Elections - reservations - caste certificate and income certificate - In Ballari Zilla Panchayat, the post of Adhyaksha was reserved for the category of Backward Caste-B (Women). After the said notification, since the appellant intended to contest the election to the post of Adhyaksha of Ballari Zilla Panchayat, she made an application on 22.04.2016 to the jurisdictional Tahshildar for issuance of Income and Caste Certificate, a certificate which was a prerequisite for submitting the nomination form for the election to the post of Adhayaksha. That certificate was issued by the Tahshildar on 26.04.2016 on the basis of which the appellant contested the election held on 29.04.2016 and was declared elected. As required in terms of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes (Reservation of Appointment etc.) Act, 1990 and the Rules framed thereunder, the Income and Caste Certificate has been forwarded to the District Caste Verification 3 Committee Ballari. The process of verification thereof is still in progress. 3. According to the appellant, at the behest of the unsuccessful candidates who could not file any election petition to challenge the election of the appellant, respondent Nos.6 to 9 filed a writ petition before the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad being Writ Petition No.106417 of 2016, about 3 months after the election of the appellant as Adhyaksha. The substance of the allegation made in the said writ petition against the appellant was that she played fraud on the Government and public by submitting a false affidavit before the Tahshildar for issuance of Income and Caste Certificate, on the basis of which she contested the election for the post of Adhyaksha Zilla Panchayat and got elected to the said post, to which she was otherwise not entitled to or qualified for. = directing the Caste Verification Committee to expedite the enquiry regarding the validity of the Income and Caste Certificate issued to the appellant by respondent no.5 and conclude the same preferably within two months and also intimate its final decision to the appellant within the same time. Needless to observe that the Caste Scrutiny Committee will decide the matter on its own merit and without being influenced whatsoever by any observations made in the impugned judgments but in accordance with law. Besides, it shall deal with every contention raised before it by recording tangible reasons.

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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1763 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.1532 of 2018)
Bharati Reddy …..Appellant(s)
:Versus:
The State of Karnataka & Ors. ....Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This appeal, by special leave, takes exception to the
judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High
Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench dated 04.12.2017 in Writ
Appeal No.5872 of 2017.
2. Briefly stated, pursuant to notification dated 04.12.2015,
elections were held and the appellant was elected on
28.03.2016 as a member of the Zilla Panchayat from 13-
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Badanahatti Constituency, Ballari District, Karnataka which
was reserved for General (Women) Category. Later, the State
Government published a notification on 15.04.2016 declaring
the reservation for the post of Adhyaksha and Upa-Adhyaksha
of Zilla Panchayats in the State. In Ballari Zilla Panchayat, the
post of Adhyaksha was reserved for the category of Backward
Caste-B (Women). After the said notification, since the
appellant intended to contest the election to the post of
Adhyaksha of Ballari Zilla Panchayat, she made an application
on 22.04.2016 to the jurisdictional Tahshildar for issuance of
Income and Caste Certificate, a certificate which was a
prerequisite for submitting the nomination form for the
election to the post of Adhayaksha. That certificate was issued
by the Tahshildar on 26.04.2016 on the basis of which the
appellant contested the election held on 29.04.2016 and was
declared elected. As required in terms of the Karnataka
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward
Classes (Reservation of Appointment etc.) Act, 1990 and the
Rules framed thereunder, the Income and Caste Certificate
has been forwarded to the District Caste Verification 
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Committee Ballari. The process of verification thereof is still in
progress.
3. According to the appellant, at the behest of the
unsuccessful candidates who could not file any election
petition to challenge the election of the appellant, respondent
Nos.6 to 9 filed a writ petition before the High Court of
Karnataka, Dharwad being Writ Petition No.106417 of 2016,
about 3 months after the election of the appellant as
Adhyaksha. The substance of the allegation made in the said
writ petition against the appellant was that she played fraud
on the Government and public by submitting a false affidavit
before the Tahshildar for issuance of Income and Caste
Certificate, on the basis of which she contested the election for
the post of Adhyaksha Zilla Panchayat and got elected to the
said post, to which she was otherwise not entitled to or
qualified for. The allegation about the nature of fraud
committed by the appellant can be discerned from the
assertions made in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the writ petition,
which read thus:
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“6. It is submitted that the 6th Respondent in order to
grab the post of Adhyaksha of Zila Panchayat has
submitted a bogus and false caste certificate to show
that she belongs to the Backward community-B Category
obtained from the 5th Respondent. It is further submitted
that in the application filed by 6th Respondent to 5th
Respondent for issuance of caste certificate, she filed an
affidavit stating that her livelihood is agriculture and that
she owns 1.03 acres of agricultural land in Badanahatti
village and 3.50 Acres of land in Sy. No. 36A in Yarrangaligi
village. Further she also declared that her family income is
not more than Rs.3,50,000/- per annum from all other
sources and that she and her husband are not assessed to
Income Tax and Commercial Tax. The said declaration
made by the 6th Respondent is totally false to the
knowledge of herself, which is clear from the Affidavit filed
by the 6th Respondent before the 2nd Respondent while
contesting for the member of Bellary Zilla Panchayat General
Elections. It is further submitted that the 6th Respondent in
her affidavit dated 06.02.2016 declared that she is getting
rent of Rs.1,40,000/- per annum and her husband getting
4,80,000/- per annum, which details are found in paragraph
4-A. This itself shows that her family income from one
source only is more than 3,50,000/- as declared in the
affidavit dated 26.04.2016 filed before the 5th Respondent for
issuance of Caste and Income Certificate. That apart she
has also declared in the said affidavit dated 26.04.2016 that
she and her husband are not assessed to the Income Tax
and Commercial Tax, which are also contrary to the
declaration made in the affidavit dated 06.02.2016 filed
before 2nd Respondent that she has been assessed to Income
Tax and has paid Income Tax, the said details are stated in
paragraph 5 of the said affidavit. It is also reliably learnt
that the husband of the 6th Respondent is Class-I contractor
and is having more than income of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- per
annum and is assessed to Income Tax and Commercial
Taxes. True copies of the Affidavit dated 06.02.2016,
26.04.2016 and Caste and Income Certificate issued by the
5th Respondent dated 26.04.2016 are produced herewith as
Annexure-E,F and G respectively.
7. It is further submitted that in the proceedings held on
29.04.2016 under the Chairmanship of Regional
Commissioner, Kalburgi Division, Kalburgi, the 6th
Respondent was successful in getting elected as
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Adhyaksha under the Category-Backward Community-B
based on the above said false Caste and Income
Certificate which was issued by the 5th Respondent on
the same day of application without any proper enquiry
as required under the law. A true copy of the said
proceedings dated 29.04.2016 is produced herewith as
Annexure-H.”
(emphasis supplied)
On the basis of these allegations, the respondent Nos.6 to 9
prayed for the following reliefs in the said writ petition:
“PRAYER
Wherefore, this Hon‟ble Court may be pleased to
a. Issue a writ of Quo Warranto directing the 6th Respondent
to vacate the office of the Adhyaksha, Zilla Panchayat,
Bellary.
b. set aside the proceedings dated 29.04.2016 bearing No.
SUM./KAM/Pra HaGu/chunavana/05/2016-17 declaring
the 6th Respondent as Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat,
Bellary vide Annexure-H.
c. consequently quash the caste certificate issued to the
6th Respondent vide order dated 26-04-2016 in
application No. 01/16-17 issued by the 5th
Respondent vide Annexure-G.
d. pass such other or further orders or directions as this
Hon‟ble Court may deem fit, in the interest of justice”.
(emphasis supplied)
4. This writ petition was contested by the appellant inter
alia on the ground that the same was not maintainable in view
of the bar contained in Article 243-O of the Constitution of
India. Further, the writ petitioners were only voters and
therefore, had no locus to challenge the election of the
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appellant as Adhyaksha, which was an indirect election. Rule
7 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Rules explicitly envisages
that only a member of the Panchayat may challenge the
validity of the election of Adhyaksha and Upa-Adhyaksha. It
was also pointed out that the writ petition filed by the said
respondents was a politically motivated petition and filed at
the behest of unsuccessful candidates who could not prevent
the appellant from getting elected as Adhyaksha. As regards
the allegations in the writ petition that the appellant had made
false declarations and filed incorrect affidavits, the appellant
contended that the Income and Caste Certificate was issued in
favour of the appellant by the competent authority after
completing all the formalities and procedure. So long as the
said certificate was valid and in force, issuance of writ of quo
warranto was misplaced. For, there is legal presumption about
the validity of the said certificate in terms of Rules 3-C of the
Rules of 1992 framed under the 1990 Act. The said Rule
makes it amply clear that the certificate would remain valid
until it is cancelled by the jurisdictional Caste Verification
Committee. The appellant also pointed out that the allegation
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made in the writ petition, regarding the false or incorrect
income disclosure made by the appellant, was wrong and illfounded.
Such allegation was based on far-fetched logic and
untenable assumptions. The affidavit dated 06.02.2016
submitted along with the nomination form filed for contesting
elections from 13-Badanahatti Constituency was in reference
to the factual position stated therein. Similarly, the affidavit
filed by the appellant dated 26.04.2016 was also true, faithful
and accurate as it disclosed facts in reference to the
qualification required for contesting the election of Adhyaksha
at the relevant time, in respect of post reserved for “B”
Category (Women) Backward Caste. In other words, both the
affidavits and the information disclosed therein were truthful,
accurate and contextual, as noted in the respective affidavit.
The appellant also asserted that the fact that the Income and
Caste Certificate was issued within five days from the date of
application for the said certificate or on the same date the
affidavit dated 26th April, 2016 was filed before the Tahshildar,
could not give rise to a presupposition, inference or
assumption that the same was issued without necessary and
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proper enquiry. On the other hand, there is legal presumption
that the same was valid, having been issued by the
jurisdictional Tahshildar competent in that regard. The
circumstances, of the time of issue of E-stamps at about 5:27
P.M. or the date of affidavit being 26.04.2016, cannot be a just
basis to assume that the certificate was fraudulent, in the
face of the statutory provision making it explicit that it would
be valid until cancelled by the Caste Verification Committee.
Thus, the circumstances relied upon by the writ petitioners
were neither relevant nor sufficient to draw any inference on
fact, much less legal inference, so as to conclude that the
certificate was fraudulently issued. The fact that the appellant
belongs to “Kapu Caste”, which is notified as B Category
Backward Class; and the declaration regarding income made
by the appellant, are issues which are intrinsically mixed with
the issuance of the Income and Caste Certificate. It is not open
to question the validity of the said certificate much less to
entertain the prayer for issuance of a writ of quo warranto on
the assumption that the said certificate was fraudulent
because of some fortuitous circumstances. It was pointed out
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by the appellant that the writ of quo warranto is not an
ordinary power to be exercised by the High Court and moreso,
in the matter involving disputed questions of fact. The High
Court may be justified in issuing such a writ only if it is
indisputable that the elected public representative was
ineligible or disqualified to contest the election or had incurred
disqualification at a later point of time. In either case, such a
person cannot justify holding on to the public post such as
that of Adhyaksha. That situation will arise only if the Caste
Verification Committee was to invalidate and cancel the
Income and Caste Certificate issued in favour of the appellant
and not otherwise. On these contentions, the appellant prayed
for dismissal of the writ petition.
5. Preliminary objection regarding bar of jurisdiction in
terms of Article 243-O of the Constitution of India and locus of
the writ petitioners raised by the appellant commended to the
learned Single Judge, who dismissed the writ petition vide
judgment and order dated 21.10.2016.
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6. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition, the
writ petitioners (respondent Nos.6 to 9 herein) carried the
matter in Writ Appeal No.101459 of 2016. The Division Bench
reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge and allowed
the writ appeal vide judgment and order dated 05.06.2016. It
remanded the matter to the learned Single Judge for fresh
decision.
7. The appellant therefore, approached this Court by way of
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.17059 of 2017 (converted to
Civil Appeal No.10587 of 2017) wherein the preliminary
objection regarding the bar under Article 243-O of the
Constitution of India and locus of the writ petitioners, as also
the contention that the only remedy to challenge the election
of the appellant would be an election petition, was reiterated.
The two-Judge Bench of this Court disposed of the appeal
preferred by the appellant on the finding that the voter of the
Panchayat cannot be rendered remediless and if he is
aggrieved by the election of the Adhyaksha of the Panchayat, it
is open to him to seek the remedy of judicial review under
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Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of the India. In such
proceedings, it is open to the High Court to undertake judicial
review of the subject matter. In paragraph 13 of its judgment,
this Court observed thus:
“13. It is thus clear that power of judicial review under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution is an essential feature
of the Constitution which can neither be tinkered with nor
eroded. Even the Constitution cannot be amended to erode
the basic structure of the Constitution. Therefore, it cannot
be said that the writ petition filed by respondent Nos. 6 to 9
under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable.
However, it is left to the discretion of the court exercising the
power under Articles 226/227 to entertain the writ petition.”
Again in paragraph 15, the Court observed thus:
“15. As noticed above, though respondent Nos. 6 to 9 are the
voters are not the members of the Zilla Panchayat. They are
aggrieved by the election of the appellant to the office of the
Adhyaksha. They cannot challenge the election of the
appellant to the office of Adhyaksha by filing an election
petition as they are not the members of the Zilla Panchayat
in question. In our view, a voter of the Zilla Panchayat who
is not a member cannot be denied an opportunity to
challenge the election to the office of Adhyaksha under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. Therefore, we hold
that the writ petition filed by respondent Nos. 6 to 9 before
the High Court is maintainable.”
After this decision, the preliminary objections regarding the
maintainability of writ petition stood concluded. An attempt
was made by the appellant to question the correctness of the
view expressed by this Court in the aforesaid decision.
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Concededly, even if the arguments of the appellant may
appear to be attractive, it cannot be entertained in relation to
the decision inter partes.
8. Be that as it may, in light of the view expressed by this
Court, the parties were relegated before the learned Single
Judge of the High Court. Before the remanded writ petition
was taken up for hearing by the learned Single Judge, the
appellant filed a writ petition bearing Writ Petition No.108700
of 2017 (LB-RES) before the High Court of Karnataka,
Dharwad Bench, challenging the note appended to the
notification dated 13.01.1995. That notification had been
issued by the State Government in exercise of powers
conferred under Section 2(2) of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj
Act, 1993, for classifying and notifying the classes of citizens
as Backward Class, for the purpose of reservation of seats and
office of Chairperson in Zilla Panchayat, Taluk Panchayat and
Gram Panchayat. The note predicates that no person falling
under category “B” would be entitled to the benefit of
reservation in the seats and office of Adhyaksha and Upa-
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Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Taluk Panchayat and Gram
Panchayat if, inter alia, he/she or either of his/her
parents/guardians was an income tax assessee/wealth tax
assessee (Clause ii). This stipulation has been assailed by the
appellant as being in the teeth of the exposition of this Court
in K. Krishna Murthy (Dr.) and Others Vs. Union of India
and Another1 and Indra Sawhney and Others Vs. Union of
India2. The High Court being prima facie convinced with the
said contention granted interim stay to the said stipulation
(Clause ii) in the notification dated 13.01.1995.
9. Reverting to the remanded writ petition from which the
present appeal arises as aforesaid, the same was to be heard
by the learned Single Judge on merits of the controversy for
grant of reliefs prayed in the writ petition including for
issuance of a writ of quo warranto. The learned Single Judge,
after examining the rival contentions and after taking note of
the original documents forming part of the original file

