LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Wednesday, July 6, 2016

"The Government cannot evict the persons in occupation of the Government land un-authorisedly in exercise of its powers under Sections 6 and 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, where the complicated questions of title arise for decision. The summary remedy, for eviction which is provided for Section 6 of the Act can be resorted to by any Government only against persons who are in un-authorised occupation of any land, which is "the property of the Government", but not in respect of the persons who have bona fide claim to litigate and they cannot be evicted saved by due process of law. The summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 is not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated questions of title".

PETITIONER:
GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Vs.

RESPONDENT:
THUMMALA KRISHNA RAO & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/03/1982

BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ)
BENCH:
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ)
VARADARAJAN, A. (J)
SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J)

CITATION:
 1982 AIR 1081  1982 SCR  (3) 500
 1982 SCC  (2) 134  1982 SCALE  (1)180


ACT:
     Andhra  Pradesh   Land  Encroachment  Act, 1905-S.  6-
Provision for  summary eviction of unauthorised occupant of
government land-Existence  of bona  fide  dispute  regarding
title between  government  and occupant-Resort to  summary
remedy-Whether valid and legal?



HEADNOTE:
     The Andhra Pradesh Land  Encroachment  Act,  1905 was
enacted to  check  unauthorised  occupation  of  government
lands. Under  s. 2  of the  Act all  public roads,  streets,
lands, paths,  bridges etc,  are  deemed  to  be  government
property. Any  person who  is in  unauthorised occupation of
any land  which is  the property of the government is liable
to pay assessment as provided in s. 3 of the Act. Section 5
provides that any person, liable to assessment shall also be
liable to  pay an additional sum by way of penalty. Under s.
6(1) the  Collector, Tahsildar or Deputy  Tahsildar has the
power to summarily evict any person unauthorisedly occupying
any land for which he is liable to pay assessment under s. 3
after issuing a show cause notice as provided in s. 7.
     Some time between the years 1932 and 1937 certain lands
were acquired  by the  Government of  Nizam of Hyderabad for
the benefit  of a University. A question having arisen as to
whether three  specific plots  of land had been included in
the acquisition, the University filed a suit in 1956 praying
for the eviction of the occupant. This suit was dismissed in
1959 on the ground  that one  of the  plots  had  not been
acquired by  the Government  and in respect of the other two
plots the  University had  failed to  prove  its  possession
within 12  years before the filing  of the  suit. The trial
court found that the heir of the original owner of the plots
had encroached on the said two plots in 1942. The judgment
of the trial court was confirmed by the High Court in 1964.
The State Government was not a party to those proceedings.
     The  University  activated the  State  Government for
summary eviction  of the heir of the original owner from the
three plots  of lands. The Tahsildar  initiated action and
passed an  order of  eviction under  s. 6(1)  of the  Act on
December 15,  1964. Appeals  against the order were rejected
by the Collector in  1965 and by the Revenue Board in 1968.
The respondents who purchased the plots during the pendency
of the appeal before  the Revenue  Board were impleaded as
parties
501
to the proceedings on the death of the heir of the original
owner and.  their appeal  from the  decision of the Revenue
Board was rejected by the Government in 1973
     The respondents  challenged the  order of eviction by a
petition under Art. 226  which was  dismissed by  a  Single
Judge of  the High Court who held that the question of title
to the property could not properly be decided by him under
Article 226  but the  fact that there was  a finding by the
Civil Court  that there was  encroachment  by the  alleged
encroacher was sufficient  to entitle the  Government  to
initiate  action   under  the provisions   of  the Land
Encroachment Act.
     The appeal of  the  respondents  was  allowed  by the
Division Bench which held that a dispute relating to as far
back as 1942 could not be dealt with in summary proceedings
under the  provisions of  the  Land  Encroachment  Act. The
summary remedy could not be resorted to unless there was an
attempted encroachment or encroachment of  a very  recent
origin; nor   could  it   be  availed of  in cases  where
complicated questions of title arose for decision.
     Dismissing the appeals,
^
     HELD: (I) The summary  remedy for eviction provided by
s. 6  of tho  Act can  be resorted to by the Government only
against persons who are  in unauthorised  occupation of any
land which  is the property of the Government. If there is a
bonafide dispute  regarding the title of  the Government to
any  property, the  Government cannot take  a  unilateral
decision in  its own  favour that tho property belongs to it
and on that basis  take  recourse  to the  summary  remedy
provided  by   s  6.   In  the instant  case there was
unquestionably a   genuine  dispute  , between  the  State
Government and the respondents as to whether the three plots
of  land   bad been   the  subject-matter   of acquisition
proceedings taken  by the  then Government of Hyderabad, and
whether the  University for  whose benefit  the plots were
alleged to have been acquired had lost title to the property
by operation of the law of limitation. The respondents had a
bonafide claim to litigate  and they  could not  be evicted
save  by   the due  process  of  law. The  summary  remedy
prescribed by  s. 6  was not the kind of legal process which
was suited  to adjudication  of  complicated  questions  of
title. That procedure was, therefore, not the due process of
law for evicting the respondents. [506 H; 507 A; 507 D-H]
     2. The  view of  the Division  Bench that the  summary
remedy provided for by s. 6 could not be resorted to unless
the alleged  encroachment was  of  "a  very  recent  origin"
cannot be  stretched too  far. It is not the duration, short
or long,  of encroachment that is conclusive of the question
whether the  summary remedy prescribed by the Act can be put
into operation for evicting  a person. What is relevant for
the decision  of that  question is  more the  nature of the
property on  which the encroachment is alleged to have been
committed and  the consideration  whether the  claim of the
occupant is  bonafide. Facts  which raise a bonafide dispute
of title between the Government and the occupant must be ad-
judicated upon by the ordinary courts of law. The duration
of occupation  is relevant in the sense that a person who is
in occupation of a property openly for
502
an appreciable length of  time can  be taken prima facie to
have  a bona  fide  claim  to the  property  requiring  an
impartial  adjudication  according   to   the established
procedure of  law. In  the instant case, the long possession
of the respondents and their predecessors-in-title raised a
genuine dispute between them  and  the Government  on the
question of  title. Whether  the title to the property had
come  to  be  vested  in  the  Government  as  a  result  of
acquisition and whether the  heir of the original owner had
encroached upon that property and perfected  his title  by
adverse possession   had  to be  decided  in a  properly
constituted suit. [508 A-D; 508 E-G]



