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Saturday, November 2, 2019

Or.7 rule 11 CPC- Right of pre-emption - No cause of action - plaint is liable to be rejected - as there is no condition in the partition deed not to sale to thrid parties nor there is a pleading in the plaint that there is an obligation in respect of pre-emption rights of plaintiff. in the absence of corelative duty which can be enforceable in law under partition deed - no party of that document can claim pre-emption rights . an accepted/admitted the Memorandum of Partition document does not give any right of pre-emption to the first respondent. There is also no pleading to the said effect in the plaint - Hence the ownership of the second respondent and his right to sell the property in terms of the Memorandum of Partition are and would be undisputed legal rights under the Transfer of Property Act,1882. There was no restraint to exercise of this right vested with the second respondent by contract or under any statute. This is not alleged and adverted to in the plaint. It is also an undisputed position that Sunil Kumar Mehta who was on partition allotted the third portion of the property, has sold and transferred his portion to a third party vide registered sale deed dated 15.10.2009. The said sale deed is not under challenge and was not questioned by the first respondent. we fail to understand how and on what basis, the first respondent claims right of pre-emption or repurchase of the portion that was allotted to the second respondent in terms of amicable division as evidenced by Memorandum of Partition dated 04.12.2008. For a right to exist, there must be a corelative duty which can be enforced in a law suit. A right cannot exist without an enforceable duty. Ownership means a bundle of rights which would normally include the right to exclude and transfer the property in a manner one wants, subject to contractual obligations as agreed or statutory restrictions imposed on the owner. In the present case, the pleadings fail to establish violation of a statutory right or breach of a contractual obligation which creates an enforceable right in the court of law. In the absence of any such right or even a claim, the plaint would not disclose cause of action. In T. Arivandanam v. T.V. Satyapal and Another 3 this Court has held that if the plaint is manifestly vexatious, meritless and groundless, in the sense that it does not disclose a clear right to sue, it would be right and proper to exercise power under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (�Code�, for short). A mere contemplation or possibility that a right may be infringed without any legitimate basis for that right, would not be sufficient to hold that the plaint discloses a cause of action.

Or.7 rule 11 CPC-  Right   of pre-emption - No cause of action - plaint is liable to be rejected - as there is no condition in the partition deed not to sale to thrid parties nor there is a pleading in the plaint that there is an obligation in respect of pre-emption rights of plaintiff. in the absence of corelative duty which can be enforceable in law under partition deed - no party of that document can claim pre-emption rights .

 an   accepted/admitted the   Memorandum   of   Partition    document   does   not   give   any   right   of pre-emption to the first respondent. 
There is also no pleading to the said effect in the plaint - Hence the ownership  of   the  second  respondent   and  his right   to   sell   the   property   in   terms   of   the   Memorandum   of   Partition   are and would be undisputed legal rights under the Transfer of Property Act,1882.     
There   was   no   restraint   to   exercise   of   this   right   vested   with   the second respondent by contract or under any statuteThis is not alleged and adverted to in the plaint. 
It is also an undisputed position that Sunil Kumar  Mehta   who   was   on   partition   allotted   the  third   portion   of  the property,   has   sold   and  transferred   his   portion   to   a   third   party  vide registered sale deed dated 15.10.2009. The said sale deed is not under challenge and was not questioned by the first respondent. we   fail   to   understand   how   and   on   what   basis,   the   first respondent claims right of pre-emption or repurchase of the portion that was  allotted  to  the   second   respondent   in   terms   of   amicable  division  as evidenced   by   Memorandum   of   Partition   dated   04.12.2008.  
 For   a   right   to   exist,   there   must   be   a corelative duty which can be enforced in a law suit. A right cannot exist without an enforceable duty.  Ownership means a bundle of rights which
would normally include the right to exclude and transfer the property in a manner   one   wants,   subject   to   contractual   obligations   as   agreed   or statutory   restrictions   imposed   on   the   owner.   
In   the   present   case,   the pleadings   fail   to   establish   violation   of   a   statutory   right   or  breach   of   a contractual  obligation which  creates an enforceable right  in the court  of
law.   In  the  absence  of   any  such  right   or   even  a  claim,   the  plaint   would
not disclose cause of action.

In  T. Arivandanam v.   T.V.   Satyapal   and   Another 3 this   Court   has   held   that   if   the   plaint   is manifestly vexatious, meritless and groundless, in the sense that it does not disclose a clear right to sue, it would be right and proper to exercise power   under   Order   VII   Rule   11   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908 (�Code�,   for   short).   
A   mere  contemplation  or   possibility  that   a  right   may be   infringed   without   any   legitimate   basis   for   that   right,   would   not   be sufficient to hold that the plaint discloses a cause of action.




IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6760 OF 2019
(ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 9233 OF 2017)
COLONEL SHRAWAN KUMAR JAIPURIYAR
@ SARWAN KUMAR JAIPURIYAR �..    APPLICANT(S)
VERSUS
KRISHNA NANDAN SINGH  AND ANOTHER �..RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
Leave granted. 
2. In   spite   of   second   call,   there   is   no   appearance   on   behalf   of   Krishna
Nandan Singh, the plaintiff, the first respondent before us.
3. The first respondent has filed a civil suit T.S. No. 97/16 against Sarwan
Kumar   Jaipuriyar,   the   appellant   before   us   and   Anil   Kumar,   the   second
respondent before us. The second respondent is the brother of the first
respondent.
4. The   plaint   admits   that   there   was   amicable   division   and   partition   of
property bearing Holding no. 163 old Holding no. 42, Ward No. 10 (New)
7 (Old), Mahal No.1, Mohalla- Mainpura, P.S. Danapur, Patna amongst

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respondent no.1, respondent no.2 and their brother Sunil Kumar Mehta.
This   partition   was   evidenced   by   recording   Memorandum   of   Partition
dated   04.12.2008,   which   was   signed   and   executed   by   the   three
brothers.
5. The factum of partition and the partition deed itself is not challenged and
questioned in the civil suit preferred by the first respondent. In fact, Sunil
Kumar   Mehta,   the  third brother   is  not   even  a party  to  the  suit.   The suit
also acknowledges that the second respondent was allotted and became
the owner of south-eastern part of the aforesaid holding whereas the first
respondent stands recorded as the owner of another portion and that the
first respondent and second respondent have been paying taxes for the
respective portions to Nagar Parishad under receipts. 
6. The grievance and the cause of action as pleaded in the civil suit by the
first   respondent   is   that   the   second   respondent   had   sold   the   portion
allotted   to   him   on   partition   to   the   appellant   vide   registered   sale   deed
dated   25.01.2016.     This   sale   deed,   it   is   claimed,   is   void   ab   initio   and
inoperative   as   there   is   every   chance   that   the   privacy   of   the   first
respondent�s family  would be  affected  and destroyed.  It  is pleaded that
the   first   respondent   has   got   a   right   and   authority   to   repurchase   the

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portion  allotted  to  the  second  respondent   under   the  partition  evidenced
by the Memorandum of Partition dated 04.12.2008.
7. The   Memorandum   of   Partition   dated   04.12.2008   which   is   placed   on
record   and   an   accepted/admitted   document   does   not   give   any   right   of
pre-emption to the first respondent. There is also no pleading to the said
effect in the plaint. As the partition and the Memorandum of Partition are
not   denied  or   challenged,   ownership  of   the  second  respondent   and  his
right   to   sell   the   property   in   terms   of   the   Memorandum   of   Partition   are
and would be undisputed legal rights under the Transfer of Property Act,
1882.     There   was   no   restraint   to   exercise   of   this   right   vested   with   the
second respondent by contract or under any statute. This is not alleged
and adverted to in the plaint. It is also an undisputed position that Sunil
Kumar   Mehta   who   was   on   partition   allotted   the   third   portion   of   the
property,   has   sold   and   transferred   his   portion   to   a   third   party   vide
registered sale deed dated 15.10.2009. The said sale deed is not under
challenge and was not questioned by the first respondent.
8. The aforesaid factual and legal position being admitted and accepted in
the   plaint,   we   fail   to   understand   how   and   on   what   basis,   the   first
respondent claims right of pre-emption or repurchase of the portion that
was  allotted  to  the   second   respondent   in   terms   of   amicable  division  as
evidenced   by   Memorandum   of   Partition   dated   04.12.2008.   On   the

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aforesaid   partition,   the   second   respondent   became   the   sole   and
exclusive owner of  the  portion allotted  to him,  a legal position,  which is
not even controverted and denied by the first respondent in the plaint.
9. In   the   aforesaid   background,   it   is   to   be   held   that   the   plaint   does   not
disclose  any  cause  of  action  for   the  relief  prayed,   that   is,  a  direction  to
the second respondent to execute and register a sale deed in favour of
the first respondent and to put the first respondent in possession. There
does not exist any legal right which the plaintiff or the first respondent is
entitled   to   invoke   and   enforce.     For   a   right   to   exist,   there   must   be   a
corelative duty which can be enforced in a law suit. A right cannot exist
without an enforceable duty.  Ownership means a bundle of rights which
would normally include the right to exclude and transfer the property in a
manner   one   wants,   subject   to   contractual   obligations   as   agreed   or
statutory   restrictions   imposed   on   the   owner.   In   the   present   case,   the
pleadings   fail   to   establish   violation   of   a   statutory   right   or   breach   of   a
contractual  obligation which  creates an enforceable right  in the court  of
law.   In  the  absence  of   any  such  right   or   even  a  claim,   the  plaint   would
not disclose cause of action.
10. This   Court   in   Church   of   Christ   Charitable   Trust   and   Educational
Society   Represented   by   its   Chairman   v.   Ponniamman   Educational

