“Institutional Preference” for Post Graduate Medical Admissions is the core issue involved in these appeal/petitions. = The decision of this Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar (Dr. )(II) (supra) permitting 25% Institutional Preference has been distinguished by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Saurabh Chaudri(supra). Therefore, once the Institutional Preference to the extent of 50% of the total number of open seats has held to be permissible, in that case, thereafter it will be for the appropriate authority/State to consider how much percentage seats are to be reserved for Institutional Preference/Reservation. It will be in the realm of a policy decision and this Court cannot substitute the same, unless it is held to be arbitrary and/or mala fide and/or not permissible. As observed hereinabove, a five Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Saurabh Chaudri (supra) has categorically allowed/permitted/approved the Institutional Preference/Reservation in the post graduate medical courses to the extent of 50% of the total number of open seats. Therefore, for the reasons stated above and considering the decisions of this Court in the cases of Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra); a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Saurabh Chaudri (supra); and Saurabh Dwivedi (supra), Institutional Preference to the extent of 50% is approved and it is observed and held that introduction of the NEET Scheme shall not affect such Institutional Preference/Reservation. Such a regulation providing 50% Institutional Preference/Reservation shall not be in any way ultra vires to Section 10D of the MCI Act. Even otherwise, as observed hereinabove, even in the case of Institutional Preference/Reservation, the admissions in the post graduate courses are to be given on the basis of the merits and marks obtained in the NEET examination result only.

“Institutional   Preference”   for   Post   Graduate   Medical Admissions is the core issue involved in these appeal/petitions.  =   The decision of this Court in the case of Dinesh   Kumar   (Dr.   )(II)   (supra)  permitting   25%   Institutional Preference has been distinguished by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of  Saurabh Chaudri(supra).   Therefore, once the Institutional Preference to the extent of 50% of the total number of open seats has held to be permissible, in that case, thereafter   it   will   be   for   the   appropriate   authority/State   to consider   how   much   percentage   seats   are   to   be   reserved   for Institutional Preference/Reservation.  It will be in the realm of a policy decision and this Court cannot substitute the same, unless it is held to be arbitrary and/or mala fide and/or not permissible.
As observed hereinabove, a five Judge Bench of this Court in the case   of  Saurabh   Chaudri   (supra)  has   categorically allowed/permitted/approved   the   Institutional Preference/Reservation in the post graduate medical courses to the extent of 50% of the total number of open seats. 
Therefore, for the reasons stated above and considering the decisions of this Court in the cases of  Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra); a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Saurabh
Chaudri   (supra);  and  Saurabh   Dwivedi   (supra),  Institutional Preference to the extent of 50% is approved and it is observed and held that introduction of the NEET Scheme shall not affect such   Institutional   Preference/Reservation.     
Such   a   regulation providing 50% Institutional Preference/Reservation shall not be in any way ultra vires to Section 10D of the MCI Act.   Even otherwise,   as   observed   hereinabove,   even   in   the   case   of Institutional Preference/Reservation, the admissions in the post graduate courses are to be given on the basis of the merits and marks obtained in the NEET examination result only.


REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7939 OF 2019
(Arising from SLP(C) No. 7003 of 2017)
Yatinkumar Jasubhai Patel and others …Appellants
Versus
State of Gujarat and others …Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 122 OF 2018
WRIT PETITION(C) NO. 1479 OF 2018
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 1142 OF 2019
J U D G M E N T
M.R. SHAH, J.
Leave granted in the special leave petition.
1
2. The   “Institutional   Preference”   for   Post   Graduate   Medical
Admissions is the core issue involved in these appeal/petitions.  
3. Pursuant to the order passed by a two Judge Bench of this
Court dated 12.09.2018, all these appeal/petitions are placed
before the larger Bench.
4. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned
judgment and order dated 22.02.2017 passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Special Civil Application
No. 19918/2016, by which the Division Bench has dismissed the
said writ petition upholding the vires of Rules 2, 3, 4.1 and 4.3
relating   to   admission   to   the   Post   Graduate   Medical   Courses
framed by the Gujarat University providing that the preference
shall be given to the candidates graduating from the Gujarat
University (providing for “Institutional Reservation”), the original
writ petitioners have preferred the special leave petition/appeal.
Thus,   the   original   writ   petitioners   are   challenging   the
“Institutional Preference” in the Post Graduate Medical Courses.
4.1 Writ Petition (C) No. 1479 of 2018 under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India has been preferred by the petitioners also
challenging the policy of “Institutional Preference” for admission
to the Post Graduate Medical Courses insofar as respondent no.3
2
– University of Delhi and respondent no.4 – Guru Gobind Singh
Indraprastha University is concerned.  Similar prayers are made
in   Writ   Petition   (C)   No.   122/2018   and   Writ   Petition(C)   No.
1142/2019   also   challenging   the   policy   of   “Institutional
Preference” in the Post Graduate Medical Courses.
4.2 For   the   sake   of   convenience,   Civil   Appeal   arising   from
Special   Leave   Petition(C)   No.   7003/2017   arising   out   of   the
impugned judgment and order dated 22.02.2017 passed by the
High Court of Gujarat is treated and considered as a lead matter
and   the   relevant   rules   of   the   Gujarat   University   relating   to
admission to the Post Graduate Medical Courses framed by the
Gujarat University are considered.
5. In exercise of powers under Section 39 read with Section 32
of the Gujarat University Act, 1949, the Gujarat University has
framed the rules for the purpose of governing admission to Post
Graduate Courses.  The relevant Rules are Rules 2, 3, 4.1, 4.2
and 4.3, which read as under:
“2. As per directive of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India,
New Delhi, 50% of total available seats in Academic year
in various post graduate degree and diploma courses in
each subject in Government Institution/Colleges will be
filled up as a All India Quota Seats as per All India 50%
quota rank by competent authority.  The remaining seats
3
will be available for the candidates passing from Gujarat
University in  accordance with  Rule 4.1.   The  student
passing from other statutory Universities within Gujarat
State will be considered as per their merit in accordance
with Rule 4.3.
3. Remaining 50% (or more) of total seats after Rule
2.0 (and Rule 2.1) in post graduate courses will be filled
up by the “Admission Committee” of University.
4.0 Selection:   Selection   of   candidates   eligible   under
rule 1 for seats under rule 3.0 will be done category and
status wise on the basis of merits as laid down herein
further.
4.1 Preference shall be given to candidates graduating
from Gujarat University.
4.2 Deleted.
4.3 After   the   merit   list   prepared   under   Rule   4.1   is
exhausted   the   candidates   graduating   from   any   other
University located in Gujarat State will be considered.”
5.1 As per the aforesaid Rules, 50% of the total available seats
in   the   academic   year   in   various   Post   Graduate   Degree   and
Diploma   Courses   in   each   subject   in   Government
Institution/Colleges will be filled up as “All India Quota Seats” by
competent authority and the remaining seats will be filled up in
accordance with Rule 4.1 of the Rules of the University.  As per
Rule 3 of the Rules, remaining 50% of the total seats in Post
Graduate Courses will be filled up by the “Admission Committee”
4
of University.   As  per Rule 4.3 of  the  Rules, after merit  list
prepared   under   rule   4.1   is   exhausted,   candidates   graduating
from   any   other   University   located   in   Gujarat   State   will   be
considered.
5.2 The   original   writ   petitioners   challenged   the   vires   of   the
afore­stated Rules providing  “Institutional  Preference” –  giving
preference to the candidates graduating from Gujarat University
mainly on the ground that in view of introduction of the National
Eligibility Entrance Test (hereinafter referred to as ‘NEET’) and
the admissions are to be given solely on the basis of the merits
and   the   marks   obtained   in   the   NEET,   the   Rules   providing
“Institutional Preference” shall be violative of the Indian Medical
Council   Act,   1956   and   the   Post   Graduate  Medical   Education
Regulations, 2000 framed under the Indian Medical Council Act.
That by the impugned judgment and order and after considering
the decisions of this Court in the cases of  Dr. Pradeep Jain v.
