LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Saturday, November 2, 2019

Without necessary permission from the Charity Commissioner in view of the provisions of the said Act. -No settlement carries value in the eye of law - The respondents No.1 to 4 were owners of the land in question and it is their say that the said land belonged to Laxmi Narayan Devesthan (a Public Trust).- Since Haji, a tenant in possession of the suit land on the relevant date on 1.04.1957, the proceedings under Section 32 (G) of the said Act culminated in an order in favour of the tenant on 6.5.1963 as a statutory sale in favour of the tenant. Haji having become the owner of the suit land in pursuance of the same in 1963 sought permission to sell the land in favour of the appellants on 18.4.1996, which permission was granted on 30.6.1997. The sale was consequently effected and, thus, Haji lost all interest, as may be available to him, in the land in question as tenent etc.,-After almost a lapse of 3 � decades, Respondents No.1 to 4 sought to assail the order dated 6.5.1963 of a statutory sale in favour of Haji in which endeavour they succeeded on 24.6.1999 on the ground that the land belongs to the Trust and, thus, there could not have been any sale in favour of the tenant. - Purchaser and Respondents No.1 to 4 came to a settlement but the legal heirs of Haji filed objections - their objections were dismissed as not maintainable as they have no locus sandi to file any objections. We, however, make it clear that respondents No.5 to 7 will have no locus before the Charity Commissioner.


 Without  necessary permission   from   the   Charity   Commissioner   in   view   of   the
provisions of the said Act. -No settlement carries value in the eye of law - The   respondents   No.1   to   4   were   owners   of   the   land   in question   and   it   is   their   say   that   the   said   land   belonged   to Laxmi   Narayan   Devesthan   (a   Public   Trust).- Since   Haji,   a   tenant   in   possession   of   the suit   land   on   the   relevant   date   on   1.04.1957,     the   proceedings
under Section 32 (G) of the said Act culminated in an order in favour of the tenant on 6.5.1963 as a statutory sale in favour of  the  tenant.    
Haji  having  become  the  owner  of  the  suit  land in pursuance of the same in 1963 sought permission to sell the land in favour of the appellants on 18.4.1996, which permission
was   granted   on   30.6.1997.   The   sale   was   consequently   effected and, thus, Haji lost all interest, as may be available to him, in the land in question as tenent etc.,-After almost a lapse of 3 � decades, Respondents No.1 to 4 sought to assail the order dated 6.5.1963 of   a   statutory   sale   in   favour   of   Haji   in   which   endeavour   they succeeded   on   24.6.1999   on   the   ground   that   the   land   belongs   to the   Trust   and,   thus,   there   could   not   have   been   any   sale   in
favour   of   the   tenant. - Purchaser and Respondents No.1 to 4 came to a settlement but the legal heirs of Haji filed objections - their objections were dismissed as not maintainable as they have no locus sandi to file any objections.
We,   however,   make   it   clear   that   respondents   No.5   to   7 will have no locus before the Charity Commissioner.  

SLP (C) No.30590 of 2011
1
ITEM NO.10               COURT NO.13               SECTION IX
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No.30590/2011
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  25-07-2011
in   WP   No.6446/2010   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at
Bombay)
AMIR J ALI  & ANR.                                 Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
VIDYADHAR KESHAV DATAR . & ORS.                    Respondent(s)
WITH
SLP(C) No. 31019/2011 (IX)
SLP(C) No. 31061/2011 (IX)

Date : 17-07-2019 These petitions were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.M. JOSEPH
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, AOR
                    Ms. Surabhi Guleria, Adv.
Mr. Yogesh K., Adv.
Mr. Mahesh Shinde, Adv.
For Respondent(s)   Mr. Vinay Navare, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Gwen Kartika, Adv.
Ms. Abha R. Sharma, AOR
                   
Mr. Sushil Karanjkar, Adv.
Mr. K. N. Rai, AOR                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Leave granted.
The   respondents   No.1   to   4   were   owners   of   the   land   in
question   and   it   is   their   say   that   the   said   land   belonged   to

SLP (C) No.30590 of 2011
2
�Laxmi   Narayan   Devesthan�   (a   Public   Trust).     One   Hasan   Haji
Miya  Shaikh  (Teli)  was  a  tenant  of  the  said  land.    The  tenant
invoked the provisions of Section 32 (G) of the Bombay Tenancy
and   Agricultural   Lands   Act,   1948   (hereinafter   referred   to   as
�the   said   Act �).     Since   Haji,   a   tenant   in   possession   of   the
suit   land   on   the   relevant   date   on   1.04.1957,     the   proceedings
under Section 32 (G) of the said Act culminated in an order in
favour of the tenant on 6.5.1963 as a statutory sale in favour
of  the  tenant.    Haji  having  become  the  owner  of  the  suit  land
in pursuance of the same in 1963 sought permission to sell the
land in favour of the appellants on 18.4.1996, which permission
was   granted   on   30.6.1997.   The   sale   was   consequently   effected
and, thus, Haji lost all interest, as may be available to him,
in the land in question.   After almost a lapse of 3 � decades,
Respondents No.1 to 4 sought to assail the order dated 6.5.1963
of   a   statutory   sale   in   favour   of   Haji   in   which   endeavour   they
succeeded   on   24.6.1999   on   the   ground   that   the   land   belongs   to
the   Trust   and,   thus,   there   could   not   have   been   any   sale   in
favour   of   the   tenant.     The   further   proceedings   have   also   been
culminated   in   orders   in   favour   of   the   Trust   right   till   the
impugned order.
In   the   course   of   pendency   of   the   proceedings   before   us,
the   purchasers   from   the   tenant   i.e.   the   appellants   and   the
Trust claim to have been settled their disputes and have filed

SLP (C) No.30590 of 2011
3
a memo of settlement.  It is the settlement which sought to be
objected   by   respondent   No.6,   one   of   the   legal   heirs   of   the
original tenant. 
On hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the
view   that   the   endeavour   of   respondent   No.6   is   completely
misconceived and is an attempt to extract amounts arising from
the   settlement   arrived   at   between   the   original   owner   and   the
subsequent   purchaser(s).     The   fact   remains   that   if   the
impugned   order   of   sale   in   favour   of   the   tenant   is   set   aside,
that   would   have   restored   the   status   as   a   tenant   provided   the
tenant   continue   to   hold   the   property.     The   tenant   Haji
extinguished   his   rights   in   the   property   by   transferring   it   to
a third party. 
Now the legal heirs having come into the picture, such an
endeavour   is   made   by   way   of   objections,   which   cannot   be
countenanced.
This   does   not   mean   that   this   Court   will   not   examine   the
validity   of   the   settlement   but   not   at   the   behest   of   the   said
respondent   No.6.     The   objections   of   respondent   No.6   are
dismissed   with   costs   quantified   at   Rs.20,000/-;   Rs.10,000/-
each to the landlords and to the subsequent purchaser(s).
Now   coming   to   the   consent   terms.     We   have   heard   learned
counsel   for   the   appellants   and   learned   counsel   for   the

SLP (C) No.30590 of 2011
4
respondents   No.2   to   4.     We   may   note   that   respondent   No.1   had
passed   away   and   has   been   deleted   from   the   array   of   parties.
Respondents   No.5   to   7   are   the   legal   heirs   of   the   original
tenant but the objections were filed only by respondent No.6.
The   settlement   terms   indicate   the   necessity   for
respondents   No.2   to   4   to   transfer   the   land   in   favour   of   the
subsequent   purchasers   as   according   to   them   considerable
afforestation has been done by the appellants in some part of
the   land   and   a   temple   exists   which   is   required   to   be
maintained   by   respondents   No.2   to   4   for   which   moneys   are
required.     In   terms   of   the   settlement,   a   part   of   the   land
shall   continue   to   vest   with   the   subsequent   purchasers   being
the   appellants.     While,   in   respect   of   the   other   part   of   the
land respondents No.2 to 4 are to take steps for sale of that
land   on   behalf   of   the   Trust.     The   appellants   would   be   given
the first option to match that bid.
We   find   it   difficult   to   straightaway   give   our
imprimatur   to   the   settlement   as   it   may   envisage   necessary
permission   from   the   Charity   Commissioner   in   view   of   the
provisions of the said Act.  We, thus, consider it appropriate
that the appellants  and respondents No.1 to 4 should approach
the   Charity   Commissioner   for   obtaining   necessary   permission
which will be considered on its own merits.   On such request
being   made   to   the   Charity   Commissioner,   the   request   will   be

