advocatemmmohan

My photo

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN -  Practicing both IN CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND FAMILY LAWS,Etc.,

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - FOR KNOWLEDGE IN LAW & FOR LEGAL OPINIONS - SHARE THIS

Sunday, July 3, 2016

whether suit filed by the plaintiff was barred by limitation. Relevant provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 are Article 55 and Article 113 which are to the following effect: |Article|Description of suit |Period of|Time from which | | | |limitatio|period begins to run| | | |n | | |55. |For compensation for the |Three |When the contract is| | |breach of any contract, |years |broken or (where | | |express or implied not | |there are successive| | |herein specially provided | |breaches) when the | | |for. | |breach in respect of| | | | |which the suit is | | | | |instituted occurs or| | | | |(where the breach is| | | | |continuing) when it | | | | |ceases. | | 113. |Any suit for which no period|Three |When the right to | | |of limitation is provided |years |sue accrues. | | |elsewhere in this Schedule. | | | =held that default is from 20th May, 1984 the suit ought to have been filed within 20.5.1987. Suit was filed on 25th May, 1988 being beyond three years was to be dismissed.= In exercise of power under Clause 4 of the agreement dated 20.9.1983 the plaintiff had taken possession of vehicle on 9.2.1985 and had immediately vide letter dated 12.2.1985 called upon the defendant to pay them due within 10 days from the receipt of the letter. The notice dated 12.2.1985 was received by the first defendant which was also replied by the first defendant as has been pleaded in the written statement. Thus,in any event of the matter contract stood broken on the default and right to sue accrued to the plaintiff on demanding the amount to be paid within 10 days. Thus, in any view of the matter suit filed by the plaintiff was beyond three years and has rightly been dismissed by the trial court. The High Court has also not erred in dismissing the appeal by taking the view that the suit was barred by limitation.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7245 OF 2008


M/S. SUNDARAM FINANCE LIMITED           … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

NOORJAHAN BEEVI AND ANOTHER          … RESPONDENT




                               J U D G M E N T



ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

      The plaintiff-appellant has filed this  appeal  against  the  judgment
dated 10th April, 2002 in A.S. No.388 of 1992 of Kerala High Court by  which
the High Court dismissed the appeal  filed  by  the  plaintiff-appellant  in
which appeal the judgment of the trial  court  dated  29.05.1991  dismissing
the suit was assailed.

2.    The brief facts necessary to be noted in this appeal are :
      The plaintiff-appellant is a public  limited  company  carrying  on  a
business of extending hire purchase facilities for commercial vehicles.  The
plaintiff and the first  defendant  had  entered  into  an  agreement  dated
20.09.1983 by which plaintiff had financed an amount of  Rs.1,47,000/-.  The
first defendant, the hirer was to clear off entire amount due in 36  monthly
instalments.  The  first  defendant  committed   default   in   payment   of
instalments with  effect  from  20th  May,1984.  The  plaintiff  seized  the
vehicle No. KLI2447 on 9th February,  1985.  Thereafter,the  plaintiff  vide
letter dated 12th February, 1985 called upon the defendants  to  settle  the
contract within 10 days from the date of the receipt  of  the  notice.   The
defendants did not make any payment. The plaintiff on 30th  May,  1985  sold
the vehicle and after adjusting the amount received  from  sale  of  vehicle
balance of  Rs.40,138/-  was  further  demanded.  Notice  dated  12th  July,
1985/22.07.1985 was sent by the plaintiff. Reply to the notice was given  on
30th July, 1985. The  plaintiff  filed  Original  Suit  No.148  of  1988  on
25.5.1988 praying for decree of sum of Rs.40,138/- along with interest.  The
second defendant, the husband of  first  defendant  was  also  impleaded  as
guarantor. A written statement  was  filed  by  the  first  defendant  where
execution of hire purchase agreement was admitted. The  default  in  payment
of instalments was admitted. It  was  further  pleaded  that  provisions  in
Clause 4 of hire purchase agreement regarding termination without notice  is
contrary to the  statutory  provisions.  It  was  further  stated  that  the
vehicle was not sold on best price. The defendant pleaded that plaintiff  is
not entitled for any relief. The trial court framed 8  issues.  One  of  the
issues, issue No.7 was: “whether the suit  is  barred  by  limitation”.  The
trial court after  considering  the  facts  held  that  suit  is  barred  by
limitation.  It was held that default is from 20th May, 1984 the suit  ought
to have been filed within 20.5.1987.  Suit  was  filed  on  25th  May,  1988
being beyond three years was to be dismissed.

