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Saturday, August 6, 2016

mere withholding of documentary evidence by a party is not enough to draw adverse inference against him. The other party must ask the party in possession of such evidence to produce the same, and in case the party in possession does not produce it, adverse inference may be drawn: “It is true that the defendant-respondent also did not call upon the plaintiff-appellant to produce the documents whose existence was admitted by one or the other witness of the plaintiff and that therefore, strictly speaking, no inference adverse to the plaintiff can be drawn from his non-producing the list of documents. The Court may not be in a position to conclude from such omission that those documents would have directly established the case for the respondent. But it can take into consideration in weighing the evidence or any direct inferences from established facts that the documents might have favoured the respondent case.”

PETITIONER:
MAHANT SHRI SRINIVASA RAMANUJ DAS

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
SURAJNARAYAN DASS & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:
06/05/1966

BENCH:
DAYAL, RAGHUBAR
BENCH:
DAYAL, RAGHUBAR
SARKAR, A.K. (CJ)
HIDAYATULLAH, M.
BACHAWAT, R.S.
SHELAT, J.M.

CITATION:
 1967 AIR  256  1966 SCR  436


ACT:
Orissa Hindu  Religious Endowments Act, 1939 (Orissa  4  of
1939), Math, Characteristics of-Distinction between  public
and private trust-Math, if governed by Act-Onus of proof  of
showing that Math is outside Act-Gazetteer-Statements  in-If
evidence



HEADNOTE:
The Commissioner of Hindu Religious Endowments, Orissa, de-
manded contribution  under  s. 49 of  the  Hindu  Religious
Endowments  Act and  took steps to  enforce  certain  other
provisions  of the Act against the appellants and  certain
properties.  These properties, the appellant.% claimed, were
not  math as defined in the Act and the public had  no free
access to its premises and had no right of entry or  worship
of the deity installed therein. The Commissioner held that
the properties were math as defined in the Act and that the
properties constituted a 'religious endowment' to which the
Act  applied.  Thereafter, the appellants instituted a suit
and  prayed  for  setting  aside  of  the  decision  of the
Commissioner  and  for a declaration that the  Act  did not
apply to the properties in suit.  The trial Court  dismissed
the  suit, which on appeal was confirmed by the High  Court.
In appeal by special leave.
HELD:-The appeal must be dismissed.
(1)An  institution comes within the definition of 'Math'  if
it  satisfies three conditions (i) that the  institution  be
for  the  promotion of. the Hindu religion; (ii)that  it  be
presided over by a person whose duty is to engage himself in
spiritual  service  or who exercises or claims to  exercise
spiritual head ship over a body of disciples; and (iii) that
the  office of such person devolves in accordance  with the
directions of the founder of the institution or is regulated
by usage. [441E]
There  was  ample evidence on the record to  show  that the
property  was presided over by the Mahant, that the  Mahant
exercised  spiritual headship over the disciples,  and that
the succession to the office of the Mahant was regulated  by
the  usage of the institution. There could be no  question
that such an institution must have been for the promotion of
the Hindu religion. [441F]
Religious  endowment includes the premises of the Math.  If
the Premises of the property had been used both for  secular
purposes  and  for religious purposes, it according  to the
explanation to sub-s. (12) of S. 6, shall be deemed to be  a
religious endowment and its administration shall be governed
by the provisions of the Act.  This makes it clear that the
premises  of the math is not only deemed to be a  religious
endowment, but is deemed to be a Hindu Public religious en-
dowment to which the Act applies, as the provisions of the
Act   govern  its  administration.   It follows   that  an
institution which comes within the definition of math  under
the  Act,  ipso facto, comes within  the  expression  'Hindu
public religious endowment' and therefore become subject  to
the provisions of the Act. [441H-442B]
437
The definition of 'temple' requires that the place would  be
a  temple  if  it be used as a place  of  public  religious
worship.  There is no requirement that an institution to  be
a math must be a public institution for the promotion of the
Hindu  religion.   The use of the  word  'public'  was not
necessary  in  connection  with an  institution  for such
promotion of the Hindu religion as any institution for such
promotion of the Hindu religion must be of a public  nature.
the  object being to promote Hindu religion, there would  be
no  point  in  shutting the benefit of the  institution  to
anyone among the Hindus. [442C-D]
The  distinction between a public trust and a private  trust
is,   broadly speaking,  that in  a public trust the
beneficiaries of the trust are the people in general or some
section of the people, while in the case of a private  trust
the  beneficiaries are an ascertained body of persons. The
beneficiaries of a math are the members of the fraternity to
which the math belongs and the persons of the faith to which
the  spiritual head of the math  belongs,  and constitute,
therefore,  at least a section of the public.  Maths,  in
general, consequently, are public maths. [442E-F]
[QUAERE:-Whether there can be a private math or not?]
(2)The onus was initially on the  appellant-plaintiff to
show  that the order of the Commissioner was wrong and this
he could only show by establishing prima facie that the Math
was  not a math as defined in the Act and that the  various
properties were not endowed properties. [443H]
(3)  The gazetteer could le consulted on matters  of  public
history. [447B]
(4)  The documentary evidence on the record did not  support
the case  of  the appellant, but showed that the  Properties
were those of the   math.



JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION:- Civil Appeal No. 205 of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree  dated
November  30, 1961 of the Orissa High Court in First  Appeal
No. 63 of 1957.
A. K. Sen and P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant.
Niren  de, Addl.  Solicitor-General, Dipak  Datta  Chaudhuri
and R. N. Sachthey, for respondent No. 2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Raghubar Dayal, J. This appeal, by special leave, is against
the judgment and decree of the Orissa High Court, confirming
the judgment and decree of the Additional Subordinate Judge,
Puri.  dismissing  the suit instituted by  Mahant  Gadadhar
Ramanuj Das, represented after his death by Mahant  Srinivas
Ramanuj Das, for the setting aside of the decision  of the
Commissioner  of  Endowments dated July 20, 1946,  under  s.
64(1)  of  the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments  Act, 1939
(Act  4 of  1939), hereinafter called the Act, and  for  a
declaration  that  the Act did not apply to  the  properties
described in Schedules Ka, Kha and Ga of the plaint.
The allegations in the plaint are as, follows. The premises
on  which the residential quarters of the plaintiff  existed
was said to
438
be  popularly  known as (i) Srinivas  Kote;  (ii)  Rajagopal
Math;  and (iii) Emar Math, according to. the names  of the
different   ancestors  of  the plaintiff,   Srinivasachari,
Rajagopalachari and Embarachari.  It was alleged that  these
premises,  though  known as Emar Math, was not a  'math'  as
defined in the Act.  The public had no free access  to its
premises  and had no right of entry or worship of the  deity
installed  therein.   Embarachari  and his  ancestors were
alleged to  be grahasts.  His successors to the  Emar Math
were  celibate.  Srinivasachari  was  the  grand-father  of
Embarachari.   It is alleged that he acquired a portion  of
the present site of the plaintiff's residential quarters and
built  his residence there and installed therein his  family
deity Sri Raghunathji for his own spiritual benefit and the
spiritual benefit of his family members and that Embarachari
acquired  a large Plot of land adjacent to Srinivas Math  as
an  absolute  gift and constructed buildings  thereon. The
buildings  therefore  became popularly known as Emar  Math,
although Embarachari was a married man and was living  there
with  his  wife and children with  the private  deity Sri
Raghunathji.
The  plaintiff alleged that the  properties  described  in
Schedule  Ka  of the plaint were  his  personal properties,
those in Schedule Ka-1 as acquired through absolute gifts to
the  plaintiff or his ancestors and those in Ka-2 as  gifted
to  or purchased by the plaintiff or his  predecessors and
that they were wrongly recorded in the settlement papers  in
the  name of the plaintiff as marfatdar of  Lord  Jagannath.
The  properties in  Schedule Kha are alleged  to  be  Amrit
Manohi properties of Lord Jagannath held by the plaintiff as
marfatdar  and to have been acquired either by purchase  or
'krayadan'  or by way of gift subject to the charge of some
offering  to Lord Jagannath.  The properties in Schedule  Ga
were  alleged to be owned and possessed by the plaintiff  as
marfatdar  of various private deities. It was alleged that
none  of  the  properties in  these  schedules was  however
dedicated to the public and that the public had no  interest
in  or right  to any of  the  properties.   The  properties
therefore  did not constitute 'Public religious endowments'
within the meaning of the Act which, accordingly, could not
apply to them.
The  Commissioner  of Hindu  Religious Endowments,  Orissa,
hereinafter  called the Commissioner. demanded contribution
under  S.  49 of the Act and took steps to  enforce  certain
other  provisions of the Act against the plaintiff  and the
properties in suit.  This led the plaintiff to formally ask
for a decision under S. 64(1) of the Act.  The Commissioner
decided against him on July 20, 1946 and held that the Emar
Math  was  a  'math'  as defined in the Act  and  that the
properties constituted a 'religious endowment' to which the
Act applied.  Thereafter the plaintiff instituted this suit
and  prayed  for the setting aside of the  decision  of the
Commissioner  and  for a declaration that the  Act  did not
apply to the properties in suit.
439
The  Commissioner,  defendant  No.  2, contested  the suit
asserting  that the properties in suit were public  debonair
properties  and were  public endowments to  which  the Act
applied.  It was further contended that the premises of Emar
Math was a 'math' as defined in the Act and the public had a
right  to  go there and had been actually going there from
time immemorial.
The  trial Court accepted the contentions of  the  defendant
Commissioner  and  dismissed the suit. The High  Court,  on
appeal by  the plaintiff, agreed with the findings  of the
trial Court and accordingly dismissed the appeal.
Two  main  contentions have been raised before us.   One  is
that  the  Emar Math in suit is not a public math  and that
therefore  the Act does not apply to it.  The other is that
the properties in Schedule Ka were the personal property  of
the appellant-plaintiff and that the properties in schedules
Kha   and  Ga  were  private  debottar properties  of the
plaintiff.   Before  dealing with the  contentions,  we may
refer to the object and the relevant provisions of the Act.
The Act was enacted for the better administration and gover-
nance  of  certain Hindu Religious Endowments. Section  2,
sub-s. (a), states that  the  Act applies,   save  as
thereinafter   provided,  to  all  Hindu  public   religious
endowments which, according to the Explanation to that sub-
section,  do not include Jain religious endowments.   'Math'
is defined in sub-s. (7) of s. 6 as:-
     "'   math'  means an  institution   for the
     promotion of the Hindu religion presided over
     by a person whose duty is to engage himself in
     spiritual service or who exercises or  claims
     to exercise spiritual headships over a body of
     disciples and  succession  to  whose   office
     devolves in accordance with the directions  of
     the founder of the institution or is regulated
     by  usage;  and includes places  of  religious
     worship other than a temple and also places of
     instruction  or places for the maintenance  of
     vidyarthies or places for rendering charitable
     or religious services in general which are  or
     may be appurtenant to such institution."
Sub-s. (10) of s. 6 defines the expression  'person  having
interest' to mean, in the case of a math, a disciple of the
math  or a person of the religious persuasion to  which the
math  belongs. Sub-s. (12) of  s.  6 defines  'religious
endowment' or 'endowment' as meaning:-
     "all  property  belonging to,  or  given  or
     endowed  for 'the support of maths or  temples
     or  for  the  performance of  any service  or
     charity  connected  therewith whether  or not
     such  maths  or  temples be in  ruins  or the
     worship in   connection   with  them  is
     discontinued either temporarily or permanently
     and   includes  the  premises  of  maths  or
     temples."
     440
     The explanation thereto reads:-
     "Where an endowment has been made or  property
     given for the support of an institution  which
     is  partly  of  a religious and  partly  of  a
     secular  character or for the  performance  of
     any service or charity connected therewith, or
     where  an endowment made or property given  is
     appropriated partly to religious and partly to
     secular  uses, such endowment or property  or
     the  income therefrom shall be deemed to be  a
     religious endowment  and its  administration
     shall  be governed by the provisions  of this
     Act."
     According to sub-s. (13) of s. 6, 'temple'  is
     defined as follows:-
     "'temple'  means  a   place,   by   whatever
     designation  known, used as a place of  public
     religious worship and dedicated to, or for the
     benefit of, or used as of right by, the  Hindu
     community, or any section thereof, as a  place
     of  religious  worship and also  includes any
     cultural institution  or mandab or  library
     connected  with such  a place of   public
     religious worship."
General superintendence of all religious endowments  vested
in  the Commissioner under s. 11 of the Act.  Clause (b)  of
sub-s. (1) of s. 12 requires the Commissioner to maintain  a
register  for every math or temple and all title  deeds and
other documents relating thereto.  Sub-s. (2) provides that
the  register shall be prepared, verified and signed by the
trustee of the math or temple or by his authorised agent and
submitted  by  him to the Commissioner within such  period
after  the commencement of the Act as the  Commissioner may
fix.   Sub-s. (3) authorises the Commissioner to  make such
enquiry as he may consider necessary and to direct that the
register  be  approved with such alterations,  omissions  or
additions  as he thinks fit to order.  Section 13  requires
the annual verification of the entries in this register.
Section 46 reads:-
     "The  trustee of a math or temple may, out  of
     the  funds  of the endowments in his  charge,
     after  satisfying adequately the purposes  of
     the    endowments,   incur   expenditure  on
     arrangements  for securing the health,  safety
   or convenience  of  disciples,  pilg
rims   or
     worshippers resorting to such math or temple:-
     Provided that  the  Commissioner  may, for
     reasons  to be setforth in  writing,  restrict
     and  place under such control as he may  think
     fit  the exercise  by  the  trustee  of his
     discretion under this section."
Section 49  provides that every math or  temple  and  every
specific  endowment attached to a math or temple  shall pay
annually  contributions at specified rates for meeting the
expenses of the Commissioner when the annual income  exceeds
a specified amount.
441
Under  s.  51(1), the amount of contributions payable  by  a
math  under s. 49 was to be assessed on and notified to the
trustee of the math, temple or specified endowment concerned
in  the prescribed manner.  The trustee can object  to the
assessment  and has  to  pay  such  amount  as be  finally
determined by the Commissioner on considering the objection.
Section 64 reads:-
     "(1)  If any dispute arises as to whether  an
     institution is a math or temple as defined  in
     this  Act or whether a temple is an  excepted
     temple,  such dispute shall be decided by the
     Commissioner.
     (2)Any  person  affected by a  decision  under
     subsection (1) may, within one year, institute
     a suit  in the Court to modify or  set  aside
     such  decisions; but subject to the result  of
     such suit, the order of the Commissioner shall
     be final."
Before we deal with the contention about the Emar Math being
not  a public math, we may first consider what the  Commis-
sioner had  to  do  under  s. 64(1) of  the Act. The
Commissioner  had to decide under that sub-section  whether
the  Emar  Math was a math as defined in the Act.   He held
that  it was and we have to see whether he was right  in  so
doing.
An  institution comes within such  a definition  if  it
satisfies three conditions:- (i) that the institution be for
the  promotion of  the Hindu religion;  (ii) that  it  be
presided over by a person whose duty is to engage himself in
spiritual  service  or who exercises or claims to  exercise
spiritual headship over a body of disciples; and (iii) that
the  office of such person devolves in accordance  with the
directions of the founder of the institution or is regulated
by usage.
There is ample evidence on the record to show that the Emar
Math  was  presided  over by the  Mahant,  that the  Mahant
exercised  spiritual headship over the disciples,  and that
the succession to the office of the Mahant was regulated  by
the  usage of the institution. There could be no  question
that such an institution must have been for the promotion of
the  Hindu  religion.  It was for such an  object  that one
would have a body of disciples. It is in evidence that the
Mahant used to preach and had a large number  of  disciples
who  were  attracted  by  the  high  reputation the  Mahant
enjoyed.   It  is said that Embarachari was  regarded with
great  respect in his times and that it was on account  of
such  respect  that the gift of the land  evidenced  by the
Deed,  Exhibit 110, executed sometime is 1767, was  made  in
his favour.
It is not disputed for the appellant that the institution is
a math. What is disputed is that it is not a public math as
required  by  the  Act.  The  premises of  the  Emar Math
constituted  a religious  endowment,  which  includes the
premises of maths or temples.
442
Further, if the premises of the Emar Math-had been used both
for  secular  purposes and  for  religious  purposes, it,
according  to the explanation to sub-s. (12) of s. 6,  shall
be deemed to be a religious endowment and its administration
shall be governed by the provisions of the Act. This  makes
it clear that the premises of the Math is not only deemed to
be a religious endowment, but is deemed to be a Hindu public
religious  endowment  to  which the  Act  applies,  as the
provisions of the Act govern its administration.  It follows
that  an  institution which comes within the  definition  of
'math' under the Act, ipso facto comes within the expression
'Hindu public religious endowment' and  therefore  becomes
subject to the provisions of the Act.
In this connection, reference may be made to the  definition
of 'temple'.  While the definition of 'temple' requires that
the  place  would be a temple if it be used as a  place  of
public religious worship, there is no requirement  that  an
institution  to be a math must be a public  institution for
the  promotion of the Hindu religion.  The use of  the word
'public' was not necessary in connection with an institution
for  the promotion of the Hindu religion as any institution
for such promotion of the Hindu religion must be of a public
nature; the object being to promote Hindu  religion,  there
would be no point in shutting the benefit of the institution
to anyone among the Hindus.
The  distinction between a public trust and a private  trust
is,   broadly speaking,  that in  a public trust the
beneficiaries of the trust are the people in general or some
section of the people, while in the case of a private  trust
the  beneficiaries are an ascertained body of persons. The
beneficiaries of a math are the members of the fraternity to
which the math belongs and the persons of the faith to which
the  spiritual head  of the math  belongs,  and  constitute
therefore  at  least  a section of the public.  Maths,  in
general, consequently, are public maths.  We say nothing  as
to  whether there can be a private math or not. Mukherje  a
states at p. 390, in his 'Law of Endowment', 1st Edition:-
     "By   private  math  should  be  meant   those
     institutions where the head or superior  holds
     the property not on behalf of an indeterminate
     class  of persons or a section of the  public
     but  for a determinate body  of individuals,
     viz.,   the  family  or  descendants  of the
     grantor."
In the present case, there is no evidence as to who actually
founded the Math by granting the property to the  spiritual
preceptor.   The earliest evidence on the record is of year
1767 when a piece of land was gifted to Emar Gosain on which
a portion of the present Math stands.  However, there is  no
evidence, whoever the founder be, that any particular family
is  the only body of persons who is interested in the  Math.
The  spiritual family of the preceptor consisting  of his
disciples and the disciples in succession, cannot be  deemed
to be such a private family for whose benefit
443
the Math is founded and on that account the Math be called a
private Math. The body of disciples and  the  disciples'
disciples  etc., is a very unascertainable body.   The Emar
Math is therefore not such a private math.
Much  has been said on either side with respect to the onus
in connection with the Math being public or not.  Onus loses
its importance when the parties have led evidence sufficient
to determine the matter' in dispute.  The High Court  agreed
with  the  trial Court that the onus was on  the  plaintiff-
appellant to establish that the institution was the  private
property  of  the  Mahant.  It is said in  para 10  of its
judgment  that the  initial  burden  of  showing  that the
Commissioner's decision was wrong was on the plaintiff and
that apart from the appellant's position as plaintiff he had
a   heavy  burden  to  establish  affirmatively  that the
institution was the private property of the Mahant.
It is contended for the appellant that the initial onus lay
on the defendant-respondent to establish that the Math was a
public math.  Reliance is placed on several cases of  which
reference  may be made to Parma Nand v. Nihal Chand(1)  in
which  the  Privy Council approved of the view of  the High
Court  that  it was for the defendants to  prove  that the
plaintiff  who was admittedly in possession of the  property
held  it  on  a trust created for a  public  purpose  of  a
charitable  and religious nature.  The application was made
to  the District Judge by some representatives of the  Hindu
public alleging  that the Baghichi Thakaran  was  a  public
endowment for religious and charitable purposes, and calling
upon Mahant Narain Das to furnish details of the nature and
purposes of the trust. Narain Das then instituted the suit
which ultimately went to the Privy Council.
Section 5(3), the Charitable and Religious Trusts Act, 1920
(Act 14 of 1920) provides for the stay of proceedings before
the  Judge under s. 3 of that Act, in order that the  person
denying the public nature of the trust may institute a suit
for a declaration that the property was not trust  property.
There was no decision of any binding nature by the Court  or
by  any authority which was to be avoided by  the  plaintiff
instituting  a suit for a declaration that the property was
not  trust  property. In the present case  the  suit was
instituted  in pursuance  of  s. 64(2) of  the  Act  which
provides  that any person affected by a decision  under its
sub-s. (1)  may, within one year, institute a suit  in the
Court to modify or set aside such decision and that, subject
to the result of such a suit, the order of the Commissioner
shall  be  final.  The plaintiff-appellant  instituted this
suit for the setting aside of the order of the Commissioner
under  sub-s. (1) of s. 64 holding the institution to  be  a
'math' as defined in the Act and the property belonging  to
it  endowed properties. This order of the  Commissioner  is
final, subject to the result of the suit.  The plaintiff has
to  get over  it  to avoid  that  decision.   The  onus  is
therefore initially on the plaintiff to show that the
(1)  L.R. 65 I.A. 252.
444
order of the Commissioner is wrong and this he can only show
by  establishing prima facie that the Math is not a math  as
defined in the Act and that the various properties were not
endowed properties.
Learned counsel  for the parties have argued on  the  basis
that  The Act applies to public maths. It is urged for the
appellant  that it is not proved to be a public math,  while
the  respondent contends to the contrary.  Undoubtedly, the
Math  had  been in existence for over two  centuries. Oral
evidence  about the  founding of the Math  could  not  be
possible  after such a long period.  The mahant of the Math
has not come in the witness box.  The Courts below have held
the  Math  to  be  a public math on  the  basis of  several
considerations.  These are  that  the Mahants  had been
celibate and therefore not likely to have personal ownership
in the property including even the dakshinas or cash offered
to  them, by disciples or other devotees.  Religious  books,
viz. the Bhagavad Gita and the Ramayan, are recited daily in
the  temple  of Raghunathji.  There was also  the  image  of
Ramanuj, the founder of the cult.  This image is carried  in
procession  for five days around the compound of  the main
temple of Lord Jagannath at Puri.  This could be to  provide
darshan to  the  devotees  of the  Vaishnav  faith. Some
ascetics  called babajis reside at the math and are  fed  by
the  math authorities. The buildings of the math are  many,
much  beyond  the  requirements of the Mahant  and  the few
resident  disciples.   The  Mahants of this  Math  have the
privilege of rendering service to Lord Jagannath both in the
temple and  in the Gundicha Mandir.  They also manage the
Amrit Manchi properties the proceeds from which are utilised
for  offering  bhog to Lord Jagannath and  the Maha  Prasad
therefrom  is  distributed  to the  poor  pilgrims  and the
Vaishnav visitors.
Apart  from these considerations, certain  documents  relied
upon by the High Court tend to favour the finding that Emar
Math  is  a  public math and that  the various properties,
though ostensibly  acquired  by the  Mahants, were  really
acquired for the Math. The first document of importance  in
this  respect is Exhibit 110 of 1767.  It is a deed of gift
by  a  private person in favour of Sadhu  Emar Gosain, the
Adhikari  of Ramanuj Kote Math. P.W. 2 states that  Ramanuj
Kote  belongs to Emar Math area.  This description  supports