SLP (C) No.30590 of 2011
5
processed expeditiously so that the decision is made available
to us by the next date of hearing. 
We,   however,   make   it   clear   that   respondents   No.5   to   7
will have no locus before the Charity Commissioner.  
Learned   counsel   for   the   parties   states   that   the   present
appeal   may   be   kept   pending   in   order   to   facilitate   the
aforesaid.
List   the   matters   for   directions   on   22-10-2019   on
Miscellaneous Board.
(POOJA ARORA)                            (ANITA RANI AHUJA)
COURT  MASTER                               COURT MASTER 

When the suit was dismissed for the default of plaintiff or his advocate when other side is present under Or.9 rule 8, the only remedy is to file a restoration petition under Or.9 rule 9 but not filing a separate suit - if any suit is filed it is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. it was dismissed under the provisions of Order IX Rule 8 of the CPC as the counsel for defendants was present and counsel for the plaintiffs was absent. In view of the provisions contained in Order IX Rule 9 decree against plaintiffs by default bars fresh suit. Order IX Rule 9 is extracted hereunder:- 9. Decree against plaintiff by default bars fresh suit (1) Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed un - der rule 8, the plaintiff shall be precluded from bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause of action. But he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit. (2) No order shall be made under this rule unless notice of the application has been served on the opposite party.� In view of the aforesaid, High Court erred in law in holding that the subsequent suit was based on different cause of action, as such it was maintainable. The impugned judgment and order is patently illegal. Thus, it is set aside and the suit is ordered to be dismissed as it was not maintainable. The purchaser is sailing in the same boat as that of the original plaintiffs, he cannot be said to be having better rights than the original plaintiffs.

When the suit was dismissed for the default of plaintiff or his advocate when other side is present under Or.9 rule 8, the only remedy is to file a restoration petition under Or.9 rule 9 but not filing a separate suit - if any suit is filed it is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed.

it was dismissed under   the   provisions   of   Order   IX   Rule   8   of   the   CPC   as   the   counsel
for   defendants   was   present   and   counsel   for   the   plaintiffs   was
absent.     In   view   of   the   provisions   contained   in   Order   IX   Rule   9
decree against plaintiffs by default bars fresh suit. Order IX Rule
9 is extracted hereunder:-
9. Decree against plaintiff by default bars fresh 
suit
(1) Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed un -
der   rule   8,   the   plaintiff   shall   be   precluded   from
bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause
of action. But he may apply for an order to set the
dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that
there   was   sufficient   cause   for   his   non-appearance
when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court
shall   make   an   order   setting   aside   the   dismissal
upon   such   terms   as   to   costs   or   otherwise   as   it
thinks fit,  and shall  appoint a  day for  proceeding
with the suit.
(2)   No   order   shall   be   made   under   this   rule   unless
notice   of   the   application   has   been   served   on   the
opposite party.�
In   view   of   the   aforesaid,   High   Court   erred   in   law   in   holding that the subsequent suit was based on different cause of action, as such   it   was   maintainable.     
The   impugned   judgment   and   order   is patently illegal.  
Thus, it is set aside and the suit is ordered to be dismissed as it was not maintainable.   
The purchaser is sailing in   the   same   boat   as   that   of   the   original   plaintiffs,   he   cannot   be
said to be having better rights than the original plaintiffs.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL  NO(S). 6424/2019
(ARISING FROM  SLP(C) No. 6330/2018)
MAYANDI                                            APPELLANT(S)
                                VERSUS
PANDARACHAMY & ANR.                                RESPONDENT(S)
         O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. The judgment and decree passed by the High Court is liable to
be set aside on the short and singular ground that in the previous
suit   i.e.   Original   Suit   No.85/1996   a   similar   relief   was   prayed   by
Pechimuthu   S/o.   Arumgasamy   Thevar,   Minor   Manimegalai   D/o.
Pechimuthu,   Thilagavathi   (Minor)   D/o.   Pechimuthu   and   Arul   Pandian
(Minor) D/o. Pechimuthu.   Prayer was made for declaration of title
and for permanent injunction on the basis of Will dated 05.12.2004
executed by Sadaiyappa Konar which became operative on his death on
20.02.1995. O.S. No.85 of 1996 was filed in which following prayer
was made:-
�A. declaring   the   plaintiffs   2   to   4   is   title   to
the plaint 1 st
 schedule property.
B. granting the consequential relief of permanent
prohibitary   injunction   restraining   the   defendants
from   disturbing   the   plaintiffs   title,   possession
and enjoyment of the plaint 1 st
 schedule property.
C. granting   permanent   prohibitary   injunction
restraining the  defendants from  sub letting  the 2 nd
schedule   house   without   the   written   permission   of
the plaintiff.
D.  awarding   the   costs   of   this   suit   to   the
plaintiffs.�
3. It   was   on   the   basis   of   the   Will,   Civil   Suit   No.85/1996   was
filed.   It   was   dismissed   vide   order   dated   16.03.2001,   when   the
counsel   for   the   plaintiffs   was   absent   and   the   counsel   for   the
defendants was present in the Court.
1

4.  Plaintiff   Nos.2,   3   and   4   filed   the   second   suit   i.e.   Suit
No.1106/2004   against   the   defendants.     The   prayer   was   made   for
permanent   injunction   on   the   basis   of   the   Will   only.     After   filing
of   the   suit,   Respondent   No.1   purchased   the   property   from   the
original plaintiffs.
5. The   High   has   decreed   the   suit   of   the   plaintiffs   by   the
impugned judgment and decree, while allowing the second appeal.
6. After hearing  learned counsel  for the  parties, it  is apparent
from the order of dismissal of the prior suit that it was dismissed
under   the   provisions   of   Order   IX   Rule   8   of   the   CPC   as   the   counsel
for   defendants   was   present   and   counsel   for   the   plaintiffs   was
absent.     In   view   of   the   provisions   contained   in   Order   IX   Rule   9
decree against plaintiffs by default bars fresh suit. Order IX Rule
9 is extracted hereunder:-
�9. Decree against plaintiff by default bars fresh 
suit
(1) Where a suit is wholly or partly dismissed un -
der   rule   8,   the   plaintiff   shall   be   precluded   from
bringing a fresh suit in respect of the same cause
of action. But he may apply for an order to set the
dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the Court that
there   was   sufficient   cause   for   his   non-appearance
when the suit was called on for hearing, the Court
shall   make   an   order   setting   aside   the   dismissal
upon   such   terms   as   to   costs   or   otherwise   as   it
thinks fit,  and shall  appoint a  day for  proceeding
with the suit.
(2)   No   order   shall   be   made   under   this   rule   unless
notice   of   the   application   has   been   served   on   the
opposite party.�
7. In   view   of   the   aforesaid,   High   Court   erred   in   law   in   holding
that the subsequent suit was based on different cause of action, as
such   it   was   maintainable.     The   impugned   judgment   and   order   is
patently illegal.  Thus, it is set aside and the suit is ordered to
be dismissed as it was not maintainable.   The purchaser is sailing
in   the   same   boat   as   that   of   the   original   plaintiffs,   he   cannot   be
said to be having better rights than the original plaintiffs.
8. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed.
2

9. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
...........................J.
[ARUN MISHRA]
...........................J.
[M.R. SHAH]
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 19, 2019.
3

