corporate laws - insurance laws- motor accident claims = lost complete sensation below the abdomen. - considered as 100% disability - As a result of the multiple fractures sustained by him, the appellant has lost complete sensation below the abdomen. Evidently he cannot work any more as load man. In these circumstances, the assessment of disability at 70 per cent is incorrect. On a realistic view of the matter, the nature of the disability must be regarded as being complete. In the circumstances, we find no reason or justification for the deduction of an amount of Rs 2,91,600 by the Tribunal (Rs 9,72,000 minus Rs 6,80,400). The amount so deducted must be restored and is rounded off to Rs 3,00,000. Moreover we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of the claim petition. The appeal is accordingly allowed by enhancing the compensation granted by the Tribunal by an amount of Rs 3,00,000. The appellant would be entitled to interest @ 9 per cent per annum, on the total amount of compensation

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO 3152 OF 2017
S. THANGARAJ ..Appellant
VERSUS
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. REP.BY
THE BRANCH MANAGER ..Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 Delay condoned.
2 The claim arises out of a disability sustained as a result of a motor
accident. The Tribunal granted compensation to the claimant in the amount of
Rs 11,27,359 together with interest at 12 per cent per annum. The High Court
has simply reduced the interest awarded by the Tribunal to 7.5 per cent per
annum while maintaining the award of compensation. The claimant is in appeal.
REPORTABLE
2
3 The accident took place on 1 August 2004. The appellant was 26 years
old at the time of the accident. The accident took place when the appellant was
a pillion rider on a motor cycle ridden by one Edwin. As the motor cycle was
proceeding from Marthandam, a lorry bearing Registration No.TN 69 Z 2979
dashed against it. The lorry thereafter dashed against an electric pole and
collided with a residential property resulting in the death of an occupant of the
house. The appellant sustained serious injuries in the accident. The injuries
have been described in the evidence of PW 4, the doctor at the hospital where
the appellant was treated. The appellant sustained a fracture in his spinal cord,
right leg and right hip bone. As a result of the accident the appellant has no
sensation or movement in his legs. The Tribunal accepted the evidence of PW
4 and observed thus:
“Moreover PW 4 the doctor has stated in his evidence that
below the abdomen of the petitioner, there is no movement
and sensation in two legs…”
The Tribunal determined the disability at 70%, on the basis of medical opinion.
The Tribunal computed the compensation payable to the appellant on account
of the loss of income occasioned by the disability at Rs 9,72,000. However, on
the basis of the opinion of the doctor that the disability was to the extent of 70
per cent, the net amount was determined at Rs 6,80,400. After taking into
account the medical and other expenses, the Tribunal awarded a total
compensation of Rs 11,27,359 together with interest of 12 per cent per annum. 
3
4 Before the High Court, the insurer filed an appeal against the award of
the Tribunal. The appellant filed cross objections. The High Court has reduced
the interest component from 12 per cent per annum to 7.5 per cent per annum.
5 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the
High Court has not assessed the compensation in a correct manner. There
was – it has been urged – no justification to compute the disability at 70 per
cent. The appellant was at the relevant time a load man engaged by a building
contractor. The nature of the disability involves a complete loss of sensation in
both the legs. Hence, it would not be possible for him to work as a load man.
Moreover it was urged that there was no justification to reduce the award of
interest to 7.5 per cent per annum and the award of the Tribunal on interest
should be maintained.
6 On the other hand it has been urged on behalf of the insurer that the High
Court was justified in maintaining the award of compensation since it was urged
on behalf of the appellant-claimant at the hearing before the High Court that the
Tribunal had granted just and reasonable compensation. Learned counsel
supported the judgment of the High Court.
7 Having perused the order passed by the High Court, we are not in
agreement with the submission of the insurer that there was a concession on
the part of the appellant before the High Court which must bind him. The
4
statement made by counsel for the appellant before the High Court was on
whether the Tribunal had granted just and reasonable compensation. Whether
in fact the compensation which has been granted is just and reasonable cannot
hence be construed as a matter of concession and it would not preclude the
appellant from raising a contest in these proceedings.
8 On perusing the record it is evident that the injuries sustained by the
appellant are indeed of a serious nature. As a result of the multiple fractures
sustained by him, the appellant has lost complete sensation below the
abdomen. Evidently he cannot work any more as load man. In these
circumstances, the assessment of disability at 70 per cent is incorrect. On a
realistic view of the matter, the nature of the disability must be regarded as
being complete. In the circumstances, we find no reason or justification for the
deduction of an amount of Rs 2,91,600 by the Tribunal (Rs 9,72,000 minus Rs
6,80,400). The amount so deducted must be restored and is rounded off to Rs
3,00,000. Moreover we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to interest
at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of the claim petition.
9 The appeal is accordingly allowed by enhancing the compensation
granted by the Tribunal by an amount of Rs 3,00,000. The appellant would be
entitled to interest @ 9 per cent per annum, on the total amount of
compensation (instead and in substitution of 7.5% per annum awarded by the
5
High Court). The differential amount shall be paid over to the appellant within a
period of eight weeks from today. There shall be no order as to costs.
...........................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ...........................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ...........................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi;
March 06, 2018

corporate laws - insurance laws - Motor Accident Claims = what is the Light Motor Vehicle & Light Motor Vehicle driving Licence is enough - “Light motor vehicle” as defined in Section 2(21) of the Act would include a transport vehicle as per the weight prescribed in Section 2(21) read with Sections 2(15) and 2(48). Such transport vehicles are not excluded from the definition of the light motor vehicle by virtue of Amendment Act 54 of 1994.” (Id at page 709) ; A transport vehicle and omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg would be a light motor vehicle and also motor car or tractor or a roadroller, “unladen weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg and holder of a driving licence to drive class of “light motor vehicle” as provided in Section 10(2)(d) is competent to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, the gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 7500 kg or a motor car or tractor or roadroller, the “unladen weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg. That is to say, no separate endorsement on the licence is required to drive a transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class as enumerated above. A licence issued under Section 10(2)(d) continues to be valid after Amendment Act 54 of 1994 and 28-3-2001 in the form.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO 240 OF 2017
JAGDISH KUMAR SOOD ..Appellant
VERSUS
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD.
