   (Accused   No.6)   by   the   High   Court.     Their
acquittal has become final.
7. In the present appeal, the assail is based essentially on the
argument   that   both   the   Courts   below   have   misread   or
misappreciated the evidence on record.  The evidence of Bishan
Singh (PW­1) and Baljit Singh (PW­2) was unreliable and was an
6
attempt to falsely implicate the appellants.  It is urged that the
prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt
even against the appellants.  According to the appellants, the real
and   core   facts   have   not   been   properly   investigated   and   the
prosecution’s case is replete with several deficiencies such as :­
“(i) No seizure list of clothes of deceased made by
IO;
(ii) Blood group of deceased was not ascertained,
hence   no   link   was   established   between   blood
found on alleged kurta and blood stained earth
with   the   blood   of   the   deceased.   Thus   the
prosecution   has   totally   failed   to  establish   the
link between blood found on the seized articles
and blood of the deceased;
(iii) Prosecution   though   allegedly   recovered   the
alleged knife and sent it to FSL, but it did not
produce the said knife in the Court nor got it
exhibited, besides there were no blood stains,
hence the recovered knife cannot be connected
with this crime;
(iv) Shirt was seized as per recovery memo Ex. PB,
but Kurta was replaced while sending it to FSL;
(v) Kurta   if   worn   by   the   deceased   while   he   was
injured by knife, must have cut signs but there
was none;
(vi) No   Independent   Panchas   (Recovery   witness)
examined by the prosecution;
(vii) The   IO   has   miserably   failed   to   show   in   the
Sketch plan Ex PH as to from which place or
places, trail of blood was there as per FIR and
alleged blood recovered, since in the alleged first
attack by appellants the deceased was on motor
cycle, which he left and tried to run away by
making noise “mar diya mar diya” and thereafter
7
he was knived at least two to three times by
Roop Chand and Devi;
(viii) No Independent witness examined either for the
occurance   or   for   the   alleged   Recovery   and
Inquest Report;
(ix) The most important and valuable witnesses i.e.
Anil   and   Ved   Prakash   were   withheld   by   the
prosecution, who also participated in the earlier
village incident @ 6.30 pm and got injured;
(x) Prosecution did not examine any eye witness of
the   incident   which   occurred   in   the   village   at
about   6.30   pm   on   25/04/1998,   which   was
shown   as   motive   for   the   present   incident
allegedly @ 8.30 pm.
(xi) Prosecution   purposely   withheld   MLR   of   the
deceased   which   was   proved   by   the   defence
through DW­2 and on the said MLR and injuries
sustained   by   Moharpal,   Ved   Prakash   &   Anil,
there was a cross case through the FIR lodged
by injured Ved Prakash u/s 323/324/506/149
r/w 148 IPC at PS Sadar, Case was tried by
Judicial  Magistrate 1st  Class,   Palwal,  and the
accused   were   acquitted   vide   judgment   dated
24/01/2007;
(xii) Sketch plan Ex PH does not show as to where
motorcycle was thrown, where deceased threw
away   his   clothes,   where   the   witnesses   PW­1,
PW­2 and their Associates were standing and
from which place body of the deceased was lifted
and   brought   to   the   Hospital.     Hence   the
prosecution has miserably failed to connect the
place   of   occurrence   with   the   commission   of
offence;
(xiii) In   this   case   FIR   appears   to   be   concocted,
fabricated and recorded and after consultations
etc.   It appears that FIR was lodged only after
Inquest   report   where   the   time   of   death   was
recorded as 11.50 AM on the dictates of PW­1
and also there would have been fully disclosed
genesis of the crime, names of the assailants,
name of the weapon and names of the witnesses
8
etc, which are completely missing in the Inquest
report.
(xiv) There is the variance between the alleged FIR
and report of IO for registering case;
(xv) Non­seizure of Motor Cycle;
(xvi) Non   production   of   Anil   and   Ved   Prakash   as
witnesses  and various other irregularities  and
serious   lapses   of   the   Investigation   including
improper statement of IO PW­6 which entitles
benefit of doubt to the appellants.”
