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Tuesday, May 10, 2016

Elections - Conversion to Sikh Community - keeping old name for the purpose of Identification - conversion of entire family not necessary to consider a person as a converted person in to other religion = the appellant embraced Sikh religion on 13.04.2006, and got published the declaration on 04.01.2007 in the newspapers Hindustan Times (English) Exh.RA, and Ajit (Punjabi) Exh RB. Nomination for election in question was filed by him five years thereafter. The appellant has further sufficiently explained that since he was popular as a singer with the name – ‘Mohammad Sadique’ as such without changing his name, he accepted Sikhism and followed all rites and traditions of Sikh Religion. = It is not essential for anyone to change one’s name after embracing a different faith. However, such change in name can be a corroborating fact regarding conversion or reconversion into a religion/faith in appropriate cases. Also it is not necessary in law that entire family of a person should convert or reconvert to the religion to which he has converted. RW- 5 Mohammad Sadique has stated that he not only followed Sikh traditions, he never offered Namaz, nor observed Roza nor went to Haj. It is also relevant to mention here that PW-7 Darbara Singh Guru (respondent-Election Petitioner) in his cross-examination admits that he did not raise any objection at the time when nomination papers were filed by the appellant In the above circumstances, we are inclined to hold that the High Court has erred in law, by ignoring the above facts on the record, and giving importance to form of declaration, and the interview said to have been given by appellant to PW 6 Gulzar Singh Shaunki, author of book - “Sada Bahar Gayak – Mohammad Sadique : Jeevan Te Geet” (Exh.PK). Statement of the appellant as RW-5 regarding conversion to Sikhism, is fully corroborated by RW-11 Darshan Singh, Ex-Sarpanch of village Kupkalan, RW-6 Rachhpal Singh, Secretary of Gurudwara Sahib Kupkalan, RW-9 Ms. Sukhjeet Kaur, co-singer in Gurudwara, and RW-14 Sant Shamsher Singh Jageda, who presented ‘Saropa’ to the appellant. Having re-appreciated the evidence on record, as above, and keeping in view the law laid down by this Court in Guntur Medical College v. Y. Mohan Rao1, S. Anbalagan v. B. Devarajan2, and Kailash Sonkar v. Maya Devi3, in our opinion, the impugned judgment passed by the High Court cannot be upheld.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4870 OF 2015


Mohammad Sadique                             … Appellant

                                   Versus

Darbara Singh Guru                                 … Respondent






                               J U D G M E N T

Prafulla C. Pant, J.



      This appeal, preferred under Section 116A  of  The  Representation  of
the  People  Act,  1951,  is  directed  against  judgment  and  order  dated
07.04.2015, passed by High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, in  EP
No. 1/2012, whereby Election Petition filed by respondent has been  allowed,
and election of the appellant from 102-Bhadaur  (Scheduled  Caste)  Assembly
Constituency in Punjab, has been set aside.

2.    Brief facts of the case are  that  General  Elections  were  held  for
Punjab Legislative Assembly, in  January,  2012.  Last  date  of  filing  of
nomination papers was 12.01.2012. Date for  scrutiny  of  nomination  papers
was 16.01.2012. And polling was held on 30.01.2012. The  counting  of  votes
was done on 06.03.2012, in which appellant was declared elected.

3.    Election Petitioner (respondent herein) filed  his  nomination  papers
as a candidate of Shiromani Akali Dal. The appellant was  a  candidate  from
Indian National Congress. There were other 17 candidates in the fray.  Seven
independent candidates withdrew their candidature, as  such,  only  12  were
left in the field. Since Bhadaur constituency  was  reserved  for  Scheduled
Castes, only the candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes were qualified  to
contest the election under Section  5  (a)  of  The  Representation  of  the
People Act, 1951 (hereinafter “RP Act”).

4.    It appears that on 14.01.2012,  one  Badal  Singh  complained  to  the
Returning Officer, Bhadaur Constituency, alleging  that  appellant  Mohammad
Sadique was a muslim, and as such did not belong to any Scheduled Caste.  He
also filed Civil Writ Petition No. 985/2012 before the High Court which  was
dismissed as not pressed, since, the  remedy  of  challenging  the  election
through Election Petition was available.

