Order 6 Rule 18 of CPC deals with failure to amend after the application for amendmentisallowedbythecourt. Aspertheprovisionpartyhastoamend the plaint within the time prescribed in the order and if no time limit is prescribed then within 14daysfromthedate of theorder. Theplaintiffshall notbepermittedtoamend after14days or time fixedbythe court as thecase maybe,unless the time is extended by the court.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

INHERENTJURISDICTION

R.P.(C)No.751/2019inC.A.No.8242/2009

ANIRUDHKUMARSAHU Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

JHARKHANDSTATEHOUSINGBOARDANDORS. Respondent(s)

ORDER

1. This review petition is filed assailing the judgment dated 9 th

October 2018

wherebytheappealfiledby theJharkhandStateHousingBoardwasallowed

by setting asidethejudgment anddecree dated26 th

August,2004 passedby the High Court affirming the concurrent findings of the Courts below.             While allowingtheappealthisCourthasdirected to maintain statusquo for a period

of three months and to avail the remedy available under law,if so advised.

2. This Court has allowed the appeal onthegroundthatthough the plaintiff has

sought the relief of injunction, the courts below treating it as a suit for

declaration and declared thetitle of theplaintiff bydecreeing thesuits. Now

the review petition is filed ontheground that suitis for declaration of title but

not for injunction and sought for the review of thejudgment.Insupport ofthe

same,hefiledapplication under Order 6 Rule17filed beforethecourtbelow

dated 11.02.1998 and order dated 29.04.1998 passed by the trial court

allowingtheamendment.

3. We have gone through these two documents, the order impugned and the

grounds raised in support of the review petition. First both the documents

filed by the petitioner will not come to his rescue for the reason, the

application dated 11.02.1998 is only an application to amend the plaint but

2

not the amended plaint. Though the court passed order dated 29.04.1998

allowingtheamendment,unlesstheplaint is amended and filed it cannot be

takenintoconsideration.

4. Order 6 Rule 18 of CPC deals with failure to amend after the application for

amendmentisallowedbythecourt. Aspertheprovisionpartyhastoamend

the plaint within the time prescribed in the order and if no time limit is

prescribed then within 14daysfromthedate of theorder. Theplaintiffshall

notbepermittedtoamend after14days or time fixedbythe court as thecase

maybe,unless the time is extended by the court.

5. This court while allowing the appeal had taken into consideration the

submission of the review petitioner that the suit is for bare injunction, the

counterfiledbyhimandtheothermaterialplacedbeforethiscourtandcame

tothejustconclusionthatthesuitisformereinjunction.

6. We are of the considered opinion that no grounds are made out seeking

indulgenceofthiscourttoreviewthejudgmentanddecreedated09.10.2018.

Accordinglyreviewpetitionisdismissed.

.....................J

(N.V.RAMANA)

................................................J

(MOHANM.SHANTANAGOUDAR)

NEWDELHI;

27THMARCH,2019.

3

ITEMNO.1001SECTIONXVII

SUPREMECOURTOFINDIA

RECORDOFPROCEEDINGS

R.P.(C)No.751/2019inC.A.No.8242/2009

ANIRUDHKUMARSAHUPetitioner(s)

VERSUS

JHARKHANDSTATEHOUSINGBOARDANDORS.Respondent(s)

Date:27032019Thispetitionwascirculatedtoday.

CORAM:

HON'BLEMR.JUSTICEN.V.RAMANA

HON'BLEMR.JUSTICEMOHANM.SHANTANAGOUDAR

ByCirculation

UPONperusingpaperstheCourtmadethefollowing

ORDER

TheReviewPetitionisdismissedintermsofthesignedorder.

(VISHALANAND)(RAJRANINEGI)

COURTMASTER(SH)ASSISTANTREGISTRAR

(SignedOrderisplacedonthefile)

4

Without reference and discussion no finding be given =There is no reference and discussion by the High Court about those documents which were ignored by the Courts below. =Whether the lower courts ignored to appreciate the documents in proper perspective on behalf of the plaintiff in O.S.No.22/82 and also further committed an error with respect to the identity of the suit property?" The High Court reversed the order pertaining to the identification of the property by upholding that the property purchased by the respondent is different from the property which is the suit schedule property in O.S.No.31/82. The substantial question of law framed is to the effect that the lower courts failed to appreciate certain facts while deciding the point pertaining to the identification of the property. There is no reference and discussion by the High Court about those documents which were ignored by the Courts below. The High Court reversed the findings of the First Appellant Court by re- appreciating the evidence. We are also informed by the learned counsel for the appellant that the counsel for the appellant was not present when the matter was heard by the High Court. In view of the aforesaid, we set aside the judgment of the High Court and remand the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration.

