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Wednesday, April 10, 2019

Smt. P. Leelavathi (D) by LRs .. Appellant Versus V. Shankarnarayana Rao (D) by LRs .. Respondent



whether   in   the   facts   and circumstances of the case and merely because some financial
assistance   has   been   given   by   the   father   to   the   sons   to purchase   the   properties,  can   the   transactions   be   said   to benami in nature? - NO -

TRIAL COURT DISMISSED THE SUIT FOR PARTITION - HIGH COURT CONFIRMED THE SAME - APEX COURT ALSO CONFIRMED THE SAME

Suit for partition -  purchasing properties in the name of sons etc., for joint family purpose is different that of providing financial assitance to purchase property by the sons in their name for their sake themselves alone



  1. The plaintiff has miserably failed to establish and prove   the   intention   of   the   father   to   purchase   the   suit properties   for   and   on   behalf   of   the   family,   which   werepurchased in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3.  
  2.  It is required to be noted that, as such, the plaintiff – daughter has not stepped into the witness box and that the evidence on behalf of the plaintiff has been given by her husband who, as such, can be said to be an outsider, so far as the joint family is concerned.  
  3.  Apart from that, it has come on record that the plaintiff and her husband were maintained by Late G. Venkata Rao.  
  4. The financial assistance was also given to the plaintiff and her husband to purchase the residential house   at   Bangalore.     
  5. Late   G.   Venkata   Rao,   therefore, provided a shelter to his daughter and, as observed herein above, also  gave  the financial assistance  to  purchase  the residential house at Bangalore.   
  6. It has also come on record that   Late   G.   Venkata   Rao   even   purchased   the   share certificates and his daughter­ original plaintiff was also given certain   number   of   shares.    
  7. Therefore,   considering   the aforesaid   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,   Late   G. Venkata Rao also must have given the financial assistance to defendant Nos. 1 to 3 – sons and helped them in purchase of the properties.   
  8. Therefore, the intention of Late G. Venkata Rao   to   give   the   financial   assistance   to   purchase   the properties in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 cannot be said to be to purchase the properties for himself and/or his family members and, therefore, as rightly observed by the High   Court,   the   transactions   of   purchase   of   the   suit properties   –   Item   Nos.   I(a)   to   I(c)   in   the   names   of   the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 cannot be said to be benami in nature.
  9. The intention of Late G. Venkata Rao was to provide the financial   assistance   for   the   welfare   of   his   sons   and   not beyond that.  
  10. None of the other ingredients to establish the transactions as benami transactions, as held by this Court in the   aforesaid   decisions,   are   satisfied,   except   that   some financial assistance was provided by Late G. Venkata Rao. 
  11. In the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the evidence on record, the purchase of the suit properties – Item Nos. I(a) to I(c) in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 cannot be said to be benami transactions and, therefore, as rightly observed and held by the learned trial Court and confirmed by the High Court, the plaintiff has no right to claim 1/4th share in the suit properties – Item Nos. I(a) to I(c) which were purchased by the sons in their names by separate sale deeds. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court.

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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1099 OF 2008
Smt. P. Leelavathi (D) by LRs .. Appellant
Versus
V. Shankarnarayana Rao (D) by LRs .. Respondent
J U D G M E N T
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka
at Bangalore dated 06.09.2007 in RFA No. 220 of 1991, by
which the High Court has dismissed the said First appeal
preferred  by   the  original   plaintiff  Smt.   P.   Leelavathi   (now
deceased and represented through her legal heirs) and has
confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the learned
trial Court dismissing the suit, the legal heirs of the original
plaintiff Smt. P. Leelavathi have preferred the present appeal.
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2. The facts leading to the present appeal in nutshell are
as under:
That Smt. P. Leelavathi instituted Original Suit No. 1248 of
1980 in the Court of the XIV Additional City Civil Judge at
Bangalore   against   the   original   defendants   –   V.
Shankaranarayan   Rao   (now   deceased   and   represented
through his legal heirs) and two others for partition and for
recovery of 1/4th share of the plaintiff in the plaint scheduled
properties.  That the original plaintiff Smt. P. Leelavathi and
the original defendants are the sister and brothers and the
daughter and sons of Late G. Venkata Rao, who died on
08.10.1974. 
