Disablitiy Pension Claim = not entitled - mental disorder at the time of recruitment cannot normally be detected when a person behaves normally. Since there is a possibility of non-detection of mental disorder, therefore, it cannot be said that Schizophrenia is presumed to be attributed to or aggravated by military service.= The appellant was enrolled in the Indian Army on December 2, 2003. The invaliding Medical Board found the appellant to be suffering from Schizophrenia, which disability was assessed at 20% for a period of five years. The opinion of the Board was that disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service and consequently, the appellant was discharged from army service on May 8, 2007. The claim of the appellant for disability for short, ‘Tribunal’ 1 pension was rejected departmentally and later by the Tribunal and still aggrieved, the appellant is before this Court.= Apex court held that In the present case, clause 14(d), as amended in the year 1996 and reproduced above, would be applicable as entitlement to disability pension shall not be considered unless it is clearly established that the cause of such disease was adversely affected due to factors related to conditions of military service. Though, the provision of grant of disability pension is a beneficial provision but, mental disorder at the time of recruitment cannot normally be detected when a person behaves normally. Since there is a possibility of non-detection of mental disorder, therefore, it cannot be said that Schizophrenia is presumed to be attributed to or aggravated by military service.

Disablitiy Pension Claim = not entitled - mental disorder at the time of recruitment cannot normally be detected when a person behaves normally. Since there is a possibility of non-detection of mental disorder, therefore, it cannot be said that Schizophrenia is presumed to be attributed to or aggravated by military service.=
 The appellant was enrolled in the Indian Army on December 2, 2003. The invaliding Medical Board found the appellant to be suffering from Schizophrenia, which disability was assessed at 20% for a period of five years. The opinion of the Board was that disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service and consequently, the appellant was discharged from army service on May 8, 2007. The claim of the appellant for disability  for short, ‘Tribunal’ 1 pension was rejected departmentally and later by the Tribunal and still aggrieved, the appellant is before this Court.= Apex court held that In the present case, clause 14(d), as amended in the year 1996 and reproduced above, would be applicable as entitlement to disability pension shall not be considered unless it is clearly established that the cause of such disease was adversely affected due to factors related to conditions of military service. Though, the provision of grant of disability pension is a beneficial provision but, mental disorder at the time of recruitment cannot normally be detected when a person behaves normally. Since there is a possibility of non-detection of mental disorder, therefore, it cannot be said that Schizophrenia is presumed to be attributed to or aggravated by military service.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7672 OF 2019
(DIARY NO. 27850 OF 2017)
NO. 14666828M EX CFN NARSINGH YADAV .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1) The challenge in the present appeal is to an order passed by the
Armed Forces Tribunal, Lucknow1
 on September 23, 2011 whereby,
the claim of the appellant for grant of disability pension was not
accepted.
2) The appellant was enrolled in the Indian Army on December 2,
2003. The invaliding Medical Board found the appellant to be
suffering from Schizophrenia, which disability was assessed at 20%
for a period of five years. The opinion of the Board was that
disability was neither attributable to nor aggravated by military
service and consequently, the appellant was discharged from army
service on May 8, 2007. The claim of the appellant for disability
1 for short, ‘Tribunal’
1
pension was rejected departmentally and later by the Tribunal and
still aggrieved, the appellant is before this Court.
3) The appellant was appointed as CFN - Craftsman (Military Rank). In
Annexure RP1 which includes the signed Personal Statement of the
appellant, he was posted at 3 EME Centre, Bhopal from December
2, 2003 to August 23, 2005 and thereafter at AD Static Workshop
from August 24, 2005 till the time, he was produced before the
invaliding Medical Board. Both the places of posting of the
appellant were the peace stations. In respect of disease, the
appellant declared that he was treated, firstly, at INHS, Nivarini
Chilka on September 7 and 8, 2006, then, at Command Hospital,
Kolkata from September 9, 2006 to December 23, 2006.
Thereafter, he was treated at Military Hospital, Allahabad from
January 21, 2007 to February 21, 2007 and finally, at Command
Hospital, Kolkata from February 23, 2007 till the time, he was
examined by the invaliding Medical Board. In Part I of the Personal
Statement, the Question asked was to “Give details of any
incidents during your service which you think caused or made your
disability worse”. The answer given by the appellant was ‘NIL’. In
Part II of the Report, the Commanding Officer answered ‘No’ to the
question – “Did the Duties involve Severe/exceptional stress and
strain?”
4) The summary and opinion of the Specialist in Psychiatry of
Command Hospital (Eastern Command), Kolkata dated April 10,
2
2007 read as under:
“Summary
Period of Hospitalization:
Sec Hospital, Gopalpur 07 Sep 06 to 07 Sep 06
INHS Kaiyani, Vizag 07 Sep 06 to 15 Sep 06
CH (EC), Kolkata 16 Sep 06 to 23 Dec 06
Sick Leave 24 Dec 06 to 21 Jan 07
MH Allahabad 21 Jan 07 to 22 Feb 07
CH (EC), Kolkata 23 Feb 07 onwards till date
AFMSF-10 dated 07 Sep 06 mentions “punctual,
disciplines, dedicated, social drinker, above average
competence, cheerful, active and outgoing,
retention recommended, developed fever and
headache on 06 Sep 06 following which he was
noted to be behaving abnormally.
History of Present Illness:
Individual was brought to psychiatric attention in
mid Sep at the behest of unit authorities as he was
talking irrelevantly, laughing and crying for no
apparent reason, in the background of febrile
episode. Apparently functioning well until Sep 06
when he was noted to be aloof, lacked interest in
his work, not taking self care nor reporting for duty
in time. Found to be wandering aimlessly in the
unit. Felt that others were planning to harm him;
could hear them talking about him. Further when
onboard the train to Vizag felt he was being
followed and things happening around him was in
reference to him. When offered fruits by copassenger felt it had a special meaning often noted
to be taking irrelevantly, crying for his mother who
had died about 12 years back. Felt that others
came to know what he was thinking. Become
violent when others tried to stop him or gave
instructions to follow.”
“Opinion
21½ years old EME/Veh Mech with nearly 3½ years
service, no past or family h/o psychiatric illness.
Had a psychotic breakdown of schizophrenic nature
in Sep 06 Managed as a case of Schizophrenia F 20
3
and treated with antipsychotics, ECT and other
supportive measures. Poor response to treatment.
Presently asymptomatic, residual negative features
persist.
In view of the above, onset of his psychotic
breakdown at the start of the career, and
persistence of residual negative features, he is
unlikely to be a fit soldier for further service. Hence
recommend to be invalided from service in category
S5 of SHAPE classification as a case of
Schizophrenia F20.”
5) The Medical Board concluded that the disability is neither
attributed to army service nor aggravated by military service
though it assessed the disability at 20% for five years. Such
opinion of the Medical Board dated April 20, 2007 is the basis of
the discharge of the appellant. The opinion of the Medical Board is
as under:
“CERTIFICATE
1. Certified that the IMB held in respect of
No.14666828m CFN NS Yadav of AD State Wk Sp
C/o 99 APO to a case of SCHIZOPHRENIA F. 20.0.
2. Individual is found fit for civil job.
Date: 20 Apr. 2007 Lt. Col.
(Rajiv Kamra)”
6) The appellant relies upon an order passed by this Court in Ex. Gnr.
Laxmanram Poonia (Dead) through Legal Representatives v.
Union of India & Ors.
2
 as also the judgments in Dharamvir
Singh v. Union of India & Ors.
3
 and Union of India & Anr. v.
2 (2017) 4 SCC 697
3 (2013) 7 SCC 316
4
Rajbir Singh
4
to contend that since no note was given at the time
of enrolment of the said disease in the Army, therefore, such
disability is to be attributed to military service.
7) In Laxmanram Poonia, there was a positive finding that appellant
was overburdened with work due to scarcity of staff and he
suffered hypertension resulting in lack of sleep and hunger due to
continuous restless duty hours for several days. This Court allowed
the appeal of the appellant and granted disability pension.
8) In Dharamvir Singh, the appellant was sepoy in the Corps of
Signals of the Indian Army and was boarded out of service after
nine years of service when he was suffering from schizophrenia.
This Court relied upon Guide to Medical Officers (Military Pension),
1980 and the Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards,
19825
 to hold that since no note was given at the time of enrolment
of the person, therefore, such disease is presumed to be attributed
to or aggravated by military service. The Guide to Medical Officers
(Military Pensions), 2002 — “Entitlement: General Principles” has
mentioned following diseases in para 27 of the judgment, which
ordinarily escape detection at the time of enrolment:
“(a) Certain congenital abnormalities which are
latent and only discoverable on full investigations
e.g. Congenital Defect of Spine, Spina bifida,
Sacralisation,
(b) Certain familial and hereditary diseases e.g.
Haemophilia, Congential Syphilis,
4 (2015) 12 SCC 264
5 for short, ‘1982 Rules’
5
Haemoglobinopathy.
(c) Certain diseases of the heart and blood vessels
e.g. Coronary Atherosclerosis, Rheumatic Fever.
(d) Diseases which may be undetectable by physical
examination on enrolment, unless adequate history
is given at the time by the member e.g. Gastric and
Duodenal Ulcers, Epilepsy, Mental Disorders, HIV
Infections.
(e) Relapsing forms of mental disorders which have
intervals of normality.
(f) Diseases which have periodic attacks e.g.
Bronchial Asthma, Epilepsy, Csom, etc.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
9) This Court also extracted the relevant provisions from the 1982
Rules in the order, which read as under:-
“5. The approach to the question of entitlement to
casualty pensionary awards and evaluation of
disabilities shall be based on the following
presumptions:
Prior to and during service
(a) A member is presumed to have been in sound
physical and mental condition upon entering service
except as to physical disabilities noted or recorded
at the time of entrance.
(b) In the event of his subsequently being
discharged from service on medical grounds any
deterioration in his health, which has taken place, is
due to service.
xx xx xx
9. Onus of proof.—The claimant shall not be called
upon to prove the conditions of entitlements.
He/She will receive the benefit of any reasonable
doubt. This benefit will be given more liberally to
the claimants in field/afloat service cases.
6
xx xx xx
14. Diseases.—In respect of diseases, the
following rules will be observed—
(a) Cases in which it is established that conditions of
military service did not determine or contribute to
the onset of the disease but influenced the
subsequent courses of the disease will fall for
acceptance on the basis of aggravation.
(b) A disease which has led to an individual's
discharge or death will ordinarily be deemed to
have arisen in service, if no note of it was made at
the time of the individual's acceptance for military
service. However, if medical opinion holds, for
reasons to be stated, that the disease could not
have been detected on medical examination prior to
acceptance for service, the disease will not be
deemed to have arisen during service.
(c) If a disease is accepted as having arisen in
service, it must also be established that the
conditions of military service determined or
contributed to the onset of the disease and that the
conditions were due to the circumstances of duty in
military service.”
10) The Rule 14, as reproduced above, was amended vide Government
of India, Ministry of Defence letter No. 1(1)/81/D(Pen-C) dated 20th
June, 1996. The amended Clauses read as follows:
"Rule 14 (a)- For acceptance of a disease as
attributable to military service, the following two
conditions must be satisfied simultaneously:
(i) That the disease has arisen during the period of
military service, and
(ii) That the disease has been caused by the
conditions of employment in military service.
(b) If medical authority holds, for reasons to be
stated, that the disease although present at the
7
time of enrolment could not have been detected on
medical examination prior to acceptance for
service, the disease, will not be deemed to have
arisen during service. In case where it is established
that the military service did not contribute to the
onset or adversely affect the course disease,
entitlement for casualty pensionary award will not
be conceded even if the disease has arisen during
service.
(c) Cases in which it is established that conditions
of military service did not determine or contribute
to the onset of the disease but, influenced the
subsequent course of the disease, will fall for
acceptance on the basis of aggravation.
(d) In case of congenital, hereditary, degenerative
and constitutional diseases which are detected after
the individual has joined service, entitlement to
disability pension shall not be conceded unless it is
clearly established that the course of such disease
was adversely affected due to factors related to
conditions of military services."
11) In Rajbir Singh, this Court held that the respondents having been
discharged from service on account of medical disease/disability,
the disability must be presumed to have been arisen in the course
of service which must, in the absence of any reason recorded by
the Medical Board, be presumed to have been attributable to or
aggravated by military service. There is initial presumption that
the respondents were all physically fit and free from any disease
and in sound physical and mental condition at the time of their
entry into service. The Court held as under:
“9. As regards diseases Rule 14 of the Entitlement
Rules stipulates that in the case of a disease which
has led to an individual's discharge or death, the
disease shall be deemed to have arisen in service, if
no note of it was made at the time of individual's
acceptance for military service, subject to the
8
condition that if medical opinion holds for reasons
to be stated that the “disease could not have been
detected on medical examination prior to
acceptance for service, the same will not be
deemed to have so arisen”. ……
xx xx xx
14. The legal position as stated in Dharamvir Singh
case [Dharamvir Singh v. Union of India, (2013) 7
SCC 316 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 706] is, in our
opinion, in tune with the Pension Regulations, the
Entitlement Rules and the Guidelines issued to the
Medical Officers. The essence of the rules, as seen
earlier, is that a member of the armed forces is
presumed to be in sound physical and mental
condition at the time of his entry into service if
there is no note or record to the contrary made at
the time of such entry. More importantly, in the
event of his subsequent discharge from service on
medical ground, any deterioration in his health is
presumed to be due to military service. This
necessarily implies that no sooner a member of the
force is discharged on medical ground his
entitlement to claim disability pension will arise
unless of course the employer is in a position to
rebut the presumption that the disability which he
suffered was neither attributable to nor aggravated
by military service.
xx xx xx
16. Applying the above parameters to the cases at
hand, we are of the view that each one of the
respondents having been discharged from service
on account of medical disease/disability, the
disability must be presumed to have been arisen in
the course of service which must, in the absence of
any reason recorded by the Medical Board, be
presumed to have been attributable to or
aggravated by military service. There is admittedly
neither any note in the service records of the
respondents at the time of their entry into service
nor have any reasons been recorded by the Medical
Board to suggest that the disease which the
member concerned was found to be suffering from
could not have been detected at the time of his
entry into service. The initial presumption that the
respondents were all physically fit and free from any
9
disease and in sound physical and mental condition
at the time of their entry into service thus remains
unrebutted. Since the disability has in each case
been assessed at more than 20%, their claim to
disability pension could not have been repudiated
by the appellants.”
12) A three Judge Bench of this Court in Veer Pal Singh v. Secretary,
Ministry of Defence
6
 rejected the opinion of invaliding Medical
Board but directed the respondents to refer the case to Review
Medical Board to reassess the medical condition of the appellant
and to find out whether at the time of discharge from service, he
was suffering from disease which made him unfit to continue in
service. In the said case, the appellant was appointed in the year
1972 and was discharged in view of the opinion of the invaliding
Medical Board dated November 14, 1977. The appellant has
prayed for constitution of a fresh Medical Board to assess his
disease and disability in a writ petition filed before the Allahabad
High Court. This Court held as under:
“10. Although, the courts are extremely loath to
interfere with the opinion of the experts, there is
nothing like exclusion of judicial review of the
decision taken on the basis of such opinion. What
needs to be emphasised is that the opinion of the
experts deserves respect and not worship and the
courts and other judicial/quasi-judicial forums
entrusted with the task of deciding the disputes
relating to premature release/discharge from the
army cannot, in each and every case, refuse to
examine the record of the Medical Board for
determining whether or not the conclusion reached
by it is legally sustainable.
xx xx xx
6 (2013) 8 SCC 83
10
16. F.C. Redlich and Daniel X. Freedman in their
book titled The Theory and Practice of
Psychiatry (1966 Edn.) observed:
“Some schizophrenic reactions, which we call
psychoses, may be relatively mild and
transient; others may not interfere too
seriously with many aspects of everyday
living…. (p. 252)
Are the characteristic remissions and relapses
expressions of endogenous processes, or are
they responses to psychosocial variables, or
both? Some patients recover, apparently
completely, when such recovery occurs
without treatment we speak of spontaneous
remission. The term need not imply an
independent endogenous process; it is just as
likely that the spontaneous remission is a
response to non-deliberate but nonetheless
favourable psychosocial stimuli other than
specific therapeutic activity….” (p. 465)
(emphasis supplied)
18. In Controller of Defence Accounts
(Pension) v. S. Balachandran Nair [(2005) 13 SCC
128 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 734] on which reliance has
been placed by the Tribunal, this Court referred to
Regulations 173 and 423 of the Pension Regulations
and held that the definite opinion formed by the
Medical Board that the disease suffered by the
respondent was constitutional and was not
attributable to military service was binding and the
High Court was not justified in directing payment of
disability pension to the respondent. The same view
was reiterated in Ministry of Defence v. A.V.
Damodaran [(2009) 9 SCC 140: (2009) 2 SCC (L&S)
586] . However, in neither of those cases, this Court
was called upon to consider a situation where the
Medical Board had entirely relied upon an inchoate
opinion expressed by the psychiatrist and no effort
was made to consider the improvement made in the
degree of illness after the treatment.
19. As a corollary to the above discussion, we hold
that the impugned order as also the orders dated
14-7-2011 and 16-9-2011 passed by the Tribunal
11
are legally unsustainable. In the result, the appeal is
allowed. The orders passed by the Tribunal are set
aside and the respondents are directed to refer the
case to the Review Medical Board for reassessing
the medical condition of the appellant and find out
whether at the time of discharge from service he
was suffering from a disease which made him unfit
to continue in service and whether he would be
entitled to disability pension.”
13) In the aforesaid case, the Court referred the matter to the Review
Medical Board in view of the fact that Psychiatrist has noted that
the appellant has improved with treatment. The Court referred to
Merriam Webster Dictionary; Report of National Institute of Mental
Health, USA; Modi's Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology; and the
book titled ‘The Theory and Practice of Psychiatry’ authored by F.C.
Redlich and Daniel X. Freedman, to hold that the observations
made by Psychiatrist was substantially incompatible with the
existing literature on the subject.
14) However, in the present case, we find that there is no such infirmity
in the report of the Medical Board which may warrant
reconsideration of the physical condition and the extent of
disability by the Review Medical Board.
15) We find that it is not mechanical application of the principle that
any disorder not mentioned at the time of enrolment is presumed
to be attributed to or aggravated by military service. The question
is as to whether the person was posted in harsh and adverse
conditions which led to mental imbalance.
12
16) Annexure I to Chapter IV of the Guide to Medical Officers (Military
Pensions), 2002 — “Entitlement: General Principles” points out that
certain diseases which may be undetectable by physical
examination on enrolment including the Mental Disorders; Epilepsy
and Relapsing forms of mental disorders which have intervals of
normality, unless adequate history is given at the time by the
member. The Entitlement Rules itself provide that certain diseases
ordinarily escape detection including Epilepsy and Mental Disorder,
therefore, we are unable to agree that mere fact that
Schizophrenia, a mental disorder was not noticed at the time of
enrolment will lead to presumption that the disease was
aggravated or attributable to military service.
17) The 1982 Rules classify the diseases which are affected by climatic
conditions, stress and strain and dietary complications. The stress
and strain cause the following injuries as per the said classification
of diseases:
“(a) Psychosis and psychoneurosis.
(b) Bronchial Asthma.
(c) Myocardial infarction, and other forms of IHD.
(d) Peptic ulcer.”
18) Therefore, each case has to be examined whether the duties
assigned to the individual may have led to stress and strain leading
to Psychosis and psychoneurosis. Relapsing forms of mental
disorders which have intervals of normality and Epilepsy are
13
undetectable diseases while carrying out physical examination on
enrolment, unless adequate history is given at the time by the
member.
19) The appellant was a young boy of 18 years at the time of
enrolment and had been boarded within 3½ years of his service.
Even if he was suffering from any mental disorder prior to
enrolment, the same could not be detected as there were intervals
of normality. The appellant was posted in peace station as a
Vehicle Mechanic. Neither the nature of job nor the place of
posting was such which could have caused stress and strain
leading to disability as attributed to or aggravated by military
service.
20) In the present case, clause 14(d), as amended in the year 1996 and
reproduced above, would be applicable as entitlement to disability
pension shall not be considered unless it is clearly established that
the cause of such disease was adversely affected due to factors
related to conditions of military service. Though, the provision of
grant of disability pension is a beneficial provision but, mental
disorder at the time of recruitment cannot normally be detected
when a person behaves normally. Since there is a possibility of
non-detection of mental disorder, therefore, it cannot be said that
Schizophrenia is presumed to be attributed to or aggravated by
military service.
21) Though, the opinion of the Medical Board is subject to judicial
14
review but the Courts are not possessed of expertise to dispute
such report unless there is strong medical evidence on record to
dispute the opinion of the Medical Board which may warrant the
constitution of the Review Medical Board. The invaliding Medical
Board has categorically held that the appellant is not fit for further
service and there is no material on record to doubt the correctness
of the Report of the invaliding Medical Board.
22) Thus, we do not find any merit in the present appeal, accordingly,
the same is dismissed.
.............................................J.
(L. NAGESWARA RAO)
.............................................J.
(HEMANT GUPTA)
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 03, 2019.
15