AND ORS ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal allowed a claim for compensation
filed by the third respondent. The claim arose from the death of the husband of
the claimant on 4 January 2009 as a result of an accident caused by a collision
with an offending truck. The Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs 4,08,000
together with interest at 6 per cent per annum. In an appeal filed by the third
respondent the High Court enhanced the compensation to Rs 8,04,000.
Interest @ 7.5 per cent per annum was awarded on the enhanced
compensation.
REPORTABLE
2
2 The Tribunal absolved the insurer on the ground that the vehicle involved
in the accident was a Light Goods Vehicle. The driver had a licence to drive
the Light Motor Vehicle. The Tribunal held that in the absence of a specific
authorization to drive a transport vehicle, the liability could not be fastened on
the insurer. The Tribunal directed the insurer to pay in the first instance and
allowed it to recover the compensation from the driver and the owner. The
present appeal has been filed by the owner.
3 The High Court, while enhancing the compensation did not interfere with
the order of the Tribunal absolving the insurer.
4 The issue which arises before the Court is not res integra and is covered
by a judgment of a three Judges of this Court in Mukund Dewangan v Oriental
Insurance Company Limited1
in which it has been inter alia held as follows:
“60.1. “Light motor vehicle” as defined in Section 2(21) of
the Act would include a transport vehicle as per the weight
prescribed in Section 2(21) read with Sections 2(15) and
2(48). Such transport vehicles are not excluded from the
definition of the light motor vehicle by virtue of Amendment
Act 54 of 1994.” (Id at page 709)
“60.2. A transport vehicle and omnibus, the gross vehicle
weight of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg would be
a light motor vehicle and also motor car or tractor or a
roadroller, “unladen weight” of which does not exceed 7500
kg and holder of a driving licence to drive class of “light
motor vehicle” as provided in Section 10(2)(d) is competent
to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, the gross vehicle

1
(2017) 14 SCC 663
3
weight of which does not exceed 7500 kg or a motor car or
tractor or roadroller, the “unladen weight” of which does not
exceed 7500 kg. That is to say, no separate endorsement
on the licence is required to drive a transport vehicle of light
motor vehicle class as enumerated above. A licence issued
under Section 10(2)(d) continues to be valid after
Amendment Act 54 of 1994 and 28-3-2001 in the form.” (Id
at page 710)
5 Having regard to the above position, the Civil Appeal will have to be
allowed.
6 The appeal is allowed, the order of the Tribunal absolving the insurer
shall accordingly stand set aside. The liability shall jointly and severally be
fastened on the insurer, in addition to the owner and driver. There shall be no
order as to costs.
...........................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ...........................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ...........................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi;
March 06, 2018

corporate laws - Banking Laws - Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI Act’) - Education Loan- Dwelling on Section 60 of the Transfer of the Property Act, this Court held that the right of redemption is available to a mortgagor unless it stands extinguished by an act of parties. The right of the mortgagor to redeem the property survives until there has been a transfer of the mortgagor’s interest by a registered instrument of sale. - the appellant failed to comply with the provisions of Section 13(8). The statute mandates that it is only where the dues of the secured creditor are tendered together with costs, charges and expenses before the date fixed for sale or transfer that the secured asset is not to be sold or transferred.= The stay was extended till 28 March 2016 by which date the appellant was to deposit an amount of Rs 7,00,000. The balance was required to be deposited by 30 April 2016. While appellant deposited an amount of Rs 7,00,000 with the bank, he failed to deposit the balance in accordance with the provisions of Section 13(8). The sale was confirmed, a sale certificate was issued and a registered sale deed was executed on 12 April 2016. The appellant failed to ensure compliance with Section 13(8). The right to redemption stands extinguished on the execution of the registered sale deed. ; The appellant, is however, entitled to a refund of his deposit of Rs 7,00,000 with interest at 9% per annum from the date of deposit till payment. The bank has in its counter affidavit stated that it was at all times ready and willing to do so. The bank shall refund this amount of Rs 7,00,000 with interest at 9% per annum within 8 weeks. For the above reasons, save and except for the above direction to refund Rs 7,00,000 with interest, we find no merit in the appeal.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO 000148 OF 2018
(@ Special Leave Petition (C )No 26428 of 2016)
DWARIKA PRASAD ..Appellant
VERSUS
STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ORS ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 The appellant was a guarantor to a loan sanctioned for educational
purposes to one Jitendra Kumar. Under the letter of sanction dated 20 June
2009, there was a ‘repayment holiday’ of 24 months (comprised of a grace
period of 12 months and an additional 12 months) or six months after the
borrower obtained a job, whichever was earlier. Repayment was to commence
from 20 June 2011. In order to secure the liability, the appellant created an
equitable mortgage in respect of an immovable property bearing Khasra
Nos.185, 186 and 188, Central Doon, Dehradun. At the request of the
appellant, the period prescribed for repayment was extended by two periods
REPORTABLE
2
each of six months (29 June 2011 to 20 December 2011 and again upto 30
June 2012). The loan was not repaid. The account was classified as a nonperforming
asset on 3 September 2013. Corporation bank (the second
respondent) which had disbursed the loan initiated proceedings by issuing a
recall notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (‘SARFAESI
Act’) on 12 September 2013. Neither was a representation made nor was any
money deposited. The bank took symbolic possession on 14 February 2015.