ITEM NO.53               COURT NO.4               SECTION XII
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).  6330/2018
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  10-10-2017
in SAMD No. 51/2014 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Madras at Madurai)
MAYANDI                                            PETITIONER(S)
                                VERSUS
PANDARACHAMY & ANR.                                RESPONDENT(S)
(IA No. 33847/2018 - EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)
Date : 19-08-2019 These matters were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.R. SHAH
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Abhinav Ramkrishna, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Parijat Kishore, AOR
(Appearance slip not given)
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Leave granted.
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
(NARENDRA PRASAD)                        (JAGDISH CHANDER)
  COURT MASTER                                COURT MASTER 
(Signed order is placed on the file)

Friday, November 1, 2019

Cheque Bounce Case- non disputed his signature on cheque - eventhough the account was closed by the bank long back itself -and also even though the cheque was issued by the firm name - Acquital by trail cour was rightly set aside by the High court but reduced the sentence of fine double the amount from Rs.5 lakhs to 2.80 lakhs - along with costs. The appellant-accused had issued a cheque from the account of a firm named Synergy and Solution Incorporation of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Fifty Thousand) in order to refund the earnest money to the respondent-complainant. When the said cheque was presented for clearance by the respondentcomplainant the same was returned with the endorsement “Account Closed”. After issuing the legal Notice dated 23.08.2013, the respondent-complainant filed a complaint against the appellant under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.- the Trial Court acquitted - the appellant-accused on the ground that the cheque was issued from the account of a firm, namely, Synergy and Solution Incorporation and the said account was in the name of one Vipin Dhopte and not in the name of the appellant-accused. The Trial Court also pointed out that the said account was closed due to the negative balance on 11.03.2006. The High Court has pointed that the appellant has not disputed his signature on the said cheque presented for clearance and that there is nothing on record to show that the said Firm by name Synergy and Solution Incorporation was a firm or a company and that the account was maintained by one Vipin Dhopte. The High Court has also held that it is not the case of the appellant-accused that other entries in said cheque is not in his own handwriting. The High Court has held that the Trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in the right perspective and in the light of the provisions of Section 139 of the N.I. Act which create statutory presumption in favour of the holder of cheque and the burden is on the accused to rebut the statutory presumption. Observing that there is sufficient evidence on record to show that the said cheque was issued to discharge “legally enforceable debt”, the High Court has reversed the acquittal of the appellant-accused and convicted him under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and imposed fine amount of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) and also imposed costs of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand) on the appellant. Apex court - As pointed by the High Court in the statutory presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act, the appellant-accused has not satisfactorily rebutted the statutory presumption. In view of the above, we do not find any ground warranting interference with the conviction of the appellantaccused under Section 138 of N.I. Act. Insofar as the amount directed to be deposited, the High Court has directed the appellant to deposit Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) and also costs of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand) whereas the cheque amount is only Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Fifty Thousand). Though Section 138 of the N.I. Act enable the court to impose the higher amount than the cheque amount, however, considering the facts and circumstances of the case we are of the view that the amount of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) ordered to be deposited is on the higher side and the same has to be reduced to Rs.2,80,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Eighty Thousand) plus costs of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand). Ordered accordingly.

Cheque Bounce Case- non disputed his signature on cheque - eventhough the account was closed by the bank long back itself -and also even though the cheque was issued by the firm name - Acquital by trail cour was rightly set aside by the High court but reduced the sentence of fine double the amount from Rs.5 lakhs to 2.80 lakhs - along with costs.

The appellant-accused had issued a cheque from the account of a firm named Synergy and Solution Incorporation of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Fifty Thousand) in order to refund the
earnest money to the respondent-complainant. When the said cheque was presented for clearance by the respondentcomplainant the same was returned with the endorsement “Account Closed”. After issuing the legal Notice dated 23.08.2013, the respondent-complainant filed a complaint against the appellant under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.-

the Trial Court acquitted - the appellant-accused on the ground that the cheque was issued
from the account of a firm, namely, Synergy and Solution Incorporation and the said account was in the name of one Vipin Dhopte and not in the name of the appellant-accused. The Trial Court also pointed out that the said account was closed due to the negative balance on 11.03.2006.

The High Court has pointed that the appellant has not disputed his signature on the said cheque presented for clearance and that there is nothing on record to show that the
said Firm by name Synergy and Solution Incorporation was a firm or a company and that the account was maintained by one Vipin Dhopte.
The High Court has also held that it is not the case of the appellant-accused that other entries in said cheque is not in his own handwriting. The High Court has held that the Trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in the right perspective and in the light of the provisions of Section 139
of the N.I. Act which create statutory presumption in favour of the holder of cheque and the burden is on the accused to rebut the statutory presumption. 
Observing that there is sufficient evidence on record to show that the said cheque was issued to
discharge “legally enforceable debt”, the High Court has reversed the acquittal of the appellant-accused and convicted him under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and imposed fine amount of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) and also imposed costs of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand) on the appellant.
Apex court - As pointed by the High Court in the statutory presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act, the appellant-accused has not satisfactorily rebutted the statutory presumption. In view of the above, we do not find any ground warranting interference with the conviction of the appellantaccused under Section 138 of N.I. Act.
Insofar as the amount directed to be deposited, the High
Court has directed the appellant to deposit Rs.5,00,000/-
(Rupees Five Lakhs) and also costs of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees
Twenty Thousand) whereas the cheque amount is only
Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Fifty Thousand). Though
Section 138 of the N.I. Act enable the court to impose the
higher amount than the cheque amount, however, considering the
facts and circumstances of the case we are of the view that the
amount of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) ordered to be
deposited is on the higher side and the same has to be reduced
to Rs.2,80,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Eighty Thousand) plus costs
of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand). Ordered accordingly.