Section 120B, 467, 467 read with 471 IPC The allegation against appellant(T. Maran) and appellant(M. Ramalingam­A2 in CC No. 03/1995) was that A2 (M. Ramalingam) along with A1 (T. Maran, Branch Manager) and Nagarajan(since deceased) conspired together so as to cheat the bank to the extent of Rs. 7000/­ without pledging the jewel. A2 (M. Ramalingam) applied for the jewel loan and the same was sanctioned by A1 (T. Maran) by making false entries in the jewel loan movement register(Exhibit P­4), as if the jewel was pledged by A2 (M. Ramalingam) but in fact there was no entry in the register thereby caused wrongful loss to the bank and wrongful gain for themselves. As per the jewel register, the jewel as shown to be pledged by A2 (M. Ramalingam) is pertaining to other loanee Sri Muthuramalingham(PW­9) (loan dated 12th November, 5 1981) and he closed his loan account (AJL No. 45/81 on 26th March, 1988) and the jewel pledged by him was not returned to him which were kept as lien. The register shows that bank had not obtained any jewel in support of loan AJL 78/89 by A2 (M. Ramalingam) and there was no entry for AJL 78/89 and in between 75/89 and 80/89, one entry has not been done.= so far as appellant M. Ramalingam(A2 in CC No. 03/1995) and appellant N. Rajangam(A2 in CC No. 05/1995) is concerned, there was no evidence on record which could at all connect them for the offences under Section 120B and 420 IPC(appellant M. Ramalingam) and Section 120B, 467, 467 read with 471 IPC(appellant N. Rajangam) and it was not the case of the prosecution that the loanee A2(N. Ramalingam and N. Rajangam) were ever aware of this fact that such a loan could be sanctioned only after a jewel being pledged. In all bonafides, it reveals from the record that applications were submitted by the loanee who are illiterate agriculturists and loan was got sanctioned by the appellant T. Maran(A1­Bank Manager) with the connivance of the Nagrajan(deceased) in violating the rules and regulations for their personal gains. We are not able to trace out any evidence in respect of dishonesty/misuse in obtaining loan without furnishing any security.In our view the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonabledoubt the charges levelled against the appellant(M. Ramalingam and N. Rajangam) in Criminal Appeal No. No. 1949 of 2009 and Criminal Appeal 347 of 2010 and, the conviction of appellant M. Ramalingamunder Section 120B and 420 IPC and appellant N. Rajangam underSection 120B, 467 read with 471 IPC deserves to be set aside.