5.    Total 1,13,233 votes, including 83  Postal  Ballots,  were  polled  on
30.01.2012 in the Bhadaur  Assembly  Constituency.  On  counting  of  votes,
appellant was found  to  have  secured  52,825  votes  in  his  favour,  and
respondent got 45,856 votes, and as  such  appellant  Mohammad  Sadique  was
declared elected from 102-Bhadaur (Scheduled  Caste)  Assembly  Constituency
on 06.03.2012.

6.    Respondent challenged the election of the appellant pleading that,  he
(appellant), being a muslim, is not a member  of  Scheduled  Caste,  and  as
such he was not qualified to contest  the  election  from  any  constituency
reserved  for  Scheduled  Castes.  It  was  specifically  pleaded  that  the
appellant was born in a family which followed Islam,  and  his  parents  and
others members of the family also professed  Islam.  They  had  their  names
which are prevalent amongst muslims, and they used to observe traditions  of
Islam. None of their family members add “Singh”, with their names,  normally
found in the names  of  those  following  ‘Sikh’  religion.  It  is  further
pleaded by the election petitioner-respondent that in his interview  in  the
book titled - “Sada Bahar Gayak – Mohammad Sadique : Jeevan  Te  Geet”,  the
appellant had confessed that he was a muslim. It  was  also  stated  in  the
election petition that after death of the parents of  the  appellant,  their
bodies were buried as per muslim rites. It  was  further  alleged  that  the
Caste certificate issued to the  appellant  showing  him  to  be  member  of
community “Doom (Marasi)” by  Tehsildar,  Ludhiana  (West),  was  cancelled.
Thereafter, the appellant obtained caste certificate certifying his cast  as
“Doom” (i.e. Scheduled Caste) on 25.08.2006. However, the  Joint  Secretary,
Department of Welfare, Government of Punjab  vide  memorandum  No.1/32/2008-
RS-1 dated 17.11.2008 issued directions to all the Deputy  Commissioners  in
State of Punjab that a person professing Islam  is not legally  entitled  to
get Scheduled Caste  certificate.  Another  communication  dated  16.03.2009
stated to have been issued by the  State  Government  informing  the  Deputy
Commissioners that such Scheduled Castes certificates  issued  on  or  after
01.01.1980 were liable to be cancelled.

7.    Appellant contested the  election  petition,  and  filed  his  written
statement. He pleaded that he professed Sikh religion, and is  a  member  of
“Doom” community which is a Scheduled Caste  in  the  State  of  Punjab.  He
admitted that he was born in a muslim family, but never offered  prayers  in
mosque or observed Rozas. It is further pleaded  that  since  childhood  the
appellant used to sing songs in the company of  Sikh  writers,  artists  and
singers. He used to go to the Gurudwaras  to  pay  obeisance  and  developed
faith in Sikh religion. He followed the rites, rituals and customs  of  Sikh
religion. He performed ‘Sampath Path’ with Ragis at his residence for  seven
days in the year 2000, and his two daughters are married to Hindu boys.  The
appellant specifically stated in the  written  statement  that  he  embraced
Sikh religion formally on 13.04.2006, and a public  notice  to  this  effect
was published in newspapers- ‘The Hindustan Times’, Chandigarh,  and  ‘Daily
Akali Patrika’, Jalandhar, dated 04.01.2007. It is explained in the  written
statement that since the appellant  was  popular  as  a  singer  with  name-
Mohammad  Sadique,  therefore,  he  did  not  change  his  name  even  after
embracing Sikh religion. On death of his wife  Smt.  Raffikan  @  Seeto  who
died on 17.12.2007  though  she  was  buried  by  followers  of  Islam,  but
appellant performed “Akhand Path” from 04.01.2008 to 06.01.2008 as per  Sikh
religion. It is further stated that Bhog of Akhand Path,  Kirtan  and  Antim
Ardas were held in Gurudwara at Ludhiana which  was  attended  by  prominent
Sikh personalities. The appellant has explained  in  the  written  statement
that his mother Smt. Parsanni Devi who died on 16.12.2009  was  follower  of
Islam, and after her death her body was buried but the  appellant  performed
Akhand Path and Bhog on 27.12.2009 in Gurdwara Sahib  at  village  Kupkalan.
Name of the appellant’s father was Waliat Ali.  The  appellant  denied  that
he admitted in the interview that he was a muslim. It is alleged that  since
earlier he was issued caste certificate as ‘Doom Marasi’  by  mistake,  that
is why he got issued fresh certificate of caste mentioning   ‘Doom’.  It  is
also pleaded that the daughters of the appellant were also issued  Scheduled
Caste certificates. The appellant accepted that  he  did  receive  a  notice
vide letter dated 30.11.2006, to deposit caste certificate issued to him  by
19.12.2006 but denied that his certificate was ever cancelled  or  withdrawn
by the Government.
8.    The High Court, on the basis of the pleadings of  the  parties  framed
following issues:-
      (1)  Whether the respondent being muslim was not qualified to  contest
the  election  from  102-Bhadaur  Assembly  Constituency  reserved  for  the
members of the Scheduled Castes?