JUDGMENT:
     CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2031 of
1977.
     Appeal by special Leave  from the judgment and  order
dated the  30th June,  1977 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
in Writ Petition No. 905 of 1975.
   WITH
   Civil Appeal Nos. 136 & 137 of 1978.
     From the  judgment and  order dated the 30th June, 1977
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Petition Nos. 796 &
922 of 1975 respectively.
     Ramachandra Reddy, Advocate General and B. Parthasarthi
for the Appellants
     P. Rama  Reddy and A.V.V. Nair for Respondent No. 2 in
CA. 2031, R. 3 in 136 & R. 2 in 137.
     A. Subba Rao for RR I & 2 in CA. 136/78.
     A.K. Sen, e. Rajendra  Choudhury, G.R.  Subbaryan,  I.
Koti Reddy  and Mahabir Singh for  Respondent No.  1 in CA.
137/78.
     B. Ranta Rao for Respondent No. 1 in CA. 2031/77.
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
     CHANDRACHUD, C.J. these three  appeals arise  out of a
common judgment dated June  30. 1977 of a Division Bench of
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, setting aside the judgment
of a  learned single  Judge dated  November 18, 1975 in Writ
Petitions Nos. 1539 of 1974 and  798 of 1975. Civil Appeal
No. 2031  (NCM) of  1977 is by special leave while the other
two appeals are by certi-
503
ficate granted by the High Court  The question which these
appeals involve is whether the appellant, the Government of
Andhra Pradesh, has the  power to  evict  the respondents
summarily in  exercise of  the power conferred by the Andhra
Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905. This question arises on
the following facts:
     We are  concerned in these appeals with three groups of
lands situated in Habsiguda,  Hyderabad East  Taluk, Andhra
Pradesh. Those lands are: R.S. No 10/1, which corresponds to
plot No. 94 admeasuring 10 acres and 2 guntas, R.S. No. 10/2
which corresponds to plot No. 104 admeasuring 9 acres and 33
guntas; and  R.S. Nos. 7, 8  and 9 which correspond to plot
No. 111 admeasuring 26 acres and  14 guntas. These  lands
belonged originally  to Nawab Zainuddin and after his death,
they devolved  on Nawab Habibuddin.  Sometime between the
years 1932  and 1937,  certain lands  were acquired  by the
Government of  the Nizam  of Hyderabad under the  Hyderabad
Land Acquisition  Act of 1309 Fasli, the provisions of which
are in material respects  similar  to those  of  the Land
Acquisition Act,  1894. The  lands  were  acquired  for the
benefit of   the  osmania   University  which  was then
administered as a Department of the Government of Hyderabad.
The University acquired an  independent legal status of its
own under  the osmania University  Revised  Charter,  1947,
which was promulgated by the Nizam. E
     The question  whether the aforesaid three plots of land
were included  in the acquisition notified by the Government
of Nizam  became a  bone of  contention between the parties,
the osmania University contending that they were so included
and that  they were  acquired for its benefit and the owner,
Nawab Habibuddin,  contending that  the three plots were not
acquired. On  February 13, 1956 the osmania University filed
a suit (O.S. No. 1 of 1956) against Nawab Habibuddin, in the
City Civil  Court, Hyderabad,  claiming that the three lands
were acquired  by the  Government for its benefit and asking
for his eviction from those lands. That suit was dismissed
in 1959 on the ground that plot No. 111 was not acquired by
the Government and that  though plots Nos. 94 and 104 were
acquired, the  University failed  to  prove  its  possession
thereof within twelve years  before the filing of the suit.
In regard  to plots Nos. 94 & 104, it was found by the trial
court that  Habibuddio had  encroached thereupon in the year
1942, which  was more than twelve years before the filing of
the suit. Civil Appeal No. 61 of 1959 filed by
504
the  University against  that judgment  was  dismissed  on
January 24,  1964 by  the  High Court which  affirmed the
findings of  the trial court. The  State Government was not
impleaded as a party to those proceedings.
     On May 8, 1964 the osmania University wrote a letter to
the Government of Andhra  Pradesh, requesting it  to take
steps for the summary eviction of persons who were allegedly
in unauthorised occupation of the 3  plots. On December 8,
1964, the  Tahsildar, Government  of Andhra  Pradesh, acting
under section 7 of the Land Encroachment Act, 1905, issued a
notice to  Nawab Habibuddin  to vacate the  lands  and  on
December 15, 1964 the Tahsildar passed an order evicting him
iron the  lands. The  appeal  filed  by Habibuddin  to the
Collector was  dismissed in  1965 and the appeal against the
decision of the Collector was dismissed by the Revenue Board
in 1968 During the pendency of the appeal before the Revenue
Board, the  respondents purchased  the plots from Habibuddin
for valuable  consideration and on the death of Habibuddin,
they were  impleaded to the proceedings  before the Revenue
Board. They  preferred an  appeal from the decision  of the
Revenue Board to  the  Government  but  that appeal was
dismissed on November 26, 1973.
     On March 19, 1974, the respondents filed Writ Petitions
in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh challenging the order by
which they  were evicted  from the plots summarily under the
provisions of  the Act of 1905.  The learned  single  Judge
dismissed those Writ Petitions observing:
 "The question whether the lands with which we are
     concerned in  the writ  petition were  acquired by the
     Government or   not  and the  question whether the
     Government had  transferred its title to the University
     or not  are questions  which cannot properly be decided
     by me  in an  application under  article 226  of the
     Constitution. The appropriate remedy of the petitioners
     is to file a suit to establish their title."
The learned Judge held that:
 "Though  the title of  the Government  is not
     admitted by  the alleged encroacher, there is a finding
     by the Civil
505
     Court  that  there was  encroachment  by the  alleged
     encroacher.  That is  sufficient  to   entitle the
     Government to  initiate action  under the provisions of
     the Land Encroachment Act."
     Three appeals  were preferred  to The  Division  Bench
against the  judgment of  the learned  single Judge,  two of
them being  by the  petitioners in one writ petition and the
third by  the petitioner  in the  other writ  petition. The
Division Bench, while setting aside the  judgment  of the
learned single Judge, held:
 "The question whether the lands. belong to osmania
     University or  not will  have to be decided as and when
     the Government  comes  forward  with  a  suit  for the
     purpose. Even  if we  assume for  the  purpose  of our
     judgment, as  we are  not pronouncing any conclusion as
     to whether  the  land  vested  in the  Government  or
     University, that  the  Government is  the owner, the
     dispute going  back from 1942 - cannot be dealt with in
     summary  proceeding   under  section   7  of  the Land
     Encroachment Act."
The summary  remedy provided  by section 7, according to the
Division Bench, cannot be  resorted to "unless there is an
attempted encroachment or encroachment of  a very  recent
origin" and  further, that  it cannot be availed of in cases
where complicated questions of title arise for decision.
     We are  in respectful  agreement with the view taken by
the Division Bench, subject however to the observations made
herein below.  The Andhra  Pradesh  Land  Encroachment Act,
1905, was  passed in order "to provide measures for checking
unauthorised occupation of lands  which are the property of
Government." The  preamble to  the Act says that it had been
the practice to check unauthorised occupation of lands which
are the property of  the Government  "by the  imposition of
penal or  prohibitory assessment or charge" and since doubts
had arisen  whether such  practice was authorised by law, it
had  become  necessary to  make  statutory  provisions for
checking unauthorised  occupations. Section 2 (1) of the Act
provides that  all  public  roads,  streets,  lands,  paths,
bridges, etc.  shall be deemed to be the property belonging
to Government, unless it  falls under clauses (a) to (e) of
that section.  Section 2  (2) provides that all public roads
and streets
506
vested in  any public  authority shall be deemed  to be the
property of  the Government by section 3 (1), any person who
is in  unauthorised occupation of any land  which  is the
property of  Government, is  liable  to pay  assessment  as
provided in  clauses (i) and (ii) of that section. Section S
provides that  any person  liable to  pay  assessment  under
section 3  shall also  be liable,  at the  discretion of the
Collector, to  pay an  additional sum  by  way of  penalty.
Sections 6  (1) and  7, which  are relevant for our purpose,
read thus:
     "Sec. 6  (1)    Any person unauthorisedly occupying any
   land for  which  he is  liable  to pay
   assessment under section 3   may  be
   summarily  evicted by  the  Collector,
   Tahsildar or  Deputy Tahsildar  and any
   crop or other product raised on the land
   shall be  liable to forfeiture and any
   building or other construction  erected
   or anything   deposited  thereon  shall
   also, if  not removed  by him after such
   written   notice   as   the  Collection
   Tahsildar. or  Deputy Tahsildar may deem
   reasonable, be  liable  to forfeiture.
   Forfeitures under  this section shall be
   adjudged by the Collector, Tahsildar or
   Deputy Tahsildar  and  any property  so
   forfeited shall  be disposed  of as the
   Collector, Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar
   may direct."
"Sec. 7.    Before taking proceedings under section
   5  or   section  6,  the  Collector  or
   Tahsildar or  Deputy  Tahsildar  as the
   case may  be shall cause to be served on
   the person reputed to be in unauthorised
   occupation of land being the property of
   Government, a notice specifying the land
   so occupied and calling  on him to show
   cause  before  a  certain  date  why  he
   should not be proceeded  against  under
   section S or section 6."
     It seems  to us  clear from  these provisions  that the
summary remedy for eviction which is provided for by section
6 of  the Act  can be  resorted to  by the  Government only
against persons who are in
507
unauthorized occupation of any land which is "the property
of Government". In regard  to properly described  in sub-
sections (I)  and (2)  of section  2, there can be no doubt,
difficulty or dispute as to the title of the Government and,
therefore, in respect of such property, the Government would
be free to take  recourse to the summary remedy of eviction
provided for in section 6. A person who occupies a part of a
public road,  street, bridge,  the bed of the sea and the
like, is  in unauthorised  occupation of  property which  is
declared by  section 2 to be the property of the Government
and, therefore, it is in  public  interest  to  evict him
expeditiously which  can only  be done by resorting  to the
summary remedy provided by the Act. But section 6 (1) which
confers the  power of  summary eviction on  the  Government
limits that  power  to cases in  which  a  person  is  in
unauthorised occupation of a land "for which he is liable to
pay assessment under section 3''. Section 3, in turn, refers
to  unauthorised  occupation  of  any  land  "which  is the
property of Government" If there is a bond dispute regarding
the title  of the  Government to any property the Government
cannot take a unilateral decision in its own favour that the
property belongs  to it,  and on  the basis of such decision
take recourse  to the  summary remedy  provided by section 6
for evicting the person who is in possession of the property
under a bona fide claim or title. In the instant case, there
is  unquestionably  a  genuine dispute between  The  State
Government and the respondents as to whether The three plots
of land were the  subject-matter of acquisition proceedings
taken by  the then  Government of  Hyderabad and whether the
osmania University.  for whose benefit the plots are alleged
to have been acquired, had lost  title to  the property by
operation of  the law  of limitation.  The suit filed by the
University was dismissed on the ground of limitation, inter
alia, since Nawab Habibuddin was found to have encroached on
the properly  more than twelve years before the date of the
suit and  the  University  was not  in possession  of the
property at  any time  within that  period. Having tailed in
the suit,  the University  activated the Government to evict
the Nawab  and his  transferees summarily, which seems to us
impermissible. The  respondents have  a bona  fide claim  to
litigate and  they cannot be evicted save by the due process
of law. The summary  remedy prescribed by section 6 is not
the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication
of  complicated questions  of title. That  procedure is,
therefore, not the due process of  law  for  evicting the
respondents.
508
     The view  of the Division Bench that the summary remedy
provided for  by section  6 cannot be resorted to unless the
alleged encroachment is of "a very recent origin", cannot be
stretched too  far That was also  the view  taken  by the
learned single Judge him  self in  another  case  which  is
reported in  Meherunnissa Begum v. State  of A.P. which was
affirmed by  a Division Bench.(2) It  is not  the duration,
short or  long, of  encroachment that  is conclusive  of the
question whether  the summary  remedy prescribed  by the Act
can be put into  operation for evicting a  person. What is
relevant for  the decision  of that  question  is  more the
nature of  the property on which the encroachment is alleged
to have been committed and the  consideration whether the
claim of  the occupant is bona fide. Facts " which raise a
bond fide  dispute of  title between  the Government and the
occupant must  be adjudicated upon by the Ordinary courts of
law.   The   Government  cannot   decide   such   questions
unilaterally  in   its own  favour  and  evict any  person
summarily on  the basis of such  decision. But duration of
occupation is  relevant in the sense that a person who is hl
occupation of a property openly for an appreciable length of
time can  be taken, prima facie, to have a bonafide claim to
the property  requiring an  impartial adjudication according
to the established procedure of law.
     The conspectus  of facts  in the instant case justifies
the view  that the  question as to the title to  the three
plots cannot  appropriately be decided in a summary inquiry
contemplated by sections 6  and 7  of the  Act.  The long
possession of  the respondents and  their  predecessors-in-
title of  these plots  raises a genuine dispute between them
and the Government on the question  of title, remembering
especially   that   the  property,   admittedly,   belonged
originally to  the family  of Nawab Habibuddio from whom the
respondents claim  to have  purchased it. The question as to
whether the  title to  the property came to be vested in the
Government as  a  result  of  acquisition  and the  further
question whether  the Nawab  encroached upon  that  property
thereafter and perfected his  title by adverse  possession
must be decided in a properly constituted suit. May be, that
the Government may succeed in establishing its title to the
property but,  until that is done, the respondents cannot be
evicted summarily.
     For these reasons,  we  uphold  the  judgment  of the
Division Bench of the High Court and dismiss these appeals
with costs.
509
     We do  not propose to pass  any orders  on Civil Misc.
Petitions A Nos. 18974, 18975, 18976, 18497, 18498 and 18499
of 1981 which have been filed for adding certain parties as
respondents to these appeals. Those petitions involve the
question of  a Will  alleged to have  been  made  by  Nawab
Habibuddin in  favour of  Entashamuddin alias Anwar Siddiqui
and his elder brother. We cannot  go into  the validity of
that Will and other incidental questions in these ap peals.
H.L.C.  Appeals dismissed.
510