the conclusion that the Math, though under a different name,
had  been in existence from before the time of Emar  Gosain.
The plaint alleges that the premises in suit had been  known
by  different  names.  The gift deed states that  the  donee
will  enjoy the property gifted in perpetuity. The idea  of
perpetuity is further emphasised when it is said in the gift
deed:-
     "Your  Chelas, Sishyas and  Anusisllyas  shall
     all enjoy this property for ever in perpetuity
     until the sun and moon last."
This stipulation shows that it was not a gift personally  to
Emar,  that the gift was for the benefit of chelas,  sishyas
and  anusisllyas  and  that  it was  in favour of  persons
indeterminate in number.  The
445
fact  that  the chelas are distinguished  from sishyas and
anusisllyas shows that the chela is the nominee of the Guru
for  the  purpose of succession and that  though  the  chela
would succeed to the Gaddi, he would hold the properties not
for  personal enjoyment but for the benefit of sishyas and
their sishyas-indicating  that  the  property was   trust
property.   Further,  the  land donated  by  this  document
admittedly  is a  portion of the site on  which  the Math
stands. The gift of such land could be for no other  object
but  for  the purpose of the construction of  the  Math and
therefore a gift to the Math, though it would normally be in
the name of the Mahant, the head of the Math.
Another document  of importance in this connection  is the
Will, Exhibit 140, executed by Mahant Mohan Dass in 1857  in
favour of his disciple who was the subsequent Mahant by the
name Mahant Raghunandan Das.  This Will, besides speaking of
the careful training given to Raghunandan Das making him fit
to succeed to the gaddi, states :-
     "After me the said Raghunandan as my successor
     in the Mahantai Gaddi shall become the Mahant,
     Malik  and  Gadanashin and shall continue  to
     exercise ownership and possession in  respect
     of  all the properties as he is doing now and
     shall enjoy as the rightful owner and Malik of
     all  the movable properties of  and  connected
     with  this Math both within this part  of the
     country and outside (Desh Bideshare) and shall
   continue to manage the rendering and
supplying
     of  the  fixed Sheba Puja offerings  and Bhog
     etc.   of  Shri Jagannath   Mohaprabhu  in
     accordance  with the traditional customs and
     shall  give food and shelter, as he  is  doing
     now,  to Bhaishnab guests and  other  persons
     arriving in  the Math (Abhyagata)  etc., and
     committing no laches in this and remaining  in
     observance  of his own religion, shall  manage
     all affairs".
The  last  expression  with respect to giving  of  food and
shelter to Vaishnay guests and other persons arriving in the
Math etc. indicates that visitors. belonging to the  Ramanuj
Sampraday,  used to visit the Math when on a  pilgrimage  to
the  Lord Jagannath Temple and the Mathadhish of  Emar Math
used to give shelter and food to them and the will  enjoined
the  nominee  to continue that practice.   Such a  practice
shows  that  the beneficiaries of the Math  properties were
again indeterminate in number. The gift being to the  Math.
though ostensibly in the name of the Mahant, the Mahant held
the  properties as a trustee for the indeterminate class  of
beneficiaries, viz., sishyas, anusishyas and visitors. This
stamps the  Math  with  the  public  character.   It  is
significant  to note  that  there is not  a  word  in this
document  to the effect that Mahant Mohan Das possessed any
private property and that such private property was to go to
Raghunandan  Das who was to succeed him on the gaddi  or  to
somebody else, The only conclusion from such an omission can
be that Mahant
446
Mohan  Das  did not consider any, property, to be  his own
personal property.  Whatever he possessed and over which  he
exercised ownership was considered to be the property of the
Math  or  properties connected with the Math  and  that his
successor was to exercise ownership and possession over all
such properties.
We therefore hold that the Emar Math is a math as defined in
the Act and that it is a public math.
The  history of the Emar Math, according to the passage  in
the  Puri  Gazetteer, fits in with our finding.   The High
Court  has  relied  on what has been  stated  in  the Puri
Gazetteer of O'Malley of 1908, at pp. 112-113. The relevant
portion of the passage relied on is the following:-
     "No  account  of Jagannath  worship  would  be
     complete without some account of the maths  in
     Puri.   Maths are monastic  houses  originally
     founded with the object of feeding travellers,
     beggars, and ascetics, of giving religious in-
     struction  to   chelas  or   disciples, and
     generally of  encouraging a  religious  life.
     The  heads of these religious houses  who are
     called Mahants or Mathadharis are elected from
     among  the  chelas, and are  assisted  in the
     management  of their properties  by  Adhikaris
     who   may be  described as  their   business
     managers. They are generally celibates but in
     certain maths married men may hold the office.
     Mahants  are the gurus or spiritual guides  of
     many   people  who  present  the maths with
     presents of  money and  endowments  in  land.
     Thus,  the  Sriramdas or Dakshinaparswa Math
     received rich endowments from  the  Mahrattas
     its abbot having been the guru of the Mahratta
     Governor; While the Mahant of Emar Math in the
     eighteenth  century who had the reputation  of
     being a very holy ascetic, similarly got large
     offerings from his followers.  Both Saiva and
     Vaishnava Maths exist in Puri.  The lands  of
     the   latter  are known as   Amruta   Manchi
     (literally  nectar  food), because  they were
     given  with  the intention that  the  proceeds
     thereof  should  be spent in  offering  bhoga
     before Jagannath and that the Mahaprasad thus
     obtained should be distributed among pilgrims,
     beggars  and ascetics; they are distinct from
     the  Amruta Manchi lands of the temple  itself
     which  are  under the superintendence  of the
     Raja.  In 1848 Babu Brij Kishore Ghose roughly
     estimated the annual income of 28 maths from
     land  alone  at Rs. 1,45,400 and this  income
     must  have increased largely during  the last
     sixty years.
     There  are  over 70 maths in Puri Town. The
     Chief  Saiva  maths are located in  the  sandy
     tract near Swargadwar viz., Sankaracharya math
     with  a  fine library of old  manuscripts and
     Sabkarananda  math  which has  a branch  at
     Bhubaneshwar.  Most of the maths are naturally
     447
     Vaishnava.   The richest of  the latter are
     Emar,  Sriramdasa and Raghavadasa the  inmates
     of   which   are Ramats or   followers  of
     Ramananda."
It  is urged for the appellant that what is stated  in the
Gazetteer  cannot be treated as evidence.  These  statements
in the Gazetteer are not relied on as evidence of title but
as  providing historical material and the practice  followed
by the Math and its head.  The Gazetteer can be consulted on
matters of public history.
The next question relates to the nature of the properties in
suit.
The oral evidence about the foundation of the Math or  about
the various acquisitions of property by purchase or by gift
is nil. Whatever a witness has deposed has not been on the
basis  of his personal knowledge.  This is natural when the
Math  was founded about two hundred years ago and when most
of  the acquisitions had taken place long  ago.   The best
person to speak, though not from personal knowledge,  could
have  been the Mahant himself. He can base his knowledge  on
the  documents about  the  history  of the  Math  and the
acquisition   of  the  properties.   Such   documents must
naturally  be in the custody of the Mahant.  The Mahant has
not  come  in the witness box. All the documents  have not
been  produced.  In  fact it is  the  plaintiff  alone who
produced a number of documents but he had picked and  chosen
from among the documents in his possession.  Some  documents
which  could  have thrown some light on the  question  under
determination  have not been produced. It is true that the
defendant-respondent  also did not call upon the  plaintiff-
appellant  to  produce the documents  whose  existence was
admitted  by one or the other witness of the  plaintiff and
that  therefore, strictly speaking no inference adverse  to
the  plaintiff can be drawn from his non-producing the list
of  documents. The  Court  may not be in  a position  to
conclude from such omission that those documents would have
directly  established the case for the respondent.   But  it
can take into consideration in weighing the evidence or any
direct inferences from established facts that the  documents
might have favored the respondent's case.
The  documents relied upon for  the  appellant  relate  to
acquisition of properties by purchase or gift and are in the
name of the Mahant of the Math. Such documents being in the
name  of  the Mahant alone, do not necessarily lead  to the
conclusion that the properties were acquired or received  in
donation  by  the Mahant in ],is personal capacity  for his
personal  use and possession.  An inference that  they were
acquired by the Mahant for the Math is equally possible and
in  fact is to be preferred to what appears on the  face  of
the documents. The onus of proof being on the appellant, it
was  possible  for  him to  establish his  case  from the
documents available to him.  But he has chosen not to  place
at the disposal of the Court all the relevant documents.  It
is  significant to note that not a single document has been
produced by the plaintiff
448
which specifically mentioned the purchase or the gift to  be
by  or to the Math itself.  It is difficult to believe that
the Math acquired no property during the long period of its
existence.   The Mahant as the head of the institution acts
for  the  Math and is its  real  representative.   All the
dealings for and on behalf of the Math must be conducted  by
the  Mahant and it should be no wonder if the Mahant  acting
for  the Math acts ostensibly in his own name. Though the
documents  relating  to purchase of  properties  have been
produced,  no  evidence was  led to  show  that  they were
purchased   from   the personal  assets  of   the   Mahant.
Presumably  if there was such evidence, it would  have been
produced.  The only possible inference which can be drawn is
that they were purchased from the assets of the Math.
Reference may be made to Sitaram Days Banasi v. H.R.E. Board
Madras(1)  and to Raghbir Lala v. Mohammad Said(1).  In the
former case, Varadachariar, J. said:-
     "From the few sale deeds filed in the case, it
     no doubt appears that some of those properties
     were  purchased  in  the name  of  the  prior
     Mahant;  but it being admitted that he was  an
     ascetic  and  celibate  and the  head  of the
     institution,  the probabilities are that they
     were   purchased with  the  funds   of the
     institution." and in the latter it was said:-
     "No   doubt  if  a  question  arises   whether
     particular   property  acquired  by  a   given
     individual  was acquired on his own behalf  or
     on behalf of some other person or institution
     with  whom or with which he was connected the
     circumstance that the individual so  acquiring
     property was  a professed  ascetic  may have
     importance."
     Reference may also be made in this  connection
     to the Order, Exhibit 136, of the Maharaja  of
     Puri,  to Dewan Bhramarbar  Ray.  The  order
     states :-
     "The  Maharaja  hereby  grants  this   Sananda
     taking  Rs.  3,000  that he  has granted the
     following 145 Batis and 15 Manas of land, that
     the  income of this land will be utilised  in
     Bhog  of Lord Jagannath and distributed  among
     the coming Baishnabas.  The 19th day of  Mass,
     Anka 2.
     1.    Rahang,  Ph.   Alisa-117  Batis  and  15
     Manas.
     2.    Out of Bania Kera-10 Batis.
     3.    Chabiskud, Ph.  Tinikud-18 Batis."
Of  the three properties mentioned in this order, the  first
one belongs to Schedule Ka-1, the second to Schedule Kha and
the  third  to Schedule Ka-2, attached to the  plaint. The
property  in Schedule Ka-1 is the property which is said  to
have been acquired by the plaintiff and his ancestors. The
property  in  Schedule Ka-2  is the  property said  to  be
acquired by the plaintiff's
(1)I.L.R. 1937 Mad. 197:- A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 186-187.
(2) A.I.R. 1943 P.C. 79.
449
ancestors for personal services to Lord Jagannath while the
properties  in Schedule Kha are said to be acquired  subject
to  a charge of offering Bhog to Lord Jagannath.  The  order
makes no distinction in the nature of the objects for  which
the  three properties are given.  In fact it shows that the
income from all the three properties was to be utilised  in
offering  Bhog to Lord Jagannath, and for  distributing the
prasad among  the  Vaishnavas who would  visit the  place.
There  is nothing in this order that any of  the  properties
was for the personal enjoyment and possession of the  Mahant
alone. It  is not possible to hold  that  the  properties
covered  by  the  same grant should fall  in   different
categories  as is  the case,  according  to  the  schedules
attached to the plaint.
Apart  from (these general considerations,  the documentary
evidence  on  record  does  not support  the  case  of the
plaintiff  with respect to the properties in  schedule Ka-1
and Ka-2.  It may also be mentioned at this stage that there
is  no document on record with respect to the properties  in
schedules Kha and Ga.  We have already referred to  document
Exhibit 110, the gift deed with respect to the land  which
forms  part of the site of the Math.  Exhibit 112 refers  to
certain land  given  to  the Adhikari of  Emar  'Math for
building a temple for the God. The document states that the
drain  for the gruel from the temple of Lord Jagannath used
to  pass  over this  land and that this  drain had  to  be
shifted.  It is difficult to believe that the land which was
being  used  in connection with a public temple would have
been  given  for the purpose of personal  enjoyment  by the
Mahant or for the purpose of constructing a private temple.
The  land  mentioned in Exhibit 115 and Exhibit  1.16 were
acquired  by the Mahant on payment of certain  amounts.  He
was  further  required to pay certain amount towards the
'Kotha Bhoga' of Lord Jagannath.  Exhibit 117 relates to  a
land  purchased by  the Mahant.  He  was  required  to pay
certain amount towards Chamar Seba of Lord Jagannath.
Exhibit 118 mentions that certain land which the Mahant had
purchased  was being assigned to his Math in order  that  he
might  enjoy it for all times to come. This clearly  brings
out  that the land purchased by the Mahant from some  person
was made over to the Math.  He was exempted from payment  of
all sorts of extra taxes or other similar duties.  Exemption
from revenue and taxes appears to have been granted  because
it  was understood that the lands were of the  ownership  of
the  Math  and not the personal properties  of the  Mahant.
Even  this property which has been clearly assigned  to the
Math,  according to this document is mentioned in  Schedule
Ka-1,  indicating thereby that no particular care  had been
taken  in  preparing the schedule which just  included the
properties which had been acquired by sale deeds.
450
Exhibit  1  19 sanctions  certain  purchases by   Mahant
Samujamatra  and states that he will enjoy the same for all
time to come on dedication of all sorts of requirements for
Gundichaghar  Chali  (House of Lord  Jagannath).   No  other
demand towards Kotha should be made on  him. This  again
clearly indicates  that  the  property was  dedicated for
meeting the expenses of Gundichaghar Chali and was  exempted
from any other demand towards the Kotha presumably the Kotha
Bhog of Sri Lord referred to in Exhibits 115 and 116. This
property is included in Schedule Ka-2.
It  appears that the various maths at Puri were founded  by
saints following  different  cults,  but  devoted  to Lord
Jagannath.   They  had to offer seva to Lord  Jagannath  in
different  forms, e.g., offering Bhog and getting back Maha
Prasad, Chamar Seva ie., fanning of the Lord etc.  For Bhog
or  other services which required expenses, the saints were
in  need of funds and naturally the devotees of the  saints
would  make  gifts to them to enable them to  perform  these
services.  Gifts of property to the Mahants or exempting the
Mahants to  pay  taxes etc.  with  respect  to  the  lands
purchased by them was therefore merely to provide them with
funds necessary for rendering services to Lord Jagannath, on
behalf of  the Math  and also to  meeting  the  necessary
expenses  in  running  of  the Maths  which  would  include
expenses on the maintenance of the buildings, feeding of the
Mahant and the disciples and such other persons who came  to
reside at  the Math and also for distributing food  to the
poor.  The documents referred to above make this amply clear
and  thus show that the properties to which they  relate  do
not  belong to the Mahant personally but really belonged  to
the  Math.   It makes no difference to the  nature  of the
properties  whether  they were purchased by the Mahants  in
their own names or in the names of the Math.
Some  properties  have been shown to be  purchased  by the
chelas of the Mahants previous to their occupying the  gaddi
of  the Mahant,  that is  to say,  such  properties were
purchased when they were mere chelas and not mahants.  It is
therefore submitted for the appellants that these properties
could  not  be held to be math properties now. It  is true
that the presumption that the properties that were  obtained
during the  period  when they were not Mahants  cannot  be
presumed  to  be properties purchased or  acquired  for the
Math.  But the fact remains that when they themselves became
Mahants such self-acquired properties did not appear to have
been  treated  in any separate manner. Proceeds  from such
properties  were  mixed up with the proceeds  of  the  other
property.   Letters, Exhibits C & D, by Mahant Gadadhar Das
to  the Commissioner speak of the entire  mingling  of the
accounts of the private and Math properties.  Some witnesses
of  the plaintiff stated that Gadadhar Das told them  later
that  he  had  made wrong statement  in those letters for
ulterior  purposes.   Courts below did not  rightly  believe
such statements.  Further, it
451
may be noted that it appears from the sale deed, Exhibit 77,
executed in favour of Gadadhar Ramanuj Das, Chela of  Mahant
Raghunandan Ramanuj Das in 1909, that the founder owed a sum
of  Rs. 400/- to the Mahant Guru of Gadadhar and  that this
sum was adjusted towards the purchase price of the  property
conveyed  under this deed.  Mahant Mohan Das, by  his will
Exhibit 140,  permitted  his  Chela  Raghunandan,  who was
nominated  to  succeed him to get his own  name  gradually
mutated in respect of the lands and zamindaris standing  in
the name of the Mahant. It follows therefore that the mere
fact  that certain properties were ostensibly  purchased  by
the  chelas does not necessarily mean that those  properties
were  either acquired as their personal properties' or that
they  continued to be their personal properties after they
succeeded to the gaddi.
The plaintiff has failed to produce the expenditure accounts
with respect to the income from the properties in suit.  He
has not produced the consolidated budget which is  prepared.
That could have indicated whether the income and expenditure
over the property in suit was treated as of the Math or not.
Accounts  showing  the sources of  money  from  which the
properties  were  acquired have not  been  produced.   These
omissions, together with statements in letters Exhibits C  &
D,  are sufficient to support the findings  of the  Courts
below  that even these properties had been treated  as Math
properties.
We are therefore of opinion that the properties mentioned in
Schedules  Ka-1 and  Ka-2,  alleged  to  be  the   personal
properties  of the Mahant, are not his personal  properties
but are properties of the Math.
We  may now consider the properties in schedule Kha said  to
be the Amrut Manohi properties of Lord Jagannath and held by
the  plaintiff as marfatdar.  The  plaintiff  alleges that
these  properties  were acquired  either  by  purchase  or
'krayadan'  or by way of gift subject to a charge  of some
offering   to  Lord  Jagannath which  depended  upon the
individual  judgment  and discretion of the  plaintiff, and
that  the  public  had no concern  with  the  enjoyment  or
management  of the usufruct thereof.  The Gazetteer makes  a
reference to such properties and states:--
     "Both Saiva and Vaishnava Maths exist in Puri.
     The  lands of the latter are known  as  Amruta
     Manohi  (literally nectar food), because they
     were   given  with  the  intention  that the
     proceeds thereof should be spent in  offering
     bhoga before Jagannath and that the Mahaprasad
     thus  obtained  should  be  distributed  among
     pilgrims, beggars  and  ascetics-,  they are
     distinct from the Amruta Manohi lands of the
     Temple itself which are under the
     superintendence of the Raja".
453