 Section 120B, 467, 467 read with 471 IPC
The   allegation   against   appellant(T.   Maran)   and   appellant(M. Ramalingam­A2 in CC No. 03/1995) was that A2 (M. Ramalingam) along   with   A1   (T.   Maran,   Branch   Manager)   and   Nagarajan(since deceased) conspired together so as to cheat the bank to the extent of Rs. 7000/­ without pledging the jewel.  A2 (M. Ramalingam) applied for the jewel loan and the same was sanctioned by A1 (T. Maran) by making false entries in the jewel loan movement register(Exhibit P­4), as if the jewel was pledged by A2 (M. Ramalingam) but in fact there was no entry in the register thereby caused wrongful loss to the bank and wrongful gain for themselves.  As per the jewel register, the jewel as shown to be pledged by A2 (M. Ramalingam) is pertaining to other loanee   Sri   Muthuramalingham(PW­9)   (loan   dated   12th  November, 5 1981) and he closed his loan account (AJL No. 45/81 on 26th March, 1988) and the jewel pledged by him was not returned to him which were kept as lien.  The register shows that bank had not obtained any jewel in support of loan AJL 78/89 by A2 (M. Ramalingam) and there was no entry for AJL 78/89 and in between 75/89 and 80/89, one entry has not been done.=
 so far as appellant M. Ramalingam(A2 in CC No. 03/1995) and appellant N. Rajangam(A2 in CC No. 05/1995) is concerned, there was no evidence on record which could at all connect them for the offences under Section 120B and 420 IPC(appellant M. Ramalingam) and Section 120B, 467, 467 read with 471 IPC(appellant N. Rajangam) and it was not the case of the prosecution that the loanee A2(N. Ramalingam and N. Rajangam) were ever aware of this fact that such a loan could be sanctioned only after a jewel being pledged.  In all bonafides, it reveals from the record that applications were submitted by the loanee who are illiterate agriculturists and loan
was got sanctioned by the appellant T. Maran(A1­Bank Manager) with the connivance of the Nagrajan(deceased) in violating the rules and regulations for their personal gains.  
We   are   not   able   to   trace   out   any   evidence   in   respect   of dishonesty/misuse in obtaining loan without furnishing any security.In our view the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonabledoubt the charges levelled against the appellant(M. Ramalingam and N. Rajangam) in Criminal Appeal No. No. 1949 of 2009 and Criminal Appeal 347 of 2010 and, the conviction of appellant M. Ramalingamunder Section 120B and  420 IPC and appellant N. Rajangam underSection 120B, 467 read with 471 IPC deserves to be set aside.
1
NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 1949 OF 2009
M. RAMALINGAM         ..APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE REPRESENTED BY
INSPECTOR OF POLICE
SBE/CBI/ACB, MADRAS               .RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 2186­2188 OF 2009
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 347 OF 2010
J U D G M E N T
Rastogi, J.
1. The instant appeals arise from the common judgment dated 21st
July,   2009   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Madras
upholding the conviction of the appellant T. Maran (accused no. 1) for
offences under Section 120B, 467, 467 read with 471, 420, 477­A IPC
and   Section   13(2)   read   with   Section   13(1)(d)   of   Prevention   of
Corruption   Act,   1988   and   sentenced   to   undergo   rigorous
imprisonment for two years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/­ in all
the three cases and the sentence was directed to run concurrently.
2
Appellant M. Ramalingam (accused no. 2 in CC no. 03/1995) was
convicted under Section 120B and 420 IPC and sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for two years and also to pay a fine of Rs.
1,000/­ in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months for
each of the offences and appellant N. Rajangam(accused no. 2 in CC
no. 05/1995) was convicted under Section 120B, 467 read with 471
IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years
and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/­ in default to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 6 months for each of the offences. 
2. The brief facts of the case are that T.Maran(A1) in all the three
cases was the Branch Manager in the Indian Overseas Bank (IOB),
Narikudi from 4th May, 1988 to 28th January, 1991.  Accused no. 1(T.
Maran) along with one Nagrajan(A2 in CC No. 04/1995) (who was the
clerk­cum­typist   died   after   filing   of   the   charge­sheets)   were   the
custodian of the jewel safe of the Branch.   Three separate criminal
cases CC No. 03/1995, 04/1995 and 05/1995 were filed against him
and   the   allegation   was   that   appellant(T.Maran­A1)   sanctioned
agricultural jewel loan of Rs. 7,000/­ in favour of M. Ramalingam(A2
in CC No. 03/1995) in AJL No. 78/89.  It was alleged that the jewels
deposited in AJL No. 45/81 had been used by A1 (T. Maran) for the
purpose of advancing loan AJL No. 78/89 to M. Ramalingam(appellant
3
in Criminal Appeal No. 1949 of 2009).  For that purpose, account no.
AJL 45/81 was opened on 12th  November, 1981 and closed on 26th
March, 1988.
3. In a different transaction, Appellant T. Maran (A1) sanctioned
jewel loan of Rs. 7,100/­ to one Nagarajan(A2 in CC No. 04/1995­
since deceased) in JL No. 49/90.   The allegation was that the jewel
deposited in JL No. 50/90 had been altered to JL No. 49/90 and the
same was used for advancing loan to Nagarajan(deceased).  JL 50/90
was opened on 24th March, 1990 and closed on 1st June, 1990.
4. Yet in another separate transaction, appellant (T. Maran­ A1)
sanctioned agricultural jewel loan of Rs. 10,000/­ to one Rajangam
(A2 in CC No. 05/1995) in AJL NO. 123/90.  The allegation was that
the jewel deposited in AJL No 372/87 had been used for the purpose
of advancing the loan AJL No. 123/90 of Rajangam.  AJL No. 372/87
was opened on 10th  November, 1987 and closed on 28th  January,
1988.
5. It was unearthed when appellant(T. Maran­A1) went on leave
from 4th October, 1990 to 6th October, 1990.  PW­2 (Krishnamoorthy)
became in­charge and found certain discrepancies and informed the
same to the Chief Zonal Officer.  The Vigilance Officer was deputed to
4
enquire   into   the   loan   accounts   who,   after   enquiry,   found   serious
irregularities and thereafter   three separate FIR were registered and
finally the charges were framed in each of them against appellant T.
Maran(A1) who was charged under Section 120B, 467, 467 read with
471, 420, 477­A IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and accused M. Ramalingam(A2 in
CC   No.   03/1995   was   charged   under   Section   120B,   420   IPC   and
accused   N.   Rajangam(A2   in   CC   No.   05/1995)  was  charged  under
Section 120B, 467 read with 471 IPC.
6. The   allegation   against   appellant(T.   Maran)   and   appellant(M.
Ramalingam­A2 in CC No. 03/1995) was that A2 (M. Ramalingam)
along   with   A1   (T.   Maran,   Branch   Manager)   and   Nagarajan(since
deceased) conspired together so as to cheat the bank to the extent of
Rs. 7000/­ without pledging the jewel.  A2 (M. Ramalingam) applied
for the jewel loan and the same was sanctioned by A1 (T. Maran) by
making false entries in the jewel loan movement register(Exhibit P­4),
as if the jewel was pledged by A2 (M. Ramalingam) but in fact there
was no entry in the register thereby caused wrongful loss to the bank
and wrongful gain for themselves.  As per the jewel register, the jewel
as shown to be pledged by A2 (M. Ramalingam) is pertaining to other
loanee   Sri   Muthuramalingham(PW­9)   (loan   dated   12th  November,
5
1981) and he closed his loan account (AJL No. 45/81 on 26th March,
1988) and the jewel pledged by him was not returned to him which
were kept as lien.  The register shows that bank had not obtained any
jewel in support of loan AJL 78/89 by A2 (M. Ramalingam) and there
was no entry for AJL 78/89 and in between 75/89 and 80/89, one
entry has not been done.
7. The allegation against appellant(T. Maran) and A2 Nagrajan(clerk
who died after filing of the charge­sheet) in CC No. 04/1995 was that
appellant   T.   Maran(A1)   entered   in   conspiracy   to   cheat   the   bank.
Further that A2(Nagarajan­deceased) on 24th March, 1990 applied for
the jewel loan for a sum of Rs. 7,100/­ and the same was sanctioned
by A1 (T. Maran) in JL No. 49/90.  There is no entry of 24th March,
1990 in the jewel loan movement register(Exhibit P­5) for the said
jewel loan but there is entry with regard to a jewel loan no. 50/90
obtained by one ‘Irulan’ (his jewel application­Exhibit P4) and that
subsequently jewel loan no. 50/90 had been altered to JL No. 49/90
to show that the jewel was pledged for the JL No. 49/90.   JL No.
50/90 to ‘Irulan’ was sanctioned on the same date, i.e. 24th  March,
1990 and curious enough, JL No. 50/90 was closed as the loanee
‘Irulan’ redeemed the jewel and there is entry in the jewel movement
register of 1st June, 1990 to that effect.
6
8. In yet another transaction which is separately registered CC No.
05/1995, allegation was that A2 (N. Rajangam) along with appellant(T.
Maran­branch manager A1) and Nagrajan(clerk who died after filing of
the charge­sheet) have conspired so as to cheat the bank to the extent
of Rs. 10,000/­ without pledging the jewel.  The allegation was that on
30th  August, 1990, A2(N. Rajangam) applied for jewel loan for Rs.
10,000/­ without pledging the jewel.   A1 (T. Maran) sanctioned the
loan and the jewels alleged to have been pledged were not appraised
by bank appraiser and further there was no entry in the jewel loan
movement register (Exhibit P­4) with regard to AJL Nos. 123 and 124
of 1990 but whereas on 28th  August, 1990 an entry was made with
regard to jewel loan no. 122 of 1990 and on 4th  September, 1990,
another entry was made with regard to jewel loan no. 125 of 1990.  It
was alleged that jewels in AJL No. 123 of 1990 were not tallied with
the weight as the available chain weight was only 17.5 grams and not
64 grams as stated in the loan application of A2(N. Rajangam) and the
said jewel pertained to one ‘A. Karuppannan’ who pledged the jewel on
10th November, 1987 under the jewel loan no. 372/87 and received the
loan of Rs. 2,000/­ and the loan account was closed by him on 28th
January, 1988 but the jewel was not returned to him as the same was
kept as lien over the bullock cart loan 8/84.
7
9. It is to be noticed that apart from the criminal case, both the
employees faced departmental enquiry and after being held guilty,
appellant(T. Maran­A1) was dismissed from service on 8th July, 1992.
10. That during the course of trial the statements of PW­2(Officer,
Indian   Overseas   Bank,   Regional   Office,   Madurai),   PW­3(Officer,
Vigilance,   Indian   Overseas   Bank),   PW­4(Cashier,   Indian   Overseas
Bank,   Narikkudi),   PW­5(Chief   Officer,   Zonal   Office),   PW­6(Special
Assistant,   Indian   Overseas   Bank,   Narikkudi)   and   PW­8(Mr.
Jayprakash, the legal heir of the loanee Karuppannan) were recorded
in support of the case of the prosecution and the learned trial Judge
conducted simultaneous trial of all the three cases 03/1995, 04/1995
and 05/1995 and held appellant(T. Maran) guilty and convicted him
under Section 120B, 467, 467 read with 471, 420, 477­A IPC and
Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
two years and also to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/­ in default to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for six months for each of the offences and
sentence to run concurrently. 
11. At   the   same   time   appellant   M.   Ramalingam(A2   in   CC   no.
03/1995)   was   convicted   under   Section   120B   and   420   IPC   and
8
appellant N. Rajangam(A2 in CC no. 05/1995) was convicted under
Section   120B,   467   read   with   471   IPC   and   sentenced   to   undergo
rigorous imprisonment for two years and also to pay a fine of Rs.
1,000/­ in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 6 months for
each of the offences. 
12. The   High   Court   also   on   appraisal   found   no   infirmity   in   the
findings recorded by the trial Judge holding the appellants guilty for
the aforesaid offences and proceeded on the indisputed facts which
came on record that appellant T. Maran(A1) was the Branch Manager
from   4th  May,   1988   to   28th  January,   1991   and   Nagarajan,   since
deceased, being shroff during that period were joint custodians of
jewel safe of the branch, that one Karuppannan availed jewel loan
372/87 and the account was closed on 28th  January, 1988 on his
repayment, that when appellant T. Maran(A1) went on leave from 4th
October,   1990   to   6th  October,   1990,   PW­2   Krishnamoorthy   was
deputed   in   his   place   and   also   appraised   the   evidence   of   PW­3
Vigilance Officer of the Bank who inspected physically all the jewel
with the pending loan accounts and on physical verification, he found
only one jewel namely gold chain weighing 17.5 grams available in the
pocket relating to AJL 123/90 instead of 10 items of jewels and the
one jewel also was pertaining to the jewel loan 372/87.   The High
9
Court also took note of the statement of PW­4 (S.A. Soosai Prakasam,
Cashier, IOB, Narikkudi), PW­6(P. Ponnuchamy, Spl. Assistant, IOB,
Narikudi),   PW­8   (Mr.   Jayprakash,   the   legal   heir   of   the   loanee
Karuppannan) and found no infirmity in the finding recorded by the
learned trial Judge under the impugned judgment and accordingly
confirmed the conviction and sentence of the accused appellants and
held   that   the   appellant(T.   Maran­A1)   being   the   public   servant   by
abusing position and by illegal means dishonestly misused the public
money   and   got   the   amount   sanctioned   without   furnishing   any
security.  Thus, charges framed against the accused appellants have
been   held  to   be  proved   beyond   reasonable  doubt   and   accordingly
confirmed the conviction and sentenced passed by the trial Court
under the impugned judgment.
13. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and with their
assistance perused the material available on record.
14. As   regards   the   appellant(T.   Maran­A1)   is   concerned,   there   is
sufficient evidence on record which has been examined by the trial
Judge and so also appraised by the High Court and nothing has been
elicit from the submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant
and on appraisal of the evidence which has come on record and after
going   through   the   impugned   judgment   of   the   case,   we   find   no
10
apparent   error   being   committed   by   the   High   Court   in   upholding
conviction of the accused appellant(T. Maran) for the offences under
Section 467, 467 read with 471, 420, 477­A IPC and Section 13(2)
read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
15. At the same time so far as appellant M. Ramalingam(A2 in CC
No. 03/1995) and appellant N. Rajangam(A2 in CC No. 05/1995) is
concerned, there was no evidence on record which could at all connect
them for the offences under Section 120B and 420 IPC(appellant M.
Ramalingam) and Section 120B, 467, 467 read with 471 IPC(appellant
N. Rajangam) and it was not the case of the prosecution that the
loanee A2(N. Ramalingam and N. Rajangam) were ever aware of this
fact that such a loan could be sanctioned only after a jewel being
pledged.  In all bonafides, it reveals from the record that applications
were submitted by the loanee who are illiterate agriculturists and loan
was got sanctioned by the appellant T. Maran(A1­Bank Manager) with
the connivance of the Nagrajan(deceased) in violating the rules and
regulations for their personal gains. 
16. We   are   not   able   to   trace   out   any   evidence   in   respect   of
dishonesty/misuse in obtaining loan without furnishing any security.
In our view the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the charges levelled against the appellant(M. Ramalingam and
11
N. Rajangam) in Criminal Appeal No. No. 1949 of 2009 and Criminal
Appeal 347 of 2010 and, the conviction of appellant M. Ramalingam
under Section 120B and 420 IPC and appellant N. Rajangam under
Section 120B, 467 read with 471 IPC deserves to be set aside.
17. Consequently, Criminal Appeal No. 1949 of 2009 filed by M.
Ramalingam   and   Criminal   Appeal   No.   347   of   2010   filed   by   N.
Rajangam are allowed.  The impugned judgment qua the appellants is
hereby   set   aside  and   since   both   are  on   bail,  their   bail  bonds   be
discharged.
18. At the same time, Criminal Appeal Nos. 2186­2188 of 2009 filed
by appellant T. Maran (A1) are hereby dismissed.   The appellant T.
Maran   was   granted   bail   on   9th  April,   2010.     His   bail   bonds   are
cancelled and he is directed to surrender and undergo remaining part
of the sentence. 
19. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
……………………………………..J.
(N. V. RAMANA)
……………………………………...J.
(AJAY RASTOGI)
NEW DELHI
OCTOBER 03, 2019 
12