1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 1598 OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP(CRL.)No.10408 of 2018)
RAHUL SUDHAKAR ANANTWAR Appellant(s)
 VERSUS
SHIVKUMAR KANHIYALAL SHRIVASTAV Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
R. BANUMATHI, J.:
Leave granted.
(2) This appeal arises out of judgment and order 05.09.2018 in
Criminal Appeal NO.140 of 2017 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, in and by which the High
Court has reversed the acquittal of the appellant under Section
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and convicted him
under Section 138 of the said Act and imposed a fine of
Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) and also costs of Rs.20,000/-
(Rupees Twenty Thousand) total Rs.5,20,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs
Twenty Thousand)
(3) Brief facts while led to filing of this appeal by way of
special leave petition is as under. The appellant-accused and
the respondent-complainant entered into an Agreement of Sale
dated 28.02.2012 as per which the appellant-accused agreed to
sell the property, registered owner of which is the mother of
the appellant, in favour of the respondent-complainant. The
2
parties have agreed that the sale consideration of the said
property would be Rs.25,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Lakhs) and
the respondent-complainant has paid an advance of Rs.2,50,000/-
(Rupees Two Lakhs Fifty Thousand) under the said Agreement
dated 28.02.2012. Due to certain circumstances, the Agreement,
as agreed by the parties, could not be fructified. The
appellant-accused had issued a cheque from the account of a
firm named Synergy and Solution Incorporation of Rs.2,50,000/-
(Rupees Two Lakhs Fifty Thousand) in order to refund the
earnest money to the respondent-complainant. When the said
cheque was presented for clearance by the respondentcomplainant the same was returned with the endorsement “Account
Closed”. After issuing the legal Notice dated 23.08.2013, the
respondent-complainant filed a complaint against the appellant
under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
(4) Upon consideration of evidence, the Trial Court acquitted
the appellant-accused on the ground that the cheque was issued
from the account of a firm, namely, Synergy and Solution
Incorporation and the said account was in the name of one Vipin
Dhopte and not in the name of the appellant-accused. The Trial
Court also pointed out that the said account was closed due to
the negative balance on 11.03.2006. The Trial Court acquitted
the appellant-accused by observing that the complainant has
failed to prove the guilt of the accused under Section 138 of
the N.I. Act beyond reasonable doubt and that the appellant has
nothing to do with the cheque issued on the account of the firm
named Synergy and Solution Incorporation.
3
(5) Challenging the order of acquittal of the Trial Court, the
respondent-complainant has filed an appeal before the High
Court. The High Court has pointed that the appellant has not
disputed his signature on the said cheque presented for
clearance and that there is nothing on record to show that the
said Firm by name Synergy and Solution Incorporation was a firm
or a company and that the account was maintained by one Vipin
Dhopte. The High Court has also held that it is not the case
of the appellant-accused that other entries in said cheque is
not in his own handwriting. The High Court has held that the
Trial Court has not appreciated the evidence in the right
perspective and in the light of the provisions of Section 139
of the N.I. Act which create statutory presumption in favour of
the holder of cheque and the burden is on the accused to rebut
the statutory presumption. Observing that there is sufficient
evidence on record to show that the said cheque was issued to
discharge “legally enforceable debt”, the High Court has
reversed the acquittal of the appellant-accused and convicted
him under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and imposed fine amount
of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) and also imposed costs of
Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand) on the appellant.
(6) We have heard Mr. G.L. Bajaj, learned counsel appearing
for the appellant-accused and Mr. Sudheer Voditel, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent-complainant and also
perused the impugned judgment and the evidence/materials on
record.
4
(7) Admittedly, the parties had entered into an Agreement of
Sale dated 28.02.2012. It is also an admitted fact that the
respondent-complainant had paid Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs
Fifty Thousand) as an advance/earnest money to the appellantaccused as per the terms of the Agreement. As pointed out by
the High Court, the appellant-accused has not disputed his
signature on the said cheque presented for clearance.
Contention of the appellant that the cheque issued in the name
of the Firm, named, Synergy and Solution Incorporation was
removed from his office table is not convincing nor the same is
supported by any evidence. As pointed by the High Court in the
statutory presumption under Section 139 of N.I. Act, the
appellant-accused has not satisfactorily rebutted the statutory
presumption. In view of the above, we do not find any ground
warranting interference with the conviction of the appellantaccused under Section 138 of N.I. Act.
(8) Insofar as the amount directed to be deposited, the High
Court has directed the appellant to deposit Rs.5,00,000/-
(Rupees Five Lakhs) and also costs of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees
Twenty Thousand) whereas the cheque amount is only
Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Fifty Thousand). Though
Section 138 of the N.I. Act enable the court to impose the
higher amount than the cheque amount, however, considering the
facts and circumstances of the case we are of the view that the
amount of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) ordered to be
deposited is on the higher side and the same has to be reduced
to Rs.2,80,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Eighty Thousand) plus costs
5
of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand). Ordered accordingly.
Mr. Sudheer Voditel, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-complainant, has submitted that the respondentcomplainant has already received Rs.2,50,000/- plus Rs.20,000/-
(towards costs). An amount of Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty
Thousand) be disbursed to the respondent-complainant and the
balance amount of Rs.2,20,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs Twenty
Thousand) be returned to the appellant-accused along with the
accrued interest, if any.
(9) The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
..........................J.
 (R. BANUMATHI)
..........................J.
 (HRISHIKESH ROY)
NEW DELHI,
OCTOBER 21, 2019.

Whether the provisions of Section 125-A of theR.P. 1951 Act would be applicable in the present case, as claimed by the appellant – complainant, to make the first respondent liable in law ? criminal complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nagpur for registration of a case against the first respondent under Section 125-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 - The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nagpur by order dated 7th September, 2015 dismissed the complaint. - In Revision, the learned Sessions Judge, Nagpur remanded the matter to the learned trial Court for a de novo consideration.- Section 125-A of the 1951 Act [Inserted by Section 5 of the Representation of the People (Third Amendment) Act, 2002’ (Act 72 of 2002)] reads as under: “Section 125-A. Penalty for filing false affidavit, etc.- A candidate who himself or through his proposer, with intent to be elected in an election,— (i) fails to furnish information relating to sub-section (1) of section 33-A; or (ii) gives false information which he knows or has reason to believe to be false; or (iii) conceals any information, in his nomination paper delivered under subsection (1) of section 33 or in his affidavit which is required to be delivered under sub-section (2) of section 33-A, as the case may be, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both” The above can leave no element of doubt that, subsequent to the substitution of Form 26 in 2012, the new Form 26 (as in vogue at the time of the elections in 2014), mandates the disclosure of information by the contesting candidate of not only case(s) in which charges have been framed but also case(s) in which cognizance has been taken by the Court.- In the light of the view that we have taken and in view of the clear averment made in the complaint to the effect that the First Respondent had knowledge of the two cases against him which had not been mentioned in the affidavit filed by the First Respondent alongwith his nomination papers, we unhesitatingly arrive at the conclusion that the order of the learned trial Court upheld by the High Court by the impugned judgment and order dated 3rd May, 2018 is legally not tenable and the same deserves to be set aside which we hereby do. The complaint of the appellant will be considered afresh by the learned trial Court from the stage where it was interdicted by the order dated.

 Whether the provisions of Section 125-A of theR.P. 1951 Act would be applicable in the present case, as claimed by the appellant – complainant, to make the first respondent liable in law ?

criminal complaint before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nagpur for registration
of a case against the first respondent under Section 125-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 - The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nagpur by order dated 7th September, 2015 dismissed the complaint. - In Revision, the learned Sessions Judge, Nagpur remanded the matter to the learned trial Court for a de novo consideration.- Section 125-A of the 1951 Act [Inserted by Section 5 of the Representation of the People (Third Amendment) Act, 2002’ (Act 72 of 2002)] reads as under:
“Section 125-A. Penalty for filing false affidavit,
etc.- A candidate who himself or through his
proposer, with intent to be elected in an
election,—
(i) fails to furnish information relating to
sub-section (1) of section 33-A; or
(ii) gives false information which he knows
or has reason to believe to be false; or
(iii) conceals any information,
in his nomination paper delivered under subsection (1) of section 33 or in his affidavit which
is required to be delivered under sub-section (2)
of section 33-A, as the case may be, shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to six months, or with fine, or with
both”
The above can leave no element of doubt that, subsequent to the substitution of Form 26 in 2012, the new Form 26 (as in vogue at the time of the elections in 2014), mandates the disclosure of information by the contesting candidate of not only case(s) in which charges have been framed but also case(s) in which cognizance has been taken by the Court.-

