1. Whether the ITAT was justified in holding that the notice issued by the AO under Section 148 was bad in law when admittedly the impugned notice was issued in the case where the assessment was made under Section 143(1) of the Act but not under Section 143(3) of the Act. 2. Whether the ITAT was justified in holding that the notice issued under Section 148 of the Act was bad because it was based on mere change of opinion by overlooking the fact that there was no foundation to form any such opinion. 3 When admittedly the notice in question satisfied the requirements of Section 148 of the Act as it stood, namely, that first, it contained the facts constituting the "reasons to believe" and second, it furnished the necessary details for assessing the escaped income of the assessee, whether the ITAT was still justified in declaring the notice as being bad in law without taking into consideration any of these admitted facts. 4 In case, if the notice is held proper and legal, whether the finding recorded by the ITAT on the merits of the case on each item, which is subject matter of the notice, is legally sustainable. 5 12. In our considered view, the aforementioned four questions framed need to be answered by the High Court on their respective merits while deciding the appeal filed by the Revenue (appellant herein) under Section 260­A of the Act. 13. We are, therefore, of the view that such order is not legally sustainable in law and hence deserves to be set aside. 14. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High Court for answering the aforementioned questions on merits in accordance with law.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL  APPEAL No.3450  OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.32222 of 2017)
Pr. Commissioner of Income
Tax 6 ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Nokia India Pvt. Ltd.             ….Respondent(s)
               
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and   order   dated   21.04.2017  passed   by   the   High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in ITA No.854 of 2016
whereby   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court
1
dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein.
3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the
disposal of this appeal, which involves a short point.
4. By impugned order, the Division Bench of the
High   Court   dismissed   the   Revenue's   (appellant
herein)   appeal   filed   under   Section   260­A   of   the
Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Act”)   on   the   ground   that   it   did   not   involve   any
substantial question of law within the meaning of
Section 260­A of the Act.
5. In other words, the High Court was of the view
that since the appeal did not involve any substantial
question of law, it deserves dismissal in limine.
6. The appellant is the Revenue (Commissioner of
Income Tax) and the respondent is an assessee. The
issue arises out of an assessment year (1999­2000).
7. The   issue   essentially   relates   to   legality   and
correctness of the notice issued by the Assessing
2
Officer (AO) to the respondent under Section 148 of
the   Act   and   to   the   consequential   determination
made by the AO in the assessment order for which
the impugned notice was issued to the respondent.
8. The   objections   raised   by   the   respondent
(assessee) to the notice contending  inter alia  that
since the impugned notice was based on "change of
the opinion" and hence bad in law was upheld by
the   ITAT   resulting   in   allowing   the   respondent's
appeal   and   further   by   dismissing   the   Revenue's
appeal  by  the  High  Court.  The  Revenue  has   felt
aggrieved by the order of the High Court dismissing
their   appeal   in  limine  and   has   filed   the   present
appeal by way of special leave in this Court.
9. The   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High
Court was right in dismissing the Revenue's appeal
3
in  limine  holding   that   it   did   not   involve   any
substantial question of law.
10. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are of the view that the High Court was not justified
in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the
appeal did not involve any substantial question of
law.     We are, therefore, constrained to allow this
appeal, set aside the impugned order and remand
the   case   to   the   High   Court   for   deciding   the
appellant’s appeal afresh on merits in accordance
with law.
11. In   our   considered   view,   the   following
substantial  questions of law do arise in this appeal
filed   by   the   Revenue   (appellant   herein)   under
Section 260­A of the Act in the High Court against
the order dated 03.06.2016 passed by the ITAT in
Appeal No. 1870/DEL/2010 and the same should
4
have been framed by the High Court for deciding the
appeal on merits in accordance with law:
1.   Whether   the   ITAT   was   justified   in
holding   that     the   notice   issued   by   the   AO
under   Section   148       was   bad   in   law   when
admittedly   the   impugned  notice   was   issued
in  the  case  where the  assessment was made
under Section 143(1) of the Act but not under
Section 143(3) of the Act.
2.   Whether   the   ITAT   was   justified   in
holding that the notice issued under Section
148 of the Act was bad because it was based
on mere change of opinion by overlooking the
fact that there was no foundation to form any
such opinion.
3   When   admittedly   the   notice   in
question   satisfied   the   requirements   of
Section  148  of  the  Act  as   it  stood,  namely,
that first, it contained the facts constituting
the   "reasons   to   believe"   and   second,   it
furnished the necessary details for assessing
the escaped income of the assessee, whether
the   ITAT  was   still   justified   in  declaring  the
notice as being bad in law without taking into
consideration any of these admitted facts.
4   In  case,   if  the  notice   is  held  proper
and   legal,   whether   the   finding   recorded   by
the  ITAT  on  the  merits  of  the  case  on  each
item, which is subject matter of the notice, is
legally sustainable.
5
12. In   our   considered   view,   the   aforementioned
four questions framed need to be answered by the
High Court on their respective merits while deciding
the appeal filed by the Revenue (appellant herein)
under Section 260­A of the Act.
13. We are, therefore, of the view that such order
is not legally sustainable in law and hence deserves
to be set aside.
14. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The impugned
order is set aside. The case is remanded to the High
Court for answering the aforementioned questions
on merits in accordance with law.   
15. Since we have formed an opinion to remand
the case to the High Court for its fresh disposal on
merits, we have not expressed any opinion on the
merits of the case while deciding this appeal.  The
High   Court   will,   therefore,   decide   the   appeal
6
uninfluenced   by   any   observation   made   by   this
Court in this order.     
                                     .………...................................J.
                                   [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]   
                               
     …...……..................................J.
             [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
April 08, 2019
7

unreasoned order is liable to be set aside = every judicial or/and quasi­judicial order passed by the Court/Tribunal/Authority concerned, which decides the lis between the parties, must be supported with the reasons in support of its conclusion. The parties to the lis and so also the appellate/revisionary Court while examining the correctness of the order are entitled to know as to on which basis, a particular conclusion is arrived at in the order. In the absence of any discussion, the reasons and the findings on the submissions urged, it is not possible to know as to what led the Court/Tribunal/Authority for reaching to such conclusion.