  

whether the conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the Code is justified and correct, or it should be converted to Section 304 Part I of the Code. =As per the dying declaration of the deceased, the appellant Satish Kumar had given ‘Lathi’ blows on his waist and below the right knee whereas Dhajja Ram had given ‘Lathi’ blows on his thigh/knee of left leg and left hand.Subsequently, condition of Shamsher had deteriorated and he was referred to Post Graduate Institute of Medical Sciences, Rohtak where he died on 21st March, 2002.As per the post mortem, the head injury was sufficient cause of death in ordinary course of nature.As noticed above, the dying declaration of the deceased had referred to ‘Lathi’ blows which were given on his legs, left hand and waist and did not refer to any ‘Lathi’ blow on his head. The Criminal Appeal No. 1835 of 2010 Page 4 of 7 medico-legal report Ex-PC prepared by Dr. Jai Mala (PW-3) also does not refer to any head injury. Dr. R.K. Nandal (PW-4) who had conducted the post mortem had testified that there was infiltration of blood in the whole brain with clotted blood 80-100 cc present at the base of skull. There was dislocation of first cervical vertebral joint. All other organs were found healthy and pale. The cause of death was the head injury.Clearly, therefore, there is inconsistency between the dying declaration, medico-legal report Ex-PC and the post mortem report Ex-PG. Further, cross-examination of Dr. R.K. Nandal (PW4) exposits contradiction as to whether the injury in question was sufficient to cause death in normal course of nature. Benefit of Criminal Appeal No. 1835 of 2010 Page 5 of 7 doubt in view of the ambiguity and contradictions must go the appellant.In view of the aforesaid, we do not think that the condition and mandate of third clause of Section 300 of the Code that the bodily injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in ordinary cause of nature to cause death has been proved and established beyond doubt. Pertinently, it is under this clause alone that the present appellant has been convicted for murder under Section 302 read with Section 300 of the Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant Satish Kumar is converted from Section 302 to Part I of Section 304 of the Code. Other convictions are maintained and not interfered.

whether the conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the Code is justified and correct, or it should be converted to Section 304 Part I of the Code. =As per the dying declaration of the deceased, the appellant Satish Kumar had given ‘Lathi’ blows on his waist and below the right knee whereas Dhajja Ram had given ‘Lathi’ blows on his thigh/knee of left leg and left hand.Subsequently, condition of Shamsher had deteriorated and he was referred to Post Graduate Institute of Medical Sciences, Rohtak where he died on 21st March, 2002.As per the post mortem, the head injury was sufficient cause of death in ordinary course of nature.As noticed above, the dying declaration of the deceased had referred to ‘Lathi’ blows which were given on his legs, left hand and waist and did not refer to any ‘Lathi’ blow on his head. The Criminal Appeal No. 1835 of 2010 Page 4 of 7 medico-legal report Ex-PC prepared by Dr. Jai Mala (PW-3) also does not refer to any head injury. Dr. R.K. Nandal (PW-4) who had conducted the post mortem had testified that there was infiltration of blood in the whole brain with clotted blood 80-100 cc present at the base of skull. There was dislocation of first cervical vertebral joint. All other organs were found healthy and pale. The cause of death was the head injury.Clearly, therefore, there is inconsistency between the dying declaration, medico-legal report Ex-PC and the post mortem report Ex-PG. Further, cross-examination of Dr. R.K. Nandal (PW4) exposits contradiction as to whether the injury in question was sufficient to cause death in normal course of nature. Benefit of Criminal Appeal No. 1835 of 2010 Page 5 of 7 doubt in view of the ambiguity and contradictions must go the appellant.In view of the aforesaid, we do not think that the condition and mandate of third clause of Section 300 of the Code that the bodily injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in ordinary cause of nature to cause death has been proved and established beyond doubt. Pertinently, it is under this clause alone that the present appellant has been convicted for murder under Section 302 read with Section 300 of the Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant Satish Kumar is converted from Section 302 to Part I of Section 304 of the Code. Other convictions are maintained and not interfered.

NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1835 OF 2010
SATISH KUMAR ….. APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
THE STATE OF HARYANA ….. RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
The impugned judgment dated September 19, 2008 passed
by the Punjab & Haryana High Court affirms conviction of the
present appellant Satish Kumar and one Dhajja Ram for murder of
Shamsher under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian
Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the “Code”), for which the
appellant has been sentenced to imprisonment for life and fine of
Rs. 10,000/- with default stipulation to undergo further rigorous
imprisonment for two years. The impugned judgment also affirms
conviction of Satish Kumar and Dhajja Ram under Section 506
read with Section 34 of the Code for which they have been
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs.
1,000/- each with default stipulation to undergo rigorous
Criminal Appeal No. 1835 of 2010 Page 1 of 7
imprisonment for 3 months and under Section 323 read with
Section 34 of the Code for which they have been sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and fine of Rs.
500/- each, and in default to undergo further rigorous
imprisonment for one month.
2. It appears that Dhajja Ram has not assailed the impugned
judgment passed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court. In fact, it
was stated before us that perhaps he has been released on grant
of remission.
3. As far as involvement of the present appellant in the offences
under Sections 302, 506 and 323 read with Section 34 of the
Code is concerned, we find no ground and reason to interfere with
the findings recorded by the High Court affirming the findings of
the trial Court that Dhajja Ram and Satish Kumar had given ‘Lathi’
blows to deceased Shamsher as was stated by the deceased to
Surender (PW-2) on his way to the hospital and to ASI Sri Kishan
(PW-9), which statements have been relied upon as dying
declaration. Bharpoor (PW-7) and Sadhu Ram (PW-8), who had
gone to ease themselves, on hearing alarm raised by the
deceased Shamsher had returned and witnessed the incident.
They have also deposed on the involvement of the appellant.
They along with Surender (PW-2) have also deposed as to the
Criminal Appeal No. 1835 of 2010 Page 2 of 7
reason and motive for the violence, as the appellant and Dhajja
Ram had threatened deceased Shamsher on account of their
objections to the relations of a woman belonging to ‘Dahiya Gotra’
with a man of ‘Ohlan Gotra’.
4. The primary question which arises for consideration is whether the
conviction of the appellant for murder under Section 302 of the
Code is justified and correct, or it should be converted to Section
304 Part I of the Code.
5. As per the dying declaration of the deceased, the appellant Satish
Kumar had given ‘Lathi’ blows on his waist and below the right
knee whereas Dhajja Ram had given ‘Lathi’ blows on his
thigh/knee of left leg and left hand. The medico-legal report Ex-PC
prepared by Dr. Jai Mala (PW-3) on 20th March, 2002 at about
9:15 a.m., had observed the following injuries on Shamsher, when
he was alive:
“1. A bruise reddish bluish in colour, 3 cm x 1cm in
size was present on posterior aspect of left forearm
in middle part along with swelling. No bleeding was
present. Tenderness was present. Advised for Xray left forearm, A.P. lateral view.
2. A bruise reddish in colour, 10 cm x 1 cm in size
was present on upper border of the right buttock
region.
3. A bruise 4 cm x 1 cm in size, reddish in colour was
present below right knee along with diffused
swelling involving right knee. No bleeding was
present. Tenderness was present. Advised X-ray
right knee, A.P and later view.
Criminal Appeal No. 1835 of 2010 Page 3 of 7
4. A bruise reddish in colour 4 cm x ½ cm in size was
present on right upper back region. Advised X-ray
chest right side.”
6. Subsequently, condition of Shamsher had deteriorated and he
was referred to Post Graduate Institute of Medical Sciences,
Rohtak where he died on 21st March, 2002. Dr. R.K. Nandal (PW4) had conducted autopsy of Shamsher on March 22, 2002 at
about 12:05 p.m. and his post-mortem report Ex-PG, records:
“1. A contusion on left forearm, mid part posterior side,
on dissection, infiltration of blood in surrounding
tissues was present.
2. There was contusion of posterior side of left elbow
joint, 3x2 cm. On dissection fracture of humerous
was seen.
3. The contusion on right buttuck, 10x1.2 cm, on
dissection, infiltration of blood was present.
4. A contusion on right knee joint front 4.5 x 2 cm on
dissection, infiltration of blood was present.
5. A contusion on right upper back region, 4x1 cm in
size.
6. On dissection of head, there was infiltration of
blood in whole the brain with clotted blood present
at the base of skull, 80-100 cc.
7. There was dislocation of first cervical vertebral joint
present.”

As per the post mortem, the head injury was sufficient cause
of death in ordinary course of nature.
7. As noticed above, the dying declaration of the deceased had
referred to ‘Lathi’ blows which were given on his legs, left hand
and waist and did not refer to any ‘Lathi’ blow on his head. The
Criminal Appeal No. 1835 of 2010 Page 4 of 7
medico-legal report Ex-PC prepared by Dr. Jai Mala (PW-3) also
does not refer to any head injury. Dr. R.K. Nandal (PW-4) who had
conducted the post mortem had testified that there was infiltration
of blood in the whole brain with clotted blood 80-100 cc present at
the base of skull. There was dislocation of first cervical vertebral
joint. All other organs were found healthy and pale. The cause of
death was the head injury. Importantly, Dr. R. K. Nandal (PW-4)
during the course of cross-examination had stated as under:
“Before post mortem, only police papers of inquest
proceedings before me with initial summary. Bed Head
ticked was not produced before me. It is not necessary
that just after dislocation of first cervical patient would
die within very short period. Death is also not certain in
case of dislocation of first cervical. I am MBBS and
M.D (Gynaecologist). It is incorrect that detection of
dislocation of first cervical is not possible without X-ray.
Volunteered it is possible in post mortem examination.
It is incorrect to say that only Neurologist expert can
find out its dislocation of cervical and not any other
medical officer. It is correct that first cervical is
surrounded by a ring of fibrous tissues. Dislocation
can also be due to sudden severe jerk. It is incorrect
that my opinion regarding cause of death may not be
correct.”
8. Clearly, therefore, there is inconsistency between the dying
declaration, medico-legal report Ex-PC and the post mortem
report Ex-PG. Further, cross-examination of Dr. R.K. Nandal (PW4) exposits contradiction as to whether the injury in question was
sufficient to cause death in normal course of nature. Benefit of
Criminal Appeal No. 1835 of 2010 Page 5 of 7
doubt in view of the ambiguity and contradictions must go the
appellant.
9. In view of the aforesaid, we do not think that the condition and
mandate of third clause of Section 300 of the Code that the bodily
injury intended to be inflicted was sufficient in ordinary cause of
nature to cause death has been proved and established beyond
doubt. Pertinently, it is under this clause alone that the present
appellant has been convicted for murder under Section 302 read
with Section 300 of the Code and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant Satish Kumar is
converted from Section 302 to Part I of Section 304 of the Code.
Other convictions are maintained and not interfered.
10. Turning to the question of sentence for the offence under Section
304 Part I, we find that the appellant was released on bail vide
order dated July 22, 2011, which refers to Jail Custody Certificate
dated September 16, 2010 that the appellant had undergone
sentence of seven years on the date of issue. The appellant has
been on bail since then. We do not think that the appellant should
be again incarcerated and sent to jail.
11. We would, therefore, partly allow the present appeal by converting
the conviction of the appellant from Section 302 to Section 304
Criminal Appeal No. 1835 of 2010 Page 6 of 7
Part I of the Code for imprisonment to the period already
undergone. The appellant would, however, be liable to pay a fine
of Rs. 1,000/- in default of which he would undergo simple
imprisonment for one month. As stated above, the conviction and
sentence of the appellant for other offences is maintained.
......................................J.
(INDU MALHOTRA)
......................................J.
(SANJIV KHANNA)
NEW DELHI;
OCTOBER 3, 2019.

Criminal Appeal No. 1835 of 2010 Page 7 of 7

Challenging Award filed an application under sec.34 of Arbirtration and concilation Act before Jaipur District court - Jaipur Dirstrict court returned to present the same before the Jodhpur as sitting of Award is Jodhpur - delay of 8 days in representing the same was occured - otherside made objection under Sec.3 of limitation Act for dismissal as it is not presented in time - the applicant filed a petition under Sec.14 of limitation Act for condoning the entire delay that took place in Jaipur District Court instead of filing Sec.5 limitation of Act petition for condoning delay of 8 days in representation -District court as well as High court wrongly dismissed main application as time barred as well as sec.14 of limitation Act petition also and wrongly allowed Sec.3 of limitation of Act petition filed by other side.-Apex court held that The dealy is only of 8 days in re presenting the application which was returned by Jaipur court for presenting in Jodhpur court and as such the trial court as well as High court should not examine the matter under sec.14 of Limitation Act - Apex court held that since the affidavit for Sec.14 of limitation petition contains the reasons for delay - set aside district court order - restored the application of Sec.34 of Arbitration and concialation Act on the file of Jodhpur.

Challenging Award filed an application under sec.34 of Arbirtration and concilation Act before Jaipur District court - Jaipur Dirstrict court returned to present the same before the Jodhpur as sitting of Award is Jodhpur - delay of 8 days in representing the same was occured - otherside made objection under Sec.3 of limitation Act for dismissal as it is not presented in time - the applicant filed a petition under Sec.14 of limitation Act for condoning the entire delay that took place in Jaipur District Court instead of filing Sec.5 limitation of Act petition for condoning delay of 8 days in representation -District court as well as High court wrongly dismissed main application as time barred as well as sec.14 of limitation Act petition also and wrongly allowed Sec.3 of limitation of Act petition filed by other side.-Apex court held that The dealy is only of 8 days in re presenting the application which was returned by Jaipur court for presenting in Jodhpur court and as such the trial court as well as High court should not examine the matter under sec.14 of Limitation Act - Apex court held that since the affidavit for Sec.14 of limitation petition contains the reasons for delay - set aside district court order - restored the application of Sec.34 of Arbitration and concialation Act on the file of Jodhpur.


       REPORTABLE
             
   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
   CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6524 OF 2009
  Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.                      .…Appellant(s)
Versus
 M/s Tejparas Associates                             ….Respondent(s)
 & Exports Pvt. Ltd. 
J U D G M E N T
A.S. Bopanna,J.
       