In the light of the view that we have taken and in view of the clear averment made in the complaint to the effect that the First Respondent had knowledge of the two cases against him
which had not been mentioned in the affidavit filed by the First Respondent alongwith his nomination papers, we unhesitatingly arrive at the conclusion that the order of the learned trial Court upheld by the High Court by the impugned judgment and order dated 3rd May, 2018 is legally not tenable and the same deserves to be set aside which we hereby do. The complaint of the appellant will be considered afresh by the learned trial Court from the stage where it was interdicted by the order dated.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1515-1516 OF 2019
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos. 19-20 of 2019]
SATISH UKEY APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
DEVENDRA GANGADHARRAO FADNAVIS
AND ANR. RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
RANJAN GOGOI, CJI
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant– Satish Ukey is a practicing Advocate of
the Bombay High Court. The first respondent is an elected
member of the Maharashtra State Legislative Assembly and is
presently holding the post of Chief Minister of the State of
Maharashtra.
2
3. The appellant had filed a criminal complaint before the
learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nagpur for registration
of a case against the first respondent under Section 125-A of the
Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as
“the 1951 Act”). The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Nagpur by order dated 7th September, 2015 dismissed the
complaint. In Revision, the learned Sessions Judge, Nagpur
remanded the matter to the learned trial Court for a de novo
consideration. Aggrieved, the first respondent moved the High
Court and the High Court having set aside the order of the
learned Sessions Judge by its judgment and order dated 3rd May,
2018, the present appeals have been filed.
4. The complaint filed by the appellant contains an
allegation that in the affidavit in Form-26, prescribed by the
Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the
1961 Rules”), which had accompanied the nomination papers of
the first respondent details of two cases in which cognizance was
taken i.e. (i) Summary Case No.231 of 1996 (under Section 500
of IPC) before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nagpur; and (ii)
Regular Criminal Case No.343 of 2003 (Old No.125 of 1998)
3
(under Sections 468, 471, 218, 467, 420 and 34 of IPC) before
the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Nagpur have not
been mentioned by the first respondent despite knowledge of the
same. Consequently, according to the appellant – complainant,
an infraction of the provisions of Section 125-A has been
committed for which the first respondent is liable to be
prosecuted in a court of competent jurisdiction.
On the very same allegations the appellant had challenged
the election of the first respondent before the High Court by
instituting Election Petition No.1 of 2014 which has been
dismissed by the High Court by its order dated 19th August,
2015.
5. To determine the correctness of the stand taken by the
appellant - complainant and the legality of the impugned order
of the High Court holding that the complaint is liable to be
dismissed, the Court would be required to consider the
provisions of Sections 33-A and 125-A of the 1951 Act, Rule 4A
of the 1961 Rules read with Form-26 prescribed under the said
Rules. Several letters of the Election Commission of India to the
4
Chief Electoral Officers of all the States and the Union Territories
issued in this regard would also require a close look.
6. Before setting out the relevant provisions of the law
enumerated above, a brief prologue on the judicial precedents
that had led to the insertion of Sections 33-A and 125-A in the
1951 Act and the provisions of Rule 4-A of the 1961 Rules read
with Form-26 is considered necessary.
7. In Union of India (UOI) and Ors. v. Association for
Democratic Reforms and Ors.1 this Court while examining the
issue of the Voters right to know relevant particulars of the
contesting candidates before they are called upon to cast their
votes had made the following observations :
“22. For health of democracy and fair election,
whether the disclosure of assets by a candidate,
his/her qualification and particulars regarding
involvement in criminal cases are necessary for
informing voters, may be illiterate, so that they can
decide intelligently, whom to vote? In our opinion,
the decision of even illiterate voter, if properly
educated and informed about the contesting
candidate, would be based on his own relevant
1
 (2002) 5 SCC 294
5
criteria of selecting a candidate. In democracy,
periodical elections are conducted for having
efficient governance for the country and for the
benefit of citizens -- voters. In a democratic form of
government, voters are of utmost importance. They
have right to elect or re-elect on the basis of the
antecedents and past performance of the
candidate. He has choice of deciding whether
holding of educational qualification or holding of
property is relevant for electing or re-electing a
person to be his representative. Voter has to decide
whether he should cast vote in favour of a
candidate who is involved in criminal case. For
maintaining purity of elections and healthy
democracy, voters are required to be educated and
well informed about the contesting candidates.
Such information would include assets held by the
candidate, his qualification including educational
qualification and antecedents of his life including
whether he was involved in a criminal case and if
the case is decided--its result, if pending-- whether
charge is framed or cognizance is taken by the
Court? There is no necessity of suppressing the
relevant facts from the voters.
[underlining is ours]”
Further, this Court issued the following directions to the Election
Commission (para 48, pg. 322):
“48. The Election Commission is directed to call
for information on affidavit by issuing necessary
order in exercise of its power under Article 324 of
the Constitution of India from each candidate
seeking election to Parliament or a State
Legislature as a necessary part of his nomination
paper, furnishing therein, information on the
6
following aspects in relation to his/her
candidature:-
(1) Whether the candidate is convicted/acquitted/
discharged of any criminal offence in the past-if
any, whether he is punished with imprisonment
or fine?
(2) Prior to six months of filing of nomination,
whether the candidate is accused in any pending
case, of any offence punishable with
imprisonment for two years or more, and in which
charge is framed or cognizance is taken by the
Court of law. If so, the details thereof.
[underlining is ours]”
8. Consequent to the above and the directions issued in
Association for Democratic Reforms (Supra), Section 33-A was
inserted into the 1951 Act vide the ‘Representation of the People
(Third Amendment) Act, 2002’ (Section 2 of the Act 72 of 2002).
9. The new Section 33-A, which is the bone of contention
in the present case, deals with the ‘Right to Information’ and
reads as under:
“33A. Right to information.—(1) A candidate
shall, apart from any information which he is
required to furnish, under this Act or the rules
made thereunder, in his nomination paper
delivered under sub-section (1) of section 33,
also furnish the information as to whether –
7
(i) he is accused of any offence punishable with
imprisonment for two years or more in a pending
case in which a charge has been framed by the
court of competent jurisdiction;
(ii) he has been convicted of an offence other
than any offence referred to in sub-section (1) or
sub-section(2), or covered in sub-section (3), of
section 8 and sentenced to imprisonment for one
year or more.
(2) The candidate or his proposer, as the case
may be, shall, at the time of delivering to the
returning officer the nomination paper under
sub-section (1) of section 33, also deliver to him
an affidavit sworn by the candidate in a
prescribed form verifying the information
specified in sub-section (1).
(3) The returning officer shall, as soon as may be
after the furnishing of information to him under
sub-section (1),display the aforesaid information
by affixing a copy of the affidavit, delivered under
sub-section (2), at a conspicuous place at his
office for the information of the electors relating
to a constituency for which the nomination
paper is delivered.
[underlining is ours]”
It is pertinent to note here that Section 33-A(1), as worded and
drafted, required furnishing of the information of cases where (i)
the person filing the nomination has been convicted; and (ii)
where charges have been framed against the person filing the
nomination but excluded cases where cognizance had been
8
taken. This was despite the order of this Court, noticed above,
to the effect that details of case(s) of which cognizance has been
taken should also be furnished.
10. The aforesaid discrepancy was addressed by this
Court, in the case of People's Union for civil Liberties (PUCL)
and Ors. v. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.
2
In the said case, this
Court had examined the import of Sections 33-A and 33-B3 of the
1951 Act [as inserted in the 1951 Act through the amendment in
2002 (Supra)] vis-à-vis the directions issued by this Court in the
case of Association for Democratic Reforms (Supra) and held
as under (opinion of M.B. Shah, J. is quoted. The opinion of P.
Venkatarama Reddi and D.M. Dharmadhikari, JJ. on the point
is one of concurrence):
“114. I shall now discuss the specifics of the
problem. With a view to promote the right to
information, this Court gave certain directives
2
(2003) 4 SCC 399
3Section 33-B was also added through the 2002 Amendment. It stated that
notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment of any Court, or any instruction
issued by the Election Commission, no candidate shall be liable to disclose
information not required by the Act or rules made thereunder.
Section 33-B was declared unconstitutional in People’s Union of Civil Liberties v.
Union of India and Ors. ((2003) 4 SCC 399) as violating the fundamental right of
citizens to know the antecedents of candidates contesting in the elections, which
right was held to be an essential facet of freedom of speech and expression
enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution which could only be validly
limited through the restrictions conforming with Article. 19(2) of the Constitution
of India.
9
to the Election Commission which, as I have
already clarified, were ad hoc in nature. The
Election Commission was directed to call for
details from the contesting candidates broadly
on three points, namely, (i) criminal record, (ii)
assets and liabilities, and (iii) educational
qualification. The Third Amendment to the RP
Act which was preceded by an ordinance
provided for disclosure of information. How far
the Third Amendment to the Representation of
the People Act, 2002 safeguards the right of
information which is a part of the guaranteed
right under Article 19(1)(a), is the question to be
considered now with specific reference to each
of the three points spelt out in the judgment of
this Court in Assn. for Democratic Reforms
case.
115. As regards the first aspect, namely,
criminal record, the directives in Assn. for
Democratic Reforms case are twofold: (SCC p.
322, para 48)
“(1) Whether the candidate is
convicted/acquitted/discharged of any
criminal offence in the past — if any, whether
he is punished with imprisonment or fine.
(2) Prior to six months of filing of
nomination, whether the candidate is an
accused in any pending case, of any offence
punishable with imprisonment for two years
or more, and in which charge is framed or
cognizance is taken by the court of law.”
As regards the second directive, Parliament has
substantially proceeded on the same lines and
made it obligatory for the candidate to furnish
information as to whether he is accused of any
offence punishable with imprisonment for two
years or more in a pending case in which a
10
charge has been framed by the competent court.
However, the case in which cognizance has been
taken but charge has not been framed is not
covered by clause (i) of Section 33-A(I).
Parliament having taken the right step of
compelling disclosure of the pendency of cases
relating to major offences, there is no good
reason why it failed to provide for the disclosure
of the cases of the same nature of which
cognizance has been taken by the Court. It is
common knowledge that on account of a variety
of reasons such as the delaying tactics of one or
the other accused and inadequacies of the
prosecuting machinery, framing of formal
charges gets delayed considerably, especially in
serious cases where committal procedure has to
be gone through. On that account, the
voter/citizen shall not be denied information
regarding cognizance taken by the Court of an
offence punishable with imprisonment for two
years or more. The citizen's right to information,
when once it is recognized to be part of the
fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a), cannot
be truncated in the manner in which it has been
done. Clause (i) of Section 33-A(I) therefore falls
short of the avowed goal to effectuate the right
of information on a vital aspect. Cases in which
cognizance has been taken should therefore be
comprehended within the area of information
accessible to the voters/citizens, in addition to
what is provided for in clause (i) of Section 33-
A.
[underlining is ours]”
Further, the Court held:
“123. Finally, the summary of my conclusions:
(1) …..
11
(2) ….
(3) The directives given by this Court in Union of
India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms were
intended to operate only till the law was made by
the legislature and in that sense “pro tempore” in
nature. Once legislation is made, the Court has to
make an independent assessment in order to
evaluate whether the items of information
statutorily ordained are reasonably adequate to
secure the right of information available to the
voter/citizen. In embarking on this exercise, the
points of disclosure indicated by this Court, even
if they be tentative or ad hoc in nature, should be
given due weight and substantial departure
therefrom cannot be countenanced.