2.1 It was the case on behalf of the original plaintiff that her
father Late G. Venkata Rao was an Estate Agent and he was
doing money lending business in his name and also in the
names of his sons and he was purchasing properties in the
names   of   his   sons,   though   his   father   was   funding   those
properties.     According to the plaintiff, at the time of his
death, G. Venkata Rao was in possession of a large estate
comprising   of   immoveable   properties,   bank   deposits   etc.
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shown in the plaint schedule.  It was the case on behalf of
the original plaintiff that the suit schedule properties were as
such joint family properties and/or they were purchased in
fact by their late father G. Venkata Rao and the same was
funded by their father.  That, it was the case on behalf of the
original plaintiff that the plaintiff was entitled to 1/4th share
in all the said properties belonging to her father.  It was the
case on behalf of the original plaintiff that as the defendants
refused to give her 1/4th  share and gave an evasive reply,
which prompted the plaintiff to demand in writing her share
and for early settlement.   That, thereafter she got a notice
dated 18.07.1975 issued demanding partition and amicable
settlement.     But   the   defendants   have   failed   to   settle   the
matter.  Therefore, the plaintiff instituted the aforesaid suit
for partition and for recovery of her 1/4th share in the plaint
schedule properties.
3. That the original defendants resisted the suit by filing
the   written   statement.     It  was  the  case  on  behalf   of  the
original defendants that the plaint schedule properties are
exclusively   owned   by   the   defendants   in   their   individual
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rights.   Item No. 1 of the plaint schedule i.e., premises No.
32/1,   Aga   Abbas   Ali   Road   is   the   personal   property   of
defendant No. 3.  Item (b) of schedule 1 belongs to defendant
No.   2   and   Item   (c)   belongs   to   defendant   No.   1.       These
properties never belonged to their deceased father G. Venkata
Rao and they do not form part of his estate.  Coming to Item
No. II, the three fixed deposits were the personal properties of
each   of   the   defendants.     There   was   a   joint   saving   bank
account in the Syndicate Bank, Cantonment Branch in the
joint names of the deceased and defendant No. 2.  There is a
small amount still lying in the said account.   At any rate,
there is no outstanding of Rs.10,000/­ in the said account.
Regarding Item No. III, there were no debts due and payable
to the deceased.  939 shares were in the joint names of the
deceased and the plaintiff.  840 shares were in the names of
the deceased and defendant No. 1.  Another 840 shares were
in the names of the deceased and defendant No. 2.     949
shares were in the names of the deceased and defendant No.
3.   The plaintiff had major share which were purchased by
the deceased in the names of himself and the plaintiff.  Late
G. Venkata Rao was a head clerk attached to an advocate’s
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office   in   Civil   Station,   Bangalore.     On   retirement,   the
deceased indulged in and acted as an estate agent in a most
casual manner.     At any rate, he was not doing moneylending business nor did he purchase properties as is sought
to be made out in the plaint.  The deceased was at no point of
time in affluent circumstances.  The solvency of the deceased
was at a very low ebb at the time of his death and he left no
jewellery.   Even the furniture available at Premises No. 138,
Aga Abbas Ali Road, Bangalore was not worth mentioning
inasmuch as the pieces left could be counted on finger tips.
The   value   of   the   entire   hold   effects   would   not   exceed
Rs.400.00.   Only Items 10, 12, 19, 20, 21 and 22 out of the
said premises were valuable articles of the deceased.   The
other items never existed at any point of time.  The plaintiff
had the best of things from her father while he was alive.