The property was put to e-auction on 30 March 2015. No bid was received. A
second e-auction was scheduled on 30 January 2016. After the bank received
one bid in response to the auction, the appellant initially proposed to deposit
the amount of Rs 2,00,000 as against the dues of Rs.36 lakhs. This was not
acceptable. The proceedings before the DRT were listed on 1 February 2016
during the course of which the appellant stated that he would move a
redemption application within three days. The proceedings were adjourned to
4 February 2016. No stay was granted on the confirmation of the sale. The
sale was confirmed on 2 February 2016. The appellant moved a redemption
proposal on 3 February 2016. During the pendency of the proceedings before
the DRT, the appellant filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court (Writ
(C ) 10877 of 2016). The following order was passed on 15 March 2016 by a
Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court:
“Learned counsel for the petitioner upon instructions states
that the petitioner is ready and wiling to deposit the entire loan
amount within a month. He further submits that on or before
28.3.2016 the petitioner will deposit Rs. 7,00,000/- and the
3
remaining amount as may be intimated by the Bank would be
deposited on or before 30.4.2016
Put up this case as a fresh case on 28.3.2016. By the said date
the petitioner will fill a supplementary affidavit annexing proof
of receipt of deposit of Rs. 7,00,000/- with the respondent
Bank.
The execution of the sale deed will remain stayed till
28.3.2016”
From the record it is not in dispute that the appellant paid the amount of Rs
7,00,000 by demand drafts of the State Bank of India. However, on 28 March
2016 the attention of the court was drawn to the fact that the appellant had
already initiated proceedings before the DRT. The objection raised by the bank
to the maintainability of the writ petition being noted, the appellant sought leave
to withdraw the writ petition and to pursue the proceedings initiated by him
before the DRT. Hence, on 28 March 2016, the following order was passed:
“Sri Shashi Dhar Sahai, learned counsel for the respondentBank
on the basis of instructions has brought to our notice that
petitioner who is a guarantor to the loan has already initiated
proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Lucknow for
the same relief which is being claimed in the writ petition and
same cause of action. An application for temporary relief has
also been moved before the Debt Recovery Tribunal,
Lucknow, which is pending.
Learned counsel for the petitioner when confronted with the
aforesaid facts sought leave of the Court to permit withdrawal
of the writ petition with the liberty to pursue before the Debts
Recovery Tribunal.
Prayer made is allowed.
Writ petition stands dismissed as withdrawn.”
4
After the dismissal of the writ petition, the sale certificate was issued on 5 April,
2016 in favour of the auction purchaser. After the confirmation of the sale the
bank executed a registered sale deed against the receipt of a total consideration
of Rs 54,41,500. The auction purchasers (respondent nos 3 and 4) took
possession of the property.
2 The appellant filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court
contending that since he was ready and willing to clear the outstanding dues of
the bank, he has a right of redemption to the mortgaged property and that the
auction sale without considering his offer for redemption was illegal and void.
The Division Bench of the High Court rejected the writ petition, placing reliance
on the provisions of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act. The High Court held
that the exercise of the right of redemption is permissible before the execution
of the sale in favour of the auction purchaser. In this view, once the sale was
complete and was registered, it was not open to the appellant to exercise the
equity of redemption. The High Court has relied on the judgment of this Court
in Mathew Varghese v M. Amritha Kumar1
.
3 The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that
prior to the confirmation of the sale, the appellant voluntarily offered to defray
an amount of Rs 36,00,000 towards claim of the bank and indicated his
willingness to make an initial deposit of Rs 6,00,000. Though before the DRT

1
(2014) 5 SCC 610
5
the bank had on 1 February 2016 stated that the appellant should apply for
redemption, when the application was moved on 3 February 2016 it was
arbitrarily rejected. Thereafter in pursuance of the order of the High Court dated
15 March 2016, the appellant deposited a sum of Rs 7,00,000 and was ready
to deposit the balance within 30 days, the time stipulated in the order dated 15
March 2016. Hence it was urged that there was no reason or justification for
the bank to issue a certificate of sale on 12 April 2016. The fact that the
appellant did not obtain an interim order before the DRT was not a circumstance
within his control and the appellant demonstrated his willingness by making a
part payment of Rs 7,00,000.
4 On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the bank
and for the auction purchasers supported the order of the High Court. It was
urged that despite moving the DRT, the appellant sought relief before the
Allahabad High Court in proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. After
the High Court passed an order on 15 March 2016 recording the statement that
the appellant would deposit an amount of Rs 7,00,000 by 28 March 2016 and
the balance by 30 April 2016 the writ petition was withdrawn on 28 March 2016
with liberty to pursue the proceedings before the Tribunal. At no stage did the
Tribunal interdict the issuance of a certificate of sale. The sale certificate was
issued and was followed by the registration of the sale deed in April 2016. The
bank had advertised the proposed sale by auction and followed all requisite
procedure under law. The appellant failed to comply with the provisions of
6
Section 13(8). Having failed to do so, the appellant cannot assert an equity of
redemption upon the completion of the sale and the registration of the sale
deed.
5 Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act provides as follows:
“(8) If the dues of the secured creditor together with all
costs, charges and expenses incurred by him are tendered
to the secured creditor at any time before the date fixed for
sale or transfer, the secured asset shall not be sold or
transferred by the secured creditor, and no further step shall
be taken by him for transfer or sale of that secured asset.”
These provisions have fallen for interpretation before this Court in Mathew
Varghese (supra). Dwelling on Section 60 of the Transfer of the Property Act,
this Court held that the right of redemption is available to a mortgagor unless it
stands extinguished by an act of parties. The right of the mortgagor to redeem
the property survives until there has been a transfer of the mortgagor’s interest
by a registered instrument of sale. Applying these principles in the context of
the SARFAESI Act this Court held as follows:
“39. When we apply the above principles stated with
reference to Section 60 of the T.P. Act in respect of a
secured interest in a secured asset in favour of the secured
creditor under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the
relevant Rules applicable, under Section 13(1), a free hand
is given to a secured creditor to resort to a sale without the
intervention of the Court or Tribunal. However, under
Section 13(8), it is clearly stipulated that the mortgagor, i.e.
the borrower, who is otherwise called as a debtor, retains
his full right to redeem the property by tendering all the
dues to the secured creditor at any time before the date
fixed for sale or transfer. Under Sub-section (8) of Section
13, as noted earlier, the secured asset should not be sold
7
or transferred by the secured creditor when such tender is
made by the borrower at the last moment before the sale
or transfer. The said Sub-section also states that no further
step should be taken by the secured creditor for transfer or
sale of that secured asset. We find no reason to state that
the principles laid down with reference to Section 60 of the
T.P. Act, which is general in nature in respect of all
mortgages, can have no application in respect of a secured
interest in a secured asset created in favour of a secured
creditor, as all the above-stated principles apply in all fours
in respect of a transaction as between the debtor
and secured creditor under the provisions of the
SARFAESI Act”.