Tuesday, July 5, 2016

The orders of the Criminal Court vis-a-vis Ramachandraiah are illegal and liable to be set aside. We also find that the impugned judgment in appeal is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside. The orders of the Courts below are accordingly set aside. The appeal succeeds.= “A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one’s imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which he is charged ………..…… In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worthy and the animus of witness - In fact, we find that the learned District Judge could not have proceeded with the attachment proceedings at all since the attachment proceedings were initiated by the State against Ramachandraiah under clause 3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944, who was actually dead. Clause 3 contemplates that such an application must be made to the District Judge within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the said person ordinarily resides or carries on business, in respect of property which the State Government believes the said person to have procured by means of the offences. It is incomprehensible, therefore, that such an application could have been made in regard to a dead person who obviously cannot be said to be ordinarily resident or carrying on business anywhere. There is no legal provision which enables continuance of prosecution upon death of the accused. We must record that the proceedings and the decisions of the courts below are disturbing, to say the least. In the first place, though the accused had died, the trial court proceeded with the trial and recorded a conviction two years after his death. Then, this null and void conviction was used as a basis for making an attachment of his properties before the Sessions Court. Astonishingly, all applications succeeded, the attachment was made absolute and over and above all, the High Court upheld the attachment.

                                                   REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1596 OF 2011



U. SUBHADRAMMA & ORS.                                    ..APPELLANTS

                                     VS


STATE OF A.P. REP.BY PUB. PROSECUTOR & ANR.    ..RESPONDENTS




                                 1 JUDGMENT



S. A. BOBDE, J.


      The appellants being legal representatives of one  Ramachandraiah  who
was accused of offences under Sections 409, 468 read  with  Section  471  of
the Indian Penal Code, have filed  this  appeal  against  the  Judgment  and
order dated 28-6-2006 of the High  Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh  at  Hyderabad
dismissing their petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure  Code.
 Ramachandraiah, since deceased, who was the husband of Appellant  No.1  and
father of Appellant   Nos. 2 and  3,  was  prosecuted  under  the  aforesaid
sections in respect of  misappropriation  of  funds.  He  was  charged  with
misappropriation of an amount of Rs. 6,57,355.90  during  the  period  31-7-
1987 to 29-6-1988 along with him one  Subbarayudu  was  charged  as  Accused
No.2. In October, 1991, U. Ramachandraiah  expired  during  the  trial.  The
trial court  acquitted  the  Accused  No.2  Subbarayudu  by  Judgment  dated
25.10.1993. However, the trial court observed  on  the  basis  of  oral  and
documentary evidence that Ramachandraiah  alone  committed  the  offence  as
alleged by the prosecution. Further, that there was no oral  or  documentary
evidence placed before the Court to  show  that  Subbarayudu  the  surviving
accused assisted  Ramachandraiah  in  committing  the  alleged  offence.  In
effect, the trial court found Ramachandraiah responsible  for  the  offences
though he could not be adjudged guilty since he had expired.

