S.482,Cr.P.C = & 141of the Negotiable Instruments Act,1881= cheques for Rs.25,00,000/ each and one cheque for Rs.30,00,000/ were drawn on different dates by the authorised signatory, i.e. , M.D. of M/s Dhruti Infra Projects Limited, which were returned dishonored, on presentation by the appellant, with the remark Payment stopped by Drawer . Thereafter, the appellant issued a legal notice on 04.08.2016 to (i) M/s Dhruti Infra Projects Limited (accused no.1);(ii) M.D.of M/s Dhruti Infra Projects Limited (accused no. 2); (iii) Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.2(asDirectors). Apex court held that we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified in allowing the quashing petitions by invoking its power under S.482 Cr.P.C.In a case pertaining to an offence under S. 138 and S. 141 of the Act, the law requires that the complaint must contain a specific averment that the Director was in charge of, and responsible for, the conduct of the company's business at the time when the offence was committed = A perusal of the record in the present case indicates that the appellant has specifically averred in his complaint that the respondent nos. 1 and 2 were actively participating in the day to day affairs of the accused no.1 company. Further, the accused nos. 2 to 4 (including the respondent nos. 1 and 2 herein) are alleged to be from the same family and running the accused no.1 company together. The complaint also specificies that all the accused, in active connivance, mischievously and intentionally issued the cheques in favor of the appellant and later issued instructions to the Bank to Stop Payment .No evidence of unimpeachable quality has been brought on record by the respondent nos.1 and 2 to indicate that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the court.

 S.482,Cr.P.C =  & 141of the Negotiable Instruments Act,1881= cheques  for Rs.25,00,000/ each and  one  cheque for Rs.30,00,000/ were drawn on different dates  by  the authorised signatory,  i.e. ,  M.D. of M/s Dhruti Infra Projects Limited, which were returned dishonored, on presentation  by  the  appellant, with the remark Payment stopped by Drawer .
Thereafter,  the appellant  issued  a  legal  notice  on 04.08.2016
to (i) M/s Dhruti Infra Projects Limited (accused no.1);(ii) M.D.of M/s  Dhruti  Infra Projects  Limited (accused no. 2); (iii)  Respondent No.1 and Respondent No.2(asDirectors).
Apex court held that
we  are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not justified   in allowing  the  quashing petitions  by invoking  its power under S.482 Cr.P.C.In a case pertaining to an
offence under S. 138 and S. 141 of the Act, the law requires that
the complaint must contain a specific averment that the Director
was in charge of, and responsible for, the conduct of the company's business  at the time when the  offence was committed = A  perusal of  the record  in  the present case indicates that the appellant has  specifically averred  in  his  complaint that  the respondent  nos.  1 and  2 were actively participating in the day to day affairs  of  the  accused  no.1  company.  Further, the  accused nos. 2  to 4 (including the  respondent nos. 1 and 2  herein) are alleged to be from the same family and running the accused no.1 company together.  The complaint  also specificies that all the accused,  in  active connivance, mischievously and intentionally issued the cheques in favor of the appellant and later issued instructions  to  the Bank to  Stop Payment .No evidence  of unimpeachable quality has been  brought  on record by the respondent nos.1 and 2 to indicate that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the court.

1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.403,405 OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Nos.9626 28 of 2017)
A.R. RADHA KRISHNA                    APPELLANT
V ERSUS
DASARI DEEPTHI & ORS.          RESPONDENTS
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. These appeals, by special leave, are directed against the order
dated 22.09.2017  passed  by  the High  Court of Judicature  at
Hyderabad for  the State  of Telangana  and  the  State  of Andhra
Pradesh  in  Criminal  Petition  Nos.  6508,  6530 &  6531  of 2017,
whereby  the High  Court  allowed  the  Criminal Petitions  filed  by
respondent nos.1and2 and set aside the cognizance order passed
by the trial court.
3. The  case  of  the  prosecution  in  brief  is  that the  appellant  had
entered into  an  investment agreement  with  M/s  Dhruti  Infra
Projects Limited  (accused  no.1) on  01.12.2013  on  the  basis of
representation of respondent nos.  1 and 2 herein, who were the
Directors of the said Company. The appellant  invested a total

2
amount of  Rs.2,11,50,000/ in the said project. According  to the
appellant, as  on  31.03.2016,  a  total  amount of Rs.1,81,50,000/
was left  to  be  repaid to  him  along with applicable  interest on it.
Thereafter,  upon several  representations  by the appellant, M/s
DhrutiInf ra Projects Limited agreed to repay the amount via  issue
of seven cheques  in favour of  the appellant. Six cheques  for
Rs.25,00,000/ each and  one  cheque for Rs.30,00,000/ were
drawn on different dates  by  the authorised signatory,  i.e. ,  M.D. of
M/s Dhruti Infra Projects Limited, which were returned dishonored,
on presentation  by  the  appellant, with the remark Payment
stopped by Drawer .
4. Thereafter,  the appellant  issued  a  legal  notice  on 04.08.2016
to (i) M/s Dhruti Infra Projects Limited (accused no.1);(ii) M.D.of
M/s  Dhruti  Infra Projects  Limited (accused no. 2); (iii)  Respondent
No.1 and Respondent No.2(asDirectors).
5. Consequently, proceedings were initiated by  the appellant
under Sections138 & 141of the Negotiable Instruments Act,1881
(hereinafter � referred � to � as � `the � Act�). � � During � the � pendency � of � the
said � complaint, � the � respondent � nos. � 1 � and � 2 � made � an � application
before�the�High�Court�for�the�quashing�of�the�proceedings�initiated
against � them. � The � High � Court, � as � mentioned � above, � allowed � the

3
Criminal � Petitions � filed � by � respondent � nos. � 1 � and � 2 � and � quashed
the � proceedings � against � them. � Being � aggrieved, � the � appellant � has
approached�this�Court�through�the�instant�appeals.
6. Learned � counsel � for � the � appellant, � Mr. � Y. � Rajagopala � Rao
vehemently � contended � that � the � High � Court � was � not � justified � in
allowing�the�quashing�petitions�by�invoking�its�power�under�Section
482 � Cr.P.C. � despite � the � fact � that � a � prima � facie � case � was � made � out
against � respondent � nos. � 1 � and � 2 � in � the � complaint � filed � by � the
appellant. � He � contended � that � the � trial � court, � on � the � basis � of � the
material�on�record,�took�cognizance�of�the�case�against�respondent
nos. � 1 � and � 2 � under � Sections � 138 � and � 141 � of � the � Act. � Learned
counsel�for�the�appellant�further�submitted�that�all�the�accused,�in
active � connivance, � mischievously � and � intentionally � issued � the
cheques � in � favor � of � the � appellant � and � later � issued � instructions � to
the�Bank�to�� Stop�Payment �.
7. On � the � other � hand, � learned � counsel � for � the � respondents, � Mr.
Kaushal�Yadav�submitted�that�the�answering�respondents�are�only
non�executory�Directors�of�the�company,�neither�playing�any�role�in
the � conduct � of � day�to�day � business � of � the � company � nor � being � in
charge � of � the � affairs � of � the � company. � Further, � he � also � contended
that�merely�by�virtue�of�being�a�Director�in�a�company,�one�cannot

