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Tuesday, July 5, 2016

juvenile in terms of the 2000 Act = The subsequent repeal of the 2000 Act on and with effect from 15.01.2016 would not affect the inquiry in which such claim was found to be acceptable. Section 25 of the 2015Act makes it very clear.= In Jitendra Singh and another v. State of U.P. (supra), having found the juvenile guilty of the offence with which he was charged, in accordance with the law laid down by this Court as stated above, the matter was remanded to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board constituted under the 2000 Act for determining appropriate quantum of fine. The view taken therein is completely consistent with the law laid down by this Court and in our opinion the decision in Jitendra Singh and another v. State of U.P. (supra) does not call for any reconsideration. The subsequent repeal of the 2000 Act on and with effect from 15.01.2016 would not affect the inquiry in which such claim was found to be acceptable. Section 25 of the 2015Act makes it very clear. Thus, while holding appellant Dilshad @ Pappu to be juvenile in terms of the 2000 Act as on the day of occurrence and guilty of the offence with which he was tried, we set aside the sentence of life imprisonment passed against him and remit the matter to the Jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for determining the appropriate quantum of fine that should be levied on the appellant Dilshad @ Pappu and the compensation that should be awarded to the family of the deceased, keeping in mind the directions issued in Jitendra Singh and another v. State of U.P. (supra). Appellant Dilshad @ Pappu stands remitted to the Jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for determination as aforesaid.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2084 OF 2009

Mumtaz@ Muntyaz                               ….Appellant

                                   Versus

State of U.P. (Now Uttarakhand)                     …. Respondent

                                    WITH
                        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.460 OF 2010

Dilshad @ Pappu                                     ….Appellant

                                   Versus

State of U.P. (Now Uttarakhand)                     …. Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T

Uday U. Lalit, J.


These appeals by special leave at the instance of  Appellants  Mumtaz  alias
Muntyaz and Dilshad alias Pappu challenge correctness  of  the  decision  of
the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal Appeal No.270 of  2001
affirming their  conviction  and  sentence  for  offences  punishable  under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal  Code  (for  short  the
“IPC”) passed in Sessions Trial No.15 of 1991 on the file of the  Additional
Sessions Judge, Roorkee.

2.    On 27.12.1990 at about 6.30 AM PW-1 Radhey Shyam  lodged  FIR  Ext.A-1
with Police Station Manglaur that his nephew Pawan Kumar had left his  house
at about 8.00 PM on the previous day and that in the  intervening  night  of
26th and 27th December 1990 PW-1 heard  shrieks  of  Pawan  Kumar  from  the
house of one Raees in the neighbourhood, whereafter   PW-1  along  with  his
other nephew PW-2 Anil Kumar came out of the house and saw  that  the  hands
of Pawan Kumar were tied  and he was ablaze  in the courtyard of  the  house
of Raees.  Both PWs 1 and 2 rushed there and put a  quilt  on  Pawan  Kumar.
In this report, PW-1 Radhey Shyam  further  stated  that  he  had  seen  the
appellants and their associates Naseem Khan and  Anees  Khan  setting  Pawan
Kumar on fire.  Soon after this reporting, the police came to the  spot  and
sent Pawan Kumar to Primary Health Centre, Manglaur for  medical  attention.
Aforesaid FIR Ext.A-1 led to registration of Crime No.328 of 1990 at  Police
Station Manglaur relating to offences punishable under Sections 307 and  342
IPC.