Proceedings under the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance against the  property
of the deceased

2.    In 1997, the  State  moved  an  application  under  the  Criminal  Law
Amendment Ordinance, 1944 (Ordinance No. XXXVIII of 1944) for attachment  of
property of the appellant under the criminal  law.   Thereon,  the  District
Judge passed an order of interim attachment under Clause 4 of the  ordinance
on the basis that Ramachandraiah has committed  the  scheduled  offences  or
that he has procured money or the property in question from the proceeds  of
such offence. The District Judge issued notice calling upon  the  appellants
to show cause why the order of attachment should not be  made  absolute.  In
this order, the District Judge observed that according to the state as  many
as  30  items  mentioned  in  the  schedule  were  acquired  by   the   said
Ramachandraiah either in his own name or his wife's name or in the names  of
his sons due to illegal amounts drawn by him and a case  was  filed  against
Ramachandraiah  as  accused  No.1  and  Subbarayudu  as  accused  no.2.  The
District Judge further observed that the trial court i.e.  first  Additional
District Munsif, Cuddapah found Ramachandraiah had committed the offence  as
alleged  by  the  prosecution  and,  therefore,  the   said   Ramachandraiah
committed the offence. It was observed by the learned  District  Judge  that
Ramachandraiah had been found to  have  prepared  bills  in  the  fictitious
names of 21 lecturers during the relevant period and had drawn cash  on  the
basis of the pay bills including the bogus bills since May  1991  and  drawn
about Rs.38,00,000/- to Rs.40,00,000/-.
3.    Thereafter on 1-10-2002, the learned District Judge heard  both  sides
and made the order of interim conditional attachment absolute.  He  observed
that the High Court has refused to  interfere  with  the  order  of  interim
conditional attachment and though no counter affidavit  had  been  filed  by
the appellants, the learned District  Judge  observed  that  the  appellants
have failed to prove that the properties as mentioned in  the  schedule  are
the self-acquired properties of U. Ramachandraiah and, therefore, the  order
is being made absolute.
4.    The appellants then challenged  the  order  of  the  learned  District
Judge making an interim attachment absolute  by  way  of  a  petition  under
Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code.  The learned Single  Judge  held
that the amount misappropriated is 6,57,355.90; strangely, on the  basis  of
the  charge  sheet.   The  learned   Single   Judge   also   observed   that
Ramachandraiah who alone had committed  the  offence  and  not  Subbarayudu,
must be taken to have misappropriated the said amount since the Trial  Court
held  the  latter  to  be  innocent.   Against  the  aforesaid  order,   the
appellants have preferred this appeal.
5.    Learned Senior counsel for the appellants submitted  that  the  scheme
of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 does not permit  the  District
Judge to confirm any attachment of the property though  the  criminal  court
has not validly  convicted  and  found  the  accused  or  the  person  whose
property is sought to be attached as guilty. Learned counsel submitted  that
in this case, it was not possible for the criminal court to  have  convicted
or found Ramachandraiah guilty since he expired in 1991  during  the  trial.
In fact, according to the appellants, no application  for  attachment  could
have  been  made  under  these  circumstances.  Learned  counsel   for   the
respondents strongly opposed the prayer and submitted  that  the  appellants
may not to be allowed to retain property obtained by  ill-gotten  means  and
it was legal for the learned District Judge to  have  passed  the  order  of
attachment in respect of such property  which  was  admittedly  the  subject
matter of the charge-sheet. It has, therefore, become necessary  for  us  to
examine whether the property of  a  person  which  was  merely  case  of  an
offence of  misappropriation  but  who  died  during  the  pendency  of  the
criminal trial can be attached in the hands  of  his  legal  representatives
under the provisions of Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944.
6.    As far as making the application for attachment, we find that the  law
authorises the State Government to make  such  an  application  even  though
proceedings against the person may not yet have resulted  in  a  conviction.
This is by virtue of clause 3[1] which empowers the Government to  authorise
making of such an application to the District Judge where it has  reason  to
believe that any person has committed any  scheduled  offence.  But  however
clause 3 requires  the  Government  to  make  such  an  application  to  the
District Judge within the  local  limits  of  whose  jurisdiction  the  said
person ordinarily resides or carries on  business;  thus  clearly  requiring
the existence of such a person. It excludes the possibility  of  proceedings
against a dead person. Clause 4 of the act empowers the  District  Judge  to
pass an order of ad interim attachment on prima facie grounds for  believing
that the person in respect of whom the application  is  made  has  committed
any scheduled offence or has procured any money or  property  thereby.  Sub-
clause 2 requires the District Judge to issue a notice,  presumably  at  the
address where the person ordinarily resides or  carries  on  business  (vide
clause 3) along with copies of the order and the application etc.  Clause  5
provides for an investigation of objections to the attachment who have  been
served with notices under clause  4.  Sub-clause  3  empowers  the  District
Judge to pass an order making the ad interim order  of  attachment  absolute
or varying it by releasing a portion of  the  property  or  withdrawing  the
order. Clause 13 requires the Government to inform the District Judge  about
the status of the  criminal  proceedings.  It  requires  the  Government  to
furnish the District Judge with a copy of  the  judgment  or  order  of  the
trial court and with copies of  the  judgment  or  orders,  if  any  of  the
appellate or revisional  court  thereon.  Sub-clause  2  mandates  that  the
District  Judge  shall  forthwith  withdraw  any  orders  of  attachment  of
property made in connection with the offence if (a)  cognizance  of  alleged
scheduled offence has not been taken or (b) where  the  final  judgment  and
orders of the criminal court is one of acquittal.   While,  this  clause  is
clear that the orders of attachment must be withdrawn if cognizance  of  the
offence has not been taken or there has been an  acquittal;  the  clause  is
silent as to the effect of abatement of  prosecution.  It  is  due  to  this
silence that it is contended by the State Government in this case  that  the
orders of attachment could not only have been continued but could also  have
been confirmed.  It is not possible for us to accept the submission. If  the
law requires  that  the  orders  of  attachment  should  be  withdrawn  upon
acquittal it stands to reason that such orders must be  withdrawn  when  the
prosecution abates or cannot result in a conviction due to the death of  the
accused, whose property is attached.  Concept of abatement of a trial  could
be subsumed in the  clause  where  the  final  judgment  and  order  of  the
Criminal Court is one of acquittal. In  this  context,  the  presumption  of
innocence of an accused till he is convicted  must  be  borne  in  mind  and
there is no reason to consider this presumption to have vaporized  upon  the
death of an accused. It may be noted that this  Court  has  time  and  again
reiterated  the  presumption  of  innocence  of  an  accused  till   he   is
convicted.[2]
7.    As far as the circumstances of this case are concerned, we  find  that
there has been a gross mis-carriage of justice  at  several  steps.  In  the
first place, the finding of the trial court that  Ramachandraiah  was  alone
responsible for the offences is completely vitiated as null and  void  since
Ramachandraiah had admittedly died on the date this  finding  was  rendered.
It is too well settled that a prosecution cannot  continue  against  a  dead
person. A fortiori a criminal court cannot continue  proceedings  against  a
dead person and find him guilty.  Such  proceedings  and  the  findings  are
contrary to the very foundation of criminal jurisprudence.  In such  a  case
the accused does not  exist  and  cannot  be  convicted.  Consequently,  the
learned District Judge committed a gross error of law in acting upon such  a
finding and treating Ramachandraiah as guilty of such offences while  making
the order of attachment and while confirming the said  order  of  attachment
of properties.
8.    In such circumstance, the courts below erred in recording the  finding
that  Appellant  No.1  had  committed  the  offence  as   alleged   by   the
prosecution.  Further, finding recorded by the learned Single Judge  of  the
High Court that Appellant No.1 alone  had  committed  the  offence  and  nor
Appellant No.2, must be taken to have misappropriated  the  said  amount  is
perverse.
      “A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale  wherein  one  is  free  to
give flight to one’s imagination and phantasy.  It concerns itself with  the
question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty  of  the
crime with which he is charged ………..……  In arriving at the conclusion  about
the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime,  the  court
has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities,  its  intrinsic
worthy and the animus of witness[3].