She was the recipient of favours shown by her father from
time to time.  The deceased stretched his generosity even to
his son­in­law, the husband of the plaintiff.  The deceased in
fact emptied his resources at the calls of her daughter and
her husband.   The son­in­law also collected cash from the
deceased.   The plaintiff and her husband are also due in a
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sum of Rs.3000/­ borrowed by them under a pro­note dated
11.06.1966 from the deceased and defendant No. 3.   They
are also due a sum of Rs.1500/­ under another pro­note
dated   29.11.1966   payable   to   the   deceased.     The   above
amounts   also   carry   interest   at   stipulated   rates.     The
defendants   serve   their   right   to   recover   the   said   amounts
through proper legal remedies.   The plaintiff constructed a
house bearing No. 150, Veerapillai Street with the said and
financial   assistance   of   her   father.     The   plaintiff   in   active
connivance with her husband ransacked the house No. 138,
Aga Abbas Ali Road during the absence of the deceased and
defendant No. 2 who had gone to Tirupathi and Madras.
The   plaintiff   had   made   wrongful   gains   about   this   time
somewhere in 1963.  The plaintiff stayed with her husband at
Chicmagalur only for about three months after her marriage.
Thereafter   she   came   with   her   husband   to   Bangalore   and
stayed with her father for nearly six years.   The plaintiff is
enjoying the special privilege and she has benefits bestowed
on her, her husband and her children almost regularly.  In
addition to her father, defendant No. 2 was also looking after
the needs of the plaintiff’s family at considerable expenses.
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All the defendants are residing in rented houses.  The claim
of the plaintiff in respect of Item A to C in the plaint schedule
is not tenable, in view of provisions of Section 2 of Benami
Transactions   (Prohibition   of   Right   to   Recover   Property)
Ordinance, 1988, the plaintiff has no cause of action and no
relief can be given to her.   The suit is therefore liable to be
dismissed with costs.
3.1 That the trial Court framed the following issues:
1) Whether the plaintiff proves that the suit schedule
immovable and movable properties as described in
Schedule I to V are the self­acquire properties?
2) Whether the suit schedule I(a) vacant site bearing
No.   32/1,   Aga   Abbas   Ali   Road,   Civil   Station,
Bangalore, is the self acquired property of defendant
No. 3?
3) Whether the suit schedule I(b) vacant site bearing
No.   32/1,   Aga   Abbas   Ali   Road,   Civil   Station.
Bangalore, is the self acquired property of defendant
No. 2?
4) Whether the suit schedule I(c) property is the self
acquired property of defendant No. 1?
5) Whether the defendants prove that the suit schedule
II Bank deposits are the personal properties of each
of the defendants?
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6) Whether   the   defendants   prove   that   there   were
furniture mentioned as Items 10, 12, 19, 20, 21 and
22 of suit Schedule V in page­5 of the plaint, hardly
worth Rs.400/­ in premises No. 138/A (New No. 6)
Armstrong Road, Civil Station, Bangalore?
7) Whether   the   plaintiff   is   entitled   to   partition   and
possession of her 1/4th  share in the suit schedule
properties?
8)  Whether there is cause of action for the suit?
9) To what reliefs is the plaintiff entitled?
Additional Issue:  Is the claim of the plaintiff barred by
Section 2 of the Benami Transaction
(Prohibition   of   Right   to   Recover
Property) Ordinance, 1988 as alleged?
3.2 That   the   learned   trial   Court   dismissed   the   suit   by
holding that the suit schedule properties are not the selfacquired properties of Late G. Venkata Rao; suit Item Nos.
I(a), I(b) and I(c) are the properties of original defendant Nos.
1 to 3; the bank deposits mentioned in Scheduled II of the
plaint are the personal properties of defendant Nos. 1 to 3.
The learned trial Court further observed and held that in
respect of moveable properties mentioned in Schedule V as
suit Item Nos. 10, 12, 19, 20, 21 and 22, the plaintiff is
9
entitled for 1/4th share and therefore the learned trial Court
granted the decree for recovery of 1/4th share to the plaintiff
which   was   hardly   worth   Rs.400/­   (sic)   available   in   the
premises bearing No. 138/A (New No. 6) Armstrong Road,
Civil Station, Bangalore. 
4. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   judgment
and decree passed by the learned trial Court dismissing the
suit and holding that the suit schedule properties were not
the self­acquired properties of Late G. Venkata Rao and they
were the properties of defendant Nos. 1 to 3, the original
plaintiff preferred an appeal before the High Court.   The High
Court vide judgment and order dated 26.02.1999 set aside
the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court
holding that all though the properties were in the names of
the original defendants, the transactions, in question, were
benami in nature and in that view of the matter, the plaintiff
had inherited 1/4th share therein. 