3.    At Primary Health Centre, a dying declaration Ext.A-24 of Pawan  Kumar
was recorded at  7.35  AM  by  PW-5  Satya  Prakash  Mishra,  Sub-Divisional
Magistrate in which Pawan Kumar stated that the appellants had  set  him  on
fire.  The translation of the relevant  portion  of  the  dying  declaration
Ext.A-24 is as under:
“Two persons after pouring kerosene set me on fire.  I was set on fire  this
morning at about 2.00 – 2.30 AM.  I  was  set  on  fire  by  Pappu,  son  of
unknown, R/o Landhaura and Mumtaz,   son of unknown, R/o Landhaura.   Mumtaz
works in the flour mill of Pappu.  When I was coming after running a VCR  on
the way, I was taken to house of  a  Pathani  lady  whose  name  is  Joulie.
Joulie is wife of Raees, R/o Landhaura.  In the presence  of  Joulie,  Pappu
and Mumtaz poured kerosene on me and set me on fire and ran  away.   When  I
started burning, I shouted and a person who is not known to  me  came  there
and extinguished fire by pouring water.  Thereafter what happened I  do  not
know.  I do not know why Pappu and Mumtaz set me  on  fire.   Pappu’s  flour
mill is on Lakshar Road.  Name of brother of Pappu is Zinda Hasan.”

      Below the above dying  declaration  Ext.A-24,  a  certificate  to  the
effect that Pawan Kumar was in a  fit  state  of  mind  to  give  the  dying
declaration was recorded by Dr. S.K. Mittal.

4.    On 27.12.1990 itself PW-2 Anil Kumar who had  burnt  his  hands  while
trying to save Pawan Kumar,  was  examined  by  PW-7  Dr.  N.D.  Arora,  who
prepared injury report Ext.A-23.  This report mentioned that  when  he  came
to the Primary Health Centre, there were burn injuries on the hands of  PW-2
Anil Kumar.

5.    On 27.12.1990 at about 4.30 PM Pawan Kumar succumbed to burn  injuries
while he was being taken to Meerut for medical treatment.  Crime  No.328  of
1990 was thereafter converted to one  under  Section  302  IPC.   After  the
death  of  Pawan  Kumar,  PW-6  Sub-Inspector  Saudan  Singh,  Investigating
Officer took the dead body in his possession at about 5.30 PM on  27.12.1990
and prepared inquest report Ext.A-9.  Thereafter by letter Ext.A-8  he  sent
the body for post-mortem.  PW-6 Investigating Officer had  interrogated  the
witnesses and had also taken in  possession  quilt,  match  box,  shawl  and
kerosene from the spot vide Memorandum Ext.A-12, A-13, A-14 and A-16.

6.    PW-4  Dr. Rakesh Kumar conducted  post-mortem  on  the  dead  body  of
Pawan Kumar at about 12.30 PM on 28.12.1990 and found  ante-mortem  injuries
on the body and opined that the deceased had died due  to  shock  from  burn
injuries.

7.    After completion of investigation,  charge-sheet  Ext.A-16  was  filed
against the  appellants  as  well  as  Naseem  Khan  and  Anees  Khan.   The
prosecution examined 9 witnesses.  PW-1 Radhey Shyam  and  PW-2  Anil  Kumar
were examined as eye witnesses and so also PW-3 Narendra Kumar who had  seen
the accused taking Pawan Kumar and setting him on  fire.   PW-4  Dr.  Rakesh
Kumar who had conducted post mortem on  the  dead  body  of  deceased  Pawan
Kumar proved this post mortem report Ext.A-2.  According to him,  the  cause
of the death was shock  from  burn  injuries.   PW-5  Satya  Prakash  Mishra
proved dying declaration Ext.A-4.  The Investigating  Officer  Saudan  Singh
was examined as PW-6 who proved Site Plans  Ext.A-4  and  A-5,  sample  seal
memo Ext.A-7, Inquest Report Ext. A-9, Seizure  Memo  of  quilt  Ext.  A-10,
Seizure Memo of burnt clothes of  Pawan  Ext.A-11,  Seizure  Memo  of  burnt
shawl Ext.A-14 and other relevant documents.   PW-7  Dr.  N.  D.  Arora  was
examined to prove injuries on the person  of  PW-2  Anil  Kumar  and  injury
report Ext. A-23.  PW-8 Dr. R. D. Sharma proved the endorsement of Dr.  S.K.
Mittal on the dying declaration of Pawan Kumar  Ext.A-22.   No  witness  was
examined on behalf of the defence.