6 In the present case, the appellant failed to comply with the provisions of
Section 13(8). The statute mandates that it is only where the dues of the secured
creditor are tendered together with costs, charges and expenses before the date
fixed for sale or transfer that the secured asset is not to be sold or transferred.
The appellant was aware of the proceedings initiated by the bank for asserting
its right to recover its dues by selling the property. The appellant moved the
DRT in Securitization Application 176 of 2015. During the pendency of those
proceedings, orders were passed by the Tribunal on 1 February 2016 and 3
February 2016. The appellant moved the Allahabad High Court which by its
order dated 9 March 2016 restrained the bank and the auction purchaser from
executing the sale deed until 15 March 2016. The stay was extended till 28
March 2016 by which date the appellant was to deposit an amount of Rs
7,00,000. The balance was required to be deposited by 30 April 2016. While
appellant deposited an amount of Rs 7,00,000 with the bank, he failed to deposit
the balance in accordance with the provisions of Section 13(8). Even after the
writ proceedings before the High Court was withdrawn, the appellant did not
8
deposit the balance due together with the costs, charges and expenses. The
sale was confirmed, a sale certificate was issued and a registered sale deed
was executed on 12 April 2016. The appellant failed to ensure compliance with
Section 13(8). The right to redemption stands extinguished on the execution of
the registered sale deed. This is also the view which has been expressed in the
judgment in Mathew Varghese (supra).
7 The appellant, is however, entitled to a refund of his deposit of Rs
7,00,000 with interest at 9% per annum from the date of deposit till payment.
The bank has in its counter affidavit stated that it was at all times ready and
willing to do so. The bank shall refund this amount of Rs 7,00,000 with interest
at 9% per annum within 8 weeks. For the above reasons, save and except for
the above direction to refund Rs 7,00,000 with interest, we find no merit in the
appeal. The appeal shall accordingly stand disposed of. There shall be no order
as to costs.
...........................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ...........................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ...........................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi;
March 06, 2018

Accident claims - Insurance law - future medical treatment be given due 90% disability as even not able to eat and not able to go toilet with out assistance of attended = injured in a motor accident - The appellant was 24 years of age- measure of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being - whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering. Awards of compensation are not law’s doles. In a discourse of rights, they constitute entitlements under law. - unable to even eat or to attend to a visit to the toilet without the assistance of an attendant.- the disability at 90 per cent. The disability is indeed total.; the loss of income, including future prospects, would be Rs. 18,14,400/-. In addition to this amount, the appellant should be granted an amount of Rs. 2 lakhs on account of pain, suffering and loss of amenities.; the amount awarded by the Tribunal towards medical expenses (Rs. 98,908/-); for extra nourishment (Rs. 25,000/-) and for attendant’s expenses (Rs. 1 lakh) is maintained. ; allowed an amount of Rs. 3 lakhs towards future medical expenses ; The appellant would be entitled to interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum ; The liability to pay compensation has been fastened by the Tribunal and by the High Court on the insurer, owner and driver jointly and severally which is affirmed. The amount shall be deposited before the Tribunal within a period of 6 weeks from today and shall be paid over to the appellant upon proper identification.

1
REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No 2217 OF 2018
[Arising out of SLP (C) No 7739 OF 2017
JAGDISH .....APPELLANT
Versus
MOHAN & ORS. .....RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 The appellant was injured in a motor accident. The Tribunal awarded
compensation of Rs. 12,81,228/- for the injuries suffered by him. The High Court
enhanced the award of compensation by an amount of Rs.2,19,000/-. Interest of 7.5
per cent per annum has been awarded from the date of the filing of the claim. The
appellant seeks an enhancement of compensation.
2
2 The appellant was 24 years of age when the accident took place on 24
November 2011. The accident occurred at 4pm when the appellant and another
person were riding on a motor cycle. The appellant who was riding the motor cycle
at a moderate speed indicated to a dumper which was ahead of him to allow him to
pass. When the appellant was passing the vehicle, it swerved on the driver’s side
and hit the motor cycle of the appellant. The appellant was injured in the course of
the accident.
3 The nature of the injuries is evident from the following extract from the
judgment of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal No. 2, Kota.
“As for the claimant due to the injuries received by the claimant he
has suffered 90% permanent disability…
The claimant came to give evidence in the matter…
looking at both the hands of the claimant it was noted that…
the hands are not able to perform any function. It has also been
submitted on behalf of the claimant that the claimant himself is
unable to eat food or go to toilet for which he requires the
assistance of someone else as both his hands are unable to
perform any function as it has been stated in Exhibit 168. In such
situation if a person of labour class suffers from an injury due to
which 90% of both his hands are unable to perform any function
then in such situation the claimant would have same difficulty
which would be the permanent disability of his body. Therefore
relying on Exhibit 168 I hold that there has been loss of 90% of
earning ability of the claimant”.
4 The Tribunal found that there was negligence on the part of the driver of the
dumper and that the appellant was liable to be compensated for the injuries sustained
by him.
5 In computing the amount of compensation, the Tribunal noted that the
appellant was a carpenter and had claimed that he was in receipt of an income of
3
Rs. 6,000/- per month. In the absence of documentary evidence, the Tribunal took
the monthly income of the appellant at Rs. 4,050/-. The appellant having been found
to suffer from 90 per cent disability, the loss of the future monthly income was
computed at Rs. 3645/-. The Tribunal applied a multiplier of 18 and held that the
appellant was entitled to compensation for loss of future income of Rs. 7,87,320/-
(Rs. 3645 X 12 X 18). The Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 1.80 lakhs on account
of mental and physical hardship and agony, Rs. 90,000/- for loss of comfort, Rs.