4
be�deemed�to�be�in�charge�of,�or�responsible�to,�the�company�for�the
conduct�of�its�business.��
8. In � any � case, � the � learned � counsel � for � the � respondents � further
submitted � that � his � clients � are � ready � to � pay � the � balance � amount � of
Rs.70,00,000/� � to � the � appellant � within � a � period � of � six � months.
However, � learned � counsel � for � the � appellant � did � not � agree � to � the
same.
9. Having � heard � learned � counsel � for � the � parties � and � carefully
scrutinizing � the � record, �we � are � of � the � considered � opinion � that � the
High � Court � was � not � justified �   in � allowing � the � quashing � petitions � by
invoking �its�power �under �S.482,�Cr.P.C.�In�a�case�pertaining �to �an
offence � under � S. � 138 � and � S. � 141 � of � the � Act, � the � law � requires � that
the � complaint � must � contain � a � specific � averment � that � the � Director
was�in�charge�of,�and�responsible�for,�the�conduct�of�the�company�s
business � at � the � time � when � the � offence � was � committed. � The � High
Court,�in�deciding�a�quashing�petition�under�S.�482,�Cr.P.C.,�must
consider �whether �the �averment� made�in �the �complaint� is� sufficient
or � if � some � unimpeachable � evidence � has � been � brought � on � record
which � leads � to � the � conclusion � that � the � Director � could � never � have
been�in�charge�of�and�responsible�for�the�conduct�of�the�business�of
the�company�at�the�relevant�time.�While�the�role�of�a�Director�in�a

5
company�is�ultimately�a�question�of�fact,�and�no�fixed�formula�can
be�fixed�for�the�same,�the�High�Court�must�exercise�its�power�under
S. � 482, � Cr.P.C. � when � it � is � convinced, � from � the � material � on � record,
that � allowing � the � proceedings � to � continue � would � be � an � abuse � of
process � of � the � Court. � [ See � Gunamala � Sales � Private � Limited � v.
Anu�Mehta�and�Ors.,� (2015)�1�SCC�103 ]
10. A  perusal of  the record  in  the present case indicates that the
appellant has  specifically averred  in  his  complaint that  the
respondent  nos.  1 and  2 were actively participating in the day to
day affairs  of  the  accused  no.1  company.  Further, the  accused
nos. 2  to 4 (including the  respondent nos. 1 and 2  herein) are
alleged to be from the same family and running the accused no.1
company together.  The complaint  also specificies that all the
accused,  in  active connivance, mischievously and intentionally
issued the cheques in favor of the appellant and later issued
instructions  to  the Bank to  Stop Payment .No evidence  of
unimpeachable quality has been  brought  on record by the
respondent nos.1 and 2 to indicate that allowing the proceedings to
continue would be an abuse of process of the court.
11. In � the � above � view � of � the � matter, � the � instant � appeals � are
allowed � and � the � impugned � order � dated � 22.09.2017, � passed � by � the

6
High � Court � of � Judicature � at � Hyderabad � for � the � State � of � Telangana
and � the � State � of � Andhra � Pradesh � in � Criminal � Petition � Nos.6508,
6530 � & � 6531 � of � 2017, � is � set � aside � and � that � of � the � trial � court � is restored.
12. Before parting with the matter, we make it clear that we have
not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case pending before
the trial  court.  Needless  to say, the trial court  will adjudicate  the
matter  on  its  own merits  uninfluenced by any  of  the  observations
made herein.
13. However,keeping in view the nature of the case, we direct the
trial court  to  expedite the  trial  and  dispose  of  the same  in
accordance with law.
� .........................J.
(N.V.RAMANA)
������
� ........................J.
�(MOHAN�M.SHANTANAGOUDAR)
�........................J.
�����(INDIRA�BANERJEE )
N EW �D ELHI ;
F EBRUARY �28,�2019.

7
ITEM NO.1               COURT NO.4               SECTION II
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s).9626-9628/2017
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 22-09-2017
in   CRLP   No.6508,   6530   &   6531   of   2017   passed   by   the   High   Court   of
Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of
Andhra Pradesh)
A.R. RADHA KRISHNA                                 Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
DASARI DEEPTHI & ORS.                              Respondent(s)
Date : 28-02-2019 These petitions were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA
         HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR
         HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE INDIRA BANERJEE
For Petitioner(s)   Mr.Y.Raja Gopala Rao, AOR
                    Mr.B.Mohan, Adv.
Ms.Y.Vismai Rao, Adv.
Mr.K.Sharat Kumar, Adv.
For Respondent(s)   Mr.Kaushal Yadav, AOR
Ms.Sunita Yadav, Adv.
Mr.Nand Lal Kumar Mishra, Adv.
Ms.Ankita Aggarwal, Adv.
Ms.Shweta Yadav, Adv.
                    Mr.S.Udaya Kumar Sagar, AOR 
Ms.Bina Madhavan, Adv.             
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Leave granted.
The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed order.
K eeping   in   view   the   nature   of   the   case,   we   direct   the
trial   court   to   expedite   the   trial   and   dispose   of   the   same   in
accordance with law.
(SATISH KUMAR YADAV)                           (RAJ RANI NEGI)
     AR-CUM-PS                                  ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
(Signed order is placed on the file)