NON­REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL  APPEAL Nos.3448­3449  OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.7837­7838 of 2014)
Kushuma Devi ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Sheopati Devi (D) & Ors.             ….Respondent(s)
               
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. These   appeals   are   filed   against   the   final
judgment and order dated 27.07.2012 in CMWP No.
1
3231 of 2002 and order dated 16.01.2013 in CMRA
No.247546 of 2013 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad.
3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the
disposal   of   these   appeals   which   involve   a   short
point.
4. The appellant filed an eviction petition against
the respondents being Misc. Case No. 18/1990. By
order dated 19.04.1996, the Civil Judge decreed the
suit and passed the decree for eviction against the
respondents.   The   respondents   felt   aggrieved   and
filed Rent Appeal No. 4/1996 in the Court of A.D.J.,
Court No.8, Fatehpur.  The first Appellate Court by
order   dated   04.12.2001   allowed   the   appeal   and
dismissed   the   eviction   petition   filed   by   the
appellant. The appellant felt aggrieved and filed a
writ petition in the High Court at Allahabad. By
impugned order dated 27.07.2012, the High Court
dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the order
2
dated 04.12.2001 passed by the Additional District
Judge, Court No.8, Fatehpur in the absence of the
appellant.   The appellant  filed an application for
recall   of   the   order   dated   27.07.2012.     The   High
Court by order dated 16.01.2013 dismissed the said
application.  The appellant felt aggrieved by the said
orders and has filed these appeals by way of special
leave in this Court.
5. The impugned order reads as under :
“Having gone through the impugned order, I
do   not   find   any   patent   illegality   or
irregularity   therein   warranting   interference.
Findings   of   fact   have   been   recorded   which
have not been shown perverse or contrary to
material on record.   I, therefore, do not find
any reason to interfere.  The scope of judicial
review under Article 227 is very limited and
narrow as discussed in detail by this Court in
Civil  Misc.  Writ   Petition   No.27433   of   1991
(Lala Ram Narain  vs. Xth Additional District
Judge,   Moradabad   &   Ors.)   decided   on
13.07.2012.     There   is   nothing   which   may
justify   judicial   review   of  order   impugned   in
this writ petition in the light of exposition of
law, as discussed in the above judgment.”
6. The   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration   in   these   appeals,   is   whether   the
3
aforementioned   impugned   order   is   legally
sustainable or not.
7. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are constrained to allow these appeals, set aside the
impugned orders and remand the case to the High
Court   for   deciding   the   appellant’s   writ   petition
afresh on merits in accordance with law.
8. The need to remand the case to the High Court
has   occasioned   because   from   the   perusal   of   the
impugned order dated 27.07.2012 quoted above, we
find that it is an unreasoned order.  In other words,
the High Court neither discussed the issues arising
the   case,  nor  dealt  with   any  of  the  submissions
urged by the parties and nor assigned any reason as
to why it has dismissed the writ petition.
9. This   Court   has   consistently   laid   down   that
every judicial or/and quasi­judicial order passed by
the   Court/Tribunal/Authority   concerned,   which
4
decides   the  lis  between   the   parties,   must   be
supported   with   the   reasons   in   support   of   its
conclusion.   The parties to the  lis  and so also the
appellate/revisionary   Court   while   examining   the
correctness of the order are entitled to know as to
on which basis, a particular conclusion is arrived at
in the order.  In the absence of any discussion, the
reasons and the findings on the submissions urged,
it   is   not   possible   to   know   as   to   what   led   the
Court/Tribunal/Authority   for   reaching   to   such
conclusion. (See ­ State of Maharashtra vs. Vithal
Rao Pritirao Chawan, (1981) 4 SCC 129, Jawahar
Lal Singh vs. Naresh Singh & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC
222,  State  of  U.P.   vs.   Battan  &  Ors.,  (2001) 10
SCC 607,  Raj  Kishore  Jha  vs.  State  of  Bihar  &
Ors., (2003) 11 SCC 519 and  State  of  Orissa  vs.
Dhaniram Luhar, (2004) 5 SCC 568).
5
10. The orders impugned in these appeals suffer
from the aforesaid error, because, as would be clear
from the perusal of the order, the High Court while
passing the impugned order simply dismissed the
writ petition  without  any discussion,  finding and
the reason.
11. We are, therefore, of the view that such order
is not legally sustainable and hence deserves to be
set aside.
12. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeals
succeed and are accordingly allowed. The impugned
orders are set aside.  The case is remanded to the
High Court for deciding the writ petition afresh, out
of   which   these   appeals   arise,   for   its   disposal   in
accordance   with   law   keeping   in   view   the
observations made above.   
13. Since we have formed an opinion to remand
the case to the High Court for its fresh disposal on
merits, we have not expressed any opinion on the
6
merits of the case while deciding these appeals.  The
High Court will, therefore, decide the writ petition
uninfluenced   by   any   observations   made   by   this
Court   in   this   order   as   expeditiously   as   possible
preferably within six months.
                                     .………...................................J.
                                   [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]   
                               
     …...……..................................J.
             [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
April 08, 2019
7

No injunction suit against the purchasers of one of co sharers = In our view, even assuming that the plaintiffs claimed to be in possession of the suit property (which the two Courts below did not find in their favour) for claiming injunction, yet they were not entitled to claim injunction against the other cosharers over the suit property. It is a settled principle of law that the possession of one co­sharer is possession of all co­sharers, it cannot be adverse to them, unless there is a denial of their right to 6 their knowledge by the person in possession, and exclusion and ouster following thereon for the statutory period. [See Mohammad Baqar & Ors. vs. Naim­un­Nisa Bibi & Ors.(AIR 1956 SC 548)] 18. So far as the claim of the plaintiffs as being in exclusive possession to the exclusion of others was concerned, the same was held not proved by the two Courts below. 19. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 (appellants herein) being the purchasers of the suit property from one of the co­sharers stepped into the shoes of their vendor (co­sharer) and, therefore, had a right to defend their title and possession against the other co­sharer. 20. In the light of the aforesaid admitted position arising in the case, in our view, the plaintiffs had no case to claim injunction against defendant Nos.1 and 2 in relation to the suit property. The two 7 Courts below, therefore, rightly declined it and we affirm the same. 21. As noted above, the High Court failed to appreciate the factual and legal controversy in its proper perspective and, therefore, erred in interfering in the concurrent findings of the fact without recording a finding as to why the concurrent findings of fact are bad in law and why it requires interference in its second appellate jurisdiction.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL  APPEAL No. 3408 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.23575 of 2011)
T. Ramalingeswara Rao (Dead)
Thr. LRs. & Anr. ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
N. Madhava Rao & Ors.               ….Respondent(s)
               
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and   order   dated   23.11.2010  passed   by   the   High
Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad
in   Second   Appeal   No.1036   of   2006   whereby   the
High   Court   allowed   the   second   appeal   filed   by
respondent Nos.1 to 3 herein. 