Union   of   India   reported   in   1984   (3)   SCC   654;   and  Saurabh
Chaudri v. Union of India reported in 2003 (11) SCC 146 and after
considering the scheme of the NEET (PG), the High Court has
dismissed the said petition holding the “Institutional Preference”.
5
Hence, the present appeal challenging the policy of “Institutional
Preference” in the Post Graduate Medical Courses.
6. Learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   writ   petitioners   have
vehemently submitted that it is true that earlier – prior to the
introduction of the NEET, the “Institutional Preference” in the
Post   Graduate   Medical   Courses   is   held   to   be   permissible.
However, in view of the introduction of the NEET which brings
about the change to the effect that all admissions to the Post
Graduate Medical Courses should be only on the basis of merit in
the NEET, as per Regulation 9 of the Post Graduate Medical
Education   Admission   Regulations,   2000,   now   “Institutional
Preference” would not be permissible and the same shall be ultra
vires the Medical Council Act and the Regulations, 2000 and
contrary to the scheme of the NEET.
6.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel for the
writ petitioners that the purpose due to which such “Institutional
Reservation” was held permissible by this Court no longer exists
as now there exists 50% All India Quota and the admission is
also done on the basis of an All India Examination – NEET.
6.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the writ
petitioners that even the MCI Regulations for the Post Graduate
6
Admissions,   namely,   Regulations,   2000   do   not   permit
“Institutional   Reservation”.     It   is   submitted   that   the   MCI
Regulations have been held by this Court to be a complete Code
and therefore no reservations could be provided unless the same
is permitted under the regulations.   In support of the above,
reliance is placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of
State of U.P. v. Dinesh Singh Chauhan reported in (2016) 9 SCC
749.
7. So   far   as   the   Delhi   University   and   Guru   Gobind   Singh
Indraprastha University are concerned, it is submitted by the
learned counsel for the respective petitioners that under the MCI
Regulations, admissions are to be done only by way of two lists,
i.e., (i) 50% seats on the basis of “All India Merit List”; and (ii)
50% seats to be filled on the basis of “State­wise List”.   It is
submitted that the admissions to the State Quota seats in the
aforesaid two Universities are not being done on unified “Statewise List” but both the universities are preparing two separate
“University­wise” lists which is not in accordance with the MCI
Regulations. 
7.1 It   is   further   submitted   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the
respective   petitioners   that   the   two   universities   have   provided
7
“Institutional   Reservation”   to   an   extent   of   100%   of   the   State
Quota seats, i.e., the entire State quota has been reserved for
their alumni completely denying opportunity of selection to other
State   candidates.     It   is   submitted   that   the   petitioners   being
MBBS graduates from the State of NCT of Delhi are entitled to be
considered under the State quota seats.  It is submitted that at
present because of the “Institutional Reservation”, the petitioners
are not entitled to be considered under the State quota at all.  It
is   submitted   that   therefore   100%   “Institutional   Reservation”
cannot  at all  be  permitted even  if it  is otherwise  held to  be
permissible.
8. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the writ
petitioners   that   in   the   case   of  Dr.   Pradeep   Jain   (supra),
“Institutional Preference” was limited to 50% of the total number
of open seats.   It is submitted that the same was held to be
permissible at a time when 100% seats in the State colleges were
filled up by the State.  It is submitted that in the case of AIIMS
Students’   Union   v.   AIIMS   reported   in   (2002)   1   SCC   428,   the
“Institutional Reservation” was permitted only to an extent of
25%.   It is submitted that similarly in the case of  Dr. Saurabh
Chaudhary (supra), the “Institutional Preference” was permitted
8
to the extent of 50%.  It is submitted that even if this Court holds
the “Institutional Preference” permissible, in that case, the same
should be limited to the 50% of the total number of State quota
seats.
9. All these appeal/petitions are vehemently opposed by the
learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the respective States,
respective   Universities   and   the   learned   counsel   appearing   on
behalf of the MCI.  Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respective respondents have vehemently submitted that, as such,
the “Institutional Preference” is held to be permissible by this
Court right from 1971.   It is submitted that the issue involved
with respect to “Institutional Preference” is now not res integra in
view of the decisions of this Court in the cases of D.N. Chanchala
v. State of Mysore reported in (1971) 2 SCC 293; Dr. Pradeep Jain
(supra);  a Constitution Bench judgment in the case of  Saurabh
Chaudri (supra); and Gujarat University v. Rajiv Gopinath Bhatt
reported in (1996) 4 SCC 60.  It is submitted therefore now it will
not be open for the petitioners to again re­agitate the issue with
respect to “Institutional Preference”.   It is submitted that the
relevant   regulations   prescribing   “Institutional   Preference”   are
9
absolutely in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in
the aforesaid decisions.
9.1 Learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   MCI,   while
opposing the present appeal/petitions, has vehemently submitted
that admission to Post Graduate Medical Courses in the medical
colleges is done on the basis of the NEET merit and 50% seats
are filled up on merit drawn on “All India basis” and 50% seats
are   filled   up   on   merit   drawn   on   “State­wise   basis”.     It   is
submitted   that   earlier   the   Gujarat   University   used   to   hold
examinations   for   Post   Graduate   Medical   Courses   and   now
instead of such test by the Gujarat University, merit is to be
determined  on   the   basis  of   NEET  examination   results.     It  is
submitted that the National Board of Examinations is entrusted
with the job of holding NEET test for admission to Post Graduate
Medical Courses.   It is submitted that as per the information
bulletin issued by the National Board of Examination, 50% of the
available seats are All India Quota seats and the remaining seats
are to be filled either by the State Government or Colleges or
Universities at the institute level using NEET­PG score and as per
the applicable regulations and/or eligibility criteria, reservation
policy, etc.  It is submitted that for the remaining 50% seats, it is
10
left open for the State Government and Government Agency to
make admission in such colleges, universities and institutions
following   the   score   obtained   by   the   students   in   the   NEET
examination.  It is submitted therefore that holding of common
examination cannot lead to invalidity of “Institutional Preference”
as has been held permissible by this Court in catena of decisions.
It is further submitted that after uniform entrance examination
through NEET, provisions of Section 10D does not debar source
from which admissions are to be made at the post graduate level.
9.2 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeal/writ petitions.
10. The short question which is posed for consideration of this
Court is, whether after the introduction of the NEET Scheme, still
the   “Institutional   Preference”   in   the   Post   Graduate   Medical
Courses would be permissible?
10.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that, as such, and it
is not in dispute that such “Institutional Preference” in the Post
Graduate Medical Courses is held to be permissible by this Court
in catena of decisions, more particularly a three Judge bench
decision of this Court in the case of Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra); a
Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Saurabh
11
Chaudri (supra); and in the case of Saurabh Dwivedi v. Union of
India reported in (2017) 7 SCC 626.
10.2 In the case of  Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra), it is observed and
held by this Court as under:
“We are therefore of the view that so far as admissions to
post­graduate courses, such as MS, MD and the like are
concerned, it would be eminently desirable not to provide
for   any   reservation   based   on   residence   requirement
within   the   State   or   on   institutional   preference.     But
having regard to  broader considerations of equality of
opportunity   and   institutional   continuity   in   education
which has its own importance and value, we would direct
that though residence requirement within the State shall
not be a ground for reservation in admissions to postgraduate courses, a certain percentage of seats may in
the present circumstances, be reserved on the basis of
institutional preference in the sense that a student who
has   passed   MBBS   course   from   a   medical   college   or
university, may be given preference for admission to the
post­graduate   course   in   the   same   medical   college   or
university   but   such   reservation   on   the   basis   of
institutional preference should not in any event exceed
50 per cent of the total number of open seats available for
admission to the post­graduate course.  This outer limit
which we are fixing will also be subject to revision on the
lower side by the Indian Medical Council in the same
manner as directed by us in the case of admissions to the
MBBS course.  But, even in regard to admissions to the
post­graduate   course,   we   would   direct   that   so   far   as
super specialities such as neuro­surgery and cardiology
are concerned, there should be no reservation at all even
on the basis of institutional preference and admissions
should be granted purely on merit on all­India basis.”