4.1 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   judgment
and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   dated   26.02.1999
allowing   the   appeal   and   quashing   and   setting   aside   the
judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court and,
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consequently decreeing the suit and holding that the plaintiff
had inherited 1/4th share in the said schedule properties, the
legal representatives of the original defendants approached
this Court by way of Civil Appeal No. 7117 of 2000.
4.2 That   by   judgment   and   order   dated   11.05.2007,   this
Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the
High Court observing that the High Court has not properly
appreciated and/or considered whether the transaction in
question is benami or not.
4.3 That thereafter, on remand, the High Court has by the
impugned   judgment   and   order   dismissed   the   appeal
confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned
trial Court dismissing the suit, by specifically observing that
the purchase/transaction in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 3
with respect to the suit schedule properties were not the
benami transactions  and   that  they  were the   self­acquired
properties   of   defendant   Nos.   1   to   3   and,   therefore,   the
plaintiff is not entitled to any share in the suit schedule
properties.   The High Court has further observed and held
that the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition)
Act, 1988 are retroactive in application. 
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5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court in dismissing
the appeal and confirming the judgment and decree passed
by the trial Court dismissing the suit, the original plaintiff
(now the deceased and represented through the legal heirs)
has preferred the present appeal. 
6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants
has   vehemently   submitted   that,   in   the   facts   and
circumstances of the case, the High Court has committed a
grave   error   in   dismissing   the   appeal   and   confirming   the
judgment and decree passed by the trial Court dismissing the
suit.
6.1 It   is   vehemently   submitted   by   the   learned   counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellants that the Courts below
have materially erred in not accepting the case of the plaintiff
that the suit properties acquired in the names of defendant
Nos. 1 to 3 were benami in nature.
6.2 It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf   of   the   appellant   that   the   findings   recorded   by   the
learned trial Court and confirmed by the High Court that the
suit properties acquired in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to
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3  were   not   benami   in  nature,  but  were   the   self­acquired
properties   of   defendant   Nos.   1   to   3   are   contrary   to   the
evidence on record.
6.3 It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants that it has come in evidence that the
sale consideration was paid by the father of the plaintiff and
defendant Nos. 1 to 3.   It is submitted that DW1 admitted
that he had borrowed a sum of Rs.1,030/­ from his father
Late G. Venkata Rao and that Late G. Venkata Rao sent a
demand draft for a sum of Rs.1,030/­ directly to the Tamil
Nadu Housing Board. It is submitted that even the entire
consideration for acquisition of suit properties ­ Item Nos.
1(a) to 1(c) were paid by Late G. Venkata Rao.
6.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing
on   behalf   of   the   appellant   that   the   High   Court   having
concluded that the purchase money of suit properties ­Item
Nos. 1(a) to 1(c) came from Late G.Venkata Rao, thereafter,
the High Court is not justified in concluding that the plaintiff
was required to give further evidence to establish that the
suit properties were acquired for the benefit of defendants or
Late G. Venkata Rao had other reasons to acquire the suit
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properties in the names of his sons – original defendant Nos.
1 to 3.  Relying upon the decision of this Court in Thakur
Bhim Singh  v. Thakur  Kan Singh  (1980) 3 SCC 72, it is
vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant that, as held by this Court in the
aforesaid decision, if it is proved that the purchase money
came from a person other than the person in whose favour
the property was transferred, the purchase is  prima   facie
assumed to be for the benefit of person who supplied the
purchase money, unless there is an evidence to the contrary.
6.5 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant that both the Courts below have
materially erred in observing and consequently holding that
the plaintiff was not a member of the joint family.
6.6 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to allow the
present appeal and quash and set aside the judgment and
decree passed by both the Courts below and consequently to
decree the suit. 