1. The   appellant   insurance   company   had   issued   fire
insurance policy in respect of the plant and machinery of the
respondent company.  The sum for which it was insured was
a sum of Rs.70,00,000/­ (Rupees Seventy Lakhs only).  In
respect of the policy issued on 01.12.1999, the claim arose
on 23.04.2000 when fire accident took place in the premises
of the respondent.   In respect of the claim, the appellant

Page 1 of 19
insurance company offered a sum of Rs.7,98,019/­ (Rupees
Seven Lakhs Ninety­Eight Thousand Nineteen only) to the
respondent on 06.12.2000.  The respondent having refused
to accept the same, a meeting was thereafter convened on
20.09.2001   wherein   Vijaya   Bank   at   whose   instance   the
policy was issued was also present.  In the said meeting, the
appellant insurance company revised the offer to pay the
respondent a sum of Rs.33,80,925/­ (Rupees Thirty­Three
Lakhs Eighty Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty­Five only).
The said sum was also not acceptable to the respondent but
a sum of Rs.25,00,000/­ (Rupees Twenty­Five Lakhs only)
was   paid   to   the   respondent   through   Vijaya   Bank.     The
respondent   therefore   being   aggrieved   that   the   claim   for
insurance reimbursement was not satisfied, had approached
the   National   Consumer   Disputes   Redressal   Commission,
New Delhi (“NCDRC” for short) by filing OP No. 146 of 2002.
The said complaint came to be dismissed on the ground that
the claim involves complicated questions of law and the Civil
Court would have jurisdiction to decide the matter.  

Page 2 of 19
2. The   matter   was,   however,   ultimately   referred   to
arbitration   by   an   Arbitral   Tribunal   consisting   of   three
learned Arbitrators.   In the arbitral proceedings, an award
dated 28.06.2004 was passed, whereunder two out of three
arbitrators   awarded   the   sum   of   Rs.44,90,000/­   (Rupees
Forty­Four Lakh Ninety Thousand only) with interest at 18%
per annum also the costs as indicated therein.  Since, a sum
of Rs.25,00,000/­ had already been paid by the appellant on
20.09.2001, the award constituted the entire sum of Rs.
70,00,000/­ (Rupees Seventy Lakhs only) for which it was
insured.   The third learned arbitrator, however, dissented
from   the   majority   award   and   held   that   the   sum   of   Rs.
33,80,925/­   offered   by   the   appellant   insurance   company
was   fair   and   proper.     Subsequent   thereto   the   appellant
herein   filed   an   application   under   Section   33   of   the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Act, 1996” for short)
seeking   for   clarification   relating   to   the   award   dated
28.06.2004 and also with regard to the venue of arbitration
as indicated in the award.  The said application filed under
Section 33 of the Act was dismissed through the order dated
17.12.2004.     Pursuant   thereto   the   appellant   insurance

Page 3 of 19
company, in order to assail the award dated 28.06.2004 and
the order dated 17.12.2004 filed the petition under Section
34   of   the   Act,   1996   on   24.02.2005.     Since,   the   award
indicated that the same was passed at Jaipur and the third
learned arbitrator in his order had declared the venue of the
arbitral tribunal to be at Jaipur, the appellant insurance
company filed the petition on 24.02.2005 before the learned
District Judge, Jaipur.  
3. The respondent on appearing in the said proceedings
had objected to the proceedings being held at Jaipur, since
according to the respondent the entire cause of action had
arisen at Jodhpur.  The learned District Judge at Jaipur on
considering   the   rival   contentions   had   through   the   order
dated   12.03.2008   held   the   petition   as   not   maintainable
before that Court but exercised the power under Order 7
Rule 10 and 10 A of the Civil Procedure Code and returned
the   petition   to   the   appellant   insurance   company   and
directed that the parties shall be present before the learned
District Judge, Jodhpur, on 02.04.2008 for presentation of
the   petition   therein   and   proceed   with   the   matter.     The

Page 4 of 19
appellant insurance company however presented the petition
before   the   learned   District   Judge,   Jodhpur,   only   on
10.04.2008, instead of the specified date of 02.04.2008.  In
that   circumstance,   the   respondent   herein   filed   an
application under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, before the
learned District Judge, Jodhpur, in the re­presented petition
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 which was numbered as
arbitration application number 18­A of 2008.  Through the
said application the respondent had sought rejection of the
petition on the ground of the limitation.
4. At this stage, the appellant insurance company filed an
application   dated   03.05.2008   under   Section   14   of   the
Limitation   Act,   seeking   that   the   time   spent   in   the
proceedings before the learned District Judge, Jaipur, be
excluded and the petition be entertained on its merits.  The
respondent   herein   opposed   the   said   application.     The
learned District Judge, Jodhpur, through the order dated
15.07.2008 had considered the applications under Section
14 and 3 of the Limitation Act and dismissed the application
filed by the appellant insurance company under Section 14

Page 5 of 19
of the Limitation Act and allowed the application filed by the
respondent herein under Section 3 of the Limitation Act.
Consequently, the petition filed under Section 34 of the Act,
1996   was   dismissed.     The   appellant   insurance   company
therefore claiming to be aggrieved filed the appeal under
Section   37   of   the   Act,   1996   before   the   High   Court   of
judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur.  The High Court after
taking   note   of   the   order   passed   by   the   learned   District
Judge, Jodhpur, while disposing of the application under
Section  3 & 14 of  the  Limitation  Act has  dismissed the
appeal through the order dated 06.02.2009.  The appellant
insurance company therefore claiming to be aggrieved by the
said order dated 06.02.2009 passed by the High Court in SP
(C) Misc. Appeal No. 1103/2008 is before this Court in this
appeal.
5. We have heard Dr. Meera Aggarwal, learned advocate
for the appellant, Mr. Puneet Jain, learned advocate for the
respondent and perused the appeal papers.
6. As noted in the sequence of events that flowed from the
point   the   policy   was   issued   on   01.12.1999   and   a   claim

Page 6 of 19
relating to the same being made in view of the fire accident,
the dispute essentially is with regard to the quantum of
compensation  which   had  led to  the  dispute  between   the
parties.  The present proceeding has however arisen in the
background of the petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996
being   dismissed   on   the   ground   of   limitation.     In   that
circumstance, though the appellant had also filed the appeal
under   Section   37   of   the   Act,   1996   and   had   raised   the
contentions with regard to correctness or otherwise of the
award dated 28.06.2004 and the order dated 17.12.2004 on
the application under Section 33 of the Act, 1996, the merits
of the rival contentions relating to the claim would not arise
for consideration at this stage.  This is for the reason that in
the proceedings under Section 34 of the Act, which is the
remedy available to assail the award, the contentions on
merits of the claim relating to the insurance policy has not
been gone into to consider the correctness or otherwise of
the arbitral award and the proceedings has been concluded
on the ground of limitation.   Consequently, in the appeal
filed   under   Section   37   of   the   Act,   1996   also   it   is   on
examination of that aspect the appeal has been dismissed.

Page 7 of 19
In that view, the limited consideration to be made in this
appeal is to determine whether the dismissal of the petition
under   Section   34   of   the   Act,   1996   on   the   ground   of
limitation is justified.  In that regard, if the conclusion to be
reached   by   us   is   to   the   effect   that   in   the   present
circumstance the petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996
was to be considered on merits, the matter would thereafter
have to be gone into on merits before the learned District
Judge,   Jodhpur,   to   advert   to   the   merits   limited   to   the
consideration permissible under Section 34 of the Act, 1996.
7. While taking note of these aspects the fact that the
award   was   initially   passed   on   28.06.2004   and   the   third
learned arbitrator disposed of the application under Section
33 of the Act, 1996 on 07.12.2004 is the position which
emerges from the record.   In that view, the petition filed
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 before the learned District
Judge, Jaipur, on 24.02.2005 is within the time frame as
stipulated   under   Section   34   (3)   of   the   Act,   1996.     The
position   is   also   that   the   learned   District   Judge,   Jaipur,
returned the original application through the order dated

Page 8 of 19
12.03.2008 permitting the appellant to present it before the
learned   District   Judge,   Jodhpur,   on   02.04.2008.     If   the
petition was presented on the said date in terms of the order
the need for consideration on delay would not have arisen.
However, as noticed the appellant insurance company represented   the   petition   before   the   learned   District   Judge,
Jodhpur only on 10.04.2008.  In view of the application filed
by the respondent under Section 3 of the Limitation Act
seeking dismissal in that context, the appellant herein filed
the application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.  The
issue   that   would   therefore   arise   is   as   to   whether   the
presentation   of   the   petition   before   the   learned   Judge,
Jodhpur, should be considered as a fresh petition and the
explanation for the entire period from the original limitation
period i.e., from the date of the award is to be considered for
the purpose of condonation of delay for prosecuting in an
alternate   jurisdiction,   while   considering   the   application
under Section 14 of the Act or in the present circumstance
since the earlier Court had exercised the power under Order
7   Rule   10   and   10A   of   the   Civil   Procedure   Code,   the
consideration should be for the delay condonation between

Page 9 of 19
the period 02.04.2008 to 10.04.2008 merely being the delay
in re­presentation.   
8. The learned counsel for respondent in that regard has
contended that when a plaint is returned under Order 7
Rule 10 CPC to be filed before the Court having jurisdiction
and in that circumstance when the plaint is presented in the
Court having jurisdiction the petition can be deemed to be
instituted in the proper Court as a fresh petition when the
plaint   is   presented   in   such   Court.     To   buttress   such
contention, the learned counsel has relied on the decision in
the case of  Shri  Amar  Chand   Inami  vs.  Union  of   India
(1973) 1 SCC 115 with reference to para 9 thereof.  We have
carefully perused the said decision in the background of the
said contention.  Though such decision was rendered in the
facts   arising   therein   and   the   decision   was   rendered   on
13.10.1972   in   the   context   of   the   provision   contained   in
Order 7 Rule 10 CPC as it existed, it is to be noted that
amendment was made on 01.02.1977 whereunder Rule 10A
was substituted under Order 7 Rule 10 of CPC.  A perusal of
the same will indicate that after amendment the matter is

Page 10 of 19
not left in a limbo after the plaint is returned in terms of
Rule 10(2) which existed earlier.   Presently through Rule
10A to Order 7 of CPC on an application being made a date
is to be specified for its presentation so as to enable the
appearance   before   the   Court   in   which   it   would   be   represented.  Therefore, the re­presentation of the petition in
the Court which is indicated in the order for return cannot
be considered as a fresh filing in all circumstances when, it
is returned to the plaintiff for such re­representation.  This
Court in the case of  Joginder  Tuli   vs.  S.L.  Bhatia  and
another (1997) 1 SCC 502 has held that normally, when the
plaint   is   directed   to   be   returned   for   presentation   to   the
proper court perhaps it has to start from the beginning but
in the cited case, since the evidence was already adduced by
the parties, the matter was tried accordingly.   The High
Court had in that case directed to proceed from the stage at
which the suit stood transferred and this Court did not find
any illegality in such order passed by High Court to treat the
same as a continuation of the proceedings. 