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Trust Represented by its Chairman/ Managing Trustee 1
  has referred
to   the   earlier   judgment   of   this   Court   in   A.B.C.   Laminart   Pvt.   Ltd.   and
Another v.   A.P.   Agencies,   Salem 2
  to   explain   that   the   cause   of   action
means every fact which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff
to   prove   in   order   to   seek   a   decree   and   relief   against   the   defendant.
Cause   of   action   requires   infringement   of   the   right   or   breach   of   an
obligation   and   comprises   of   all   material   facts   on   which   the   right   and
claim for breach is founded, that is, some act done by the defendant to
infringe and violate the right or breach an obligation. In  T. Arivandanam
v.   T.V.   Satyapal   and   Another 3
  this   Court   has   held   that   if   the   plaint   is
manifestly vexatious, meritless and groundless, in the sense that it does
not disclose a clear right to sue, it would be right and proper to exercise
power   under   Order   VII   Rule   11   of   the   Code   of   Civil   Procedure,   1908
(�Code�,   for   short).   A   mere  contemplation  or   possibility  that   a  right   may
be   infringed   without   any   legitimate   basis   for   that   right,   would   not   be
sufficient to hold that the plaint discloses a cause of action.
11. In view  of   the  aforesaid  discussion,   we  would  allow  the  present   appeal
and set aside the impugned order. The application under Order VII Rule
11 of the Code filed by the appellant is allowed and the plaint preferred
1
 (2012) 8 SCC 706
2
 (1989) 2 SCC 163
3
 (1977) 4 SCC 467

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by   the   first   respondent   is   rejected   as   it   discloses   no   cause   of   action.
There shall be no order as to costs.
...............����������, J.
(MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
..............����������, J.
(SANJIV KHANNA)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 02, 2019.

ITEM NO.32               COURT NO.10               SECTION XVI
S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).  9233/2017
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  30-01-2017
in CMJC No. 159/2017 passed by the High Court Of Judicature At
Patna)
COLONEL SHRAWAN KUMAR JAIPURIYAR
@ SARWAN KUMAR JAIPURIYAR    Petitioner(s)
VERSUS
KRISHNA NANDAN SINGH & ANR.                        Respondent(s)
Date : 02-09-2019 This petition was called on for hearing today.
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Vivek Singh, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. Ashutosh Jha, AOR
Mr. Somanatha Padhan, AOR
UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R
Leave granted.
In   spite   of   second   call,   there   is   no   appearance   on   behalf   of
Krishna   Nandan   Singh,   the   plaintiff,   the   first   respondent   before
us.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
(GULSHAN KUMAR ARORA)                           (R.S. NARAYANAN)
COURT MASTER  COURT MASTER
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

Appreciation of Evidence - in a suit for specific performance - while finding the capacity of plaintiff to pay the balance amount - his statment that he got gold and also purchased other properties too is enough in the absence of serious dispute about the existence of gold - Non production of bills for the gold is not fatal.- Apex court held that In regard to the statement by the plaintiff that gold ornaments worth about Rs.24 lakhs were held by him and family members and there was cash of about Rs. 8 lakhs, the plaintiff is not cross-examined as such. At any rate, there is no serious dispute raised when he was cross-examined in this regard. There is no question raised about the family members not making available the gold ornaments or that it was not available with them. The non-availability of bills relating to the gold jewellery to prove ownership as such may not be in the facts of this case fatal to the plaintiff.-we are of the view that the High Court erred in interfering with the decree passed by the Trial Court.