8 

Whether the date of demise of late R. Laxmikantham (Late Ranoji) the father of the vendors of the respondent, is proved ? whether that evidence clearly prove that Late Ranoji died on 3.4.1997 and thus, valid title was given to the respondent by sons of Late Ranoji or whether he died sometime in the year 2004 thus, giving valid title to the appellant through attorney of Late Ranoji . We may notice that since the respondent is plaintiff, the burden lay on him to prove his case. Apex court held that We may notice the observations of the trial Court that Exhibit A-5 was inadmissible as the respondent/plaintiff had not examined the Panchayat Secretary who had issued the certificate (allegedly without being authorised to do so) and the certificate issued on the basis of the register maintained by the Panchayat, as noticed above, gave rise to the additional evidence being led. We may also notice the observations made by the trial Court, as pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, qua the conduct of the vendors of the respondent to contend that even the trial Court found that they had executed the document twice over in respect of the sale of land i.e. one set of sale deeds in favour of the respondent while another sale deed in favour of B. Prabhkar on 16.9.2004 subsequent to the sale deeds executed in favour of the respondent and were thus stated to be misusing their position being the legal representatives of Late Ranoji. The register Exhibit C-1 to contend that the date of death of Late Rano Ji set out as 3.4.1997 is clearly an interpolation, apparent on the face of the reading of the document. In this behalf it is found that the first two pages show that different columns are maintained in respect of serial number, name of the deceased, name of the father/husband, age, date of death and nature of death. This was how the register was maintained prior to the entry in question and post entry. In respect of entry in question, setting out the date of death of late Ranoji, there are two entries on that page alone which bear two different seals, one seal being common to other pages. There are no columns. The name is written in English qua the date of death. The other pages are all maintained in Telugu Language and all entries are made in that language. the testimony of PW-3 P. Satyanarayana, who was the Panchayat Secretary, on the date he appeared as witness i.e. 27.12.2010. He had joined the post on 1.1.2007 and thus could only produce the relevant record for that period of time in question. Logically, he did not have personal knowledge. The testimony shows that the practice followed was that a Gram Sewak would conduct enquiry and inform about the death orally to the Panchayat Secretary who would then make an entry. There was a register which contained the provisions for incorporating the name of Gram Sewak and also their signatures. It is conceded that there was no signature of then Panchayat Secretary on any of the pages of Exhibit C-1 register which is normally maintained in a serial form. The entry at page 65, which is occurring after 2005, is stated to be pertaining to the year 1997 which he claimed he had not written as he was not an officer at the relevant time. The witness admits that while page 63-64 disclose details such as cause of death date of death and age at the time when the villager died, such details were not contained in the entry at page 65 and was unaware why such a variance existed. He could also not explain why that particular entry on that page was recorded in English while all other entries were recorded in Telugu. The Gram Panchayat was stated not to be having the register for the year 1996 or earlier years and records are stated to have been handed over to him only from 1997. He further admits it is true at page no.65 there is a vast blank space regarding the years 1997 and 1998. It is true that Ex.C-1 does not disclose closing of the relevant year after the expiry of the year. He, however, denied the allegation of fabrication. We may also notice another fact that Exhibit A-5, the date of death certificate was issued only in 2007 and no certificate was obtained contemporaneously after the alleged demise of Late Ranoji in 1997. We can find no worthy reason why a register maintained in normal course by the Panchayat in Telugu language with separate columns should acquire a different character of two entries made in English language only giving the date of death. We do not believe that the respondent has been able to discharge this burden. We are recording this aspect as, the fact whether Ranoji did die on 3.4.1997 or died some time in the year 2004, in a sense is conceded by the parties as the issue which determines whether the appellant would fail or succeed in the appeal.

Whether    the   date   of   demise   of   late   R.   Laxmikantham (Late   Ranoji)   the   father   of   the   vendors   of   the   respondent,   is  proved ?
whether that   evidence   clearly   prove   that   Late   Ranoji   died   on   3.4.1997   and
thus,   valid   title   was   given   to   the   respondent   by   sons   of   Late Ranoji   or   whether he   died   sometime   in   the   year   2004   thus,   giving valid   title   to   the   appellant   through   attorney   of   Late   Ranoji .   
We may   notice   that   since   the   respondent   is   plaintiff,   the   burden   lay
on him to prove his case.

Apex court held that

We may notice   the   observations   of   the   trial   Court   that   Exhibit   A-5   was inadmissible   as   the   respondent/plaintiff   had   not   examined   the Panchayat   Secretary   who   had   issued   the   certificate   (allegedly without   being   authorised   to   do   so)   and   the   certificate   issued   on
the   basis   of   the   register   maintained   by   the   Panchayat,   as   noticed above, gave rise to the additional evidence being led. 

We   may   also   notice   the   observations   made   by   the   trial   Court, as   pointed   out   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant,   qua   the conduct   of   the   vendors   of   the   respondent   to   contend   that   even   the trial Court found that they had executed the document twice over in
respect of the sale of land i.e. one set of sale deeds in favour of the respondent while another sale deed in favour of B. Prabhkar on 16.9.2004   subsequent   to   the   sale   deeds   executed   in   favour   of   the respondent and were thus stated to be misusing their position being
the legal representatives of Late Ranoji.  
The register   Exhibit   C-1   to   contend   that   the   date   of   death   of Late   Rano   Ji   set   out   as   3.4.1997   is   clearly   an   interpolation, apparent on the face of the reading of the document.