1 (2010) 7 SCC 202
2 (1992) Supp (3) SCC 210
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produced by the Government advocate, opined vide judgment
and order dated 21.09.2017 as under:
“11. Learned AGA appearing for respondents 1,3 to 5 filed
following documents pertaining to issuance of caste and
income certificate to respondent No. 6-Smt. Bharati Reddy
w/o Sri Thimmareddy for perusal of this Court.
1. Application dated 22.04.2016 for issue of caste and
income certificate (Xerox copy).
2. Notice dated 23.04.2016 issued by the Revenue
Inspector.
3. Report of the Revenue Inspector dated 26.04.2016
bearing No. Sam.Kam.Jaa and Aa Zi.
Pam.Chu/01/16-17 dated 26.04.2016.
4. Mahazar
5. Statement
6. Affidavit of the applicant sworn before the Advocate
Notary
7. Applicant‟s identity card (Xeroxcopy)
8. Applicant‟s voter identity card (Xerox copy)
9. Transfer Certificate (certified copy)
10. Study Certificate (certified copy)
11. Original Caste and Income Certificate bearing No.
Sam.Kam.01/06-07 dated 26.04.2016.
12. Form No. 24 regarding applicant‟s land holding.
12. On perusal of the documents it is seen that on
22.04.2016 the respondent No. 6 has filed application for
issue of caste and income certificate; on 23.04.2016 the
jurisdictional Revenue Inspector has issued notice to
respondent No. 6 pointing out the discrepancies with regard
to issuance of caste and income certificate; on 26.04.2016
the Revenue Inspector has submitted a report recommending
to issue caste certificate to the petitioner in Backward Caste
II(B); revenue inspector had conducted mahazar along with
the Village Accountant and opined that there is no objection
for issue of caste certificate to the petitioner in Backward
Caste II(B); statement of Smt. C. Bharathi w/o V.C. Thimma
Reddy before the Revenue Inspector; affidavit of Smt. C.
Bharathi w/o V.C. Thimma Reddy sworn before the
Advocate Notary, Ballari Tq. Rev. Area on 26.04.2016; Xerox
copy of the original voters‟ list of the year 2015; Xerox copy
of the voter‟s identity card; certified copy of the transfer
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certificate; certified copy of the study certificate and also the
original certificate issued by the Special Tahasildar,
Kurugodu, declaring the caste of the respondent No. 6 as
Kapu which comes under Backward Category „B‟ on
26.04.2016 so also the original of Form No. 24 regarding
holding of land by the respondent No. 6.
13. The entire process of issuance of caste certificate is
concluded in five days, i.e., application was filed on
22.04.2016 and the caste certificate was issued on
26.04.2016, which cannot be said to be illegal, as contended
by the learned counsel for respondent No.6. However, on
perusal of the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 6
before the Notary it is seen that the e-stamp paper is
purchased at 5.27 PM on 26.04.2016 and after purchase
affidavit was sworn before the Notary and on that day
itself the caste certificate is issued. It is also seen that
the date 26.04.2016 is over-written. This creates a
serious doubt about the process of issuance of caste
certificate by the respondent No.5.
14. The respondent No. 5 being a responsible officer of
the Revenue Department has issued the caste certificate
in a mortal hurry. The respondent No. 6 who purchased
the E-stamp paper on 26.04.2016 at 5.27 PM and on the
same day she files the affidavit on the E-Stamp paper before
the Advocate Notary and the same is submitted before the
Special Tahsildar and the Tahsildar after verification has
issued caste certificate to the respondent No.6, being the
contested candidate for the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla
Panchayat, Ballari. The same is found in the documents
produced by the learned AGA. From this process it can be
said that the respondent No. 5 being a responsible officer
has not taken care and diligence in issuing the caste
certificate and had adopted a casual working nature.
Whether this casual attitude of the respondent No.5 can
be said as illegality or negligence is to be considered in a
separate proceedings”.
(emphasis supplied)
Again, while dealing with the factual matrix of the case, the
learned Single Judge, in the same judgment, analysed the
issue as follows:
16
“35. In this writ petition the core issue relates to the holding of
the office of Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Ballari, by the
respondent No.6 and also seeking quashing of Annexure-H the
notification declaring the respondent No. 6 as Adhyaksha of
Zilla Panchayat Ballary. Therefore, the concept of creamy
layer as stated supra, does not come in the way of disposal of
this writ petition which is filed for issue of writ of quo
warranto against the respondent No. 6 to vacate the office of
the Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Ballary and also to quash
Annexure-H. In view of the same, the contention of the
respondent No.6 does not hold substance.
36. In the instant petition it is relevant to state that the
procedure of writ of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and
authority on the Court to control executive action in the
matter of making an appointment of a person to the public
office against the relevant statutory provisions. In the instant
case, the petitioners are the voters/electorates and so also the
whistle blowers. It is also relevant to state that, the writ of
Quo Warranto protects from illegal deprivation of public
office to which they may have a right and also it relates to
protect the public from usurping of public office by a
person who is not entitled to hold the public office as a
result of connivance of executive or that its active help,
wherein the respondent No. 5 being the responsible
Tahasildar, Kurugodu, issued caste certificate to
respondent No. 6, on the basis of which she was able to
contest and elect for the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla
Panchayat, Ballari. The respondent No.6 was contested and
elected for post of Zilla Panchayat Member from 13-
Badanahatti Constituency which was reserved for General
Category (Woman). In her affidavit (Annexure-E dated
06.2.2016) itself she has stated that she is an income tax
assessee and has even furnished PAN (permanent account
number). However, the said fact is suppressed in the
subsequent affidavit vide Annexure-F dated 26.04.2016
submitted before the Tahasildar, Kurugodu (respondent
No. 5) along with her application for obtaining Backward
Class B Community certificate.
xxx xxx xxx xxx
38… However, the respondent No.5 is under suspension
pending enquiry with regard to the procedure adopted by
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him in issuing the caste certificate to the respondent
No.6.
39. The respondent No.6 who is elected by a democratic
process, she belonged to Kapu caste, which caste falls under
Backward Class-B category, which is indicated in the
Government Notification dated 13.01.1995 of the Government
of Karnataka. However, now the issue is pending before the
Caste Verification Committee and that issue cannot be
decided under the jurisdiction of this court under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
40…. whereas in the instant writ petition the Income Tax
Returns filed by the respondent No. 6 pertains to the year
2013-14. But she sworn in the affidavit that she is not an
assessee for the year 2015-16. It reflects the conduct of
the respondent No.6.”
(emphasis supplied)
Finally, the learned Single Judge concluded as under:
“42. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that, the E-stamp paper
was purchased at 5.57 pm on 26.04.2016 and the caste cum
income certificate was issued on the same day, which fact
reveals that the certificate was issued in a mortal hurry.
Accordingly, this writ petition is filed for issue of writ of Quo
Warranto in respect of quashing the proceedings vide
Annexure-H dated 29.04.2016 and also to direct the
respondent No. 6 to vacate the office of Adhyaksha of Zilla
Panchyat, Ballari.
43. Respondent No. 6 being a responsible member of Zilla
Panchayat, Ballari as she was the successful candidate elected
from 13 Badanahatti constituency which was reserved for
General Category (Woman) as per the notification dated
28.03.2016 published in Karnataka Gazatee. The post of
Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat was reserved for Backward
Category B Woman. The respondent No.6 belonged to Kapu
community which belongs to Category B Community.
However, the declaration regarding her family income
reveals that it is more than Rs.3,50,000/- p.a. that too
only from the rental income. This shows that the
respondent No. 6 files an affidavit to secure the caste and
income certificate from the respondent No.5, who issued
the certificate in a mortal hurry. This creates serious
doubt about the genuinity or otherwise of the process of
18
issuing the caste certificate. However, the issue is now
pending before the Caste Verification Committee, which is
a fact finding committee and would be decided in its own
course. Hence, the question of fact as regarding the caste
of respondent No. 6 in this writ petition does not arise for
consideration.
In view of the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion, since the
respondent No. 6 has not declared her correct and proper
family income only with an intention to hold the post of
Adhyaksha which is a public office, must be prevented from
holding the office.”
(emphasis supplied)
On the said finding and after recording its opinion, the learned
Single Judge passed the following order:
“ORDER
Writ Petition is allowed in part. Accordingly, the
proceddings dated 29.04.2016 bearing No.
SUM./KAM/PraHaGu/ chunavana/05/2016-17 declaring
the 6th respondent as Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Ballari,
vide Annexure-H is hereby quashed. Consequently, writ of
quo warranto is issued directing the 6th respondent to vacate
the office of Adhyaksha, Zilla Panchayat, Ballari. Rest of
the prayers do not arise for consideration and
accordingly they are rejected.
The records submitted by the learned A.G.A. before
this court on 07.09.2017 are directed to be returned by
substituting them with Xerox copies.
The observations made in this Writ Petition is
restricted for disposal of this case and shall not have any
bearing regarding the pending litigation before the Caste
Verification Committee. The Caste Verification
Committee shall independently hold an enquiry and
dispose of the case in accordance with law”.
(emphasis supplied)
10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the appellant filed
Writ Appeal No.5872 of 2017. The writ petitioners (respondent
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Nos.6 to 9 herein) also filed a cross appeal being Writ Appeal
No.100657 of 2017. Both the appeals were heard and decided
together by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Karnataka, Dharwad Bench vide judgment and order dated
04.12.2017. The Division Bench broadly reiterated the view
expressed by the learned Single Judge and affirmed the
conclusion of the learned Single Judge both on factual and
legal matters. While analysing the factual matrix, the Division
Bench observed as follows:
35… “As narrated in the preceding paragraph Nos. 12 and
13, supra, the appellant filed an application before the
jurisdictional Tahsildar for issue of Caste cum Income
Certificate on 22.04.2016 in the prescribed format as per the
Notification dated 13.01.1995. On considering the same, the
jurisdictional Revenue Inspector has issued notice to the
appellant calling upon her to rectify the defects pointed out,
pursuant to which, the appellant filed an affidavit on
India, Non-Judicial, Government of Karnataka, e-stamp
paper issued on 26.04.2016 at 5.27 p.m. declaring that
the appellant and her husband are neither income tax
assesses nor sales tax assesses. Annexure-G to the Writ
Petition No. 106417/2016 is the application filed by the
appellant in the prescribed format in terms of the
notification dated 13.1.1995, whereby in Clause - 11, it
is stated that the applicant or their
father/mother/guardian are not the assessee of income
tax/wealth tax. This is the moot point which requires to
be considered to decide whether the appellant has
played any fraud on the constitution.”
(emphasis supplied)
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11. Again in paragraph 36, the Division Bench noted as
follows:
“36. It is not in dispute that any affidavit filed before the
authorities has sanctity in the eye of law and the same, if
found to be false statement and misrepresentation, it is a
case of perjury punishable under criminal law. Based on the
statement declared by the appellant, the jurisdictional
Tahasildar has issued verification certificate certifying that
the appellant belongs to backward Class-B Category in terms
of the notification dated 13.1.1995. It is not in dispute that
the statements were made by the appellant on the E-stamp
paper issued on 26.04.2016 at 5.27 p.m. and the
jurisdictional Tahasildar has issued the certificate on the
very same day i.e. 26.04.2016, based on the application
bearing No. 01/16-17, dated 25.04.2016. Fraud played by
the appellant is manifest from the certificate issued by
the jurisdictional Tahasildar. Based on these facts, the
Government of Karnataka has now suspended the
jurisdictional Tahasildar for providing false certificate.
On 06.02.2016, the appellant swearing to an affidavit
that she is an income-tax assessee, furnishing the PAN
card details, subsequently giving statements before the
Revenue Inspector that she is not a PAN card holder and
not an income tax assessee prima facie proves the
fraudulent act of the appellant. In addition to that filing a
false affidavit in order to usurp a public office is highly
deplorable. In such circumstances, if the appellant is
continued to chair and hold the office of Adhyaksha, her
action would be fraud on the constitution….”
(emphasis supplied)
The other relevant extract of the impugned judgment of the
Division Bench in paragraph 44, reads thus:
“44. The issue relating to the caste, whether the
appellant belongs to Kapu caste or not is a disputed
question of fact. It is true that there is no absolute bar
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to
consider annulment of caste certificate de hors alternative
statutory remedy available provided the disputed question of
21
facts are not involved and the circumstances warrant
invoking of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The
judgments relied upon by the respondents on this point do
not assist the respondents since the matter is already
pending before the Caste Verification Committee, considering
this prayer at this stage would be, entertaining the parallel
proceedings which is not tenable. The determination of
caste requires a full-fledged enquiry, as such the learned
single judge directing the caste verification committee,
to proceed with the matter cannot be found fault with.
Confirming the order of the learned single Judge, we direct
the Caste Verification Committee to proceed with the matter
in accordance with law without being influenced by any of
the observations made above. All rights and contentions of
the parties are left open. Caste Verification Committee shall
decide the matter in an expedite manner.
In the result, both the appeals stand dismissed.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. We have heard Mr. C.A. Sundaram, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the appellant and Dr. Rajeev Dhawan &
Mr. S.M. Chander Shekhar, learned Senior Counsel appearing
for the respondents.
13. It is indisputable that the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla
Panchayat is a public office in relation to which a writ of quo
warranto can be issued, if the post is occupied by a person
who is not eligible to be so appointed or incurs disqualification
to continue to occupy the post. Indeed, when a statutory
remedy is provided for removal of disqualified person from the
22
public office who is allegedly usurper of public office, the writ
court would be ordinarily slow in interfering, much less,
issuing a writ of quo warranto. The Constitution Bench of this
Court in the case of The University of Mysore and Another
Vs. C.D. Govinda Rao and Another3 has observed thus.
“6. The judgment of the High Court does not indicate that the
attention of the High Court was drawn to the technical
nature of the writ of quo warranto which was claimed by
the respondent in the present proceedings, and the
conditions which had to be satisfied before a writ could
issue in such proceedings.
7. As Halsbury has observed :
„An information in the nature of a quo warranto
took the place of the obsolete writ of quo warranto
which lay against a person who claimed or
usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire
by what authority he supported his claim, in order
that the right to the office or franchise might be
determined.‟
8. Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a
judicial remedy by which any person, who holds an
independent substantive public office or franchise or liberty, is
called upon to show by what right he holds the said office,
franchise or liberty, so that his title to it may be duly
determined, and in case the finding is that the holder of the
office has no title, he would be ousted from that office by
judicial order. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto
gives the Judiciary a weapon to control the Executive from
making appointment to public office against law and to protect
a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he has a