Specific performance of sale agreement - termination notice was also given = the defendant sent legal notice on 28.03.1985 to the plaintiff extending time to the plaintiff to pay sale consideration on or before 10.04.1985 with a warning that his failure to comply with the same, sale agreement dated 25.12.1983 would be terminated. The plaintiff did not perform his part of the contract within the extended period of legal notice. In those circumstances, the Apex Court treated the contract was not existing by the date of filing the suit for specific performance and held suit is not maintainable without a prayer for declaratory relief.

                                                           REPORTABLE

                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA                CIVIL
           APPELLATE JURISDICTION




                   CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7306 OF 2013         (Arising out of SLP
           (C) No. 20367 of 2009)




I.S. SIKANDAR (D) BY LRs.           ... APPELLANTS

                              VS.

K. SUBRAMANI & ORS.                         ... RESPONDENTS



                               J U D G M E N T




      V. Gopala Gowda, J.

           Leave granted.

      2.    This civil appeal is directed against  the  judgment  and  order
      dated 08.12.2008 passed in Regular First Appeal No. 97 of 2001 by  the
      High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore, urging certain relevant facts  and
      legal contentions, whereby the High Court has  reversed  the  judgment
      and decree passed  in  the  Original  Suit  No.  2012  of  1985  dated
      25.09.2000 by the X1th Additional City Civil  Judge,  Bangalore  City,
      Bangalore and has modified the decree by allowing the appeal, granting
      the decree for specific performance of the Agreement of Sale in favour
      of the respondent No.1/plaintiff in  relation  to  the  suit  schedule
      property. Further, it has granted the decree of  permanent  injunction
      against the defendants restraining  them  from  interfering  with  the
      respondent No.1/plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment  of  the
      suit schedule property.

      3.    Necessary facts and legal contentions urged  on  behalf  of  the
      parties are stated herein with a view to find out as  to  whether  the
      impugned judgment and  decree  in  granting  the  relief  of  specific
      performance of the sale of the suit schedule property in favour of the
      plaintiff requires to be set aside by allowing this appeal.