8. According to the appellants, the Trial Court and the High
Court have completely glossed over the glaring infirmities and
foundational defects of the prosecution which were fatal, and in
any case, the appellants deserved similar benefit of doubt as
given to other accused persons by the Trial Court and then by
the High Court.  The role of the other accused persons spoken
about  by  the   prosecution   witnesses  is  no   different   than  that
ascribed to  the  appellants.    Accordingly, it  is urged that  the
appellants be acquitted as the prosecution has failed to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and in any case, they should
be given benefit of doubt as is given to accused Roop Chand
(Accused No.4) and Dev Kumar (Accused No.6) by the High Court.
9
9. Learned   counsel   for   the   State   has   adopted   the   reasons
recorded by the Trial Court and the High Court to distinguish the
case of the appellants Rohtas (Accused No.1) and Surender Singh
(Accused   No.2),   who   have   been   named   by   the   prosecution
witnesses, and because there is clinching evidence on record to
establish their guilt.  It is urged that there is no deficiency in the
investigation   nor   in   the   evidence   produced   before   the   Court
which commended the Trial Court as well as the High Court to
record finding of guilt against the appellants.  It cannot be said to
be inadequate in any manner.  On the other hand, it is evident
that   the   accused   persons   took   contradictory   plea   by   first
asserting   that   Mohar   Pal   sustained   injuries   during   the   fight
between two groups in the earlier incident which had occurred at
6.30 p.m. on the same evening.   Having realised that the said
plea cannot be substantiated by them, alternative plea was taken
that the incident in question did not occur near the Government
hospital and the injuries suffered by Mohar Pal were sustained at
some other place near Anaj Mandi from where he was brought in
a three­wheeler to the hospital for being admitted for treatment.
However,   no   evidence   was   produced   by   the   accused   to
substantiate that fact.  It is urged by the State that just because
co­accused have been acquitted, that does not warrant grant of
10
same   relief   to   the   appellants   despite   the   clinching   evidence
against them about their role and the manner of commission of
offence by them.   The learned counsel for the State contended
that even if the State has not challenged the acquittal of other
accused persons, that by itself cannot be the basis to acquit the
appellants herein, for there is sufficient evidence against them
and has been produced by the prosecution to bring home their
guilt.  It is thus contended that the benefit given to other accused
by the High Court cannot be the basis to give similar benefit to
the appellants. 
10. It is submitted that the evidence of Bishan Singh (PW­1)
and Baljit Singh (PW­2), who were the eye­witnesses, cannot be
undermined, at least against the appellants before this Court.  It
is well established position that the principle of  falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus  has no general applicability in India and the
Court   is   not   debarred   from   separating   the   truth   from   the
falsehood and accepting a part of the evidence.  It is urged that
the appeal is devoid of merits and the same be dismissed.
11. We   have   heard   Mr.   Arvind   Kumar,   Advocate   for   the
appellants and Dr. Monika Gusain Advocate for the respondent
State.
11
12. It is well established position in law that this Court, while
entertaining an appeal by way of special leave under Article 136
of   the   Constitution   of   India,   ordinarily,   will   not   attempt   to
reappreciate the evidence on record unless the decision of the
Trial Court or the High Court is shown to have committed a
manifest error of law or procedure or the conclusion reached by
the Courts below is, on the face of it, perverse.  Merely because
another view on the same evidence is possible, that cannot be the
basis to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the Courts
below much less concurrent finding of facts.   (See  Duli Chand
vs. Delhi Administration1
; Mst. Dalbir Kaur & Ors. vs. State
of Punjab2
; Ramanbhai Naranbhai Patel & Ors. vs. State of
Gujarat3
; Chandra Bihari Gautam & Ors. vs. State of Bihar4
;
and  Radha  Mohan  Singh  @  Lal  Saheb  &  Ors.  vs.  State  of
U.P.5
).