1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).     687-688 of 2013


ABDUL SUBAN SAB @ PYARE SAB (D)
BY LRS.& ORS.      Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
CHIDANANDA & ORS.                           Respondent(s)
O R D E R
The   appellants   herein   filed   O.S.   No.31/82   for
permanent   injunction.   The   respondents   filed
O.S.No.22/82   for   declaration   of   title   and   permanent
injunction.   The   Trial   Court   decreed   the   suit   of   the
appellant   and   granted   permanent   injunction.
O.S.No.22/82   filed   by   the   respondent   was   dismissed.
The   common   judgment   in   O.S.Nos.22/82   and   31/82   was
affirmed by the First Appellate Court.  The contention
of the respondents that the suit schedule property was
not identifiable was rejected by the Trial Court.  The
said finding was upheld by the First Appellate Court.
The   High   Court   framed   a   substantial   question   of   law
which is reproduced hereunder:

2
"1.   Whether   the   lower   courts
ignored   to   appreciate   the   documents   in
proper   perspective   on   behalf   of   the
plaintiff   in   O.S.No.22/82   and   also
further   committed   an   error   with   respect
to the identity of the suit property?"
The   High   Court   reversed   the   order   pertaining
to   the   identification   of   the   property   by   upholding
that   the   property   purchased   by   the   respondent   is
different from the property which is the suit schedule
property   in   O.S.No.31/82.       The   substantial   question
of   law   framed   is   to   the   effect   that   the   lower   courts
failed to appreciate certain facts while deciding the
point   pertaining   to   the   identification   of   the
property. There is no reference and discussion by the
High Court about those documents which were ignored by
the   Courts   below.     The   High   Court   reversed   the
findings   of   the   First   Appellant   Court   by   re-
appreciating   the   evidence.     We   are   also   informed   by
the learned counsel for the appellant that the counsel
for the appellant was not present when the matter was
heard by the High Court.
In   view   of   the   aforesaid,   we   set   aside   the
judgment of the High Court and remand the matter back
to   the   High   Court   for   fresh   consideration.       We   have
not expressed any view on the merits of the matter and

3
all points are left open to be considered by the High
Court.
As   the   suit   was   filed   in   the   year   1982,   we
request   the   High   Court   to   decide   the   appeals   at   the
earliest.
The   appeals   are   disposed   of   accordingly.
Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.
         
.................... J
(L.NAGESWARA RAO )
.................... J 
( HEMANT GUPTA ) 
NEW DELHI; 
06 th
 August, 2019

4
ITEM NO.108               COURT NO.10               SECTION IV-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).687-688/2013
ABDUL SUBAN SAB @ PYARE SAB (D) BY LRS. & ORS.     Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
CHIDANANDA & ORS.                                  Respondent(s)

Date : 06-08-2019 These appeals were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. NAGESWARA RAO
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA
For Appellant(s) Mr. Anupam Lal Das,Sr.Adv.
Mr. B.Vishwanath Bhandarkar,Adv.
Mr. Karunakar Mahalik,Adv.
Mr. Sarbendra Kumar Adv.
Mr. N.K.Naik,Adv.
                    Mr. V.N.Raghupathy, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. N.D.B.Raju,Adv.
                    Mr. M. A. Chinnasamy, AOR
Mr. Bharathi Raju,Adv.
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
  The   appeals   are   disposed   of   in   terms   of   the
signed   order.   Pending   application(s),   if   any,   stand
disposed of.
     (B.Parvathi)                          (Sunil Kumar Rajvanshi)
     Court Master                              Court Master
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

suit for specific performance for the remaining land after deducting the land purchased by Bonafide purchaser = we have gone through the entire record and are satisfied that the purchase by respondent no.2 was completely bona fide . The agreement dated 31.07.1998 was an unregistered one and the plaintiff himself had not initiated any action for more than five years. There is nothing on record to indicate that any public notice was given or that defendant no.2 was aware of the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant no.1. The price paid by the defendant no.2 in respect of the extent of 8 Kanals can also not be said to be inadequate or in any way at a lesser rate. The record also discloses that defendant no.2 was a mortgagee in whose favour a registered deed was executed by defendant no.1. All these facets taken together completely prove that defendant no.2 was a bona fide purchaser for value and, as such, the assessment made by the Appellate Court was absolutely correct and justified. The High Court, therefore, was right in dismissing the second appeal preferred by the appellant herein. That leaves us with the question - whether the appellant would be entitled to the rest of the land and at what price? If we go by the agreement dated 31.07.1998, the appellant had made over 4/5 th of the consideration and if the extent of 8 Kanals of land is left out, what the appellant would now be entitled to is the extent of 14 Kanals 17 Marlas, which is less than the 2/3rd of the land. Though served, the defendant no.1 has chosen not to appear in the matter and thus we have not had the benefit of hearing him on this issue. However, considering the fact that 4/5 th consideration was actually paid way back in 1998, that consideration should be sufficient for the extent of land which will now be 2/3rd of the land. We, therefore, order accordingly and direct that the suit for specific performance stands decreed in respect of the extent of 14 Kanals 17 Marlas at the price of Rs.2,00,000/- as stated above.