      (2)  Whether the respondent is a Sikh and professes Sikh religion?

      (3) Whether the election petition is not verified in  accordance  with
Order VI Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? If so, its effect.

      (4) Whether no material fact can be pleaded in the  replication  after
expiry of the period of limitation for filing an election petition?

      (5)Whether paragraph Nos. 12  to  15,  22(vii)(viii)(ix)(x)(xiii)(xiv)
and 27 to 28 of the election petition are liable to be  struck  off  on  the
ground  mentioned  in  the  Preliminary  Objection  No.1  of   the   written
statement?

      (6) Relief.”


9.    The High Court, after recording evidence of the parties,  and  hearing
them, allowed the Election Petition  and  set  aside  the  election  of  the
appellant, holding that he was a muslim,  and  not  a  member  of  Scheduled
Caste, as such  not  qualified  to  contest  election  from  102  –  Bhadaur
(Scheduled Caste) Assembly Constituency.

10.  Aggrieved by the  above  order  of  the  High  Court,  this  appeal  is
preferred by the respondent in the Election Petition.

11.    Submissions and arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant:

11.1  In  1939,  appellant  was  born  in   ‘Doom’  caste  in  Punjab.   The
appellant’s parents were Muslims by  birth.   However,  the  appellant  even
before his conversion to Sikhism, had complete inclination  towards  Sikhism
and was a ‘Ragi’ and used to perform Kirtan at Alamgir Sikh Gurdwara.

11.2  The appellant has throughout been raised as a Sikh.  He has  professed
the Sikh religion, and  performed  the  ceremonies,  rituals  and  rites  of
Sikhism.

11.3  He has never offered prayer in a mosque, or  kept  Rozas,  or  offered
Namaz, or had never been to Haj.  He has never lived nor considered  himself
a muslim, nor was he so considered by others.

11.4  He started singing songs at a very early age and in due course  became
one of the most popular folk singers in  Punjab.   He  was  associated  with
other writers, artists, singers and producers, who were all Sikhs, and  used
to visit Gurdwaras with them to pay obeisance, and had full  faith  in  Sikh
religion.  At  every  stage  -  show  of  his,  the  appellant  started  the
performance by singing religious songs in praise of the Guru Sahibans.

11.5   During  1989-1991,  appellant’s  daughters  were  all  issued   caste
certificates mentioning ‘Doom’ as their caste,  as  per  certificates  dated
01.08.1989, and 16.04.1991.  These are still valid and not cancelled.

11.6  During 1999-2000, appellant was going through a personal bad phase  in
his life.  On the advice of Sardar Pargat Singh Grewal,  the  appellant  got
performed the ‘Sampat Path’, which was performed by Sant  Baba  Sucha  Singh
along with other Ragis of Jawadi Taksal at his  residence  in  Ludhiana  for
seven days.   Thereafter, the appellant’s condition started  improving,  and
it further strengthened his belief in Sikh religion.

11.7  During 2001-2002, three of the appellant’s daughters,  namely,  Naseem
Akhtar, Shehnaz Akhtar and Javed Akhtar were married  into  Hindu  families.
The marriages were performed as per Hindu rites and ceremonies,  as  desired
by the respective husbands’ families.