1
 (1975) 4 SCC 649
2
 (1976) 4 SCC 158
3
 (JT 1999 (9) SC 319
4
 JT 2002 (4) SC 62
5
 JT 2006 (1) SC 428
12
13. Despite   this   settled   position,   we   may   venture   to   wade
through   the   evidence   on   record   to   reassure   ourselves   as   to
whether  the Trial Court and the  High Court have committed
manifest error bordering on perversity or error apparent on the
face   of   record.   As  regards   the   role   of   the   appellants,   Rohtas
(Accused No.1) and  Surender Singh  (Accused No.2), the  Trial
Court analysed the testimonies of eye­witnesses Bishan Singh
(PW­1) and Baljit Singh (PW­2) and found them to be natural and
trustworthy.  The Trial Court, observed as follows :­
“20.    ………………… Both of them have stated that in the
incident which had taken place in the village, Anil and Ved
Parkash from their side had received injuries and that in that
connection they had brought them to General Hospital Palwal
where Mohar Pal arrived at his motor cycle at 8.30 p.m. and
that when Mohar Pal left for Anaj Mandi, Palwal for bringing
some money from some commission agent, then he was way
laid   by   the   accused   persons   and   then   caused   injuries   by
means of knives. No suggestion was given to these PWs that
Mohar   Pal   had   received   injuries   along   with   Anil   and   Ved
Prakash in the village. They were rather given the suggestions
that Baljit (PW­2) and Mohar Pal had gone to Anaj Mandi from
the village after the incident had taken place there and both of
them   had   consumed   liquor.   They   were   further   given   the
suggestion that Mohar Pal had received injuries in the Anaj
Mandi Palwal and Baljit had brought him in a rickshaw for
being admitted in the nursing home of Dr. Lokesh which was
situated in the vicinity of General Hospital Palwal and when
Mohar Pal died then taking undue advantage of his death, this
false   story  was  coined   implicating the  accused.   They  were
further   given   the   suggestion   that   Mohar   Pal   had   received
injuries from sharp edged railings of the kitchen garden of the
commission agent to whom he had gone. No suggestion at all
was   given   that   Mohar   Pal   was   rendered   injured   for   the
incident that took place in the evening in the village. Thus, the
plea that the accused party caused injuries to Mohar Pal in
the right of private defence is absolutely baseless.
21. It is true that in the FIR No.152 dated 28/4/1998 vide Ex.
DB   recorded   at   Police   Station   Sadar   Palwal   against   the
13
complainant party, it was mentioned that Anil, Ved Prakash
and  Mohar Pal  were  caused   injuries   in defence.   This  first
information report was lodged by Rajinder accused. However,
no reliance can be placed upon this version as the same came
into existence after the death of Mohar Pal had taken place. A
perusal of the Fir Ex. DB shows that the same came to be
recorded on the basis of rapat No.5 dated 26.1.1998 at 9 a.m.
By that time, Mohar Pal had expired and to us allegation that
he had (sic) been caused injuries in the incident of 25.4.1998
at 6.30  p.m.  in the village cannot  be  given  any credence.
Morever, it is well established that the FIR is not a substantive
evidence by itself. The same can be used only for the purpose
of contradicting or corroborating a particular versions. The
accused have not examined any witness in their defence who
could depose that Mohar Pal had been caused injuries by the
accused party in their right of private defence in the incident
that took place in the village.”
The Trial Court, further observed :­
“But in the case this Judgment does not help to the accused
in any manner because there is no whisper of suggestion even
in the cross examination of Bishan Singh and Baljit Singh
PWs that Mohar Pal had been cause injuries in the incident
which took place on 25.4.1998 evening in the village.”
The Trial Court again observed :­
“24. It is true that Bishan Singh (PW­1) Baljit (PW­2) Ratti
Chand,   Ved   Prakash   and   Anil   could   not   case   effective
resistance   when   Mohar  Pal  was   assaulted   by   the   accused
within their sight (sic). But that by itself is no ground to paint
their statements with black color. Incident after all had taken
place near General Hospital, Palwal as the investigating officer
ASI Gian Singh also lifted blood stained earth from there.
Presence of these persons there was natural as they must
have come to obtain treatment for Anil and Ved Parkash, who
had received injuries in the prior altercation that took place in
the village.
  ……….. In the present case, the incident appears to have
taken place all of a sudden near the hospital. It might have
lasted only 2­3 minutes, Bishan Singh, Baljit Singh and thus
it is not surprising that they could not effectively intervene
(sic) by chasing the accused.”