3 (1964) 4 SCR 575
23
right. These proceedings also tend to protect the public from
usurpers of public office, who might be allowed to continue
either with the connivance of the Executive or by reason of its
apathy. It will, thus, be seen that before a person can
effectively claim a writ of quo warranto, he has to
satisfy the Court that the office in question is a public
office and is held by a usurper without legal authority,
and that inevitably would lead to the enquiry as to
whether the appointment of the alleged usurper has
been made in accordance with law or not.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. The moot question in the present case is: whether the
High Court, in the facts of the present case, was justified in
invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction to issue a writ of quo
warranto? Let us advert to the assertion made in the writ
petition in support of such a relief claimed by the respondent
Nos.6 to 9. The relevant paragraphs have been extracted in
paragraph 3 of this judgment, being paragraphs 6 and 7 of the
writ petition. The case of the writ petitioners was that the
appellant, in order to grab the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla
Panchayat, submitted a bogus and false certificate indicating
that she belongs to the backward community-B category,
which was surreptitiously obtained from respondent No.5. In
support of this plea, the crux of the allegation is that a false,
incorrect and misleading declaration was given by the
24
appellant in respect of her financial status and income. In
that, in the first affidavit dated 6th February, 2016 she had
declared that she was receiving rent of Rs. One lakh forty
thousand per annum and her husband was receiving rent of
Rs. Four lakh eighty thousand per annum. Whereas in the
second affidavit dated 26th April, 2016 filed in support of the
application for grant of Income and Caste Certificate, she has
stated that the annual income of her family was only Rs. Three
lakh fifty thousand; and that she and her husband were not
paying income tax and commercial tax. According to the writ
petitioners, this declaration was false to the knowledge of the
appellant. Further, the caste certificate was issued on the
same day of the application without any proper inquiry as
required under the law. On these assertions, the matter
proceeded before the High Court. We will advert to the
explanation offered by the appellant a little later.
15. First, we must notice the other material which had come
on record during the hearing of the writ petition and which
weighed with the High Court. During the hearing, the original
25
official file relating to the grant of caste certificate to the
appellant was produced by the Government Advocate, as noted
in paragraph 11 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge
and extracted in paragraph 9 above. On analyzing the
documents contained in the original file, it is noticed that the
certificate was not granted to the appellant on the same day of
the application as alleged but it took almost five days‟ time for
processing the application and for its issuance. In that, first, a
notice was issued by the Revenue Inspector, then, a report of
the Revenue Inspector was obtained, Mahazar was prepared,
statement was recorded, and then affidavit of the appellant
came to be filed along with other documents, as has been
noted in the original file.
16. The concurrent finding recorded by the learned Single
Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court is that the
process of issuance of the certificate to the appellant by the
jurisdictional Authority was done in a mortal hurry. This
inference has been drawn by the High Court in light of the
facts revealed from the original official file - that the appellant
26
purchased stamp paper for preparing affidavit at 5.27 p.m. on
26th April, 2016 and used the same for notarization and also
submitted it to the respondent No.5, who then issued the
caste certificate on the same day i.e. 26th April, 2016. The
Court has also noted that there was some overwriting in
relation to the date. After adverting to these circumstances,
the High Court opined that there was something seriously
wrong about the process adopted by the respondent No.5 for
issuance of caste certificate, which was obviously done to
favour the appellant who could then contest the election. The
High Court also noted that the respondent No.5 who had
issued the stated certificate was later on suspended, pending
departmental enquiry against him in reference to the selfsame
certificate issued to the appellant. Additionally, the High
Court has found that there was discrepancy in the two
affidavits filed by the appellant, which is in the nature of
suppression and non-disclosure of material financial
information. Finally, the High Court concluded that since the
issue regarding the validity of Income and Caste Certificate
was pending before the Caste Verification Committee, which
27
was a fact finding Committee, the Committee would decide the
same on its own merits. Notably, the High Court did not quash
the caste certificate as being void but left it open to the Caste
Verification Committee to proceed in accordance with law.
17. It is pertinent to mention that the Division Bench of the
High Court, while deciding Writ Appeal No.101459 of 2016,
vide judgment dated 5th June, 2017, has recorded in Para 12
of the judgment that there is no dispute as to the caste status
of the appellant herein; that she belongs to “Kapu” Caste is
not at all in dispute. Considering the above, the issue before
the Caste Verification Committee would essentially be one
relating to the income eligibility of the appellant. That may be
a mixed question of fact and law. Presumably, therefore, the
High Court stopped short of quashing the Income and Caste
Certificate issued in favour of the appellant as being void.
18. In this backdrop, the controversy will have to be analysed
so as to determine whether the High Court was justified in
issuing a writ of quo warranto in such a situation. Interfering
in exercise of writ jurisdiction is limited to judicial review of
28
the decision making process and not of the decision itself. In
this case, the final decision regarding the validity of Income
and Caste Certificate issued to the appellant has been
advisedly kept open, thereby the same, in law and in fact, is
still valid and in force. There is statutory presumption that
such caste certificate shall be valid until it is cancelled by the
Competent Authority. However, the only logic that can be
deduced from the contemplation done by the learned Single
Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, is that the
process followed by the respondent No.5 for issuing the stated
certificate to the appellant is replete with serious doubt and,
therefore, is prima facie fraudulent.
19. In other words, the existence of the caste certificate or for
that matter the fact that it has been so issued by the
respondent No.5, is not doubted or in dispute. It is not a case
of appellant relying on a non-existing or officially non-issued
caste certificate. Thus, enquiry will have to be made about the
circumstances warranting issuance of stated certificate in a
tearing hurry by the respondent No.5, allegedly to favour the
29
appellant. The other aspect is about the discrepancies in the
two affidavits submitted by the appellant and including the
suppression and non-disclosure of her truthful financial
information.
20. Indubitably, both these aspects will be the subject matter
of the enquiry before the Caste Verification Committee, being
intrinsically mixed with the question of validity of the stated
certificate. Appellant had offered explanation on both these
matters. Regarding the factum of mortal hurry allegedly
displayed by the respondent No.5 in issuing the caste
certificate, she contends that it was not issued on the same
day as alleged but after due enquiry. That is evinced from the
original official file produced before the Court. In that, the
application was made on 22nd April, 2016 whence the process
commenced and then concluded on 26th April, 2016. The
process was required to be completed expeditiously as the
certificate was required for contesting the impending election
of Adhyaksha scheduled on 29th April, 2016. This explanation
certainly will have to be examined by the Caste Verification
30
Committee, before invalidating the caste certificate on the
ground that proper procedure was not followed. For the
present, suffice it to observe that the mere fact that the
certificate was issued in a short span of five days from the
date of the application, per se, does not lead to an inference
that the required procedure has not been followed.
21. The fact as to whether necessary procedure has been
complied with or not will be one aspect of the enquiry before
the Caste Verification Committee, apart from the core aspect of
whether in fact the appellant fulfills the income and financial
criteria. The mere fact that the caste certificate has been
issued within a short span of five days albeit after following
due procedure, can be no just basis to invalidate the certificate
by the Caste Verification Committee. The said Committee will
be obliged to record a clear finding of fact about the eligibility
of the appellant in reference to her financial status and
income, keeping in mind the purport of Clause (ii) of the Note
to Notification dated 13th January, 1995. While considering
that matter, the Committee will have to make an enquiry as to
31
whether the appellant or her parent(s)/guardian(s) “is” an
income tax assessee /wealth tax assessee on the date of
issuance of the certificate. As regards this fact, Caste
Verification Committee will have to examine the correctness
and efficacy of the two affidavits in its proper perspective
known to law. According to the appellant, there is no
discrepancy in the disclosures made by her in the two
declarations concerning her financial matters at the relevant
time. The first affidavit dated 6th February, 2016, correctly
discloses the fact that the appellant possessed PAN Card and
was an income tax assessee, having paid income tax for the
Financial Year 2013-14. The second affidavit dated 26th April,
2016 is also accurate and discloses the correct financial
position wherein it is stated that the annual income of her
family is Rs. Three lakh fifty thousand from all the sources;
and neither she nor her husband are income tax and
commercial tax payers in reference to the Financial Year
(2015-16), for which the affidavit was sworn on 26th April,
2016. It is also contended by the appellant that Clause (ii) of
the Note posits two aspects:- the first is that the incumbent or
32
either of his/her parents/guardian should not be an income
tax or wealth tax “assessee” at the relevant time. The
expression used in this clause, “is” an income tax
assessee/wealth tax assessee, pre supposes that it is in
praesenti and for the relevant period. Secondly, the incumbent
must necessarily fall within the expression “assessee” given in
the concerned tax laws. That means only a person, by whom
any tax or any other sum of money is payable under the Act
for the concerned period and not otherwise. No material has
been produced or is forthcoming that the appellant, or for that
matter, her husband, had paid any tax or are liable to pay tax
or a sum of money under the concerned tax legislation, for the
relevant period i.e. Financial Year 2015-16. Absence of such
evidence, the Income and Caste Certificate issued to the
appellant cannot be invalidated. Furthermore, the income of
her husband / spouse is not a relevant fact for issuance of the
Income and Caste Certificate. For, Clause (ii) excludes benefit
only if the incumbent or either of his/her parent/guardian is
an income tax assessee or wealth tax assessee. This provision
will have to be interpreted strictly, as in the case of provision
33
for any other disqualification. The appellant also asserts that
there is no discrepancy or for that matter suppression or nondisclosure
of financial information in the declarations
submitted by her. In any case, that would be a disputed
question of fact and per se concerning the issue of validity of
Income and Caste Certificate.
22. According to the appellant, as long as the Income and
Caste Certificate is valid and in force, which has only been
doubted by the High Court having been issued by the
respondent No.5 in a mortal hurry, the matter must rest at
that. We find force in the submission of the appellant that all
these issues will be the subject matter during the enquiry into
the question of validity of the stated Income and Caste
Certificate, which is pending before the Caste Verification
Committee. Even the High Court was conscious of this
position and perhaps, therefore, did not quash or set aside the
Income and Caste Certificate as being void. A writ of quo
warranto cannot be issued on the basis of assumptions,
inferences or suspicion regarding the factum of fulfillment of
34
eligibility criteria. Being an extraordinary power, ordinarily
such a writ ought to be issued only on the basis of
indisputable facts leading to a singular conclusion that the
incumbent was in fact or in law disqualified to occupy the
public office or has incurred disqualification to continue to
remain therein. Only whence such a person would fall within
the description of an usurper of public office without legal
authority. On the other hand, for a person possessing an
Income and Caste Certificate issued by the jurisdictional
Authority and so long as it is valid and in force, in fact and in
law, treating such a person as usurper of the public office and
occupying it without legal authority, cannot be countenanced.
In our opinion, the High Court had plainly erred in engaging
itself in an enquiry into a prohibited area which is already the
subject matter of the proceedings pending before the Caste
Verification Committee, without realizing that the observations
made by it were inherently bound to influence the Committee
from taking a just and proper decision in accordance with law
irrespective of its observation to decide without being
influenced by its decision.
35
23. Strikingly, neither the learned Single Judge nor the
Division Bench of the High Court thought it appropriate to
quash and set aside the Income and Caste Certificate as being
void. If the High Court was to allow that relief or other reliefs
claimed by the writ petitioners in entirety after a full-fledged
enquiry, the correctness of that approach could have been
tested on a different scale. We must immediately clarify that
we may not be understood to have said that such a course was
open to the High Court. That issue does not arise in this
appeal.
24. As aforementioned, the High Court stopped short of
concluding that the Income and Caste Certificate issued to the
appellant is void. It merely expressed a prima facie opinion that the
process adopted by the respondent No.5 to issue the Income and
Caste Certificate to the appellant created a serious doubt. At best,
it observed that the appellant was instrumental in playing fraud
upon the jurisdictional Authority and/or the said Authority
colluded with the appellant, by surreptitiously issuing the Income
and Caste Certificate to the appellant. But, finally, it has left the
36
question regarding the validity of the certificate open to be decided
by the Caste Verification Committee, in the pending proceedings,
dealing with the factum of validity of the certificate issued to the
appellant. Having said this, the High Court could not have issued
a writ of quo warranto. That writ could be issued only if the Income
and Caste Certificate was held to be void or after it was invalidated
by the Competent Authority.
25. The distinction between a void and voidable order was
considered in the case of Nawabkhan Abbaskhan Vs. State of
Gujarat.4 The Court noted the dictum of Rubinstein that, when
an act is not voidable but void, it is a nullity and can be
disregarded and impeached in any proceedings, before any Court
or Tribunal and whenever it is relied upon. In other words, it is
made subject to „collateral attack‟. The Court observed that illegal
act of authorities, if can be defied on self-determined voidness,
startling consequences will follow. It, however, made an exception
of cases where the order is passed by the jurisdictional authority
without hearing the party affected, which entails injury to a

4
 (1974) 2 SCC 121
37
Constitutionally guaranteed right to the affected party. It held that
such orders may be treated as void and ineffectual to bind the
parties from the beginning. That is not the case on hand. The
underlying principle is that, in cases such as the one under
consideration, the Income and Caste Certificate can only be
invalidated after affording opportunity to the holder of the
certificate. It will be useful to reproduce the legal position summed
up by the Court in paragraph 18 as follows:
“18. …………Decisions are legion where the conditions for
the exercise of power have been contravened and the order
treated as void. And when there is excess or error of
jurisdiction the end product is a semblance, not an
actual order, although where the error is within
jurisdiction it is good, particularly when a finality clause
exists. The order becomes „infallible in error‟, a peculiar legal
phenomenon like the hybrid beast of voidable voidness for
which, according to a learned author, Lord Denning is
largely responsible. The legal chaos in this branch of
jurisprudence should be avoided by evolving simpler
concepts which work in practice in Indian conditions.
Legislation, rather than judicial law-making will meet
the needs more adequately. The only safe course, until
simple and sure light is shed from a legislative source, is
to treat as void and ineffectual to bind parties, from the
beginning, any order made without hearing the party
affected if the injury is to a constitutionally guaranteed
right. In other cases, the order in violation of natural
justice is void in the limited sense of being liable to be
avoided by Court with retroactive force.”
(emphasis supplied)
38
As the subject certificate still holds the field and until it is
invalidated by the Competent Authority, it is unfathomable as to
how the appellant can be said to have occupied the public office
without legal authority so as to invoke the extraordinary writ
jurisdiction of issuing a writ of quo warranto.
26. In K. Venkatachalam Vs. A. Swamickan5, the challenge
was to the election of the appellant to the Legislative Assembly in
Tamil Nadu by way of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution
filed by the contesting candidate (respondent therein) for a
declaration that the appellant was not qualified to be a Member of
Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, since he was not enrolled as an
elector in the electoral roll in the concerned constituency for the
general elections in question. The Court analysed the factual
matrix which pointed out that, admittedly, the incumbent was not
an elector of the concerned constituency and that he blatantly and
fraudulently impersonated himself as another elector in the
constituency. Accepting that indisputable position, the Court
proceeded to conclude that the appellant was not eligible to
contest elections from the concerned constituency, not being a