11.8  Though the appellant  had  always  been  raised  as  a  Sikh  and  had
followed Sikhism, he formally embraced Sikhism on  13.04.2006.   He  gave  a
public notice of this, which was  published  in  leading  newspapers  namely
Hindustan  Times,  Chandigarh  and  Daily  Akali  Patrika,   Chandigarh   on
04.01.2007.  Since appellant had become famous throughout Punjab and  indeed
all over India as a singer, he retained his muslim name and did  not  change
it.

11.9  On 13.07.2006, appellant got his application and affidavit typed by  a
typist in Ludhiana for obtaining his caste certificate.  The  appellant  did
not read the same before signing and  Caste certificate was  issued  to  the
appellant mentioning his caste as ‘Doom’ (Marasi).  The  appellant  at  this
stage realized that the typist had by mistake in  the  application   wrongly
mentioned his caste as ‘Doom’(Marasi) instead of caste ‘Doom’.

11.10   On 25.08.2006, appellant therefore asked  the  Tehsildar  to  cancel
the wrong caste certificate and, on his asking, re-applied with the  correct
caste mentioned as ‘Doom’.  Fresh caste  certificate  mentioning  ‘Doom’  as
the caste was issued to the appellant, which is  still  valid  and  has  not
been cancelled. ‘Doom’ is a Scheduled Caste in Punjab.

11.11 There was  no  objection  from  anyone  to  the  appellant’s  formally
embracing  Sikhism,  rather,  he  was  welcomed  into  it.   Prominent  Sikh
personalities such as Sant Shamsher Singh Jagera, President of  Sant  Sepahi
Dal and International Sant  Samaj,  honoured  the  appellant  by  presenting
“Saropa” to him on 20.01.2007.  He was also welcomed  by  Sant  Kartar  Dass
Jee at his Dera and Sardar  Pargat  Singh  Grewal,  President,  Prof.  Mohan
Singh Foundation.

11.12 The appellant’s wife  Rafikan  @  Seeto  passed  away  on  17.12.2007.
Since she had been following Islam, she  was  buried.   However,  since  the
appellant had been following Sikhism, he got the ‘Akhand Path’ performed  in
Gurdwara Shri Tegh  Bahadur  Satsang  Sabha,  Ludhiana  from  04.01.2008  to
06.01.2008, and the bhog of  Akhand  Path  of  Sh.  Guru  Granth  Sahib  was
performed on 06.01.2008 at his residence and  thereafter  Kirtan  and  Antim
Ardas was held on the same day followed  by  Guru  ka  Langar  as  per  Sikh
rituals, rites, customs and ceremonies.  The obituary to this fact  was  got
published  in  various  newspaper  namely  ‘Aj  Di  Awaj,  Jalandhar   dated
05.01.2008   and  ‘Ajit  Jalandhar’   dated   04.01.2008.        The  Kirtan
and Antim Ardas of the appellant’s  wife  was  well  publicised  and  widely
attended, including by prominent Sikh personalities.  The entire  event  was
also videographed  and  the  original  video  recordings  were  produced  as
evidence before the High Court.

11.13 The appellant’s mother Smt. Parsanni Devi passed away  on  16.12.2009.
Since she had followed Islam, she was buried.   However,  again,  since  the
appellant was following Sikhism, he got performed the Akhand Path  and  bhog
of Akhand Path of Sri Guru Granth  Sahib  and  Kirtan  and  Antim  Ardas  on
27.12.2009  in  Gurdwara  Sahib  at  Village  Kupkalan,  Tehsil   Malerkotla
District  Sangrur.   This  was  also  attended  by  several  prominent  Sikh
personalities.

11.14 In  December  2011,  the  election  schedule  for  Punjab  Legislative
Assembly Elections was announced.  Nomination papers were to be filed on  or
before 12.01.2012. Scrutiny of papers was on 13.01.2012.      The  appellant
filed his nomination papers from Indian National Congress Party for  Bhadaur
Constituency.  The respondent (Election  Petitioner)  filed  his  nomination
from the Shiromani Akali Dal Party.  Bhadaur constituency was  reserved  for
Scheduled Castes in Punjab.  Demographically, it is dominated by  Sikhs  who
are the majority religious group in this constituency. Polling was  held  on
30.01.2012. On 06.03.2012, results were declared and the  appellant  emerged
as the successful candidate, winning by a wide margin.