1
3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the
disposal of this appeal, which involves a short point.
4. The appellants herein are defendant Nos.1 and
2, respondent Nos.1­3  herein are the plaintiffs and
respondent Nos.5­9 are the defendant Nos.4­8   of
the civil suit out of which this appeal arises.
5. Respondent Nos.1­3 (plaintiffs) filed a civil suit
against the appellants (defendant Nos.1 and 2) and
respondent   Nos.5   to   9   (defendant   Nos.4   to   8)
seeking perpetual injunction against the defendants
restraining   them   from   interfering   in   his   peaceful
possession over the suit properties.
6. The   appellants   (defendant   Nos.1   and   2)
contested   the   suit   whereas   the   remaining
defendants (4 to 8) remained  ex parte.   The Trial
Court   by   judgment/decree   dated   20.08.2001
dismissed the suit.  Respondent Nos.1­3 (plaintiffs)
felt   aggrieved   and   filed   first   appeal   before   the
Additional   District   &   Sessions   Judge(Fast   Track
2
Court),   Visakhapatnam.     By   judgment   dated
07.11.2005, the First Appellate Court dismissed the
appeal and upheld the judgment/decree of the Trial
Court.
7. The   plaintiffs   (respondent   Nos.1­3)   felt
aggrieved and filed second appeal in the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh. By impugned order, the High
Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment
impugned therein and decreed the plaintiffs’ suit by
passing a decree for perpetual injunction against
the   defendants   in   relation   to   the   suit   property,
which has given rise to filing of the present appeal
by way of special leave in this Court by defendant
Nos.1 and 2.
8. So,   the   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High
Court was justified in allowing the plaintiffs’ second
appeal and thereby was justified in decreeing their
suit by granting a decree of perpetual injunction
3
against defendant Nos.1 and 2 in relation to the suit
property.
9. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are   constrained   to   allow   the   appeal   and   while
setting   aside   the   impugned   order   restore   the
judgment/decree of the First Appellate Court and
the Trial Court which resulted in dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ suit.
10. In   our   considered   opinion,   the   High   Court
erred in interfering in the concurrent findings of
facts of the two Courts below, which dismissed the
plaintiffs’ suit.
11. In   our   view,   the   Trial   Court   and   the   First
Appellate Court on appreciating the evidence of the
parties had rightly come to a conclusion that the
plaintiffs failed to prove the ingredients necessary
for the grant of perpetual injunction.
4
12. When   the   two   Courts   below   have   recorded
concurrent   findings   of   fact   against   the   plaintiffs,
which   are   based   on   appreciation   of   facts   and
evidence,   in   our   view,   such   findings   being
concurrent in nature are binding on the High Court.
It   is   only   when   such   findings   are   found   to   be
against any provision of law or against the pleading
or evidence or are found to be wholly perverse, a
case for interference may call for by the High Court
in its second appellate jurisdiction.
13. Such was not the case made out in the High
Court.  It is for this reason, we are of the view that
the High Court should not have interfered in the
findings of the two Courts below and instead, the
findings   should   have   been   upheld   by   the   High
Court.
14. Coming now to the facts of the case, we find
that the plaintiffs (respondent Nos.1­3) have no case
5
much   less  prima   facie  for   grant   of   perpetual
injunction.
15. The suit property is a part of big chunk of land
owned by several brothers who inherited the same
after the death of their father, namely, Poornayya.
16. The appellants (defendant Nos.1 and 2) are the
purchasers   of  the   suit   land  from  one   of   the  cosharers (one of the brothers) by a registered sale
deed. Respondent Nos.1­3 (plaintiffs) are the sons of
another co­sharer (brother).
17. In our view, even assuming that the plaintiffs
claimed to   be  in   possession   of  the  suit  property
(which the two Courts below did not find in their
favour) for claiming injunction, yet they were not
entitled to claim injunction against the other cosharers   over   the   suit   property.   It   is   a   settled
principle of law that the possession of one co­sharer
is possession of all co­sharers, it cannot be adverse
to them, unless there is a denial of their right to
6
their knowledge by the person in possession, and
exclusion   and   ouster   following   thereon   for   the
statutory period. [See Mohammad Baqar & Ors. vs.
Naim­un­Nisa Bibi & Ors.(AIR 1956 SC 548)]
18.    So far as the claim of the plaintiffs as being
in exclusive possession to the exclusion of others
was concerned, the same was held not proved by
the two Courts below.
19. Defendant   Nos.1   and   2   (appellants   herein)
being the purchasers of the suit property from one
of the co­sharers stepped into the shoes of their
vendor   (co­sharer)   and,   therefore,   had   a   right   to
defend their title and possession against the other
co­sharer. 
20. In the light of the aforesaid admitted position
arising in the case, in our view, the plaintiffs had no
case to claim injunction against defendant Nos.1
and   2   in   relation   to   the   suit   property.   The   two
7
Courts below, therefore, rightly declined it and we
affirm the same.
21. As   noted   above,   the   High   Court   failed   to
appreciate the factual and legal controversy in its
proper   perspective   and,   therefore,   erred   in
interfering   in   the   concurrent   findings   of   the   fact
without   recording   a   finding   as   to   why   the
concurrent findings of fact are bad in law and why it
requires   interference   in   its   second   appellate
jurisdiction. 
22. In view of the foregoing discussion, we allow
the   appeal,   set   aside   the   impugned   order   and
restore the judgment/decree of the Trial Court/First
Appellate Court which dismissed the suit filed by
respondent Nos.1­3 (Plaintiffs).
                                     .………...................................J.