            In this judgment for the sake of brevity, we would like to refer
      to the ranking of the parties as  assigned  in  the  plaint  presented
      before the trial court. Since there is incongruence in the  mentioning
      of exhibits in the judgments of the trial court as well as of the High
      Court, we will refer to the documents as per the  annexures  presented
      along with this appeal.

           The plaintiff  (respondent  No.1  herein)  instituted  O.S.  No.
      2012/85 before the Additional Civil Judge for grant  of  a  decree  of
      specific performance in respect of suit schedule property on the basis
      of the Agreement of Sale dated 25.12.1983  (Annex.P-1)  and  also  for
      grant  of  permanent  injunction  restraining  the   defendants   from
      interfering with his peaceful possession and  enjoyment  of  the  suit
      schedule property.  The suit property covered in the Agreement of Sale
      was a vacant site measuring 54 ft. from East to West and 42  ft.  from
      North to South carved out of survey  Nos.  18/2,  19,  20  and  21  of
      Agrahara  Thimmasandra  village,  known  as  C.K.  Chinnappa   Garden,
      Bangalore North Taluk, within  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the
      Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike (for short “BBMP”). It is the  case
      of the plaintiff that he entered into an agreement with defendant Nos.
      1-4 for sale of the suit property in his favour for  consideration  of
      Rs.45,000/-.   A  sum  of  Rs.5000/-  was  paid  towards   part   sale
      consideration to the defendant Nos.1-4  and  they  delivered  original
      title deeds and put the plaintiff in physical possession of  the  suit
      schedule property.  They  had  agreed  to  receive  the  balance  sale
      consideration amount of Rs.40,000/- at the time of registration of the
      sale deed to be executed in favour of the plaintiff within five months
      after securing  necessary  permission  from  the  Urban  Land  Ceiling
      Authority under the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and  Regulation)
      Act, 1976 (for short ‘ULCR Act’) now repealed,  and  Income  Tax  Act,
      1961  and also to get change of khata of the suit schedule property in
      their names from that of the deceased husband of the  first  defendant
      in the property register maintained by the BBMP at  the  cost  of  the
      plaintiff. Further, the plaintiff had an obligation to pay the  layout
      and conversion charges to the BBMP  and  bear  the  vendors  cost  for
      securing the permission from the aforesaid authorities.   Further,  it
      is the case of the plaintiff that the time for completion of the  sale
      of the suit property was agreed to be extended by two months  in  case
      of  delay  in  securing  the  permission  from  the   above   referred
      authorities which  might  in  turn  cause  delay  in  payment  of  the
      conversion charges.

      4.    It is the case of the plaintiff that on being put in  possession
      of the suit property, he erected cattle shed to tether cattle and paid
      betterment charges on 25.04.1984 to the concerned  authorities.  There
      is an acknowledgement to this effect and he  also  secured  change  of
      khata on 02.05.1984 and paid the property taxes to the  BBMP  for  the
      period 1977 to 1983-84 and thereafter, he also paid the  property  tax
      to the BBMP for the future years.

      5.    The case of the plaintiff is  that  the  defendant  Nos.1-4  got
      issued legal  notice  dated  06.03.1985  (Annex.  P-2)  through  their
      counsel calling upon the plaintiff to comply  with  his  part  of  the
      contract by  paying  the  balance  sale  consideration  on  or  before
      18.03.1985 failing which legal action  would  follow,  for  which  the
      plaintiff had issued a reply dated  16.03.1985  (Annex.  P-3)  calling
      upon the defendant Nos.1-4 to execute the conveyance deed and  receive
      the balance sale consideration on 23.05.1985  by  securing  the  draft
      sale deed five days prior thereto. By another letter dated  04.05.1985
      (Annex. P-5) he requested the vendors to  go  to  the  sub-Registrar’s
      office on 23.05.1985 and execute the deed of conveyance in his favour.
       He further pleaded in the plaint that the vendors by a telegram dated
      18.05.1985 declined to accede to  his  request  and  stated  that  the
      Agreement of Sale was rescinded by the defendants by  a  letter  dated
      28.03.1985, which is  a  legal  notice  sent  by  them  through  their
      advocate to the plaintiff, wherein he was called upon  to  return  the
      original documents of suit property  given  to  him  at  the  time  of
      execution of the Agreement of Sale and on his failure to do so  on  or
      before 10.04.1985, the said agreement  dated  25.12.1983  would  stand
      terminated vide the aforesaid notice.

      6.    After institution of the original  suit  by  the  plaintiff  for
      specific performance and permanent injunction  against  the  defendant
      Nos.1-4, the vendors  who  were  served  with  the  suit  summons  and
      notices, remained absent and unrepresented  in  the  proceedings,  and
      therefore they were placed ex-parte. An interlocutory application  was
      filed by the appellant to implead himself  as  5th  defendant  to  the
      original  suit  proceedings  pleading  that  he  is  the   proper  and
      necessary party to the original suit proceedings, claiming that he had
      purchased  the  suit  schedule  property  under  a  sale  deed   dated
      30.05.1985 from his vendors viz. defendant Nos.1-4 (Annex.  P-6).  The
      said application was allowed by the trial court. He was  permitted  to
      be impleaded as defendant No.5 in the original suit proceedings and he
      resisted the suit by filing  a  written  statement  dated  13.12.1989,
      inter alia, admitting that defendant Nos. 1-4 were the owners  of  the
      suit schedule property and further he denied the plea of the plaintiff
      that he is being in possession of the suit  property.  It  is  further
      stated that the deed of conveyance in respect  of  the  suit  schedule
      property was executed by the defendant Nos. 1-4 in  his  favour  after
      obtaining necessary permission from the competent authority under  the
      ULCR Act by letter dated 25.05.1985 and therefore, he has pleaded that
      the reliefs  sought  for  by  the  plaintiff  in  the  suit  filed  on
      26.06.1985 became infructuous.  It is further pleaded that because  of
      default committed by the plaintiff,  he  is  disentitled  to  get  the
      decree for specific performance of sale of the property on  the  basis
      of the Agreement of Sale.

      7.   The trial court on the basis of pleadings of the  parties  framed
      six issues:

           1) Whether the plaintiff  proves  that  defendant  Nos.1-4  have
           executed  Agreement  of  Sale  dated  25.12.1983  and  delivered
           possession of the same?

           2)  Whether the plaintiff proves that he is in lawful possession
           of the suit property?

           3)    Whether the 5th defendant proves  that  he  purchased  the
           property under sale deed dated 30.05.1985 and is  in  possession
           of it?

           4) Whether plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his
           part of the obligation?

           5) Whether the  5th  defendant  proves  that  plaintiff  is  the
           defaulter and is not ready and willing to perform  his  part  of
           the obligation?

           6)  Whether  the  defendant  proves  that   plaintiff   put   up
           construction after the completion of the sale?

      8.    The original suit went for trial; plaintiff was examined as PW-1
      and marked 27 documents as  Exhs.  P1-  to  P-27.  On  behalf  of  the
      defendants, the 5th defendant was examined as DW-1 and another witness
      named K.N.Prakash as DW-2 and marked 4 documents as Exhs.D-1 to D-4 to
      prove his case.  The trial court on  appreciation  of  the  pleadings,
      documentary and oral evidence on record has recorded the  findings  of
      fact in the affirmative on the issue Nos. 1,  2  and  5  and  answered
      issue No.3 partly in affirmative  and  issue  Nos.  4  and  6  in  the
      negative.  The trial court in its judgment has recorded the finding of
      fact holding that 5th defendant is the  owner  of  the  suit  property
      pursuant to sale deed dated 30.05.1985 and  he  is  entitled  to  take
      possession of the same from the plaintiff in accordance with  law  and
      accordingly, partly decreed the suit in his favour vide  judgment  and
      decree dated 25.09.2000.

      9.  Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff preferred
      Regular First Appeal before the High  Court  of  Karnakata  which  was
      registered as RFA No. 97/2001, urging various  legal  contentions  and
      prayed to set aside the same in so far as dismissal of  the  suit  for
      grant of the decree  for  specific  performance  in  respect  of  suit
      schedule property on the basis of sale deed is concerned.

      10.  The legal contention urged before the High Court on behalf of the
      plaintiff is  that  the  trial  court  has  erroneously  recorded  its
      findings on the above contentious issue Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4  &  5  without
      appreciating the plaint averments and the evidence  on  record  having
      regard to the undisputed  fact  that  the   Agreement  of  Sale  dated
      25.12.1983 and the covenants of the  said  agreement  provide  limited
      obligation on the part of the plaintiff to pay the layout charges  and
      expenses required to be incurred by him to enable the defendant Nos. 1-
      4, to secure the permission from the authorities under  the  ULCR  Act
      and Income Tax Act for execution  and  registration  of  the  deed  of
      conveyance in his favour. It is further contended  on  behalf  of  the
      plaintiff that he paid the betterment charges and  property  taxes  to
      the BBMP within the stipulated time, and in addition to  that  he  got
      secured the change of khata in favour  of  the  defendant  Nos.1-4  in
      respect of the suit schedule property as agreed upon  by  him  in  the
      agreement. He further contended that the trial court has  recorded  an
      erroneous finding of fact holding that the plaintiff  did  not  secure
      the permission from the competent authority under the ULCR Act and the
      Income Tax Authority to execute and register the sale deed  as  agreed
      by  the  defendant  Nos.1-4.  Therefore,  it  is  contended  that  the
      defendant Nos. 1-4 committed breach of Agreement of Sale and therefore
      the plaintiff is entitled for the decree for specific  performance  of
      execution of the sale deed on the basis of the Agreement of  Sale.  It
      is further contended that the plaintiff has been ready and willing  at
      all material times, and even as on 28.03.1985, to pay the balance sale
      consideration amount to defendant Nos. 1-4 on execution of the deed of
      conveyance of the suit property. He further urged in the  appeal  that
      execution of the sale deed dated  30.05.1985  in  favour  of  the  5th
      defendant for a sale consideration of an amount  of  Rs.48,000/-  that
      is, Rs.3000/- in excess of what was agreed upon  with  the  plaintiff,
      would demonstrate that the defendant Nos.1-4 took undue advantage  and
      committed the breach of the terms  and  conditions  of  the  contract.
      Further, it is urged that the above aspects of the matter has not been
      properly appreciated by the trial court while dismissing the suit  for
      not granting the relief of specific performance in respect of the suit
      schedule property in favour of the plaintiff.      It is also urged in
      the R.F.A. before the High Court that defendant Nos. 1-4 were required
      to secure permission under the ULCR Act and Income Tax  Department  to
      convey the suit property in favour of the 5th defendant, which further
      demonstrates that without such a permission, the registration of  deed
      of conveyance in  favour  of  the  5th  defendant  was  impermissible,
      thereby the defendant Nos. 1-4  committed  a  serious  breach  of  the
      obligation in terms of Agreement of  Sale  dated  25.12.1983.  It  was
      further contended that the plaintiff was carrying  cash  with  him  to
      prove that he had necessary funds to  pass  on  consideration  to  the
      defendant Nos.1-4 at the time of registration of the sale deed and the
      learned counsel has placed reliance on the reported decision  of  this
      Court in Sukhbir Singh & Ors. Vs. Brij  Pal  Singh  &  Ors.[1]  It  is
      further contended with reference to para 24 of  the  judgment  of  the
      trial court, that the trial court fell into  error  in  recording  the
      finding of fact on the contentious issue No.3  holding  that  the  5th
      defendant is the owner of the suit schedule property  in  pursuant  to
      the sale deed dated  30.05.1985  although  he  had  knowledge  of  the
      Agreement of Sale dated 25.12.1983 in  favour  of  the  plaintiff  and
      therefore he is not the bona fide purchaser.