1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7010 OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP  (Civil) No.13528/2019
SATBIR                                             Appellant
                                VERSUS
INDER SINGH & ANR.                                 Respondents
O R D E R
Leave granted.
The   appellant/plaintiff   filed   Civil   Suit   No.RBT-697   of   2003
seeking   specific   performance   of   an   agreement   dated   31.07.1998   by
which   the   first   defendant   (respondent   no.2   herein)   had   agreed   to
transfer   22   Kanals   17   Marlas   of   land   to   the   appellant.     Under   the
agreement,   the   agreed   sale   consideration   was   Rs.2,50,000/-.   The
agreement   was   printed   on   a   stamp   paper   of   Rs.10/-   but   was   not
registered.     On   that   day   the   appellant   had   paid   Rs.2,00,000/-   by
way   of   earnest.     The   suit   was   however   filed   on   21.08.2003,   nearly
five years after the agreement.
It   is   relevant   to   note   that   from   and   out   of   the   aforesaid   22
Kanals   17   Marlas   of   land,   an   extent   of   8   Kanals   of   land   was   sold
away by the first defendant in favour of defendant no.2 (respondent
no.1   herein)   vide   transaction   dated   01.07.2003.     The   Deed   of
Conveyance recorded the consideration to be Rs.1,60,000/-   for the
extent   of   8   Kanals   of   land.     The   suit   was   filed   after   this
transaction.

2
In the suit, it was submitted that the first defendant had no
authority   to   sell   the   extent   of   8   Kanals   and   that   the   second
defendant   would   also   be   bound   by   the   decree   of   specific
performance.   The suit came to be decreed by the Trial Court which
granted   the   decree   of   specific   performance   in   favour   of   the
appellant in respect of the entire land of 22 Kanals 17 Marlas.
In the appeal preferred by the second defendant, the Appellate
Court concluded that the second defendant was a  bona fide  purchaser
for   value   without   notice   and,   as   such,   the   relief   of   specific
performance   could   not   be   granted   as   against   him.   The   Appellate
Court, therefore, modified the decree passed by the Trial Court and
excluded   the   extent   of   8   Kanals   of   land   and   confirmed   the   decree
only   to   the   extent   of   remainder   portion   of   the   land,   that   is   to
say, 14 Kanals and 17 Marlas.
In   the   second   appeal   preferred   by   the   appellant,   the
substantial   questions   of   law   were   framed   by   the   High   Court   vide
order dated 15.01.2015 and the matter was taken up for hearing.  By
Order   dated   18.03.2019,   the   Second   Appeal   No.3324   of   2010   was
dismissed   by   the   High   Court,   which   order   is   presently   under
challenge.
We   have   heard   Mr.   Mahabir   Singh,   learned   senior   counsel   for
the   appellant   and   Mr.   Manoj   Swarup,   learned   senior   counsel   for
respondent no.1.

3
Mr.   Mahabir   Singh,   learned   senior   counsel   submitted   that   the
discussion   in   the   impugned   judgment   had   proceeded   on   points   which
were   completely   different   from   the   questions   of   law   framed   by   the
High   Court.     According   to   him,   the   High   Court   ought   to   have
concentrated   on   the   issue   whether   the   purchase   by   respondent   no.2
was  bona fide  or not.
With   the   assistance   of   the   learned   counsel,   we   have   gone
through   the   entire   record   and   are   satisfied   that   the   purchase   by
respondent   no.2   was   completely   bona   fide .     The   agreement   dated
31.07.1998   was   an   unregistered   one   and   the   plaintiff   himself   had
not   initiated   any   action   for   more   than   five   years.     There   is
nothing   on   record   to   indicate   that   any   public   notice   was   given   or
that   defendant   no.2   was   aware   of   the   agreement   between   the
plaintiff and defendant no.1.  The price paid by the defendant no.2
in   respect   of   the   extent   of   8   Kanals   can   also   not   be   said   to   be
inadequate   or   in   any   way   at   a   lesser   rate.     The   record   also
discloses   that   defendant   no.2   was   a   mortgagee   in   whose   favour   a
registered   deed   was   executed   by   defendant   no.1.     All   these   facets
taken together completely prove that defendant no.2 was a  bona fide
purchaser   for   value   and,   as   such,   the   assessment   made   by   the
Appellate Court was absolutely correct and justified.
The High  Court, therefore,  was right  in dismissing  the second
appeal preferred by the appellant herein.
That leaves us with the question - whether the appellant would
be entitled to the rest of the land and at what price?

4
If we go by the agreement dated 31.07.1998, the appellant had
made   over   4/5 th
  of   the   consideration   and   if   the   extent   of   8   Kanals
of land is left out, what the appellant would now be entitled to is
the extent of 14 Kanals 17 Marlas, which is less than the 2/3rd of
the land.
Though served, the defendant no.1 has chosen not to appear in
the   matter   and   thus   we   have   not   had   the   benefit   of   hearing   him   on
this issue.   However, considering the fact that 4/5 th
  consideration
was   actually   paid   way   back   in   1998,   that   consideration   should   be
sufficient   for   the   extent   of   land   which   will   now   be   2/3rd   of   the
land.
We, therefore,  order accordingly  and direct  that the  suit for
specific performance stands decreed in respect of the extent of 14
Kanals 17 Marlas at the price of Rs.2,00,000/- as stated above. 
With   the   aforesaid   observations,   the   appeal   stands   disposed
of.  No costs.
.................................J.
            [UDAY UMESH LALIT]
.................................J.
      [VINEET SARAN]   
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 4, 2019