In this behalf it is found that the first two pages show that different columns are maintained in respect of serial number, name of the deceased, name of the father/husband, age, date of death and
nature of death. This was how the register was maintained prior to the   entry   in   question   and   post   entry.     In   respect   of   entry   in question,   setting   out   the   date   of   death   of   late   Ranoji,   there   are two entries on that page alone which bear two different seals, one seal   being   common   to   other   pages.   There   are   no   columns.     The   name is   written   in   English   qua   the   date   of   death. 
The   other   pages   are all maintained in Telugu Language and all entries are made in that
language. 
 the testimony of PW-3 P. Satyanarayana,   who   was   the   Panchayat   Secretary,   on   the   date   he
appeared   as   witness   i.e.   27.12.2010.   He   had   joined   the   post   on 1.1.2007   and   thus   could   only   produce   the   relevant   record   for   that period   of   time   in   question.     Logically,   he   did   not   have   personal knowledge.   The testimony shows that the practice followed was that a Gram Sewak   would   conduct   enquiry   and   inform   about   the   death   orally   to the   Panchayat   Secretary   who   would   then   make   an   entry.   There   was   a register   which  contained   the  provisions   for  incorporating   the  name of Gram Sewak and also their signatures.  It is conceded that there was no signature of then Panchayat Secretary on any of the pages of
Exhibit C-1 register which is normally maintained in a serial form.
The entry at page 65, which is occurring after 2005, is stated to   be   pertaining   to   the   year   1997   which   he   claimed   he   had   not written as he was not an officer at the relevant time.  The witness
admits   that   while   page   63-64   disclose   details   such   as   cause   of death   date   of   death   and   age   at   the   time   when   the   villager   died, such   details   were   not   contained   in   the   entry   at   page   65   and   was unaware why such a variance existed.  He could also not explain why
that   particular   entry   on   that   page   was   recorded   in   English   while all other entries were recorded in Telugu. 
The Gram Panchayat was stated   not   to   be   having   the   register   for   the   year   1996   or   earlier years   and   records   are   stated   to   have   been   handed   over   to   him   only from  1997.  He  further  admits  it  is  true  at  page  no.65  there  is  a vast   blank   space   regarding   the   years   1997   and   1998.     It   is   true that   Ex.C-1   does   not   disclose   closing   of   the   relevant   year   after the   expiry   of   the   year.
 He,   however,   denied   the   allegation   of fabrication.
We may also notice another fact that Exhibit A-5, the date of death   certificate   was   issued   only   in   2007   and   no   certificate   was obtained   contemporaneously  after   the  alleged   demise  of   Late  Ranoji in 1997.
We  can  find  no  worthy  reason  why  a register   maintained   in   normal   course   by   the   Panchayat   in   Telugu language with separate columns should acquire a different character
of   two   entries   made   in   English   language   only   giving   the   date   of death.   We   do   not
believe that the respondent has been able to discharge this burden. We are recording this aspect as, the fact whether Ranoji did die on 3.4.1997 or died some time in the year 2004, in a sense is conceded by the parties as the issue which determines whether the appellant would fail or succeed in the appeal.


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
   CIVIL APPEAL NO.4661/2012
STRIPS INDIA LTD.                                  Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
V.L.S. PRASAD                                      Respondent(s)
  O R D E R
1. The   dispute   over   the   date   of   demise   of   late   R.   Laxmikantham
(Late   Ranoji)   the   father   of   the   vendors   of   the   respondent,   is   a
fundamental   fact   over   which   these   disputes   have   dragged   on   from
2006 with the two parties before us equally claiming their right as
bona   fide   purchasers   of   the   property   which   stood   in   the   name   of
Late   Ranoji.     The   manner   of   obtaining   title   by   the   two   parties   is
different. 
2. The   appellant   claims   that   Late   Ranoji   executed   a   Power   of
Attorney   dated   14.3.1984   in   favour   of   one   R.R.   Madhusudhan   Reddy.
On   24.12.2002,   R.   R.   Madhusudhan   Reddy,   power   of   attorney   of   Late
Ranoji   executed   a   sale   deed   in   favour   of   M/s   Nadella   Estates   Ltd.
The   said   entity,   in   turn,   executed   a   sale   deed   dated   28.3.2006   in
favour   of   the   appellant   and   another   sale   deed   almost
contemporaneously   was   executed   between   the   same   parties   on
22.05.2006   for   adjoining   land.     On   the   other   hand,   the   respondent
traces his title through the three sons of late Ranoji who executed
the   sale   deeds   in   respect   of   their   stated   1/3rd   share   each   vide

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three sale deeds dated 29.08.2003, 18.9.2003 and 14.10.2003.  It is
the say of the respondents that Late Rano ji died on 03.4.1997 and
thus   the   alleged   power   of   Attorney   dated   14.3.1984   ceases   to   have
any   legal   effect   and   thus   could   not   have   been   utilised   to   execute
any further sale deeds in favour of M/s Nadella Estates Ltd. who in
turn   transferred   the   title   to   the   appellant.     On   the   other   hand,
the   contention   of   the   appellant   is   that   Late   Ranoji   actually   died
only sometime in the year 2004.
3. Some other aspects may also be noticed i.e. the three vendors
of   the   respondent   are   stated   to   have   executed   another   sale   deed
dated   16.9.2004   in   favour   of   one   B.   Prabhakar.     This   sale   deed   in
turn   is   stated   to   have   resulted   in   a   dispute   between   the   M/s
Nadella Estate Ltd and B. Prabhkar which was decreed as settled and
even B. Prabhakar became a party to the sale deed in favour of the
appellant who thus perfected the title.
The respondents filed a suit seeking the following reliefs:
a) To   pass   a   decree   of   declaration,   declaring   the
plaintiff   as   absolute   owner   and   possessor   of   the   suit
schedule   property   i.e.   Agricultural   Land   bearing   Sy.
No.188   (188/A   admeasuring   an   area   of   Ac.1.10   guntas,
Ac.1.10   Guntas   and   Ac.1.12   guntas)   total   Ac.3.32   guntas,
situated   at   Kollur   village   Ramachandrapuram   Mandal,   Medak
District.
b)  To   grant   perpetual   injunction,   restraining   the
defendant, his men, or any other person of persons, on his
behalf, from interfering with the possession and enjoyment
of the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule property
i.e.   Agricultural   Land   bearing   Sy.   No.188(188/A

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admeasuring an area of Ac.1.10 guntas, Ac 1.10 Guntas and
Ac.1.12   Guntas)   total   Ac.3.32   guntas,   situated   at   Kollur
village, Ramachandrapuram Mandal, Medak District.�
4. The apparent sale consideration for the sale deeds in the year
2003   deeds   was   1.52   lakh.     As   per   appellant   as   per   sale   deed   of
2006, it is Rs.14 .25 lakhs.
5. The   suit   was   tried   by   the   District   and   Sessions   Judge,   Medak
at Sangareddy and was dismissed by the order dated 8.02.2010.   The
respondents   aggrieved   by   the   same   preferred   an   appeal   before   the
then   High   Court   of   Andhra   Pradesh   and   at   the   stage   of   final
hearing, moved an application to lead additional evidence. This was
so as the trial Court, on appreciation of evidence, found that the
date   of   death   certificate   (which   is   a   proforma   to   issue   date   of
death   certificate)   was   marked   through   PW-1,   i.e.   the   original
plaintiff and the respondent before us and he was not the person to
prove   the   contents   of   Exhibit   A-5.     The   correct   course   would   have
been to examine the Panchayat Secretary, who issued Exhibit A-5 but
had   not   been   examined.     Moreover,   Exhibit   A-5   was   issued   under
Section   12/17   and   G.O.M.   No.276   dated   18.07.2002   which   meant   that
the   Gram   Panchayat   became   authorized   to   issue   the   date   of   death
certificate   only   after   18.07.2002   under   the   said   G.O.   while   the
date of death certificate in question recorded the date of death as
3.4.1997.   In the year 1997 or at any time prior to 18.07.2002, it
was the Mandal Revenue Officer (MRO) who could have issued the date
of death certificate and not any other authority.  Exhibit A-5 was,