25,000/- for expenses and Rs. 95,908/- on account of medical expenses. An amount
of Rs. 1 lakh was awarded for attendant charges. The Tribunal awarded a total
amount of Rs. 12,81,228/- as compensation on which interest was allowed at the rate
of 7.5 per cent per annum from the date of the filing of the claim petition. No amount
was awarded towards expenses for future treatment.
6 In appeal, the High Court awarded an additional amount of Rs. 2,19,000/-. The
High Court directed that if the enhanced amount is not deposited within 8 weeks, it
would carry interest at 9 per cent per annum.
7 The appellant has sought an enhancement of compensation under the
following heads:
(i) The Tribunal ought to have, but did not award any amount towards loss of future
prospects. The appellant submits that in view of the recent judgment of the
Constitution Bench in National Insurance Company Limited v Pranay Sethi1
,
he would be entitled to be compensated for loss of future prospects even though
he is self-employed;

1
(2017) 13 SCALE 12
4
(ii) According to the appellant, the nature of the injuries suffered, resulting in a total
loss of the functionality of both the hands would require compensation to be
computed on the basis of a disability of 100 per cent and not 90 per cent; and
(iii) The income as claimed of Rs. 6,000/- per month should be the basis of
computation and not Rs. 4,050/- as allowed by the Tribunal and confirmed by the
High Court.
8 In assessing the compensation payable the settled principles need to be borne
in mind. A victim who suffers a permanent or temporary disability occasioned by
an accident is entitled to the award of compensation. The award of compensation
must cover among others, the following aspects:
(i) Pain, suffering and trauma resulting from the accident;
(ii) Loss of income including future income;
(iii) The inability of the victim to lead a normal life together with its amenities;
(iv) Medical expenses including those that the victim may be required to
undertake in future; and
(v) Loss of expectation of life.
In Sri Laxman @ Laxman Mourya v Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd2
, this Court held:
“The ratio of the above noted judgments is that if the victim of an
accident suffers permanent or temporary disability, then efforts
should always be made to award adequate compensation not only

2 2011 (12) SCALE 658
5
for the physical injury and treatment, but also for the pain, suffering
and trauma caused due to accident, loss of earnings and victim’s
inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, which he would
have enjoyed but for the disability caused due to the accident.”
In K Suresh v New India Assurance Company Ltd3
, this Court adverted to the
earlier judgments in Ramesh Chandra v Randhir Singh4 and B Kothandapani v
Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation Limited5
. The Court held that
compensation can be granted for disability as well as for loss of future earnings for
the first head relates to the impairment of a person’s capacity while the other relates
to the sphere of pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life by the person himself.
In Govind Yadav v New India Insurance Company Limited6
, this Court adverted to
the earlier decisions in R D Hattangadi v Pest Control (India) (Pvt) Ltd.7
, Nizam’s
Institute of Medical Sciences v Prasanth S Dhananka8
, Reshma Kumari v
Madam Mohan9
, Arvind Kumar Mishra v New India Assurance Company
Limited10
, and Raj Kumar v Ajay Kumar11 and held thus:
“18. In our view, the principles laid down in Arvind Kumar
Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Raj Kumar v. Ajay
Kumar must be followed by all the Tribunals and the High Courts
in determining the quantum of compensation payable to the
victims of accident, who are disabled either permanently or
temporarily. If the victim of the accident suffers permanent
disability, then efforts should always be made to award adequate
compensation not only for the physical injury and treatment, but
also for the loss of earning and his inability to lead a normal life
and enjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the
disability caused due to the accident.” (Id at page 693)

3
(2012)12SCC274
4
(1990) 3 SCC 723
5
(2011) 6 SCC 420
6
(2011) 10 SCC 683
7
(1995) 1 SCC 551
8
(2009) 6 SCC 1
9
(2009) 13 SCC 422
10 (2010) 10 SCC 254
11 (2011) 1 SCC 343
6
These principles were reiterated in a judgment of this Court in Subulaxmi v MD Tamil
Nadu State Transport Corporation12 delivered by one of us, Justice Dipak Misra (as
the learned Chief Justice then was).
9 Having regard to these principles, it would be now appropriate to assess the
case of the appellant for enhancement of compensation. The accident took place on
24 November 2011. The appellant was a skilled carpenter and self-employed. The
claim of the appellant that his earnings were Rs. 6,000/- per month cannot be
discarded. This claim cannot be regarded as being unreasonable or contrary to a
realistic assessment of the situation on the date of the accident.
10 In the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi (supra), this Court
has held that the benefit of future prospects should not be confined only to those who
have a permanent job and would extend to self-employed individuals. In the case of
a self-employed person, an addition of 40 per cent of the established income should
be made where the age of the victim at the time of the accident was below 40 years.
Hence, in the present case, the appellant would be entitled to an enhancement of Rs.
2400/- towards loss of future prospects.
11 In making the computation in the present case, the court must be mindful of
the fact that the appellant has suffered a serious disability in which he has suffered a
loss of the use of both his hands. For a person engaged in manual activities, it
requires no stretch of imagination to understand that a loss of hands is a complete

12 Civil Appeal No. 7750 of 2012, decided on 1 November 2012
7
deprivation of the ability to earn. Nothing – at least in the facts of this case – can
restore lost hands. But the measure of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt
of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our yardsticks of compensation should
not be so abysmal as to lead one to question whether our law values human life. If it
does, as it must, it must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the
trauma of suffering. Awards of compensation are not law’s doles. In a discourse of
rights, they constitute entitlements under law. Our conversations about law must shift
from a paternalistic subordination of the individual to an assertion of enforceable
rights as intrinsic to human dignity.
The Tribunal has noted that the appellant is unable to even eat or to attend to a visit
to the toilet without the assistance of an attendant. In this background, it would be a
denial of justice to compute the disability at 90 per cent. The disability is indeed total.