9.    The facts involved herein did not warrant  presumption  of  commission
of offence by Appellant No.1 and thus the findings recorded  by  the  courts
below are not tenable.

10.   In fact, we find that  the  learned  District  Judge  could  not  have
proceeded with the  attachment  proceedings  at  all  since  the  attachment
proceedings were initiated by the State against Ramachandraiah under  clause
3 of the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance,  1944,  who  was  actually  dead.
Clause 3 contemplates that such an application must be made to the  District
Judge within  the  local  limits  of  whose  jurisdiction  the  said  person
ordinarily resides or carries on business, in respect of property which  the
State Government believes the said person to have procured by means  of  the
offences. It is incomprehensible, therefore, that such an application  could
have been made in regard to a dead person who obviously cannot  be  said  to
be ordinarily resident or carrying on business anywhere.  There is no  legal
provision which  enables  continuance  of  prosecution  upon  death  of  the
accused.  We must record that the  proceedings  and  the  decisions  of  the
courts below are disturbing, to say the least.  In the first  place,  though
the accused had died, the trial court proceeded with the trial and  recorded
a  conviction  two  years  after  his  death.   Then,  this  null  and  void
conviction was used as a basis for making an attachment  of  his  properties
before the Sessions Court. Astonishingly, all  applications  succeeded,  the
attachment was made absolute and over and above all, the High  Court  upheld
the attachment.
11.   The orders of the Criminal Court vis-a-vis Ramachandraiah are  illegal
and liable to be set aside. We also  find  that  the  impugned  judgment  in
appeal is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside.  The  orders  of  the
Courts below are accordingly set aside. The appeal succeeds.



                                      .....................................J
                                                                (S.A. BOBDE)




                                   ........................................J

                                                               (AMITAVA ROY)
NEW DELHI,
4TH JULY, 2016
-----------------------
[1]
      1.    3. Application for attachment of property:-

      (1) Where the [State Government or as the case  may  be,  the  Central
Government] has reason to believe that any  person  has  committed  (whether
after the commencement of this Ordinance or not) any scheduled  offence  the
[State Government may, whether or not any Court has taken cognizance of  the
offence, authorise the making  of  an  application  to  the  District  Judge
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction  the  said  person  ordinarily
resides or carries on business, for attachment,  under  this  Ordinance,  of
the money or other property which the [State Government, or as the case  may
be, the Central Government] believes the said person  to  have  procured  by
means of the offence, or if such money or property cannot for any reason  be
attached, of other property of the said person of value as nearly as may  be
equivalent to that of the aforesaid money or other property.

      [Amended by A.O.1950 & again by Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988]

      (2) The provisions of Order XXVII of the First Schedule  to  the  Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908,  shall  apply  to  proceedings  for  an  order  of
attachment under this Ordinance as they apply to suits by the [Government].

      (3) An application under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied  by  one
or more affidavits, stating the grounds on which the belief  that  the  said
person has committed any scheduled offence is founded,  and  the  amount  of
money or value of other property believed to have been procured by means  of
the offence. The application shall also furnish-

      [Added by Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988]


(a) any information available as to the location for the time being  of  any
such money or other property and  shall,  if  necessary,  give  particulars,
including the estimated value, of other property of the said person;


(b) the names and addresses of any other person believed to have  or  to  be
likely to claim, any interest or title in the property of the said person.



[2]


[3]      (1955) 2 SCR 1140 at page 1195
         (1963) 3 SCR 749 at page 766
         (2002) 7 SCC 317 at para 8
         (2005) 5 SCC 294 at para 35
         (2015) 3 SCC 724 at paras 12 and 17
[4]


[5] State of Punjab v.Jagbir Singh,Baljit Singh and Karan Singh,AIR 1973 SC
2407

juvenile in terms of the 2000 Act = The subsequent repeal of the 2000 Act on and with effect from 15.01.2016 would not affect the inquiry in which such claim was found to be acceptable. Section 25 of the 2015Act makes it very clear.= In Jitendra Singh and another v. State of U.P. (supra), having found the juvenile guilty of the offence with which he was charged, in accordance with the law laid down by this Court as stated above, the matter was remanded to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board constituted under the 2000 Act for determining appropriate quantum of fine. The view taken therein is completely consistent with the law laid down by this Court and in our opinion the decision in Jitendra Singh and another v. State of U.P. (supra) does not call for any reconsideration. The subsequent repeal of the 2000 Act on and with effect from 15.01.2016 would not affect the inquiry in which such claim was found to be acceptable. Section 25 of the 2015Act makes it very clear. Thus, while holding appellant Dilshad @ Pappu to be juvenile in terms of the 2000 Act as on the day of occurrence and guilty of the offence with which he was tried, we set aside the sentence of life imprisonment passed against him and remit the matter to the Jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for determining the appropriate quantum of fine that should be levied on the appellant Dilshad @ Pappu and the compensation that should be awarded to the family of the deceased, keeping in mind the directions issued in Jitendra Singh and another v. State of U.P. (supra). Appellant Dilshad @ Pappu stands remitted to the Jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for determination as aforesaid.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2084 OF 2009

Mumtaz@ Muntyaz                               ….Appellant

                                   Versus

State of U.P. (Now Uttarakhand)                     …. Respondent

                                    WITH
                        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.460 OF 2010

Dilshad @ Pappu                                     ….Appellant

                                   Versus

State of U.P. (Now Uttarakhand)                     …. Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T

Uday U. Lalit, J.


These appeals by special leave at the instance of  Appellants  Mumtaz  alias
Muntyaz and Dilshad alias Pappu challenge correctness  of  the  decision  of
the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Appeal No.270 of  2001
affirming their  conviction  and  sentence  for  offences  punishable  under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal  Code  (for  short  the
“IPC”) passed in Sessions Trial No.15 of 1991 on the file of the  Additional
Sessions Judge, Roorkee.

2.    On 27.12.1990 at about 6.30 AM PW-1 Radhey Shyam  lodged  FIR  Ext.A-1
with Police Station Manglaur that his nephew Pawan Kumar had left his  house
at about 8.00 PM on the previous day and that in the  intervening  night  of
26th and 27th December 1990 PW-1 heard  shrieks  of  Pawan  Kumar  from  the
house of one Raees in the neighbourhood, whereafter   PW-1  along  with  his
other nephew PW-2 Anil Kumar came out of the house and saw  that  the  hands
of Pawan Kumar were tied  and he was ablaze  in the courtyard of  the  house
of Raees.  Both PWs 1 and 2 rushed there and put a  quilt  on  Pawan  Kumar.
In this report, PW-1 Radhey Shyam  further  stated  that  he  had  seen  the
appellants and their associates Naseem Khan and  Anees  Khan  setting  Pawan
Kumar on fire.  Soon after this reporting, the police came to the  spot  and
sent Pawan Kumar to Primary Health Centre, Manglaur for  medical  attention.
Aforesaid FIR Ext.A-1 led to registration of Crime No.328 of 1990 at  Police
Station Manglaur relating to offences punishable under Sections 307 and  342
IPC.