5
ITEM NO.71               COURT NO.7               SECTION IV-B
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.13528/2019
(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 18-03-2019
in RSA No.3324/2010 passed by the High Court Of Punjab & Haryana At
Chandigarh)
SATBIR                                             Petitioner(s)
                                VERSUS
INDER SINGH & ANR.                                 Respondent(s)

Date : 04-09-2019 This petition was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UDAY UMESH LALIT
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINEET SARAN
For Petitioner(s)  Mr. Mahabir Singh, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Rakesh Dahiya, AOR
                    Mr. Aditya Dahiya, Adv.
For Respondent(s)  Mr. Manoj Swarup, Sr. Adv.
Ms. Vidisha Swarup, Adv.
Mr. Neelmani Pant, Adv.
Mr. Ankit Swarup, AOR
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
Leave granted.
The appeal is disposed of, in terms of the signed order.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
   (MUKESH NASA)                              (SUMAN JAIN)
      COURT MASTER                              BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the File) 

suit for specific performance - dismissed - Apex court order for refund of amount of amount = when the dispute mentioned in agreement of sale was solved to the knowledge of the plaintiff, he ought to have obtained registered sale deed without waiting for killing of time - discloses he is not ready and willing to perform =The notice simply states that he had recently learnt that the dispute pending regarding the lands had finally been disposed of and, therefore, he was approaching the defendant immediately. No source of information or date of knowledge is disclosed. At this stage, it is very relevant to notice that the advocate representing the defendant before the Tribunal was none other than the friend of the plaintiff. We are of the considered opinion that no further discussion is required with regard to the fact that the plaintiff was aware of the resolution of the dispute which was an impediment in the execution of the sale deed no sooner than it was resolved. Yet he made no efforts to approach the defendant at the first instance without delay, much less did he attempt to obtain any information in this regard from the Tribunal. we find no reason to interfere with the findings of the appellate court as affirmed by the High Court that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate readiness and willingness on his part to perform his duty under the agreement for sale by tendering the balance amount and presenting his claim for execution of the agreement at the earliest opportunity for which he took no steps till he gave a legal notice four years later. This conduct of the plaintiff has therefore correctly been held to be evidence for lack of readiness and willingness on part of the plaintiff to perform his part of the agreement for sale

1
          IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
   Civil Appeal No(s). 3541 of 2009
RUDRAGOUDA Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
VASUDEV(D) BY LRS.                 Respondent(s)
O R D E R
The   appellant,   who   was   the   plaintiff,   is   aggrieved   by
order   dated   14   October   2008   dismissing   his   Regular   Second
Appeal, affirming the order in Regular Appeal No. 14 of 2003
dated 28 November 2005 preferred by the defendant. The latter
order   set   aside   the   decree   for   specific   performance   granted
to the plaintiff in O.S. No. 271 of 1994.
The   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   submitted   that
the   agreement   for   sale   dated   14   August   1986   itself   recited
that the lands which were the subject matter of the agreement
were   in   dispute,   and   that   the   sale   deed   was   to   be   executed
after   the   disputes   were   resolved.   The   balance   consideration
was   also   to   be   paid   at   the   time   of   execution.   For   this
reason, no time limit was fixed for the execution of the sale
deed. Time was thus not the essence of the agreement.
Thus   it   was   the   responsibility   of   the   defendant   to
inform the plaintiff when the disputes got resolved to enable

2
him   to   take   necessary   steps   by   payment   of   the   balance
consideration   to   facilitate   execution   of   the   agreement.   No
sooner that the plaintiff was made aware of the resolution of
the  disputes,   he  gave   a  legal   notice  to   the  defendant   on  18
June   1994.   The   plaintiff   was   always   ready   and   willing   to
perform   his   part   of   the   agreement.   It   was   the   defendant   who
did   not   perform   his   part   of   the   agreement   because   of   which
the   suit   had   to   be   filed.   The   plaintiff   has   already   paid   a
sum of Rs.37,000/- as advance to the defendant from the total
consideration   of   Rs.80,000/-.   Possession   of   the   lands   had
already   been   handed   over   to   the   plaintiff   pursuant   to   the
execution of the agreement for sale.
The   High   Court   erred   in   deciding   the   second   appeal
without framing any substantial question of law. The finding
regarding   lack   of   readiness   and   willingness   on   part   of   the
plaintiff is belied as the plaintiff took all necessary steps
which   were   required   to   be   taken   by   him   by   giving   a   legal
notice and following it with a suit for specific performance
of the agreement for sale.
Learned   counsel   for   the   defendant   submitted   that   there
are concurrent findings of the First Appellate Court as also
by   the   High   Court   that   the   plaintiff   has   not   been   able   to
show readiness and willingness on his part for the execution
of   the   agreement   for   sale.   On   his   own   showing   from   his
evidence,   he   was   aware   that   the   disputes   mentioned   in   the