Appreciation of Evidence - in a suit for specific performance - while finding the capacity of plaintiff to pay the balance amount - his statment that he got gold and also purchased other properties too is enough in the absence of serious dispute about the existence of gold - Non production of bills for the gold is not fatal.- 
Apex court held that In regard to the statement by the plaintiff that gold ornaments worth about Rs.24 lakhs were held by him and family members and there was cash of about Rs. 8 lakhs, the plaintiff is not cross-examined as such. At any rate, there is no serious dispute raised when he was cross-examined in this regard. There is no question raised about the family members not making available the gold ornaments or that it was not available with them. The non-availability of bills relating to the gold jewellery to prove ownership as such may not be in the facts of this case fatal to the plaintiff.-we are of the view that the High Court erred in interfering with the decree passed by the Trial Court.
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Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3336 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.1701 of 2016)
BHAVYANATH REPRESENTED BY
POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER … APPELLANT(S)
 VERSUS
K.V. BALAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
K.M. JOSEPH, J.
1. The appeal by Special Leave is directed against
the judgment passed by the High Court of Kerala at
Ernakulam dated 08.10.2015 in RFA No.869 of 2013. The
appellant is the plaintiff in a suit for specific
performance which has been decreed by the trial Court
but on appeal by the defendant dismissed by the
impugned judgment of the High Court. For the sake of
convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter
as per their status shown in the plaint before the
trial Court.
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THE AGREEMENT
2. There is no dispute that the plaintiff and the
defendant have indeed entered into an agreement on
25.04.2007. The agreement (marked as A1), inter alia,
provided as follows; The property, which was agreed,
to be sold was mentioned as 75 ¾ cents held by the
defendant as per assignment deed No.1405 of 1975. The
property agreed to be sold included all improvements
thereon including an incomplete RCC house building,
Well, motor shed etc. Payment of Rs.2,00,000/- as
advance was recorded. Towards balance consideration the
plaintiff was to pay the minimum amount of
Rs.3,00,000/- within four months from 25.04.2007. It
is further recited that on such payment, the defendant
will assign land equivalent to Rs.3,00,000/- in favour
of the person nominated by the plaintiff for the
portion agreed by both the parties. The consideration
was fixed at Rs.34,000/- per cent of property to be
found on actual measurement. The time limit was fixed
as "till the 24th day of March, 2008". Time limit was
expressly mentioned as an essential part of the
agreement. The assignment was to be executed either in
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favour of the plaintiff or any other person nominated
by him in writing. Before the execution of the
assignment deed, the contract further provided that the
plaintiff shall be convinced of the title of the
property and other connected things.
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE AGREEMENT
3. It is not in the region of dispute that the
plaintiff paid Rs.3,00,000/- by cheque on 25.08.2007
and it is also endorsed in the agreement. Thereafter,
on 25.01.2008 the defendant sent a lawyers notice to
the plaintiff. Therein it is stated that the defendant
holds 75 ¾ cents as per the assignment deed, already
referred to, which property was agreed to be sold for
Rs.34,000/- in terms of the agreement and the last date
of the agreement was fixed as 24.03.2008. It is further
stated that the plaintiff was to give balance
consideration by deducting the advance within the
stipulated time for which the defendant is ready and
he called upon the plaintiff to get ready for the same
by that time. It is further stated that the plaintiff
had orally offered to the defendant in the presence of
witnesses that he will take assignment of the property
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even before the stipulated date for which the defendant
is ready.
4. The plaintiff caused a reply notice to be sent to
the aforesaid lawyers notice. The reply notice sent was
dated 18.03.2008. Therein it is relevant to notice
certain statements. After referring to Ext.A1
agreement, it is stated that the lawyers notice was
sent by the defendant without getting the property
measured or producing and convincing the plaintiff
about the original title deed No.1405/1975 as well as
prior documents. It is stated that the plaintiff was
and is continuously ready and willing to perform his
part of the agreement right from the beginning till
then and in future. The statement in the notice, sent
by the defendant, is denied that the plaintiff will
take the assignment before the agreed date and it was
agreed so in the presence of witnesses. It is alleged
that defendant sent the notice with ulterior motive
concealing that property had not been measured and
without producing the original title deed. The
plaintiff pointed out that the defendant consented to
measure the property only three days before that date
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i.e. on 16.03.2008 (it may be noticed that reply notice
is dated 18.03.2008 and it was sent only later). It was
further stated that the defendant told the plaintiff
that the total extent of property, as per the document,
found on measurement was only 70.950 cents. The case
sought to be set up further is that, according to the
plaintiff, 1 ½ cents of property was not in the
possession or ownership of the defendant. Out of the
70.950 cents of property one cent on the southern
boundary was alleged to belong to one Kochammu and
another ½ cent of property on the northern boundary
belonged to some one else. This information was got by
plaintiff from reliable source. The plaintiff complains
in the reply notice that the defendant was insisting
that he will assign the property only if the
consideration in full for the said 70.950 cents was
paid. Objection was taken to the same by the plaintiff.
Thereafter, it is, inter alia, stated that the
plaintiff is ready and willing to take the assignment
of the entire property available as per the original
document No.1405/1975. The insistence on the part of
the defendant in withholding the original document is
stated to be ill-motivated. The plaintiff thereafter
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states that he wished to construct residential house
building for his own occupation adjacent to the
property as per agreement which is very close to his
proposed residence. Plaintiff is alleged to have made
solid arrangement for the same. It was specifically,
inter alia, stated that the plaintiff had arranged
balance consideration and he was continuously ready and
willing to take the assignment right from the date of
the agreement i.e. on 24.03.2007 and thereafter in
future as well.
We further notice that on 24.03.2008, which as per
Ext.A1 agreement, was to be the "last date" under the
agreement, the plaintiff and the defendant claimed that
they were present at the office of the Sub Registrar.
According to the plaintiff, the defendant was elusive
and could not be contacted over the phone and he was
unavailable. The plaintiff filed a complaint before the
police on 24.03.2008 in the evening. He also followed
it up with a petition before the Sub Registrar on
25.03.2008. Within three days from 24.03.2008, that is
on 27.03.2008, the present suit came to be instituted,
claiming specific performance. In the plaint, after
referring to the agreement, the plaintiff has alleged
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that he was always ready and willing to perform his
obligations. The blame was put at the doorstep of the
defendant for breaching the contract. The defendant in
his written statement on the other hand blamed the
plaintiff for breach and it was his case that plaintiff
was not ready and willing and he was not ready with the
funds.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
5. The trial Court struck the following issues; (1)
whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform
his part of the contract, (2) whether the defendant
committed breach and (3) whether the plaintiff is
entitled to get a decree for specific performance. The
trial Court, inter alia, found as follows.
"8. It is true that plaintiff has not
produced any document to show that he was
having ready cash covering the balance
consideration, payable by him under Ext.A1,
at the relevant time. Of course, certain
documents are produced to show that presently
he is having some ready cash in the form of
fixed deposits and in the form of share
certificates etc. I do not think that any of
these documents are much relevant in this
case for the reason that in the nature of the
dispute the plaintiff has to prove his
capacity to pay the balance consideration
within the period shown in Ext.A1. Production
of these documents which are admittedly after
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the suit may not have much evidentiary
value."
6. The trial Court further holds that it is not the
requirement of law that a vendor in a contract for sale
has to carry the balance consideration with him always
till the expiry of the agreement. It is sufficient that
he has enough source to raise the funds as and when
required. Rejecting the contention of the defendant,
that plaintiff did not have money even when he entered
Ext.A1 agreement, it was noticed that admittedly on the
date of agreement Rs.2,00,000/- was paid and
subsequently Rs.3,00,000/- was paid. The explanation
of plaintiff as to why he did not take the proportionate
extent on payment of Rs.3,00,000/-, as provided in the
agreement, was accepted. It was found that the extent
was not found sufficient on the advise of the engineer
to start the construction. The case of the plaintiff,
in fact, is that the idea to purchase the plaint
schedule property was to start a tuition center by
making a partnership between himself and his family
members. Thereafter, it is found as follows in
paragraph 12:
9
"12. Plaintiff has given clear evidence to
the effect that he had sufficient money with
him for completing his part. As already
stated by him, he did not carry the ready
cash with him through out the period of the
agreement. The total amount o f consideration
comes to Rs.25,67,000/-, even if the extent
is taken as 75 3/4 cents. It is contended
that plaintiff was only a student at the time
of Ext.A1. He is so described in Ext.A1 also.
PW1 says that even at that time he was
employed. True, one cannot expect that from
his employment alone he could have mobilized
the balance consideration. The income tax
returns filed by him show his salary and
prove the above fact. But there is ample
evidence to show that his father was actively
involved in the transaction. PW1 has deposed
that his family members were possessing gold
ornaments worth Rs.25,00,000/- and he was
having cash amount of Rs.8,00,000/- at the
relevant time. The defendant has no case that
the plaintiff was not supported by his
father. In fact, the active involvement of
his father in the transaction is rather
admitted by defendant himself. Plaintiff has
produced several documents to show that his
parents are having sufficient properties and
gold ornaments. Of course, most of them are
after suit documents. But there is an
admission made by DW1 that after Ext.A1, the
plaintiff has purchased an adjacent plot
measuring 10 cents. Considering the totality
of the evidence available, I am inclined to
hold that the plaintiff was having capacity
to raise the balance consideration had the
necessity arisen. Therefore, I am inclined to
accept the evidence of PW1 that he was ready
with the balance consideration or at least he
was capable of raising the balance
consideration as and when required."
10
7. The trial Court thereafter also rendered findings
on the issue as to whether the defendant had committed
breach. The contention of the plaintiff that the
lawyers notice dated 25.01.2008 sent by the defendant
was issued with ulterior motive was accepted. It was
found that under Ext.A1 agreement the property was to
be measured and the actual extent was to be
ascertained. Before sending lawyers notice, the
defendant had not got the property measured. It was for
the defendant to get the property measured. Referring
to the admissions made by the defendant, it was found
that he had not taken any step for measuring the
property. The admission that the defendant was aware
on the date of Ext.A1 agreement that the entire extent
of 75 ¾ cent was not available is referred to. The case
of the defendant that the property was measured by the
plaintiff on 16.05.2007 was found unacceptable. The
case of the plaintiff was that on 16.05.2007 he along
with engineer inspected the site to find out the
possibility of construction in the extent falling
proportionately to the amount of Rs.3,00,000/- was
explored. Defendant was to convince the plaintiff
regarding the title deed and the tax receipt. The
11
plaintiff had got marked Ext.A9 and A10, encumbrance
certificate. They revealed that mortgage was created
by the defendant over the property in the year 1983.
No entry regarding the clearance of the mortgage was
found. The case of the defendant that he had obtained
the release deed was found unacceptable by noting that
the release deed was neither produced nor there is any
evidence to prove that fact. Thus, the defendant had
breached his obligation under the contract. The
plaintiff got the property measured through the village
officials on 16.03.2008 in the presence of the
defendant. The trial Court relied on Ext.A42, the copy
of the counter, filed by the defendant to interlocutory
application, filed by the plaintiff, wherein the
defendant has averred that the plaintiff and his father
got convinced to the actual extent as 70.950 cents by
measuring the property. The trial Court found this to
be a case of the defendant accepting that the
measurement was done on 16.03.2008. The measurement on
16.03.2008 was arranged and paid for by the plaintiff.
It again, according to the trial Court, indicated the
readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff
and that the defendant was negligent in performing his
12
part. In Court, the property was got measured by the
Commissioner with the help of Taluk Surveyor. Ext.C2
is the report and Ext.C2(a) is the survey plan prepared
by Commissioner. They show that extent in possession
of the defendant on the strength of the title deed is
71.70 cents. 4.25 cents has been taken out from the
property of the defendant for road. Another extent of
0.375 cents was found to be in the possession of a
third party. These facts are found to be admitted by
defendant as DW1. Measurement in such circumstances was
found absolutely necessary for the completion of the
sale transaction. As regards both, the plaintiff and
defendant, asserting that they were before the Sub
Registrar on 24.03.2008, the trial Court found no
meaning in the same. Both sides were aware that without
measurement it would not have been possible to complete
the transaction. The plaintiff found on measurement
that only lesser extent is available. Appearance before
the Sub Registrar could not be considered as an act
showing the readiness and willingness, it was found
both for the plaintiff and the defendant. Dehors this
act, the trial Court found there were other
circumstances which proved readiness and willingness
13
of the plaintiff. No default on the part of the
plaintiff being found and breach being found on the
part of the defendant and still further finding no
undue hardship even being complained of by the
defendant, the trial Court decreed the suit by
directing specific relief against the defendant.
Defendant appealed.
FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT
8. The High Court, inter alia, has entered into the
following findings. It referred to para ‘8’ of the
judgment of the Trial court, which we have extracted.
In paragraphs 23 and 24, the High Court proceeded
to discuss the question whether the defendant was in
breach and this is what the Court proceeded to say:
"23. In so far as the condition requiring
measurement of the amount is concerned,