11.15  For  the  avoidance  of  doubt,  on  11.08.2014,  appellant  made   a
declaration as per Section 2(9) of  the  Sikh  Gurdwaras  Act  1925  to  the
effect that he was a follower of Sikh religion. However, on 07.04.2015,  the
impugned  order  was  pronounced  by  the  High  Court,  which  allowed  the
petition, holding that  the  appellant  was  not  eligible  to  contest  the
election from Bhadaur.  The High  Court  held  that  since  the  appellant’s
parents followed Islam, he was a muslim and therefore could not be a  member
of a Scheduled Caste.  It further  held  that  appellant  had  not  embraced
Sikhism and even if he embraced Sikhism, he would not  get  the  benefit  of
being a member of a Scheduled Caste.

11.16 The impugned order is erroneous because it  ignored  the  overwhelming
evidence that the appellant  had  lived  his  life  throughout  as  a  Sikh.
Finding of High Court that the appellant is a muslim is incorrect,  and  the
evidence has not been correctly appreciated.  There is  no  formal  ceremony
or procedure required to embrace Sikhism.  The fact that a  person  has  led
his  life  throughout  by  following  Sikh  customs,  rituals,   rites   and
ceremonies, and that he has  not  followed  the  ceremonies,  of  any  other
religion, leads to the conclusion that the person is a Sikh.

11.17 Appellant had led his life throughout by following Sikh  customs.   He
used to pray in Gurdwaras.  He got the Akhand Path, bhog, kirtan  and  Antim
Ardas performed after the death of his wife and his mother.   Three  of  his
daughters are married into Hindu families.  He had given a public notice  of
his formally embracing Sikhism as  far  back  as  in  2006,  which  was  not
objected to by anyone.  On the other hand, the evidence was  clear  that  he
had never observed any of  the  customs,  rites,  or  ceremonies  of  Islam.
Thus, neither did appellant conduct himself as a muslim, nor did  he  regard
himself as the one.  He was not perceived as a muslim by his near  and  dear
ones, friends and acquaintances.

11.18 The High Court erred in holding  that  the  declaration  made  by  the
appellant under the Sikh Gurdwaras Act 1925 would take effect only from  the
date of the declaration.  It failed to note that  the  declaration,  by  its
very nature, would be retroactive in operation.

11.19 The High Court erred in holding that  the  instant  case  was  one  of
conversion from Islam to Sikhism  and  therefore  the  appellant  could  not
claim to be a member of a  Scheduled  Caste.   The   High  Court  failed  to
appreciate that the appellant had been raised as a Sikh belonging to  ‘Doom’
caste from the very beginning and as such it was not a case of conversion.

11.20 The High Court has misconstrued the evidence of PW-2, PW-4  and  PW-5.
All that was stated by these witnesses is  that  the  State  Government  had
issued instructions that Scheduled Caste Certificates should not  be  issued
to  muslims,  even  if  they  indicated  their  caste  as   ‘Doom’.    These
instructions were not specific to  the  case  of  the  appellant  since  the
appellant is not a muslim.  The Caste Certificate issued  to  the  appellant
remains valid even on date, and has never been cancelled.

11.21 The High Court further erred in holding that since the  appellant  did
not wear the five ‘kakkas’ i.e Kachha, Karha, Kirpan, Kangha  and  Kesh,  he
could not be a Sikh.  The High  Court  failed  to  note  that  the  same  is
required only of Amritdhari  Sikhs,  and  not  all  Sikhs,  and  even  among
Amritdhari Sikhs it is not a universal practice.

12.   Submissions and arguments advanced on behalf of  Respondent  (Election
Petitioner) :-

Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950  provides  that  no  person  who
professes a religion different from the Hindu,  the  Sikh  or  the  Buddhist
shall be deemed to  be  a  member  of  a  Scheduled  Caste.  Thus  a  person
professing Muslim religion cannot claim Scheduled Caste status.



12.2 Under section 5(a) of the Representation of the People  Act  1951,  the
qualification to  be  elected  to  the  Legislative  Assembly  from  a  seat
reserved for Scheduled Castes is that the candidate must belong  to  one  of
the Scheduled Castes specified for  the  said  State,  in  the  Constitution
(Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. Since the Bhadaur Constituency was  reserved
for the Scheduled Castes in the State of Punjab, as such the  appellant  not
being a member of Scheduled Caste was  not  qualified  to  contest  election
from said Constituency.