3.    The plaintiff filed an appeal in the Kerala  High  Court.  The  Kerala
High Court also affirmed the judgment of the trial court and held that  suit
is barred by limitation. Plaintiff has come in this appeal  questioning  the
correctness of the judgment of the High Court.
4.    The only question which needs to be considered was as to whether  suit
filed by the plaintiff was barred  by  limitation.  Relevant  provisions  of
Limitation Act, 1963 are Article  55  and  Article  113  which  are  to  the
following effect:


|Article|Description of suit         |Period of|Time from which     |
|       |                            |limitatio|period begins to run|
|       |                            |n        |                    |
|55.    |For compensation for the    |Three    |When the contract is|
|       |breach of any contract,     |years    |broken or (where    |
|       |express or implied not      |         |there are successive|
|       |herein specially provided   |         |breaches) when the  |
|       |for.                        |         |breach in respect of|
|       |                            |         |which the suit is   |
|       |                            |         |instituted occurs or|
|       |                            |         |(where the breach is|
|       |                            |         |continuing) when it |
|       |                            |         |ceases.             |
| 113.  |Any suit for which no period|Three    |When the right to   |
|       |of limitation is provided   |years    |sue accrues.        |
|       |elsewhere in this Schedule. |         |                    |

5.    The submissions which have been pressed by  the  learned  counsel  for
the plaintiff that last instalment was to be paid on  20th  September,  1986
and the balance liability of the defendant could be ascertained  only  after
the sale of the vehicle which took place on 30th May,  1985  and   the  suit
was filed within three years from the date of sale of the  vehicle  as  well
as within three years from the last date of payment  of  instalment,  hence,
it could not have been said to be barred by time. The  present  was  a  case
which was to be governed by Article 113 of the  Limitation  Act,  1963.  The
Courts below erred in applying Article 55. The case  was  fully  covered  by
the judgment of the Madras High Court in Bell Alloys Steels Private  Limited
vs. The National Small Industries Corporation  Limited(1980  Legal  Surveyor
85). The default in payment of each  of  the  instalments  would  constitute
default. Therefore, a “continuing breach”, hence, the suit  is  well  within
time  from the date of default of payment of last instalment  that  is  20th
September, 1986.
6.    Learned counsel appearing for  the  respondents  refuting  submissions
made by the learned counsel for  the  appellant  contended  that  the  trial
court was correct in dismissing the suit as barred by time. Learned  counsel
for the respondent has also placed reliance on the judgment  of  this  Court
in  Deepak  Bhandari  vs.  Himachal  Pradesh  State  Industrial  Development
Corporation Limited,2015 (5) SCC 518.
7.    We have gone  through  the  records  and  considered  the  submissions
raised by the learned counsel for the parteis.
8.    As noted above, the trial court framed issue No.7, as to  whether  the
suit was barred by time. In paragraph 10 of  the  judgment  this  issue  was
dealt with in the following manner:
“10.ISSUE NO.7 :- According to the learned counsel for  the  defendants  the
suit is barred by limitation for the reason that the date  of  agreement  is
20.9.83 and the last date of payment is 20.4.84 but the suit is  filed  only
on 26.5.88. He has invited by attention to clause 4 to the  effect  that  if
any instalment is not  paid  within  the  stipulated  time  whether  legally
demanded or not; break or fail to  perform  or  observe  any  conditions  on
their part therein contained, then and in  such  cases  the  rights  of  the
hirer under the  agreement  shall  forth  with  be  determined  ipso  facto,
without any notice to the hirer. Therefore,  according  to  him  on  20.4.84
itself to contract was also determined. But  the  learned  counsel  for  the
plaintiff would argue that clause  4  contains  provisions  for  seizure  of
vehicle and unless  the  vehicle  is  sold  to  balance  in  any  cannot  be
ascertained and therefore the plaintiff would get course of action  only  on
30.5.85, the date of  sale  of  the  vehicle.  Though  I  went  through  the
different provisions of Ext.A2 agreement, I could  not  find  any  provision
for sale of the vehicle. Even in Ext.A3 there  is  no  such  provisions.  So
this argument cannot hold good. In the case on hand,  the  default  is  from
20.5.84, the suit ought to have been filed within  20.5.87.  Therefore,  the
suit is barred by limitation.