3.    At Primary Health Centre, a dying declaration Ext.A-24 of Pawan  Kumar
was recorded at  7.35  AM  by  PW-5  Satya  Prakash  Mishra,  Sub-Divisional
Magistrate in which Pawan Kumar stated that the appellants had  set  him  on
fire.  The translation of the relevant  portion  of  the  dying  declaration
Ext.A-24 is as under:
“Two persons after pouring kerosene set me on fire.  I was set on fire  this
morning at about 2.00 – 2.30 AM.  I  was  set  on  fire  by  Pappu,  son  of
unknown, R/o Landhaura and Mumtaz,   son of unknown, R/o Landhaura.   Mumtaz
works in the flour mill of Pappu.  When I was coming after running a VCR  on
the way, I was taken to house of  a  Pathani  lady  whose  name  is  Joulie.
Joulie is wife of Raees, R/o Landhaura.  In the presence  of  Joulie,  Pappu
and Mumtaz poured kerosene on me and set me on fire and ran  away.   When  I
started burning, I shouted and a person who is not known to  me  came  there
and extinguished fire by pouring water.  Thereafter what happened I  do  not
know.  I do not know why Pappu and Mumtaz set me  on  fire.   Pappu’s  flour
mill is on Lakshar Road.  Name of brother of Pappu is Zinda Hasan.”

      Below the above dying  declaration  Ext.A-24,  a  certificate  to  the
effect that Pawan Kumar was in a  fit  state  of  mind  to  give  the  dying
declaration was recorded by Dr. S.K. Mittal.

4.    On 27.12.1990 itself PW-2 Anil Kumar who had  burnt  his  hands  while
trying to save Pawan Kumar,  was  examined  by  PW-7  Dr.  N.D.  Arora,  who
prepared injury report Ext.A-23.  This report mentioned that  when  he  came
to the Primary Health Centre, there were burn injuries on the hands of  PW-2
Anil Kumar.

5.    On 27.12.1990 at about 4.30 PM Pawan Kumar succumbed to burn  injuries
while he was being taken to Meerut for medical treatment.  Crime  No.328  of
1990 was thereafter converted to one  under  Section  302  IPC.   After  the
death  of  Pawan  Kumar,  PW-6  Sub-Inspector  Saudan  Singh,  Investigating
Officer took the dead body in his possession at about 5.30 PM on  27.12.1990
and prepared inquest report Ext.A-9.  Thereafter by letter Ext.A-8  he  sent
the body for post-mortem.  PW-6 Investigating Officer had  interrogated  the
witnesses and had also taken in  possession  quilt,  match  box,  shawl  and
kerosene from the spot vide Memorandum Ext.A-12, A-13, A-14 and A-16.

6.    PW-4  Dr. Rakesh Kumar conducted  post-mortem  on  the  dead  body  of
Pawan Kumar at about 12.30 PM on 28.12.1990 and found  ante-mortem  injuries
on the body and opined that the deceased had died due  to  shock  from  burn
injuries.

7.    After completion of investigation,  charge-sheet  Ext.A-16  was  filed
against the  appellants  as  well  as  Naseem  Khan  and  Anees  Khan.   The
prosecution examined 9 witnesses.  PW-1 Radhey Shyam  and  PW-2  Anil  Kumar
were examined as eye witnesses and so also PW-3 Narendra Kumar who had  seen
the accused taking Pawan Kumar and setting him on  fire.   PW-4  Dr.  Rakesh
Kumar who had conducted post mortem on  the  dead  body  of  deceased  Pawan
Kumar proved this post mortem report Ext.A-2.  According to him,  the  cause
of the death was shock  from  burn  injuries.   PW-5  Satya  Prakash  Mishra
proved dying declaration Ext.A-4.  The Investigating  Officer  Saudan  Singh
was examined as PW-6 who proved Site Plans  Ext.A-4  and  A-5,  sample  seal
memo Ext.A-7, Inquest Report Ext. A-9, Seizure  Memo  of  quilt  Ext.  A-10,
Seizure Memo of burnt clothes of  Pawan  Ext.A-11,  Seizure  Memo  of  burnt
shawl Ext.A-14 and other relevant documents.   PW-7  Dr.  N.  D.  Arora  was
examined to prove injuries on the person  of  PW-2  Anil  Kumar  and  injury
report Ext. A-23.  PW-8 Dr. R. D. Sharma proved the endorsement of Dr.  S.K.
Mittal on the dying declaration of Pawan Kumar  Ext.A-22.   No  witness  was
examined on behalf of the defence.

8.    The Trial Court by its judgment and order dated 19.12.1994  found  the
appellants guilty of the charges punishable  under  Section  302  read  with
Section 34 IPC  and  sentenced  them  to  imprisonment  for  life  and  also
directed them to pay fine  of  Rs.5,000/-,  in  default  whereof  they  were
directed to undergo further imprisonment for  one  year.   Naseem  Khan  and
Anees Khan were however acquitted of all the charges.

9.    Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction  and  sentence,  the  appellants
preferred Criminal Appeal No.2007 of 1994 in the High  Court  of  Judicature
at Allahabad.  The appeal was thereafter transferred to the  High  Court  of
Uttarakhand at Nainital and re-numbered as Criminal Appeal No.270  of  2001.
The High  Court  by  its  judgment  and  order  under  appeal  affirmed  the
conviction and sentence passed  against  the  appellants.   The  High  Court
principally relied upon eye-witness account through PW-1  Radhey  Shyam  and
PW-2 Anil Kumar as well as dying-declaration Ext.A-24.

10.    After granting special leave to appeal, by  orders  dated  15.11.2010
and 03.01.2011 appellant Mumtaz @ Muntyaz  and  appellant  Dilshad  @  Pappu
respectively were ordered to be released on bail during  pendency  of  these
appeals.  Thereafter,  on  an  application  preferred  by  Dilshad  @  Pappu
seeking permission to take additional documents on record to submit that  he
was a juvenile on the date of the incident, following order  was  passed  by
this Court on 07.08.2014.
“Application seeking permission documents  on  record  is  allowed.   It  is
submitted by Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior  counsel  that  the  appellant
Dilshad @ Pappu was a juvenile on the date  of  occurrence  i.e.  27.12.1990
inasmuch as his date of birth  is  22.07.1974,  as  is  reflected  from  the
School leaving Certificate, contained in Annexure A-1 at  page  9.   Learned
senior counsel would submit that an inquiry should be held by  the  District
and Sessions Judge, Roorkee, and the report be made available to this  Court
and thereafter the hearing may take place.

Regard being had to the language employed in  Section  7A  of  the  Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000,  it  is  directed  that
the concerned District & Sessions Judge,  Roorkee  shall  cause  an  inquiry
with  regard  to  juvenility  of  the  appellant,  Dilshad  @  Pappu,  after
following the procedure as engrafted under Rule 12 of the  Juvenile  Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 and submit his  report  within
a period of 30 days from the date of receipt  of  the  order  passed  today.
Learned District & Sessions Judge shall submit  the  documents  forming  the
basis of his report.”


11.    An  appropriate  enquiry  was  thereafter  conducted  by  the   First
Additional and District Sessions Judge, Roorkee, Haridwar who by his  report
dated 05.09.2014 concluded as under:-
“13.  Hence from the above discussion the date of birth of Dilshad  @  Pappu
is discernible from Exhibits Ka4 to Ka5.  The entries made therein have  not
been controverted by the Counsel  appearing  for  the  State  and  there  is
nothing on record to refute or rebut the factum of date of birth as  entered
in above Exhibits.  Hence the inquiry under  Rule  12  of  Juvenile  Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Rules,  2007  has  been  fully  satisfied.
The Court accordingly determines that Dilshad @ Pappu date of birth is 22-7-
1974 (Twenty two July Nineteen Seventy Four) and on date of occurrence  i.e.
27-12-1990 he was 16 years 5 months and 5 days old and hence a  juvenile  as
per Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

14.   Let a certified copy of the findings of this  Court  be  forwarded  to
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indian in compliance of its order.”