8.    The Trial Court by its judgment and order dated 19.12.1994  found  the
appellants guilty of the charges punishable  under  Section  302  read  with
Section 34 IPC  and  sentenced  them  to  imprisonment  for  life  and  also
directed them to pay fine  of  Rs.5,000/-,  in  default  whereof  they  were
directed to undergo further imprisonment for  one  year.   Naseem  Khan  and
Anees Khan were however acquitted of all the charges.

9.    Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction  and  sentence,  the  appellants
preferred Criminal Appeal No.2007 of 1994 in the High  Court  of  Judicature
at Allahabad.  The appeal was thereafter transferred to the  High  Court  of
Uttarakhand at Nainital and re-numbered as Criminal Appeal No.270  of  2001.
The High  Court  by  its  judgment  and  order  under  appeal  affirmed  the
conviction and sentence passed  against  the  appellants.   The  High  Court
principally relied upon eye-witness account through PW-1  Radhey  Shyam  and
PW-2 Anil Kumar as well as dying-declaration Ext.A-24.

10.    After granting special leave to appeal, by  orders  dated  15.11.2010
and 03.01.2011 appellant Mumtaz @ Muntyaz  and  appellant  Dilshad  @  Pappu
respectively were ordered to be released on bail during  pendency  of  these
appeals.  Thereafter,  on  an  application  preferred  by  Dilshad  @  Pappu
seeking permission to take additional documents on record to submit that  he
was a juvenile on the date of the incident, following order  was  passed  by
this Court on 07.08.2014.
“Application seeking permission documents  on  record  is  allowed.   It  is
submitted by Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior  counsel  that  the  appellant
Dilshad @ Pappu was a juvenile on the date  of  occurrence  i.e.  27.12.1990
inasmuch as his date of birth  is  22.07.1974,  as  is  reflected  from  the
School leaving Certificate, contained in Annexure A-1 at  page  9.   Learned
senior counsel would submit that an inquiry should be held by  the  District
and Sessions Judge, Roorkee, and the report be made available to this  Court
and thereafter the hearing may take place.

Regard being had to the language employed in  Section  7A  of  the  Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000,  it  is  directed  that
the concerned District & Sessions Judge,  Roorkee  shall  cause  an  inquiry
with  regard  to  juvenility  of  the  appellant,  Dilshad  @  Pappu,  after
following the procedure as engrafted under Rule 12 of the  Juvenile  Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 and submit his  report  within
a period of 30 days from the date of receipt  of  the  order  passed  today.
Learned District & Sessions Judge shall submit  the  documents  forming  the
basis of his report.”


11.    An  appropriate  enquiry  was  thereafter  conducted  by  the   First
Additional and District Sessions Judge, Roorkee, Haridwar who by his  report
dated 05.09.2014 concluded as under:-
“13.  Hence from the above discussion the date of birth of Dilshad  @  Pappu
is discernible from Exhibits Ka4 to Ka5.  The entries made therein have  not
been controverted by the Counsel  appearing  for  the  State  and  there  is
nothing on record to refute or rebut the factum of date of birth as  entered
in above Exhibits.  Hence the inquiry under  Rule  12  of  Juvenile  Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Rules,  2007  has  been  fully  satisfied.
The Court accordingly determines that Dilshad @ Pappu date of birth is 22-7-
1974 (Twenty two July Nineteen Seventy Four) and on date of occurrence  i.e.
27-12-1990 he was 16 years 5 months and 5 days old and hence a  juvenile  as
per Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.

14.   Let a certified copy of the findings of this  Court  be  forwarded  to
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indian in compliance of its order.”