7. Shri G. V. Chandrashekar, learned advocate appearing
on   behalf   of   the   original   defendants,   while   opposing   the
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present appeal, has vehemently submitted that the finding
recording by the learned trial Court, confirmed by the High
Court that the suit properties – Item Nos. I(a) to I(c) were not
benami transactions, are on appreciation of evidence.   It is
submitted that, as rightly observed by the High Court, merely
because some financial assistance might have been given by
the   father   to   the   defendants   while   purchasing   the   suit
properties, the same would not become a benami transaction,
unless the contrary intention is established and proved.
7.1 It   is   vehemently   submitted   by   the   learned   counsel
appearing on behalf of the defendants that, in the present
case,   all   the   three   suit   properties   were   purchased   by
defendant Nos. 1 to 3 by registered sale deeds and some
financial assistance was given by the father Late G. Venkata
Rao, which was given to the plaintiff also.   It is submitted
that, in the present case, it has come on record that the
plaintiff married with PW­1 in the year 1954; the marriage of
the plaintiff was performed by Late G. Venkata Rao; and that
after the marriage of the plaintiff, Late G. Venkata Rao and
defendant Nos. 1 to 3 were living together.   It is submitted
that it has also come on record that Late G. Venkata Rao
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provided the financial assistance to the plaintiff to acquire
the house bearing No. 150, Veerapillai Street, Civil Station,
Bangalore.  It is submitted that even the evidence on record
would disclose that after the marriage, the plaintiff and her
husband were maintained by her father for a period of 10
years.     It   is   submitted   that,   considering   the   aforesaid
circumstances, as rightly observed by the High Court, the
intention   of   Late   G.   Venkata   Rao   in   providing   financial
assistance to his sons for acquisition of properties was to
provide shelter to his sons and, therefore, the acquisition of
the suit properties – Items I(a) to I(c) by defendants, out of the
financial assistance provided by their father Late G. Venkata
Rao, did not involve any benami transaction. 
7.2 It is further submitted on behalf of the defendants that,
as   such,   the   provisions   of   the   Benami   Transactions
(Prohibition) Act would not be applicable retrospectively.   It
is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the original defendants that, as observed and held
by this Court in the  case of  Binapani   Paul   v.   Pratima
Ghosh  (2007) 6 SCC 100, the burden of proving of benami
nature   of   transaction   lies   on   the   person   who   alleges   the
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transaction   to  be  a  benami.    It  is  submitted  that  in   the
aforesaid decision, it is further observed and held by this
Court   that   the   source   of   money   can   never   be   the   sole
consideration   and   it   is   merely   one   of   the   relevant
considerations, but not determinative in character.       It is
submitted that, in the present case, the plaintiff has failed to
establish and prove that the purchase of the properties – Item
Nos.   I(a)   to   1(c)   were   benami   in   nature   and/or   that   the
intention of Late G. Venkata Rao was to purchase the suit
properties   for   and   on   behalf   of   the   family,   but   were
purchased in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3.     It is
submitted that, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of
the case, the High Court has rightly dismissed the appeal
and has rightly confirmed the judgment and decree passed by
the learned trial Court dismissing the suit, by specifically
observing and holding that the suit properties – Items I(a) to
I(c) were not benami in nature.   Therefore, it is prayed to
dismiss the present appeal.
8. Heard   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the
respective parties at length.   In the present case, the original
plaintiff instituted the suit claiming 1/4th   share in the suit
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properties, including the suit properties – Item Nos. I(a) to
I(c).     Admittedly,   the   suit   properties   were   purchased   by
defendant Nos. 1 to 3 respectively.  However, it was the case
on   behalf   of   the   plaintiff   that   the   purchase   of   the   suit
properties was benami transaction as the sale consideration
was paid by their father Late G. Venkata Rao.  The aforesaid
is not accepted by the High Court and the High Court has
observed and held that the plaintiff has failed to establish
and prove by leading cogent evidence that the intention of
Late G. Venkata Rao to purchase the suit properties in the
names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 was to purchase for and on
behalf of the family and, therefore, the transaction cannot be
said to be benami in nature. 
8.1 Therefore,   the   short   question   that   is   posed   for
consideration   of   this   Court   is,   whether   in   the   facts   and
circumstances of the case and merely because some financial
assistance   has   been   given   by   the   father   to   the   sons   to
purchase   the   properties,   can   the   transactions   be   said   to
benami in nature?