5 AIR 1999 SC 1723 = (1999) 4 SCC 526
39
voter in that constituency. It thus held that the appellant therein
lacked the basic qualification under Clause (c) of Article 173 of the
Constitution of India read with Section 5 of the 1951 Act, which
was quintessential to be elected from the constituency. On such
finding, the Court entertained the writ petition under Article 226
and declared the appellant to be occupying the public office
without legal authority and issued a writ of quo warranto. In other
words, the matter was decided on the basis of indisputable and
established facts. This judgment will be of no avail to the writ
petitioners in the present case, so long as the Income and Caste
Certificate issued to the appellant is in force.
27. In Kurapati Maria Das Vs. Ambedkar Seva Samajan6 the
Court distinguished the decision in K. Venkatachalam (supra)
being on the facts of that case and reversed the judgment of the
High Court under challenge, whereby a writ of quo warranto was
issued against the appellant therein. The reason for doing so may
have some bearing on the matter in issue as in that case, there
was dispute about the caste status of the appellant. The Court

6 (2009) 7 SCC 387
40
opined that the issue regarding the caste status can be decided
only by the Competent Authority under the relevant enactment
and not by the High Court. The Court accepted the contention of
the appellant that continuance of the post of Chairperson
depended directly on his election, firstly, as a ward member and
secondly as the Chairperson, which election was available only to
the person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. In paragraph 32 of
the reported decision, the Court while accepting the contention of
the appellant noted that the question of caste and his election are
so inextricably connected that they cannot be separated and
therefore, when the writ petitioners challenged the continuation of
the appellant on the ground of his not belonging to a particular
caste what they actually challenged was the validity of the election
of appellant though, apparently, the petition was for a writ of quo
warranto.
28. We agree with this exposition. It applies on all fours to the
case on hand. Inasmuch as, what the writ petitioners (respondents
6 to 9) had questioned was the correctness of the declarations
submitted by the appellant about her financial status and income
41
which, according to them was beyond the prescribed limit and
disentitled the appellant to get the Income cum Caste Certificate.
The firm stand taken by the appellant is that there was no
discrepancy between the two declarations muchless indicative of
excess income of the appellant at the relevant time. In our opinion,
there is no tittle of material forthcoming to show that in fact, the
appellant or her parents/guardians had paid income tax or wealth
tax during the relevant Financial Year 2015-16. That indeed could
have disentitled the appellant from getting an Income and Caste
Certificate. This submission of the appellant is founded on the
setting in which Clause (ii) of the Note has been placed and is
attracted only to an income tax assessee/wealth tax assessee as
per the relevant taxation laws during the current period. An
assessee is a person who pays taxes or is liable to pay tax or any
other sum of money payable by him/her. The argument is that the
fact that the appellant has been issued PAN number or has filed
tax return and paid tax in the past will be of no consequence and
does not impair or impinge upon the eligibility of the appellant to
get an Income and Caste Certificate for the relevant period in any
manner. As noted earlier, these are matters to be considered by
42
the Caste Verification Committee and only if rejected, the caste
certificate in question could be invalidated. Until a final decision is
taken by the Caste Verification Committee, in law, it will have to
be presumed that subject certificate is valid and in force in view of
the statutory provision making it explicit to that effect.
29. In the case of Arun Singh alias Arun Kr. Singh Vs. State
of Bihar and Others7, this Court over turned the decision of the
High Court issuing a writ of quo warranto, on the ground that it
was unclear from the orders passed by the Superintendence of
Police or the District Magistrate, or for that matter, the State
Election Commissioner, suggestive of the fact that the appellant
therein was held to have committed any misconduct within the
meaning of the Service Rules. In paragraph 13, the Court observed
thus:
“13. ……..No cogent or sufficient reasons have been given
by the High Court for setting aside the well-considered order
of the State Election Commission. Furthermore, issuance of
a writ of quo warranto is discretionary and such a writ
should be issued only upon a clear finding that the
appointment to a public office was contrary to the
statute. For the said purpose it was obligatory on the part of
the High Court to arrive at a finding that the disqualifying
clause contained in Section 139(1)(f) was squarely attracted
in the case of the appellant, in the light of the order of the

7 (2006) 9 SCC 375
43
State Election Commission. Evidently, the appellant was not
disqualified.”
30. In B.R. Kapur Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.8 the
Constitution Bench was called upon to consider the situation
where a person convicted for a criminal offence and whose
conviction has not been suspended pending appeal, could be
sworn in as the Chief Minister of a State and continue to function
as such. The Court was called upon to answer the controversy on
the basis of indisputable fact that the incumbent Chief Minister
had already been convicted of a criminal offence and such
conviction had not been suspended in the pending criminal
appeal. After considering the purport of Article 164 and Article 173
of the Constitution, the Court concluded that the appointment of
the second respondent in the appeal as the Chief Minister was in
clear violation of the constitutional provisions and thus a writ of
quo warranto was inevitable. The substratum of the exposition was
the factum of basic ineligibility of the person to be appointed or
continue as Chief Minister. In a concurring judgment by Brijesh
Kumar, J. (as His Lordship then was) the nature of writ of quo
warranto has been explicated in the following words:

8 (2001) 7 SCC 231
44
“79. ……A writ of quo warranto is a writ which lies against
the person, who according to the relator is not entitled to
hold an office of public nature and is only a usurper of the
office. It is the person, against whom the writ of quo
warranto is directed, who is required to show, by what
authority that person is entitled to hold the office. The
challenge can be made on various grounds, including on the
grounds that the possessor of the office does not fulfil the
required qualifications or suffers from any disqualification,
which debars the person to hold such office. So as to have
an idea about the nature of action in the proceedings for writ
of quo warranto and its original form, as it used to be, it
would be beneficial to quote from Words and Phrases,
Permanent Edn., Vol. 35-A, p. 648. It reads as follows:
“The original common law writ of quo warranto
was a civil writ at the suit of the Crown, and not a
criminal prosecution. It was in the nature of a writ
of right by the King against one who usurped or
claimed franchises or liabilities, to inquire by what
right he claimed them. This writ, however, fell into
disuse in England centuries ago, and its place was
supplied by an information in the nature of a quo
warranto, which in its origin was a criminal
method of prosecution, as well as to punish the
usurper by a fine for the usurpation of the
franchise, as to oust him or seize it for the Crown.
Long before our revolution, however, it lost its
character as a criminal proceeding in everything
except form, and was applied to the mere purposes
of trying the civil right, seizing the franchise, or
ousting the wrongful possessor, the fine being
nominal only; and such, without any special
legislation to that effect, has always been its
character in many of the States of the Union, and
it is therefore a civil remedy only.”
45
80. In the same volume of Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edn., at p. 647 we find as follows:
“The writ of „quo warranto‟ is not a substitute for
mandamus or injunction nor for an appeal or
writ of error, and is not to be used to prevent an
improper exercise of power lawfully possessed,
and its purpose is solely to prevent an officer or
corporation or persons purporting to act as such
from usurping a power which they do not have.
State ex inf. McKittrick v. Murphy9
Information in the nature of „quo warranto‟ does
not command performance of official functions
by any officer to whom it may run, since it is not
directed to officer as such, but to person holding
office or exercising franchise, and not for purpose
of dictating or prescribing official duties, but only
to ascertain whether he is rightfully entitled to
exercise functions claimed. State ex inf. Walsh v.
Thatcher10.”
(emphasis supplied)
81. In Halsbury‟s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Reissue Vol. I,
p. 368, para 265 it is found as follows:
“265. In general.—An information in the nature of a
quo warranto took the place of the obsolete writ of quo
warranto which lay against a person who claimed or
usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by
what authority he supported his claim, in order that
the right to the office or franchise might be
determined.”

9 148 SW 2d 527, 529, 530 : 347 Mo 484
10 102 SW 2d 937, 938 : 340 Mo 865
46
31. In the case of High Court of Gujarat and Anr. Vs. Gujarat
Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and Ors.
11 (supra) in a concurring
judgment S.B. Sinha, J. (as His Lordship then was) noted that the
High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of this
nature is required to determine at the outset as to whether a case
has been made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or a writ of
quo warranto. However, the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue
a writ of quo warranto is a limited one. While issuing such a writ,
the Court merely makes a public declaration but will not consider
the respective impact of the candidates or other factors which may
be relevant for issuance of a writ of certiorari. The Court went on
to observe that a writ of quo warranto can only be issued when the
appointment is contrary to the statutory rules as held in Mor
Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. Vs. Financial Commr. &
Secy. To Government of Haryana12. The Court also took notice
of the exposition in R.K. Jain Vs. Union of India13. The Court
noted that with a view to find out as to whether a case has been
made out for issuance of quo warranto, the only question which

11 (2003) 4 SCC 712
12 (2002) 6 SCC 269
13 (1993) 4 SCC 119
47
was required to be considered was as to whether the incumbent
fulfilled the qualifications laid down under the statutory provisions
or not. This is the limited scope of inquiry. Applying the underlying
principle, the Court ought not to enquire into the merits of the
claim or the defence or explanation offered by the appellant
regarding the manner of issuance of Income and Caste Certificate
by the jurisdictional Authority or any matter related thereto which
may be matter in issue for scrutiny concerning the validity of the
Caste Certificate issued by the jurisdictional statutory authority
constituted under the State Act of 1990 and the rules framed
thereunder. That inquiry may require examination of all factual
aspects threadbare including the legality of the stand taken by the
appellant herein.
32. In the case of Chairman and Managing Director, Food
Corporation of India and Others Vs. Jagdish Balaram Bahira
and Others14, the question was in reference to the Caste
Certificate which was invalidated after the verification done by the
jurisdictional Scrutiny Committee. The observations in the said

14 (2017) 8 SCC 670
48
decision may be of some import, if the Caste Verification
Committee was to invalidate the Caste Certificate issued to the
appellant after due verification. As a matter of fact, the enquiry
before the Caste Verification Committee ought to proceed in terms
of the procedure prescribed by the Act of 1990 and Rules framed
thereunder and including the dictum of this Court in, amongst
others Madhuri Patil Vs. Commr., Tribal Development15.
33. In Rajesh Awasthi Vs. Nand Lal Jaiswal and Ors.16, the
Court noted that a writ of quo warranto will lie when the
appointment is made contrary to the statutory provisions as held
in the case of Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. (supra)
Further, relying on the decision in the cases of B. Srinivasa
Reddy Vs. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage
Board Employees Asson.17 and Hari Bansh Lal Vs. Sahodar
Prasad Mahto18, wherein the legal position has been restated that
the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is
a limited one which can only be issued if the appointment is

15 (1994) 6 SCC 241
16 (2013) 1 SCC 501
17 (2006) 11 SCC 731
18 (2010) 9 SCC 655
49
contrary to the statutory rules and the Court has to satisfy itself
that the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. In that
case, the Court after analysing the factual matrix found, as of fact,
that there was non-compliance of sub-Section (5) of Section 85 of
the Electricity Act, 2003, in the matter of appointment of the
incumbent to the post of Chairperson of the Commission for which
it became necessary to issue a writ of quo warranto. In the
supplementing judgment by one of us Dipak Misra, J. (as His
Lordship then was), the settled legal position expounded in B.R.
Kapur (supra), University of Mysore (supra), High Court of
Gujarat (supra), Centre for PIL Vs. Union of India19 has been
recapitulated in paragraphs 29 to 33 of the reported decision.
34. We have adverted to some of those decisions in the earlier
part of this judgment. Suffice, it to observe that unless the Court
is satisfied that the incumbent was not eligible at all as per the
statutory provisions for being appointed or elected to the public
office or that he/she has incurred disqualification to continue in
the said office, which satisfaction should be founded on the

19 (2011) 4 SCC 1
50
indisputable facts, the High Court ought not to entertain the
prayer for issuance of a writ of quo warranto.
35. In the case of K. Krishna Murthy (Dr.) (supra) the
Constitution Bench of this Court examined two questions as noted
in paragraph 9 of the reported judgment, which read thus:
“9. In light of the submissions that have been
paraphrased in the subsequent paragraphs, the contentious
issues in this case can be framed in the following manner:
(i) Whether Article 243-D(6) and Article 243_T(6) are
constitutionally valid since they enable reservations in
favour of backward classes for the purpose of occupying
seats and chairperson positions in panchayats and
municipalities respectively?
(ii) Whether Article 243-D(4) and Article 243-T(4) are
constitutionally valid since they enable the reservation of
chairperson positions in panchayats and municipalities
respectively?”
The Court opined that the objectives of democratic decentralisation
are not only to bring governance closer to the people, but also to
make it more participatory, inclusive and accountable to the
weaker sections of society. The Court went on to observe that
reservations in local self-government are intended to directly
benefit the community as a whole, rather than just the elected
51
representatives. It is for this very reason that there cannot be an
exclusion of the “creamy layer” in the context of political
representation. It also noted that while exclusion of the “creamy
layer” may be feasible as well as desirable in the context of
reservations for education and employment, the same principle
cannot be extended to the context of local self-government.
We may note that this decision may be of relevance to the
appellant to pursue his remedy before the High Court in the writ
petition No.108700 of 2017, questioning the validity of Clause (ii)
of the notification dated 13.01.1995 providing for exclusion of
“creamy layer” against the reserved category. We may, however,
without any hesitation record that the High Court had justly
negatived the argument of the appellant which was founded on the
interim relief granted by the High Court in the stated writ petition
on the ground that the same cannot validate an action which was
illegal so as to alter the eligibility criteria for contesting the election
of Adhyaksha conducted on 26th April, 2016.
We do not intend to express any opinion either way on the pending
issues in that proceedings, which are not the subject
52
matter of this appeal. The High Court is free to deal with that writ
petition on its own merits in accordance with law.
36. This, however, will make no difference to the conclusion
which we must reach in this case that the High Court could not
have issued a writ of quo warranto until the Income and Caste
Certificate issued in favour of the appellant, on the basis of which
she participated in the election for the post of Adhyaksha and got
elected, was to be declared void or invalidated by the Caste
Scrutiny Committee. We do not wish to dilate on other incidental
aspects/arguments as the same will not have any bearing on the
conclusion noted above.