12.   On 14.01.2015 when the matters were taken up,  the  counsel  appearing
for the State submitted that the decision of this Court  in  Jitendra  Singh
and another v. State of U.P.[1] which was relied upon  by  the  counsel  for
the  appellants  required  re-consideration.   On  and  with   effect   from
15.01.2016, the Juvenile Justice (Care  and  Protection  of  Children)  Act,
2015 (hereinafter referred to as “the  2015  Act”)  came  into  force  which
repealed the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of  Children)  Act,  2000
(hereinafter referred to as “the 2000 Act”).

13.   The matters were thereafter  taken  up  for  hearing.   We  heard  Mr.
K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Advocate in support of these  appeals  and  Mr.
Tanmaya Agarwal, learned Advocate for the State.  In so far  as  the  appeal
of Mumtaz @ Muntyaz is concerned  the  submissions  of  the  learned  Senior
Advocate as detailed in his Written Submissions were as under:-
“1. There are  several  discrepancies,  inconsistencies  and  contradictions
that raise a serious doubt about the reliability of the  dying  declaration.
When all the attendant circumstances  are  taken  together,  the  cumulative
effect is that the dying declaration fails the test of credibility.

2. The prosecution case and  the  dying  declaration  itself  furnishes  the
defense of grave provocation as a result of which every normal  human  being
will be deprived of the power of self-control.  The fact that  the  deceased
is found at the house of appellant’s brother at 03:00 am with whose wife  he
was  suspected  to  be  having  an  illicit  liaison  it  establishes  grave
provocation.  The case would fall within the exception 4 of Section  300  of
IPC making him liable for sentence only under Section 304 part-II of IPC.”

14.   We have gone through dying declaration Ext.A-24  and  the  examination
of PW-5 Satya Prakash Mishra.  The witness clearly stated that  all  through
the recording of his statement, Pawan Kumar remained in  fit  condition  and
that the witness had got this fact confirmed from the Doctor on  duty.   The
dying declaration bears  appropriate  endorsement  of  the  Doctor  on  duty
namely Dr. S.K. Mittal which endorsement  was  proved  by  PW-8  Dr.  R.  D.
Sharma.  There is nothing in the cross examination of either  PW-5  or  PW-8
nor in the dying declaration Ext.A-24 which could raise any  doubt.  Relying
on the law laid down by this Court in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra[2],  we
find the evidence in that behalf  trustworthy  and  hold  dying  declaration
Ext. A-24 to  be  reliable.  We,  therefore,  reject  the  first  submission
advanced by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant Mumtaz @ Muntyaz.

15.   The second submission advanced  by  the  learned  Senior  Advocate  is
based on the theory or defence of alleged grave  provocation.   It  is  true
that deceased Pawan Kumar was found  at  3:00  a.m.  in  the  house  of  the
brother of appellant Mumtaz @ Muntyaz.  The eye witness account  shows  that
his hands were tied and he was set ablaze.  The memorandum  of  the  seizure
of  burnt  shawl  clearly  corroborates  said  assertion.   Therefore,  mere
presence of Pawan Kumar in the house of  the  brother  of  appellant  Mumtaz
alia Muntyaz by itself does not support  the  theory  of  grave  provocation
specially when Pawan Kumar was found with his  hands  tied.   Not  a  single
witness was examined on behalf of the defence nor is there any  material  to
support such theory.   What kind of provocation and in what  manner  was  it
made are all matters of evidence, which are  completely  absent  on  record.
In the circumstances, we  do  not  find  any  circumstance  or  material  to
support the second  submission  advanced  on  behalf  of  accused  Mumtaz  @
Muntyaz.  We, therefore, reject the second submission as well.

16.   It is true that in the dying declaration Ext. A-24,  the deceased  had
 stated that he did not  know  the  person  who  extinguished  the  fire  by
pouring water.  It could be that while he was in flames, the deceased  could
not identify the person who tried to save him.  The prompt  lodging  of  the
FIR and the fact that one of  the  eyewitnesses  was  having  burn  injuries
establishes the presence of the eyewitnesses.  In  any  case,  even  if  the
eyewitness account is taken to be inconsistent with this part of  the  dying
declaration, once the dying declaration is found reliable,  trustworthy  and
consistent with circumstantial evidence on record,  such  dying  declaration
by itself is adequate to bring home the case against the accused.