Having regard to the age of the appellant, the Tribunal applied a multiplier of 18. In
the circumstances, the compensation payable to the appellant on account of the loss
of income, including future prospects, would be Rs. 18,14,400/-. In addition to this
amount, the appellant should be granted an amount of Rs. 2 lakhs on account of
pain, suffering and loss of amenities. The amount awarded by the Tribunal towards
medical expenses (Rs. 98,908/-); for extra nourishment (Rs. 25,000/-) and for
attendant’s expenses (Rs. 1 lakh) is maintained. The Tribunal has declined to award
any amount towards future treatment. The appellant should be allowed an amount of
Rs. 3 lakhs towards future medical expenses. The appellant is thus awarded a total
sum of Rs. 25,38,308/- by way of compensation. The appellant would be entitled to
interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum on the compensation from the date of the
8
filing of the claim petition. The liability to pay compensation has been fastened by the
Tribunal and by the High Court on the insurer, owner and driver jointly and severally
which is affirmed. The amount shall be deposited before the Tribunal within a period
of 6 weeks from today and shall be paid over to the appellant upon proper
identification.
12 The appeal is accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
............................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 …….........................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ….............................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi
March 6, 2018

On 29.11.2007, the appellant filed an application under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. making allegations against the respondent, who was counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 91 of 2004 that he committed offence in verifying and forging thumb impression of dead appellant namely Shaba Manju Velip. = It is further to be noted that the execution application, which was filed by the 18 decree holder was also withdrawn. It is further relevant to notice that the appeal, which was filed by judgment debtor was withdrawn by judgment debtor, which in no manner had impaired the interest of the appellant, who was legal heir of decree holder. It is also on the record that legal heirs of the decree holders have also withdrawn their execution application, which has attained finality. None of the appellants, who had filed Appeal No.91 of 2004 before the High Court has initiated any proceeding against the present respondent N.M. Dessai, who was their advocate. It is only the appellant, who was respondent in Appeal No.91 of 2004 has filed a complaint under Section 195. The High Court having taken into consideration entire facts and circumstances have rightly come to the conclusion that present is not a case where any complaint could have been proceeded under Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 359 OF 2018
(Arising Out of SLP (Criminal) No. 1395 of 2010)
VISHNU CHANDRU GAONKAR … APPELLANT
VERSUS
N.M. DESSAI … RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
This appeal has been filed questioning the
judgment and order dated 06.10.2009 of the High
Court of Bombay at Goa in Criminal Appeal No. 22
of 2009 by which judgment, the criminal appeal
filed by the respondent Shri Narayan M. Dessai
has been allowed setting aside the order of
District & Sessions Judge dated 31.07.2008
directing for filing a complaint under Section
195(1)(b)(ii) of Cr.P.C. 
2
2. The facts which are necessary to be noted
for deciding this appeal are:-
A regular Civil Suit No. 4 of 1993 was filed
by two plaintiffs namely Laximan Rama
Gaonkar and Janu Narayan Gaonkar impleading
two defendants namely Kusta Naga Gaonkar and
Shri Suresh Kust Gaonkar. The appellant in
this appeal is legal heir of original
plaintiff No. 2, Janu Narayan Gaonkar. The
Suit No. 4 of 1993 was decreed by judgment
and decree dated 07.12.2001. An application
for execution of decree was filed by the
legal heirs of the plaintiffs on 07.12.2003.
Legal heirs of the original defendants filed
a Civil Appeal No. 91 of 2004 questioning
the judgment and decree dated 07.12.2001.
One of the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 91
of 2004 namely Shaba Manju Velip (one of the
legal heirs of original defendants Kusta
Naga Gaonkar) died on 02.03.2005. No
application to bring his legal heirs on
3
record was filed by the appellants. The
application to withdraw execution case No. 1
of 2003 filed for execution of the decree in
Civil Suit No. 4 of 1993 was filed by the
plaintiff’s advocate on 20.06.2006. The
application for withdrawal of Civil Appeal
No. 91 of 2004 was filed on 18.07.2006,
which was allowed on 18.07.2006 itself. The
Execution Case No. 01 of 2003 was also
allowed to be withdrawn on 21.07.2006. On
29.11.2007, the appellant filed an
application under Section 195(1)(b)(ii)
Cr.P.C. making allegations against the
respondent, who was counsel for the
appellants in Civil Appeal No. 91 of 2004
that he committed offence in verifying and
forging thumb impression of dead appellant
namely Shaba Manju Velip. By order dated
31.07.2008, learned District & Sessions
Judge found that it is a fit case for
inquiry under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) and
4
directed for inquiry and registering a
complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(ii).
Respondent preferred an appeal before the
High Court against the order of District &
Sessions Judge dated 31.07.2008. The High
Court vide its impugned judgment allowed the
appeal and quashed the order of the District
Judge dated 31.07.2008 as well as the
complaint filed pursuant thereto. Aggrieved
against the judgment of the High Court, the
appellant has filed this appeal.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted
that the High Court relying on the Three Judge
Bench judgment of this Court in Sachida Nand
Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr., (1998) 2
SCC 493, which has been approved by the
Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh
Marwah & Anr. Vs. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr.,
(2005) 4 SCC 370, has allowed the appeal filed
by the respondent whereas the above judgments of
this Court, wherein reference was made to
5
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C., which were not
applicable in the facts of the present case,
since allegations made in the complaint filed by
the appellant were referable to Section 195(1)
(b)(i). It is submitted that the District &
Session Judge has rightly considered all facts
and circumstances and directed for filing of
complaint against the respondents under Section
195(1)(b). No one has appeared on behalf of the
respondent in spite of service.
4. We have considered the submissions of the
learned counsel for the parties and perused the
records.