                                   [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]   
                               
     …...……..................................J.
             [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
April 05, 2019
8
9

the plea of the respondent-husband that the appellant-wife is entitled for maintenance only from one forum, appellant-wife is directed to elect one forum to which she wants to get maintenance is tenable ? = when the child unwilling to study in a new school ? = This Court also interacted with the boy and the boy expressed his desire to continue his studies only in Shahjanpur school. When the boy is not inclined to study in Col. Satsangi’s Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi, and stay in the Boarding House, we are of the view that in the interest of the welfare of the child, he cannot be compelled to admit in Col. Satsangi’s Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi, attached with the Boarding House. In such view of the matter, it cannot be said that the appellant-wife has violated the direction issued by the High Court vide Orders dated 21.05.2018 and 6 20.08.2018. (13) From the very perusal of the order impugned, it appears that the High Court has ascertained the views of the boy and has recorded that he is very much attached and has more affiliation towards his mother (appellant herein). In that view of the matter we are of the opinion that the child, namely, Krish @ Master Krishav Gautam cannot be compelled to join in Col. Satsangi’s Kiran Memorial Public School at New Delhi. We are further of the view that in the interest and welfare of of the child, Krish @ Master Krishav Gautam shall be allowed to continue his study at Global International School, Shahjanpur. (14) Further, in the impugned order, the appellant-wife is directed to elect one forum from which she wants to get the maintenance. As the same is also not in conformity with the law, the said direction is liable to be set aside. Ordered accordingly. (15) As the respondent-husband is a natural father of the child, namely, Krish @ Master Krishav Gautam, he is also entitled to visitation rights. We permit the respondenthusband to visit his child and he is entitled to take the child from the House of the appellant on any Sunday’s and public holiday’s whenever he visits Shahjanpur. The appellant-wife shall allow the child to leave along with the respondent-father at 09:00 a.m., and the respondent-husband to return the child 7 at the house of the appellant-wife before 06:00 p.m. on the same day. For any further modification of visitation rights respondent-father is at liberty to move the High Court with appropriate application and the same shall be considered in accordance with law, keeping in view the welfare of the child. (16) For the aforesaid reasons, Orders dated 21.05.2018 and 20.08.2018 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in First Appeal No.316 of 2018 are set aside. We request the High Court to dispose of the appeal itself as expeditiously as possible in accordance with law.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No(s). 3409-3410 OF 2019
(Arising out of SLP(C) No(s).28166-28167 OF 2018)
NUTAN GAUTAM Appellant(s)
 VERSUS
PRAKASH GAUTAM Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
R. Subhash Reddy, J.:
(1) Leave granted.
(2) These appeals are filed by the wife of the respondent
herein aggrieved by orders dated 21.05.2018 and 20.08.2018
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in First
Appeal NO.316 of 2018.
(3) The marriage of the appellant-wife and the respondenthusband was solemnized in the year 2006. In the year 2009 a
son was born to them who is named Krish alias Master Krishav
Gautam. In the year 2012, respondent-husband filed a petition
for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia)(iii) of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955. The said divorce petition is decreed ex-parte by
the Trial Court in favour of the respondent-husband. The Trial
Court also directed that the son of the appellant, namely,
Krish alias Master Krishav Gautam, should be admitted in Col.
2
Satsangi’s Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi.
(4) Aggrieved by the ex-parte order, the appellant herein
filed First Appeal NO.316 of 2018 before the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad. Pursuant to order of the Family
Court, the son of the parties has been admitted in Col.
Satsangi’s Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi, and he has
been put in a Boarding House of the School. By way of an
interim order dated 21.05.2018, which is impugned in these
appeals, the respondent-husband was permitted to take the boy
with him to Delhi and to leave him in the Boarding House till
the start of the summer vacations of 2018. Further, the
appellant-mother was permitted to take the child in summer
vacations and leave him in the School/Boarding House before the
reopening of the School.
(5) The Family Court has also awarded an amount of Rs.10,000/-
per month towards maintenance for the appellant-wife. In view
of the plea of the respondent-husband that the appellant-wife
is entitled for maintenance only from one forum, appellant-wife
is directed to elect one forum to which she wants to get
maintenance.
(6) After reopening of the School in the summer vacation, it
appears that the boy, Krish @ Master Krishav Gautam, was not
willing to go to study in the Boarding House in Col. Satsangi’s
Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi. Further, fifteen
3
days’ time was granted by the High Court to the appellantmother vide Order dated 20.08.2018 to comply Order dated
21.05.2018.
(7) We have heard Mr. Harikumar V., learned counsel appearing
for the appellant-wife, and Mr. R. Basant, learned senior
counsel appearing for the respondent-husband.
(8) It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant-wife
that the boy is not willing to study in the Col. Satsangi’s
Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi, as he is attached to
his mother very much and intends to study in his old school.
Accordingly, he was admitted in Global International School,
Shahjanpur, where he is comfortable with his studies. It is
submitted at the Bar that as welfare of the child is the
paramount consideration and he is good at studies by pursing
his study in Global International School also at Shahjanpur,
and requested to set aside the impugned order and permit the
boy to continue in the same school at Shahjanpur.
(9) On the other hand, Shri R. Basant, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondent, has submitted that the respondent
is willing to join his son in the best school of Delhi by
paying more than Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two Lakhs) towards fees
and it is in the interest and welfare of the child to allow him
to study only at Col. Satsangi’s Kiran Memorial Public School,
New Delhi. Further, It is submitted that there was a specific
4
direction for joining the boy in the Boarding House/School at
New Delhi after reopening, the appellant-wife has violated
Order dated 21.05.2018 and further Order dated 20.08.2018. It
is submitted that wish of the child itself is not a criteria
and the welfare of the child will be best served by admitting
him in Col. Satsangi’s Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi.
(10) We have heard learned counsel on both the sides, perused
Orders dated 21.05.2018 and 20.08.2018 and other materials
placed on record.
(11) It is clear from the materials placed on record, in view
of the differences cropped up between the parties, respondenthusband has filed petition for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia)
(iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, in the year 2012 which
is decreed ex-parte and appeal against that order is pending
before the High Court. The appellant-wife is presently
residing at her parental house at Shahjanpur, Uttar Pradesh.