9.    The trial court has elaborately considered  the  submissions  of  both
the parties  and  has  referred  to  relevant  clauses  of  agreement  dated
20.9.1983.
10.   On the question of limitation while  referring  to  Clause  4  of  the
agreement dated 20.9.1983 in para 4 of the judgment following was observed:
“4.....Ext.A2 agreement dated 20.9.83 contains the terms and  conditions  to
be followed by the parties. As per clause 4 of Ext.  A2,  the  plaintiff  is
entitled to seize the vehicle even without notice  in  case  of  default  of
instalments  or  other  conditions  mentioned   therein.   Admittedly,   the
defendants have committed default  of  instalments.  If  the  hirer  commits
breach of the agreement, the rights of  the  hirer  commits  breach  of  the
agreement, the rights of the hirer under the agreement  shall  forthwith  be
determined  ipso  facto  without  any  notice  to  the  hirer  and  all  the
instalments previously paid by the hirer shall be  absolutely  forfeited  to
the owners who shall thereupon be entitled  to  enter  any  house  or  place
where the said vehicle may then be seize, remove and  retake  possession  of
it and to sue for all the instalments due and for damages for breach of  the
agreement and for all the costs occasioned by the hirer's  default.  So,  as
per the defendants, the financier invoked Clause 4 of the agreement and  the
vehicle was seized and subsequently sold.  The  cause  of  action  arose  on
20.4.1984. The plaintiff ought to have filed the  suit  within  three  years
from 20.4.1984. but the suit was filed  only  on  26.5.1988.  The  agreement
between the parties were determined on the date of default itself.”

11.   The High Court has come to conclusion that as  per  Clause  4  if  the
hirer commits breach of the agreement, the rights of  the  hirer  under  the
agreement shall forthwith be determined ipso facto  without  any  notice  to
the hirer and all the instalments previously paid  by  the  hirer  shall  be
absolutely forfeited to the owners who shall thereupon be entitled to  enter
any house or place where the said vehicle may  then  be  seize,  remove  and
retake possession of it. Further in paragraph 6 of the judgment of the  High
Court following further was observed:
“As per the  agreement,  the  financier  is  at  liberty  to  terminate  the
agreement ipso facto and also seize the vehicle without  notice.   There  is
no question of surrender of the vehicle and as  stated  above,  the  vehicle
belonged to the first defendant at the time of the agreement.  The  suit  is
being one for damages for  breach  of  contract  of  hire  purchase,  it  is
governed by Article 55 of the Limitation Act and therefore, the suit  should
have been filed within three years from the date of the  breach.  Here,  the
breach has been committed on 20.4.84.  In  pursuance  of  clause  4  of  the
agreement, the vehicle was seized by the plaintiff. So,  he  ought  to  have
filed the sit within three years from the date of breach of  the  agreement.
The contract was determined on 20.4.84 itself. The argument of  the  learned
counsel for the plaintiff that the vehicle was sold only on  30.05.1985  and
the amount was credited and then only the cause of action will arise  cannot
be accepted since it is a loan  transaction  between  the  parties  and  the
contract has ipso factor determined on the date of breach  of  contract.  It
is clear from clause 4 of the agreement that the financier is at liberty  to
forfeited the previous payment  made  by  the  hirer  and  also  seized  the
vehicle and sue for all the instalments due and for damages  for  breach  of
the agreement and for all the costs  of  retaking  possession  of  the  said
vehicle  and  all  costs  occasioned  by  the  hirer's  default.  Since  the
plaintiff invoked the said provision, the argument advanced by  the  learned
counsel  for  the  plaintiff  that  the  last  instalment  is  due  only  on
20.09.1986 and the suit is within time cannot be accepted. Since,  there  is
no provision to sell the vehicle and credit the amount to the loan  advanced
there is no question of waiting till the sale of the vehicle.”