14
The High Court, on reappreciation of the evidence, once again
observed as follows :­
“PW­1 Bishan Singh and PW 2 Baljit Singh can be
safely   relied   upon   about   Mohar   Pal   having   been
assaulted in the occurrence at 8.30 PM.   Contention
that there was delay in FIR or that the FIR was antetimed   or   that   the   genesis   of   the   occurrence   was
suppressed,   based   only   on   the   ground   that   in   the
inquest report, number of the FIR and names of the
FIR and names of the accused were not mentioned,
has no merit.  Statement of Bishan Singh PW 1 is duly
recorded in the inquest report and entire version given
by him in the FIR including presence of PW 2 Baljit
Singh finds mention therein.  Reading of a part of the
statement separately recorded that he identified the
dead body of which post mortem was being done, as
statement recorded later is not justified.  Testimony of
PW 1 Bishan Singh and PW 2 Baljit Singh cannot be
rejected   but   has   to   be   carefully   appreciated   by
accepting that part which may be clearly reliable and
by not accepting the part which may not be safe to be
relied upon.  Role of each accused has to be carefully
considered.
According  to the version  given by PWs,  when
Mohar Pal had left for the Anaz Mandi on motor cycle,
he was stopped by the accused.  Rohtas and Surender,
gave one knife blow each in the stomach of Mohar Pal.
We do not find any reason to reject this part of the
version with regard to Rohtas and Surender.  Rohtas
and Surender are sons of Shiv Singh, who according to
the defence, were injured in the earlier incident.   A
knife has been recovered from Rohtas.  Opening of the
attack by Rohtas and Surender could have been easily
noticed by Bishan Singh PW1 and PW 2 Baljit Singh,
whose presence on the spot is established by prompt
lodging of the FIR.  Mere fact that their names are not
mentioned in the MLR, does not create any doubt.  In
the MLR, it has not been mentioned as to who brought
the injured to the hospital.  The fact that the injured
was described as having died, instead of having been
injured, is not a major discrepancy.  The injured died
within half an hour and immediately the police was
informed.  The I.O., recorded the statement of Bishan
Singh PW 1 in the hospital itself soon after the death.
FIR was formally registered immediately at 12.45 AM
in the night and copy was received by the Magistrate
in the night itself by 4 AM.  Case of the prosecution is
15
to be examined a whole and any minor discrepancy
cannot be taken in isolation.  Mere fact that the said
witnesses did not intervene to save the deceased, is of
no effect.   The witnesses were at some distance and
within minutes,  the accused caused  injuries to the
deceased.  The witnesses had, thus, no opportunity to
intervene.   Discrepancy of the I.O. in not recovering
the motor cycle or not showing the source of light,
does not create any suspicion about the version of the
prosecution.”
14. After perusing the evidence of Bishan Singh (PW­1), we have
no hesitation in taking the view that the concurrent finding of
fact recorded by the two Courts below needs no interference.
Bishan Singh (PW­1) in his examination­in­chief has deposed as
follows :­
“At about (sic) 8.30 p.m. on the same day I, Rati Chand and
Baljit were talking at the gate of G.H. Palwal. My brother
Mohar Pal also came  there  on a  motor cycle.   I then  sent
Mohar Pal back for bringing money from a commission agent
in the Anaz Mandi, Palwal.
Mohar Pal must have crossed hardly a distance of 10
paces   that   the   accused   Rohtas,   Surender,   Billu,   Rajender,
Roopi and Devi present in the Court came there and they
made   to   stop   the   Mohar   Pal’s   motor   cycle.     Rohtas   and
Surender then gave one knife blow each on the abdomen of
Mohar Pal.  Leaving his motor cycle, Mohar Pal then started
running and raised the alarm of mar­diya mardiya.  Billu and
Rajender then caught him and Roopi accused gave a knife
blow on his back and Devi accused gave another knife blow on
his abdomen with the result that Mohar Pal died at the spot.
When   I,   Rati   Chand,   Ved   Parkash   and   Anil   etc.     started
running for saving Mohar Pal, then the accused persons ran
away.”
15. He   has   been   extensively   cross­examined   but   the   crossexamination   does   not   make   any   dent   with   regard   to   his
16
statement in the examination­in­chief that Rohtas (Accused No.1)
and Surender Singh (Accused No.2) gave knife blow each on the
stomach of Mohar Pal and caused the fatal injuries.  Dr. Ramesh
Leekha (PW­5) has spoken about the injuries in his evidence and
the same also can be noticed from the post­mortem report of
Mohar Pal that he had sustained the following injuries :­
“1. Incised wound 3 x 0.25 cm, 8 cm above and lateral
to  umbilicus.   On  the   opening   of   the   abdomen,   the
middle   log   of   liver   was  found   cut   badly   with   huge
quantity of blood in the abdominal cavity. Superficial
and deep facie with omentum and peritoneum was cut
through and through.