4
thus, held as not admissible in evidence.
6. In   order   to   get   over   this   aspect,   the   application   came   to   be
filed   which   was   allowed   with   consent   and   thus   additional   evidence
was led at the appellate stage before the High Court. The register
of the Panchayat was brought on record and proved as Exhibit C-1.
7. In the course of this evidence Exhibit C-1a, C-2 and C-2a were
also marked.   The testimony of Panchayat Secretary was recorded as
PW-3 who was also cross-examined.
8. The   High   Court,   after   examining   the   trial   Court   judgment   and
the   additional   evidence   produced   came   to   the   conclusion   that   the
respondent   has   been   able   to   establish   the   date   of   death   of   late
Ranoji as 3.4.1997 and thus decreed the suit.
9. The appellant thus filed the present Special Leave Petition in
which leave was granted on 11.5.2012.
10. We   have   heard   four   learned   senior   counsels   for   the   appellant
and two learned senior counsels for the respondent.
11. On hearing the submissions, we are of the view that really the
only   aspect   which   needs   to   be   considered   is   the   worthiness   of   the
additional   evidence   led   before   the   appellate   Court   i.e.   whether
that   evidence   clearly   prove   that   Late   Ranoji   died   on   3.4.1997   and
thus,   valid   title   was   given   to   the   respondent   by   sons   of   Late
Ranoji   or   whether   he   died   sometime   in   the   year   2004   thus,   giving
valid   title   to   the   appellant   through   attorney   of   Late   Ranoji .     We
may   notice   that   since   the   respondent   is   plaintiff,   the   burden   lay

5
on him to prove his case.
12. Learned   counsel   for   the   parties   have   taken   us   through   the
discussion both in the trial Court and the appellate Court.  We may
notice   the   observations   of   the   trial   Court   that   Exhibit   A-5   was
inadmissible   as   the   respondent/plaintiff   had   not   examined   the
Panchayat   Secretary   who   had   issued   the   certificate   (allegedly
without   being   authorised   to   do   so)   and   the   certificate   issued   on
the   basis   of   the   register   maintained   by   the   Panchayat,   as   noticed
above, gave rise to the additional evidence being led. 
13. We   may   also   notice   the   observations   made   by   the   trial   Court,
as   pointed   out   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant,   qua   the
conduct   of   the   vendors   of   the   respondent   to   contend   that   even   the
trial Court found that they had executed the document twice over in
respect of the sale of land i.e. one set of sale deeds in favour of
the respondent while another sale deed in favour of B. Prabhkar on
16.9.2004   subsequent   to   the   sale   deeds   executed   in   favour   of   the
respondent and were thus stated to be misusing their position being
the legal representatives of Late Ranoji.  Learned counsel for both
the   parties   have   also   taken   us   through   the   documents   led   in
additional   evidence   as   well   as   the   testimony   of   the   Panchayat
witness.  Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention
to   the   register   Exhibit   C-1   to   contend   that   the   date   of   death   of
Late   Rano   Ji   set   out   as   3.4.1997   is   clearly   an   interpolation,
apparent on the face of the reading of the document.
14. In this behalf it is found that the first two pages show that

6
different columns are maintained in respect of serial number, name
of the deceased, name of the father/husband, age, date of death and
nature of death. This was how the register was maintained prior to
the   entry   in   question   and   post   entry.     In   respect   of   entry   in
question,   setting   out   the   date   of   death   of   late   Ranoji,   there   are
two entries on that page alone which bear two different seals, one
seal   being   common   to   other   pages.   There   are   no   columns.     The   name
is   written   in   English   qua   the   date   of   death.   The   other   pages   are
all maintained in Telugu Language and all entries are made in that
language.   It   is   this   aspect   which   is   sought   to   be   emphasized   by
learned counsel for the appellant more so since the evidence led is
in the form of additional evidence before the appellate Court.
15. Our attention has also been drawn to the testimony of PW-3 P.
Satyanarayana,   who   was   the   Panchayat   Secretary,   on   the   date   he
appeared   as   witness   i.e.   27.12.2010.   He   had   joined   the   post   on
1.1.2007   and   thus   could   only   produce   the   relevant   record   for   that
period   of   time   in   question.     Logically,   he   did   not   have   personal
knowledge.   However, as per learned counsel for the appellant this
fact was to be proved by the respondent.
16. The testimony shows that the practice followed was that a Gram
Sewak   would   conduct   enquiry   and   inform   about   the   death   orally   to
the   Panchayat   Secretary   who   would   then   make   an   entry.   There   was   a
register   which  contained   the  provisions   for  incorporating   the  name
of Gram Sewak and also their signatures.  It is conceded that there
was no signature of then Panchayat Secretary on any of the pages of
Exhibit C-1 register which is normally maintained in a serial form.

7
17. The entry at page 65, which is occurring after 2005, is stated
to   be   pertaining   to   the   year   1997   which   he   claimed   he   had   not
written as he was not an officer at the relevant time.  The witness
admits   that   while   page   63-64   disclose   details   such   as   cause   of
death   date   of   death   and   age   at   the   time   when   the   villager   died,
such   details   were   not   contained   in   the   entry   at   page   65   and   was
unaware why such a variance existed.  He could also not explain why
that   particular   entry   on   that   page   was   recorded   in   English   while
all other entries were recorded in Telugu.   The Gram Panchayat was
stated   not   to   be   having   the   register   for   the   year   1996   or   earlier
years   and   records   are   stated   to   have   been   handed   over   to   him   only
from  1997.  He  further  admits   it  is  true  at  page  no.65  there  is  a
vast   blank   space   regarding   the   years   1997   and   1998.     It   is   true
that   Ex.C-1   does   not   disclose   closing   of   the   relevant   year   after
the   expiry   of   the   year.   He,   however,   denied   the   allegation   of
fabrication.
18. We may also notice another fact that Exhibit A-5, the date of
death   certificate   was   issued   only   in   2007   and   no   certificate   was
obtained   contemporaneously  after   the  alleged   demise  of   Late  Ranoji
in 1997.
19. Learned   counsel   for   the   respondent   endeavoured   to   persuade   us
not   to   interfere   with   the   findings   of   the   High   court   which,
accordingly   to   their   submissions,   are   cogent   and   reasonable   and
cannot be called perverse and thus, no interference would be called
for by this Court even if leave has been granted under Article 136
of the Constitution of India.