12.3 The High Court has   correctly  evaluated  the  material  available  on
record to find out as to whether  the  appellant  had  taken  birth  in  the
family of Scheduled Caste as per the Constitution (Scheduled Castes)  Order,
1950 before concluding that the appellant being a muslim cannot  derive  any
benefit of Scheduled Caste.




12.4  Even if it is presumed that the appellant belonged to  Doom  community
and embraced Sikhism, it cannot be said that he was a  member  of  Scheduled
Caste and he would carry his ‘Doom’ Caste along with  him  at  the  time  of
conversion.  It is apposite to mention here that a muslim even if  belonging
to Scheduled Caste was not eligible to contest the election, and as such  by
merely embracing Sikhism, he cannot become eligible for the same.

12.5 A person embracing religion other than Hindu or  Sikh  does  not  carry
his caste with him as a general rule.  No special  circumstances  have  been
brought on record so that this Court may  presume  that  the  appellant  had
carried his ‘Doom’ caste along with him after embracing Sikhism.   In  fact,
on the basis of the evidence led by both the parties,  the  High  Court  was
rightly not convinced that  the  appellant  had  embraced  Sikhism  for  the
reason that the appellant fairly admitted during his cross-examination  that
his forefathers as well as his wife were following Islam.



Moreover, the declaration which is required to be verified by  a  Magistrate
under Rule 3(b) of the Sikh Gurdwaras Rules, 1925 has been verified  by  the
Oath Commissioner and not by the Magistrate, and hence it does  not  qualify
to be a legal declaration and therefore, its not a valid declaration.



By an application dated 13.07.2006, (Exh. PF),  the  appellant  had  applied
for issuance of a Scheduled Caste certificate by claiming  himself  that  he
belonged to “Doom (Marasi)” caste, which was granted  to  him  on  the  same
date i.e.13.07.06 (Exh. PF6),  under  the  orders  of  the  then  Tehsildar,
Ludhiana (West).  When the said fact came to light, the  then  Commissioner,
Patiala Division, Patiala, ordered an inquiry  and  thereafter  a  direction
was issued to the appellant to return the said Scheduled  Caste  certificate
in the office of the Tehsildar by 19.12.2006, but the same  was  not  obeyed
by the appellant and, as such, the Government of Punjab vide its  order  no.
15/MC, dated 11.01.2007, cancelled the said certificate.  In  the  meantime,
the appellant again applied on 25.08.2006 (Exh.PG), for issuance of  another
Scheduled Caste certificate claiming himself to be a “Doom” caste  only  and
a certificate (Exh. PG2), to that effect was issued on the  same  date  i.e.
25.08.2006.  However, the Joint Secretary, Welfare,  Government  of  Punjab,
vide his Memo No.1/32/2008-RS-1, dated 17.11.2008, issued directions to  all
the Deputy Commissioners in the State  of  Punjab,  to  the  effect  that  a
person belonging to Islam was not legally entitled to get a Scheduled  Caste
certificate.

12.8 A public notice claiming to declare the appellant a Sikh was  published
in the  newspapers  –  The  Hindustan  Times,  Chandigarh  and  Daily  Akali
Patrika, Jalandhar on 04.01.2007 but as admitted by his own  witness  RW  14
in the  cross  examination,  the  appellant  was  a  Mohammedan  before  the
advertisement in the newspapers on 04.01.2007. As such the  appellant  is  a
born muslim, and continued to be  a  muslim  upto  the  date  of  filing  of
nomination papers.



The  two  Scheduled  Caste  Certificates  dated   13.07.2006   Exh.PF6   and
25.08.2006 Exh.PG2 got issued by  the  appellant  are  not  valid  Scheduled
Caste certificates.



12.10 Sub Section (9) of Section 2, of the Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1925  defines
a Sikh reads as follows-

“(9) Sikh – “Sikh means a person who professes the Sikh religion or  in  the
case of a deceased person, who professed the Sikh religion or was  known  to
be a Sikh during his life time.


If any question arises as to whether any living person is or is not a  Sikh,
he shall be deemed respectively to be or not to be a Sikh  according  as  he
makes or refuses to make in such manner as the  State  Govt.  may  prescribe
the following declaration: -


I solemnly affirm that I am a Sikh,  that  I  believe  in  the  Guru  Granth
Sahib, that I believe in the ten Gurus and that I have no other religion.”