[emphasis supplied]
12
10.3 Thereafter, a five Judge Bench of this Court in the case of
Saurabh   Chaudri   (supra)  has   reiterated   the   scheme   of
“Institutional Preference” as framed in  Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra)
and has approved the “Institutional Preference” confined to 50%
of the total number of open seats.   In that decision, this Court
also took note of the subsequent decision in the case of Dinesh
Kumar (Dr.) (II) v. Motilal Nehru Medical College, reported in (1986)
3 SCC 727  fixing the “Institutional Preference” to the extent of
25%.  However, after taking note of the said decision, this Court
has reiterated the scheme framed in   Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra)
providing “Institutional Preference” confined to 50% of the total
number of open seats.  In the case of Saurabh Dwivedi (supra),
this   Court   has   again   approved   the   “Institutional   Preference”.
Thus, right from 1971 onwards till 2017, consistently this Court
has approved and/or permitted the “Institutional Preference” in
the Post Graduate Medical Courses.
However, it is the case on behalf of the petitioners that in
view of the introduction of the NEET Scheme and in view of
Section 10D of the MCI Act, by which admissions are to be given
on the basis of the merit in the NEET, such an “Institutional
13
Preference” would not be permissible.  It is required to be noted
that introduction of the NEET has, as such, nothing to do with
any   preference/Institutional   Preference,   more   particularly   the
“Institutional Preference”  as approved by this Court time and
again.  The purpose and object of the introduction of the NEET
was to conduct a uniform entrance examination for all medical
educational   institutions   at   the   under­graduate   level   or   postgraduate level and admissions at the under­graduate level and
post­graduate level are to be given solely on the basis of the
merits and/or marks obtained in the NEET examination only.  It
is required to be noted that earlier the respective universities
including the Gujarat University used to hold examination for
post­graduate admission to medical courses and now instead of
such   tests   by   the   Gujarat   University/concerned   universities,
merit is to be determined on the basis of the NEET examination
results only and admissions are required to be given on the basis
of such merits or marks obtained in NEET.  The only obligation
by   virtue   of   introduction   of   NEET   is   that,   once   centralized
admission test is conducted, the State, its agencies, universities
and institutions cannot hold any separate test for the purpose of
admission to Post­Graduate and PG and Diploma Courses and
14
such   seats   are   to   be   filled   up   by   the   State   agencies,
universities/institutions for preparing merit list as per the score
obtained by the applicants in NEET examination and therefore by
introduction of the NEET, Section 10D of the MCI, Act has been
amended,   consequently   amendment   to   the   Post­Graduate
Education   Regulations,   2000,   admission   to   Post   Graduate
Courses are made providing for solely on the basis of the score
secured   by   the   candidates   seeking   admission   based   on
centralized examination, i.e., NEET.
10.4 Even   while   giving   admissions   in   the   State
quota/institutional   reservation   quota,   still   the   admissions   are
required to be given on the basis of the merits determined on the
basis of the NEET examination results.  Under the circumstances,
introduction of the NEET Scheme, as such, has nothing to do
with   the   “Institutional   Preference”.     Therefore,   the   change   by
introduction of the NEET Scheme shall not affect the Institutional
Preference/Reservation as approved by this Court from time to
time   in   catena   of   decisions,   more   particularly   the   decisions
referred to hereinabove.   Under the guise of introduction of the
NEET Scheme, the petitioners cannot be permitted to re­agitate
and/or re­open the issue with respect to Institutional Preference
15
which has been approved and settled by this Court in catena of
decisions, more particularly the decisions referred to hereinabove.
11. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the petitioners
that   if   the   50%   seats   are   reserved   for   State   quota   and   if
institutional preference/reservation is permitted to the extent of
50% of the total number of open seats, in that case, not a single
seat   in   the   State   quota   shall   be   available   and   therefore   the
percentage   of   Institutional   Preference   may   be   reduced   to   the
extent of 25% or so is concerned, at the outset, it is required to
be noted that as such the Institutional Preference to the extent of
50% of the total number of open seats has been approved by this
Court   in   catena   of   decisions,   more   particularly   the   decisions
referred to hereinabove.  The decision of this Court in the case of
Dinesh   Kumar   (Dr.   )(II)   (supra)  permitting   25%   Institutional
Preference has been distinguished by a Constitution Bench of
this Court in the case of  Saurabh Chaudri(supra).   Therefore,
once the Institutional Preference to the extent of 50% of the total
number of open seats has held to be permissible, in that case,
thereafter   it   will   be   for   the   appropriate   authority/State   to
consider   how   much   percentage   seats   are   to   be   reserved   for
Institutional Preference/Reservation.  It will be in the realm of a
16
policy decision and this Court cannot substitute the same, unless
it is held to be arbitrary and/or mala fide and/or not permissible.
As observed hereinabove, a five Judge Bench of this Court in the
case   of  Saurabh   Chaudri   (supra)  has   categorically
allowed/permitted/approved   the   Institutional
Preference/Reservation in the post graduate medical courses to
the extent of 50% of the total number of open seats. 
12. Therefore, for the reasons stated above and considering the
decisions of this Court in the cases of  Dr. Pradeep Jain (supra); a
Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Saurabh
Chaudri   (supra);  and  Saurabh   Dwivedi   (supra),  Institutional
Preference to the extent of 50% is approved and it is observed
and held that introduction of the NEET Scheme shall not affect
such   Institutional   Preference/Reservation.     Such   a   regulation
providing 50% Institutional Preference/Reservation shall not be
in any way ultra vires to Section 10D of the MCI Act.   Even
otherwise,   as   observed   hereinabove,   even   in   the   case   of
Institutional Preference/Reservation, the admissions in the post
graduate courses are to be given on the basis of the merits and
marks obtained in the NEET examination result only.
17
In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, all
these   appeal/writ   petitions   deserve   to   be   dismissed   and   are
accordingly dismissed.  No costs.
……………………………………..J.
[ARUN MISHRA]
……………………………………..J.
[M.R. SHAH]
NEW DELHI; ……………………………………..J.
OCTOBER 04, 2019. [B.R. GAVAI]
18

Whether there is any limitation prescribed and if not, whether the residuary provision (Article 137 in the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 – hereafter “the Act”) applies and for which the starting point of limitation is the date of alleged knowledge of the grant of letters of administration.= Apex court = If the probate is granted, the same operates from the date of the grant of the probate for the purpose of limitation Under Article 137 of the Limitation Act - The petition for revocation of the letters of administration are to be filed with in 3 years. Proceedings were clearly time barred, given that the original grant of the ancillary letters took place on 25.11.1994; they constituted notice to all concerned. Clearly, the petition for revocation of letters of administration was time barred. It is accordingly held that there is no infirmity in the concurrent findings impugned; the appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.

Whether there is any limitation prescribed and if not, whether the residuary provision (Article 137 in the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963 – hereafter “the Act”) applies and for which   the   starting   point   of   limitation   is   the   date   of   alleged knowledge of the grant of letters of administration.=

Apex court =  If the probate is granted, the same operates from the date of the grant of the probate for the purpose of limitation Under Article 137 of the Limitation Act - The   petition   for   revocation   of   the   letters   of administration are to be filed with in 3 years. Proceedings were clearly time barred, given that the original grant of the ancillary letters took   place   on   25.11.1994;   they   constituted   notice   to   all concerned.   Clearly,   the   petition   for   revocation   of   letters   of administration was time barred. It is accordingly held that there is no infirmity in the concurrent findings impugned; the appeal fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1399 OF 2010
RAMESH NIVRUTTI BHAGWAT ...APPELLANT
VS.
DR. SURENDRA MANOHAR PARAKHE ...RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. This appeal by special leave questions the decision of the
Bombay High Court affirming the rejection of an application for
revocation of letters of administration granted to the respondent,
(hereafter “the LOA holder”), in respect of the will of deceased Mrs.
Antoinette Bendre Bhagwat (hereafter “Antoinette”).