8
20. We did point out to learned counsel for the appellant that the
present case is not one of either affirmation or reversal based on
the   findings   of   the   trial   Court   but   a   reversal   based   on   the
additional   documents   led   at   the   appellate   stage   which   in   turn   has
formed   the   basis   of   the   reversal.   Thus,   a   little   closer   scrutiny
would   be   required   as   this   Court   is   effectively   acting   as   first
Court   of   appeal   over   the   findings   of   the   High   Court   qua   the
additional evidence.
21. It   emerges   from   the   impugned   order   that   the   argument   of   the
respondent   was   based   on   an   oral   partition   carried   out   after   the
death of Late Ranoji between the vendors of the respondent, though
a perusal of the sale deed shows that there is no mention of either
oral or written partition.  In this behalf in the cross-examination
questions were posed by the appellant to PW-2 where it is admitted
that   there   was   no   written   partition.     Thus,   it   could   not   be   said,
as   opined   in   the   impugned   order,   that   this   aspect   was   not   cross-
examined   qua   there   being   a   partition   inter   se   the   vendors   of   the
respondent. 
22. We   have   also   perused   the   impugned   order   insofar   as   it   deals
with the crucial question of the additional evidence led.  The High
Court appears to have been swayed by the fact that exhibit C-1 is a
public   document,   no   direct   suggestion   was   given   about   the   date   of
death   of   Late   Ranoji,   General   Power   of   Attorney   holder   was   not
produced   and   the   documents   as   produced   were   sufficient   by
themselves,   and   the   testimony   of   PW-3   satisfactorily   explains   the
death certificate of Late Ranoji as alleged by the respondent.

9
23. It   is   also   recorded   that   no   suggestion   was   put   as   to   the
correctness of Exhibit A-5 filed which was marked by PW-1 but then
we   may   note   at   this   stage   itself   that   the   such   Exhibit   was   issued
on   the   basis   of   the   records   of   the   Panchayat   and   was   not   an
independent document by itself.
24. We   have   given   our   thoughtful   consideration   to   the   controversy
in question and the submissions advanced by learned counsel for he
parties.
25. We   are   unable   to   persuade   ourselves   to   uphold   the   impugned
judgment of the High Court. The facts we have set out leave us with
great doubt about the authenticity of the entries made stating the
date  of  death  of  Late  Ranoji.    We  can  find  no  worthy  reason  why  a
register   maintained   in   normal   course   by   the   Panchayat   in   Telugu
language with separate columns should acquire a different character
of   two   entries   made   in   English   language   only   giving   the   date   of
death.  The methodology of recording before and after is the same.
26. We may also note that the date of death certificate stated to
have   been   obtained   on   the   basis   of   these   entries   was   only   in   the
year 2007 i.e. after a gap of almost a decade from the alleged date
of   death   and   after   the   suit   proceedings   were   filed   by   the
respondent.   There   is   something   to   be   said   also   about   the
observations   of   the   trial   Court   on   both   aspects   �   firstly,   the
respondent not leading the evidence required and the date of death
certificate   being   not   duly   authorised   and   secondly   the   conduct   of
the vendors of the respondent in executing one set of sale deeds in

10
favour   of  the   respondent  while   subsequently  executing   another  sale
deed in favour of B. Prabhakar.
27. As far as the first aspect is concerned, the respondent sought
to   cure   the   problem   in   the   midst   of   arguments   before   appellate
Court   by   adducing   additional   evidence.     However,   the   evidence   so
produced   despite   being   public   record,   becomes   highly   doubtful   by
reason of the manner in which entry has been made qua the death of
Late   Ranoji.     In   any   case,   in   view   of   this   the   contents   also   were
required to be proved.
28. On the second aspect also the observations of the trial Court
that   sons   of   Late   Ranoji   seem   to   be   utilizing   his   demise   to   sell
the   property   more   than   once   is   an   aspect   casting   doubt   on   the
manner   in   which   the   vendors   of   the   respondent   executed   the   sale
deed.     It   is   trite   to   say   that   the   respondent   being   the   plaintiff
had to state and prove his case in turn depending on the ability to
prove   that   Late   Ranoji   actually   died   on   3.4.1997.     We   do   not
believe that the respondent has been able to discharge this burden.
We are recording this aspect as, the fact whether Ranoji did die on
3.4.1997 or died some time in the year 2004, in a sense is conceded
by the parties as the issue which determines whether the appellant
would fail or succeed in the appeal.
29. We are conscious of the fact that possibly the respondent has
also   been   led   up   the   garden   path   by   the   vendors   but   then   when   we
balance the legal position on the two sides we are not able to hold
that the title of the respondent can be said to be superior to that

11
of the appellant.  The respondent would be well within its right to
pursue such remedy as may be available against the vendors, in view
of what we have opined aforesaid.
30. We   note   with   some   regret   that   we   did   endeavour   in   the
interlude   of   lunch   break,   to   persuade   the   parties   to   utilize   the
period   to   arrive   at   a   mutual   settlement   of   the   suit   pending   for
such a long period of time where one party would gain everything or
lose   everything   but   that   appears   to   have   failed,   hence   we   have
penned   downed   a   judgment   even   if   the   result   deprives   one   party   of
the   fruits   of   the   land.   The   impugned   order   is   set   aside   and   the
decree   passed   by   the   trial   Court   is   restored   even   taking   into
account additional evidence produced before the appellate Court.
31. The appeal is allowed leaving parties to bear their own costs.
���������������..J.
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]
����������������.J.
[M.R. SHAH]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 26, 2019.