17.   Having gone through the material on record, we do not see  any  reason
to upset the findings recorded  by  the  Trial  Court  and  the  High  Court
regarding  conviction  and  sentence  of   appellant   Mumtaz   @   Muntyaz.
Confirming his conviction and sentence we dismiss  Criminal  Appeal  No.2084
of 2009 preferred by appellant Mumtaz @ Muntyaz.

18.   As regards  Dilshad@Pappu,  by  order  dated  7.08.2014  District  and
Sessions Judge, Roorkee  was  directed  to  cause  inquiry  with  regard  to
juvenility of the appellant. The report dated 5.09.2014, clearly shows  that
on considering the entirety  of  the  matter  the  claim  was  found  to  be
acceptable.  The counsel appearing for the State could not refute  or  rebut
the fact that his date of birth was 22.07.1974  and  that  on  the  date  of
occurrence he was 16 years 5 months and 5 days old.

19.   Thus, on the date of occurrence Dilshad  @  Pappu  was  more  than  16
years of age but less than 18 years  of  age.   In  terms  of  the  Juvenile
Justice Act, 1986(hereinafter referred to as “the 1986 Act”)  which  was  in
force at that time,  he was  not  a  juvenile  and  was  rightly  tried  and
convicted by the Trial Court vide its judgment dated 19.12.1994.  While  the
appeal against his conviction and sentence was pending, on and  with  effect
from 1.04.2001, the 2000 Act came into force which repealed  the  1986  Act.
The 2000 Act inter alia raised the age of juvenility from  16  to  18  years
and in terms  of  Section  20  of   the  2000  Act,   the  determination  of
Juvenility was required to be done in all  pending   matters  in  accordance
with Section 2(1) of the 2000 Act.

20.   The effect of Section 20 of the 2000 Act  was  considered  in   Pratap
Singh v. State of Jharkhand and another[3] and it was stated as under:
“31. Section 20 of the Act as quoted above deals with the special  provision
in respect of pending cases and begins  with  a  non  obstante  clause.  The
sentence “notwithstanding anything contained in this  Act,  all  proceedings
in respect of a juvenile pending in any court in any area  on  the  date  on
which this Act came into force” has great significance. The  proceedings  in
respect of a juvenile pending in any court referred to in Section 20 of  the
Act are relatable to proceedings initiated before the  2000  Act  came  into
force and which are pending when the 2000 Act  came  into  force.  The  term
“any court” would include even ordinary criminal courts. If the  person  was
a “juvenile” under the 1986 Act the proceedings  would  not  be  pending  in
criminal courts. They would be pending in criminal courts only  if  the  boy
had crossed 16 years or the girl had  crossed  18  years.  This  shows  that
Section 20 refers to cases where a person had ceased to be a juvenile  under
the 1986 Act but had not yet crossed the age of 18 years  then  the  pending
case shall continue in that court as if the 2000 Act  has  not  been  passed
and if the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it  shall
record such finding and instead of passing any sentence in  respect  of  the
juvenile, shall forward the juvenile to the Board which  shall  pass  orders
in respect of that juvenile.”


21.   In Bijender Singh v.  State  of  Haryana  and  another[4],  the  legal
position as regards Section 20 was stated in  following words:
“8. One of the basic distinctions between the 1986  Act  and  the  2000  Act
relates to the age of males and females. Under  the  1986  Act,  a  juvenile
means a male juvenile who has not attained  the  age  of  16  years,  and  a
female juvenile who has not attained the age of 18 years. In the  2000  Act,
the distinction between male and female juveniles on the basis  of  age  has
not been maintained. The age-limit is 18 years for both males and females.