12.   There is no dispute between  the  parties  that  the  hirer  committed
default in payment of instalments on 20th May,  1984.  The  High  Court  has
further held that there is no clause in agreement permitting  the  plaintiff
to sell  the  vehicle.  The  submission  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the
appellant that limitation to file the suit for recovery  of  balance  amount
shall begin with effect from the date of sale this is  30th  May,1985,  does
not appeal to us. The contract was to be determined ipso  facto  on  default
being committed. The power of seizing the vehicle and to take possession  as
contemplated under Clause 4 of  the  agreement  was  consequent  to  default
being committed by the hirer.
13.   This Court on 12th June, 2012 passed the following order:
      “Learned counsel for the appellant shall place on  record  a  copy  of
the hire purchase agreement dated 20th September, 1983.

      List thereafter.”

            The copy of the agreement dated 20th September, 1983 having  not
been placed before us, we have no option except to rely on the  contents  of
Clause 4 as noted by the High Court in its  judgment.  The  High  Court  has
noted that agreement does not contain any provision for sale of the  vehicle
hence, taking starting point of limitation from the date of sale of  vehicle
cannot be accepted.
14.   As noted above, in paragraph 4 of  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court
while noticing the contents of  Clause  4  of  the  agreement  it  has  been
observed that “if the hirer commits the breach of the agreement, the  rights
of the hirer under the agreement shall forthwith be  determined  ipso  facto
without any notice to the hirer and all the instalments previously  paid  by
the hirer shall be absolutely forfeited to the owners  who  shall  thereupon
be entitled to enter any house or place where the said vehicle may  then  be
seize,  remove  and  retake  possession  of  it  and  to  sue  for  all  the
instalments  due  and  for  damages  for  breach   of   the   agreement....”
(underlined by us).
15.   Thus, as per Clause 4 the right to sue accrues when the hirer  commits
breach of the agreement. Committing default in   payment of  instalement  is
nothing but a breach of the agreement and  thus  courts  below  has  rightly
taken a view that period of limitation for filing a suit  under  Article  55
shall begin with effect from 20th May, 1984 when the default  was  committed
by the hirer.
16.   In this case it is relevant to refer the judgment  of  this  Court  in
Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation vs. Pawna  and  others,  2015  (5)SCC
617. In the above case Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation  had  given  a
loan to a partnership firm. As security for that loan, a mortgage  deed  was
executed. Clause 7 of the mortgage deed contemplated that without  prejudice
to the rights and powers  conferred  on  the  Corporation  under  the  State
Financial Corporations  Act,  1951,  in  the  event,  the  partners  of  the
industrial concern fail to pay the said principal  sum  with  interest,  the
Corporation shall be entitled to realise its dues by sale of  the  mortgaged
properties, and if the sale proceeds thereof  are  insufficient  to  satisfy
the dues of the Corporation, to recover the balance  from  the  partners  of
the industrial concern. Clause 7 of  the  agreement  was  to  the  following
effect:
 “3. Clause 7 of the mortgage deed is important. It reads as follows:
“Without  prejudice  to  the  above  rights  and  powers  conferred  on  the
Corporation by these presents and  by  Sections  29  and  30  of  the  State
Financial Corporations Act, 1951 and as amended in 1956  and  1972  and  the
special remedies available to the Corporation under  the  said  Act,  it  is
hereby further agreed and declared that if the partners  of  the  industrial
concern fail to pay the said principal sum with interest  and  other  monies
due from them under these presents to the Corporation in the manner  agreed,
the Corporation shall be entitled  to  realise  its  dues  by  sale  of  the
mortgaged properties, the said fixtures and fittings and other  assets,  and
if the sale proceeds thereof are insufficient to satisfy  the  dues  of  the
Corporation, to recover the balance from  the  partners  of  the  industrial
concern and the other properties owned by them though not included  in  this
security.”
                                                        (emphasis supplied)”


17.   In the above case the assets were sold  on  28.3.1984  and  14.3.1985.
The sale amount could not satisfy the  outstanding  hence,  the  notice  was
issued on 27.5.1985 and thereafter suit was filed  on  15.9.1985.  The  High
Court has dismissed the suit as barred by limitation.  In  the  appeal  this
Court set  aside  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  by  making  following
observations in paragraphs 10 and 11:

“10. Whilst considering the question of limitation the  Division  Bench  has
given a very lengthy judgment running into approximately 50 pages.  However,
they appear to have not noticed the fact that under Clause  7  an  indemnity
had been given. Therefore, the premise on which the judgment  proceeds  i.e.
that  the  loan  transaction  and  the  mortgage  deed  are  one   composite
transaction which was inseparable is entirely erroneous. It is  settled  law
that a  contract  of  indemnity  and/or  guarantee  is  an  independent  and
separate contract from the main contract.  Thus,  the  question  which  they
required to address themselves, which unfortunately they did not,  was  when
does the right to sue on the indemnity arose. In  our  view,  there  can  be
only one answer to this question. The  right  to  sue  on  the  contract  of
indemnity arose only after the assets were sold off.  It  is  only  at  that
stage that the balance due became ascertained. It  is  at  that  stage  only
that a suit for recovery of  the  balance  could  have  been  filed.  Merely
because  the  Corporation  acted  under  Section   29   of   the   Financial
Corporations Act did not mean that the contract  of  indemnity  came  to  an
end. Section 29 merely enabled the Corporation to take possession  and  sell
the assets for recovery of the dues under the main contract. It may be  that
on the Corporation taking action  under  Section  29  and  on  their  taking
possession they became deemed owners. The mortgage may have come to an  end,
but the contract of indemnity, which was an independent contract,  did  not.
The right to claim for the balance arose, under the contract  of  indemnity,
only when the sale proceeds were found to be insufficient.

11. In this case, it is an admitted position that the sale took place on 28-
3-1984 and 14-3-1985. It is only after this date that the question of  right
to sue on the indemnity (contained in Clause 7) arose. The suit having  been
filed on 15-9-1985 was well within limitation. Therefore, it  was  erroneous
to hold that the suit was barred by the law of limitation.”

18.   The above case was based on Clause 7 of the agreement  as  well  as  a
specific  power  given  to  the  Corporation  under  the   State   Financial
Corporations Act, 1951, there is no such clause  akin to  Clause  7  of  the
mortgage deed in the present case.
19. In Deepak Bhandari vs. Himachal  Pradesh  State  Industrial  Development
Corporation Limited,2015 (5) SCC 518 while considering  Article  55  of  the
Limitation Act, 1963, this Court was considering the  question  whether  the
limitation   period begins  from  notice  recalling  loan  amounts  or  from
realisation of sale proceeds of mortgaged/hypothecated assets. It  was  held
that limitation for such suit beginsfrom the date when amount  of  dues  for
recovery are ascertained, and that  can  take  place  only  after  adjusting
amounts received from sale of mortgaged/hypothecated  assets.  In  paragraph
11 and 12 facts of the case were noted which are to the following effect:

“11. As per the defendants, the cause of  action  for  filing  the  recovery
suit arose on 21-5-1990 when recall notice was issued by the Corporation  to
the Company and the guarantors. Therefore, the suit was to be  filed  within
a period of 3 years from the said date and calculated in this  manner,  last
date for filing the suit was 20-5-1993. It was, thus, pleaded that the  suit
filed on 26-12-1994 was beyond the period of 3  years  from  21-5-1990  and,
therefore, the same was time-barred.

12. The Corporation, on the other hand, contended that  action  for  selling
the mortgaged/hypothecated properties of the Company  was  taken  under  the
provisions of Section 29 of the Act  and  the  sale  of  these  assets  were
fructified on 21-3-1994. It is on  the  realisation  of  the  sale  proceeds
only,  that  the  balance  amount  payable  by  the  guarantors   could   be
ascertained. Therefore, the  starting  point  for  counting  the  limitation
period is 31-3-1994 and the suit filed by the Corporation on 26-12-1996  was
well within the period of limitation.”


            This Court has also referred to the  judgment  of  the  Himachal
Pradesh Financial Corporation(supra). In paragraph 27 of  the  judgment  the
following was stated:

“27. We thus, hold that when the Corporation takes  steps  for  recovery  of
the amount by resorting to the provisions of Section  29  of  the  Act,  the
limitation period for recovery of the balance amount would start only  after
adjusting the proceeds from the sale of assets of  the  industrial  concern.
As the Corporation would be in a position to know as to whether there  is  a
shortfall or there is excess amount realised, only after  the  sale  of  the
mortgaged/hypothecated assets. This is  clear  from  the  language  of  sub-
section (1) of Section 29 which makes the position abundantly clear  and  is
quoted below:
29. Rights of Financial Corporation  in  case  of  default.—(1)  Where  any
industrial concern, which is under a liability to the Financial  Corporation
under an agreement, makes any default in repayment of any  loan  or  advance
or any instalment thereof or in meeting its obligations in relation  to  any
guarantee given by the Corporation or otherwise fails  to  comply  with  the
terms of  its  agreement  with  the  Financial  Corporation,  the  Financial
Corporation shall have the right to take over the management  or  possession
or both of the industrial concern, as well as the right to transfer  by  way
of lease or sale and realise the property pledged,  mortgaged,  hypothecated
or assigned to the Financial Corporation.”