(6) The right to information provided for by
Parliament under Section 33-A in regard to the
pending criminal cases and past involvement in
such cases is reasonably adequate to safeguard
the right to information vested in the voter/citizen.
However, there is no good reason for excluding the
pending cases in which cognizance has been taken
by the Court from the ambit of disclosure.
[underlining is ours]”
Eventually, the following direction was issued by the Court
to the Election Commission of India:
“123 (9) The Election Commission has to issue
revised instructions to ensure implementation
12
of Section 33-A subject to what is laid down in
this judgment regarding the cases in which
cognizance has been taken….”
11. Section 125-A of the 1951 Act [Inserted by Section 5
of the Representation of the People (Third Amendment) Act, 2002’
(Act 72 of 2002)] reads as under:
“Section 125-A. Penalty for filing false affidavit,
etc.- A candidate who himself or through his
proposer, with intent to be elected in an
election,—
(i) fails to furnish information relating to
sub-section (1) of section 33-A; or
(ii) gives false information which he knows
or has reason to believe to be false; or
(iii) conceals any information,
in his nomination paper delivered under subsection (1) of section 33 or in his affidavit which
is required to be delivered under sub-section (2)
of section 33-A, as the case may be, shall,
notwithstanding anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to six months, or with fine, or with
both”
12. Whether the provisions of Section 125-A of the 1951
Act would be applicable in the present case, as claimed by the
appellant – complainant, to make the first respondent liable in 
13
law, would require the Court to decide on the true meaning and
purport of the following phrases found in Section 125-A of the
1951 Act.
(a) fails to furnish information relating to sub-section (1)
of Section 33-A;
(b) conceals any information;
(c) in his nomination paper delivered under sub-section
(1) of section 33 or in his affidavit which is required to
be delivered under sub-section (2) of section 33-A.
13. To find out the true meaning and purport of the
aforesaid phrases, the crucial question that has to be answered
is whether the word ‘information’ as mentioned in Section 33-A
of the 1951 Act means only such information as mentioned in
clause (i) and (ii) of Section 33-A(1) or whether along with the said
information a candidate is also required to furnish such other
information as required under the Act or the Rules made
thereunder. The consequential question that would arise is
whether in the affidavit required to be filed under sub-section (2)
of Section 33-A information is to be given as required in terms of
14
the affidavit which is prescribed by Form-26 of the 1961 Rules or
such information is confined to what is required to be submitted
under Section 33-A (1) (i) and (ii). It is at this stage that Rule 4-
A of the 1961 Rules would require to be noticed. Rule 4-A which
was inserted by S.O.935(E), dated 3.9.2002 with effect from
3.9.2002 is in the following terms.
“4-A. Form of affidavit to be filed at the time
of delivering nomination paper.— The
candidate or his proposer, as the case may be,
shall, at the time of delivering to the returning
officer the nomination paper under sub-section
(1) of Section 33 of the Act, also deliver to him
an affidavit sworn by the candidate before a
Magistrate of the first class or a Notary in Form
26.”
14. Form 26 is the prescribed form of affidavit to be filed
by a candidate along with his nomination papers as required
under Section 33-A (2) of the 1951 Act. The said affidavit in the
prescribed form reads as hereunder:
" [FORM 26
(See Rule 4-A)
Please affix your recent
passport size photograph
here
15
Affidavit to be filed by the candidate along with nomination paper before the returning officer for
election to ………………………… .(name of the House) from……………………………constituency (Name
of the constituency)
PART A
I ……………………………………., **son/daughter/wife of…………………………………………
Aged…………………………..years, resident of ………………………………………………… (mention full
postal address), a candidate at the above election, do hereby solemnly affirm and state on oath as
under—
(1) I am a candidate set up by……………………….(**name of the political party)/**am contesting
as an Independent candidate.
(**Strike out whichever is not applicable)
(2) My name is enrolled in ………………………………………….(Name of the constituency and the
State), at Serial No. …………………in Part No. ……………….
[(3) My contact telephone number(s) is/are………………………… and my E-mail ID (if any) is
……………………..
[(4) Details of Permanent Account Number (PAN) and status of filing of income tax return:
Sl.
No.
Names PAN The financial year for
which the last
income-tax return
has been filed.
Total income shown in income tax return (in
Rupees)
1. Self
2 Spouse
3. Dependent-1
4. Dependent-2
5. Dependent-3
5. I am/am not accused of any offence(s) punishable with imprisonment for two years or more in a
pending case(s) in which a charge(s) has/have been framed by the court(s) of competent jurisdiction.
If the deponent is accused of any such offence(s) he shall furnish the following information-
(i) The following case(s) is/are pending against me in which charges have been framed by the court
for an offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more-
(a) Case/First Information Report No./Nos.
together with complete details of
concerned Police Station/District/State
(b) Section(s) of the concerned Act(s) and
short description of the offence(s) for
which charged
(c) Name of the Court, Case No. and date of
Order taking cognizance:
(d) Court(s) which framed the charge(s)
(e) Date(s) on which the charge(s) was/were
framed
(f) Whether all or any of the proceeding(s)
have been stayed by any Court(s) of
competent jurisdiction
(ii) The following case(s) is/are pending against me in which cognizance has been taken by the
Court(other than the cases mentioned in item (i) above.
(a) Name of the Court, Case No. and date of
order taking cognizance:
16
(b) The details of cases where the Court has
taken cognizance, section (s) of the Act(s)
and description of the offence(s) for which
cognizance taken
(c) Details of Appeal(s)/Application(s) for
revision (if any) filed against the above
order(s)
(6) I have been/have not been convicted of an offences(s) other than any offence(s) referred to in
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), or covered in sub-section (3), of Section 8 of the Representation of
the People Act, 1951 (43 of 1951) and sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more.
If the deponent is convicted and punished as aforesaid, he shall furnish the following information:
In the following cases, I have been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by a court of
law:-
(a) The details of cases, Section(s) of the
concerned Act (s) and description of the
offence(s) for which convicted.
(b) Name of the court(s), Case No. and date(s)
of order(s)
(c) Punishment imposed.
(d) Whether any appeal was/has been filed
against the conviction order. If so, details
and the present status of the appeal.
(7) That I give hereinbelow the details of the assets (movable and immovable etc.) of myself, my
spouse and all dependents:
A. Details of movable assets:
Note:1. Assets in joint name indicating the extent of joint ownership will also have to be given
Note:2. In case of deposit/investment, the details including serial number, amount, date of deposit,
the scheme, name of the Bank/Institution and Branch are to be given.
Note:3. Value of Bonds/Share Debentures as per current market value in Stock exchange in respect
of listed companies and as per books in case of non-listed companies should be given.
Note:4. Dependent here has the same meaning as assigned in Explanation (v) under Section 75-A of
the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
Note:5: Details including amount is to be given separately in respect of each investment.
Sl. No. Description SelfSpouse Dependent1
Dependent2
Dependent3
(i) Cash in hand
(ii) Details of deposit in Bank accounts (FDRs,
Term Deposits and all other types of
deposits including saving accounts),
Deposits with Financial Institutions, NonBanking Financial Companies and
Cooperative societies and the amount in
each such deposit
(iii) Details of investment in Bonds,
debentures/shares and units in
companies/Mutual funds and others and
the amount
17
(iv) Details of investment in NSS, Postal
Saving, Insurance policies and investment
in any Financial instruments in Post Office
or Insurance Company and the amount
(v) Personal loans/advance given to any
person or entity including firm, company,
Trust etc., and other receivables from
debtors and the amount
(vi) Motor Vehicles/Aircrafts/Yachts/Ships
(Details of Make, registration number etc.
year of purchase and amount)
(vii) Jewellery, bullion and valuable thing(s)
(give details of weight and value)
(viii) Any other assets such as value of
claims/interest
(ix) Gross Total Value
B. Details of Immovable Assets:
Note: 1. Properties in joint ownership indicating the extent of joint ownership will also have to be
indicated.
Note: 2. Each land or building or apartment should be mentioned separately in this format.
Sl.
No.
Description SelfSpouse Dependent1
Dependent2
Dependent3
(i) Agricultural Land Location(s)
Survey number(s)
Area (total measurement in acres)
Whether inherited property (Yes or No)
Date of Purchase in case of selfacquired property
Cost of Land (in case of purchase) at the
time of purchase
Any investment on the land by way of
development, construction etc.
Approximate current market value