9. A person above 16 years in terms of the 1986 Act was not a  juvenile.  In
that view of the matter  the  question  whether  a  person  above  16  years
becomes “juvenile” within the purview of  the  2000  Act  must  be  answered
having regard to the object and purport thereof.

10. In terms of the 1986 Act, a person who was not juvenile could  be  tried
in any court. Section 20 of the 2000 Act takes  care  of  such  a  situation
stating that despite the same the trial shall continue in that court  as  if
that Act has not been passed and in the event, he is found to be  guilty  of
commission of an offence, a finding to that effect shall be recorded in  the
judgment of conviction, if any, but  instead  of  passing  any  sentence  in
relation to the juvenile, he would be  forwarded  to  the  Juvenile  Justice
Board (in short “the Board”) which shall pass orders in accordance with  the
provisions of the Act as  if  it  has  been  satisfied  on  inquiry  that  a
juvenile has committed the offence. A legal fiction has, thus, been  created
in the said provision. A legal fiction as is well known must  be  given  its
full effect although it has its limitations. …………

11.  ………….

12. Thus, by reason of legal fiction, a person,  although  not  a  juvenile,
has to be treated to be one by the Board  for  the  purpose  of  sentencing,
which takes care of a situation that the person although not a  juvenile  in
terms of the 1986 Act but still would be treated as such under the 2000  Act
for the said limited purpose.”

 22.  In Dharambir v. State (NCTof Delhi) and another[5]  the  determination
of juvenility even after conviction  was  one  of  the  issues  and  it  was
stated:
“11. It is plain from the language of the Explanation to Section 20 that  in
all pending cases, which would include not only trials but  even  subsequent
proceedings by way  of  revision  or  appeal,  etc.,  the  determination  of
juvenility of a juvenile has to be in terms of  clause  (l)  of  Section  2,
even if the juvenile ceases to be a juvenile on  or  before  1-4-2001,  when
the Act of 2000 came into force, and the provisions of the Act  would  apply
as if the said provision had been in force for  all  purposes  and  for  all
material times when the alleged offence was committed.

12. Clause (l) of Section 2 of the Act of 2000 provides  that  “juvenile  in
conflict with law” means a “juvenile” who is alleged to  have  committed  an
offence and has not completed eighteenth year of  age  as  on  the  date  of
commission of such offence. Section 20 also enables the  court  to  consider
and determine the juvenility of  a  person  even  after  conviction  by  the
regular  court  and  also  empowers  the  court,   while   maintaining   the
conviction, to set aside the sentence imposed and forward the  case  to  the
Juvenile Justice Board concerned for passing  sentence  in  accordance  with
the provisions of the Act of 2000.”

23.   Similarly in Kalu v.  State of Haryana[6]  this  Court  summed  up  as
under:
“21. Section 20 makes a special provision in respect of  pending  cases.  It
states that notwithstanding anything contained  in  the  Juvenile  Act,  all
proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court  in  any  area  on
the date on which the Juvenile Act comes into force in that  area  shall  be
continued in that court as if the Juvenile Act had not been  passed  and  if
the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall  record
such finding and instead of passing any sentence in respect of the  juvenile
forward the juvenile to the Board which shall  pass  orders  in  respect  of
that juvenile in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile  Act  as  if
it had been satisfied on inquiry under the Juvenile Act  that  the  juvenile
has committed the offence. The Explanation to  Section  20  makes  it  clear
that in all pending cases, which would include  not  only  trials  but  even
subsequent proceedings by way of revision or appeal,  the  determination  of
juvenility of a juvenile would be in terms of clause (l) of Section 2,  even
if the juvenile ceased to be a juvenile on  or  before  1-4-2001,  when  the
Juvenile Act came into force, and the provisions of the Juvenile  Act  would
apply as if the said provision had been in force for all  purposes  and  for
all material times when the alleged offence was committed.”


