No injunction suit against the purchasers of one of co sharers = In our view, even assuming that the plaintiffs claimed to be in possession of the suit property (which the two Courts below did not find in their favour) for claiming injunction, yet they were not entitled to claim injunction against the other cosharers over the suit property. It is a settled principle of law that the possession of one co­sharer is possession of all co­sharers, it cannot be adverse to them, unless there is a denial of their right to 6 their knowledge by the person in possession, and exclusion and ouster following thereon for the statutory period. [See Mohammad Baqar & Ors. vs. Naim­un­Nisa Bibi & Ors.(AIR 1956 SC 548)] 18. So far as the claim of the plaintiffs as being in exclusive possession to the exclusion of others was concerned, the same was held not proved by the two Courts below. 19. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 (appellants herein) being the purchasers of the suit property from one of the co­sharers stepped into the shoes of their vendor (co­sharer) and, therefore, had a right to defend their title and possession against the other co­sharer. 20. In the light of the aforesaid admitted position arising in the case, in our view, the plaintiffs had no case to claim injunction against defendant Nos.1 and 2 in relation to the suit property. The two 7 Courts below, therefore, rightly declined it and we affirm the same. 21. As noted above, the High Court failed to appreciate the factual and legal controversy in its proper perspective and, therefore, erred in interfering in the concurrent findings of the fact without recording a finding as to why the concurrent findings of fact are bad in law and why it requires interference in its second appellate jurisdiction.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL  APPEAL No. 3408 OF 2019
(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.23575 of 2011)
T. Ramalingeswara Rao (Dead)
Thr. LRs. & Anr. ….Appellant(s)
VERSUS
N. Madhava Rao & Ors.               ….Respondent(s)
               
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and   order   dated   23.11.2010  passed   by   the   High
Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad
in   Second   Appeal   No.1036   of   2006   whereby   the
High   Court   allowed   the   second   appeal   filed   by
respondent Nos.1 to 3 herein. 
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3. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the
disposal of this appeal, which involves a short point.
4. The appellants herein are defendant Nos.1 and
2, respondent Nos.1­3  herein are the plaintiffs and
respondent Nos.5­9 are the defendant Nos.4­8   of
the civil suit out of which this appeal arises.
5. Respondent Nos.1­3 (plaintiffs) filed a civil suit
against the appellants (defendant Nos.1 and 2) and
respondent   Nos.5   to   9   (defendant   Nos.4   to   8)
seeking perpetual injunction against the defendants
restraining   them   from   interfering   in   his   peaceful
possession over the suit properties.
6. The   appellants   (defendant   Nos.1   and   2)
contested   the   suit   whereas   the   remaining
defendants (4 to 8) remained  ex parte.   The Trial
Court   by   judgment/decree   dated   20.08.2001
dismissed the suit.  Respondent Nos.1­3 (plaintiffs)
felt   aggrieved   and   filed   first   appeal   before   the
Additional   District   &   Sessions   Judge(Fast   Track
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Court),   Visakhapatnam.     By   judgment   dated
07.11.2005, the First Appellate Court dismissed the
appeal and upheld the judgment/decree of the Trial
Court.
7. The   plaintiffs   (respondent   Nos.1­3)   felt
aggrieved and filed second appeal in the High Court
of Andhra Pradesh. By impugned order, the High
Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment
impugned therein and decreed the plaintiffs’ suit by
passing a decree for perpetual injunction against
the   defendants   in   relation   to   the   suit   property,
which has given rise to filing of the present appeal
by way of special leave in this Court by defendant
Nos.1 and 2.
8. So,   the   short   question,   which   arises   for
consideration in this appeal, is whether the High
Court was justified in allowing the plaintiffs’ second
appeal and thereby was justified in decreeing their
suit by granting a decree of perpetual injunction
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against defendant Nos.1 and 2 in relation to the suit
property.