3
agreement   for   sale   were   resolved   in   1990.   Yet   he   took   no
steps to have the agreement for sale executed till he gave a
legal   notice   four   years   later   in   1994.   It   has   therefore
rightly   been   concluded   that   he   was   not   ready   and   willing   to
perform   his   part   of   the   contract.   The   First   Appellate   Court
has   returned   a   specific   finding   that   the   plaintiff   was   in
possession of the lands. 
We   have   considered   the   submissions   on   behalf   of   the
parties. The High Court opined that the second appeal did not
raise   any   substantial   question   of   law   and   dismissed   the   ap -
peal.     In   Hari   Narayan   Bansal   v.   Dada   Dev   Mandir   Prabandhak
Sabha, (2015) 17 SCC 658,   it was observed : 
2. In our opinion, a substantial question of law is not
required   to   be   framed   if   the   High   Court   decides   to
dismiss   the   second   appeal   at   an   admission   stage.   Only
in   a   case   where   the   second   appeal   is   admitted   or   is
decided   finally   by   allowing   the   same,   a   substantial
question   of   law   is   required   to   be   framed   by   the   High
Court.
3. In the instant case, no substantial question of law
was   involved   in   the   second   appeal   and   therefore,   the
High   Court   had   rightly   dismissed   the   second   appeal   at
the admission stage by passing the impugned order. We,
therefore, see no reason to entertain this petition.
The   agreement   for   sale   contains   a   clear   recital   with
regard   to   the   pendency   of   dispute   concerning   the   subject
lands   which   were   part   of   the   agreement   for   sale.   The
agreement   itself   provided   that   the   sale   deed   was   to   be
executed   after   the   dispute   was   resolved.   In   that   context,
there   was   a   recital   that   there   was   no   specific   time   limit
fixed   as   it   was   dependent   on   the   time   to   be   taken   in

4
resolution   of   the   dispute.   This   clause   cannot   be   considered
as   a   carte-blanche   to   seek   enforcement   of   the   agreement   for
sale   at   any   time   irrespective   of   when   the   dispute   was
resolved.
It   is   also   an   undisputed   fact   that   the   plaintiff   had
already   paid   Rs.37,000/-   as   part   payment   out   of   the   total
consideration   of   Rs.80,000/-.   The   Trial   Court   decreed   the
suit   of   the   plaintiff   primarily   on   basis   of   the   genuineness
of the agreement for sale without returning any finding with
regard to the readiness and willingness of the plaintiff.
The   First   Appellate   Court   returned   a   specific   finding
that   the   plaintiff   had   failed   to   prove   readiness   and
willingness   on   his   part   as   required   under   Section   16(c)   of
the   Specific   Relief   Act,   1963.   The   defendant   was   in
possession   of   the   suit   lands.   The   High   Court   likewise
affirmed the finding of lack of readiness and willingness on
part   of   the   plaintiff   to   perform   his   part   of   the   agreement.
There   is   thus   a   concurrent   finding   of   fact   against   the
plaintiff by two courts.
The   dispute   as   mentioned   in   the   agreement   for   sale
pertained to only one property from amongst three properties.
There is no controversy that the pending dispute was resolved
by  the   Tribunal  in   1990.    The  plaintiff   was  a   well  educated
person holding the post of Director of Physical Education as
mentioned   by   him   in   his   evidence.   He   also   acknowledges

5
awareness   of   the   disposal   of   the   case   by   the   Tribunal   in
1990.
Yet legal notice was issued by him belatedly on 18 June 1994
without   any   explanation   for   the   same.   The   notice   simply
states   that   he   had   recently   learnt   that   the   dispute   pending
regarding   the   lands   had   finally   been   disposed   of   and,
therefore,   he   was   approaching   the   defendant   immediately.   No
source   of   information   or   date   of   knowledge   is   disclosed.   At
this   stage,   it   is   very   relevant   to   notice   that   the   advocate
representing the defendant before the Tribunal was none other
than the friend of the plaintiff.
We   are   of   the   considered   opinion   that   no   further
discussion   is   required   with   regard   to   the   fact   that   the
plaintiff   was   aware   of   the   resolution   of   the   dispute   which
was an impediment in the execution of the sale deed no sooner
than it was resolved. Yet he made no efforts to approach the
defendant at the first instance without delay, much less did
he attempt to obtain any information in this regard from the
Tribunal. 
In   view   of   the   aforesaid   discussion   we   find   no   reason
to   interfere   with   the   findings   of   the   appellate   court   as
affirmed   by   the   High   Court   that   the   plaintiff   had   failed   to
demonstrate readiness and willingness on his part to perform
his   duty   under   the   agreement   for   sale   by   tendering   the
balance amount and presenting his claim for execution of the