12
ITEM NO.105               COURT NO.10               SECTION XII-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).  4661/2012
STRIPS INDIA LTD.                                  Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
V.L.S. PRASAD                                      Respondent(s)
([ RETAIN ITS POSITION ] )

Date : 26-09-2019 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.R. SHAH
For Appellant(s) Mr. Parag Tripathi, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Arvind Nayar, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Rana Mukherjee, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Anupam Lal Das, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Arjun Kant, Adv.
Ms. Upasana Chandrashekaran, Adv.
Mr. Lalltaksh Joshi, Adv.
                    Mr. Ugra Shankar Prasad, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Raju Ramchandran, Sr. Adv.
Mrs. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv.
                    Mr. D. Mahesh Babu, AOR
Ms. Suchitra Hrangkhawl, Adv.
Mr. Ganesan Subbian, Adv.
Mr. T.V. Bhaskar Reddy, Adv.
Mr. Shaurya Sahay, Adv.
Ms. Rekha Bakshi, Adv.
Mr. Chetan Joshi, Adv.               
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
(ASHA SUNDRIYAL)                                (ANITA RANI AHUJA)
  COURT MASTER                                   COURT MASTER

13
[Signed order is placed on the file] 

casting aspersions on the judicial officer - not good Even if the High Court felt as strongly as it did that action needed to be taken, then the proper course was to place the matter before the Chief Justice on the administrative side with a request that action be taken against the concerned judicial officer. In this case, the High Court did that but in addition passed the scathing remarks which virtually meant that the appellant stood condemned even before any disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him. The High Court can definitely say that the order passed shows total lack of knowledge of law. But when the High Court went further and virtually castigated the judicial officer as an unworthy and corrupt person then the High Court, in our view, over-stepped its boundaries and such remarks need to be expunged. We, accordingly, expunge all such remarks and direct deletion of para 15 of the judgment. We also set aside the order in so far as the imposition of costs of Rs.10,000/- on the appellant is concerned. Normally, costs are not imposed on the presiding officer of the Court and this practice should not be encouraged.

casting aspersions on the judicial officer - not good 
 Even if the High Court felt as strongly as it did that action needed to be taken,   then   the   proper   course   was   to   place   the   matter   before   the Chief Justice on the administrative side with a request that action be taken against the concerned judicial officer.  
In this case, the High   Court   did   that   but   in   addition   passed   the   scathing   remarks
which   virtually   meant   that   the   appellant   stood   condemned   even before any disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him.

The High Court can definitely say that the order passed shows total   lack   of   knowledge   of   law.     But   when   the   High   Court   went further   and   virtually   castigated   the   judicial   officer   as   an unworthy   and   corrupt   person   then   the   High   Court,   in   our   view, over-stepped its boundaries and such remarks need to be expunged.
We,   accordingly,   expunge   all   such   remarks   and   direct   deletion
of para 15 of the judgment.
We   also   set   aside   the   order   in   so   far   as   the   imposition   of
costs   of   Rs.10,000/-   on   the   appellant   is   concerned.     
Normally, costs   are   not   imposed   on   the   presiding   officer   of   the   Court   and
this practice should not be encouraged. 

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6634 of 2019
[ @  Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).  4409/2013]
SURENDRA PRASAD MISHRA                             Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
SMT. RAMAWATI & ORS.                               Respondent(s)
  O R D E R
Leave granted.
The   appellant,   a   judicial   officer,   was   holding   the   post   of
Motor   Accident   Claims   Tribunal   at   the   relevant   time.     A   claim
petition was filed before him in which vakalatnama was filed by two
counsel Mr. R.M. Singh and Mr. D.K. Saxena.  The matter was settled
between   the   claimant   and   the   Insurance   Company   and   the   settlement
petition   was   filed   and   signed   by   Mr.   D.K.   Saxena.     At   that   time,
Mr. R.M. Singh raised an objection that his fees had not been paid
and   that   the   compromise   should   not   be   recorded.     The   appellant
herein   accepted   the   request   of   Mr.   R.M.   Singh   and   held   that   the
compromise petition could only be filed through Mr. R.M. Singh and
not   by   Mr.   D.K.   Saxena.     He   came   to   the   conclusion   that   since
vakalatnama bears a sum of Rs.10/- for the Advocates Welfare Fund,
one lawyer can only be authorized and not more.
This   order   was   challenged.     The   High   Court   rightly   set   aside
the   order.     It   is   not   for   any   Court   to   settle   the   dispute   between
the   lawyers   with   regard   to   payment   of   fees.     If   there   is   any
1

misconduct   on   the   part   of   the   lawyer   in   taking   up   the   brief   of
another lawyer, normally it is for the Bar Council and not for the
Court to settle the dispute.  It was rightly held by the High Court
that the claimants in the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal should not
be   made   to   suffer   because   of   the   dispute   between   the   lawyers.
Having   held   so,   the   High   Court   made   certain   observations   against
the   appellant   questioning   his   bona   fide   and   casting   aspersions   on
his   integrity   and   also   accused   him   of   favouring   Mr.   R.M.   Singh.
The   High   Court   also   directed   on   the   judicial   side   that   the   matter
be   referred   on   the   administrative   side   for   an   appropriate   action.
As   far   as   the   remarks   are   concerned,   we   are   clearly   of   the   view
that   all   the   adverse   remarks   in   the   judgment   made   against
appellant,   whereby   his   integrity   has   been   questioned   or   whereby
aspersions   have   been   cast   on   his   character,   judicial   orders   or
otherwise are bound to be expunged.  
This   Court   in   a   number   of   cases   has   cautioned   that
remarks against judicial officers should normally not be passed in
judgments.     We   follow   a   system   where   the   judgment   of   a   Court   is
subject to judicial scrutiny by Higher Courts.  The judgment may be
right   or   wrong,   but   the   Higher   Courts   should   not   pass   scathing
remarks   against   the   presiding   officer   of   the   lower   courts   only
because   they   do   not   agree   with   the   point   of   view   of   the   Trial
Court.
In   Ishwari   Prasad   Mishra   v.   Mohammad   Isa   [(1963)   3   SCR   722],
this Court observed as follows:
�No doubt, if it is shown that the decision of the
trial court in a given case is a result of a corrupt
motive, the High Court must condemn it and must take
2