2
2. Antoinette was the wife of Balaji Balwant Bhagwat (hereafter
“Balaji”). The couple were permanent residents of California, US
and were US citizens. Balaji predeceased Antoinette, bequeathing
all properties to her. She died on 23.1.1981 at Alhambra, Los
Angeles   County,   California.   U.S.A.   In   her   last   will   dated
24.6.1977, she bequeathed her properties to her husband. The
will stipulated that in the event of Balaji predeceasing her, the
property  was  to  vest  in  an  inter   ­   vivos  trust.  The  trust  was
created   by   the   testatrix   and   her   husband   by   a   deed   dated
24.6.1977.   The   Executor   had   filed   a   petition   for   probate   of
Antoinette’s will (Probate Case No. 662463 in the Superior Court
of the State of California for Los Angeles County). It was probated
on 26.2.1981.
3. On 02.11.1982, Dinkar Sambhaji Patole (hereafter “Patole”)
as   constituted   attorney   of   the   original   executor’s   successor,
applied to the Bombay High Court (Petition No. 915/ 1982) for
grant of letters of administration with an authenticated copy of
the will annexed to the petition, in respect of the property and
credit of the deceased, in the State of Maharashtra. Patole died
3
during the pendency of proceedings which were continued by Dr.
Surendra Manohar Parakhe who was duly brought on record.
letters of administration were granted by the High Court by order
dated 24.11.1994.
4. Ramesh   Nivrutti   Bhagwat,   the   appellant   (hereafter
“Ramesh”) claiming to be a relative of Antoinette’s husband, took
out a notice of motion (No. 912 of 1997) in Petition No. 915/ 1982
(i.e.   the   original   administration   proceeding).   That   application
(notice of motion) was allowed to be withdrawn, with liberty to
initiate appropriate proceedings. Ramesh claimed that neither he
nor his father, nor any other family member had notice of the
administration   petition.   It   was   alleged   that   only   when   the
respondent LOA holder applied for mutation of name of Rural
Gospel and Medical Mission of India, on the basis of the letters
issued by the court, did he come to know about it after making
inquiries in the office of the High Court. Ramesh claimed that on
29.03.1997 he learnt that the respondent had obtained letters of
administration in respect of the will of Balaji by filing another
Petition   No.   912/   97.   This   was   allowed   to   be   withdrawn   on
4
01.04.1998.   He   then   filed   an   application   for   revocation   on
29.07.1999.
5. Ramesh alleged that the LOA holder had not complied with
the direction of the court granting letters of administration by
preparing  an  inventory of   the  property and  credits  within   six
months,   and   further   that   he   did   not   render   accounts   of   the
property and credits within one year. The other allegation was
that letters of administration were obtained by suppression of
material facts and by misleading the Court. The appellant alleged
that his uncle, late Balaji, had established the Bhagwant Mukti
Ashram and the name of the Ashram was mutated in the revenue
records in respect of the property. The testatrix’s will and that of
Balaji clearly showed that their intention was to use the property
for charitable purposes. The appellant Ramesh also alleged that
the Superior Court of California granted probate to John Graf
Klotzle who was named as the successor by the earlier executor
(Carl   Kinsinger)   and   that   the   said   executor   appointed   the
respondent as his attorney for obtaining letters of administration.
Therefore, it was alleged that the LOA holder was not appointed
executor by the will. It was alleged that the probate was obtained
5
from   the   Superior   Court   of   California   without   notice   to   the
petitioner or his father or any other relative. It was alleged to have
been obtained by fraud and suppression of material facts and the
said decision is given contrary to, and ignoring the law in force in
India.
6. The LOA holder opposed the application for cancellation of
probate   on   several   grounds,   including   that   the   petition   was
barred by the law of limitation, inasmuch as such applications
are covered by Article 137 of the Limitation Act,1963, and the
petition ought to have been presented within three years. It was
urged that even if the period of pendency of notice of motion were
excluded, the petition for cancellation of probate was barred by
time. It was also urged that the appellant had no locus standi to
apply for revocation of the grant as he had no interest in the
estate of the deceased on intestacy. It was alleged that the letters
of administration granted by the court was an ancillary grant
under Sections 228 and 271 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925
and could not be revoked as long as the original grant subsisted.
6
The Superior Court of California which probated the will followed
the necessary procedure.
7. A learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court relied on
Rukminidevi v. Narendra Lal Gupta, (1985) 1 SCC 144, to say that
if a party does not contest proceedings for grant of probate, it
cannot   be   permitted   to   question   the   validity   of   the   will   by   a
collateral attack in different proceedings. The court held that the
grant being  in rem,  binds not only persons who are parties but
also others who are not parties to the proceedings, whether they
had notice or not. The probate granted by the competent court is
conclusive on the validity of the will unless revoked in accordance
with law, and no evidence can be admitted to impeach it except in
the proceedings for revocation. Thus, since the original probate
granted by the California court was not challenged by appropriate
proceedings   and   since   the   probate   was   in   force,   there   is   no
question of revoking an ancillary grant which was merely to give
effect to the original probate of the will granted by the California
court.   The   Single   Judge   also   held   that   since   the   letters   of
administration   were   granted   in   ancillary   proceedings   on
7
25.11.1994   and   the   petition   for   its   revocation   was   filed   on
21.7.1999, proceedings were time barred. The Single Judge held
that such proceedings are covered by Article 137 of the Limitation
Act, 1963, which requires the application to be filed within 3
years from the date when the right to apply accrues. Even if the
period spent on the notice of motion from 29.3.1997 to 1.4.1998
were excluded from consideration, the petition for revocation was
filed beyond the period of three years from 25.11.1994, as the
three   year   period   expired   on   24.11.1997,   and   the   revocation
petition was filed on 21.7.1999. The court, after excluding the
period   of   seven   months   and   two   days   spent   in   pursuing   the
remedy of notice of motion, held it to be hopelessly barred by
time. The Single Judge also held that the appellant Ramesh was
not an heir of the deceased ­ a fact admitted by him in the
rejoinder   affidavit.   In   view   of   these   facts,   the   application   for
revocation was rejected. Ramesh appealed unsuccessfully to the
Division Bench. The judgment of the Division Bench rejected the
sole contention made in the appeal, that the law prescribed no
limitation   for   an   application   of   cancellation   of   letters   of
administration.
8
8. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that Ramesh had
no   notice   of   the   proceedings   initiated   for   grant   of   letters   of
administration   and   that   he   and   his   father   (Balaji’s   brother)
became aware of the fact only when the properties were sought to
be   mutated   in   the   revenue   records,   pursuant   to   the   letters
granted.   It   was   submitted   that   the   limitation   for   filing   an
application should be calculated from the date of knowledge of the
grant, and not the date of grant.
9. Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, urged this
court to dismiss the appeal. It was contended that the letters of
administration in respect of the will in question dated 24.06.1977
were   granted   by   the   court   after   due   notice   and   citation;
proceedings   for   their   grant   were  in   rem.  Consequently,   when
granted, the letters of administration operated against the entire
world. The cause of action, if any, for seeking their cancellation,
therefore, accrued from the date of their grant, and not on the
date of knowledge of grant, in the absence of any allegation of
fraud.
9
10. As evident, the appellant’s application for cancellation of the
letters   of   administration   was   rejected   concurrently.   The   only
question urged is whether there is any limitation prescribed and if
not, whether the residuary provision (Article 137 in the schedule
to the Limitation Act, 1963 – hereafter “the Act”) applies and for
which   the   starting   point   of   limitation   is   the   date   of   alleged
knowledge of the grant of letters of administration.
11. The relevant provisions dealing with recognition in respect of
grant of probate, of letters of administration in respect of the
probate   granted,   and   cancellation   of   probate   (or   letters   of
administration)   of   the   Indian   Succession   Act,   1925,   read   as
follows:
“Section  228  ­  Administration,  with  copy  annexed,
of authenticated  copy of Will proved abroad
When a Will has been proved and deposited in a Court of
competent jurisdiction situated beyond the limits of the
State, whether within or beyond the limits of 1 India, and
a properly authenticated copy of the Will  is   produced,
letters of administration may be granted with a copy of
such copy annexed.