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9. While considering the aforesaid question, few decisions
of   this   Court   on   the   benami   transactions/transactions   of
benami nature, are required to be referred to:
9.1 In   the   case   of  Thakur   Bhim   Singh  (supra),   it   is
observed and held by this Court that while considering a
particular transaction as benami, the intention of the person
who contributed the purchase money is determinative of the
nature of transaction.  It is further observed by this Court as
to   what   the   intention   of   the   person   who   contributed   the
purchase   money,   has   to   be   decided   on   the   basis   of   the
surrounding circumstance; the relationship of the parties;
the   motives   governing   their   action   in   bringing   about   the
transaction   and   their   subsequent   conduct   etc.       In   the
aforesaid decision, this Court considered the earlier decision
of   this   Court   in  Jaydayal   Poddar   v.   Bibi   Hazra   (Mst.)
(1974) 1 SCC 3, more particularly para 6, and thereafter
summed up in para 17 and para 18.  Paras 17 and 18 of that
judgment are as under:
“17. The   principle   enunciated   by   Lord
Macmillan   in   the   case   of Manmohan   Das  [AIR
1931 PC 175 : 134 IC 66 9 : 1931 ALJ 550] has
been   followed   by   this   Court   in Jaydayal
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Poddar v. Bibi   Hazra (Mst)   [(1974)   1   SCC   3   :
(1974) 2 SCR 90] where Sarkaria, J., observed
thus: (SCC p. 6, para 6)
“It   is   well­settled   that   the   burden   of
proving that a particular sale is benami and
the   apparent   purchaser   is   not   the   real
owner, always rests on the person asserting
it to be so. This burden has to be strictly
discharged by adducing legal evidence of a
definite   character   which   would   either
directly   prove   the   fact   of   benami   or
establish   circumstances   unerringly   and
reasonably raising an inference of that fact.
The essence of a benami is the intention of
the   party   or   parties   concerned;   and   not
unoften,   such  intention  is   shrouded  in   a
thick   veil   which   cannot   be   easily   pierced
through. But such difficulties do not relieve
the person asserting the transaction to be
benami of any part of the serious onus that
rests on him; nor justify the acceptance of
mere   conjectures   or   surmises,   as   a
substitute for proof. The reason is that a
deed is a solemn document prepared and
executed   after   considerable   deliberation,
and   the   person   expressly   shown   as   the
purchaser or transferee in the deed, starts
with the initial presumption in his favour
that the apparent state of affairs is the real
state   of   affairs.   Though   the   question
whether a particular sale is benami or not,
is largely one of fact, and for determining
this question, no absolute formulae or acid
tests, uniformly applicable in all situations,
can   be   laid   down;   yet   in   weighing   the
probabilities and for gathering the relevant
indicia,   the   courts   are   usually   guided   by
these   circumstances:(1)   the   source   from
which  the  purchase  money came; (2)  the
nature and possession of the property, after
the purchase; (3) motive, if any, for giving
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the   transaction   a   benami   colour;   (4)   the
position of the parties and the relationship
if any, between the claimant and the alleged
benamidar; (5) the custody of the title deeds
after the sale and (6) the conduct of the
parties   concerned   in   dealing   with   the
property after the sale.”
18. The   principle   governing   the
determination of the question whether a transfer
is a benami transaction or not may be summed
up   thus:   (1)   the   burden   of   showing   that   a
transfer   is   a   benami   transaction   lies   on   the
person who asserts that it is such a transaction;
(2) it is proved that the purchase money came
from a person other than the person in whose
favour the property is transferred, the purchase
is prima facie assumed to be for the benefit of the
person who supplied the purchase money, unless
there is evidence to the contrary; (3) the true
character of the transaction is governed by the
intention of the person who has contributed the
purchase money and (4) the question as to what
his intention was has to be decided on the basis
of   the   surrounding   circumstances,   the
relationship of the parties, the motives governing
their   action   in   bringing   about   the   transaction
and their subsequent conduct, etc.”