            This Court while taking the  above  view  has  referred  to  the
statutory  power  given  to  the  Corporation  under  the  State   Financial
Corporations Act.
20.   The above judgment of this Court was a case where the Court had  taken
into consideration the statutory power given to Financial Corporation  under
Section  29  of  the  State  Financial  Corporation   Act,1951   where   the
Corporation is entitled to take possession of the  assets  and  transfer  by
way of lease or sale. Present is not a case where  plaintiff  can  claim  to
exercise any power akin to Section 29 of the  State  Financial  Corporations
Act, 1951. The rights of the parties have to be determined as per terms  and
conditions of the agreement dated 20.9.1983. The terms of the  agreement  as
noted by the High Court and referred to by  us  as  above  clearly  indicate
that on committing a breach of terms and conditions  of  the  agreement  the
rights shall accrue to the plaintiff to sue for balance instalments and  the
damages for breach of contract. Thus, the  right  to  sue  shall  not  stand
differed till either sale which took place on 20th May,  1985  or  till  the
last date of payment of the instalment that is 20th September,  1986.   Both
the courts below have rightly taken the view  that  limitation  shall  start
running from the date the hirer defaulted  in  making  payment  that  is  on
20.5.1984 and suit has been filed beyond three years  from  the  above  date
was clearly barred by time. Article 55 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has  also
come  for  consideration  before  this   Court   in   Syndicate   Bank   vs.
Channaveerappa Beleri and others,2006 (11) SCC 506. In paragraph 13  of  the
judgment following was stated:

“13. What then is the meaning of the said words used in the guarantee  bonds
in question? The guarantee bond states that the guarantors agree to pay  and
satisfy the Bank “on demand”. It specifically provides  that  the  liability
to pay interest would arise upon the guarantor only from the date of  demand
by the Bank for payment. It also provides that  the  guarantee  shall  be  a
continuing guarantee for payment of the ultimate balance to  become  due  to
the Bank by the borrower. The terms of guarantee, thus, make it  clear  that
the liability to pay would arise on the guarantors only  when  a  demand  is
made. Article 55 provides that the time will begin to run when the  contract
is “broken”. Even if Article 113 is to be applied, the time  begins  to  run
only when the right to sue accrues. In this case, the  contract  was  broken
and the right to sue accrued only when a demand for payment was made by  the
Bank and it was refused by the guarantors. When a demand is  made  requiring
payment within a stipulated period, say 15 days, the breach occurs or  right
to sue accrues, if payment is not made or is  refused  within  15  days.  If
while making the demand for payment, no period is  stipulated  within  which
the payment should be made, the breach occurs or right to sue accrues,  when
the demand is served on the guarantor.”

21.   In exercise of power under Clause 4 of the agreement  dated  20.9.1983
the  plaintiff  had  taken  possession  of  vehicle  on  9.2.1985  and   had
immediately vide letter dated 12.2.1985 called upon  the  defendant  to  pay
them due within 10 days from the receipt of the  letter.  The  notice  dated
12.2.1985 was received by the first defendant which was also replied by  the
first defendant as has been pleaded in the written  statement.  Thus,in  any
event of the matter contract stood broken on the default and  right  to  sue
accrued to the plaintiff  on demanding the amount  to  be  paid  within   10
days. Thus, in any view of the  matter  suit  filed  by  the  plaintiff  was
beyond three years and has rightly been dismissed by the  trial  court.  The
High Court has also not erred in dismissing the appeal by  taking  the  view
that the suit was barred by limitation.
22.   In view of the foregoing, we do not find any  merit  in  this  appeal.
The appeal is dismissed accordingly.


                                      ………………….…...........................J.
                                       (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)


                                      ………………..…...........................J.
                                             (ASHOK BHUSHAN)

NEW DELHI,
JUNE  29, 2016.












No comments:

Post a Comment

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.