The boy is studying in Global International School, Shahjanpur,
Uttar Pradesh, while granting ex-parte decree it appears that
the Trial Court directed that their son should be admitted in
Col. Satsangi’s Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi. In
view of such direction, it appears, the boy was admitted in the
said School at New Delhi and was allowed to be taken by the
appellant-wife in the summer vacation of 2018.
5
(12) It is true that in Order dated 21.05.2018, the respondent
was permitted to take the son and get him joined at Boarding
House in Col. Satsangi’s Kiran Memorial Public School, New
Delhi, and the appellant-wife was permitted to take custody of
the boy in the summer vacation and to ensure that he returns to
the Boarding House after summer vacation. It is the case of
the appellant that after summer vacation the boy was not
inclined to go to the Boarding House/School and wanted to study
only in his old school, namely, Global International School,
Shahjanpur. It is also not in dispute that the child was
earlier studying in the same school where he is admitted now
for further studies. We are informed now that he has now
completed 3rd standard and is aged about 10 years. It is
natural, a boy of that age who has studied earlier in the
school at Shahjanpur, willing to continue in the same school as
much as he is acclimatised with the environment of such school
where he has started his studies from Ist standard onwards.
This Court also interacted with the boy and the boy expressed
his desire to continue his studies only in Shahjanpur school.
When the boy is not inclined to study in Col. Satsangi’s Kiran
Memorial Public School, New Delhi, and stay in the Boarding
House, we are of the view that in the interest of the welfare
of the child, he cannot be compelled to admit in Col.
Satsangi’s Kiran Memorial Public School, New Delhi, attached
with the Boarding House. In such view of the matter, it cannot
be said that the appellant-wife has violated the direction
issued by the High Court vide Orders dated 21.05.2018 and
6
20.08.2018.
(13) From the very perusal of the order impugned, it appears
that the High Court has ascertained the views of the boy and
has recorded that he is very much attached and has more
affiliation towards his mother (appellant herein). In that view
of the matter we are of the opinion that the child, namely,
Krish @ Master Krishav Gautam cannot be compelled to join in
Col. Satsangi’s Kiran Memorial Public School at New Delhi.
We are further of the view that in the interest and welfare of
of the child, Krish @ Master Krishav Gautam shall be allowed to
continue his study at Global International School, Shahjanpur.
(14) Further, in the impugned order, the appellant-wife is
directed to elect one forum from which she wants to get the
maintenance. As the same is also not in conformity with the
law, the said direction is liable to be set aside. Ordered
accordingly.
(15) As the respondent-husband is a natural father of the
child, namely, Krish @ Master Krishav Gautam, he is also
entitled to visitation rights. We permit the respondenthusband to visit his child and he is entitled to take the child
from the House of the appellant on any Sunday’s and public
holiday’s whenever he visits Shahjanpur. The appellant-wife
shall allow the child to leave along with the respondent-father
at 09:00 a.m., and the respondent-husband to return the child
7
at the house of the appellant-wife before 06:00 p.m. on the
same day. For any further modification of visitation rights
respondent-father is at liberty to move the High Court with
appropriate application and the same shall be considered in
accordance with law, keeping in view the welfare of the child.
(16) For the aforesaid reasons, Orders dated 21.05.2018 and
20.08.2018 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
in First Appeal No.316 of 2018 are set aside. We request the
High Court to dispose of the appeal itself as expeditiously as
possible in accordance with law.
(17) In the result, the appeals are allowed with the
direction’s as indicated above. No costs.

.........................J.
 (R. BANUMATHI)
.........................J.
 (R. SUBHASH REDDY)
NEW DELHI,
APRIL 5, 2019.

held that in the absence of any express provision in the rules, no promotion or seniority can be granted from a retrospective date when the employee has not been born in the cadre.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.14967 OF 2017
VINOD VERMA … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
This appeal has been filed against the judgment
dated 03.12.2014 of the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh dismissing the writ petition
filed by the appellant as well as the order dated
24.02.2016 rejecting the Review Application No.21 of
2016 filed by the appellant to review the judgment
dated 03.12.2014.
2. Brief facts giving rise to the appeal need to
be noted are:
Rules have been framed under proviso to Article
2
309 of the Constitution, namely, the
Telecommunications Engineering Service (Group “B”
Posts) Recruitment Rules, 1996 (hereinafter referred
to as “Rules, 1996”). The post of Sub-Divisional
Engineer is the post governed by the Rules, 1996.
The post of Sub-Divisional Engineer is hundred
percent promotional post. Junior Telecom Officers
are eligible for promotion under two methods: (i)
75% on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness, (ii) 25%
on the basis of departmental competitive
examination. In the year 2000, the Telecommunication
Department initiated the process for filling up of
the vacancies “Post 1996-97”. In the year 2001, the
appellant was promoted as Sub-Divisional Engineer
under the seniority-cum-fitness quota. The
department announced the Limited Departmental
Competitive Examination(LDCE)for promotion for the
25% quota for vacancies after 22.07.1996 which
examination could be held on 01.12.2002. The
department issued the promotion orders dated
26.04.2000 and 07.12.2001 for the officers promoted
under the seniority-cum-fitness category for the
vacancies occurring after 23.07.1996. The result of
3
Limited Departmental Competitive Examination was
declared on 15.12.2003. The appellant also appeared
in the Departmental Competitive Examination held on
01.12.2001. The promotion order dated 26.05.2004 was
issued for the promotion of LDCE successful
candidates. The order contemplated that the
seniority of these officers will be fixed as per
Rules shortly. DPC was again conducted and
promotions were made against the 75% category for
the subsequent years 2001-02 and 2002-03 on
16.09.2004. The seniority list of Sub-Divisional
Engineers was issued on 12.01.2005 which seniority
list became the subject matter of the challenge in
various Benches of Central Administrative Tribunal.
In Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh
Bench, TA No.84-HR-2009, Dewan Chand & Ors. vs.
Union of India was filed. Before Central
Administrative Tribunal, Bombay Bench, TA No.6 of
2009, S. Sadasivan vs. BSNL was filed. Before
Central Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench, OA
No.16 of 2009, Thomas Zachariah vs. BSNL and OA
No.86 of 2009, V. Govindan vs. Union of India were
filed. Chandigarh Bench of Central Administrative
4
Tribunal decided TA No.84-HR-20090 (Dewan Chand vs.