averments in the plaint itself show that on
16.3.2008, the land was measured. Although it
is case of the respondent that it was he who
got the land measured, the appellant
contended that it was at his instance, the
land was measured. Though evidence is lacking
to conclude this dispute either way, for the
purpose of this case, we do not think it
necessary to resolve this controversy for the
reason that irrespective of who got the land
measured, fact remains that the land was
measured and the parties are in agreement
that on measurement, the extent found was
14
only 71.750 cents. In other words, this shows
that as a result of teh measurement carried
out on 16.3.2008, one of the conditions for
performance of the agreement was satisfied.
24. In so far as the title of the appellant
is concerned, even the respondent plaintiff
has no case that the appellant did not have
title or that it was defective and the
question of handing over the title deds arise
only at the time of execution of the sale
deed. This, therefore, means that no fault
could have been attributed on the part of the
appellant and therefore, the court could have
granted a decree for specific performance of
the agreement only if the respondent had
satisfied the requirements of section 16(c)
of the Specific Relief Act. In so far as this
aspect of the matter is concerned, the
question is whether the respondent has proved
his readiness and willingness to perform the
agreement."
9. After referring to various decisions of this Court
and of the High Court, the High Court proceeded to find
that a finding of breach by the vendor in performing
his obligations would not be sufficient for a Court to
decree specific performance. The breach by the
defendant, in other words, would not absolve the
plaintiff to allege and prove his readiness and
willingness to perform his obligations under the
contract. "Readiness" relates to financial capacity to
pay consideration whereas "willingness relates to the
15
state of mind. Following are the findings which we may
refer to:
"25. While readiness indicates the fiscal
capacity of the respondent to perform the
agreement, willingness indicates his state of
mind. In so far as readiness is concerned,
the further question that is required to be
proved is whether readiness has been proved
on the evidence available. We have already
referred to paragraph 8 of the judgment and
the oral evidence of PW1 which, to our mind,
do not help the respondent plaintiff to prove
his case of readiness or his capacity to
perform the agreement. Turning to the
documents that are relied on, those documents
include Exts.A22 and A23 valuation
certificates of the gold allegedly possessed
by the respondent's mother and wife, which
were marked through PW4. Ext.A24 series and
A25 marked through PW8 are the certificates
issued about the properties allegedly owned
by them. These are documents which were
obtained after 24.3.2008 and are regarding
the assets owned by the father, mother and
wife of the respondent plaintiff. The owners
of these assets have not tendered any
evidence whether the actually possessed these
properties at the time when the agreement was
to be performed and even if they had
possessed these assets, whether they were
willing to part with it in order to enable
the respondent plaintiff to generate funds
out of it towards the sale consideration
payable under Ext.A1. There is also no
averment in the plaint to that effect.
26. In so far Exts.A11 to A16 are concerned,
these again are fixed deposit receipts issued
in the year 2012, which also cannot help the
respondent plaintiff to prove his capacity as
on 24.3.2008 or any time before that. Among
the other documents which were relied on by
the learned counsel for the respondent to
16
contend that the readiness was proved by him,
Exts.A17 and A20 show that his father had
sold certain shares on 3.11.2010. Similarly,
Ext.A18 shows that the respondent had sold
his shares on 31.8.2010. Ext.A19 is yet
another document which show that on
26.12.2011 his mother had sold certain
shares. Exts.A26 and 27 are certificates
issued by the Canara Bank and Union Bank
again in 2013 when the trial was pending,
which show that his father had certain funds
available with him. As in the case of
Exts.A11 to A16, A22, A23, A24 and A25, all
these documents would not show that funds
were available with either of the respondent
or his parents on 24.3.2008 or any time prior
thereto. Therefore, these documents also will
not help the respondent to contend that his
readiness and willingness were proved by him
to substantiate his prayer for specific
performance of Ext.A1 agreement."
10. On the above reasoning, High Court allowed the
appeal and decree of the trial Court was set aside.
11. We have heard Shri K.V. Viswanathan learned senior
counsel for the appellant/plaintiff besides Shri P.N.
Ravindran learned senior counsel for the
respondent/defendant.
12. Learned senior counsel for the plaintiff points
out that High Court committed error in interfering with
the judgment of the trial Court. The principles
17
relating to compliance with Section 16(c) which
enshrines the concept of readiness and willingness on
the part of the plaintiff has not been properly
appreciated. He submitted that plaintiff had sufficient
capacity which is what mattered. The law cannot be
disputed that in a suit for specific performance, the
plaintiff need not have the amount in cash. What is
crucial is whether he has the financial capacity to
perform his obligations. He drew our attention to the
fact that the plaintiff along with members of his
family, which consisted of his father, mother and his
wife, had enough resources. An amount of Rs.5,00,000/-
was already paid. Even the gold ornaments having regard
to their value (valued at Rs.24,00,000/-) besides about
Rs.8,00,000/- in cash held by the plaintiff himself
would suffice. The Court need not even go into the
aspect relating to landed properties and other assets
available. As regards the finding of the High Court
about the certificates relating to landed property,
being later in point of time, it is pointed out that
lands were very much with the members of the family as
on the date of the agreement and the date when the sale
was to be executed. The fact that the certificates were
18
of a later date did not take away the availability of
these assets. He pointed out that, in fact, the dispute
actually centered around the extent of property and the
financial capacity was not in dispute as such.
13. Per contra, Mr. P.N. Ravindran, learned senior
counsel drew our attention in paragraph 8 of the trial
Court which we have already referred to. He further
submitted that as regards the gold ornaments, the
plaintiff has not chosen to examine the members of his
family and without their testimony showing their
willingness to make available their valuables, apart
from the availability of the assets, it could not be
said that the High Court fell into error.
14. Before we advert to the facts it is appropriate to
discuss a few decisions of this Court. In Man Kaur
(Dead) by Lrs. v. Hartar Singh Sangha - (2010) 10 SCC
512, this Court dealt with the contention of the
purchaser in that case that the vendor had committed
the breach and there is no need for the plaintiff to
prove his readiness and willingness. This is what the
Court held in paragraph 40:
19
"40. This contention has no merit. There are
two distinct issues. The first issue is the
breach by the defendant - vendor which gives
a cause of action to the plaintiff to file a
suit for specific performance. The second
issue relates to the personal bar to
enforcement of a specific performance by
persons enumerated in section 16 of the Act.
A person who fails to aver and prove that he
has performed or has always been ready and
willing to perform the essential terms of the
contract which are to be performed by him
(other than the terms the performance of
which has been prevented or waived by the
defendant) is barred from claiming specific
performance. Therefore, even assuming that
the defendant had committed breach, if the
plaintiff fails to aver in the plaint or
prove that he was always ready and willing to
perform the essential terms of contract which
are required to be performed by him (other
than the terms the performance of which has
been prevented or waived by the plaintiff),
there is a bar to specific performance in his
favour. Therefore, the assumption of the
respondent that readiness and willingness on
the part of plaintiff is something which need
not be proved, if the plaintiff is able to
establish that defendant refused to execute
the sale deed and thereby committed breach,
is not correct. Let us give an example. Take
a case where there is a contract for sale for
a consideration of Rs.10 lakhs and earnest
money of Rs.1 lakh was paid and the vendor
wrongly refuses to execute the sale deed
unless the purchaser is ready to pay Rs.15
lakhs. In such a case there is a clear breach
by defendant. But in that case, if plaintiff
did not have the balance Rs.9 lakhs (and the
money required for stamp duty and
registration) or the capacity to arrange and
pay such money, when the contract had to
beperformed, the plaintiff will not be
entitled to specific performance, even if he
proves breach by defendant, as he was not
20
"ready and willing" to perform his
obligations.”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Taking up the issue relating to measurement of the
property, let us examine the matter in some detail. In
Ext.A1 agreement the defendant had agreed to sell 75 ¾
cents acquired under document No.1405/1975. The price
was fixed as Rs.34,000/- per cent. The extent was no
doubt to be found on actual measurement. The trial
Court found that though it is not stipulated as to who
will carry measurement, but the defendant being in
possession he was, to undertake the measurement. The
defendant, when he was examined as DW1, has inter alia
stated as follows; For the purpose of determination of
sale consideration property had to be measured. He
further states that after one week of the date of
execution of the agreement Gopi brought a person and
measured the property. When he saw the measuring
activity, he went to the property and asked for a copy
of the measurement details, but was not given. We
proceed on the basis that the reference to Gopinath,
is none other than the father of the plaintiff. He
admits that these facts are not stated in the written
21
statement. He states that he did not know about the
measurement of the property on 16.03.2008. There was
no opportunity to get the plaint schedule property
measured before the same was to be assigned. He
specifically states that he has not convinced them the
actual measurement of the plaint schedule property. He
further states that no measurement of the plaint
schedule property was done before the expiry of the
agreement period. He further states that he has not got
measured the extent of property after execution of the
agreement. He states that he does not remember about
the statement in Ext.A42 about the extent of the
property being convinced of by the plaintiff and his
father to be 70.950 cents. He specifically states that
it is not right to say that the plaint schedule property
has been got measured on 16.03.2008. He states that he
was not present at that time. We would think that the
High Court was in error in holding that on measurement
being carried on 16.03.2008, one of the conditions for
the performance of agreement was satisfied if it is
meant to find that the defendant had carried out the
obligations under the contract. It is noticed from
paragraph 23 of the impugned judgment that contrary to
22
his deposition, which we have adverted to as DW1, it
was contended on behalf of the defendant that the
measurement on 16.03.2008 was at his instance. It is
noticed that under Ext.A1 agreement the extent was
stated to be 75 ¾ cents, under a particular assignment
deed. The consideration was undoubtedly fixed with
regard to the actual extent at the rate of Rs.34,000/-
per cent. It is clear that the measurement was
essential for executing the conveyance and the
performance of further mutual obligations. When the
lawyers notice was caused to be sent on 24.01.2008 by
the defendant, he adverts to 75 ¾ cents. There is no
reference of any measurement having been done on
16.05.2007. We are inclined to find that it was the
plaintiff who took the initiative and the property
indeed was measured on 16.03.2008. We are further
inclined to agree with the trial Court that the
plaintiff, it is who financed the measurement by making
payment as he claimed. Testimony of the witness
accepted by the trial Court, which has had opportunity
to watch the demeanour of the witness is not to be
likely shaken by the appellate court.
23
16. Still further the next finding by the High Court
is contained in paragraph 24 of its judgment. The Court
proceeds to hold that even the plaintiff has no case
that the defendant did not have title or that it was
defective and the question of handing over title deed
arises only on the execution of the sale deed and
therefore no fault could be attributed to the
defendant.
17. In this regard there are two aspects which we would
think has not been considered by the High Court. We
have adverted to the statements in the reply notice
sent dated 18.03.2008 by the plaintiff. The measurement
took place on 16.03.2008. On measurement it appears to
have been found that the extent available with the
defendant was 70.950 cents. However, plaintiff found
that one cent out of the 70.950 cents was not with the
defendant and instead was with one Kochammu and half
of cent was with somebody else in the northern side.
However, when this was brought to the notice of
defendant, according to plaintiff, he wanted payment
on the basis that he had the whole of 70.950 cents.
Therefore, the said question related to the title of
24
the defendant, a question relating to the exact extent
available for being conveyed. Secondly and far more
importantly, admittedly there was a mortgage over the
plaint schedule property created in 1983 by the
defendant. Encumbrance certificates produced by the
plaintiff has been relied upon by the trial Court to
find that the mortgage had not been cleared. The
defendant in his evidence as DW1 sets up the case that
the mortgage was cleared and release deed was available
with him. It is at his home. On the one hand, the
encumbrance certificates did disclose the mortgage and
they did not reveal the clearing of the mortgage. The
defendant on the other hand, though setting up the case
that the debt was paid of and mortgage was got released
but did not choose to produce the evidence which was
in his possession.
18. The High Court has overlooked this aspect and came
to the conclusion that there was no dispute relating
to the title. Under Ext.A1 agreement, it was incumbent
upon the defendant to convince the plaintiff about the
title of the property and other connected things. No
doubt, the plaintiff had made a demand for the original
25
title deeds relating to the property, as he wanted to
use them for the purpose of taking a loan in connection
with his proposed construction. This we do not think
he was entitled under the contract and if the defendant
refused the title deeds we would not be in a position
to blame him. We are, therefore, of the view that the
High Court has fallen into an error in reversing the
finding that the defendant was in breach of his
obligations.
19. We have noticed the law to be that it does not
suffice for the plaintiff in a suit for specific
performance to establish that the defendant was in
breach to seek a decree for specific relief. The
plaintiff must further establish, if it is contested
that he was ready and willing from the date of the
contract to perform his obligations.
20. In a contract, a contract usually embodies mutual
obligations. The order of performance of obligations
by the parties to the contract would have an impact on
the aspect relating to readiness and willingness
undoubtedly. In fact, readiness and willingness on the
part of plaintiff makes its appearance right from the
26
time of the reply notice sent by the plaintiff and
continued in his pleadings. We are, however, concerned
in this case only with the aspect relating whether he
has proved despite what he might have established
against the defendant that he was ready to perform his
obligations. To begin with, the plaintiff has filed the
suit on 27.03.2008. It must be remembered that under
Ext.A1 agreement, the last date for executing the sale