2. Incised wound 2.5 x 0.5 cm which was 2 cm above
and   lateral   to   umbilicus   underlying   superficial   and
deep facia and omentum was cut on the left side of the
abdomen.
3. Reddish abrasion 8 cm long and linear in shape and
8 cm above and lateral to the left side of umbilicus.
4. Incised wound 1 x 0.5 cm  n the left supra scapular
region underlying muscles were cut with no injury to
lung or pleura.”
XXX   XXX  XXX
VI­REMARKS BY MEDICAL OFFICER
In my opinion the cause of death in this case in
shock and haemorrhage (sic) as a result of injuries
sustained   by   the   deceased,   particularly   No.1   which
alone   in   sufficient   to   cause   death   in   an   ordinary
course   of   nature.   All   injuries   are   ante   mortem   in
nature.”
16. Suffice it to observe that the cross­examination of Bishan
Singh   (PW­1)   does   not   take   the   matter   any   further   for   the
17
appellants, as is rightly held by the two Courts below.  Same is
the position with regard to the evidence of Baljit Singh (PW­2).
Even   he   has   plainly   mentioned   about   the   manner   in   which
Mohar Pal was stopped by all the accused persons when he was
riding his motorcycle and immediately thereafter Rohtas (Accused
No.1) and Surender Singh (Accused No.2) inflicted knife blows on
his stomach one after the other.  The fact that similar role has
been ascribed to Roop Chand (Accused No.4) and Dev Kumar
(Accused   No.6)   but   the   High   Court   acquitted   them   by   giving
benefit of doubt cannot be the basis to undermine the quality of
evidence which has already come on record.  We are not dilating
on the correctness of the view so taken by the High Court  qua
those   accused   as   neither   the   State   nor   the   complainant   has
assailed the finding recorded by the High Court in that regard.
That   does   not   mean   that   a   wrong   relief   given   to   co­accused
should also be given to the appellants against whom clinching
evidence has come on record about the manner in which the
offence was committed by them.
17. Reverting to the exposition of this Court in State of U.P. vs.
Moti Ram & Ors.6
, it turns on the facts of that case. That case
6
 (1990) 4 SCC 389
18
was an appeal against acquittal and the quality of evidence was
not   reassuring   and   warranting   a   finding   of   guilt   against   the
acquitted accused.  Even in the case of Balaka Singh & Ors. vs.
The   State   of   Punjab7
, this Court was dealing with evidence
against the appellants and four accused named along with the
appellants therein, which was so inextricably mixed up that it
was not possible to separate one from the other. 
18. In the present case, however, the evidence of Bishan Singh
(PW­1) and Baljit Singh (PW­2), who are the eye witnesses, has
mentioned about the events as unfolded.  First, all the accused
persons   obstructed   Mohar   Pal   who   was   riding   a   motorcycle.
Immediately after he was stopped, both the appellants inflicted
knife blows on the stomach of Mohar Pal one after the other.
This role of the appellants is distinct.   Thereafter Mohar Pal
attempted to flee away from the spot when he was stopped by the
other accused persons and two of them inflicted knife blows one
after the other.  The events, therefore, can be segregated. 
19. So far as the second event is concerned, the Trial Court and
the High Court gave benefit of doubt to the concerned accused.
7
 (1975) 4 SCC 511
19
In that sense, the appellants are not concerned with that part of
the event.  As aforementioned, even if we do not agree with the
approach of the High Court in absolving Accused Nos.4 and 6, we
refrain from dilating on the said approach of the High Court as
neither the State nor the complainant has assailed the acquittal
of those accused.   In any case, wrong benefit given to those
accused cannot enure to the advantage of the appellants against
whom clear, truthful and unassailable evidence is forthcoming.
For, neither the presence of Bishan Singh (PW­1) and Baljit Singh
(PW­2) can be doubted nor their evidence can be discarded on the
specious ground that they are related to the deceased Mohar Pal,
and are therefore interested witnesses. 