Union of India) vide its judgment dated 25.08.2009.
The Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh
allowed the Transfer Application. The applicants
before the Tribunal were working as Sub-Divisional
Engineers. The question raised was as to what would
be the mode of fixation of seniority in TES Group
'B' between members of service who are appointed on
the basis of seniority vis-a-vis those who enter the
service after qualifying the Limited Departmental
Competitive Examination. The Tribunal held that the
seniority of the incumbents has to be determined on
the basis of date of joining and not of the notional
date of promotion. The applicants before the
Tribunal belonged to the stream who were promoted
under seniority-cum-fitness where few of the
respondents who were impleaded before the Tribunal
were those who were promoted Sub-Divisional
Engineers vide order dated 26.05.2004 on the basis
of Limited Competitive Departmental Examination. The
Tribunal quashed the seniority list prepared by the
department and directed for redrawing the seniority
list on the basis of date of joining of the
5
incumbents. In paragraph 17 following was directed:
"17.In view of the above discussion,
both these Original Applications are
allowed. Orders/seniority lists impugned
in these petitions are quashed and set
aside. The respondents are directed to redraw the seniority of officers of TES
Group-B on the basis of dates of joining
of incumbents, as discussed above, within
a period of six months from the date of
receipt of copy of this order. Before
undertaking such exercise, respondents may
invite objections from the persons likely
to be adversely effected before re-drawing
seniority as observed herein above. No
costs.”
3. The appellant was not the party to the said
case in Dewan Chand vs. Union of India, TA No.84-HR2009, hence, he filed the review petition before the
Central Administrative Tribunal. The review petition
was dismissed by the CAT on 18.01.2010. The Writ
Petition No.5148-CAT of 2010 was filed by the
appellant challenging the order dated 25.08.2009 and
18.01.2010 passed by the Central Administrative
Tribunal, Chandigarh. The writ petition filed by the
appellant was dismissed by the Punjab and Haryana
High Court vide its judgment and order dated
03.12.2014. The High Court in its judgment dated
03.12.2014 held that controversy in the case stands
settled by the decision dated 12.08.2014 rendered by
6
this Court in SLP(C)No.35756 of 2012 (BSNL and
others vs. S. Sadasivan and others). Against the
judgment dated 03.12.2014 SLP(C)No.18621 of 2015 was
filed by the appellant which was disposed of on
16.10.2015 by this Court permitting the appellant to
withdraw the SLP with liberty to file review
application before the High Court. In pursuance of
the order dated 16.10.2015 appellant filed a review
application before the High Court which has been
rejected on 24.02.2016. Aggrieved by the judgment
dated 24.02.2016 and initial judgment dated
03.12.2014 this appeal has been filed by the
appellant.
4. We have heard Shri C.A. Sundaram, learned
senior counsel for the appellant. Shri Vikramjit
Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General has
appeared for the Union of India. Shri B.H.
Marlapalle, learned senior counsel has appeared for
BSNL. We have also heard Shri J.S. Attri, learned
senior counsel for the respondents. Shri S.
Sadasivan, who has filed application for
intervention and appeared in-person has also been
heard. There are several other applications seeking
7
impleadment in these proceedings. We do not find any
necessity to implead applicants in these
proceedings. IAs seeking impleadment in this appeal
are refused.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that
the recruitment Rules, 1996 are silent about the
seniority rules. It is submitted that the seniority
has to be determined as per OM dated 22.12.1959 and
various other subsequent OMs laying down rules for
determination of seniority. It is submitted that as
per Rules, 1996 there being 75% quota fixed for
seniority-cum-fitness and 25% for LDCE, the ROTA
rules have to be determined to decide the seniority
between those who have been promoted under
seniority-cum-fitness and those who have been
promoted under LDCE. It is submitted that the LDCE
candidates eligible for the year 1996-97 have to be
placed senior to the candidates eligible for 1997-
98, 1998-99 and so on. Learned counsel submits that
OM dated 07.02.1986 and 07.02.1990 clarified that
even if the promotions for two grades under General
Principle 5(ii) takes place through separate DPC’s,
“…the principle of rotation of vacancies between
different streams will have to be followed…”.
6. It is submitted that Union of India vs. N.R.
Parmar, (2012) 13 SCC 340, is clearly applicable. It
is submitted that neither the Central Administrative
8
Tribunal nor the High Court has considered the
relevant OM dated 22.12.1959 and subsequent OMs
laying down principles of seniority due to which
error has been committed in setting the seniority
list finalized by the department. It is submitted
that judgment of this Court in SLP(C)No.35756 of
2012(BSNL & Ors. vs. S. Sadasivan & Ors.) dated
12.08.2014 does not decide the issues raised before
the Punjab and Haryana High Court. It is further
submitted that the judgment of this Court in
C.A.No.7830 of 2014(Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited &
Ors. Vs. S.K. Dubey & Ors.) decided on 12.08.2014
does not consider the relevant OMs determining the
seniority. This Court in the said judgment fell in
error in holding that ROTA rule is not applicable.
7. Learned counsel submits that the judgment of
this Court in Union of India vs. N.R. Parmar, (2012)
13 SCC 340, has again been reiterated by this Court
in its judgment dated 03.10.2018 in C.A.Nos.5518-
5523 of 2017 (Punjab and Haryana High Court vs.
State of Punjab) that when the quota has been
prescribed under the statutory rules, the ROTA is
9
applicable automatically in the seniority. The
appellant who was eligible earlier years for
promotion has to be placed in the slot according to
his eligibility and has to be given seniority of
that position.
8. Learned Additional Solicitor General, Shri
Vikramjit Banerjee submitted that the seniority list
was drawn by the department in the ratio of 3:1 as
per OM dated 03.07.1986. Seniority list Nos.6 and 7
were prepared affecting the Rules of ROTA and quota.
Although there are statutory Rules, 1996 but the
same were not for determining the seniority. The
seniority was determined on the instructions issued
by the Government of India, Department of Personnel
and Training dated 03.07.1986. It is, however,
submitted that although department has been
supporting the seniority list based on ROTA and
quota but after it was reversed by three-Judge Bench
judgment of this Court dated 12.08.2014, the
department and the BSNL has implemented the
judgment.