deed was 24.03.2008. This means on the third day of the
date fixed under the contract on the allegation that
the defendant resiled from the promise to execute the
sale deed, the plaintiff has knocked at the doors of
the Court seeking specific relief.
21. The second thing which no doubt appears in favour
of the plaintiff is that on the date of the agreement,
which was 25.04.2007, admittedly an amount of
Rs.2,00,000/- was paid as advance within four months
of the agreement, again, indisputably a further sum of
Rs.3,00,000/- came to be paid by the plaintiff and
accepted by the defendant. The further question that
arises, however, is whether the High Court was right
in holding that the plaintiff was not in a position to
27
perform the financial obligations under the contract.
At this juncture, let us examine the state of the
evidence adduced by the parties.
22. The plaintiff has examined himself as PW1 and
further examined eight other witnesses. He has also
marked Ext.A1 to A42. The defendant has examined
himself as DW1. There are other Court exhibits which
are related to financial position of the plaintiff.
23. Not unnaturally, we must first look to what the
plaintiff has deposed before the Court. The plaintiff
says, inter alia, as follows in his cross-examination;
During the period of Ext.A1 agreement I was a student.
He added that he had a part time teaching job and
consultancy service. The plaintiff claimed that he was
a teacher in an academy. He produced income tax
returns. He was asked the following questions. At the
time of the filing of the suit, you have not produced
any document showing availability of money required for
taking assignment of the property. Whether there is any
specific reason for the same (Question)? There is no
specific reason for the same (Answer). Is there any
28
reason for not stating in the plaint in what way the
amount required was arranged (Question)? No special
reasons (Answer). How much amount was arranged by you
on 24.03.2008 to take assignment of plaint schedule
property (Question)? There was gold jewelry worth
Rs.24,00,000/- held by myself and my family members.
Besides, about Rs.8,00,000/- was arranged in cash also
(Answer). He states that he has understood that the
main dispute in this case is that he was not having the
capacity to raise the consideration as per Ext.A1
agreement. Another question which was put to the
plaintiff is as follows. Apart from producing certain
documents on 02.02.2013 showing availability of funds,
you have not produced any other document before that
to show funds (Question)? No (Answer).
24. We must notice that Shri K.V. Viswanathan, learned
senior counsel would submit that High Court has
appreciated aforesaid question and answer erroneously.
He pointed out that actually when the plaintiff
answered 'no', it should be understood the meaning was
that he was denying the suggestion that the plaintiff
had not produced any document to show funds. He would
29
submit that had the answer been yes, it could be
inferred that there was no document. The plaintiff
continues and states six documents being Ext.A11 to A16
are of the year 2012. The number of shares are not
mentioned in Ext.A17. The plaintiff has further
apparently, with reference to income tax returns Ext.35
and 36, stated that income has been shown as
Rs.1,18,000/- and Rs.1,32,000/- for the assessment
years 2007-08 and 2008-09 respectively. No doubt there
is no mention about his investments and shares in the
income tax returns. Plaintiff claimed that during the
year 2004-05 his income was about Rs.30,000/- and
during 2005 the same was around Rs.60,000/-. He joined
an academy as a teacher in the year 2006. He resigned
from the same during the year 2011. During the period
2006-08 he purchased and sold 22 cents of land.
Plaintiff does not remember the price at which the
property was purchased. He denied the suggestion that
he was not having the money to purchase the property
admeasuring 70.950 cents or as reduced by 1 ½ cents.
He was having required amount then and now and he was
ready and willing to take the property, he deposed.
30
25. PW2 is a Managing Director of financial company.
He has produced and marked Ext.A19 certificate relating
to shares held by the mother of the plaintiff.
26. PW3 is a Depository Participant of a broker. He
was examined to prove the shares held by his mother.
He states that he came to depose on being asked to do
so by Gopinathan (father of the plaintiff).
27. PW4 is a Government Gold Valuer of Income Tax
department and he has proved Ext.A22 valuation report
issued to the mother of the plaintiff after examining
her gold ornaments. He has also proved Ext.A23
valuation report, issued to the wife of the plaintiff,
after examining her gold ornaments. In crossexamination he would also state that he has not
received summons from the court, but was asked by
Gopinathan (father of the plaintiff). He states that
he has previous acquaintance with Gopinathan. He came
for valuation and thus he knew him. He states further
in cross-examination that the mother and wife of the
plaintiff came to him for valuation along with
Gopinathan. He further states that they neither
31
produced nor he demanded the bills or receipts relating
to the gold ornaments he valued that day. He further
states that they did not produce any document showing
ownership of the gold ornaments mentioned in Ext.A22
and A23 jewelery produced for valuation. In
reexamination, he points out that Gopinathan, who came
on the date of the gold valuation was sitting in the
Court.
28. PW5 is the Branch Manager of the Syndicate Bank.
He has marked Ext.A41. In cross-examination he states
that the loans were availed on 14.07.2012 and
22.03.2012. He further states that Syndicate Bank
advances loan at the rate of Rs.2100/- per gram of
gold. The two loans were given for agricultural
purposes.
29. PW6 is the Manager of Union Bank and he approved
Ext.A27. Again he is produced to prove gold loan which
is issued for agricultural purposes. The loan was
issued on 12.01.2013. The loan was given at the rate
of Rs.2000/- per gram of gold.
32
30. PW7 is the Chairman and Managing Director of
Financial Chits Company. He proved Ext.A17, 18, 20 and
21. In cross-examination he states he knows Gopinathan.
He states that he (Gopinathan) is practising as an
accountant and auditor in the next building. He states
that the shares held by him as per Ext.A20 was
transferred from his name on 03.11.2010. At present
Gopinathan and his son, the plaintiff, did not hold any
shares in the companies. The value of one share he
states is Rs.100/-. The plaintiff is not having any
share as per Ext.A17. He is holding only 250 shares.
31. PW8 has proved Ext.A24 and A25 reports. He claims
to be the valuer of property. He has valued as on 2008.
He denied the allegation that the present fair value
is less than the value shown in the report. When he was
asked what is the fair value of the properties, as
determined by the government, the answer was that he
has to verify. On similar lines was the answer in
respect of another piece of land. In answer to the
question whether he was ever verified the fair value
of the survey, the answer is in negative. Gopinathan
was known to him since last 12 years and he described
33
him as an auditor. He says that he is not acquainted
to his son (apparently the plaintiff).
32. PW-9 is the Manager of Canara Bank and he proved
Ext.A26 certificate. Apparently, it related to a gold
loan.
33. Coming to the evidence of defendant, we notice the
following inter alia; He was aware that as on the date
of agreement the extent of plaint schedule property did
not have an extent of 75 ¾ cents. He says that he knew
right from the date of the agreement that the plaintiff
is not having money to purchase the plaint schedule
property. When he was asked what was the reason for
sending the lawyers notice on 25.01.2008, his answer
was as follows: It was heard that plaintiff is trying
to resell the plaint schedule property to third parties
as he was not having money to purchase the same, hence,
the said notice was sent. He further states that he did
not know anything about the schedule of witnesses
submitted in the Court by him including the names of
witnesses as (1) Rajesh and (2) Muhammed. He says that
he does not remember the fact that in the counter to
the injunction petition, he had stated that the
34
plaintiff told Rajesh to find prospective buyers for
reselling the plaint schedule property on piecemeal
basis. He further states that anyhow Rajesh and
Muhammed were not examined as witnesses before the
Court. He denies that plaintiff was ready with the
money to purchase the plaint schedule property.
34. The plaintiff on the date of the suit in the year
2007 was 21 years. The agreement would show that the
witnesses to the agreement are one Manoharan, who is
none other than the son of the defendant and the other
witness is Gopinathan, the father of the plaintiff. The
trial Court has entered a finding that Gopinathan was
actively involved in the contract. We have eluded to
the fact that Gopinathan was a witness to the agreement
to safely conclude that the father of the plaintiff was
in the know of things and he was involved in the
transaction. We have referred to Gopinathan, figuring
in the deposition to arrive at the conclusion that the
plaintiff, though the actual party to the agreement,
the moving force and one who intended to support the
plaintiff was his father. The assets which are relied
on by the plaintiff to establish his financial capacity
35
would appear to belong to the close relatives of the
plaintiff, namely, his father, his mother and his wife.
We must recall that in his deposition PW1, when he was
asked as to on what basis he would claim that he had
the financial capacity on 24.03.2008, his answer was
that he had gold ornaments which were worth about
Rs.24,00,000/- and he had about Rs.8,00,000/- in cash
having regard to the payment of Rs.5,00,000/- by way
of advance and further payment to be made, after making
the advance, if Rs.24,00,000/- worth of gold being in
the possession of the plaintiff’s family members
besides Rs.8,00,000/- was there, certainly that would
suffice to establish the case of the plaintiff about
his financial capacity and readiness to perform the
contract. The law is certainly not that the purchaser
in a suit for specific relief must prove that he was
having cash with him from the date of the agreement
till the relevant date. What is important is that he
had the capacity to allow the deal to go through. If
gold was available, as claimed, we would think that on
a pragmatic view of the matter, it may be idle to
contend that it could not be converted into cash either
by immediate sale or by raising a loan.
36
35. We must, however, deal with certain other
contentions before we come to a conclusion in this
regard. The defendant has undoubtedly a case that the
gold ornaments though claimed to be that of the mother
and the wife of the plaintiff, without examining them
as witnesses and without their deposition showing that
they had those gold ornaments in their possession and
that they were willing to employ them for the purpose
of generating funds for the plaintiff, the Court cannot
conclude the matter in favour of the plaintiff. We
would think that it may be true that in a case of this
nature and in view of the context, it may have been
more appropriate that the relatives were examined.
Their non-examination, however, may not fatal to the
plaintiff. It must be realized that the relatives
involved are none other than the mother and the wife
of the plaintiff. Though subsequent their inclination
can be inferred from their going to the valuer PW4. In
such circumstances, we would think, it may be carrying
matters a little too far to decline specific relief,
particularly which was granted by the trial Court in
its discretion to contend that the mother and the wife
37
have not come forward to express their willingness to
make available ornaments for the purpose of the
plaintiff. In fact, no suggestion is seen put to the
plaintiff about the same.
36. The further question may, however, arise as on the
relevant date whether the gold ornaments having the
value of Rs.24,00,000/- was available with the mother
and the wife of the plaintiff. We have noticed the
deposition of PW4. He has stated that neither the bills
nor receipts relating to the gold ornaments were
produced. No documents relating to the ownership of the
gold ornaments were also produced. Could it be said,
therefore, that the gold ornaments never belonged to
the mother and the wife of the plaintiff and the
valuation report is therefore robbed of any value that
might otherwise be attached to it.
37. It is here we may notice that the family of the
plaintiff was possessed of considerable assets even
otherwise in terms of landed property. We further
notice that the plaintiff has proceeded to purchase
another 10 cents during the period when the contract
38
was in existence (relied upon by the trial Court to
establish the readiness and willingness in terms of
capacity apparently).
38. A1 contract is dated 25.04.2007. Plaintiff was, no
doubt, 21 years of age. His father Gopinathan was a
witness to A1. Knowing these facts, defendant entered
into the agreement, and what is more, received Rs.2
lakhs on the date of the agreement. Further, a sum of
Rs.3 lakhs was received under the agreement on
25.08.2007. The property is measured on 16.03.2008. On
the third day from 24.03.2008, which was the last day
for the execution of the sale deed, i.e., on
27.03.2008, the suit came to be filed. After the
advance paid by the plaintiff is deducted, the balance
amount including the stamp duty and expenses would not
exceed Rs.24 lakhs. There was the testimony of the
plaintiff as to how he intended to pay the
consideration on 24.03.2008. There was evidence of
plaintiff having gold ornaments with him and family
members worth about Rs.24 lakhs and cash of about Rs.8
lakhs. It also appeared that one of the family members
of the appellant had lands in her name. Even the
39
appellant purchased other land during the period of
contract. In regard to the statement by the plaintiff
that gold ornaments worth about Rs.24 lakhs were held
by him and family members and there was cash of about
Rs. 8 lakhs, the plaintiff is not cross-examined as
such. At any rate, there is no serious dispute raised
when he was cross-examined in this regard. There is no
question raised about the family members not making
available the gold ornaments or that it was not
available with them. The non-availability of bills
relating to the gold jewellery to prove ownership as
such may not be in the facts of this case fatal to the
plaintiff.
39. Having regard to the totality of the facts present,
we are of the view that the High Court erred in
interfering with the decree passed by the Trial Court.
We notice that the appellant has deposited the sum of
Rs.19,37,8000/- (balance amount) with the Government
Treasury immediately after judgment dated 10.06.2013.
While we are inclined to direct specific relief in
favour of the appellant, we are of the view that we
should also direct that interest at the rate of 6 per
40
cent on Rs.19,37,8000/- from 27.03.2008 (date of suit)
till date of deposit (in Government Treasury) should
be directed to be paid over and above the balance amount
to the respondents in exercise of our power under
Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Hence, we
allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the high
Court and restore the decree passed by the Trial Court,
subject to the following modifications.
40. We further direct that appellant shall pay a sum
calculated at 6 per cent per annum on Rs.19,37,800/-
from 27.03.2008 till the date of deposit in Government
Treasury in 2013 also, apart with the balance to be
paid. The respondents can withdraw the balance payment
(i.e., Rs.19,37,800/-) as also amount calculated at 6
per cent on Rs.19,37,800/- as aforesaid. The balance,
if any, in the Government Treasury, can be withdrawn
by the appellant. If the amount in the Government
Treasury does not attract interest, the appellant shall
deposit the amount of interest as calculated within 10
weeks from today which can be withdrawn by the
respondents. It is only after payment of interest as
aforesaid, that the conveyance deed need be executed.
41
41. The parties shall bear their own costs.
.......................J.
 (ASHOK BHUSHAN)
.......................J.
 (K.M. JOSEPH)
New Delhi,
September 12, 2019.