6
agreement   at   the   earliest   opportunity   for   which   he   took   no
steps   till   he   gave   a   legal   notice   four   years   later.   This
conduct of the plaintiff has therefore correctly been held to
be evidence for lack of readiness and willingness on part of
the plaintiff to perform his part of the agreement for sale. 
The   First   Appellate   Court   had   directed   refund   of
Rs.37,000/-   received   by   the   defendant   with   interest   at   the
rate   of   6%   per   annum   from   the   date   of   the   suit   till
realisation of the amount.
Considering   that   the   litigation   is   pending   since   1994,
we consider it proper and equitable to award interest at the
rate of  10% per  annum instead  of 6%  per annum.   The  payment
must be made to the appellant within a period of eight weeks
from   today.   Any   failure   to   do   so   shall   be   construed   as   a
violation of the order and direction of this Court.
The appeal is allowed only to the extent indicated.
Pending   application(s),   if   any,   shall   stand   disposed
of.
�.................J.
           (Navin Sinha)
���...............J.
           (A.S. Bopanna)
New Delhi
August 14, 2019

7
ITEM NO.103               COURT NO.12               SECTION IV-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).  3541/2009
RUDRAGOUDA  Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
VASUDEV(D) BY LRS.                           Respondent(s)

Date : 14-08-2019 This appeal was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. BOPANNA
For Appellant(s)
Mr. Sharanagouda Patil, Adv.
Ms. Supreeta Sharanagouda, Adv.
                    Mr. Shirish K. Deshpande, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s)
Mr. S.K. Kulkarni, Adv.
Mr. M. Gireesh Kumar, Adv.
                    Mr. Ankur S. Kulkarni, AOR
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed order.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(MANISH SETHI)                                  (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR)
COURT MASTER (SH)                                  BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

Suit for Specific Performance - short delay can not be considered as the party is not ready and willing to perform his contract and also simply he admitted that the costs of land at Rs.10 lakhs cannot give an asumption that the agreement is for low and english law is not applicable to India case as mere delay is not fatal to the case when it is filed within the stipulated period of limitation = the High Court was also incorrect in putting a short delay in filing the Suit against the plaintiff to state that he was not ready and willing. In India, it is well settled that the rule of equity that exists in England, does not apply, and so long as a Suit for specific performance is filed within the period of limitation, delay cannot be put against the plaintiff ; mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing the said relief, for the statute prescribes the period of limitation. If the suit is in time, delay is sanctioned by law; if it is beyond time, the suit will be dismissed as barred by time; in either case, no question of equity arises.- The High Court also went into error in stating that the value of the property was Rs.10 lakhs at the time of the sale agreement. PW-1 in his cross examination admitted that it was Rs.10 lakhs on the date when PW1 was cross-examined. The value of the property on the date of the sale agreement was only Rs.6 lakhs, and it was open for the parties to negotiate the said price upwards or downwards, which was what the parties did in the facts of the present case. Nothing can, therefore, be derived from the erroneous assumption that a valuable property had been sold at a throwaway price.

� REPORTABLE�
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
R LAKSHMIKANTHAM                               Appellant(s)
VERSUS
DEVARAJI                                       Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
R. F. NARIMAN, J.
In   the   present   appeal,   despite   service   of   notice,
nobody appears for the respondent.   We have heard Dr. (Ms.)
Pooja Jha, learned counsel appearing for the appellant.
The   High   Court,   in   the   present   appeal,   has,   by   the
impugned judgment dated 03.02.2017, set aside the concurrent
judgments of the Courts below, and allowed the appeal of the
erstwhile   defendant,   who   is   the   respondent   before   us,   and
hence,   set   aside   the   decree   for   specific   performance   that
was passed in the plaintiff�s favour.
By   an   agreement   to   sell   dated   22.09.2002,   the   suit-
property was to be sold for a sum of Rs.3,65,000/-.  Certain
clauses   of   the   agreement   are   important   and   are   set   out
hereinbelow:
�1.   The   sale   price   of   the   property   mentioned   in   the
schedule   hereunder   shall   be   Rs.3,65,000/-(Rupees
Three Lakhs and Sixty Five Thousand only).
1

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
2. The   party   of   the   second   part   has   paid   a   sum   of
Rs.5,000/-(Rupees   Five   Thousand   only)   towards
advance   by   cash   and   the   party   of   the   first   part
hereby   admit   and   acknowledge   the   receipt   of   the
same.
3. The   balance   sale   consideration   shall   be   paid   by
the   party   of   the   second   part   to   the   party   of   the
first   part   within   three   months   from   today.     The
party   of   the   first   part   agrees   to   execute   sale
deed   on   the   day   on   which   the   balance   sale
consideration is paid.
4. The party of the second part agrees to pay part of
the sale consideration of Rs.60,000/-(Rupees Sixty
Thousand   only)   to   the   party   of   the   first   on   or
before 10 th
 day of October.
5. The   party   of   the   first   part   had   handed   over   the
original   title   documents   to   the   mortgagee   and   the
party   of   the   second   part   shall   settle   the   loan,
receive   the   documents   from   the   mortgagee   and   keep
the same in his custody.
��������������������������������
�������������������������������.
8. If   there   is   no   encumbrance   to   the   schedule
property and  when the  party of  the second  part is
willing to pay the balance sale consideration, the
party   of   the   first   shall   execute   sale   deed   in
favour   of   the   party   of   the   second   part   or   her
nominee.     If   the   party   of   the   first   part   refuses
to do so, the party of the second part is entitled
to take legal action.�
It   is   stated   that   at   the   time   of   the   sale   agreement,
the suit property was worth roughly a sum of Rs.6 lakhs, but
the parties finally agreed and the defendant, in particular,
agreed to sell the aforesaid property for Rs.3.65 lakhs.   A
perusal   of   the   agreement   to   sell   would   show   that   though
clause   3   requires   that   the   balance   sale   consideration   will
be   paid   within   three   months   from   the   date   of   the   agreement
2