37. In a matter of this nature, the High Court, having kept open
the issue regarding the validity of the Income and Caste Certificate
to be decided by the jurisdictional Caste Verification Committee
and finding no legal basis to declare the certificate as void ab initio
or choosing to do so, ought to have instead directed the Caste
Verification Committee to expedite the enquiry and conclude the
same in a time bound manner. The course adopted by the High
53
Court has only prolonged the consideration of that issue by the
competent authority and embroiled the parties in avoidable
proceedings.
38. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the decisions
of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High
Court which are impugned in the present appeal. We, however,
dispose of the writ petition filed by the respondents 6 to 9 being
Writ Petition No.106417 of 2016 only by directing the Caste
Verification Committee to expedite the enquiry regarding the
validity of the Income and Caste Certificate issued to the appellant
by respondent no.5 and conclude the same preferably within two
months and also intimate its final decision to the appellant within
the same time. Needless to observe that the Caste Scrutiny
Committee will decide the matter on its own merit and without
being influenced whatsoever by any observations made in the
impugned judgments but in accordance with law. Besides, it shall
deal with every contention raised before it by recording tangible
reasons. 
54
39. The appeal is allowed in the aforementioned terms with no
order as to costs.
.………………………….CJI.
(Dipak Misra)
…………………………..….J.
 (A.M. Khanwilkar)
 …………………………..….J.
 (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)
New Delhi;
March 6, 2018.

corporate laws - tax laws - rate of tax applicable to works contracts prior to 1 April 2006 when Section 4(1)(c) was introduced by an amendment into the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act 2003 (‘KVAT Act 2003’). = For declared goods, Section 4(1)(c ) is expressly subject to Sections 14 and 15 of the CST Act 1956. Hence declared goods involved in the execution of a works contract are taxable at the rates mentioned in Section 15 of the CST Act while all other goods involved in the execution of a works contract are taxable at the rate prescribed in the Sixth Schedule upon the amendment.- The manner in which the total turnover of a dealer is computed is prescribed in Rule 3(1)(b), in the case of a normal sale, and in Rule 3(1)(c), for the purposes of a works contract. In the case of a works contract, deductions are envisaged under sub-rule (2) of Rule 3, which includes amounts such as labour and other charges. Section 7 provides that the sale of goods shall be deemed to have taken place at the time of the transfer of title or possession or incorporation of the goods in the course of the execution of a works contract. - It was open to state legislatures to provide uniform rates of tax on goods involved in the execution of works contracts. Many state legislatures did so. The Karnataka legislature did so with effect from 1.4.2006, not earlier.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO 811 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP(C) No 27048 of 2013)
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ANR ..Appellants
VERSUS
M/S DURGA PROJECTS INC ..Respondent
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOS 812-817 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP(C )Nos 10570-10575 of 2015)
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
CIVIL APPEAL NO 811 OF 2018:
(Arising out of SLP(C) No 27048 of 2013)
1 The State of Karnataka is in appeal from a judgment of a Division Bench of
the High Court dated 28 September 2012. The issue before the High Court related
to the rate of tax applicable to works contracts prior to 1 April 2006 when Section
4(1)(c) was introduced by an amendment into the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act
2003 (‘KVAT Act 2003’).
REPORTABLE
2
2 The respondent is engaged in executing civil works contacts and is
registered both under the KVAT Act and the Central Sales Tax Act. It purchases
building materials like hardware, sand and bricks falling under the Third Schedule
to the KVAT Act, declared goods under Section 15 of the CST Act and other nonscheduled
goods from within and outside the State and from unregistered dealers.
On 31 January 2006 it made an application before the Authority for Advance
Clarification and Ruling (‘AAR’) for guidance on the rate of tax applicable for the
execution of civil works contracts under the KVAT Act. The AAR held by its order
dated 2 August 2006 that since there was no specific entry providing for the rate
of tax on works contracts up to 31 March 2006, tax on goods used in the execution
of works contract should be levied in accordance with the rate of tax applicable to
the sale of goods under the KVAT Act 2003. The relevant part of the order is
extracted below:
“…correctly understood that there is no specific entry
providing rate of tax on works contract under KVAT Act, up
to 31-3-2006 and therefore, tax should be levied as per the
rate applicable on the value of each class of goods involved
in the execution of works contract. Therefore, as regards
the rate of tax on the deemed sales of goods involved in the
execution of works contract, it is to be clarified that tax is
payable at the rate applicable to the Sale of Goods Act upto
31.03.2006. And by KVAT (Amendment) Act, 2006, Clause
(c ) has been got inserted to section 4(1) w.e.f. 1.4.2006, for
levy of tax in respect of transfer of property in goods
(whether as goods or in some other form) involved in the
execution of a works contract, and appending VI Schedule
to the Act, listing out the items/descriptions of the works
contract with the rate of tax corresponding to them. As per
entry 23 of the said schedule, “all other work contracts not
specified in any of the above categories including composite
3
contracts with one or more of the above categories” are
liable to tax @ 12.5% w.e.f. 01.04.2006. The civil works
contract falls under the said entry and therefore, is liable to
tax @ 12.5% only. Hence, it is clarified accordingly.”
3 The dealer sought a further clarification on the issues that were raised in the
original application about the rate of tax on iron and steel used in the execution of
civil works contracts. By its ruling dated 7 December 2006, AAR held that the rate
of tax applicable on iron and steel is 4 per cent when used in the same form,
otherwise the rate of tax would be 12.5 per cent.
4 Subsequently, an order was passed in revision by the Commissioner of
Commercial Taxes (Karnataka), Bangalore, holding that the orders of AAR were
erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. According to the
Commissioner, there is a deemed sale in the course of the execution of a works
contract by incorporation of the goods into the work. This is distinct from a normal
sale of goods. In the case of a works contract, it is a conglomerate of goods that
is transferred and there is no sale of individual goods. According to the
Commissioner, both before and after the amendment of Section 4(1)(c) with effect
from 1 April 2006, tax is levied on the taxable turnover of goods involved in the
execution of a works contract. Taxable turnover in a works contract is determined
after allowing deductions from the total consideration admissible under Rule 3(2)
of the KVAT Rules 2005. On the other hand, in the case of a normal sale of goods,
the aggregate sale price paid for a particular commodity constitutes the taxable
4
turnover. The clarification by AAR was held to be in error in assuming that
individual goods purchased for use in the execution of a works contract are
transferred in the same form and in ruling that the rates of tax on taxable turnover
would be the rates applicable to each of the goods purchased. The matter was
kept open to be addressed by the assessing authorities in accordance with law.
5 The dealer preferred a sales tax appeal before the High Court of Karnataka,
aggrieved by the revisional order of the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes. By
its judgment dated 28 September 2012, the High Court allowed the appeal and
while setting aside the order in revision held as follows:
“The sale under the works contract is a deemed sale of
transfer of the goods alone and it is not different from the
normal sale. Hence, the tax has to be levied on the price of
the goods and material used in the works contract as if there
was a sale of goods and materials. The property in the
goods used in the works contract will be deemed to have
been passed over to the buyer as soon as the goods or
material used are incorporated to the moveable property by
principle of accretion to the moveable property. Hence, we
are of the view that the order passed by the Commissioner
is contrary to law. For the period prior to 1-4-2006, tax has
to be levied as per Section 3(1) of the Act and for the period
subsequent to 1-4-2006, tax has to be levied as per Section
4(1)(c ) of the Act. Hence, the substantial questions of law
are held in favour of the appellant.”
6 The submission which has been urged on behalf of the State is that although
Section 4(1)(c) was introduced with effect from 1 April 2006, all other provisions in
relation to works contracts existed since the inception of the Act in 2003. The
5
definitions of sale (Section 2(29)), goods (Section 2(15)), turnover (Section 2(36)),
total turnover (Section 2(35)) and taxable turnover (Section 2(34)) were a part of
the parent legislation. The distinct mechanism for determination of total turnover in
respect of a normal sale and deemed sale was also in existence prior to 1 April
2006. Consequently, it has been urged on behalf of the State by Mr Devadatt
Kamat, that:
(i) There cannot be any dispute that the KVAT Act envisaged a levy of tax on
works contracts even prior to 01.04.2006;
(ii) The rate of tax for works contracts prior to 01.04.2006 would fall under
Section 4(1)(b), the residual entry. The residual entry prescribes the rate of tax for
“other goods”, that is, goods which are not specified under any of the schedules.
The goods incorporated in a works contract also come within the ambit of the
definition of goods under Section 2(15);
(iii) In a deemed sale, the conglomerate of the goods or the value of the contract
is to be taken as the amount of goods which are sold. This is specifically
incorporated in Rule 3(c);
(iv) In case of a deemed sale, the concept of ‘total turnover’ is the total amount
of consideration for the transfer of property in the goods and the same is in
contradistinction to the concept of ‘total turnover’ in respect of a normal sale where
it is the value of each goods;
6
(v) The argument that prior to 01.04.2006 the rate of tax has to be levied on the
individual goods comprised in the works contract would militate against the
express provisions of the Act and the Rules in force which categorically lay down
a distinct procedure for computation of the rate of tax in respect of works contracts
[Rule 3(1)(c) read with Section 4(1), 2(34), 2(35) and 2(36)];
(vi) The contention that the tax is leviable on individual goods in a works contract
will render the entire scheme of the Act prior to 01.04.2006 unworkable and would
amount to abolishing the levy on works contracts prior to 01.04.2006;
(vii) The arguments of the Respondent would effectively render Section 2(29)
read with Rule 3(1)(c) completely redundant and otiose. The taxable event in a
deemed sale (See Section 7) is the time of incorporation of the goods in the course
of execution of the works contract. Therefore, to relegate the determination of the
rate of taxation to a period anterior to the taxable event would render the entire
scheme of taxation under the KVAT Act otiose; and
(viii) It is well settled that there is a presumption against redundancy of a statutory
provision [Balabhagas Hulaschand v State of Orissa, (1976) 2 SCC 44].
Furthermore, the suggestion that individual goods are to be taxed separately in a
works contract amounts to re-writing the statute, which is against the settled
cannon of interpretation that in a taxing statute nothing can be read in. [Bansal
Wire Industries Ltd. V State of Uttar Pradesh, (2011) 6 SCC 545].
7
7 On the other hand, Mr SK Bagaria, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent supports the reasoning of the High Court on the following
grounds:
(i) In the judgment of the Court in Gannon Dunkerly & Co v State of
Rajasthan1
, it was held that the State legislatures may tax the goods involved in
execution of a works contract at a uniform rate, which is different from the rates
applicable to individual goods;
(ii) The KVAT Act was enacted in 2003 and its charging section (Section 3) came
into force on 1 May 2005. Though in Gannon Dunkerly & Co (supra), this Court
permitted State legislatures to tax goods involved in the execution of works
contracts at a uniform rate, the legislature of Karnataka did not do so. No
provision existed for a uniform rate on all goods involved in the execution of works
contracts until 31 March 2006;
(iii) The above position was altered when Section 4 was amended with effect from
1 April 2006 by Act 4 of 2006. As a result, in terms of clause (c), subject to
sections 14 and 15 of the CST Act, goods involved in the execution of works
contracts are liable to a uniform rate of tax, depending upon the description of the
works contract in the Sixth Schedule;
(iv) In so far as declared goods are concerned, Section 4(1)(a) (ii) provided for a
rate of 4% on goods mentioned in the Third Schedule. Serial No.20 of the Third

1
(1993) 1 SCC 364
8
Schedule refers to declared goods specified in Section 14 of the CST Act 1956.
Hence, iron and steel which were declared goods specified in Section 14 of the
CST Act were covered by the Third Schedule and were subject to tax at 4%; goods
not covered by the Third Schedule were liable to tax at 12.5% under Section
4(1)(b);
(v) After 01.04.2006, Section 4(1)(c) is made subject to Sections 14 and 15 of the
CST Act for declared goods. Hence declared goods involved in the execution of
works contract are from 01.04.2006 taxable at the rates mentioned in Section 15
of the CST Act while all other goods are taxable at a uniform rate under the Sixth
Schedule. This amendment was made with effect from 01.04.2006 and there is
no dispute for the period thereafter;
(v) In so far as the rate of tax is concerned, as stated above, Section 4(1) of the
KVAT Act as it stood during the relevant period i.e. upto 31.03.2006 specifically
provided for the applicable rates as under:
(a) In respect of declared goods as specified in Section 14 of the CST Act
@4% (Section 4(1)(a)(ii) read with Serial No.20 of Third Schedule);
(b) In respect of the goods mentioned in the Second, Third or Fourth
Schedules at the respective rates mentioned in Section 4(1)(a) read with
the said Schedules;
(c) In respect of other goods, i.e. goods not covered by Section 4(1)(a), @
12.5% under Section 4(1)(b).
9
At that time i.e. upto 31.03.2006, there was no provision in the KVAT Act providing
for a uniform rate in respect of goods supplied in execution of a works contract. In
so far as the expression “other goods” in Section 4(1)(b) is concerned, it only
meant and covered the goods other than those covered by Section 4(1)(a). The
goods mentioned in the Second, Third or Fourth Schedules (in this case
particularly iron and steel covered by Serial No.20 of Third Schedule) were
specifically covered by the said Schedules and there could be no scope to consign
these specific goods covered by the said Schedules to the residual entry “Other
goods” in Section 4(1)(b). This position of law is well settled by the judgments of
this Court in Dunlop India Ltd. v Union of India2 and Bharat Forge and Press
Industries Pvt. Ltd. v CCE3
.
(vi) In Gannon Dunkerley’s case (supra) this Court held that it is permissible for
the State Legislatures to tax all goods involved in execution of a works contract at
a uniform rate. In spite of this, the KVAT Act which came into force on 01.05.2005
did not provide for a uniform rate. The provision for uniform rate in respect of
goods supplied in execution of works contracts was inserted only
w.e.f.01.04.2006 and consequently it is only for the period from 01.04.2006 that a
uniform rate under the newly inserted Clause (c) of Section 4(1) became
applicable.