      11. The said legal contention was seriously contested on behalf of the
      5th defendant justifying the finding and reasons recorded by the trial
      court on the above contentious issue No.3 contending  that  the  trial
      court on proper appreciation of pleadings and evidence on  record  has
      rightly answered in his favour  and  against  the  plaintiff.  He  has
      further contended that the reply notice dated 16.03.1985   which   was
      issued by the

      plaintiff shows the delay and inconvenience caused by the plaintiff to
      the vendors of the 5th defendant.  The  vendors  waited  patiently  by
      extending time for registration of the sale deed  in  respect  of  the
      suit schedule property and the plaintiff was called upon  by  them  to
      get the sale deed executed in his favour by paying  the  balance  sale
      consideration, but he had avoided the same on one pretext or the other
      leading to the conclusion that he was not ready and willing to perform
      his part of contract and therefore they  rescinded  the  contract  and
      executed the sale deed dated 30.05.1985 in favour of the 5th defendant
      in respect of the suit schedule  property.   He  has  also  sought  to
      justify  the findings on issue Nos. 4 and 5 by placing strong reliance
      upon the evidence of PW-1, the plaintiff to show that the findings  of
      fact recorded by the trial  court  on  the  above  contentious  issues
      holding that the plaintiff was not ready and willing at any  point  of
      time to pay the expenses to the defendant Nos.  1-4.  He  has  further
      contended that though  they  made  a  demand  by  legal  notice  dated
      06.03.1985 to get the sale deed  executed  on  or  before  18.03.1985,
      failure on the part of the plaintiff to do the same would  demonstrate
      the fact that he was not ready and willing to perform his part of  the
      contract by paying  the  balance  sale  consideration  amount  to  the
      defendant Nos.  1-4 as agreed upon by him and further placed  reliance
      on the Agreement of Sale dated 25.12.1983 of the suit property to show
      that defendant Nos. 1-4 were in dire necessity of money,  due  to  the
      death of the husband of the first defendant who was the bread  winner,
      and therefore they had agreed to sell the suit  schedule  property  to
      the plaintiff. Further, it is contended  by  the  learned  counsel  on
      behalf of the 5th defendant that time was the essence of the  contract
      as per Section 55 of the Contract Act as agreed upon by the parties in
      the agreement which has  not  been  performed  by  the  plaintiff  and
      therefore the trial court has rightly declined to grant the decree  of
      specific performance in favour of the plaintiff.

      12.    Therefore, the learned counsel on behalf of the  5th  defendant
      placed reliance on the reported decisions of the Division Bench of the
      Karnataka High Court and this Court in the cases of  Saraswathi  Ammal
      Vs. V.C. Lingam[2]; Manjunath Anandappa  Vs.  Tammanasa[3]    and  His
      Holyness Acharya Swamy Ganesh Dassji Vs. Shri Sita Ram  Thapar[4],  in
      justification of the findings and reasons recorded by the trial  court
      on the contentious issues framed by it.

      13. The first appellate court, on the basis of factual and rival legal
      contentions urged on behalf of the parties, has framed  the  following
      points for its determination:

        i) On issue No.3, whether the 5th defendant purchased the  property
           under the sale deed dated 30.05.1985?

       ii) Whether the 5th defendant was entitled to take possession of the
           suit schedule property in accordance with law?

      iii) On issue Nos. 4 & 5 – whether the 5th defendant has  proved  the
           plaintiff to be a defaulter, who is not  ready  and  willing  to
           perform his part of the obligation?

      14.  The High Court in exercise  of  its  appellate  jurisdiction  has
      answered in favour of the plaintiff and passed the  impugned  judgment
      and decree after adverting to Section 16 (c) of  the  Specific  Relief
      Act, 1963 and  sub-sections  (1)  and  (2)  of  Section  20  regarding
      discretionary power to be exercised by the court for grant of a decree
      of specific performance in his favour. It  is  observed  by  the  High
      Court that the court is not commonly bound to grant  such  relief,  if
      merely  it  is  lawful  to  do  so,  and  such  discretion  cannot  be
      arbitrarily refused but on sound and  reasonable  grounds,  guided  by
      judicial principles and capable of correction by the court of  appeal.




           He has referred to the judgment in the case of Parakunnan Veetill
      Joseph’s son Mathew Vs. Nedumbara Kuruvila’s son & Ors.[5], in support
      of the proposition of law that the court  must  meticulously  consider
      all the facts and circumstances of the case for grant of a decree  for
      specific performance and the court should take care to see that it  is
      not used as an instrument of oppression to have an  unfair  advantage.
      Further reliance is placed upon another  judgment  of  this  Court  in
      Nirmala Anand Vs. Advent Corporation Pvt. Limited &  Ors.[6],  wherein
      this Court has held that specific performance is an  equitable  relief
      and the Court has to strike a balance of equities between the  parties
      keeping in view  the  relevant  aspects,  including  the  lapses  that
      occurred in the facts of the case. Further, the High  Court  has  held
      that the parties are respectively responsible and though the plaintiff-
      purchaser always remained ready and willing to perform his part of the
      contract, the defendant Nos.1-4  have  not  performed  their  part  of
      contract.  Therefore, the High Court has set  aside  the  findings  of
      fact on the contentious issues recorded by the trial court against the
      plaintiff.  Further, the learned Judge of the High Court has held that
      Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides protection
      to a transferee on certain conditions, one of which is that transferee
      has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract. It is
      further held that once a  party  to  a  contract  has  repudiated  the
      contract, it is not necessary for the other party to tender the amount
      payable under the contract in the manner provided in the  contract  in
      order to successfully claim the specific performance of  the  contract
      by placing reliance upon  the  judgment  of  this  Court  reported  in
      International Contractors Ltd. Vs. Prasanta  Kumar  Sur  (Deceased)  &
      Ors[7]. wherein this Court has explained the above legal position.  In
      another decision in A. Maria Angelena Vs.  A.G.  Balkis  Bee[8],  this
      Court has made observations with reference to the plea that for  grant
      of a decree for specific performance would result in serious  hardship
      to the vendor or the  subsequent  purchaser  and  that  the  plaintiff
      should be compensated in terms of money must be taken at the  earliest
      stage.  Further,  the  High  Court  with  reference  to  the  deed  of
      conveyance in favour of the 5th defendant executed by defendant Nos. 1-
      4 raised the question as to whether the defendant No.5 was a bona fide
      purchaser for consideration without notice of the earlier Agreement of
      Sale in favour of the plaintiff is examined and answered  against  the
      5th defendant.  The  defendant  Nos.  1-4  have  remained  absent  and
      unrepresented in the original suit proceedings, hence they were placed
      ex-parte, and therefore, the  plea  of  the  5th  defendant  that  the
      plaintiff must always be ready and willing to perform his part of  the
      contract under such circumstances is wholly untenable in law.  In view
      of the said factual position, the plea that the plaintiff has not been
      ready and  willing  to  perform  his  part  of  contract  as  per  the
      agreement, is available to  the  5th  defendant  under  the  concluded
      contract  between  the  plaintiff  and  defendant  Nos.  1-4,  as  per
      Agreement of Sale dated 25.12.1983. In this regard, the High Court has
      placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court  in  MMS  Investments,
      Madurai  &  Ors.  Vs.  V.  Veerappan  &  Ors.[9]  in  support  of  the
      proposition of law that the 5th defendant stepped into  the  shoes  of
      the vendors, and that the question of readiness and willingness cannot
      be pressed into service at all in facts  of  the  case.   The  learned
      Judge of the High Court while recording his findings  and  reasons  on
      the contentious issues has            re-appreciated the pleadings and
      evidence on record with reference to rival legal contentions,  and  he
      has placed reliance upon the catena of decisions of this Court and the
      Division Bench of the Karnataka High  Court  and  has  held  that  not
      granting of the decree for  specific  performance  in  favour  of  the
      plaintiff is held to be bad in law and he has set aside  the  judgment
      and decree of the trial court  and  the  same  was  modified  granting
      decree for specific performance as per Agreement of Sale in favour  of
      the plaintiff and modified  the  judgment  restraining  the  defendant
      Nos.1-4 not to disturb  the  possession  and  enjoyment  of  the  suit
      schedule property of the plaintiff.


      15. The legality and validity of the impugned judgment and decree  are
      challenged in this appeal by the deceased 5th defendant, subsequently,
      he is substituted by his legal  representatives,  by  framing  certain
      questions of law and urged various grounds in  support  of  the  same.
      The questions of law  and  grounds  urged  in  this  appeal  would  be
      adverted while answering the points that are framed in this judgment.


      16.    After perusal of the impugned judgment of the  High  Court  and
      the questions of law framed by the defendant No.5 in this appeal,  the
      following points would arise for determination of this Court:


           1) Whether the original suit filed by the  plaintiff  seeking  a
           decree for specific performance against the defendant  Nos.  1-4
           in respect of the suit schedule  property  without  seeking  the
           declaratory   relief   with  respect  to  termination   of   the
           Agreement of Sale vide notice dated  28.3.1985,  rescinding  the
           contract, is maintainable in law?


           2)  Whether the reversal of the findings of the trial  court  on
           the issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5  by the High Court and  answering  the
           same in favour of the plaintiff in  the  impugned  judgment  and
           granting the decree for specific performance in  favour  of  the
           plaintiff in respect of  the  schedule  property  is  legal  and
           valid?
           (3) Whether the grant  of  decree  of  specific  performance  in
           favour of the plaintiff despite Clause 12 of  the  Agreement  of
           Sale dated 25.12.1983 is legal and valid?


           (4)  Whether the grant of the decree is in conformity with  sub-
           sections (1) and (2) of Section 20 of the  Specific  Relief  Act
           and whether the learned Judge of the High  Court  has  exercised
           his discretionary power  reasonably  in  granting  the  same  in
           favour of the plaintiff?
           5)    What decree or order to be passed?