9. Shri Marlapalle, learned senior counsel,
10
submits that the BSNL has been following the
instructions of the department on the judgment of
S.K.Dubey (supra) and if now the quota and ROTA
rules are implemented it will cause new problems.
10. Learned counsel for promotees under 75% quota
submits that promotions were initially governed by
1981 Rules where quota for seniority-cum-fitness was
2/3 and for LDCE was 1/3. The 1981 Rules provided
for ROTA rules and further provided that examination
has to be held every year. Rules, 1981 were replaced
by the Rules, 1996 which do not indicate that
examination has to be held every year. Further,
Rules, 1996 do not provide for ROTA.
11. Learned senior counsel further submits that the
issue raised in this appeal is covered by judgments
of this Court dated 12.08.2014 (BSNL & Ors. vs. S.K.
Dubey & Ors.) and judgment dated 12.08.2014 in
Transferred Case No…… of 2014 (arising out of
T.P(C)No.184 of 2013), Rajesh Banta & Ors. vs. Dewan
Chand & Ors. Learned counsel submits that quota of
75% and 25% is applicable but ROTA is not
applicable.
11
12. Shri S. Sadasivan, who appeared as intervener
submits that benefit of judgment of larger Bench
cannot be taken away by any order in this appeal. He
submits that the present is not a case of any direct
recruitment. Further, different grades are not
available in the present promotion exercise. He
submits that OM dated 03.07.1986 is for direct
recruitment.
13. We have considered the submissions of learned
counsel for the parties and perused the records.
14. The statutory rules, namely, the
Telecommunications Engineering Service (Group “B”
Posts) Recruitment Rules, 1996 have been framed
under proviso to Article 309 according to which the
post of Sub-Divisional Engineer(SDE) is a post which
is to be filled up by 100% promotion. Schedule to
the Rules in Column 11 provides as follows:
“Promotion:
(i) 75% on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness.
(ii)25% on the basis of a departmental
competitive examination.”
15. In the seniority list Nos.7 and 8, the inter se
12
seniority of SDE promoted through seniority-cumfitness and LDCE was fixed by the department in the
ratio of 3:1 as per OM dated 03.07.1986 which was
sought to be challenged in the present case, where
the appeal has arisen out of the order passed by the
Chandigarh Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal.
In TA No.84-HR-2009 (Dewan Chand vs. Union of
India), the applicants who had approached the
Tribunal were promoted under seniority-cum-fitness
and they were allocated to the seniority position
below the promotees under LDCE quota under which
they were given seniority slots earlier to date of
promotion. The Tribunal had allowed the TA No.84-HR2009 and set aside the seniority list and directed
for drawing the seniority list on the basis of date
of joining of the incumbents. The appellant who
claims seniority position as per occurring of
vacancy for LDCE quota is aggrieved by the direction
of the Tribunal.
16. A perusal of Rules, 1996 indicates that Rules,
1996 provides for the method of recruitment, age and
other qualifications. The Rules which have been
brought on record as Annexure P-8 to the appeal do
13
not contain any provision relating to determination
of seniority. The statutory Rules, 1996 being silent
on the question of determination of seniority, Shri
Sundaram is right in his submission that for
determination of seniority OMs dated 22.12.1959,
24.06.1978, 07.02.1986, 03.07.1986 and 07.02.1990
have to be looked into. It is settled law that the
determination of seniority can be provided by the
Executive instructions if the subject matter is not
covered by the statutory rules.
17. It is to be noted that the High Court has
dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant
challenging the order of the CAT dated 25.08.2009
holding that the issue is covered by the judgment of
this Court in BSNL vs. S. Sadasivan. It is necessary
to look into the judgment of this Court in BSNL vs.
S. Sadasivan and proceeding giving rise to this
Court’s order dated 12.08.2014. Shri S. Sadasivan
before CAT, Bombay Bench, Mumbai has challenged the
validity of the seniority list dated 28.07.2004. In
seniority list Nos.6 and 7 of Telecommunication
Engineers Group “B” S. Sadasivan was promoted under
75% quota on 07.12.2001. On 01.12.2002 Limited
14
Departmental Competitive Examination was held for
25% quota, result of which was declared on
15.12.2003. Thereafter, seniority list Nos.6 and 7
were issued. The case of S. Sadasivan was that
seniority of the applicant was below to who was
subsequently promoted on 26.05.2004. It is relevant
to notice that the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Bombay Bench allowed the application vide its
judgment dated 25.11.2010 and set aside the
seniority list. The respondents were directed to
recast the seniority list on the basis of the order
given by the Chandigarh Bench of CAT in Dewan
Chand’s case, (which is the order of the Tribunal
which has given rise to the present appeal) against
which order BSNL filed Writ Petition No.3725 of 2011
which was dismissed by the Bombay High Court on
21.06.2011.
18. Against the order of the Bombay High Court
dismissing the writ petition matter was taken to
this Court by filing SLP(C)No.35756 of 2012 (BSNL &
Ors. vs. S. Sadasivan & Ors.). This Court on
12.08.2014 dismissed the said SLP by passing the
following order:
15
“SLP (C) No.35756 OF 2012
In paragraph 3 of the impugned order, the
High Court has observed thus:
“The question is : whether the
Tribunal was right in answering the
controversy on the principal that the
correct date for reckoning seniority
of the respondent ought to be taken as
7th December, 2001 which is his date
of joining. In our opinion, there is
no infirmity in the said view taken by
the Tribunal.”
We find no infirmity with the above view
taken by the High Court. Special leave
petition is, accordingly, dismissed.”
19. The order of the CAT, Bombay which was passed
issuing direction for casting of the seniority on
the basis of the judgment of Dewan Chand passed by
CAT, Chandigarh, thus, has been received final
approval by this Court.
20. At this stage, we may consider one more
submission which has been raised by the learned
counsel for the respondents. The submission which
has been raised by the learned counsel for the
respondents is that a three-Judge Bench of this
Court in BSNL vs. S.K. Dubey (supra) has finally
determined the controversy and held that ROTA rule
will not be applicable for determining the seniority
16
of Sub-Divisional Engineers. We may notice the
judgment of this Court dated 12.08.2014 in BSNL vs.