HUDA vs. Sunita, (2005) 2 SCC 479. - Over Ruled In the case of HUDA vs. Sunita, (2005) 2 SCC 479. - Over Ruled This Court therein held that "the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (hereinafter referred to as “NCDRC”) had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the legality behind the demand of “composition fee” and “extension fee” made by HUDA, as the same being statutory obligation, does not qualify as “deficiency in service”. We hold that" the determination of the dispute concerning the validity of the imposition of a statutory due arising out of a “deficiency in service”, can be undertaken by the consumer fora as per the provisions of the Act." The decision of this Court in the case of Sunita (supra), "wherein it was held that NCDRC has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the legitimacy of the aforementioned statutory dues, was rendered without considering any of the previous judgments of this Court and the objects of the Act." Consequently, the law laid down in the aforesaid case does not hold good before the eyes of law, and is thereby overruled.

HUDA vs. Sunita, (2005) 2 SCC 479. - Over Ruled

In the case of HUDA vs. Sunita, (2005) 2 SCC 479. - Over Ruled
This Court therein held that "the   National   Consumer   Disputes   Redressal   Commission
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   “NCDRC”)   had   no   jurisdiction   to adjudicate the legality behind the demand of “composition fee” and “extension   fee”   made   by   HUDA,   as   the   same   being   statutory obligation, does not qualify as “deficiency in service”.


We hold that" the determination   of   the   dispute   concerning   the   validity   of   the
imposition of a statutory due arising out of a “deficiency in service”, can be undertaken by the consumer fora as per the provisions of the Act."

The decision of this Court in  the case of  Sunita (supra), "wherein it was held that NCDRC has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the legitimacy of the aforementioned statutory dues, was rendered without considering any of the previous judgments of this Court and the objects of the Act." 
Consequently, the law laid down in the aforesaid case does not hold good before the eyes of law, and is thereby overruled.


REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
    SLP (C)   NO. 4272 OF 2015
PUNJAB URBAN PLANNING AND                    …PETITIONER
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NOW GLADA)
VERSUS
VIDYA CHETAL                                        …RESPONDENT
WITH
    SLP (C) NO. 5237 OF 2015
PUNJAB URBAN DEVELOPMENT                 …PETITIONERS
AUTHORITY AND ANOTHER
VERSUS
RAM SINGH                      …RESPONDENT
    JUDGMENT
    N.V. RAMANA, J.
1. The reference before us arises out of the order dated 13.07.2018,
passed by a two­Judge Bench of this Court, wherein they expressed
1
doubt as to the correctness of the judgment rendered in the case of
HUDA vs. Sunita, (2005) 2 SCC 479. This Court therein held that
the   National   Consumer   Disputes   Redressal   Commission
(hereinafter   referred   to   as   “NCDRC”)   had   no   jurisdiction   to
adjudicate the legality behind the demand of “composition fee” and
“extension   fee”   made   by   HUDA,   as   the   same   being   statutory
obligation, does not qualify as “deficiency in service”.
2. It is pertinent herein to note the opinion expressed by the twoJudge Bench regarding the decision in the case of  Sunita (supra)
while passing the referral order:
“We are, prima facie, of the view that this sixparagraph   order,   which   does   not,   prima   facie,
contain   any   reason   for   the   conclusion   reached,
requires   a   relook   in   view   of   the   fact   that   the
Consumer   Protection   Act,   1986   is   a   beneficent
legislation”
3. The counsel on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the order
in  the case of  Sunita  (supra) is well reasoned, as it validly holds
that the NCDRC lacks jurisdiction to decide the legitimacy behind
the demand of “composition fee” and “extension fee”. Relying on the
aforesaid holding, the counsel further stated that “statutory dues”
cannot be claimed as “deficiency in services”. Lastly, the learned
counsel   submitted   that   although   the   Consumer   Protection   Act,
2
1986 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) is beneficial in nature,
demanding   a   liberal   construction,   the   same   cannot   be   used   to
extend the ambit of the Act by bringing in remedies or benefits
which were not intended by the legislature.
4. On the contrary, the learned senior counsel appointed by this
Court   as   amicus   curiae   to   assist   and   appear   on   behalf   of   the
respondent claimed that the order passed in the case of  Sunita
(supra), is an aberration in a series of long­standing judgments by
this   Court.   The   learned   amicus   curiae   thereafter   placed   strong
reliance   upon   the   judgments   of   this   Court   in  Lucknow
Development  Authority  v.  M.K.  Gupta,  (1994)  1 SCC  243,  and
Ghaziabad   Development   Authority   v.   Balbir   Singh,   (2004)   5
SCC 65, wherein it was held that the NCDRC has the jurisdiction to
protect consumers against defective services rendered even by a
statutory   body.   Further,   the   learned   amicus   curiae,   while
supporting the view that the Sunita case (supra) was per incuriam,
has   taken   us   through   various   judgments   of   this   Court   in   this
regard and submitted that the statutory authorities come under the
ambit of the Act.
3
5. Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner
and the learned amicus curiae in this case. The precise question
raised before us is whether the law laid down by this Court in the
case of  Sunita  (supra)  is valid. We may note that the validity of
interpretation furthered in the case of Sunita (supra) hinges on the
interpretation of Section 2(1)(d), 2(1)(e), 2(1)(f), 2(1)(g) and 2(1)(o) of
the Act.
6. At the outset, we must remind ourselves that answer to majority
of legal questions before Courts essentially lie in the process of
interpretation.1
 This Court in Commissioner of Customs (Import),
Mumbai   v.   Dilip   Kumar   and   others,   (2018)   9   SCC   40,   had
emphasized   that   the   purpose   of   interpretation   is   to   find   the
legislative intent of an Act. It is established by umpteen number of
cases in India and abroad that beneficial or remedial legislation
needs to be given ‘fair and liberal interpretation’ [refer Om Prakash
v. Reliance General Insurance and Anr., (2017) 9 SCC 724]. In
this regard we may note that, the liberal construction, extends the
letter to include matters within the spirit or purpose.2
1  Justice Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on Reading of Statutes, Columbia Law
Review, VOL. 47, Issue 4, PP. 527­546
2 Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, §5505 (Callaghan, 1943).
4
7. Having observed the law on beneficial interpretation, we need to
observe the concerned statutory provisions of the Act:
Section 2 (1) (g) “deficiency”­ means any fault,
imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the
quality, nature and manner of performance which
is required to be maintained by or under any law
for the time being in force or has been undertaken
to be performed by a person in pursuance of a
contract or otherwise in relation to any service.
Thus, meaning of deficiency is explained as any fault, imperfection,
shortcoming   or   inadequacy   in   quality,   nature   and   manner   of
performance   of   any   service   or   supply   of   goods,   in   terms   of
standards   set   by   the   parties   themselves   through   contract   or
otherwise, or imposed by the law in force. The basis for application
of   the   consumer   laws   hinges   on   the   relationship   between   the
service provider and consumer. The usage of ‘otherwise’ within the
provision subsumes other modes of standard setting alternative
instruments other than contracts such as laws, bye­laws, rules and
customary practices etc.
8. Service is defined under Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, which reads as
under:­
(o)  “service”  means   service   of   any   description
which   is   made   available   to   potential users   and
includes,   but   not   limited   to,   the   provision   of
5
facilities   in   connection   with   banking,   financing
insurance,   transport,   processing,   supply   of
electrical   or   other   energy,   board   or   lodging   or
both, housing   construction,   entertainment,
amusement   or   the   purveying   of   news   or   other
information, but does not include the rendering of
any service free of charge or under a contract of
personal service;
This definition is not exhaustive rather the legislature has left the
task   to   expound   the   provision   on   a   case   to   case   basis   to   the
judiciary. The purpose of leaving this provision open ended, without
providing an exhaustive list indicates the requirement for a liberal
interpretation. Broadly speaking, it is inclusive of all those services
performed   for   a   consideration,   except   gratuitous   services   and
contract of personal services. Moreover, aforesaid provision reflects
the legislative intent of providing impetus to ‘consumerism’. It may
be noted that such a phenomenon has had a benevolent effect on
the   Government   undertakings,   wherein   a   new   dynamism   of
innovation, accountability and transparency are imbibed.
9. On perusal of the impugned precedent, it may be noted that it
does not provide clear­cut reasoning for the view held by the Court,
except to the extent of pointing out that statutory obligations are
not   encompassed   under   the   Act.   Such   broad   proposition
necessarily required further elaboration, as there is a possibility of
6
over­inclusivity. Further, there is no gainsaying that all statutory
obligations   are   not   sovereign   functions.   Although   all   sovereign
functions/services   are   regulated   and   performed   under
constitutional/statutory instruments, yet there are other functions,
though   might   be   statutory,   but   cannot   be   called   as   sovereign
functions. These sovereign functions do not contain the consumerservice   provider   relationship   in   them   and   are   not   done   for   a
consideration. Moreover, we need to be mindful of the fact that
sovereign functions are undergoing a radical change in the face of
privatization   and   globalization.   India   being   a   welfare   State,   the
sovereign   functions   are   also   changing.   We   may   note   that   the
government in order to improve the quality of life and welfare of its
citizens, has undertaken many commercial adventures.
10. Sovereign functions like judicial decision making, imposition of
tax, policing etc, strictly understood, qualify for exemption from the
Act,   but   the   welfare   activities   through   economic   adventures
undertaken  by  the Government  or statutory  bodies  are  covered
under   the   jurisdiction   of   the   consumer   forums.   Even   in
departments   discharging   sovereign   functions,   if   there   are   subunits/wings   which   are   providing   services/supply   goods   for   a
consideration and they are severable, then they can be considered
7
to come within the ambit of the Act. [refer to Standard Chartered
Bank Ltd. v. Dr. B. N. Raman, (2006) 5 SCC 727]
11. Having   observed   the   provisions   and   the   interpretation   of
pertinent provisions, we need to refer to  Lucknow  Development
Authority Case (supra), wherein this Court was concerned with the
question as to the amenability of statutory authorities like Lucknow
Development Authority, for development of plots, to the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986.
12. This Court in  Lucknow  Development   Authority   Case  (supra)
elaborated the meaning of ‘Consumer’, as occurring under Section
2(1)(b), in the following manner:­
“3……The   word   ‘consumer’   is   a   comprehensive
expression. It extends from a person who buys any
commodity   to   consume   either   as   eatable   or
otherwise from a shop, business house, corporation,
store,   fair   price   shop   to   use   of   private   or   public
services.

It is in two parts. The first deals with goods and the
other   with   services.   Both   parts   first   declare   the
meaning   of   goods   and   services   by   use   of   wide
expressions. Their ambit is further enlarged  by use
of   inclusive   clause.   For   instance,   it   is   not   only
purchaser of goods or hirer of services but even those
who use the goods or who are beneficiaries of services
with approval of the person who purchased the goods or
who hired services are included in it.”
(emphasis supplied)
8
13. Further, this Court elaborated on the meaning of the ‘service’ in
the following manner:­
“4.   What is the meaning of the word ‘service’? Does it
extend to deficiency in the building of a house or flat? Can
a   complaint   be   filed   under   the   Act   against   the
statutory authority or a builder or contractor for any
deficiency in respect of such property.
…..
It   is   in   three   parts.   The   main   part   is   followed   by
inclusive clause and ends by exclusionary clause. The
main   clause   itself   is   very   wide.   It   applies   to   any
service  made  available  to  potential  users.  The  words
‘any’ and ‘potential’ are significant. Both are of wide
amplitude. The word ‘any’ dictionarily means ‘one or
    some or all’. In     Black's Law Dictionary it is explained
thus, “word ‘any’ has a diversity of meaning and may
be   employed   to   indicate   ‘all’   or   ‘every’   as   well   as
‘some’   or   ‘one’   and   its  meaning   in   a   given   statute
depends  upon  the  context  and  the  subject­matter  of
the statute”. The use of the word ‘any’ in the context
    it   has   been   used   in   clause   (  o)   indicates   that   it   has
been used in wider sense extending from one to all.