      17.    Answer to Point No.1

            The first point is answered in favour of the defendant No. 5 by
      assigning the following reasons:

            It is an undisputed fact that there is  an  Agreement  of  Sale
      executed by defendant Nos. 1-4  dated  25.12.1983  in  favour  of  the
      plaintiff agreeing to sell the schedule property in his favour  for  a
      sum of Rs. 45,000/- by receiving  an  advance  sale  consideration  of
      Rs.5,000/- and the plaintiff had further  agreed  that  the  remaining
      sale consideration will be paid to them at the time  of  execution  of
      the sale deed.  As per Clause 6 of the Agreement of Sale, the time  to
      get the sale deed executed was specified as 5 months in favour of  the
      plaintiff  by  the  defendant  Nos.1-4,  after   obtaining   necessary
      permission from the competent  authorities  such  as  the  Urban  Land
      Ceiling  Authority  and  Income  Tax  Department  for  execution   and
      registration of the  sale  deed  at  the  cost  and  expenses  of  the
      plaintiff.  If there is any delay in  obtaining  necessary  permission
      from the above authorities and the payment of layout charges, the time
      for due performance of agreement  shall  further  be  extended  for  a
      period of two months from the date of grant of  such  permission.   In
      the instant case,  permission  from  the  above  authorities  was  not
      obtained from defendant Nos. 1-4. The period of five months stipulated
      under clause 6 of the Agreement of Sale for execution and registration
      of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff had expired.  Despite  the
      same, the defendant Nos. 1-4 got issued legal notice dated  06.03.1985
      to the plaintiff pointing out that he has failed to perform  his  part
      of the contract in terms of  the  Agreement  of  Sale  by  not  paying
      balance sale consideration to them and getting the sale deed  executed
      in  his  favour  and  called  upon  him  to  pay  the   balance   sale
      consideration and get the sale deed executed on or  before  18.3.1985.
      The plaintiff had issued reply letter dated 16.3.1985 to the advocates
      of defendant Nos. 1-4,  in  which  he  had  admitted  his  default  in
      performing his part of contract and prayed time till 23.05.1985 to get
      the sale deed executed in his  favour.   Another  legal  notice  dated
      28.03.1985 was sent by the first defendant to the plaintiff  extending
      time to the plaintiff asking him to pay the sale consideration  amount
      and get the sale deed executed on or before 10.04.1985, and on failure
      to comply with the same, the Agreement of Sale dated 25.12.1983  would
      be terminated since the plaintiff did not avail the time  extended  to
      him by defendant Nos. 1-4. Since the plaintiff  did  not  perform  his
      part of contract within  the  extended  period  in  the  legal  notice
      referred to supra, the Agreement of Sale was terminated as per  notice
      dated 28.03.1985 and thus, there is termination of  the  Agreement  of
      Sale between the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1-4  w.e.f.  10.04.1985.
      As could be seen from the prayer sought for in the original suit,  the
      plaintiff has  not  sought  for  declaratory  relief  to  declare  the
      termination of Agreement of Sale as bad in law.   In  the  absence  of
      such prayer by the plaintiff the original suit filed by him before the
      trial court for grant of decree for specific performance in respect of
      the suit schedule property on the  basis  of  Agreement  of  Sale  and
      consequential  relief  of  decree  for  permanent  injunction  is  not
      maintainable in law.  Therefore, we  have  to  hold  that  the  relief
      sought  for  by  the  plaintiff  for  grant  of  decree  for  specific
      performance of execution of sale deed in respect of the suit  schedule
      property in his favour on the basis of non existing Agreement of  Sale
      is wholly unsustainable in  law.  Accordingly,  the  point  No.  1  is
      answered in favour of the defendant No.5.

      18. Answer to Point No. 2

            Even if we assume that the Agreement of Sale dated 25.12.1983 is
      subsisting, we have to answer point No. 2 in favour of defendant  No.5
      for the following reasons :-

            It would be very much relevant for us to extract Clause 6 of the
      Agreement of Sale which reads thus:

              “The time fixed for execution  and  completion  of  the  sale
              transaction is five months from the date of the agreement  of
              sale.  The first parties have agreed  to  get  the  necessary
              permission for registration from  the  competent  authorities
              such as the Urban Land Ceiling  authorities  and  Income  Tax
              Authority within the said period of five months at  the  cost
              and expenses of the  Second  Party.   The  Second  Party  has
              agreed to pay the necessary layout and conversion charges  of
              the suit property to the concerned  authorities.   The  first
              party have further agreed with the second party  that  if  in
              case the necessary permission from the aforesaid  authorities
              is delayed and as a consequence thereof the payment of layout
              charges is delayed, the  time  for  due  performance  of  the
              agreement shall stand extended for  a  further  period  of  2
              months from the date of grant of such permission.”




           This position of law is  well  settled  by  this  Court  in  the
      Constitution Bench judgment in Smt.Chand Rani (dead) by LRs. Vs.  Smt.
      Kamal Rani(dead) by LRs.[10]; wherein this Court has held that  it  is
      well settled principle of law, that in a case  of  sale  of  immovable
      property, time is not the essence of the  contract.  However,  If  the
      parties agreed to a specified time in the agreement to  perform  their
      part of the contract, then time is the essence  of  the  contract  and
      parties shall adhere to the same.

           To emphasize the fact that time is the essence of  the  contract
      before the High Court, the counsel for the 5th  defendant  has  placed
      reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Chand Rani’s case (supra),
      the relevant portions of which are extracted below:


           “19. It is a well-accepted principle that in the case of sale of
           immovable property, time is never regarded as the essence of the
           contract. In fact, there is a presumption against time being the
           essence of the contract.  This  principle  is  not  in  any  way
           different from that obtainable in  England.  Under  the  law  of
           equity which governs the rights of the parties in  the  case  of
           specific performance of contract to sell real estate, law  looks
           not at the letter but at the substance of the agreement. It  has
           to be ascertained whether under the terms of  the  contract  the
           parties named a specific time within  which  completion  was  to
           take place, really and in substance  it  was  intended  that  it
           should be completed within a reasonable time.  An  intention  to
           make time the essence of  the  contract  must  be  expressed  in
           unequivocal language.”




           20.  “…… Section 55 of the Contract Act  which  deals  with  the
           consequences of failure to perform an executory contract  at  or
           before the stipulated time provides by the first paragraph:
           ‘When a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing at or
           before  a  specified  time,  or  certain  things  at  or  before
           specified times, and fails to do any such thing at or before the
           specified time, the contract, or so much of it as has  not  been
           performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if the
           intention of the parties was that time should be of the  essence
           of the contract.’
           It is not merely because of specification of time at  or  before
           which the thing to be done under the contract is promised to  be
           done and default in compliance therewith, that the  other  party
           may avoid the contract. Such an option  arises  only  if  it  is
           intended by the parties that time  is  of  the  essence  of  the
           contract. Intention to make time of the essence, if expressed in
           writing, must be in language which is unmistakable: it may  also
           be inferred from the nature of the property agreed to  be  sold,
           conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances  at  or
           before the contract. Specific performance  of  a  contract  will
           ordinarily be granted, notwithstanding default in  carrying  out
           the contract within the specified period, if  having  regard  to
           the express stipulations of the parties, nature of the  property
           and the surrounding circumstances,  it  is  not  inequitable  to
           grant the relief. If the contract relates to sale  of  immovable
           property, it would normally be presumed that time was not of the
           essence of the  contract.  Mere  incorporation  in  the  written
           agreement of a clause imposing penalty in case of  default  does
           not by itself evidence an intention to make time of the essence.
           In Jamshed Khodaram Irani v. Burjorji  Dhunjibhai  the  Judicial
           Committee of the  Privy  Council  observed  that  the  principle
           underlying Section 55 of the Contract Act did  not  differ  from
           those which  obtained  under  the  law  of  England  as  regards
           contracts for sale of land.”




           22. In Hind Construction  Contractors  case  quoting  Halsbury’s
           Laws of England, this Court observed at pages 1154-55 as  under:
           (SCC pp. 76-77, paras 7 & 8)


                 “In the latest 4th edn. of Halsbury’s Laws of  England  in
           regard to building and engineering contracts  the  statement  of
           law is to be found in Vol. 4, para 1179, which runs thus:
                 ‘1179.  Where time is of the essence of the contract. — The
           expression time is of the essence means that  a  breach  of  the
           condition as to  the  time  for  performance  will  entitle  the
           innocent party to consider the breach as a  repudiation  of  the
           contract.  Exceptionally,  the  completion  of  the  work  by  a
           specified date may be a condition precedent to the  contractor’s
           right to claim payment. The parties may expressly  provide  that
           time is of the essence of the contract and where there is  power
           to determine the contract  on  a  failure  to  complete  by  the
           specified date, the stipulation as to time will be  fundamental.
           Other provisions of the contract may, on the construction of the
           contract, exclude an inference that the completion of the  works
           by a particular date is fundamental; time is not of the  essence
           where a sum is payable for  each  week  that  the  work  remains
           incomplete  after  the  date  fixed,  nor  where   the   parties
           contemplate a postponement of completion.
                 Where time has not been made of the essence of the contract
           or, by reason of  waiver,  the  time  fixed  has  ceased  to  be
           applicable, the employer may by notice fix a reasonable time for
           the completion of the work  and  dismiss  the  contractor  on  a
           failure to complete by the date so fixed.’


                 It will be clear from the aforesaid statement of law  that
           even where the parties have expressly provided that time of  the
           essence of the contract such a stipulation will have to be  read
           along with other provisions  of  the  contract  and  such  other
           provisions may, on construction of  the  contract,  exclude  the
           inference that the completion of the work by a  particular  date
           was intended to be fundamental; for instance,  if  the  contract
           were to include clauses  providing  for  extension  of  time  in
           certain contingencies or for payment  of  fine  or  penalty  for
           every day or week the work undertaken remains unfinished on  the
           expiry of the time provided in the contract such  clauses  would
           be construed as  rendering  ineffective  the  express  provision
           relating to the time being of the essence of contract.”




      19.    The legal principle laid down by this Court in the  above  case
      squarely applies to the facts of this case for the following  reasons.
      In the instant case, undisputedly, the plaintiff did not get Agreement
      of Sale executed by paying the remaining consideration amount  to  the
      defendant Nos. 1-4 within the stipulated period of 7 months as  agreed
      upon by him under Clause 6 of the agreement by  asking  the  defendant
      Nos. 1-4 to get the necessary permission  from  ULCA  and  Income  Tax
      Department  after  paying  the  layout  charges   to   the   concerned
      authorities for getting the sale deed executed  in  his  favour.   The
      plaintiff has not complied with  the  condition  within  the  original
      stipulated period of five months and extended period of two months and
      even if the delay occurs in getting permission from  the  authorities,
      that period was over by July, 1984. It is an undisputed fact that  the
      date of the institution of the original  suit  was  nearly  11  months
      after expiry of the limitation period stipulated in the  agreement  to
      get the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff.

      20.  Both the trial court as well as  the  appellate  court  have  not
      examined this important aspect of the case  though  the  parties  have
      agreed to perform their part of contract within seven months from  the
      date of execution of the agreement as stipulated in clause 6.  We have
      considered this aspect of the case on the basis of  the  period  of  7
      months stipulated in the Agreement of Sale and the same is answered in
      favour of the defendants.