20. Indubitably, just because the witnesses are related cannot
be the basis to discard their evidence, if it is otherwise natural
and truthful.  Their evidence has commended to the Trial Court
as well as the High Court as truthful and we see no reason to
deviate from that concurrent view taken by the Courts below.  It
is the duty of the Court to separate the grain from the chaff and
then to arrive at a finding of guilt of an accused or otherwise,
notwithstanding the fact that evidence is found to be deficient
qua another accused named in the same offence.   The maxim
20
falsus   in   uno,   falsus   in   omnibus  has   not   received   general
acceptance in India nor has this maxim come to occupy the
status of rule of law.  This has been restated in Rizan & Anr. vs.
State of  Chhattisgarh8
. In paragraph 12 of the said decision,
the Court observed, thus :­
“12. Stress was laid by the accused­appellants on the
non­acceptance of evidence tendered by some witnesses
to   contend   about   desirability   to   throw   out   the   entire
prosecution   case.   In   essence,   prayer   is   to   apply   the
principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (false in one
thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable.
Even   if   a   major   portion   of   evidence   is   found   to   be
deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an
accused, notwithstanding acquittal of a number of other
co­accused persons his conviction can be maintained. It
is the duty of the court to separate the grain from the
chaff. Where the chaff can be separated from the grain, it
would   be   open   to   the   court   to   convict   an   accused
notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been found to
be   deficient   to   prove   guilt   of   other   accused   persons.
Falsity   of   a   particular   material   witness   or   material
particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end.
The  maxim  falsus in  uno falsus in  omnibus  has no
application   in   India   and   the   witnesses   cannot   be
branded as liars. The maxim  falsus in uno falsus in
omnibus has not received general acceptance nor has
this  maxim  come  to  occupy  the   status  of  a  rule  of
law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts
to,   is   that   in   such   cases   testimony   may   be
disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The
doctrine  merely   involves   the   question   of   weight   of
evidence  which  a  court  may  apply   in  a  given  set  of
circumstances,  but   it   is  not  what  may  be  called   “a
mandatory rule of evidence”. (See  Nisar Ali  v.  State
of U.P.) Merely because some of the accused persons
have  been  acquitted,  though  evidence  against  all  of
them, so far as direct testimony went, was the same
does not lead as a necessary corollary that those who
8
 (2003) 2 SCC 661
21
have   been   convicted   must   also   be   acquitted.  It   is
always open to a court to differentiate accused who had
been   acquitted   from   those   who   were   convicted.   (See
Gurcharan Singh  v.  State of Punjab.) The doctrine is a
dangerous one, specially in India for if a whole body of
the testimony were to be rejected, because a witness was
evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be
feared that administration of criminal justice would come
to   a   deadstop.   Witnesses   just   cannot   help   in   giving
embroidery   to   a   story,   however   true   in   the   main.
Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what
extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely
because in some respects the court considers the same to
be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a
witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law
that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The
evidence has to be sifted with care. The aforesaid dictum
is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes
across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain
of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or
embellishment. (See  Sohrab  v.  State of M.P.  and  Ugar
Ahir v. State of Bihar.) An attempt has to be made to, as
noted above, in terms of the felicitous metaphor, separate
the grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is
not feasible to separate truth from falsehood, because the
grain and the chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the
process of separation an absolutely new case has to be
reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by
the   prosecution   completely   from   the   context   and   the
background   against   which   they   are   made,   the   only
available course to be made is to discard the evidence in
toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of M.P. and Balaka Singh
v. State of Punjab.
) As observed by this Court in State of
Rajasthan v. Kalki normal discrepancies in evidence are
those   which  are  due  to  normal errors   of  observation,
normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to
mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time
of   occurrence   and   those   are   always   there,   however
honest   and   truthful   a   witness   may   be.   Material
discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not
expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the
category into which a discrepancy may be categorized.
While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility
of a party’s case, material discrepancies do so. These
aspects   were   highlighted   recently   in  Krishna   Mochi  v.
State of Bihar and Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa.
Accusations   have   been   clearly  established   against   the
accused­appellants in the case at hand. The courts below
have categorically indicated the distinguishing features in
22
evidence so far as the acquitted and convicted accused
are concerned.”