S.K. Dubey in some detail. BSNL has filed the
appeal. In the said appeal the challenge was made to
the order of CAT, Jabalpur which directed the
appellant, BSNL to assign the notional date of
promotion to Sub-Divisional Engineers which order
was set aside by this Court by the said judgment.
Paragraphs 2 to 4 of the judgment are as follows:
“2. This appeal by special leave is
directed against the order of the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Jabalpur, whereby
the original application filed by the
respondents herein was allowed and the
direction has been given to the present
appellants (respondent therein) to assign
the notional date of promotion as Sub
Divisional Engineers (SDEs) with
consequential benefits such as counting of
experience for further promotions, annual
increments etc. to the original applicants
with effect from 23.01.2002.
3. The order passed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal cannot be sustained
for more than one reason. In the first
place, there is no rule with regard to the
subject service which gives benefit of
assigning the notional date of promotion
with retrospective effect. The present
respondents were employees of the
Department of Telecommunications,
Government of India and were working as
Junior Telecom Officers prior to 1996. In
exercise of the powers conferred by the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution
of India, the Telecommunications
17
Engineering Services (Group 'B')
Recruitment Rules, 1996 were made with
effect from 22.07.1996. Inter alia, these
rules provide for method of recruitment,
age limit and other qualifications for the
recruitment by way of promotion to the post
of TES Group 'B'.
4. As per these Rules, 75% promotion is to
be made on the basis of seniority-cumfitness from amongst Junior Telecom
Officers with three years regular service
in the Grade and 25% is to be promoted on
the basis of Departmental Competitive
Examination from Junior Telecom Officers
with three years r10egular service in the
Grade. The crucial date for determining the
eligibility is 1st July of the year to
which the vacancy pertains. 1996
Recruitment Rules do not provide for ROTA
nor does it provide for holding
Departmental Competitive Examination for
the vacancies every year in contradistinction to the earlier Rules of 1981
entitled Telegraph Engineering Service
(Group 'B' Posts) Recruitment Rules, 1981.
1981 Rules, inter alia, had a provision
that inter se seniority of the officials
who have qualified in the Departmental
Qualifying Examination shall be in the
ratio of 2:1 starting with the officers
selected by the method of selection by
Departmental Promotion Committee on the
basis of Departmental Qualifying
Examination. It also provided that there
shall be normally one examination
consisting of two parts called Qualifyingcum-Competitive Examination for promotion
to the service which shall be held at least
once in a calendar year. The ROTA rule as
well as holding the examination at least
once in a calendar year which were provided
in the 1981 Rules are conspicuously absent
in the 1996 Rules. The validity of the 1996
Rules has not been put in issue by any
one.”
18
21. This Court further held that in the absence of
any express provision in the rules, no promotion or
seniority can be granted from a retrospective date
when the employee has not been born in the cadre.
22. There is one more reason to hold that the
present appeal is covered by three-Judge Bench
judgment of this Court dated 12.08.2014. Against the
judgment of Tribunal in TA No.84-HR-2009 (Dewan
Chand vs. Union of India) a writ petition was filed
in Punjab and Haryana High Court being CWP
No.5133/CAT of 2010 (Rajesh Banta and others vs.
Central Administrative Tribunal and others). Thus,
in the said writ petition the same order of the
Tribunal dated 25.08.2009 was under challenge which
has been challenged by the appellant herein. This
Court transferred CWP No.5133/CAT of 2010 (Rajesh
Banta and others vs. Central Administrative Tribunal
and others) by Transferred Case (Civil) No……of
2014(arising out of T.P.(C)No.184 of 2013) and by
the judgment dated 12.08.2014, the three-Judge Bench
dismissed the writ petition which was filed
challenging the order of the CAT in Dewan Chand. The
19
order of this Court is brought on record at pages
181-182 of the paper book which is to the following
effect:
“TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. OF 2014
(Arising out of T.P.(Civil) No.184 of 2013)
RAJESH BANTA & ORS. PETITIONER(S)
VERSUS
DEWAN CHAND & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
Transfer petition is allowed. Writ
Petition being C.W.P. No.5133/CAT-2010
titled “Rajesh Banta and Others v. Central
Administrative Tribunal and Others” is
transferred from Punjab and Haryana High
Court to this Court and is treated as
Transferred Case.
2. We have heard Mr. Sunil Kumar, learned
senior counsel for the petitioners.
3. For the reasons stated by us in our
order passed today in Civil Appeal arising
out of SLP(C) ...2/- -2- No.39932 of 2012
titled 'Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Ors.
vs. S.K. Dubey & Ors.', the transferred
case is liable to be dismissed and is
dismissed accordingly. No costs.
.......................CJI.
 ( R.M. LODHA )
 .........................J.
 ( KURIAN JOSEPH )
NEW DELHI; ........................J.
AUGUST 12,2014 ( ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN )”
23. When three-Judge Bench of this Court following
20
the pronouncement in BSNL & Ors. vs. S.K. Dubey &
Ors., judgment of the same day, has dismissed the
writ petition against the same very judgment of the
CAT of Chandigarh Bench in Dewan Chand vs. Union of
India, the fate of this appeal is sealed by the said
judgment by dismissing the writ petition against the
order of the Central Administrative Tribunal,
Chandigarh Bench in TA No.84-HR-2009. The writ
petition filed by the appellant has to meet the same
fate. In view of the facts as noticed above that the
controversy raised in this appeal is covered by
three-Judge Bench judgment dated 12.08.2014 we see
no necessity to delve into various other arguments
raise in this appeal. We are not persuaded to take
any different view to one which has been taken by
three-Judge Bench as noted above.
24. We, thus, hold that the present appeal deserves
to be dismissed in view of the judgment of this
Court dated 12.08.2014 Transferred Case (Civil) No……
of 2014(arising out of T.P.(C)No.184 of 2013)(Rajesh
Banta & Ors. vs. Dewan Chand & Ors.) and judgment of
the three-Judge Bench of this Court in BSNL & ors.
vs. S.K. Dubey & Ors. decided on 12.08.2014. The
21
appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
......................J.
 ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
......................J.
 ( K.M. JOSEPH )
New Delhi,
April 02, 2019.