5. It is useful to extract Section 195(1) of
Cr.P.C., which is to the following effect:-
“195. Prosecution for contempt of
lawful authority of public servants,
for offences against public justice
and for offences relating to documents
given in evidence. - (1) No
Court shall take cognizance(a)
(i) of any offence punishable under
sections 172 to 188 (both in-
6
clusive) of the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860 ), or
(ii) of any abetment of, or attempt
to commit, such offence, or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy
to commit such offence,
except on the complaint in writing
of the public servant concerned
or of some other public
servant to whom he is administratively
subordinate;
(b) (i) of any offence punishable under
any of the following sections
of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860 ), namely, sections 193 to
196 (both inclusive), 199, 200,
205 to 211 (both inclusive) and
228, when such offence is alleged
to have been committed in, or in
relation to, any proceeding in
any Court, or
(ii) of any offence described in
section 463, or punishable under
section 471, section 475 or section
476, of the said Code, when
such offence is alleged to have
been committed in respect of a
document produced or given in evidence
in a proceeding in any
Court, or
(iii) of any criminal conspiracy
to commit, or attempt to commit,
or the abetment of, any offence
specified in sub-clause (i) or
sub- clause (ii), 
7
[except on the complaint in writing
of that Court, or by such officer
of the Court as that Court
may authorize in writing in this
behalf, or of some other Court to
which that Court is subordinate].
……………………………………………”
6. From the facts which are on the record,
there is no dispute that the Appeal No. 91 of
2004 was filed by several appellants, out of
which one of the appellants was Shaba Manju
Velip, who died on 02.03.2005. The application
for withdrawal of the appeal was filed on
18.07.2006. It is further to be noted that one
Vimal Shaba Velip, who was one of the
respondents before the High Court, took it upon
herself to say that the thumb impression, which
was put as of Shaba Manju Velip was put by her,
since her husband Shaba Manju Velip also used to
sign along with her, in good faith, she put her
thumb impression. The respondent N.M. Dessai
came with the case that he having been informed
that talks of settlement amongst the Gaonkars is
going on and they are intending to withdraw the
8
execution application filed by them. He, as per
instructions of his client, drafted and handed
over the application for withdrawing the Appeal
No. 91 of 2004 to one Suresh K. Gaonkar to
obtain the signatures of the remaining
respondents. He further came with the case that
he was not aware of death of Shaba Manju Velip
or alleged forged thumb impression of Shaba
Manju Velip on the application.
7. The facts fairly indicate that the
application when it was presented in the Court
in Appeal No. 91 of 2004 for withdrawal of the
appeal, signatures/thumb impressions of the
appellants were already obtained on the said
application, which was handed over to the
respondent in this appeal for filing in the
Court. On the same date, i.e., 18.07.2006, the
Court allowed the application permitting
withdrawal of the appeal.
8. A Criminal Misc. Application No. 95 of 2007
9
for initiating action under Section 195(1)(b)
(ii) of Cr.P.C. was filed by the appellant after
the said withdrawal of the appeal. Copy of the
Application No. 95 of 2007 has been filed as
Annexure P-4. It is useful to quote prayer in
the application, which is to the following
effect:-
“The applicant therefore prays that
in view of above an enquiry may be
conducted and the written complaint
be made as per the provision
contemplated under Section 195(1)(b)
(ii) of Criminal Procedure Code in
order to prosecute and take further
action against the respondents above
as per the provision of law.”
9. The application was allowed by the District
Judge vide order dated 31.07.2008 where the
District Judge had directed for inquiry to be
conducted in terms of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of
Cr.P.C., it is useful to quote Paras 18 and 19
of the order of the District Judge, which is to
the following effect:-
“18. Though the respondent No.9 has
canvassed that he was totally
unconnected with any of such
transaction, such a plea would not
10
lie in his mouth when he was
representing the said appellants and
one of whom was Shaba, since deceased
and instrumental in seeking the
withdrawal of the appeal also at his
instance as late as 18.7.2006 despite
Shaba being dead on that day.
Therefore, on the basis of the
material on record, it is apparent
that an offence of forgery under
Section 463 I.P.C. has allegedly been
committed to withdraw the appeal misrepresenting
the deceased as living
and the execution of the Sale Deeds
in respect of the very same property
on the following day and a day
thereafter. The application so filed
in Court would be “a document” in the
context of the Evidence Act and
evidence.
19. I am therefore satisfied that
this is a fit case where inquiry is
required to be conducted in terms of
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of Cr.P.C. and
initiate complaint against the
respondents for appropriate action as
per law.”
10. The two judgments of this Court, which has
already been noticed by the High Court needs
detailed reference.
11. A Three Judge Bench of this Court in
Sachida Nand Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Bihar &
11
Anr., (1998) 2 SCC 493 had occasion to consider
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) and Section 340(1) Cr.P.C.
Interpreting Section 195(1)(b)(ii), following
was laid down in Paras 8, 11 and 23:-
“8. That apart it is difficult to interpret
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) as containing
a bar against initiation of
prosecution proceedings merely because
the document concerned was produced
in a court albeit the act of
forgery was perpetrated prior to its
production in the Court. Any such
construction is likely to ensue unsavoury
consequences. For instance,
if rank forgery of a valuable document
is detected and the forgerer is
sure that he would imminently be embroiled
in prosecution proceedings he
can simply get that document produced
in any long-drawn litigation which
was either instituted by himself or
somebody else who can be influenced
by him and thereby pre-empt the prosecution
for the entire long period of
pendency of that litigation. It is a
settled proposition that if the language
of a legislation is capable of
more than one interpretation, the one
which is capable of causing mischievous
consequences should be
averted. Quoting from Gill v. Donald
Humberstone & Co. Ltd.5 Maxwell has
stated in his treatise (Interpretation
of Statutes, 12th Edn., p. 105)
that “if the language is capable of
more than one interpretation we ought
to discard the more natural meaning
12
if it leads to unreasonable result
and adopt that interpretation which
leads to a reasonably practicable result”.
The clause which we are now
considering contains enough indication
to show that the more natural
meaning is that which leans in favour
of a strict construction, and hence
the aforesaid observation is eminently
applicable here.
11. The scope of the preliminary enquiry
envisaged in Section 340(1) of
the Code is to ascertain whether any
offence affecting administration of
justice has been committed in respect
of a document produced in court or
given in evidence in a proceeding in
that Court. In other words, the offence
should have been committed during
the time when the document was in
custodia legis.
23. The sequitur of the above discussion
is that the bar contained in
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is
not applicable to a case where
forgery of the document was committed
before the document was produced in a
court. Accordingly we dismiss this
appeal.”