12.   On 14.01.2015 when the matters were taken up,  the  counsel  appearing
for the State submitted that the decision of this Court  in  Jitendra  Singh
and another v. State of U.P.[1] which was relied upon  by  the  counsel  for
the  appellants  required  re-consideration.   On  and  with   effect   from
15.01.2016, the Juvenile Justice (Care  and  Protection  of  Children)  Act,
2015 (hereinafter referred to as “the  2015  Act”)  came  into  force  which
repealed the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of  Children)  Act,  2000
(hereinafter referred to as “the 2000 Act”).

13.   The matters were thereafter  taken  up  for  hearing.   We  heard  Mr.
K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Advocate in support of these  appeals  and  Mr.
Tanmaya Agarwal, learned Advocate for the State.  In so far  as  the  appeal
of Mumtaz @ Muntyaz is concerned  the  submissions  of  the  learned  Senior
Advocate as detailed in his Written Submissions were as under:-
“1. There are  several  discrepancies,  inconsistencies  and  contradictions
that raise a serious doubt about the reliability of the  dying  declaration.
When all the attendant circumstances  are  taken  together,  the  cumulative
effect is that the dying declaration fails the test of credibility.

2. The prosecution case and  the  dying  declaration  itself  furnishes  the
defense of grave provocation as a result of which every normal  human  being
will be deprived of the power of self-control.  The fact that  the  deceased
is found at the house of appellant’s brother at 03:00 am with whose wife  he
was  suspected  to  be  having  an  illicit  liaison  it  establishes  grave
provocation.  The case would fall within the exception 4 of Section  300  of
IPC making him liable for sentence only under Section 304 part-II of IPC.”

14.   We have gone through dying declaration Ext.A-24  and  the  examination
of PW-5 Satya Prakash Mishra.  The witness clearly stated that  all  through
the recording of his statement, Pawan Kumar remained in  fit  condition  and
that the witness had got this fact confirmed from the Doctor on  duty.   The
dying declaration bears  appropriate  endorsement  of  the  Doctor  on  duty
namely Dr. S.K. Mittal which endorsement  was  proved  by  PW-8  Dr.  R.  D.
Sharma.  There is nothing in the cross examination of either  PW-5  or  PW-8
nor in the dying declaration Ext.A-24 which could raise any  doubt.  Relying
on the law laid down by this Court in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra[2],  we
find the evidence in that behalf  trustworthy  and  hold  dying  declaration
Ext. A-24 to  be  reliable.  We,  therefore,  reject  the  first  submission
advanced by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant Mumtaz @ Muntyaz.

15.   The second submission advanced  by  the  learned  Senior  Advocate  is
based on the theory or defence of alleged grave  provocation.   It  is  true
that deceased Pawan Kumar was found  at  3:00  a.m.  in  the  house  of  the
brother of appellant Mumtaz @ Muntyaz.  The eye witness account  shows  that
his hands were tied and he was set ablaze.  The memorandum  of  the  seizure
of  burnt  shawl  clearly  corroborates  said  assertion.   Therefore,  mere
presence of Pawan Kumar in the house of  the  brother  of  appellant  Mumtaz
alia Muntyaz by itself does not support  the  theory  of  grave  provocation
specially when Pawan Kumar was found with his  hands  tied.   Not  a  single
witness was examined on behalf of the defence nor is there any  material  to
support such theory.   What kind of provocation and in what  manner  was  it
made are all matters of evidence, which are  completely  absent  on  record.
In the circumstances, we  do  not  find  any  circumstance  or  material  to
support the second  submission  advanced  on  behalf  of  accused  Mumtaz  @
Muntyaz.  We, therefore, reject the second submission as well.

16.   It is true that in the dying declaration Ext. A-24,  the deceased  had
 stated that he did not  know  the  person  who  extinguished  the  fire  by
pouring water.  It could be that while he was in flames, the deceased  could
not identify the person who tried to save him.  The prompt  lodging  of  the
FIR and the fact that one of  the  eyewitnesses  was  having  burn  injuries
establishes the presence of the eyewitnesses.  In  any  case,  even  if  the
eyewitness account is taken to be inconsistent with this part of  the  dying
declaration, once the dying declaration is found reliable,  trustworthy  and
consistent with circumstantial evidence on record,  such  dying  declaration
by itself is adequate to bring home the case against the accused.

17.   Having gone through the material on record, we do not see  any  reason
to upset the findings recorded  by  the  Trial  Court  and  the  High  Court
regarding  conviction  and  sentence  of   appellant   Mumtaz   @   Muntyaz.
Confirming his conviction and sentence we dismiss  Criminal  Appeal  No.2084
of 2009 preferred by appellant Mumtaz @ Muntyaz.

18.   As regards  Dilshad@Pappu,  by  order  dated  7.08.2014  District  and
Sessions Judge, Roorkee  was  directed  to  cause  inquiry  with  regard  to
juvenility of the appellant. The report dated 5.09.2014, clearly shows  that
on considering the entirety  of  the  matter  the  claim  was  found  to  be
acceptable.  The counsel appearing for the State could not refute  or  rebut
the fact that his date of birth was 22.07.1974  and  that  on  the  date  of
occurrence he was 16 years 5 months and 5 days old.

19.   Thus, on the date of occurrence Dilshad  @  Pappu  was  more  than  16
years of age but less than 18 years  of  age.   In  terms  of  the  Juvenile
Justice Act, 1986(hereinafter referred to as “the 1986 Act”)  which  was  in
force at that time,  he was  not  a  juvenile  and  was  rightly  tried  and
convicted by the Trial Court vide its judgment dated 19.12.1994.  While  the
appeal against his conviction and sentence was pending, on and  with  effect
from 1.04.2001, the 2000 Act came into force which repealed  the  1986  Act.
The 2000 Act inter alia raised the age of juvenility from  16  to  18  years
and in terms  of  Section  20  of   the  2000  Act,   the  determination  of
Juvenility was required to be done in all  pending   matters  in  accordance
with Section 2(1) of the 2000 Act.

20.   The effect of Section 20 of the 2000 Act  was  considered  in   Pratap
Singh v. State of Jharkhand and another[3] and it was stated as under:
“31. Section 20 of the Act as quoted above deals with the special  provision
in respect of pending cases and begins  with  a  non  obstante  clause.  The
sentence “notwithstanding anything contained in this  Act,  all  proceedings
in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area  on  the  date  on
which this Act came into force” has great significance. The  proceedings  in
respect of a juvenile pending in any court referred to in Section 20 of  the
Act are relatable to proceedings initiated before the  2000  Act  came  into
force and which are pending when the 2000 Act  came  into  force.  The  term
“any court” would include even ordinary criminal courts. If the  person  was
a “juvenile” under the 1986 Act the proceedings  would  not  be  pending  in
criminal courts. They would be pending in criminal courts only  if  the  boy
had crossed 16 years or the girl had  crossed  18  years.  This  shows  that
Section 20 refers to cases where a person had ceased to be a juvenile  under
the 1986 Act but had not yet crossed the age of 18 years  then  the  pending
case shall continue in that court as if the 2000 Act  has  not  been  passed
and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it  shall
record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in  respect  of  the
juvenile, shall forward the juvenile to the Board which  shall  pass  orders
in respect of that juvenile.”


21.   In Bijender Singh v.  State  of  Haryana  and  another[4],  the  legal
position as regards Section 20 was stated in  following words:
“8. One of the basic distinctions between the 1986  Act  and  the  2000  Act
relates to the age of males and females. Under  the  1986  Act,  a  juvenile
means a male juvenile who has not attained  the  age  of  16  years,  and  a
female juvenile who has not attained the age of 18 years. In the  2000  Act,
the distinction between male and female juveniles on the basis  of  age  has
not been maintained. The age-limit is 18 years for both males and females.