(ii) Non-Agricultural Land:
Location(s)
Survey number(s)
Area (total measurement in sq. ft.)
Whether inherited property (Yes or No)
Date of Purchase in case of selfacquired property
Cost of Land (in case of purchase) at the
time of purchase
Any investment on the land by way of
development, construction etc.
Approximate current market value
(iii) Commercial Buildings (including
apartments)
—Location(s)
—Survey number(s)
18
Area (total measurement in sq.ft.)
Built-up Area (total measurement in
sq.ft.)
Whether inherited property (Yes or No)
Date of purchase in case of selfacquired property
Cost of property (in case of purchase) at
the time of purchase
Any investment on the property by way
of development, construction etc.
Approximate current market value
(iv) Residential Buildings (including
apartments):
—Location(s)
—Survey number(s)
Area (total measurement in sq.ft.)
Built-up area (total measurement in
sq.ft.)
Whether inherited property (Yes or No)
Date of purchase in case of selfacquired property
Cost of property (in case of purchase) at
the time of purchase
Any investment on the land by way of
development, construction etc.
Appropriate current market value
(v) Others (such as interest in property)
(vi) Total of current market value of (i) to (v)
above
(8) I give herein below the details of liabilities/dues to public financial institutions and
government—
(Note.—Please give separate details of name of bank, institutions, entity or individual and amount
before each item)
Sl.
No.
Description Self Spouse Dependent1
Dependent2
Dependent3
(i) Loan or dues to Bank/financial institution(s)
Name of the Bank or financial institution,
Amount outstanding, Nature of Loan
Loan or dues to any other individuals/entity
other than mentioned above Name(s),
Amount outstanding, nature of loan
Any other liability
Grand total of liabilities
(ii) Government Dues
Dues to departments dealing with
government accommodation
Dues to department dealing with supply of
water
Dues to department dealing with supply of
electricity
Dues to department dealing with supply of
telephones/mobiles
19
Dues to department dealing with
government transport (including aircrafts
and helicopters)
Income Tax dues
Wealth tax dues
Service tax dues
Municipal/Property tax dues
Sales tax dues
Any other dues
(iii) Grand total of all Government dues
(iv) Whether any other liabilities are in dispute,
if so, mention the amount involved and the
authority before which it is pending
(9) Details of profession or occupation:
(a) Self ………………………………………………………………….
(b) Spouse ……………………………………………………………..
(10) My educational qualification is as under—
……………………………………………………………………………………..
(Give details of highest School/University education mentioning the full form of the
certificate/diploma/degree course, name of the School/College/University and the year in which the
course was completed.)
PART B
(11) Abstract of the details given in (1) to (10) of Part A:
1. Name of the candidate Sh./Smt./Kum.
2. Full postal address
3. Number and name of the constituency and State
4. Name of the political party which set up the candidate
(otherwise write ‘Independent’)
5. (I) Total number of pending cases where charges have
been framed by the court for offences punishable with
imprisonment for two years or more
(ii) Total number of pending cases where the court(s)
have taken cognizance (other than the cases
mentioned in item (i) above
6. Total number of cases in which convicted and
sentenced to imprisonment for one year or more
except for offences referred to in sub-sections(1), (2) or
(3) of Section 8 of Representation of the People Act,
1951.
7. PAN of Year for which
last income
tax return
filed
Total income shown
(a) Candidate
(b) Spouse
(d) Dependents]
8. [Details of Assets and Liabilities in rupees]
Description Self Spouse Dependent-I DependentII
DependentIII
A. Movable Assets (Total Value)
B Immovable Asset
20
I. Purchase Price of self-acquired
immovable property
II. Development/Construction cost of
immovable property after purchase (if
applicable)
III. Approximate Current market price of—
(a) self-acquired assets (Total Value)
(b) inherited assets (Total Value)
9. Liabilities
(i) Government dues (Total)
(ii) Loans from Bank, Financial Institutions
and others (Total)
10. Liabilities that are under dispute
(i) Government dues (Total)
(ii) Loans from Bank, Financial Institutions
and others (Total)
11. Highest educational qualification:
(Give details of highest School/University education mentioning the full form of the
certificate/diploma/degree course, name of the School/College/University and the year in
which the course was completed.)
VERIFICATION
I, the deponent, abovenamed, do hereby verify and declare that the contents of this affidavit are
true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and no part of it is false and nothing material
has been concealed therefrom. I further declare that—
(a) there is no case of conviction or pending case against me other than those mentioned in
Items 5 and 6 of Part A and B above;
(b) I, my spouse, or my dependents do not have any asset or liability, other than those
mentioned in Items 7 and 8 of Part A and Items 8, 9 and 10 of Part B above.
Verified at…………………………this the…………………day of………………………………………
DEPONENT
Note: 1. Affidavit should be filed latest by 3.00 PM on the last day of filing nominations.
Note: 2. Affidavit should be sworn before an Oath Commissioner or Magistrate of the First Class or before
a Notary Public.
Note: 3. All column should be filled up and no column to be left blank. If there is no information to
furnish in respect of any item, either “Nil” or “Not applicable”, as the case may be, should be
mentioned.
Note: 4. The Affidavit should be either typed or written legibly and neatly.”
15. It may be noticed here that Form-26 was substituted
by S.O. 1732 (E) dated 1.8.2012 with effect from 1.8.2012.
16. A bare perusal of Form-26 makes it abundantly clear
that, for offences punishable with imprisonment for two years or
21
more, while entry (5) (i) mandates disclosure of information by
the contesting candidate regarding the case(s) that is/are
pending against him in which charges have been framed by the
Court; entry (5)(ii) mandates disclosure of information by the
contesting candidate regarding cases that are pending against
him in which cognizance has been taken by the Court.
Entry 5(ii) specifically mentions that the candidate is
required to provide information of the case(s) pending in which
cognizance has been taken. This is in addition to the information
he is required to provide against the column in Entry 5(i) as the
words ‘Other than the cases mentioned in item (i) above’ are
specifically used in Entry 5 (ii).
17. The above can leave no element of doubt that,
subsequent to the substitution of Form 26 in 2012, the new Form
26 (as in vogue at the time of the elections in 2014), mandates
the disclosure of information by the contesting candidate of not
only case(s) in which charges have been framed but also case(s)
in which cognizance has been taken by the Court.
22
18. The position is made further clear by the letters
written by the Election Commission of India to the Chief Electoral
Officer of all the States and the Union Territories. A reading of
the said letters would go to show that a contesting candidate is
mandated to furnish information concerning the cases in which
a Competent Court has taken cognizance along with the cases in
which charges have been framed. The said letters also make it
clear that the affidavit mentioned in Section 33-A(2) of the 1951
Act is prescribed in Form-26 and that any false declaration or
concealment of information in the said affidavit will attract the
provisions of Section 125-A of the 1951 Act. The letters in this
regard are dated 24.8.2012, 26.9.2012 and 26.4.2014, relevant
portions of which are extracted below:
(i) Letter dt. 24-08-2012:
“1. Sub:- Affidavit to be filed by candidates with
their nomination paper-modification of formatregarding.
The candidates at elections to the Parliament
and the State Legislatures hitherto were
required to file two affidavits: one, in Form-26
appended to Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961
23
and the other, in the Form prescribed by the
Commission, vide its Order No. 3/ER/2003 dt.
27-03-2003, as subsequently modified by the
letter of even number dt. 25-02-2011. In the
affidavits, the candidates are required to declare
information about their criminal background, if
any, assets, liabilities and educational
qualifications.
2. On a proposal moved by the Commission
for amalgamating the two affidavits into one
format, the Govt. has amended Form 26 so as
to include in it all the information that was
sought in the two separate affidavits. The
Ministry of Law and Justice have notified the
revised format 26 in the Gazette of India on 01-
08-2012. A copy of the said notification dated
1st August, 2012 is enclosed herewith.
3. In view of the amendment to Form-26, all
candidates shall, hereafter, file only one
affidavit in the revised Form 26 notified on 01-
08-2012 (at elections to the Parliament and
State Legislatures). The requirements to be
followed while filing the affidavit have been
mentioned in the notes given at the end of the
format…..
...
5. You are requested to furnish a copy of this
letter along with the copy of the enclosed
notification to every political party (including
registered unrecognized parties) having
headquarters in your State/UT, including the
State Units of recognized National and State
political parties.”[Emphasis is ours].”
(ii). Letter dt. 26-09-2012:
24
“Sub: Affidavit to be filed by the candidates
with their nomination paper-regarding:

2. Item 5 of Part A and Part B of the revised
Form 26 relates to information regarding
criminal antecedentsto be furnished by the
candidates. It is clarified that in item (5)(ii) of
the said Part A & Part B of Form-26, the details
of all pending cases in which cognizance has
been taken by the Court, irrespective of the
quantum of punishment or framing of charges
will have to be disclosed by the candidate. This
may be brought to the notice of all candidates
when they file their nomination at all future
general/bye-elections in the State…”
(iii) Letter dt. 26-04-2014:
“Sub: Filing of false affidavit in Form-26.reg.
Sir/Madam,
You are aware that the format of affidavit in
Form-26 appended to the Conduct of Election
Rules, 1961, was amended with effect from 01-
08-2012. Now the candidates are required to
make declarations about assets and liabilities
including that of spouse and dependants,
candidate’s criminal antecedents and
educational qualifications, in the affidavit in
Form 26. The concealing of information in the
affidavit in Form 26 will attract the provisions of
Section 125A. Under Section 125A, furnishing
of any false information or concealing of
information in the affidavit in Form 26 is an
electoral offence punishable with imprisonment
upto six months, or with fine or both.
25
2. Prior to amendment to Form 26 in August
2012, the affidavit regarding declaration about
assets, liabilities, criminal antecedents and
educational qualification was given in the
format prescribed by the Commission. In the
case of complaints about false statement in the
said affidavit, the Commission, vide its circular
letter No. 3/ER/2004, dated 2/6/2004, had
clarified that if complaints were filed before the
Returning Officer raising the issue of false
declaration in the affidavit and if the RO was
prima facie satisfied about the merits of the
complaint, then the RO was to file a complaint
before the competent Court under Section 177
of IPC read with Section 195 of Cr.P.C.
3. Now that the affidavit is in Form 26 under
Section 33A of the R.P. Act, 1951, making false
declaration/concealing of information in the
affidavit would be covered under Section 125A
of the Act. Under Section 125A, there is no
stipulation that complaints under the Section
have to be made by the public servant
concerned (in this case the R.O.). Therefore, it
would be open to any aggrieved person to move
petition before the appropriate Court of
competent jurisdiction with petition for action
under Section 125A in the case of any false
declaration or concealing of information in the
affidavit in Form 26.
[underlining is ours]”
19. A cumulative reading of Section 33-A of the 1951 Act
and Rule 4-A of the 1961 Rules and Form-26 along with the
letters dated 24.8.2012, 26.9.2012 and 26.4.2014, in our
26
considered view, make it amply clear that the information to be
furnished under Section 33-A of the 1951 Act includes not only
information mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 33-A(1),
but also information, that the candidate is required to furnish,
under the Act or the Rules made thereunder and such
information should be furnished in Form 26, which includes
information concerning cases in which a competent Court has
taken cognizance (Entry 5(ii) of Form 26). This is apart from and
in addition to cases in which charges have been framed for an
offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more or
cases in which conviction has been recorded and sentence of
imprisonment for a period of one year or more has been imposed
(Entries 5(i) and 6 of Form 26 respectively).
20. In the light of the view that we have taken and in view
of the clear averment made in the complaint to the effect that the
First Respondent had knowledge of the two cases against him
which had not been mentioned in the affidavit filed by the First
Respondent alongwith his nomination papers, we unhesitatingly
arrive at the conclusion that the order of the learned trial Court 
27
upheld by the High Court by the impugned judgment and order
dated 3rd May, 2018 is legally not tenable and the same deserves
to be set aside which we hereby do. The complaint of the
appellant will be considered afresh by the learned trial Court
from the stage where it was interdicted by the order dated
30.5.2016.
21. Our view as above is in consonance with a similar view
expressed by this Court in paragraph 75 of the report in
Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar and others4. Para 75 of the
report in Krishnamoorthy (supra) reads as under:
“75. On a perusal of the aforesaid format, it is
clear as crystal that the details of certain
categories of the offences in respect of which
cognizance has been taken or charges have
been framed must be given/furnished. This
Rule is in consonance with Section 33-A of the
1951 Act. Section 33(1) envisages that
information has to be given in accordance with
the Rules. This is in addition to the information
to be provided as per Sections 33(1)(i) and (ii).
The affidavit that is required to be filed by the
candidate stipulates mentioning of cases
pending against the candidate in which charges
have been framed by the Court for the offences
punishable with imprisonment for two years or
more and also the cases which are pending
4
(2015) 3 SCC 467
28
against him in which cognizance has been taken
by the court other than the cases which have
been mentioned in clause (5)(i) of Form 26.
Apart from the aforesaid, clause (6) of Form 26
deals with conviction.
22. Consequently and in the light of the above, the appeals
are allowed. The order of the High Court dated 3rd May, 2018 is
set aside. All pending applications including the application for
intervention/impleadment are disposed of.
……………………, CJI
[RANJAN GOGOI]
…………………….., J.
[DEEPAK GUPTA]
…………………….., J.
[ANIRUDDHA BOSE]
NEW DELHI
OCTOBER 01, 2019