12. It is also relevant to note that
observations have been made by this Court that
forgery of a document if committed far outside
the precincts of the Court and long before its
13
production in the Court, the same cannot be
treated as one affecting administration of
justice. In Para 12, following has been held:-
“12. It would be a strained thinking
that any offence involving forgery of
a document if committed far outside
the precincts of the Court and long
before its production in the Court,
could also be treated as one affecting
administration of justice merely
because that document later reached
the court records.”
13. A contrary earlier view having expressed
by another Three Judge Bench in Surjit Singh &
Ors. Vs. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533, being
not in accord with the view expressed by this
Court in Sachida Nand Singh & Anr. Vs. State of
Bihar & Anr. (supra), the same was referred to a
Constitution Bench for resolving the conflict.
The Constitution Bench vide its judgment in
Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. Vs. Meenakshi Marwah &
Anr., (2005) 4 SCC 370 has resolved conflict and
approved three Judge Bench judgment in Sachida
Nand Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr.
(supra). In Para 33, following was laid down:-
14
“33. In view of the discussion made
above, we are of the opinion that
Sachida Nand Singh has been correctly
decided and the view taken therein is
the correct view. Section 195(1)(b)
(ii) CrPC would be attracted only
when the offences enumerated in the
said provision have been committed
with respect to a document after it
has been produced or given in evidence
in a proceeding in any court
i.e. during the time when the document
was in custodia legis.”
14. Learned counsel for the appellant before
us has pressed only one submission, i.e., the
judgment of Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh
Marwah (supra) was a case, which interpreted
Section 195(1)(b)(ii), to which there cannot be
any dispute but present was a case of offence
under Section 195(1)(b)(i). Hence the
Constitution Bench judgment of this Court was
not applicable and the High Court committed
error in relying on the Constitution Bench
Judgment in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra).
15. The submission which has been raised by
learned counsel for the appellant before us has
15
to be stated to be rejected due to the reason
that before the Session Court as well as before
the High Court, the appellant has alleged an
offence under Section 195(1)(b)(ii). A copy of
the Application No. 95 of 2007 has been annexed
as Annexure P-4. The prayer made therein as
extracted above clearly prays for complaint to
be made as per the provisions contemplated under
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of Cr.P.C. Even the order
of District Judge, which was the basis in favour
of the appellant on 31.07.2008 has also directed
for inquiry and initiating complaint in terms of
Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of Cr.P.C., which has also
been extracted above for ready reference. There
being specific case of the appellant in his
complaint as well as in order passed by the
District Judge in his favour, it is not open for
the appellant now to turn round and claim that
allegations are covered under Section 195(1)(b)
(i). There is one more reason due to which the
above submission cannot be accepted. The
16
Constitution Bench elaborately noticing the
statutory scheme under Section 195 has held that
where offences has already been committed
earlier and later on the document is produced or
given in the evidence in Court, the same is
neither covered under Clauses (a), (b)(i) or (b)
(ii). In Para 10, Constitution Bench made
following observations:-
“10. The scheme of the statutory provision
may now be examined. Broadly, Section
195 CrPC deals with three distinct
categories of offences which have been
described in clauses (a), (b)(i) and
(b)(ii) and they relate to (1) contempt
of lawful authority of public servants,
(2) offences against public justice,
and (3) offences relating to documents
given in evidence. Clause (a) deals
with offences punishable under Sections
172 to 188 IPC which occur in Chapter X
IPC and the heading of the Chapter is —
“Of Contempts of the Lawful Authority
of Public Servants”. These are offences
which directly affect the functioning
of or discharge of lawful duties of a
public servant. Clause (b)(i) refers to
offences in Chapter XI IPC which is
headed as — “Of False Evidence and Offences
Against Public Justice”. The offences
mentioned in this clause clearly
relate to giving or fabricating false
evidence or making a false declaration
in any judicial proceeding or before a
court of justice or before a public
17
servant who is bound or authorised by
law to receive such declaration, and
also to some other offences which have
a direct correlation with the proceedings
in a court of justice (Sections
205 and 211 IPC). This being the scheme
of two provisions or clauses of Section
195 viz. that the offence should be
such which has direct bearing or affects
the functioning or discharge of
lawful duties of a public servant or
has a direct correlation with the proceedings
in a court of justice, the expression
“when such offence is alleged
to have been committed in respect of a
document produced or given in evidence
in a proceeding in any court” occurring
in clause (b)(ii) should normally mean
commission of such an offence after the
document has actually been produced or
given in evidence in the court. The
situation or contingency where an offence
as enumerated in this clause has
already been committed earlier and
later on the document is produced or is
given in evidence in court, does not
appear to be in tune with clauses (a)
(i) and (b)(i) and consequently with
the scheme of Section 195 CrPC. This
indicates that clause (b)(ii) contemplates
a situation where the offences
enumerated therein are committed with
respect to a document subsequent to its
production or giving in evidence in a
proceeding in any court.”
16. It is further to be noted that the
execution application, which was filed by the
18
decree holder was also withdrawn. It is further
relevant to notice that the appeal, which was
filed by judgment debtor was withdrawn by
judgment debtor, which in no manner had impaired
the interest of the appellant, who was legal
heir of decree holder. It is also on the record
that legal heirs of the decree holders have also
withdrawn their execution application, which has
attained finality. None of the appellants, who
had filed Appeal No.91 of 2004 before the High
Court has initiated any proceeding against the
present respondent N.M. Dessai, who was their
advocate. It is only the appellant, who was
respondent in Appeal No.91 of 2004 has filed a
complaint under Section 195. The High Court
having taken into consideration entire facts and
circumstances have rightly come to the
conclusion that present is not a case where any
complaint could have been proceeded under
Section 195(1)(b)(i) Cr.P.C. 
19
17. We thus fully endorse the view of the High
Court that present is not a case where any
complaint could have been proceeded with under
Section 195(1)(b)(ii). We thus do not find any
merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.
..........................J.
( A.K. SIKRI )
..........................J.
NEW DELHI, ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )
MARCH 06, 2018.