9. A person above 16 years in terms of the 1986 Act was not a  juvenile.  In
that view of the matter  the  question  whether  a  person  above  16  years
becomes “juvenile” within the purview of  the  2000  Act  must  be  answered
having regard to the object and purport thereof.

10. In terms of the 1986 Act, a person who was not juvenile could  be  tried
in any court. Section 20 of the 2000 Act takes  care  of  such  a  situation
stating that despite the same the trial shall continue in that court  as  if
that Act has not been passed and in the event, he is found to be  guilty  of
commission of an offence, a finding to that effect shall be recorded in  the
judgment of conviction, if any, but  instead  of  passing  any  sentence  in
relation to the juvenile, he would be  forwarded  to  the  Juvenile  Justice
Board (in short “the Board”) which shall pass orders in accordance with  the
provisions of the Act as  if  it  has  been  satisfied  on  inquiry  that  a
juvenile has committed the offence. A legal fiction has, thus, been  created
in the said provision. A legal fiction as is well known must  be  given  its
full effect although it has its limitations. …………

11.  ………….

12. Thus, by reason of legal fiction, a person,  although  not  a  juvenile,
has to be treated to be one by the Board  for  the  purpose  of  sentencing,
which takes care of a situation that the person although not a  juvenile  in
terms of the 1986 Act but still would be treated as such under the 2000  Act
for the said limited purpose.”

 22.  In Dharambir v. State (NCTof Delhi) and another[5]  the  determination
of juvenility even after conviction  was  one  of  the  issues  and  it  was
stated:
“11. It is plain from the language of the Explanation to Section 20 that  in
all pending cases, which would include not only trials but  even  subsequent
proceedings by way  of  revision  or  appeal,  etc.,  the  determination  of
juvenility of a juvenile has to be in terms of  clause  (l)  of  Section  2,
even if the juvenile ceases to be a juvenile on  or  before  1-4-2001,  when
the Act of 2000 came into force, and the provisions of the Act  would  apply
as if the said provision had been in force for  all  purposes  and  for  all
material times when the alleged offence was committed.

12. Clause (l) of Section 2 of the Act of 2000 provides  that  “juvenile  in
conflict with law” means a “juvenile” who is alleged to  have  committed  an
offence and has not completed eighteenth year of  age  as  on  the  date  of
commission of such offence. Section 20 also enables the  court  to  consider
and determine the juvenility of  a  person  even  after  conviction  by  the
regular  court  and  also  empowers  the  court,   while   maintaining   the
conviction, to set aside the sentence imposed and forward the  case  to  the
Juvenile Justice Board concerned for passing  sentence  in  accordance  with
the provisions of the Act of 2000.”

23.   Similarly in Kalu v.  State of Haryana[6]  this  Court  summed  up  as
under:
“21. Section 20 makes a special provision in respect of  pending  cases.  It
states that notwithstanding anything contained  in  the  Juvenile  Act,  all
proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court  in  any  area  on
the date on which the Juvenile Act comes into force in that  area  shall  be
continued in that court as if the Juvenile Act had not been  passed  and  if
the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall  record
such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the  juvenile
forward the juvenile to the Board which shall  pass  orders  in  respect  of
that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile  Act  as  if
it had been satisfied on inquiry under the Juvenile Act  that  the  juvenile
has committed the offence. The Explanation to  Section  20  makes  it  clear
that in all pending cases, which would include  not  only  trials  but  even
subsequent proceedings by way of revision or appeal,  the  determination  of
juvenility of a juvenile would be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2,  even
if the juvenile ceased to be a juvenile on  or  before  1-4-2001,  when  the
Juvenile Act came into force, and the provisions of the Juvenile  Act  would
apply as if the said provision had been in force for all  purposes  and  for
all material times when the alleged offence was committed.”


24.   It is thus well settled that in terms of  Section   20  of   the  2000
Act,  in all cases where the accused was above 16 years  but below 18  years
of age on the date of  occurrence,  the proceedings pending  in  the   Court
would continue and be taken to the logical end subject to an exception  that
upon finding the juvenile to be guilty,  the Court would not pass  an  order
of sentence against him but the juvenile would be referred to the Board  for
appropriate orders under the 2000 Act.

25.   What kind of order  could  be  passed  in  a  matter  where  claim  of
juvenility came to be accepted in a situation similar to the  present  case,
was dealt with by this Court in Jitendra Singh  and  another  v.   State  of
U.P. (supra) in following terms:
“32. A perusal of the “punishments” provided for under the Juvenile  Justice
Act, 1986 indicate that given the nature of the  offence  committed  by  the
appellant,  advising  or  admonishing  him  [clause   (a)]   is   hardly   a
“punishment” that can be awarded since it is not at  all  commensurate  with
the gravity of the crime. Similarly, considering his age of about 40  years,
it is completely  illusory  to  expect  the  appellant  to  be  released  on
probation of good conduct, to be  placed  under  the  care  of  any  parent,
guardian or fit person [clause (b)]. For  the  same  reason,  the  appellant
cannot be released on probation of good conduct under  the  care  of  a  fit
institution [clause (c)] nor can he be sent to a special home under  Section
10 of the Juvenile Justice Act,  1986  which  is  intended  to  be  for  the
rehabilitation and reformation of delinquent  juveniles  [clause  (d)].  The
only realistic punishment that can possibly be awarded to the  appellant  on
the facts of this case is to require him to pay a fine under clause  (e)  of
Section 21(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986.”

26.   In Jitendra Singh and another v.  State of U.P. (supra), having  found
the  juvenile  guilty  of  the  offence  with  which  he  was  charged,   in
accordance with the  law laid down by  this Court   as  stated  above,   the
matter  was  remanded  to  the   jurisdictional   Juvenile   Justice   Board
constituted under the 2000  Act   for  determining  appropriate  quantum  of
fine.  The view taken therein is completely consistent  with  the  law  laid
down by this Court and in our opinion the decision  in  Jitendra  Singh  and
another v. State of U.P. (supra) does  not  call  for  any  reconsideration.
The subsequent repeal of the 2000 Act on and  with  effect  from  15.01.2016
would  not  affect  the  inquiry  in  which  such  claim  was  found  to  be
acceptable.  Section 25 of the 2015Act makes it very clear.

 27.  Thus, while holding appellant Dilshad @ Pappu to be juvenile in  terms
of the 2000 Act as on the day of occurrence and guilty of the  offence  with
which he was tried, we set aside the sentence of  life  imprisonment  passed
against him and remit the matter  to  the  Jurisdictional  Juvenile  Justice
Board  for determining the  appropriate  quantum  of  fine  that  should  be
levied on  the appellant Dilshad @ Pappu and the compensation   that  should
be awarded  to the family of the deceased, keeping in  mind  the  directions
issued in Jitendra Singh and another v.  State of U.P. (supra).
28.   Criminal Appeal No.2084 of  2009  is  thus  dismissed  while  Criminal
Appeal No.460 of 2010 is allowed to the aforesaid extent and the  matter  as
regards Appellant Dilshad @ Pappu  stands  remitted  to  the  Jurisdictional
Juvenile Justice Board for determination  as  aforesaid.    The  bail  bonds
furnished by Appellant Mumtaz alias Muntyaz are cancelled and  he  shall  be
taken in custody forthwith to undergo the sentence awarded to him.

                                                                …….………………….J
                                                                (V.   Gopala
Gowda)


……………………….J                  (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi
July 1, 2016

-----------------------
[1]    (2013) 11 SCC 193
[2]    (2002) 6 SCC 710
[3]    (2005)3 SCC 551
[4]    (2005) 3 SCC 685
[5]    (2010) 5 SCC 344
[6]    (2012) 8 SCC 34