               ­­­­­           ­­­­­            ­­­­­­
Section 263 ­ Revocation or annulment for just cause
10
The grant of probate or letters of administration may be
revoked or annulled for just cause.
Explanation.—Just cause shall be deemed to exist where—
(a) the proceedings to obtain the grant were defective in
substance; or
(b) the grant was obtained fraudulently by making a false
suggestion, or  suggestion,   or   by   concealing   from   the
Court something material to the  case; or
(c)   the   grant   was   obtained   by   means   of   an   untrue
allegation of a fact essential in point of law to justify the
grant, though such allegation was  made   in   ignorance
or inadvertently; or
(d) the grant has become useless and inoperative through
circumstances; or
(e) the person to whom the grant was made has willfully
and   without   reasonable   cause   omitted   to   exhibit   an
inventory or account in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter   VII   of   this   Part,   or   has   exhibited   under   that
Chapter an inventory or account which is untrue in a
material respect.
Illustrations
(i)   The   Court   by   which   the   grant   was   made   had   no
jurisdiction.
(ii) The grant was made without citing parties who ought
to have been cited.
(iii) The Will of which probate was obtained was forged or
revoked.
11
(iv) A obtained letters of administration to the estate of B,
as his widow, but it has since transpired that she was
never married to him.
(v) A has been taken administration to the estate of B as if
he had died  intestate,   but   a   Will   has   since   been
discovered.
(vi) Since probate was granted, a latter Will has been
discovered.
(vii)   Since   probate   was   granted,   a   codicil   has   been
discovered which revokes or adds to the appointment of
executors under the Will.
(viii)   The   person   to   whom   probate   was,   or   letters   of
administration were,  granted   has   subsequently
become of unsound mind.
           ­­­­­­­­­­     ­­­­­­­­­­­­­        ­­­­­­­­­­­
276. Petition for probate­(1) Application for probate or
for letters of  administration,   with   the   Will   annexed,
shall be made by a petition distinctly written in English or
in the language in ordinary use in  proceedings   before
this Court in which the application is made, with the Will
or, in the cases mentioned in sections 237, 238 and 239,
a   copy,   draft,   or   statement   of   the   contents   thereof,
annexed, and stating—
(a) the time of the testator's death,
(b)   that   the   writing   annexed   is   his   last   Will   and
testament,
(c) that it was duly executed,
(d) the amount of assets which are likely to come to
the petitioner's hands, and
(e)   when   the   application   is   for probate,   that   the
petitioner is the executor  named in the Will.
12
(2)   In   addition   to   these   particulars,   the   petition   shall
further  state ­
(a) when the application is to the District Judge, that
the deceased at the time of his death had a fixed
place of abode, or had some property, situate within
the jurisdiction of the Judge; and
(b) when the application is to a District Delegate, that
the deceased at the time of his death had a fixed
place   of   abode   within   the   jurisdiction   of   such
Delegate.
(3) Where the application is to the District Judge and nay
portion of the   assets   likely   to   come   to   the   petitioner's
hands is situate in another State, the petition shall further
state the amount of such assets in each  State   and   the
District Judges within whose jurisdiction such assets are
situate.”
12. The   Indian   Succession   Act,   1925   does   not   prescribe   a
specific period of limitation for the grant of probate, or for moving
an   application   for   cancellation   of   probate   or   letters   of
administration. The residuary entry Article 137 of the Act, which
covers proceedings for which no period of limitation is stipulated
in the Act, provides for a three­year period of limitation. Article
137 reads as follows:
Description  Period of
limitation
Time from which
period begins to
run                     
13
37. Any other
application       
for   which   no
period   of
limitation   is
provided
elsewhere in this
Division.
Three years    When   the   right   to
apply accrues
13. This issue was considered in Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur v.
Kirandeep Kaur & Ors., (2008) 8 SCC 463.  This court negatived
the plea that since the Act prescribes no period of limitation in
regard   to   matters   concerning   grant   of   probate   or   letters   of
administration, there is no time limit. The court followed the
decision in the Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P.
Kunhaliumma,   (1977) 1 SCR 996 which took note of the change
in the collocation of words in Article 137 of the Limitation Act,
1963 compared with Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and
held that applications contemplated under Article 137 are not
applications confined to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In the
older   Limitation   Act   of   1908,   there   was   no   division   between
applications in specified cases and other applications, as in the
14
Limitation Act, 1963. The court held in  Kerala State Electricity
Board (supra) that:
“The words "any other application" under Article 137
cannot be said on the principle of ejusdem generis to
be applications under the Civil Procedure Code other
than those mentioned in Part I of the third division.
Any other application under Article 137 would be
petition or any application under any Act. But it has
to be an application to a court for the reason that
Sections 4 and 5 of the 1963 Limitation Act speak of
expiry of prescribed period when court is closed and
extension   of   prescribed   period   if   applicant   or   the
appellant satisfies the court that he had sufficient
cause for not preferring the appeal or making the
application during such period.
                 ­­­­­­­­      ­­­­­­          ­­­­­
22. The conclusion we reach is that Article 137 of the
1963   Limitation   Act   will   apply   to   any   petition   or
application filed under any Act to a civil court. With
respect we differ from the view taken by the twojudge bench of this Court in Athani Municipal Council
case and hold that Article 137 of the 1963 Limitation
Act is not confined to applications contemplated by
or under the Code of Civil Procedure.”
14. Applying  the  ratio  in  Kerala   Electricity   Board   (supra),  the
court, in Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur (supra) observed that:
“the crucial expression in the petition is "right to
apply". In view of what has been stated by this
Court, Article 137 is clearly applicable to the petition
15
for   grant   of   letters   of   administration.   As   rightly
observed by the High Court in such proceedings the
application merely seeks recognition from the Court
to   perform   a   duty   because   of   the   nature   of   the
proceedings it is a continuing right.”
The  court then concluded that  the  right  to  apply  for  probate
accrues on the date of death of the testator.
15. Recently, in  Sameer Kapoor   and Another v. State through
Sub­Divisional   Magistrate   South,   New   Delhi   and   Others,  2019
Online   SCC   630   (SC),   the   context   was   slightly   different;   the
probate   was   issued   by   a   foreign   court.   The   executor   sought
letters of administration in an Indian court (like in the present
case), under Section 228. The court dealt with the objection of
limitation, and noticed, firstly, that  Kunvarjeet Singh Khadapur
(supra)  had ruled about applicability of Article 137 for  grant of
probate in the first instance. Drawing a distinction from the grant
of probate (or letters of administration) and the recognition of
that, under Section 228, the court (in  Sameer Kapoor (supra))
held as follows:
“it   can   be   said   that   in   a   proceeding,   or  in   other
words, in an application filed for grant of probate or
letters   of   administration,   no   right   is   asserted   or
claimed by the applicant. The applicant only seeks
16
recognition of the court to perform a duty. Probate or
letters of administration issued by a competent court
is conclusive proof of the legal character throughout
the world. That the proceedings filed for grant of
probate or letters of administration is not an action
in law but it is an action in rem. As held by this
Court   in   the   case   of   Kunvarjeet   Singh   Khandpur
(supra), an application for grant of probate or letters
of   administration   is   for   the   court's   permission   to
perform   a   legal   duty   created   by   a   will   or   for
recognition   as   a   testamentary   trustee   and   is   a
continuous right which can be exercised any time
after the death of the deceased, as long as the right
to do so survives and the object of the trust exists or
any   part   of   the   trust,   if   created,   remains   to   be
executed.”