2
(1976) 2 SCC 241
3
(1990)1 SCC 532
10
(vii) In so far as the declared goods under Section 14 of the CST Act are
concerned, both before and after 31.03.2006, the KVAT Act makes it clear that
the rate of tax, even when supplied in execution of a works contract, will be the
rate mentioned in Section 15 of the CST Act. Under the KVAT Act as it stood upto
31.03.2006, this position prevailed under Section 4(1)(a) read with Serial No.20
of the Third Schedule. Under the KVAT Act as it stands after 01.04.2006, the said
position has been statutorily provided for in Section 4(1)(c) itself which has been
made “subject to Sections 14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956”.
(viii) The tax on sale or purchase of declared goods covered by Sections 14 and
15 of the CST Act, even when such goods are supplied in execution of a works
contract covered by Article 366(29A)(b), shall be subject to the restrictions and
conditions mentioned in Section 15 of the CST Act. This position of law has been
specifically mandated in Article 286(3)(b) of the Constitution. This position has
also been statutorily incorporated in the KVAT Act, both before and after
31.03.2006.
(ix) A review of the VAT enactments of other States would indicate that following
the decision in Gannon Dunkerly & Co (supra), some States opted to levy a uniform
rate of tax on all goods supplied in the execution of works contracts. Other states
provided for different applicable rates. Reference can be made by way of illustration
to the VAT Acts for Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Odisha and Tamil Nadu.
8 The rival submissions have to be analysed.
11
9 To facilitate an analysis of the submissions which have been urged on behalf
of the State in appeal, it would be necessary to advert to the provisions of the
KVAT Act 2003 prior to 1 April 2006 bearing on the controversy. 1 April 2006
assumes significance because by Karnataka Act 4 of 2006, clause (c) was
introduced into Section 4(1) so as to incorporate a specific rate of tax on the
transfer of property involved in the execution of works contracts. The rate of tax
came to be specified for works contracts of various descriptions in the Sixth
Schedule. But even before 1 April 2006, as our analysis would indicate, there is no
manner of doubt that works contracts were exigible to the levy of tax under the
KVAT Act 2003.
10 Section 3 of the Act is the charging provision and provides as follows:
“3. Levy of tax.- (1) The tax shall be levied on every sale of goods
in the State by a registered dealer or a dealer liable to be
registered, in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(2) The tax shall also be levied, and paid by every registered
dealer or a dealer liable to be registered, on the sale of taxable
goods to him, for use in the course of his business, by a person
who is not registered under this Act.”
The charge of tax is on the sale of goods. The statutory meaning of the expression
“sale” is contained in Section 3(29), in the following terms:
“(29) ‘Sale’ with all its grammatical variation and cognate
expressions means every transfer of the property in goods (other
than by way of a mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge) by
one person to another in the course of trade or business for cash
or for deferred payment or other valuable consideration and
includes,-
12
(a) a transfer otherwise than in pursuance of a contract of property
in any goods for cash, deferred payment or other valuable
consideration;
(b) a transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or in
some other form) involved in the execution of a works
contract;
(c) a delivery of goods on hire purchase or any system of payment
by installments;
(d) a transfer of the right to use any goods for any purpose
(whether or not for a specified period) for cash, deferred payment
or other valuable consideration”.
(emphasis supplied)
The expression ‘sale’ includes a transfer of property in goods (whether as goods
or in some other form) involved in the execution of a works contract. The
expression ‘goods’ is defined in Section 2(15) to mean all kinds of movable
property including materials, commodities and articles as well as goods involved
in the execution of a works contract:
“(15) ‘Goods’ means all kinds of movable property (other than
newspaper, actionable claims, stocks and shares and securities)
and includes livestock, all materials, commodities and articles
(including goods, as goods or in some other form) involved in the
execution of a works contract or those goods to be used in the
fitting out, improvement or repair of movable property, and all
growing crops, grass or things attached to, or forming part of the
land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the
contract of sale.”
(emphasis supplied)
Prior to the introduction of Section 4(1)(c) on 1 April 2006, Section 4 stood in the
following terms:
13
“4. Liability to tax and rates thereof.- (1) Every dealer who is or is
required to be registered as specified in Sections 22 and 24, shall
be liable to pay tax, on his taxable turnover,
(a) in respect of goods mentioned in,-
(i) Second Schedule, at the rate of one per cent,
(ii) Third Schedule, at the rate of four per cent, and
(iii) Fourth Schedule, at the rate of twenty per cent.
(b) in respect of other goods, at the rate of twelve and one half
per cent.”
By Karnataka Act 4 of 2006, clause (c) was introduced into Section 4(1). Clause
(c) reads thus:
“(c) in respect of transfer of property in goods (whether as goods
or in some other form) involved in the execution of works contract
specified in column (2) of the Sixth Schedule, subject to Sections
14 and 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (Central Act 74 of
1956), at the rates specified in the corresponding entries in
column (3) of the said Schedule.”
Section 4 sets out the liability of every dealer to pay tax on his taxable turnover.
The expression ‘taxable turnover’ is defined in Section 2(34) which reads thus :
“(34) ‘Taxable turnover’ means the turnover on which a dealer
shall be liable to pay tax as determined after making such
deductions from his total turnover and in such manner as may be
prescribed, but shall not include the turnover of purchase or sale
in the course of interstate trade or commerce or in the course of
export of the goods out of the territory of India or in the course of
import of the goods into the territory of India and the value of
goods transferred or despatched outside the State otherwise than
by way of sale.”
Taxable turnover comprises of the turnover on which a dealer shall be liable to pay
tax. Taxable turnover is arrived at by making deductions from the total turnover in
14
such a manner as may be prescribed by the rules made under the Act. The
definition of ‘taxable turnover’ is linked to the definition of total turnover because it
is from the total turnover that the prescribed deductions are made. Section 2(35)
defines ‘total turnover’:
“(35) ‘Total turnover’ means the aggregate turnover in all goods of
a dealer at all places of business in the State, whether or not the
whole or any portion of such turnover is liable to tax, including the
turnover of purchase or sale in the course of interstate trade or
commerce or in the course of export of the goods out of the
territory of India or in the course of import of the goods into the
territory of India and the value of goods transferred or despatched
outside the State otherwise than by way of sale.”
The expression ‘total turnover’ in Section 2(35) is defined to mean the aggregate
turnover of a dealer in all goods, at all places of business in the State. Hence, the
definition of total turnover is linked to turnover. The latter expression is defined in
Section 2(36) as follows:
“(36) ‘Turnover’ means the aggregate amount for which goods are
sold or distributed or delivered or otherwise disposed of in any of
the ways referred to in clause (29) by a dealer, either directly or
through another, on his own account or on account of others,
whether for cash or for deferred payment or other valuable
consideration, and includes the aggregate amount for which
goods are purchased from a person not registered under the Act
and the value of goods transferred or despatched outside the
State otherwise than by way of sale, and subject to such
conditions and restrictions as may be prescribed the amount for
which goods are sold shall include any sums charged for anything
done by the dealer in respect of the goods sold at the time of or
before the delivery thereof.
Explanation.- The value of the goods transferred or despatched
outside the State otherwise than by way of sale, shall be the
amount for which the goods are ordinarily sold by the dealer or the
15
prevailing market price of such goods where the dealer does not
ordinarily sell the goods.”
Section 7 provides when the sale of goods is deemed to take place:
“7. Time of sale of goods.- (1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 (Central Act 3 of
1930), for the purpose of this Act, and subject to subsection
(2), the sale of goods shall be deemed to have taken place
at the time of transfer of title or possession or incorporation
of the goods in the course of execution of any works contract
whether or not there is receipt of payment: Provided that
where a dealer issues a tax invoice in respect of such sale
within fourteen days from the date of the sale, the sale shall
be deemed to have taken place at the time the invoice is
issued.”
Hence, in the case of a works contract, the sale of goods takes place at the time
of the incorporation of the goods in the course of its execution.
11 The rules framed under the KVAT Act 2003 – the KVAT Rules 2005 –
provide for the determination of total turnover. In the case of a normal sale, the
total turnover is provided for in Rule 3(1)(b). The total turnover in the case of a
works contact is defined in Rule 3(1)(c). Rule 3(1), insofar as is material, provided
as follows:
“PART II
TURNOVER REGISTRATION AND PAYMENT OF SECURITY
Determination of total and taxable turnover
(1) The total turnover of a dealer, for the purposes of the Act, shall
be the aggregate of-
16
(a) the total amount paid or payable by the dealer
as the consideration for the purchase of any of
the goods in respect of which tax is leviable under
sub-section (2) of section 3;
(b) the total amount paid or payable to the dealer
as the consideration for the sale, supply or
distribution of any goods where such sale, supply
or distribution has taken place inside the State,
whether by the dealer himself or through his
agent;
(c) the total amount paid or payable to the dealer
as the consideration for transfer of property in
goods (whether as goods or in some other form)
involved in the execution of works contract
including any amount paid as advance to the
dealer as a part of such consideration;
(d) the total amount paid or payable to the dealer
as the consideration for transfer of the right to use
any goods for any purpose (whether or not for
specified period);
(e) the total amount paid or payable to the dealer
as the consideration in respect of goods delivered
on hire-purchase or any system of payment by
instalments;
(f) the aggregate of the sale prices received and
receivable by the dealer in respect of sale of any
goods in the course of linter-State trade or
commerce and export out of the territory of India
and sale in the course of import into the territory
of India; and
(g) the value of all goods transferred or
despatched outside the State otherwise than by
way of sale.”
12 Under Rule 3(2), the taxable turnover is computed by allowing for certain
deductions from the total turnover determined under Rule 3(1). Among the
deductions to be made are those in respect of amounts expended towards labour
17
charges and other charges not involving the transfer of property in goods in
connection with the execution of a works contract. Clauses (l) and (m) of Rule 3(2)
are as follows:
“The taxable turnover shall be determined by allowing the
following deductions from the total turnover:-
…
(l) All amounts actually expended towards labour charges and
other like charges not involving any transfer of property in goods
in connection with the execution of works contract including
charges incurred for erection, installation, fixing, fitting out or
commissioning of the goods used in the execution of a works
contract;
(m) Such amounts calculated at the rate specified in column (3) of
the Table below towards labour charges and other like charges as
incurred in the execution of a works contract when such charges
are not ascertainable from the books of accounts maintained by a
dealer.”
The table below clause (m) specifies types of contracts and alongside, labour and
like charges as a percentage of the value of the contract. The principle is that
expenditure on account of labour charges involved in the execution of works
contracts is excluded from the total turnover in order to arrive at the taxable turnover.
The liability to pay tax under Section 4 is on the taxable turnover.
13 The dispute in the present case relates to 2005-06. The case relates to the
position of law in the State of Karnataka, as it stood until 31 March 2006. There can
be no manner of doubt that even prior to 1 April 2006 works contracts were exigible
to the levy of tax. The charging section, Section 3, mandates that “the tax shall be
levied on every sale of goods”. The expression ‘sale’ in Section 2(29) means ‘every
transfer of the property in goods’ including ‘a transfer of property in goods (whether
18
as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution of works contract’.
Similarly, the definition of the expression ‘goods’ in Section 2(15) contains a clear
reference to “all kinds of movable property” and all materials, commodities and
articles (including goods, as goods or in some other form) involved in the execution
of works contracts. The chargeability of goods involved in the execution of works
contracts both before and after 01.04.2006 is a matter which lies beyond any
element of doubt. Such provisions in the state laws – including the State of
Karnataka – followed upon the 46th Amendment to the Constitution by which the
expression ‘tax on the sale or purchase of goods’ was incorporated in Clause 29A
of Article 366 to include taxes on the transfer of property in goods involved in the
execution of works contracts.
14 Section 4 imposes a liability to pay taxes upon every dealer on his taxable
turnover. Besides imposing a liability, Section 4 prescribes the rate of tax. The rate
of tax on goods mentioned in the Second, Third and Fourth Schedules was specified
in sub-clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Section 4(1)(a). The Second Schedule at the
material time attracted a rate of 1%, the Third Schedule 4% and the Fourth
Schedule, 20%. On ‘other goods’ the rate of tax was 12.5% under Section 4(1)(b).
The expression ‘other goods’ in Section 4(1)(b) evidently means those goods which
are not governed by Section 4(1)(a). Where goods are specifically covered by any
of the entries of the Second, Third and Fourth Schedules, such goods would be
covered by the specific entry relating to those goods. Recourse to the residual
19
provisions of Section 4(1)(b) would be available only in respect of ‘other goods’, that
is, goods which did not fall within the purview of Section 4(1)(a). The law on the
construction of a residual entry has been crystalized in several judgments of this
Court and it would be appropriate to refer to one of them: HPL Chemicals Ltd. v
CCE4
. After adverting to the decisions in Dunlop India Ltd. (supra), and Bharat
Forge and Press Industries Pvt. Ltd. (supra), this Court reiterated that “only such
goods as cannot be brought under the various specific entries in the tariff should be
attempted to be brought under the residuary entry”. Applying this principle, where
goods are specifically covered by clauses (i), (ii), or (iii) of Section 4(1)(a), recourse
to the residual provisions of Section 4(1)(b) would not be available. To allow a
residual provision to consume the specific would be to invert the intent of the
legislature. The state wants us to do just that.
15 In Gannon Dunkerly & Co (supra), this Court held that it is permissible for
the State legislatures to prescribe a uniform rate of tax for all goods involved in the
execution of works contracts, even though different rates of tax are prescribed for
the sale of such goods. This followed upon the insertion of Article 366(29A)(b). In
the opinion of this Court:
“… it would be permissible for the State Legislature to tax all
the goods involved in the execution of a works contract at a
uniform rate which may be different from the rates
applicable to individual goods because the goods which are
involved in the execution of a works contract when