due   further   steps   in   the   matter.     But   the   use   of
strong   language   and   imputation   of   corrupt   motives
should   not  be   made  light-heartedly   because  the   Judge
against   whom   the   imputations   are   made   has   no   remedy
in law to vindicate his position.
There   is   no   doubt   that   judicial   administration
should be fearless; judges must have full freedom to
express   their  conclusions   in  respect   of  the   evidence
given by the witnesses before them without any favour
or   fear;   and   so,   judicial   power   to   express   its
appreciation   about   oral   evidence   is   very   wide.     But
the   very   width   of   the   said   power   must   inevitably
impose some healthy restraints upon its exercise.�
In   K.P. Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh   [AIR 1994 SC 1031],
this Court observed as follows:
�The higher courts every day come across orders of
the   lower   courts   which   are   not   justified   either   in
law   or   in   fact   and   modify   them   or   set   them   aside.
That is one of the functions of the superior courts.
Our   legal  system   acknowledges  the   fallibility  of   the
judges   and  hence   provides  for   appeals  and   revisions.
A judge tries to discharge his duties to the best of
his   capacity.     While   doing   so,   sometimes,   he   is
likely to err.
It   is   possible   that   a   particular   judicial   officer
may   be   consistently   passing   orders   creating   a
suspicion of judicial conduct which is not wholly or
even   partly   attributable   to   innocent   functioning.
Even in such cases, the proper course for the higher
court to adopt is to make note of his conduct in the
confidential   record   of   his   work   and   to   use   it   on
proper   occasions.     The   judges   in   the   higher   courts
have   also   a   duty   to   ensure   judicial   discipline   and
respect   for   the   judiciary   from   all   concerned.     The
respect for the judiciary is not enhanced when judges
at   the   lower   level   are   criticized   intemperately   and
castigated   publicly.     No   greater   damage   can   be   done
to   the   administration   of   justice   and   to   the
confidence   of   the   people   in   the   judiciary   than   when
the judges of the higher courts publicly express lack
of faith in the subordinate judges for one reason or
the   other.     It   must   be   remembered   that   the   officers
against   whom   such   strictures   are   publicly   passed,
stand   condemned   for   ever   in   the   eyes   of   their
subordinates   and   of   the   members   of   the   public.     No
better   device   can   be   found   to   destroy   the   judiciary
from   within.     The   judges   must,   therefore,   exercise
self-restraint.     There   are   ways   and   ways   of
expressing   disapproval   of   the   orders   of   the
subordinate courts but attributing motives to them is
3

certainly not one of them.  That is the surest way to
take the judiciary downhill.
In   Parkash   Singh   Teji   v.   Northern   India   Goods   Transport   Co.
Pvt.   Ltd.   and   Anr.   [(2009)   12   SCC   577],   this   Court   observed   as
follows:
We   are   not   undermining   the   ultimate   decision   of
the   High   Court   in   remitting   the   matter   to   the   trial
court   for   fresh   disposal.     However,   we   are
constrained   to   observe   that   the   higher   courts   every
day come across orders of the lower courts which are
not   justified   either   in   law   or   in   fact   and   modify
them   or   set   them   aside.     Our   legal   system
acknowledges   the  fallibility   of  the   Judges,  hence   it
provides for appeals and revisions.  A Judge tries to
discharge   his   duties   to   the   best   of   his   capacity,
however,   sometimes   is   likely   to   err.     It   has   to   be
noted   that   the   lower   judicial   officers   mostly   work
under   a   charged   atmosphere   and   are   constantly   under
psychological   pressure.     They   do   not   have   the
benefits   which   are   available   in   the   higher   courts.
In   those   circumstances,   remarks/observations   and
strictures   are   to   be   avoided   particularly   if   the
officer has no occasion to put forth his reasonings.�
In   �K� A Judicial Officer v. Registrar General, High Court of
A.P.  [AIR 2010 SC 2801], this Court held as under:-
��.the Division Bench of the High Court may be fully
justified   in   setting   aside   the   order   of   injunction,
but   there   was   absolutely   no   justification   for   the
Division   Bench   to   make   highly   disparaging   remarks
against   the   appellant   as   a   judicial   officer   casting
doubts   on   his   ability   to   decide   the   cases
objectively.     The   use   of   the   words  out   of   sheer
arrogance and disrespect to the lawful order and the
expression   judicial   authoritarianism  in   paragraph
10 shows that the Division Bench ignored the words of
caution   administered   by   this   Court   in   several
judgments including those referred to hereinabove and
castigated   the   appellant   without   any   justification.
The   observations   and   remarks   made   by   the   Division
Bench of the High Court are bound to adversely affect
the image of the appellant in the eyes of the public,
his   credibility   as   a   judicial   officer   and   also
affects his career.  We are sure that if the Division
Bench   of   the   High   Court   had   kept   in   view   the
judgments   of   this   Court,   it   would   not   have   made
disparaging   remarks   against   the   appellant,   which,   in
4

the facts and circumstances of the case, were not at
all called for.
In   the   present   case,   the   remarks   especially   those   in   para   15
cast aspersions on the integrity of the judicial officer.   Even if
the High Court felt as strongly as it did that action needed to be
taken,   then   the   proper   course   was   to   place   the   matter   before   the
Chief Justice on the administrative side with a request that action
be taken against the concerned judicial officer.  In this case, the
High   Court   did   that   but   in   addition   passed   the   scathing   remarks
which   virtually   meant   that   the   appellant   stood   condemned   even
before any disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him.
The High Court can definitely say that the order passed shows
total   lack   of   knowledge   of   law.     But   when   the   High   Court   went
further   and   virtually   castigated   the   judicial   officer   as   an
unworthy   and   corrupt   person   then   the   High   Court,   in   our   view,
over-stepped its boundaries and such remarks need to be expunged.
We,   accordingly,   expunge   all   such   remarks   and   direct   deletion
of para 15 of the judgment.
We   also   set   aside   the   order   in   so   far   as   the   imposition   of
costs   of   Rs.10,000/-   on   the   appellant   is   concerned.     Normally,
costs   are   not   imposed   on   the   presiding   officer   of   the   Court   and
this practice should not be encouraged. 
Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   states   that   as   far   as   the
administrative action is concerned, it has already been dropped and
he is not pressing relief in this regard.
The   civil   appeal   is   accordingly   allowed   and   we   direct
expunging   of   all   remarks   made   against   the   appellant   and   further
5

direct   that   para   15   of   the   impugned   judgment   shall   stand   deleted
for all intents and purposes.
� ....................J.
[DEEPAK GUPTA]
� ....................J.
[ANIRUDDHA BOSE]
NEW DELHI;
August 16, 2019.
6

ITEM NO.35               COURT NO.10               SECTION XI
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).  4409/2013
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  05-11-2012
in   WP   No.   25607/2012   passed   by   the   High   Court   Of   Judicature   At
Allahabad)
SURENDRA PRASAD MISHRA                             Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
SMT. RAMAWATI & ORS.                               Respondent(s)
(With prayer for interim relief)

Date : 16-08-2019  This petition was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :  HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA BOSE
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Shaswat Goel, Adv.
Mr. Vibhav Mishra, Adv.
Ms. Ruchika Sharma, Adv.
For Mr. M. P. Shorawala, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s)
                   
         UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Leave granted.
The civil is allowed in terms of the signed reportable order.
Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
(MEENAKSHI  KOHLI)                              (RENU KAPOOR)
  COURT MASTER      COURT MASTER
[Signed reportable order is placed on the file]
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