24.   It is thus well settled that in terms of  Section   20  of   the  2000
Act,  in all cases where the accused was above 16 years  but below 18  years
of age on the date of  occurrence,  the proceedings pending  in  the   Court
would continue and be taken to the logical end subject to an exception  that
upon finding the juvenile to be guilty,  the Court would not pass  an  order
of sentence against him but the juvenile would be referred to the Board  for
appropriate orders under the 2000 Act.

25.   What kind of order  could  be  passed  in  a  matter  where  claim  of
juvenility came to be accepted in a situation similar to the  present  case,
was dealt with by this Court in Jitendra Singh  and  another  v.   State  of
U.P. (supra) in following terms:
“32. A perusal of the “punishments” provided for under the Juvenile  Justice
Act, 1986 indicate that given the nature of the  offence  committed  by  the
appellant,  advising  or  admonishing  him  [clause   (a)]   is   hardly   a
“punishment” that can be awarded since it is not at  all  commensurate  with
the gravity of the crime. Similarly, considering his age of about 40  years,
it is completely  illusory  to  expect  the  appellant  to  be  released  on
probation of good conduct, to be  placed  under  the  care  of  any  parent,
guardian or fit person [clause (b)]. For  the  same  reason,  the  appellant
cannot be released on probation of good conduct under  the  care  of  a  fit
institution [clause (c)] nor can he be sent to a special home under  Section
10 of the Juvenile Justice Act,  1986  which  is  intended  to  be  for  the
rehabilitation and reformation of delinquent  juveniles  [clause  (d)].  The
only realistic punishment that can possibly be awarded to the  appellant  on
the facts of this case is to require him to pay a fine under clause  (e)  of
Section 21(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986.”

26.   In Jitendra Singh and another v.  State of U.P. (supra), having  found
the  juvenile  guilty  of  the  offence  with  which  he  was  charged,   in
accordance with the  law laid down by  this Court   as  stated  above,   the
matter  was  remanded  to  the   jurisdictional   Juvenile   Justice   Board
constituted under the 2000  Act   for  determining  appropriate  quantum  of
fine.  The view taken therein is completely consistent  with  the  law  laid
down by this Court and in our opinion the decision  in  Jitendra  Singh  and
another v. State of U.P. (supra) does  not  call  for  any  reconsideration.
The subsequent repeal of the 2000 Act on and  with  effect  from  15.01.2016
would  not  affect  the  inquiry  in  which  such  claim  was  found  to  be
acceptable.  Section 25 of the 2015Act makes it very clear.

 27.  Thus, while holding appellant Dilshad @ Pappu to be juvenile in  terms
of the 2000 Act as on the day of occurrence and guilty of the  offence  with
which he was tried, we set aside the sentence of  life  imprisonment  passed
against him and remit the matter  to  the  Jurisdictional  Juvenile  Justice
Board  for determining the  appropriate  quantum  of  fine  that  should  be
levied on  the appellant Dilshad @ Pappu and the compensation   that  should
be awarded  to the family of the deceased, keeping in  mind  the  directions
issued in Jitendra Singh and another v.  State of U.P. (supra).
28.   Criminal Appeal No.2084 of  2009  is  thus  dismissed  while  Criminal
Appeal No.460 of 2010 is allowed to the aforesaid extent and the  matter  as
regards Appellant Dilshad @ Pappu  stands  remitted  to  the  Jurisdictional
Juvenile Justice Board for determination  as  aforesaid.    The  bail  bonds
furnished by Appellant Mumtaz alias Muntyaz are cancelled and  he  shall  be
taken in custody forthwith to undergo the sentence awarded to him.

                                                                …….………………….J
                                                                (V.   Gopala
Gowda)


……………………….J                  (Uday Umesh Lalit)
New Delhi
July 1, 2016

-----------------------
[1]    (2013) 11 SCC 193
[2]    (2002) 6 SCC 710
[3]    (2005)3 SCC 551
[4]    (2005) 3 SCC 685
[5]    (2010) 5 SCC 344
[6]    (2012) 8 SCC 34

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