      21.  Answer to Point No. 3

           Point No. 3 is also required to be answered in favour of the 5th
      defendant by assigning the following reasons:

           The learned Senior Counsel Mr. P. Vishwanatha  Shetty  appearing
      for the defendant No.5 has placed strong reliance on the  findings  of
      fact recorded by the trial court on the contentious issue Nos. 4 and 5
      in the negative against the plaintiff, by  recording  its  reasons  at
      paragraphs 12 and 13 of the judgment of the trial  court.   Therefore,
      he submits that the said findings of  fact  are  based  on  facts  and
      evidence on record. Further, he placed reliance upon Section 16(c)  of
      the Specific Relief Act, which provision makes  it  mandatory  on  the
      part of the plaintiff to prove his readiness and  willingness  to  get
      the decree for specific performance of the suit schedule  property  in
      his favour.  The learned Senior Counsel for  the  5th  defendant  also
      placed strong reliance upon the judgment of this Court in the case  of
      N.P.Thirugnnam (dead) by Lrs. vs Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao & Ors.[11]  in
      support of the findings of the trial court on  the  above  contentious
      issues wherein this Court has held  that  the  court  must  take  into
      consideration the conduct of the plaintiff prior and subsequent to the
      filing of the original suit along with other  attending  circumstances
      and further the amount of consideration which he has  to  pay  to  the
      defendant Nos. 1-4 must be proved by  the  plaintiff.    Further,  the
      plaintiff is required to prove the fact that right from  the  date  of
      execution of the Agreement of Sale till the date of passing the decree
      he must prove that he is ready and has always been willing to  perform
      his part of the contract as per the  agreement.  Further,  he  rightly
      contended the same by placing reliance upon another judgment  of  this
      Court in the case of P.R.Deb & Associates Vs. Sunanda Roy[12]  wherein
      this Court held that the plaintiff in a suit for specific  performance
      must be ready and willing to carry out his part of  the  agreement  at
      all material times.

      22.    The correctness of the findings of fact recorded by  the  trial
      court on the contentious issue Nos. 4 & 5 is examined by us keeping in
      view the law laid down by this Court in the above referred  case  with
      reference to the undisputed facts in the case on hand namely, that the
      letter dated 16.03.1985 sent by the plaintiff would clearly go to show
      that the plaintiff was a defaulter and another letter dated 04.05.1985
      sent by the plaintiff to the defendant Nos.1-4, would go to show  that
      the plaintiff was not  ready  and  willing  to  perform  his  part  of
      contract to purchase the suit schedule property  by  paying  remaining
      sale consideration amount to the defendant Nos.1-4  as  per  the  sale
      agreement as he had been seeking time without justification.  Further,
      the trial court has held that the court has  to  see  conduct  of  the
      party as well as the attending circumstances  of  the  case  regarding
      whether readiness and willingness of the plaintiff can be inferred and
      further the learned trial Judge rightly relied upon the  provision  of
      Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act and appreciated  evidence  of
      PW-1, the plaintiff and came to the right conclusion and held that the
      plaintiff had not produced any  document  to  show  that  he  had  the
      balance sale consideration  amount  of  Rs.40,000/-,  to  pay  to  the
      defendant Nos.1-4 to  get  the  sale  deed  executed  in  his  favour.
      Further, there is nothing on record to show that the  plaintiff  could
      have made arrangement for payment of the balance consideration  amount
      to them. But, on the other hand  the  trial  court  has  recorded  the
      finding of fact to the effect  that  the  correspondence  between  the
      parties and other circumstances would  establish  the  fact  that  the
      plaintiff had no money for payment of balance  sale  consideration  to
      the defendant Nos. 1-4 though they demanded the same from him  through
      their legal notices dated 06.03.1985 and 28.03.1985 which notices were
      served upon the plaintiff and despite the same he did not approach the
      defendant Nos.1-4 to get the sale deed executed  in  his  favour  even
      after service of notice, and, prior to issuance of the legal notice to
      him, he never offered to pay the balance consideration as agreed  upon
      by him to them even though defendant Nos. 1-4 have complied  with  all
      the formalities required.  The  learned  Judge,  on  the  question  of
      readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff to perform  his
      part of the contract to get the  sale  deed  executed  in  his  favour
      stated that performance of his obligation is mandatory as per  Section
      16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act and the law laid down in this regard
      by this Court which are referred to supra upon which the  trial  court
      has rightly relied upon and answered the  contentious  issues  against
      him by recording valid and cogent reasons.  In view of  the  foregoing
      reasons, we are of the view that the learned trial judge  has  applied
      his mind consciously and correctly to the admitted facts and on proper
      analysis and appreciation, he has correctly recorded  the  finding  of
      fact holding that the plaintiff has failed to perform his part of  the
      contract in paying the remaining sale consideration and  made  sincere
      efforts to get  necessary  permission  from  the  Urban  Land  Ceiling
      Authority and the Income  Tax  Department  by  paying  the  conversion
      charges of the land to get the sale deed executed in his  favour  from
      the defendant Nos. 1-4 within the stipulated time of five  months  and
      further extended  period  of  two  months  as  per  clause  6  of  the
      agreement. The same has been erroneously set aside  by  the  appellate
      court by recording its reasons by placing reliance upon the  judgments
      of this Court in Nirmala Anand’s case (supra), Jawahar Lal Wadhwa  Vs.
      Haripada Chakroberty[13]; and A.Maria Angelena’s case (supra).

      23.   The learned  senior  counsel  has  rightly  submitted  that  the
      findings of fact on issue Nos.4 & 5 have been erroneously set aside by
      the learned Judge of the High Court by recording his reasons which are
      not supported by pleadings and legal evidence on record. The  findings
      of the learned Judge of the High Court are contrary  to  the  admitted
      facts and legal evidence on record.

      24.   We have carefully scrutinised the findings recorded by the trial
      court on the issue Nos.1,3,4 and 5 with reference to the pleadings  of
      the case  and  legal  evidence  on  record  and  the  same  have  been
      erroneously set aside by the learned  Single  Judge  in  the  impugned
      judgment and therefore, the same cannot be allowed to sustain in  law.
             25.   The first appellate court  has  committed  serious  error
      both on facts and in law in reversing the findings of fact recorded on
      the contentious issues by referring to the decisions of this Court  in
      the impugned judgment  on  the  aforesaid  points  which  are  totally
      inapplicable to the fact situation, and has erroneously set aside  the
      findings of fact recorded by the trial court.  Therefore,  we  are  of
      the considered view  that  the  submissions  made  by  learned  Senior
      Counsel on the basis of the findings and reasons recorded by the trial
      court in its judgment are well founded and the same must  be  accepted
      and accordingly we answer the point No. 3 against the plaintiff and in
      favour of the defendant No.5.

      26.  Answer to the Point No.4

            The point No. 4 is also required to be answered in favour of the
      5th defendant for the reason that sale consideration of Rs.48,000/- in
      respect of the suit schedule property has been paid to  the  defendant
      Nos. 1-4 after the termination  of  the  earlier  agreement  with  the
      plaintiff on 10.04.1985 vide notice dated 28.03.1985.  Therefore,  the
      contention urged on behalf of the plaintiff, that 5th defendant is not
      the bona fide purchaser, does not arise at all for the reason that the
      earlier agreement executed in favour of the plaintiff by the defendant
      Nos.1-4 was not subsisting, is the finding recorded by us in answer to
      the point No.1 and we have held that there is termination of Agreement
      of Sale dated 25.12.1983 by letter dated 28.03.1985  sent  to  him  by
      them. Therefore, the findings recorded by the appellate court on  this
      aspect stating that the defendant No.5 is not a  bona  fide  purchaser
      cannot be allowed to sustain.  Accordingly, we set aside the  same  in
      the above aspect.

      27.   Further, the High Court should have considered the relevant  and
      important aspect of the case namely that the plaintiff is entitled  to
      compensation as agreed upon by him under clause 12 of the Agreement of
      Sale which is in favour of defendant Nos. 1-4.  It provides  that  the
      defendant Nos.1-4 have agreed that in the event of  their  failure  to
      comply with  the  terms  of  the  agreement  they  shall  pay  sum  of
      Rs.10,000/- to the plaintiff and also such sum which is spent  by  him
      towards conversion charges and building plan charges.  Similarly,  the
      plaintiff had agreed that in the event of his failure to  comply  with
      the terms of the agreement the defendant  Nos.  1-4  are  entitled  to
      forfeit the advance amount.  This important aspect of the terms of the
      Agreement of Sale has not been noticed by the  learned  Judge  of  the
      High Court while reversing the judgment and decree of the trial  court
      and granted the decree for  specific  performance  in  favour  of  the
      plaintiff in exercise of his discretionary  power  under  sub-sections
      (1) and (2) of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. Further, in view
      of the foregoing reasons and statutory provisions of  Sections  16(c),
      20 (1) and (2) and 21(2) of the Specific Relief Act, the plaintiff  is
      not entitled for a decree of specific performance in  respect  of  the
      suit schedule property and also he had lost the right to seek a decree
      of specific performance.

      28.   The learned High Court Judge has gravely erred in reversing  the
      findings of fact recorded on the issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5  by  the  trial
      court in favour of the defendants. He has also  failed  to  take  into
      consideration the very important aspect of the  matter,  namely,  that
      the Agreement of Sale in favour of the plaintiff was terminated and he
      had not sought declaratory relief to declare that the  termination  of
      agreement in the original suit is bad in law and  therefore  the  suit
      for specific performance is not maintainable.  Even assuming  for  the
      sake of argument that agreement was subsisting, the suit for  specific
      performance is not maintainable in law in view of the  breach  of  the
      terms and conditions of the agreement by  the  plaintiff.  Keeping  in
      view the purpose for which the Agreement of Sale was executed and  the
      time stipulated in the agreement as per clause 6 of the agreement, the
      contract should have been complied with within seven months  including
      the extended period and that has not been done by the plaintiff.   The
      findings recorded by the trial court on issue Nos. 4 and  5  and  with
      regard to the readiness and willingness on the part of the  plaintiff,
      the appellate court should  have  exercised  its  discretionary  power
      under sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 20 of  the  Specific  Relief
      Act, and for this reason also we hold that the grant of the decree for
      specific performance by the High Court in  the  impugned  judgment  is
      wholly unsustainable in law.  The trial court has come  to  the  right
      conclusions on the contentious issues framed by it and has  held  that
      even though Agreement of Sale is proved, the plaintiff is not entitled
      for the decree of specific performance in respect of the suit schedule
      property in view of the findings of fact and reasons recorded  in  the
      contentious issues by it in its judgment and we are in agreement  with
      the same.

      29.   Accordingly, we allow  this  civil  appeal  and  set  aside  the
      impugned judgment and decree of the High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore
      passed in Regular First Appeal No.97  of  2001  dated  08.12.2008  and
      restore the judgment and decree passed by  the  X1th  Additional  City
      Civil Judge, Bangalore City, Bangalore dated 25.09.2000  in  O.S.  No.
      2012 of 1985, but, in the facts and  circumstances  of  the  case,  no
      costs are awarded in these proceedings.




                                       …………………………………………………………J.       [G.S.
                                       SINGHVI]







                                       …………………………………………………………J.
                                       [V. GOPALA GOWDA]

      New Delhi,                                                   August
      29, 2013







      -----------------------
[1]     (1977) 2 SCC 200

[2]     ILR 1993 KAR 427

[3]     (2003)10 SCC 390

[4]     (1996)4 SCC 526

[5]      1987 (Suppl) SCC 340

[6]     (2002) 5 SCC 481

[7]    1961 (3) SCR 579

[8]    (2002) 9 SCC 597

[9]    (2007) 9  SCC 660

[10]   (1993) 1 SCC 519

[11]    (1995) 5 SCC 115

[12]   (1996) 4 SCC 423

[13]    (1989) 1 SCC 76



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