4
(2006)5 SCC 208
20
incorporated in the works can be classified into a separate
category for the purpose of imposing the tax and a uniform
rate may be prescribed for sale of such goods”.
The rationale underlying this principle is that goods involved in the execution of a
works contract can be classified into a separate category, so as to provide for a
uniform rate of tax. The real issue before this Court is as to whether prior to 1 April
2006, the State legislature of Karnataka had in fact done so. The answer to this is
in the negative, on a plain and natural meaning of the words used.
16 The core of the submissions which have been ably projected before the
Court by Mr Devadatt Kamat is that the State legislature had in fact prescribed a
uniform rate for works contracts, prior to 1.4.2006 in Section 4(1)(b) under which
a rate of 12.5% was provided. In his submission, declared goods would be
assessed separately; while the balance of the goods in a works contract would be
assessed on the total turnover, which is incorporated under Rule 3(1)(c). We find
ourselves unable to accept the submission. In our view, it would be far-fetched to
accept that in enacting Section 4(1)(b), the legislature intended to prescribe a
uniform rate of tax, prior to 1.4.2006, for goods incorporated in a works contract.
The scheme legislated upon in Section 4(1) envisaged specific rates of tax on
goods falling within the Second, Third and Fourth Schedules. What Section 4(1)(b)
provided was a residual entry under which a rate of 12.5% was provided ‘in respect
of other goods’. The expression ‘in respect of other goods’ meant goods other
than those falling in the Second, Third and Fourth Schedules. Declared goods
21
specified in Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 were comprehended in
Serial No.20 of the Third Schedule to the KVAT Act 2003 and attracted a rate of
4%, which applied to goods in that Schedule. As a result of the deeming definition
of the expression sale, a transfer of property in goods involved in the execution of
a works contract become exigible to tax. Exigibiliy to tax, it is settled law, is distinct
from the rate of tax and the measure of the tax. In Gannon Dunkerly & Co, this
court expressed the view that it is open to the states to provide a uniform rate of
tax on goods transferred in the course of the execution of a works contract. The
exigibility to tax is not (as it cannot be) dependent on the state prescribing a uniform
rate of tax for goods involved in works contracts. That the KVAT Act 2003 did not
provide a uniform rate of tax prior to 01.04.2006 on goods involved in the execution
of works contract also becomes apparent when we read the amendment which
introduced Section 4(1)(c) by Act 4 of 2006. As a result of the amendment, the
legislature provided that the rate of tax in respect of the transfer of property in
goods involved in the execution of a works contract would be as provided in the
Sixth Schedule. The Sixth Schedule elucidates works contracts of various
descriptions and elucidates the associated rates of tax for each distinct category.
For declared goods, Section 4(1)(c ) is expressly subject to Sections 14 and 15 of
the CST Act 1956. Hence declared goods involved in the execution of a works
contract are taxable at the rates mentioned in Section 15 of the CST Act while all
other goods involved in the execution of a works contract are taxable at the rate
prescribed in the Sixth Schedule upon the amendment. The amendment
22
introducing Section 4(1)(c) took effect on 1 April 2006. The amendment is not
clarificatory. It was with effect from 1 April 2006 that the State legislature mandated
a uniform rate of tax on goods involved in the execution of works contracts as
provided in the Sixth Schedule. The position as it existed upto 31 March 2006 was
altered with effect from 1 April 2006. We are, therefore, unable to accept the
submission of the State that upto 31 March 2006. Section 4(1)(b) envisaged a
uniform rate for the transfer of goods involved in the execution of a works contract.
Section 4 imposes the liability to pay tax on every dealer who is or is required to
be registered, on his taxable turnover. The concept of taxable turnover in Section
2(34) is defined with reference to the turnover on which a dealer is liable to be
taxed, determined after making deductions from the total turnover as prescribed.
The concept of taxable turnover thus incorporates the expressions ‘turnover’ and
‘total turnover’, both of which are defined in Sections 2(36) and Section 2(35)
respectively. The manner in which the total turnover of a dealer is computed is
prescribed in Rule 3(1)(b), in the case of a normal sale, and in Rule 3(1)(c), for the
purposes of a works contract. In the case of a works contract, deductions are
envisaged under sub-rule (2) of Rule 3, which includes amounts such as labour
and other charges. Section 7 provides that the sale of goods shall be deemed to
have taken place at the time of the transfer of title or possession or incorporation
of the goods in the course of the execution of a works contract. In our view, the
interpretation which we have placed on the provisions of the Act as they existed
prior to 1.4.2006 is consistent with the plain meaning of the words used by the
23
legislature. We are unable to subscribe to the submission which has been urged
on behalf the appellant that Section 4(1)(b), as it existed prior to 1.4.2006 was a
catch- all entry providing for a uniform rate of tax on goods involved in the
execution of a works contract. Such a construction does not emerge from the plain
meaning of the words used and is in fact belied by the need which was felt by the
legislature to impose a uniform rate of tax only with effect from 1 April 2006. Before
concluding, we need to clarify that the genesis of the present dispute arises out of
the proceedings which were initiated before AAR by the respondent seeking
guidance on the applicable rate of tax on the law as it existed until 31.03.2006.
This proceeding concludes the issue of interpretation. We clarify, by way of
abundant caution, that issues of a factual nature, will fall for adjudication in the
course of assessment proceedings. It was open to state legislatures to provide
uniform rates of tax on goods involved in the execution of works contracts. Many
state legislatures did so. The Karnataka legislature did so with effect from
1.4.2006, not earlier.
17 For the above reasons, we find that there is no merit in the challenge
preferred by the State of Karnataka to the impugned judgment and order of the
High Court. The appeal shall, accordingly, stand dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs.
24
CIVIL APPEAL NOS 812-817 OF 2018:
(Arising out of SLP(C )Nos 10570-10575 of 2015)
18 The High Court, by its impugned judgment and order dated 25 September
2014 dismissed the Sales Tax Revision Petitions filed under Section 65(1) of the
Karnataka Value Added Tax Act 2003 against the order dated 26 August 2013 of
the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bengaluru. While dismissing the revisions, the
High Court relied upon its earlier decision dated 29 September 2012 in M/s Durga
Projects Inc v State of Karnataka (STA 72 of 2010). The appeal filed by the State
of Karnataka (Civil Appeal No.811 of 2018) in the matter of M/s Durga Projects Inc.
has been dismissed by this Court. No separate submission has been raised in the
present appeals. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order
as to costs.
...........................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ...........................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ...........................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi;
March 06, 2018

corporate laws – insurance laws- motor accident claims = Driving licence not valid at the time of accident -expired before the accident and was not renewed within the prescribed period = the insured did not hold a valid driving licence at the time of the accident. The Tribunal absolved the insurer for that reason. The insurer was, however, directed to pay the compensation awarded to the claimant and to recover it from the owner of the offending motor cycle. - Section 15 of the Act does not empower the authorities to reject an application for renewal only on the ground that there is a break in validity or tenure of the driving licence has 5 lapsed, as in the meantime the provisions for disqualification of the driver contained in Sections 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 will not be attracted, would indisputably confer a right upon the person to get his driving licence renewed. In that view of the matter, he cannot be said to be delicensed and the same shall remain valid for a period of thirty days after its expiry.” The following conclusion has been recorded in summation in the judgment:: “(iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time. (iv) Insurance companies, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish “breach” on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof wherefor would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how the said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident.The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question, as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not 6 fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case”. - the owner did not depose in evidence and stayed away from the witness box. He produced a licence which was found to be fake. Another licence which he sought to produce had already expired before the accident and was not renewed within the prescribed period. It was renewed well after two years had expired. The appellant as owner had evidently failed to take reasonable care (proposition (vii) of Swaran Singh) since he could not have been unmindful of facts which were within his knowledge. In the circumstances, the direction by the Tribunal, confirmed by the High Court, to pay and recover cannot be faulted.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO 2103 OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP (C ) No 22630 of 2015)
SINGH RAM ..Appellant
VERSUS
NIRMALA AND ORS ..Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 Delay condoned.
2 In a claim for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act
1988, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’), Yamunanagar at
Jagadhri found that the insured did not hold a valid driving licence at the time
of the accident. The Tribunal absolved the insurer for that reason. The insurer
was, however, directed to pay the compensation awarded to the claimant and
to recover it from the owner of the offending motor cycle. The High Court dealt
with three appeals: one filed by the claimant seeking enhancement of
compensation, a second by the insurance company and the third by the owner
REPORTABLE
2
cum driver of the offending vehicle. The High Court held that in view of the
decision of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v Swaran Singh1
, the
Tribunal was correct in directing the insurer to pay the compensation and to
recover it from the owner-cum-driver of the offending vehicle. The present
appeal has been filed by the owner and driver. The only point which has been
urged in support of the appeal is that the Tribunal and the High Court erred in
fastening the liability on him by granting a right of recovery to the insurer.
3 The accident took place on 22 March 2010. The deceased Sunil Kumar
was riding a motor cycle bearing Registration No HR-04B-4673. The Tribunal
found that the accident was caused as a result of the rash and negligent act of
the appellant. This finding of fact has not been disturbed by the High Court.
The deceased was employed as a sweeper in Haryana Roadways and was
engaged on a salary of Rs 11,928 per month. The Tribunal allowed future
prospects of 50%, the deceased being just short of 36 years of age. After
deducting an amount representing one-fourth of the earnings for personal
expenses, the Tribunal applied a multiplier of 15. The total compensation was
computed at Rs 24,15,420 to which the Tribunal added an amount of Rs 20,000
under conventional heads. However, the Tribunal held that the financial
assistance which the heirs of the deceased would receive over a period of 12
years from the employee (amounting to Rs 16,16,112) would have to be
deducted from the compensation. After making the deduction, the Tribunal

1
(2004) 3 SCC 297
3
awarded an amount of Rs. 8,19,500 together with interest at 7.5 per cent per
annum from the date of the claim petition. The High Court has enhanced the
compensation to Rs 16,04,912.
4 Special Leave Petition (C ) No 7737 of 2015 filed by the claimant, which
was connected to this appeal, has been dismissed on 8 February 2018.
5 In the present appeal by the owner cum driver of the offending motor
cycle, the submission is that in view of the decision of a Bench of three learned
Judges of this Court in Swaran Singh (supra), the insurer ought not to have
been absolved. Hence the direction to the insurer to pay and recover the
compensation from the appellant should, it has been urged, be modified to
fasten a joint and several liability on the insurer.
6 Before we advert to the decision in Swaran Singh (supra) a brief
reference to the facts as they emerge from the decision of the Tribunal is
necessary. Initially before the Tribunal the appellant produced a driving licence
issued by the Motor Vehicles Department, Agra (Exh.R-1). The driving licence
was found to be fake. The statement of the Senior Assistant in the office of the
RTO, Agra was that Exh.R-1 had not been issued by the office. The Tribunal
noted that the witness had proved the report (Exh.R-2) issued by the
department and concluded that the licence was fake. Faced with this situation,
the appellant attempted to prove that he held a valid driving licence issued by
4
the licencing authority at Jagadhri to drive a motor cycle. The Tribunal rejected
the application filed by the appellant for producing additional evidence. The
Tribunal noted that even otherwise, the licence which was issued by the
licencing authority, Jagadhri for a tractor and car was valid only until 29 August
2009. The accident took place on 22 March 2010. The licence was renewed
on 28 November 2011 more than two years after it had expired. On these facts,
the Tribunal observed that on the date of the accident, the appellant was not
holding a valid and effective driving licence nor was there any evidence to
indicate that the licence was sought to be renewed as required in law, within 30
days of its expiry. The Tribunal also observed that the appellant did not hold a
valid licence to drive a motor cycle. On these grounds, the insurer was
absolved. The High Court has confirmed the direction of the Tribunal to pay
and recover.
7 In Swaran Singh (supra), this Court held that the holder of a driving
licence has a period of thirty days on its expiry, to renew it:
“45. Thus, a person whose licence is ordinarily renewed in
terms of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules framed
thereunder, despite the fact that during the interregnum
period, namely, when the accident took place and the date
of expiry of the licence, he did not have a valid licence, he
could during the prescribed period apply for renewal thereof
and could obtain the same automatically without undergoing
any further test or without having been declared unqualified
therefor. Proviso appended to Section 14 in unequivocal
terms states that the licence remains valid for a period of
thirty days from the day of its expiry.
46. Section 15 of the Act does not empower the authorities
to reject an application for renewal only on the ground that
there is a break in validity or tenure of the driving licence has 
5
lapsed, as in the meantime the provisions for disqualification
of the driver contained in Sections 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24
will not be attracted, would indisputably confer a right upon
the person to get his driving licence renewed. In that view of
the matter, he cannot be said to be delicensed and the same
shall remain valid for a period of thirty days after its expiry.”
The following conclusion has been recorded in summation in the judgment::
“(iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. disqualification of
the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained
in sub-section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to
have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by
the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or
disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time,
are not in themselves defences available to the insurer
against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its
liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the
insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise
reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the
policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or
one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time.
(iv) Insurance companies, however, with a view to avoid
their liability must not only establish the available defence(s)
raised in the said proceedings but must also establish
“breach” on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden
of proof wherefor would be on them.
(v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how the
said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same
would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
case.
(vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the
part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding
holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to
drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be
allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the
said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence
is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to
the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the
policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and
the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences
available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act.
(vii) The question, as to whether the owner has taken
reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence
produced by the driver (a fake one or otherwise), does not 
6
fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be
determined in each case”.
8 In the present case it is necessary to note, as observed by the Tribunal,
that the owner did not depose in evidence and stayed away from the witness
box. He produced a licence which was found to be fake. Another licence which
he sought to produce had already expired before the accident and was not
renewed within the prescribed period. It was renewed well after two years had
expired. The appellant as owner had evidently failed to take reasonable care
(proposition (vii) of Swaran Singh) since he could not have been unmindful of
facts which were within his knowledge.
9 In the circumstances, the direction by the Tribunal, confirmed by the High
Court, to pay and recover cannot be faulted. The appeal is, accordingly,
dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
...........................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ...........................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ...........................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi;
March 06, 2018

corporate laws – insurance laws- motor accident claims = Disability was not permanent - reduced the compensation = The Doctor admitted that the disability certificate indicated a tick mark on the word ‘permanent’ by mistake. He further stated that the disability in the present case was likely to improve. we find merit in the contention that the claim for compensation on the basis that the disability was permanent was clearly not established. There was no basis to award an amount of Rs. 20,75,700/-. The Tribunal has awarded an amount of Rs. 2,09,622/- towards medical expenses. We accept the figure of an annual loss of income of Rs. 79,877/-. The disability being of a temporary nature, we award compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs towards loss of income. We allow compensation of Rs. 2 lakhs towards trauma, pain and suffering. In addition, the claimant is entitled to medical expenses of Rs. 2,09,622. We are of the view that the endsof justice would be met by directing a payment of Rs. 9,10,000/- . The claimant shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of the filing of the petition. The insurer shall deposit the compensation along with interest before the Tribunal within twelve weeks which shall be disbursed to the claimant on proper identification.

1
REPORTABLE
 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 7181 OF 2015
ICICI LOMBARD GENERAL INSURANCE .....APPELLANT
CO. LTD.