Page 11 of 19
9. In the instant case though the appellant herein had not
filed   the   application   indicating   the   Court   to   which   the
petition would be re­presented and did not seek for fixing
the   date   of   hearing,   the   Court   at   Jaipur   while   ordering
return of the petition after consideration of the application of
the respondent under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC had indicated
the Court to which it was to be presented and the date for
appearance on 02.04.2008 for that purpose.  Hence, it is not
as if the proceeding came to an abrupt end when the petition
was returned so as to consider the next filing as a fresh
petition.    In that  circumstance  when  the  time  had been
granted and date was fixed by the learned District Judge at
Jaipur and if for any reason the re­presentation was not
possible on that date, the course open to the appellant was
to file an application under Section 148 of CPC before the
Court at Jaipur which ordered for return and fixed the time
for presentation in the Court at Jodhpur, seeking extension
of time granted earlier.   However, since the same was not
resorted   to   by   the   appellant   and   the   petition   was   represented before the District Court at Jodhpur with a delay
of about 8 days from the date fixed for presentation and as

Page 12 of 19
no   extension   was   also   sought   as   indicated   above,
condonation of such delay ought to have been sought.  Since
the petition was filed with delay and no other application
had   accompanied   the   petition,   the   respondent   filed   the
application   under   Section   3   of   Limitation   Act   which
prompted a knee jerk reaction by the appellant in filing the
application under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.  Though
the said application has invoked Section 14 of Limitation Act
and   thereafter   supported   by   an   additional   affidavit,   the
averments   in   the   application   is   in   the   nature   of   an
application seeking condonation of delay in re­presentation
of the petition as against the date fixed by the Court for
presentation in Jodhpur. 
10. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the
decision in the case of  S.   Ganesharaju   (dead)   through
LRs.  and  Anr.   vs.  Narsamma  (dead)  through  LRs.  and
Ors.  (2013)  11  SCC  341  to contend  that  the  expression
“sufficient cause” as contemplated under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act should be given liberal construction so as to
advance   substantial   justice   and   the   delay   should   be

Page 13 of 19
condoned unless the opposite party is able to show malafide
in  not  approaching the Court  within  time.   It is further
contended that it is held therein that the rules of limitation
are not meant to destroy or foreclose the right of parties.
The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand
would contend that  the said  decision  rendered is in  the
context   of   consideration   of   “sufficient   cause”   as
contemplated under Section 5 of the Limitation Act which
would not be applicable to proceedings under Section 34 of
the Act, 1996.  In that regard, the learned counsel for the
respondent has relied on the decision in the case of Union
of   India   vs.   Popular   Construction   Company,   (2001)   8
SCC 470 wherein it is held that Section 5 of the Limitation
Act is not applicable to the proceedings under Section 34 of
the Act, 1996 for setting aside the arbitral award.  Further
the decision in the case of Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. vs.
Union  of   India, (2019) 2 SCC 455 is also relied upon to
contend   that   Section   5   of   the   Limitation   Act   has   no
application   to   a   petition   challenging   the   arbitral   award
under Section 34 of the Act, 1996.  The said decision would

Page 14 of 19
however indicate that Section 14 of the Limitation Act is
applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of
the Act, 1996 seeking for exclusion of certain period if the
application under Section 34 of the Act, 1996 is at the first
instance filed within the limitation period provided under
Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996.   The position of law that
Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to condone
the statutory period under Section 34(3) of Act, 1996 is well
established and needs no reiteration.
11. Having noticed the said decisions, in the instant case
as already indicated above the condonation of delay sought
is not for filing the petition under Section 34 of the Act, 1996
for the first time.  The petition filed under Section 34 of the
Act, 1996 at Jaipur was within the period of limitation and
the delay regarding which explanation is put forth is for the
period of 8 days in re­presenting the petition beyond the
date fixed after it was returned under Order 7 Rule 10 of the
Civil Procedure Code.  Therefore, in that circumstance even
if the term “sufficient cause” as contained under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act is taken note, in the present facts the

Page 15 of 19
same is not with reference to petition under Section 34 of
Act,   1996   for   condonation   of   delay   beyond   the   period
prescribed under Section 34(3) of the Act, 1996.   Though
that be the position what is necessary to be taken note
herein is that the application filed for excluding the time is
under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.  In addition to the
very decisions cited above indicating that Section 14 of the
Limitation Act would be applicable to the proceedings under
Section 34 of the Act, 1996 subject to the petition under
Section 34 being filed within time, the learned counsel for
the appellant has also relied upon the decision in the case of
M/s   Consolidated   Engineering   Enterprises   vs.   The
Principal   Secretary,   Irrigation   Department   &   Ors.
(2008) 7 SCC 169 wherein the same position is reiterated. 
12. The learned counsel for the respondent would however,
refer to the very same decision and contend that even if
Section 14 of the Limitation Act is applicable, the exclusion
of time can only be of the proceedings which is bonafide
initiated in a Court without jurisdiction.  It is contended that
in the instant case the entire cause of action had occurred at

Page 16 of 19
Jodhpur and despite the same the appellant had deliberately
initiated   the   proceedings   at   Jaipur   which   cannot   be
considered as a bonafide mistake.  Though such contention
is put forth, what cannot be lost sight in the instant facts is
that   the   learned   Judge   of   the   Additional   District   Court,
Jaipur   while   considering   the   maintainability   of   the
proceedings   before   that   Court,   through   the   order   dated
12.03.2008 has taken note of the very rival contentions with
regard to the cause of action as contended and also the
Court   before   which   the   proceedings   was   required   to   be
initiated.   Though at this point of time the position of law
has been enunciated through several decisions, and there is
clarity, at that juncture the consideration with regard to the
definition of Court as contained in the Act was required to
be interpreted and on taking note of various decision of the
Supreme Court had arrived at the conclusion that keeping
in view the fact situation the petition is to be returned for
presentation in the appropriate Court.   The very nature of
consideration made by the Court at Jaipur would indicate
that   the   matter   required   a   detail   consideration   before
exercising the power under Order 7 Rule 10 and 10A of the

Page 17 of 19
Civil   Procedure   Code   and   the   Court   during   the   said
proceedings   has   not   arrived   at   a   conclusion   that   the
proceedings had been initiated malafide before that Court.
However, keeping in view the overall facts and circumstance
of the present case the Court had ordered return of the
petition for appropriate presentation and the date had been
fixed.     The   correctness   of   the   said   order   had   not   been
assailed by the respondent herein seeking absolute rejection
of the petition by raising grounds on the nature of findings
rendered therein since that Court had not held the petition
to be malafide.  
13. In such circumstance, in the fact situation wherein the
issue of delay had arisen only in the context of the delay of 8
days in re­presentation as permitted by the Court at Jaipur,
re­examination of the matter to consider the entire period
spent   before   the   Court   at   Jaipur   as   malafide   so   as   to
nonsuit the appellant and deny consideration of proceedings
under Section 34 of Act, 1996 which was initiated within the
period of limitation at the first instance, on its merits will
not be justified.  

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14. In that view, the order dated 15.07.2008 passed on the
application   filed   under   Section   14   and   Section   3   of   the
Limitation   Act   passed   by   the   Additional   District   and
Sessions   Judge   S.No.3,   Jodhpur   and   the   order   dated
06.02.2009 passed by the High Court in S.B. (Civil) Misc.
Appeal   No.1103/2008   are   not   sustainable.     They   are
accordingly, set aside.   Consequently, the proceedings in
Arbitration Application No.18­A of 2008 is restored to the file
of the Additional District Judge S.No.3, Jodhpur.  
15. The   parties   shall   appear   before   the   said   Court   on
15.10.2019 as the first date for appearance without issue of
notice/summons from that Court.  The proceedings thereto
shall be considered on merits in an expeditious manner.  All
contentions in that regard are left open.
16. The appeal is, accordingly allowed with no order as to
costs.  All pending applications shall stand disposed of.
……………………….J.
(R. BANUMATHI)
……………………….J.
                                              (A.S. BOPANNA)
New Delhi,
October 03, 2019

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