(emphasis supplied)
21. In another decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh
vs. Ram Kumar & Ors.9
, it is held that minor discrepancies in
the statement of witnesses of trivial nature cannot be a ground to
reject evidence as a whole.  The Court relied upon the exposition
of  Brahm  Swaroop  & Anr.  vs.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh10.   In
paragraph 32 of the said decision, the Court observed, thus :­
“32.  It   is   a   settled   legal   proposition   that   while
appreciating   the   evidence   of   a   witness,   minor
discrepancies on trivial matters, which do not affect the
core of the prosecution’s case, may not prompt the court
to reject the evidence in its entirety. “Irrelevant details
which   do   not   in   any   way   corrode   the   credibility   of   a
witness   cannot   be   labelled   as   omissions   or
contradictions.” Difference in some minor details, which
does   not   otherwise   affect   the   core   of   the   prosecution
case, even if present, would not itself prompt the court to
reject   the   evidence   on   minor   variations   and
discrepancies.   After   exercising   care   and   caution   and
sifting   through   the   evidence   to   separate   truth   from
untruth,   exaggeration   and   improvements,   the   court
comes   to   a   conclusion   as   to   whether   the   residuary
evidence is sufficient to convict the accused. Thus, an
undue importance should not be attached to omissions,
contradictions and discrepancies which do not go to the
heart of the matter and shake the basic version of the
prosecution   witness.   As   the   mental   capabilities   of   a
human being cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb
all the details, minor discrepancies are bound to occur in
the statements of witnesses. (See  State of U.P.  v.  M.K.
Anthony,  State   of   Rajasthan  v.  Om   Prakash,  State  v.
Saravanan and Prithu v. State of H.P.)”
9
 (2017) 14 SCC 614
10 (2011) 6 SCC 288
23
22. The so­called deficiencies pointed out by the appellants in
the investigation or the prosecution case, in our opinion, are
insignificant and trivial and cannot be the basis to reject the
whole evidence of Bishan Singh (PW­1) and Baljit Singh (PW­2)
which   is   corroborated   by   the   other   evidence   in   the   form   of
medical reports and recovery of human blood stained soil from
the spot near the hospital where Mohar Pal was assaulted by the
accused.   The fact that the blood group of the human blood
stained soil cannot be ascertained, can be no basis to discard
that piece of evidence.   Even the recovery of weapon used by
Rohtas   (Accused   No.1)   during   the   commission   of   the   offence
reinforces   the   role   and   involvement   of   the   appellants   in   the
commission of the crime.   The quality substantive evidence on
record clearly establishes the guilt of the appellants. 
23. In a recent decision in Dilawar Singh & Ors. vs. State of
Haryana11, the Court restated that while analysing the evidence
of eye witnesses, it must be borne in mind that there is bound to
be variations and difference in the behaviour of the witnesses or
their   reactions   from   situation   to   situation   and   individual   to
individual.     There   cannot   be   uniformity   in   the   reaction   of
11 (2015) 1 SCC 737
24
witnesses.     The   Court   must   not   decipher   the   evidence   on
unrealistic basis.  There can be no hard and fast rule about the
uniformity in human reaction.  The difference in the statements
of the prosecution witnesses about the conditions of Mohar Pal
when he was admitted in the hospital, therefore, does not take
the   matter   any   further   especially   when   the   medical   reports
clearly indicate that he was admitted in the hospital in semiconscious   state   and   was   declared   dead   by   the   doctor   only
thereafter. 
24. As regards, the delay in registration of FIR, that aspect has
also been considered by the Trial Court and the finding recorded
by the Trial Court rejecting that defence plea found favour with
the High Court. We see no reason to deviate from the conclusion
so recorded that there was no delay in registration of FIR in the
facts of the present case.  The significance of registration of FIR
without loss of time need not be underscored.   This Court in
State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  vs.  M.  Madhusudhan  Rao12, while
dealing with similar arguments, observed in paragraph 30 as
follows :­
12 (2008) 15 SCC 582
25
“30.   Time   and   again,   the   object   and   importance   of
prompt lodging of the first information report has been
highlighted. Delay in lodging the first information report,
more   often   than   not,   results   in   embellishment   and
exaggeration, which is a creature of an afterthought. A
delayed report not only gets bereft of the advantage of
spontaneity, the danger of the introduction of a coloured
version,   an   exaggerated   account   of   the   incident   or   a
concocted   story   as   a   result   of   deliberations   and
consultations, also creeps in, casting a serious doubt on
its veracity. Therefore, it is essential that the delay in
lodging the report should be satisfactorily explained.”