 Versus
AJAY KUMAR MOHANTY & ANR. .....RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL No. 1879 OF 2016
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J

1 In a claim for compensation under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles
Act, arising out of a disability sustained by the claimant as a result of a motor
accident, the Tribunal awarded an amount of Rs. 22,85,322/-. The High Court
in an appeal filed by the insurer reduced the compensation to Rs. 12,00,000/-
2
Interest was reduced from 7.5 per cent per annum to 7.0 per cent. The only
reasoning contained in support of the order of the High Court reads as
follows:
“Considering the grounds taken in appeal and the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the parties and keeping in view
the findings of the learned Tribunal given in the impugned award
with regard to the quantum of compensation amount awarded
and the basis on which the same has been arrived at, I feel, the
interest of justice would be best served, if the awarded
compensation amount of Rs. 22,85,322/- is modified and
reduced to Rs. 12,00,000/-. The award of interst @ 7.5% per
annum is also modified and reduced to 7% only. Accordingly, the
claimant is entitled to the modified compensation amount of Rs.
12,00,000/- along with interest @ 7% per annum from the date of
filing of the Claim application. The impugned award is modified
to the said extent.”
2 Ex-facie, there has been no application of mind by the High Court to the
evidence on the record and to the relevant facts and circumstances. The
above extract cannot be regarded as the expression of a reasoned view.
Ordinarily, we would have remitted the case back to the High Court for a fresh
determination. However, we are inclined not to do so in order to prevent a
miscarriage of justice which delay in itself is likely to occasion. The accident
took place on 25 April 2009 when the appellant was 32 years of age. The
judgment of the Tribunal was rendered on 26 February 2014. The High Court
delivered its judgment on 15 April 2015. Leave was granted by this Court on 25
February 2016. Hence, we have heard the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the contesting parties on merits and proceed to resolve the dispute
so as to render finality to the case.
3
3 The accident in question took place on 25 April 2009 when the claimant
was proceeding from Keonjhar to Badbil. The vehicle fell over a bridge of NH
215. The claimant was rescued by the villagers and was shifted to hospital for
treatment. He suffered from a fracture to the left elbow and femur. The Tribunal
entered a finding of fact that the evidence of the claimant remained unshaken
and that the accident was caused by the rash and negligent act of the driver of
the vehicle. The vehicle was insured with ICICI Lombard General Insurance
Company Ltd. (the insurer).
4 While assessing the claim for compensation, the Tribunal noted the
evidence of PW2, the Doctor who had issued a disability certificate to the
claimant. The Doctor opined that the disability was temporary and not
permanent. It appears that an admission was elicited during the course of the
cross-examination to the effect that he had made certain interpolations in the
disability certificate without the consent or knowledge of the CDMO. The
Tribunal held that whether the disability was permanent or temporary, it was
duty bound to make an assessment. From the income tax returns of the
claimant for 2007, 2008 and 2009, the Tribunal observed that his annual
income would work out to Rs. 1,45,231/-. The Tribunal thereafter observed that
the annual income was Rs. 2,62,372/-. The Tribunal however accepted the
evidence of the claimant which placed his income at a lower amount of Rs.
2,22,000/- annually on the basis of the evidence of the claimant that as a BClass
contractor, he was earning Rs. 18,500/- per month. The Tribunal applied
4
a multiplier of 17 per cent. Treating the disability to be 55 per cent, on the basis
of the certificate of the District Medical Board, Bhadrak, the Tribunal computed
the compensation at Rs. 20,75,700/-. In addition, an amount of Rs. 2,09,622/-
was awarded on account of medical expenses. A total quantum of Rs.
22,85,322/- was awarded.
5 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the insurer submits that the
order of the Tribunal is contradictory and contrary to the weight of the
evidence. The error has been compounded by the failure of the High Court to
attribute reasons. Counsel submits that the Tribunal proceeded on the
manifestly erroneous basis that the claimant suffered a permanent disability. It
was urged that the evidence of PW 2, the doctor, indicates that the disability
certificate was unauthorizedly interpolated by him. The admissions of the
doctor in the course of his evidence that the injury was of a temporary nature
and was likely to improve have been ignored. Moreover, it has been submitted
that the judgment of the Tribunal, especially paragraph 10, would indicate that
the Tribunal has committed serious and apparent errors of computation and
there is an internal inconsistency in its reasoning.
6 On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the claimant
submits that while PW 2 admits having interpolated the disability certificate,
this should in fact weigh in favour of the claimant as the nature of the
interpolation would indicate. Like the insurer, the claimant also has a
5
grievance in regard to the fact that the order of the High Court is not reasoned.
However, what the claimant submits is that there was no justification for the
High Court to reduce the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal.
7 On perusing the order of the Tribunal, we find merit in the contention of
the insurer that while calculating the income in paragraph 10 of its order, the
Tribunal has committed an error of computation. The Tribunal has on the basis
of the income tax returns for 2007, 2008 and 2009 arrived at an average
income of Rs. 1,45,231/-. However, the Tribunal has thereafter noted that the
average income comes to Rs. 2,62,372/-. Ultimately, the Tribunal proceeds on
the annual income of Rs. 2,22,000/- on the basis of the testimony of the
claimant that he was earning Rs. 18,500/- per month. This is contradictory. In
our view, on the basis of the finding of the Tribunal that the average income of
the claimant for the previous three years was Rs. 1,45,231/-, it would be
necessary to take into account the evidence of PW2 that the disability is to the
extent of 55 per cent. In other words, the loss of earning as a result of the
aforesaid disability would work out to Rs. 79,877/- per year.
8 In arriving at the quantification of compensation, we must be guided by
the well-settled principle that compensation can be granted both on account of
permanent disability as well as loss of future earnings, because one head
relates to the impairment of the person’s capacity and the other to the sphere
of pain and suffering on account of loss of enjoyment of life by the person
himself.
6
9 In Sri Laxman @ Laxman Mourya v Divisional Manager, Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd1
, this Court held thus:
“The ratio of the above noted judgments is that if the victim of an
accident suffers permanent or temporary disability, then efforts
should always be made to award adequate compensation not
only for the physical injury and treatment, but also for the pain,
suffering and trauma caused due to accident, loss of earnings
and victim’s inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities,
which he would have enjoyed but for the disability caused due to
the accident.”

In Govind Yadav v New India Insurance Company Limited2
, this Court after
referring to the pronouncements in R.D. Hattangadi v Pest Control (India)
(P) Ltd.3
 , Nizam’s Institute of Medical Sciences v Prasanth S. Dhananka4
,
Reshma Kumari v Madam Mohan5
, Arvind Kumar Mishra v New India
Assurance Co. Ltd.6
, Raj Kumar v Ajay Kumar7
 held thus:
“18. In our view, the principles laid down in Arvind Kumar
Mishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and Raj Kumar v. Ajay
Kumar must be followed by all the Tribunals and the High Courts
in determining the quantum of compensation payable to the
victims of accident, who are disabled either permanently or
temporarily. If the victim of the accident suffers permanent
disability, then efforts should always be made to award adequate
compensation not only for the physical injury and treatment, but
also for the loss of earning and his inability to lead a normal life
and enjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the
disability caused due to the accident.” (Id at page 693)
1 2011 (12) SCALE 658
2 (2011) 10 SCC 683
3 (1951) 1 SCC 551
4 (2009) 6 SCC 1
5 (2009) 13 SCC 422
6 (2010) 10 SCC 254
7 (2011) 1 SCC 343
7
These principles were reiterated in a judgment delivered by one of us (Justice
Dipak Misra, as the learned Chief Justice then was) in Subulaxmi v MD Tamil
Nadu State Transport Corporation8
.
10 In the present case, the evidence of PW2 Dr Umakanta Jena indicates
that he had initially, before issuing the disability certificate, examined the
shoulder joint, elbow joint and left femur as per the discharge certificate. The
discharge certificate indicated that the injuries sustained were grievous in
nature. The Doctor initially placed a tick mark over the word ‘permanent’.
However, subsequently he made an interpolation by cutting the word
‘permanent’ and “not likely to improve”. The evidence of the Doctor is
reproduced below, insofar as it is material:
“4) The disability is temporary but not permanent. The disability
is likely to improve. The disability certificate is the original one.
By mistake, I gave a tick mark on the word “permanent”. Per day
about one hundred disability certificates are issued. So, I
committed this wrong. I have not mentioned which documents I
verified prior to issuance of this disability certificate. There is
nothing in the certificate to show that there was nailing.
Particularly in this case, the disability may improve. Any fracture
of extremity will cause disability. I cannot give any authority to
the opinion of my above sentence.
5) It is not a fact that the percentage of disability has been made
by me being gained over by the injured and that there was no
disability. It is not a fact that being gained over by the injured I
gave this disability certificate.
TO COURT:-
Q. No. 1:- Whether the certificate issued by you is
creating confusion?
Ans; Yes.
Q. No. 2: Whether you will be paid T.A. and D.A.
from State Exchequer for your mistake?
Ans:, No, I should be paid.
8 (2012) 10 SCC 177
8
Q. No. 3:- Whether my attendance in the court is a
govt. duty or C.L.?
Ans: For my mistake I should take C.L.
Q. No. 4:- Can you explain why you interpolated
the certificate which was signed by 4
doctors including CDMO, Bhadrak?
Ans: I cannot explain.
Q. No. 5:- Was not it desirable to obtain the
consent of other three doctors before
cutting and putting tick mark and making
interpolation on an already prepared
public document?
Ans: I should have obtained the consent and
signature of all other signatories before
interpolating the document.”
11 The doctor has admitted to having made an interpolation in the disability
certificate. The above evidence indicates that the disability is temporary and
not permanent. The Doctor admitted that the disability certificate indicated a
tick mark on the word ‘permanent’ by mistake. He further stated that the
disability in the present case was likely to improve.
12 Having regard to all these facts and circumstances, we find merit in the
contention that the claim for compensation on the basis that the disability was
permanent was clearly not established. There was no basis to award an
amount of Rs. 20,75,700/-. The Tribunal has awarded an amount of Rs.
2,09,622/- towards medical expenses. We accept the figure of an annual loss
of income of Rs. 79,877/-. The disability being of a temporary nature, we award
compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs towards loss of income. We allow compensation
of Rs. 2 lakhs towards trauma, pain and suffering. In addition, the claimant is
entitled to medical expenses of Rs. 2,09,622. We are of the view that the ends
9
of justice would be met by directing a payment of Rs. 9,10,000/- . The claimant
shall be entitled to interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of
the filing of the petition. The insurer shall deposit the compensation along with
interest before the Tribunal within twelve weeks which shall be disbursed to the
claimant on proper identification.
13 For the above reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment and order
of the High Court. Both the appeals are disposed of in terms of the directions
issued above. There shall be no order as to costs.
............................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ……......................................
...J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]

….............................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi
March 06, 2018

corporate laws - insurance laws- motor accident claims = lost complete sensation below the abdomen. - considered as 100% disability - As a result of the multiple fractures sustained by him, the appellant has lost complete sensation below the abdomen. Evidently he cannot work any more as load man. In these circumstances, the assessment of disability at 70 per cent is incorrect. On a realistic view of the matter, the nature of the disability must be regarded as being complete. In the circumstances, we find no reason or justification for the deduction of an amount of Rs 2,91,600 by the Tribunal (Rs 9,72,000 minus Rs 6,80,400). The amount so deducted must be restored and is rounded off to Rs 3,00,000. Moreover we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of the claim petition. The appeal is accordingly allowed by enhancing the compensation granted by the Tribunal by an amount of Rs 3,00,000. The appellant would be entitled to interest @ 9 per cent per annum, on the total amount of compensation

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO 3152 OF 2017
S. THANGARAJ ..Appellant
VERSUS
NATIONAL INSURANCE CO. LTD. REP.BY
THE BRANCH MANAGER ..Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J
1 Delay condoned.
2 The claim arises out of a disability sustained as a result of a motor
accident. The Tribunal granted compensation to the claimant in the amount of
Rs 11,27,359 together with interest at 12 per cent per annum. The High Court
has simply reduced the interest awarded by the Tribunal to 7.5 per cent per
annum while maintaining the award of compensation. The claimant is in appeal.
REPORTABLE
2
3 The accident took place on 1 August 2004. The appellant was 26 years
old at the time of the accident. The accident took place when the appellant was
a pillion rider on a motor cycle ridden by one Edwin. As the motor cycle was
proceeding from Marthandam, a lorry bearing Registration No.TN 69 Z 2979
dashed against it. The lorry thereafter dashed against an electric pole and
collided with a residential property resulting in the death of an occupant of the
house. The appellant sustained serious injuries in the accident. The injuries
have been described in the evidence of PW 4, the doctor at the hospital where
the appellant was treated. The appellant sustained a fracture in his spinal cord,
right leg and right hip bone. As a result of the accident the appellant has no
sensation or movement in his legs. The Tribunal accepted the evidence of PW
4 and observed thus:
“Moreover PW 4 the doctor has stated in his evidence that
below the abdomen of the petitioner, there is no movement
and sensation in two legs…”
The Tribunal determined the disability at 70%, on the basis of medical opinion.
The Tribunal computed the compensation payable to the appellant on account
of the loss of income occasioned by the disability at Rs 9,72,000. However, on
the basis of the opinion of the doctor that the disability was to the extent of 70
per cent, the net amount was determined at Rs 6,80,400. After taking into
account the medical and other expenses, the Tribunal awarded a total
compensation of Rs 11,27,359 together with interest of 12 per cent per annum. 
3
4 Before the High Court, the insurer filed an appeal against the award of
the Tribunal. The appellant filed cross objections. The High Court has reduced
the interest component from 12 per cent per annum to 7.5 per cent per annum.
5 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that the
High Court has not assessed the compensation in a correct manner. There
was – it has been urged – no justification to compute the disability at 70 per
cent. The appellant was at the relevant time a load man engaged by a building
contractor. The nature of the disability involves a complete loss of sensation in
both the legs. Hence, it would not be possible for him to work as a load man.
Moreover it was urged that there was no justification to reduce the award of
interest to 7.5 per cent per annum and the award of the Tribunal on interest
should be maintained.
6 On the other hand it has been urged on behalf of the insurer that the High
Court was justified in maintaining the award of compensation since it was urged
on behalf of the appellant-claimant at the hearing before the High Court that the
Tribunal had granted just and reasonable compensation. Learned counsel
supported the judgment of the High Court.
7 Having perused the order passed by the High Court, we are not in
agreement with the submission of the insurer that there was a concession on
the part of the appellant before the High Court which must bind him. The
4
statement made by counsel for the appellant before the High Court was on
whether the Tribunal had granted just and reasonable compensation. Whether
in fact the compensation which has been granted is just and reasonable cannot
hence be construed as a matter of concession and it would not preclude the
appellant from raising a contest in these proceedings.
8 On perusing the record it is evident that the injuries sustained by the
appellant are indeed of a serious nature. As a result of the multiple fractures
sustained by him, the appellant has lost complete sensation below the
abdomen. Evidently he cannot work any more as load man. In these
circumstances, the assessment of disability at 70 per cent is incorrect. On a
realistic view of the matter, the nature of the disability must be regarded as
being complete. In the circumstances, we find no reason or justification for the
deduction of an amount of Rs 2,91,600 by the Tribunal (Rs 9,72,000 minus Rs
6,80,400). The amount so deducted must be restored and is rounded off to Rs
3,00,000. Moreover we are of the view that the appellant is entitled to interest
at the rate of 9 per cent per annum from the date of the claim petition.
9 The appeal is accordingly allowed by enhancing the compensation
granted by the Tribunal by an amount of Rs 3,00,000. The appellant would be
entitled to interest @ 9 per cent per annum, on the total amount of
compensation (instead and in substitution of 7.5% per annum awarded by the
5
High Court). The differential amount shall be paid over to the appellant within a
period of eight weeks from today. There shall be no order as to costs.
...........................................CJI
 [DIPAK MISRA]
 ...........................................J
 [A M KHANWILKAR]
 ...........................................J
 [Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD]
New Delhi;
March 06, 2018