16. The decision in Lynette Fernandes v. Gertie Mathias,  (2018)
1 SCC 271, dealt with the precise issue of the period of limitation
applicable   for   an   application   for   cancellation   of   a   probate   or
letters of administration. This court held as follows:
“One must keep in mind that the grant of probate by
a Competent Court operates as a judgment in rem
and once the probate to the Will is granted, then
such   probate   is   good   not   only   in   respect   of   the
parties to the proceedings, but against the world. If
the probate is granted, the same operates from the
date of the grant of the probate for the purpose of
limitation Under Article 137 of the Limitation Act in
proceedings for revocation of probate. In this matter,
as mentioned supra, the Appellant was a minor at
the time of grant of probate. She attained majority on
09.09.1965. She got married on 27.10.1965. In our
17
considered   opinion,   three   years   limitation   as
prescribed Under Article 137 runs from the date of
the Appellant attaining the age of majority i.e. three
years from 09.09.1965. The Appellant did not choose
to initiate any proceedings till the year 25.01.1996
i.e., a good 31 years after she attained majority. No
explanation worthy of acceptance has been offered
by the Appellant to show as to why she did not
approach   the   Court   of   law   within   the   period   of
limitation. At the cost of repetition, we observe that
the Appellant failed to produce any evidence to prove
that   the   Will   was   a   result   of   fraud   or   undue
influence.   The   same   Will   has   remained   unchallenged until the date of filing of application for
revocation. No acceptable explanation is offered for
such a huge delay of 31 years in approaching the
Court   for   cancellation   or   revocation   of   grant   of
probate.”
17. In   the   present   case,   the   letters   of   administration   were
granted in ancillary proceedings on 25.11.1994. The High Court
took note of the fact that the notice of motion (in the disposed of
proceeding)   was   filed   on   29.03.1997;   it   was   withdrawn   on
01.04.1998.   The   petition   for   revocation   of   the   letters   of
administration were filed on 29.7.1999. Proceedings were clearly
time barred, given that the original grant of the ancillary letters
took   place   on   25.11.1994;   they   constituted   notice   to   all
concerned.   Clearly,   the   petition   for   revocation   of   letters   of
administration was time barred. It is accordingly held that there
18
is no infirmity in the concurrent findings impugned; the appeal
fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.
........................................J.
                                              [ARUN MISHRA]
........................................J.
                                         [VINEET SARAN]
........................................J.
                                              [S. RAVINDRA BHAT]
New Delhi,
October 04, 2019.

Whether the Regulation 4(3) of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Compassionate Appointment Regulations, 2010 (for short, ‘the Regulations’) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ? According to Regulation 4(3) of the Regulations, claim for both compassionate appointment and compensation under the Act cannot be made against the Corporation in case of death of an employee while travelling in the vehicle of the Appellant-Corporation. Regulation 4(3) was found to be discriminatory because compassionate appointment can be provided to an employee who dies in an accident while travelling in a vehicle not belonging to the Corporation though he had claimed compensation either from the owner of the vehicleor the insurance company, under the Act. = High court held it as violative but Apex court set aside the same and held it as no violative art.14 of the constitution. Apex court held that = in National Insurance Company Limited v. Rekhaben and Others. The question that arose for consideration of this Court related to the deduction of salary that was earned by the claimant therein after being appointed on compassionate grounds while calculating the compensation payable to her under the Act for the death of her husband. It was held that the salary earned by compassionate appointment cannot be deducted from the compensation which the claimant is entitled under the Act. However, it was made clear that the salary which flowed from the compassionate appointment that was provided by the tortfeasor was liable to be deducted if the employer was the owner of the offending vehicle and thus liable to pay compensation under the Act. In other words, the employer who has provided compassionate appointment can claim deduction of the salary of the dependent while calculating if he is liable to pay compensation under the Act, being the owner of the offending vehicle.Therefore, Regulation 4(3) cannot be said to be discriminatory. In the aforementioned view, we are not in agreement with the judgment passed by the High Court that Regulation 4(3) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Whether the Regulation 4(3) of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation
Compassionate Appointment Regulations, 2010 (for short, ‘the Regulations’) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. ?

According to Regulation 4(3) of the Regulations, claim for both compassionate appointment
and compensation under the Act cannot be made against the Corporation in case of death of an employee while travelling in the vehicle of the Appellant-Corporation. Regulation 4(3) was found to be discriminatory because compassionate appointment can be provided to an employee who dies in an accident while travelling in a vehicle not belonging to the Corporation though he had claimed compensation either from the owner of the vehicleor the insurance company, under the Act. = High court held it as violative but Apex court set aside the same and held it as no violative art.14 of the constitution.

Apex court held that =  in National Insurance Company Limited v. Rekhaben
and Others. The question that arose for consideration of this Court related to the deduction of salary that was earned by the claimant therein after being appointed on compassionate grounds while calculating the compensation payable to her under the Act for the death of her husband. It was held that the salary earned by compassionate appointment cannot be deducted from the compensation which the claimant is entitled under the Act. However, it was made clear that the salary which flowed from the compassionate appointment that was provided by the tortfeasor was liable to be deducted if the employer was the owner of the offending vehicle and thus liable to pay compensation under the Act. In other words, the employer who has provided compassionate appointment can claim deduction of the salary of the dependent while calculating if he is liable to pay compensation under the Act, being the owner of the offending vehicle.Therefore, Regulation 4(3) cannot be said to be discriminatory. In the aforementioned view, we are not in agreement with the judgment passed by the High Court that Regulation 4(3) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No. 7802 of 2019
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.4772 of 2017)
RAJASTHAN STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION.

.... Appellant(s)
Versus
DANISH KHAN
 …. Respondent (s)
With
Civil Appeal No. 7803 of 2019
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.13139 of 2017)
J U D G M E N T
L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.
1. The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (for
short, ‘the Corporation’) has filed the above Appeal
aggrieved by the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court of
Judicature, Jaipur Bench by which Regulation 4(3) of the
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation
Compassionate Appointment Regulations, 2010 (for short,
‘the Regulations’) has been declared as violative of Article
14 of the Constitution of India.
1
2. The Respondent’s father Mohd. Shahid who was
working as a Helper in the Appellant-Corporation died in a
motor accident. He was travelling in a bus of the
Appellant-Corporation which collided with another bus. A
claim was made by the Respondent before the Motor
Accident Claim Tribunal, Tonk (for short, ‘the Tribunal’)
under Section 166 and 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
(for short, ‘the Act’). An amount of Rs.1,35,50,000/- was
claimed, but the Tribunal awarded a compensation of
Rs.22,95,775/-.
3. The Respondent made a representation to the Chief
Manager of the Appellant-Corporation seeking
compassionate appointment. The request for
compassionate appointment was rejected on the ground
that the Respondent was not entitled in light of Regulation
4(3) of the Regulations. Dissatisfied with the rejection of
the request for compassionate appointment, the
Respondent filed a Writ Petition in the High Court
challenging the constitutionality of Regulation 4(3). The
High Court allowed the Writ Petition by a judgment dated
29.08.2016 on the ground that Regulation 4(3) of the
2 | P a g e
Regulations is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of
the Constitution.
4. The High Court held that the object of compassionate
appointment is to mitigate the hardship of the family
members of the bread-winner and for that reason
compassionate appointment should be provided to the
family in distress. According to Regulation 4(3) of the
Regulations, claim for both compassionate appointment
and compensation under the Act cannot be made against
the Corporation in case of death of an employee while
travelling in the vehicle of the Appellant-Corporation.
Regulation 4(3) was found to be discriminatory because
compassionate appointment can be provided to an
employee who dies in an accident while travelling in a
vehicle not belonging to the Corporation though he had
claimed compensation either from the owner of the vehicle
or the insurance company, under the Act.
5. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to take note
of Regulation 4(3) of the Regulations which is as follows:
“On the occasion of death of any employee of the
Corporation while performing his duty or a vehicular death
by the vehicle belonging to the Corporation. If the legal
3 | P a g e
representatives of the deceased employee seek
compensation from the Corporation by filing a claim petition
before the accident tribunal and the same is awarded or the
matter remains pending before the tribunal. In such a case
the Legal representatives of the deceased employee shall
have no right to seek appointment on compassionate
ground, if compensation is awarded or the matter remains
pending before the tribunal. If on the death of an employee
of the Corporation his Legal representative at the time of
compassionate appointment files an application for the
same in the prescribed format then the application for
appointment on compassionate ground has to be
supplemented with an Affidavit on a non-judicial stamp
paper of Rs.10/- by the legal representative that no claim
petition against the corporation has been filed before any
competent court and also that no such claim shall be filed in
the future and if in future even if any of the legal
representatives files a claim petition before MACT then the
employer/ Corporation shall have right to cancel my
appointment without any notice and that I won’t file any
case against such dismissal before any competent court.”