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
and   that   the   seller   will   execute   the   sale   deed   on   the   date
on which balance sale consideration was paid yet, clauses 5
and   8   clearly   show   that   the   original   title   deeds   which   are
with   the   mortgagee   had   yet   to   be   handed   over   and   the
mortgage   had   yet   to   be   redeemed.     It   is   only   when   this   is
done   that   clause   3   would   kick   in,   showing   that   the   time   of
three months is obviously not of essence.
Soon   after   the   agreement,   the   plaintiff   sent   a
registered letter dated 18.12.2002 to the present address of
the   defendant   reminding   the   defendant   that   Rs.5000/-   had
been   received   on   the   date   of   signing   the   agreement   and
Rs.60,000/-  had been  received on  14.10.2002.    Despite this,
the   original   title   documents   were   not   obtained   from   the
mortgagee   and   hence   the   mortgage   could   not   be   discharged.
The   letter   then   goes   on   to   state   that   repeated   calls   were
made and that the plaintiff is ready with the balance money,
and   that   the   defendant   should   come   forward   immediately   to
discharge   the   mortgage,   get   all   documents   from   the
mortgagee, and register the sale deed.  This registered A.D.
letter was returned to the sender stating that the addressee
did   not   receive   the   same   for   the   past   one   week.     The   same
was the fate of another legal notice on the very next date,
i.e.,     19.12.2002.     Finally,   on   07.07.2003,   the   plaintiff
sent a legal notice referring to the earlier legal notice of
19.12.2002   and   called   upon   the   defendant   to   immediately
comply   with   the   terms   of   the   agreement.     To   this   notice,
3

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
which   was   admittedly   received   by   the   defendant   at   the   very
same   address,   no   reply   was   given.     Thereafter,   the   present
suit for specific performance was filed by the plaintiff in
February, 2005.
Given   these   facts,   the   trial   Court,   by   its   judgment
dated   12.09.2008,   held   that   the   suit   agreement   was   proved
and   that   three   notices   sent   by   the   plaintiff   were   also
proved, it being clear that the defendant was attempting to
wriggle out of his obligations under the agreement.   Though
the   suit   was   filed   belatedly,   the   trial   Court   felt   that   as
the   defendant   did   not   furnish   the   address   of   his   mortgagee
or   take   steps   to   clear   the   mortgage,   it   was   clear   that   the
defendant   was   attempting   to   wriggle   out   of   the   agreement.
Further,   the   plaintiff�s   readiness   and   willingness   was
proved   by   the   fact   that   he   has   necessary   funds   as   on   the
date of the agreement, and thereafter, as was stated by him
in   his   letter   dated   18.12.2002.     This   being   the   case,   the
Court   ordered   specific   performance   as   the   balance   sale
consideration   had   already   been   deposited   into   the   Court   on
the   date   of   the   filing   of   the   Suit.     The   first   appeal   from
the   aforesaid   judgment   was     dismissed   on   20.12.2010   by   the
Principal   District   Judge.     The   District   Judge   found
concurrently for the plaintiff on all the points argued and
hence dismissed the first appeal.
By   the   impugned   judgment,   the   High   Court   reversed   the
concurrent   judgments   and   held,   on   a   construction   of   the
4

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
agreement,   that   since   only   three   months   were   given   to
complete the sale transaction, time was of essence.  It also
went   on   to   hold   that   the   two   letters   dated   18.12.2002   and
19.12.2002   could   not   have   been   said   to   have   been   served   on
the   defendant   and   hence   were   not   proved.     The   High   court
recorded   the   defendant�s   advocate�s   statement   that   it   was
not   going   into   other   aspects   except   that   plaintiff   was   not
ready  and willing  throughout to  perform the  sale agreement.
Despite this, the High Court held that since the Suit itself
was   filed   belatedly,   it   would   not   be   enough   for   the
plaintiff to show that he had the necessary funds.  It would
also   have   been   necessary   for   him   to   show   that   he   was
otherwise ready and willing throughout, which cannot be said
to   be   correct   considering   that   there   was   a   long   time   gap
between   22.09.2002   and   07.07.2003   inasmuch   as   the
intermediate   letters/notices   were   not   proved.     The   High
Court also further stated that the property value was Rs.10
lakhs on the date of the sale agreement, though this was not
proved   by   the   defendant,   and   then   went   on   to   state   that
since   readiness   and   willingness   had   to   be   held   against   the
Plaintiff,   and   since   the   Suit   itself   was   belated,   specific
performance cannot be granted on the facts of this case and,
as   stated   earlier,   reversed   the   concurrent   findings   of   the
Courts below.
We have heard learned counsel for the appellant. 
The   High   Court   has,   in   the   second   appeal,   obviously
5