The   legislative   intention   is   thus   clear   to   protect   a
consumer   against   services   rendered   even   by   statutory
bodies.   The   test,   therefore,   is   not   if   a   person   against
whom complaint is made is a statutory body but whether
the nature of the duty and function performed by it is
service or even facility.”
(emphasis supplied)
Thereafter,   this   Court   answered   the   relevant   question   in   the
following manner:­
“5. This takes us to the larger issue if the public
authorities   under   different   enactments   are
9
amenable   to   jurisdiction   under   the   Act.  It   was
vehemently   argued   that   the   local   authorities   or
government   bodies   develop   land   and   construct
houses   in   discharge   of   their   statutory   function,
therefore,   they   could   not   be   subjected   to   the
provisions of the Act. …
… Any attempt, therefore, to exclude services offered
by statutory or official bodies to the common man
would be against the provisions of the Act and the
spirit behind it. … A government or semi­government
body or a local authority is as much amenable to the
Act   as   any   other   private   body   rendering   similar
service. Truly speaking it would be a service to the
society   if   such   bodies   instead   of   claiming
exclusion   subject  themselves  to  the  Act  and   let
their acts and omissions be scrutinised as public
accountability is necessary for healthy growth of
society.
6. What   remains   to   be   examined   is   if   housing
construction   or   building   activity   carried   on   by   a
private   or   statutory   body   was   service   within   the
meaning of clause (o) of Section 2 of the Act as it
stood prior to inclusion of the expression ‘housing
construction’   in   the   definition   of   “service”   by
Ordinance No. 24 of 1993. … So any service except
when it is free of charge or under a constraint of
personal  service   is  included  in   it.  Since  housing
activity is a service it was covered in the clause
as it stood before 1993.

8…..Under  our  Constitution  sovereignty  vests   in
the   people.   Every   limb   of   the   constitutional
machinery   is   obliged   to   be   people   oriented.   No
functionary   in   exercise   of   statutory   power   can
claim   immunity,  except  to  the  extent  protected
by the statute itself. Public authorities acting in
violation of constitutional or statutory provisions
10
oppressively  are  accountable   for  their  behaviour
before authorities  created  under the statute like
the   commission   or   the   courts   entrusted   with
responsibility  of  maintaining   the   rule  of   law.  …
Therefore,   when   the   Commission   has   been   vested
with   the   jurisdiction   to   award   value   of   goods   or
services and compensation it has to be construed
widely   enabling   the   Commission   to   determine
compensation for any loss or damage suffered by a
consumer which in law is otherwise included in wide
meaning of compensation.
(emphasis supplied)
14. Coming back to the Sunita case (supra), this Court held that the
NCDRC had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the legality behind the
demand   of   composition   or   extension   fee   by   a   developmental
authority. This Court observed that the statutory obligations of a
developmental authority and the plot holder under the authority’s
statutory   framework   cannot   be   construed   as   acts   or   omissions
resulting in a “deficiency in service”. In view of the law laid down by
us, the interpretation provided by the Sunita case (supra) cannot
be   sustained   as   the   service   provided   by   the   petitioner   herein
squarely comes under the ambit of ‘service’.
15. We   do   understand   that   the   confusion,   which   arose   from   the
aforesaid situation, is that the authority does have the power to levy
certain  statutory fee. However,  that  itself does not  prohibit  the
Consumer forums from evaluating the legality of such exactions or
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fulfilment of conditions by the authority before such exaction. In
broad terms, non­fulfilment of conditions or standards required,
amounts to ‘deficiency in services’ under the Act. Having said that,
out of abundant caution, we note that the legality does not extend to
the   challenge   of  vires  of   a   rule   prescribing   such   fee.   Such
contentions are best agitated before the Constitutional Courts.
16. On a different note, if the statutory authority, other than the core
sovereign duties, is providing service, which is encompassed under
the   Act,   then,   unless   any   Statute   exempts,   or   provides   for
immunity, for deficiency in service, or specifically provides for an
alternative forum, the Consumer Forums would continue to have
the jurisdiction to deal with the same.3 We need to caution against
over­inclusivity and the tribunals need to satisfy the ingredients
under Consumer Protection Laws, before exercising the jurisdiction.
17. Moreover,   we   also   need   to   note   that   the  distinction   between
statutory liability which arise generally such as a tax, and those
that may arise out of a specific relationship such as that between a
service provider and a consumer, was not considered by this Court
in  the case of  Sunita  (supra). For instance, a tax is a mandatory
imposition by a public authority for public purpose enforceable by
3 Section 3 of the Act.
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law;   and   is   not   imposed   with   respect   to   any   special   benefit
conferred, as consideration, on the tax payer. There is no element of
quid   pro   quo  between   the   tax   payer   and   the   public   authority.
However,   the   above   is   not   the   only   form   of   due   charged   by   a
statutory   authority.   In   a   catena   of   judgments,   this   Court   has
recognized   that   certain   statutory   dues   may   arise   from   services
rendered by a statutory authority. In the case of  Commissioner,
Hindu   Religious   Endowments,   Madras   v.   Sri   Lakshmindra
Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005,  a seven
Judge­Bench of this Court held that­
“46. Coming now to fees, a “fee” is generally
defined  to  be  a  charge   for  a   special   service
rendered   to   individuals   by   some
governmental   agency.  The   amount   of   fee
levied   is   supposed   to   be   based   on   the
expenses   incurred   by   the   Government   in
rendering the service, though in many cases
the costs are arbitrarily assessed. Ordinarily,
the fees are uniform and no account is taken of
the varying abilities of different recipients to pay
[ Vide Lutz on Public Finance, p. 215]. These are
undoubtedly some of the general characteristics,
but as there may be various kinds of fees, it is
not possible to formulate a definition that would
be applicable to all cases.
47. …The distinction between a tax and a fee
lies primarily in the fact that a tax is levied
as a part of a common burden, while a fee is
a payment for a special benefit or privilege.
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Fees   confer   a   special   capacity,   although   the
special advantage, as for example in the case of
registration   fees   for   documents   or   marriage
licences, is secondary to the primary motive of
regulation in the public interest [Vide Findlay
Shirras on Science of Public Finance, Vol. I, p.
202]. Public interest seems to be at the basis of
all impositions, but in a fee, it is some special
benefit which the individual receives.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. A five Judge Bench of this Court, in the case of Kewal Krishan
Puri and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Anr.,  (1980) 1 SCC 416,
also took note of the fact that certain statutory dues can arise from
a quid pro quo relationship between the authority and an individual
upon whom the liability falls.
“23. …(6) That the element of quid pro quo
may not be possible, or even necessary, to be
established with arithmetical exactitude but
even   broadly   and   reasonably  it   must   be
established  by  the  authorities  who  charge
the fees that the amount is being spent for
rendering  services  to  those on whom  falls
the burden of the fee.”
(emphasis supplied)
19. Therefore,   it   is   a   clearly   established   principle   that   certain
statutory dues, such as fees, can arise out of a specific relation.
Such statutory dues might be charged as a  quid pro quo  for a
privilege conferred or for a service rendered by the authority. As
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noted above, there are exactions which are for the common burden,
like taxes, there are dues for a specific purpose, like cess, and there
are dues in lieu of a specific service rendered. Therefore, it is clear
from the above discussion that not all statutory dues/exactions are
amenable to the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum, rather only
those exactions which are exacted for a service rendered, would be
amenable to the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum.
20. At the cost of repetition, we may note that those exactions, like
tax, and cess, levied as a part of common burden or for a specific
purpose, generally may not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the
Consumer Forum. However, those statutory fees, levied  in lieu of
service provided, may in the usual course be subject matter of
Consumer Forum’s jurisdiction provided that there is a ‘deficiency
in service’ etc.
21. We   may   also   refer   to   the   case   of  Ghaziabad   Development
Authority  (supra)  wherein   this   Court,   relying   upon  Lucknow
Development  Authority  case  (supra), held that the power of the
Consumer forum extends to redressing any injustice rendered upon
a   consumer   as   well   as   over   any  mala   fide,   capricious   or   any
oppressive act done by a statutory body. The relevant para of the
judgment reads as under:
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“6.   ….Thus,   the   law   is   that   the   Consumer
Protection   Act   has   a   wide   reach   and   the
Commission  has   jurisdiction  even   in  cases  of
service   rendered   by   statutory   and   public
authorities.   Such   authorities   become   liable   to
compensate for misfeasance in public office i.e. an
act which is oppressive or capricious or arbitrary
or negligent provided loss or injury is suffered by
a citizen.

Where there has been capricious  or arbitrary
or negligent exercise or non­exercise of power
by   an   officer   of   the   authority,   the
Commission/Forum has a statutory obligation
to   award   compensation.   If   the
Commission/Forum   is   satisfied   that   a
complainant   is   entitled   to   compensation   for
loss   or   injury   or   for   harassment   or   mental
agony   or   oppression,   then   after   recording   a
finding   it   must   direct   the   authority   to   pay
compensation   and   then   also   direct   recovery
from   those   found   responsible   for   such
unpardonable behaviour.
(emphasis supplied)
22. Therefore, in line with the law laid down by us, we hold that the
determination   of   the   dispute   concerning   the   validity   of   the
imposition of a statutory due arising out of a “deficiency in service”,
can be undertaken by the consumer fora as per the provisions of
the Act. The decision of this Court in  the case of  Sunita (supra),
wherein it was held that NCDRC has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
the legitimacy of the aforementioned statutory dues, was rendered
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without considering any of the previous judgments of this Court
and the objects of the Act. Consequently, the law laid down in the
aforesaid case does not hold good before the eyes of law, and is
thereby overruled.
23. The reference stands answered accordingly. The instant special
leave   petitions   may   be   placed   before   an   appropriate   Bench   for
considering   the   case   on   merits   after   obtaining   orders   from   the
Hon’ble Chief Justice of India.
  .........................J.
    (N.V. RAMANA)
                                      ........................J.
                                             (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
        ........................J.
         (AJAY RASTOGI)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 16, 2019.
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