6. According to the said Regulation, the death of an
employee of the Corporation while travelling in a vehicle
belonging to the Appellant-Corporation cannot give rise to
4 | P a g e
compensation under the Act as well as a claim for
compassionate appointment in the Appellant- Corporation.
The question that arises for our consideration is whether
the High Court was right in holding that Regulation 4(3) is
discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. The reason given by the High Court to hold it
unconstitutional is that whereas the dependents of the
employee who died in an accident while on a vehicle
owned by the Appellant-Corporation are not entitled for
compassionate appointment after claiming compensation
under Act, the dependents of an employee who died in an
accident while travelling in a vehicle not owned by the
Appellant-Corporation are entitled to get compensation
under the Act against the owner of the vehicle or the
insurance company as the case may be, as well as a right
to claim compassionate appointment. The High Court was
of the opinion that the dependents of employees of the
Corporation who died due to an accident while travelling in
a vehicle of the Corporation cannot be treated differently
from dependents of employees who died in an accident
while travelling in a vehicle not belonging to the
Corporation.
5 | P a g e
7. The Corporation has carved out two classes of
dependents of the deceased employees in respect of
claims for compassionate appointment. The reason for the
disqualification of the dependents of an employee who
died in an accident involving the vehicle of the Corporation
is to avoid extra burden on the Appellant- Corporation. In
such cases, the Appellant- Corporation has to pay the
compensation under the Act and also to provide
compassionate appointment to the dependents of the
deceased employee. In a case where the vehicle of the
Appellant- Corporation is not involved in the accident, the
compensation under the Act is not the liability of the
Appellant- Corporation. It cannot be said that the
dependents of an employee who claim both compensation
under the Act and compassionate appointment from the
Appellant- Corporation are on the same footing as the
dependents of the deceased employee whose claim under
the Act against a private owner or an insurance company,
and compassionate appointment from AppellantCorporation.
8. The dependents of a deceased employee who claim
compensation from the Corporation under the Act and
6 | P a g e
compassionate appointment from the AppellantCorporation from a separate class. It is well-settled that
though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid
reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation.
When any impugned rule or statutory provision is assailed
on the ground that it contravenes Article 14, its validity
can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. The first test is
that the classification on which it is founded must be based
on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
things grouped together from others left out of the group;
and the second test is that the differentia in question must
have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question.1
9. Having held that the classification of the two
categories of dependents of deceased employees is
reasonable, what remains to be examined is whether there
is a rationale nexus of the classification with the objective
sought to be achieved by the Regulations 4(3). The
intention with which Regulation 4(3) is made is to obviate
the liability of the Corporation in payment of compensation
under the Act and to provide compassionate appointment
to the same person. We find there is a rational nexus
1 State of Mysore & Anr vs P. Narasing Rao, 1968 SCR (1) 407
7 | P a g e
between the basis of classification and the object sought to
be achieved by the Regulation.
10. It is useful to refer to a judgment of this Court in
National Insurance Company Limited v. Rekhaben
and Others.
2
 The question that arose for consideration
of this Court related to the deduction of salary that was
earned by the claimant therein after being appointed on
compassionate grounds while calculating the
compensation payable to her under the Act for the death
of her husband. It was held that the salary earned by
compassionate appointment cannot be deducted from the
compensation which the claimant is entitled under the Act.
However, it was made clear that the salary which flowed
from the compassionate appointment that was provided by
the tortfeasor was liable to be deducted if the employer
was the owner of the offending vehicle and thus liable to
pay compensation under the Act. In other words, the
employer who has provided compassionate appointment
can claim deduction of the salary of the dependent while
calculating if he is liable to pay compensation under the
Act, being the owner of the offending vehicle.
2
(2017) 13 SCC 547
8 | P a g e
11. The two categories of dependents i.e. dependents of
employees who have died in an accident while travelling in
a vehicle belonging to the Corporation and dependents of
the employees who died while travelling in a vehicle not
belonging to the Corporation are not similarly situated in
respect of their claims against the Corporation. They
cannot be treated as equals. Therefore, Regulation 4(3)
cannot be said to be discriminatory. In the aforementioned
view, we are not in agreement with the judgment passed
by the High Court that Regulation 4(3) is violative of Article
14 of the Constitution.
12. As the Respondent has received the compensation
under the Act, he is not entitled for compassionate
appointment under the Regulations.
13. In view of the above, the judgment of the High Court
is set aside the Appeal is allowed.
Civil Appeal No. 7803 of 2019
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.13139 of 2017)
The application preferred by the Respondent for
compassionate appointment was rejected by the Corporation
as being not maintainable under Regulation 4(3) of the
9 | P a g e
Regulations, due to the fact that the Respondent has filed a
claim petition under the Act. The High Court allowed the Writ
Petition as being covered by a judgment in Civil Writ Petition
No.13862 of 2014. The Appeal filed by the Corporation is
allowed in terms of the judgment in Civil Appeal No. 7802 of
2019 (@ S.L.P.(C) No.4772 of 2017).
 ..…................................J.
 [L. NAGESWARA RAO]
 ..…................................J.
 [HEMANT GUPTA]
New Delhi,
October 04, 2019
10 | P a g e

In the absence of application for allotment of land for public purpose - in the absence of interest to participate in court proceedings, when the allotment was cancelled after knowing the mistake and alloted to LIC- the purpose of order of 'division bench to persue the matter when parties appears before the authority serves no purpose and as such it is set aside.

In the absence of application for allotment of land for public purpose - in the absence of interest to participate in court proceedings, when the allotment was cancelled after knowing the mistake and alloted to LIC- the purpose of order of 'division bench to persue the matter when parties appears before the authority serves no purpose and as such it is set aside.

1
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 5308 OF 2010
SMT. KASTURIBAI SUKHARAM
KHANDELWAL TRUST      .….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
INDORE DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY & ORS.           .…RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 5309 OF 2010
INDORE DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY                ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
SHRI KHANDELWAL TRUST & ORS.     ….RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
Rastogi, J.
1. Both the appellants (respondents before the High Court) being
dissatisfied with the impugned judgment dated 4th  November, 2008
have preferred these appeals.
2. The facts in brief relevant for the purpose are that the appellant
Smt. Kasturibai Sukharam Khandelwal Trust and the 2nd respondent
2
Shri Khandelwal Trust (writ petitioner) are registered public trusts.
The   2nd  respondent   made   an   application   directly   to   the   Indore
Development   Authority(hereinafter   referred   to   as   “Authority”)   for
allotment of land for public purpose and to carry out trust activities on
30th  September, 1988.   In sequel thereto, another application was
addressed to  the  then  Chief Minister on  29th  December,  1988 for
allotment of land for the purpose of construction of a community hall
to be used for public purposes.
3. The   authority   thereafter   issued   an   advertisement   dated   7th
September,   1989   inviting   applications   for   allotment   of   land   to
registered   institutions   indicating   necessary   requirements   to   be
furnished   by   the   institutions   desirous   for   allotment   of   land.     In
response   to   the   advertisement,   the   appellant   Trust   submitted   an
application   on   9th  October,   1989.     After   the   applications   were
processed, the authority took a decision to allot 50,000 sq. ft land in
scheme   no.   54/75­C   in   favour   of   the   appellant   Trust   vide
communication   dated   2nd  July,   1990   and   simultaneously,   the
authority also communicated the decision for allotment of 30,000 sq.
ft.   of   land   in   Scheme   No.   54/74­C   to   the   2nd  respondent   vide
communication dated 2nd July, 1990.
4. Immediately  after  it   reveals  to   the   authority   of  the   allotment
3
being made to both the trusts of the same community at the same
place, the authority revisited its decision and under its Resolution no.