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
gone wrong on a number of counts.   First, to hold that time
was   of   essence   in   the   agreement,   is   wholly   incorrect.
Clause   3   has   to   be   read   along   with   clauses   5   and   8,   which
clearly show that in the nature of reciprocal promises, the
promise   made   by   the   seller   in   clause   5   has   to   be   performed
first,   viz.,   that   the   title   documents   have   to   be   obtained
from   the   mortgagee   after   the   mortgage   is   cleared.     It   is
only   then   that   the   consideration   above   Rs.70,000/-,   being
the   balance   consideration   for   the   sale,   has   to   be   paid.
Secondly, the High court is wholly incorrect in stating that
the two letters of 18.12.2002 and 19.12.2002 cannot be said
to   have   been   proved.         Both   the   letters   were   registered
A.D.   letters   sent   to   the   very   address   of   the   defendant,
which   the   defendant   states   is   the   address   on   which   it
received   the   legal   notice   dated   07.07.2003.     Further,   the
moment the registered letter once sent is returned with the
remarks   mentioned   hereinabove,   it   shall   be   deemed   to   have
been   served   on   the   defendant   on   the   address   so   stated,
unless   the   contrary   is   proved.     The   defendant   did   not   come
forward   with   anything   to   show   that   this   was   not   the   proper
address.   In fact, that this is the proper address is shown
by   the   fact   that   he   acknowledged   the   receipt   of   the   legal
notice dated 07.07.2003 on this very address. 
The   High   Court   order   is   not   correct   in   stating   that
readiness   and   willingness   cannot   be   inferred   because   the
letters dated 18.12.2002 and 19.12.2002 had not been sent to
6

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
the   defendant.     The   High   Court   also   erred   in   holding   that
despite  having the  necessary funds,  the plaintiff  could not
be   said   to   be   ready   and   willing.     In   the   aforesaid
circumstances,  the High  Court was  also incorrect  in putting
a   short   delay   in   filing   the   Suit   against   the   plaintiff   to
state   that   he   was   not   ready   and   willing.     In   India,   it   is
well settled that the rule of equity that exists in England,
does   not   apply,   and   so   long   as   a   Suit   for   specific
performance  is filed  within the  period of  limitation, delay
cannot   be   put   against   the   plaintiff   �   See   Mademsetty
Satyanarayana   v.   G. Yelloji Rao and others   AIR 1965 Supreme
Court 1405 (paragraph 7) which reads as under:
      �(7)   Mr.   Lakshmaiah   cited   a   long   catena   of
English   decisoins   to   define   the   scope   of   a   Court�s
discretion.     Before   referring   to   them,   it   is
necessary to know the fundamental differnece between
the two systems-English and Indian-qua the relief of
specific   performance.     In   England   the   relief   of
specific   performance   pertains   to   the   domain   of
equity;   in   India,   to   that   of   statutory   law.     In
England   there   is   no   period   of   limitation   for
instituting   a   suit   for   the   said   relief   and,
therefore,   mere   delay   �   the   time   lag   depending   upon
circumstances   �   may   itself   be   sufficient   to   refuse
the   relief;   but,   in   India   mere   delay   cannot   be   a
ground for refusing the said relief, for the statute
prescribes the period of limitation.   If the suit is
in time, delay is sanctioned by law; if it is beyond
time,   the   suit   will   be   dismissed   as   barred   by   time;
in either case, no question of equity arises.�
The   High   Court   also   went   into   error   in   stating   that
the value of the property was Rs.10 lakhs at the time of the
sale agreement.  PW-1 in his cross examination admitted that
it was Rs.10 lakhs on the date when PW1 was cross-examined.
7

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
The value of the property on the date of the sale agreement
was   only   Rs.6   lakhs,   and   it   was   open   for   the   parties   to
negotiate   the   said   price   upwards   or   downwards,   which   was
what   the   parties   did   in   the   facts   of   the   present   case.
Nothing   can,   therefore,   be   derived   from   the   erroneous
assumption   that   a   valuable   property   had   been   sold   at   a
throwaway price.  
For   all   these   reasons,   therefore,   we   allow   the   appeal
and   set   aside   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   and   restore
that of the Courts below. 
�����������������������., J.
[  R. F. NARIMAN ]
�����������������������., J.
[ SURYA KANT ]
New Delhi;
July 10, 2019.
8

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2420 OF 2018
ITEM NO.3               COURT NO.5               SECTION XII
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No. 2420/2018
R LAKSHMIKANTHAM                                   Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
DEVARAJI                                           Respondent(s)
(With IA No.33080/2018-APPLICATION FOR EARLY HEARING)

Date : 10-07-2019 This matter was called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURYA KANT
For Appellant(s)
Dr. Pooja Jha, Adv.
Dr. R. Prakash, Adv.
Ms. Nandita Jha, Adv.
Mr. Vishwa Pal Singh, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s)
                   
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The   appeal   is   allowed   in   terms   of   the   signed
reportable judgment.
Pending application stands disposed of.
(NIDHI AHUJA)                   (RENU DIWAN)
   COURT MASTER (SH)             ASSISTANT  REGISTRAR
[Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file.]
9