9. Having   heard   the   learned   counsel   for   the
parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we
are   constrained   to   allow   the   appeal   and   while
setting   aside   the   impugned   order   restore   the
judgment/decree of the First Appellate Court and
the Trial Court which resulted in dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ suit.
10. In   our   considered   opinion,   the   High   Court
erred in interfering in the concurrent findings of
facts of the two Courts below, which dismissed the
plaintiffs’ suit.
11. In   our   view,   the   Trial   Court   and   the   First
Appellate Court on appreciating the evidence of the
parties had rightly come to a conclusion that the
plaintiffs failed to prove the ingredients necessary
for the grant of perpetual injunction.
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12. When   the   two   Courts   below   have   recorded
concurrent   findings   of   fact   against   the   plaintiffs,
which   are   based   on   appreciation   of   facts   and
evidence,   in   our   view,   such   findings   being
concurrent in nature are binding on the High Court.
It   is   only   when   such   findings   are   found   to   be
against any provision of law or against the pleading
or evidence or are found to be wholly perverse, a
case for interference may call for by the High Court
in its second appellate jurisdiction.
13. Such was not the case made out in the High
Court.  It is for this reason, we are of the view that
the High Court should not have interfered in the
findings of the two Courts below and instead, the
findings   should   have   been   upheld   by   the   High
Court.
14. Coming now to the facts of the case, we find
that the plaintiffs (respondent Nos.1­3) have no case
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much   less  prima   facie  for   grant   of   perpetual
injunction.
15. The suit property is a part of big chunk of land
owned by several brothers who inherited the same
after the death of their father, namely, Poornayya.
16. The appellants (defendant Nos.1 and 2) are the
purchasers   of  the   suit   land  from  one   of   the  cosharers (one of the brothers) by a registered sale
deed. Respondent Nos.1­3 (plaintiffs) are the sons of
another co­sharer (brother).
17. In our view, even assuming that the plaintiffs
claimed to   be  in   possession   of  the  suit  property
(which the two Courts below did not find in their
favour) for claiming injunction, yet they were not
entitled to claim injunction against the other cosharers   over   the   suit   property.   It   is   a   settled
principle of law that the possession of one co­sharer
is possession of all co­sharers, it cannot be adverse
to them, unless there is a denial of their right to
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their knowledge by the person in possession, and
exclusion   and   ouster   following   thereon   for   the
statutory period. [See Mohammad Baqar & Ors. vs.
Naim­un­Nisa Bibi & Ors.(AIR 1956 SC 548)]
18.    So far as the claim of the plaintiffs as being
in exclusive possession to the exclusion of others
was concerned, the same was held not proved by
the two Courts below.
19. Defendant   Nos.1   and   2   (appellants   herein)
being the purchasers of the suit property from one
of the co­sharers stepped into the shoes of their
vendor   (co­sharer)   and,   therefore,   had   a   right   to
defend their title and possession against the other
co­sharer. 
20. In the light of the aforesaid admitted position
arising in the case, in our view, the plaintiffs had no
case to claim injunction against defendant Nos.1
and   2   in   relation   to   the   suit   property.   The   two
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Courts below, therefore, rightly declined it and we
affirm the same.
21. As   noted   above,   the   High   Court   failed   to
appreciate the factual and legal controversy in its
proper   perspective   and,   therefore,   erred   in
interfering   in   the   concurrent   findings   of   the   fact
without   recording   a   finding   as   to   why   the
concurrent findings of fact are bad in law and why it
requires   interference   in   its   second   appellate
jurisdiction. 
22. In view of the foregoing discussion, we allow
the   appeal,   set   aside   the   impugned   order   and
restore the judgment/decree of the Trial Court/First
Appellate Court which dismissed the suit filed by
respondent Nos.1­3 (Plaintiffs).
                                     .………...................................J.
                                   [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]   
                               
     …...……..................................J.
             [DINESH MAHESHWARI]
New Delhi;
April 05, 2019
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