21 dated 11th February, 1991 decided that it may not be advisable to
allot   land   to   two   trusts   of   Khandelwal   community,   cancelled   the
application   of   the   2nd  respondent   and   confirmed   the   allotment   in
favour of the appellant Trust and that became the subject matter of
challenge in a writ petition filed at the instance of the 2nd respondent
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
5. The Single Judge of the High Court, after hearing the parties,
dismissed the writ petition under its order dated 1st  February, 2001
which came to be challenged in letters patent appeal.   The Division
Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, taking note of the rival
claim of the parties and noticing the fact that, in the interregnum
period,   the   plot   had   also   been   allotted   to   Life   Insurance
Corporation(respondent no. 4) which was nowhere the subject matter
but still taking note of the material on record and giving quietus to the
dispute, disposed of the writ petition under its order impugned dated
4
th November, 2008 with a direction to the authority to reconsider the
matter   of   allotment   of   land   afresh   after   affording   opportunity   of
hearing to the parties and assess the comparative assessment and
merit of the appellant Trust and 2nd  respondent and pass speaking
4
order in accordance with law. 
6. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the appellant Trust
submits that the allotment could be made in terms of the Regulations
for   Disposal,   1987(hereinafter   being   referred   to   as   “Disposal
Regulations 1987”) which has been framed in exercise of power under
Section 58 read with Section 86 of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha
Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 and procedure for allotment has been
provided under Chapter III and Regulation 3(A) clearly postulates that
where   the   authority   proposes   to   transfer   any   property   except   as
provided under Regulation 3(B), 3(C) and 3(D), it may do so by (a)
public auction; or (b) inviting tenders or (iii) inviting applications from
eligible persons either on continuing registration basis or otherwise, as
may be specified in terms of the advertisement. 
7. The present appellant Trust submitted application pursuant to
an advertisement inviting applications dated 7th September, 1989 and
indisputedly no application was submitted by the 2nd respondent, still
the application was processed but, after noticing by the authority that
the   allotment   of   land  to  2nd  respondent   being  in   contravention   of
Chapter   III   of   Disposal   Regulations,   1987,   the   mistake   was
immediately rectified by cancelling the letter of allotment in favour of
the   2nd  respondent   and   confirmed   the   allotment   in   favour   of   the
5
appellant Trust under its Resolution No. 21 dated 11th February, 1991
and the decision of the Authority being in conformity with Chapter III
of Disposal Regulations, 1987, interference in writ appeal was not
justiciable and deserves to be interfered by this Court.
8. Learned counsel further submitted that the 2nd respondent does
not appear to be interested in the instant proceedings to put forth his
claim.   At the same time, the present appellant had constructed a
community hall which has been used for public purposes and also by
the community for a sufficient long period and the Division Bench of
the High Court was not justified in reopening and reverting back to
square one leaving the authority to decide their respective claims at
such belated stage and, therefore, impugned judgment deserves to be
set aside.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant in the connected appeal filed
by Indore Development Authority, while supporting the submissions,
further submits that apart from the fact that 2nd respondent had not
submitted any application for allotment pursuant to an advertisement
dated 7th September, 1989 required under Disposal Regulations, 1987,
the authority was of the view that it will not be advisable to provide
adjoining   plots   to   one   community   and   after   revisiting   the   factual
matrix of the matter considered it appropriate to cancel the decision
6
for allotment made in favour of the 2nd respondent and there being no
error   in   the   decision   making   process   held   by   the   authority,   the
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   committed   manifest   error   in
directing to revisit the whole process of allotment and that needs
interference by this Court.
10. Learned counsel further submits that so far as the allotment
made in favour of 4th respondent(LIC) is concerned, it has nothing to
do   with   the   allotment   made   in   reference   to   the   trust   which   is
impugned in the proceedings and calling upon the 4th respondent(LIC)
to participate in the whole process was not justiciable.
11. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and no one has put an
appearance on behalf of the contesting respondent despite service and
with their assistance perused the material available on record.
12. Indisputedly,   the   2nd  respondent   had   not   submitted   any
application for allotment of land pursuant to an advertisement inviting
applications for allotment of land dated 7th September, 1989, despite
being published in the local newspaper.  At the same time, application
of the appellant Trust was found to be in order complying with the
necessary requirements as indicated in the advertisement and after
due scrutiny of the applications, plot ad­measuring 50,000 sq. ft was
allotted to the appellant in Scheme No. 75­C for community hall by
7
letter of allotment dated 2nd July, 1990.
13. After noticing that the 2nd respondent had submitted application
for allotment of land for community hall on 30th  September, 1988
directly to the Indore Development Authority and   to the then Chief
Minister of Madhya Pradesh dated 29th  December, 1988 which was
erroneously   processed   in   the   office   of   the   authority   and   letter   of
allotment of land was issued ad­measuring 30,000 sq. ft. in Scheme
No. 74­C dated 2nd  July, 1990 and later noticing the fact that two
separate   allotments   have   been   made   in   the   same   scheme   to   two
separate trusts of the same community and that being an apparent
error, the decision was taken by the authority vide its Resolution No.
21 dated 11th February, 1991 to confirm the allotment of 50,000 sq. ft
land in favour of the present appellant at the rate of Rs. 15/­ per sq. ft
and application of the 2nd  respondent seeking allotment of land was
rejected.
14. It was not the case of either party that the appellant Trust either
failed   to   fulfil   necessary   conditions   as   referred   to   under   the
advertisement   dated   7th  September,   1989   pursuant   to   which   the
applications   were   invited   or   failed   to   fulfil   necessary   requisite
conditions for allotment under any statutory enactment or Disposal
Regulations, 1987 or there was any error being committed by the
8
authority in its decision making process while the allotment of land
was made in favour of the appellant Trust.   To the contrary, the
emphasis of the 2nd respondent while approaching to the High Court in
a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was
that vide Resolution No. 21 dated 11th February, 1991, the authority
has cancelled their allotment of land without affording opportunity of
hearing and has failed to comply with the principles of natural justice
and that appears to be the reason prevailed upon to the Division
Bench of the High Court directing the Indore Development Authority to
revisit   the   matter   of   allotment   of   land   and   take   a   decision   in
accordance with law.
15. In   the   instant   facts   and   circumstances,   the   facts   remain
indisputed that the 2nd respondent has not submitted any application
for   allotment   of   land   pursuant   to   an   advertisement   dated   7th
September, 1989.  In the ordinary course of business, there was no
justification for the authority to consider the application of the 2nd
respondent which was not in due compliance and in terms of the
advertisement   in  reference  to   which  the  applications  were  invited.
That   appears   to   be   an   apparent   error   which   was   committed   and
indeed such application was not open to scrutiny and for allotment of
land as desired by 2nd respondent and taking note of the peculiar fact
9
situation,   calling   upon   the   2nd  respondent   and   affording   an
opportunity of hearing and for comparative assessment of claim, will
remain an empty formality and no purpose was to be served.
16. In   addition   to   it,   the   2nd  respondent   (writ   petitioner)   despite
service, has chosen not to appear and participate in the proceedings
before this Court, it appears that he is not interested to pursue and to
put its claim for alleged allotment.  That apart, the allotment made to
the LIC, in any manner, have no nexus to the inter se dispute between
the two trusts with regard to allotment of land and thus, there was no
justification for the Division Bench at least to call upon respondent
no.   4   LIC   to   be   a   part   of   the   proceedings   which   the   Indore
Development   Authority   was   to   undertake   in   compliance   of   the
impugned judgment in the instant proceedings.
17. After   going   through   the   material   on   record,   we   are   of   the
considered view that directing the Indore Development Authority to
revisit the matter afresh at this stage when the lease deed of the plot
has been executed and the appellant has raised construction and is
running a community hall for the benefit of the public at large and at
the same time, the 2nd respondent has shown complete disinterest in
the proceedings, no purpose otherwise will be served if the parties are
remitted   to   the   authorities   to   examine   their   respective   claims   in
10
compliance of the impugned judgment of the Division Bench.
18. Consequently,   both   the   appeals   succeed   and   are   accordingly
allowed.  The impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High
Court dated 4th November, 2008 is hereby set aside.  No costs.
19. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
……..…………………………………J.
(N.V. RAMANA)
……..…………………………………J.
(MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
………………………………………..J.
(AJAY RASTOGI)
NEW DELHI
OCTOBER 03, 2019