25. In the present case, there has been no delay as is evident
from the contemporaneous record.   Mohar Pal was admitted in
hospital immediately after the incident and was examined by Dr.
Ramesh.  Mohar Pal was declared dead at 11.00 p.m.  The City
Police   Station   was   informed   by   the   doctor   at   11.30   p.m.
Thereafter, Bishan Singh (PW­1) complained to ASI Gian Singh
(PW­5) near hospital building and finally the FIR was registered
at 0015 hrs. on the night between 25th and 26th April, 1998.  In
Kishan Singh (Dead) Through LRs vs. Gurpal Singh & Ors.13
,
This Court had observed as follows :­
“22. In cases where there is a delay in lodging an FIR, the
court has to look for a plausible explanation for such
delay. In the absence of such an explanation, the delay
may be fatal. The reason for quashing such proceedings
may   not   be   merely   that   the   allegations   were   an
afterthought or had given a coloured version of events. In
such cases the court should carefully examine the facts
before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who
failed   to   succeed   before   the   civil   court   may   initiate
criminal proceedings just to harass the other side with
13 (2010) 8 SCC 775
26
mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking
vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated
litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their
frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the
criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to be
permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment
and persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged
clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a
private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other
party   in   long   and   arduous   criminal   proceedings,   the
court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the
process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case.
(Vide  Chandrapal   Singh  v.  Maharaj   Singh;  State   of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal; G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P.; and
Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P.)”
26. In view of the above, we have no hesitation in upholding the
view   taken   by   the   Trial   Court   that   there   was   no   delay   in
registration of the FIR in the fact situation of the present case.
27. We are also in agreement with the view taken by the Trial
Court and affirmed by the High Court that the defence had taken
self­contradictory stand.   First, it was asserted that Mohar Pal
sustained injuries in the first incident which had occurred at
6.30 p.m. on the same evening.  However, no evidence in support
of that plea was forthcoming.  Then, the alternative plea taken by
the defence was that Mohar Pal was, in fact, injured at some
other place near Anaj Mandi and was brought in a three­wheeler
to the hospital.  Even this plea of the accused has been held to be
figment   of   imagination   and   without   any   evidence   in   support
thereof.     On   the   other   hand,   the   prosecution   has   produced
27
evidence in the form of human blood soiled mud from the spot
near the hospital where the incident in question had occurred as
stated by Bishan Singh (PW­1) and Baljit Singh (PW­2). 
28. Even the fact that the accused have been acquitted in the
cross­cases filed with regard to the first incident which took place
at 6.30 p.m. on the same evening will not take the matter any
further for the appellants.   That was an independent incident
whereas the finding of guilt recorded against the appellants is
concerning the incident which had taken place at 8.30 p.m. near
the Government Hospital, Palwal as proved by the prosecution
witnesses.   In fact, the incident at 8.30 p.m. was the counter
blast of the fight which had taken place between two groups at
6.30 p.m. and the previous enmity between them.  The fact that
there   is   no   evidence   about   the   previous   enmity   and   that   no
evidence is produced by the prosecution in that regard, in our
view, cannot be the basis to reverse the concurrent view taken by
two   Courts   below   ­   recording   finding   of   guilt   against   the
appellants for commission of offence to assault Mohar Pal near
the Government Hospital, Palwal at around 8.30 p.m. on 25th
April, 1998. 
28
29. Taking any view of the matter, therefore, no interference is
warranted in this appeal and we are disposed to dismiss the
same.  Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.  The bail bonds of
the appellants stand cancelled.   The appellants shall surrender
within   four   weeks   from   today   failing   which,   the   local   police
station   must   take   necessary   action   against   the   appellants   in
accordance with law.
………………………..,…..J.
(A.M. Khanwilkar)
………………………..,…..J.
(Dinesh Maheshwari)
New Delhi;
November 5, 2019