9.2 In Binapani Paul case (supra), this Court again had an
occasion to consider the nature of benami transactions.  After
considering a catena of decisions of this Court on the point,
this   Court   in   that   judgment   observed   and   held   that   the
source of money had never been the sole consideration. It is
merely   one   of   the   relevant   considerations   but   not
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determinative in character.  This Court ultimately concluded
after   considering   its   earlier   judgment   in   the   case   of
Valliammal v. Subramaniam (2004) 7 SCC 233 that while
considering whether a particular transaction is benami in
nature, the following six circumstances can be taken as a
guide:
“(1) the source from which the purchase money
came;
(2) the nature and possession of the property,
after the purchase;
(3) motive, if any, for giving the transaction a
benami colour;
(4)   the   position   of   the   parties   and   the
relationship, if any, between the claimant and
the alleged benamidar;
(5) the custody of the title deeds after the sale;
and
(6)   the   conduct   of   the   parties   concerned   in
dealing   with   the   property   after   the   sale.
(Jaydayal Poddar v. Bibi Hazra (supra), SCC p. 7,
para6)”
10. Applying   the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   the
aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on hand, we are of
the   opinion  that   the  High   Court   has   rightly  come  to   the
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conclusion   that   the   plaintiff   has   failed   to   prove   that   the
purchase of the suit properties – Item Nos. I(a) to I(c) in the
names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 were benami in nature.   It is
true that, at the time of purchase of the suit properties – Item
Nos. I(a) to I(c), some financial assistance was given by Late
G. Venkata Rao.  However, as observed by this Court in the
aforesaid decisions, that cannot be the sole determinative
factor/circumstance to hold the transaction as benami in
nature.   The plaintiff has miserably failed to establish and
prove   the   intention   of   the   father   to   purchase   the   suit
properties   for   and   on   behalf   of   the   family,   which   were
purchased in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3.   It is
required to be noted that, as such, the plaintiff – daughter
has not stepped into the witness box and that the evidence
on behalf of the plaintiff has been given by her husband who,
as such, can be said to be an outsider, so far as the joint
family is concerned.   Apart from that, it has come on record
that the plaintiff and her husband were maintained by Late
G. Venkata Rao.  The financial assistance was also given to
the plaintiff and her husband to purchase the residential
house   at   Bangalore.     Late   G.   Venkata   Rao,   therefore,
23
provided a shelter to his daughter and, as observed herein
above, also  gave  the financial assistance  to  purchase  the
residential house at Bangalore.  It has also come on record
that   Late   G.   Venkata   Rao   even   purchased   the   share
certificates and his daughter­original plaintiff was also given
certain   number   of   shares.     Therefore,   considering   the
aforesaid   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case,   Late   G.
Venkata Rao also must have given the financial assistance to
defendant Nos. 1 to 3 – sons and helped them in purchase of
the properties.   Therefore, the intention of Late G. Venkata
Rao   to   give   the   financial   assistance   to   purchase   the
properties in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 cannot be
said to be to purchase the properties for himself and/or his
family members and, therefore, as rightly observed by the
High   Court,   the   transactions   of   purchase   of   the   suit
properties   –   Item   Nos.   I(a)   to   I(c)   in   the   names   of   the
defendant Nos. 1 to 3 cannot be said to be benami in nature.
The intention of Late G. Venkata Rao was to provide the
financial   assistance   for   the   welfare   of   his   sons   and   not
beyond that.   None of the other ingredients to establish the
transactions as benami transactions, as held by this Court in
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the   aforesaid   decisions,   are   satisfied,   except   that   some
financial assistance was provided by Late G. Venkata Rao.  In
the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the
evidence on record, the purchase of the suit properties – Item
Nos. I(a) to I(c) in the names of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 cannot
be said to be benami transactions and, therefore, as rightly
observed and held by the learned trial Court and confirmed
by the High Court, the plaintiff has no right to claim 1/4th
share in the suit properties – Item Nos. I(a) to I(c) which were
purchased by the sons in their names by separate sale deeds.
We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the
High Court.
11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above,
the present appeal fails and deserves to be dismissed and is
accordingly dismissed.   No costs.
........................................J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
........................................J.
[M. R. SHAH]
New Delhi,
April 9, 2019.