12.11  In the Rules framed under Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1925,  it  is  provided
that a declaration shall be made  either  orally  in  the  presence  of  the
authority by whom it is to be decided whether the person in  question  is  a
Sikh or not, or in writing and (i) if the declaration  is  made  orally  the
authority in whose presence it is made shall record  the  making  of  it  in
writing and the record shall be attested by the signature or  thumb-mark  of
the person making it, and (ii) if the declaration  is  made  in  writing  it
shall be signed by the person making it, shall be verified by  a  magistrate
and shall be forwarded in original to the authority by  whom  it  is  to  be
decided whether the person in question is a Sikh or not.


12.12 For ceremony of Baptism  and  Imitation  procedure  in  Art.  XXIV  is
required to  be  followed,  which  is  not  followed,  as  such  High  Court
committed no error of law in setting aside election of the appellant.





12.13  In the above circumstances, the respondent deserves  to  be  declared
elected for remaining period from Assembly Constituency Bhadaur.

13.   We have considered the rival submissions of learned  counsel  for  the
parties and perused the papers on record.

14.   In the present case, the main issue before  us  is  whether  the  High
Court has erred in holding that the appellant was not a member of  Scheduled
Caste on the date of filing of  his  nomination  papers  from  the  Assembly
Constituency 102 Bhadaur (SC) in Punjab, as such he was not  qualified,  and
his election from said constituency is bad in law.

15.   Before further discussion we think it just and  proper  to  understand
what “caste” actually means.  The word “caste” is  defined  in  Encyclopedia
Americana, Vol. 5, as under: -

“Caste: Caste is a largely static, exclusive  social  class,  membership  in
which is determined by birth and involves particular customary  restrictions
and privileges.   The  word  derives  from  the  Portuguese  casta,  meaning
‘breed’, ‘race’, or ‘kind’ and was first used to  denote  the  Hindu  social
classification on the Indian subcontinent.  While  this  remains  the  basic
connotation, the word ‘caste’ is also used to describe in whole or  in  part
social systems that emerged at various times in other parts of the world….”

        According  to  Webster   Comprehensive   Dictionary   (International
Edition), ‘caste’ in relation to Hinduism means – any  of  the  four  social
divisions  namely  Brahmin   (Priests),   Khshatriya   (Warriors),   Vaishya
(agriculturists & traders) and Shudras (servants).

16.   Now, we would like to examine the expression  “Scheduled  Caste”.   In
Guntur Medical College v. Y. Mohan Rao[1], Constitution Bench of this  Court
has explained the term “Scheduled Castes” and made following observation: -

“3.   ………… The expression ‘scheduled castes’ has a technical  meaning  given
to it by clause (24) of Article 366 and it means -


‘such castes, races or tribes or parts of  or  groups  within  such  castes,
races or tribes as are deemed under Article 341 to be Scheduled  Castes  for
the purposes of this Constitution’.




The President in exercise of the power conferred upon him under Article  341
has issued the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950.  Paras  (2)  and
(3) of this Order are material and they read as follows:

“2.   Subject to the provisions of this Order, the castes, races  or  tribes
or parts of or groups within caste or tribes specified in Part I to XIII  of
the Schedule to this Order shall, in relation to the States to  which  these
parts respectively relate, be deemed  to  be  scheduled  castes  so  far  as
regards members thereof resident in the localities specified in relation  to
them in those Parts of that Schedule.

3.    Notwithstanding anything contained in para 2, no person who  professes
a religion different from the Hindu or the Sikh religion shall be deemed  to
be a member of a Scheduled Caste.

The schedule to this order in Part I sets out the castes,  races  or  tribes
or parts of or groups within castes or tribes which shall in  the  different
areas of the State of Andhra Pradesh be deemed to be scheduled  castes.  One
of the  castes  specified  there  is  Madiga  caste  and  that  caste  must,
therefore, be deemed to be a scheduled caste. But by reason of  clause  (3),
a person belonging to Madiga caste would not be deemed to be a member  of  a
scheduled caste unless he professes Hindu or Sikh religion at  the  relevant
time. It is not necessary that he  should  have  been  born  a  Hindu  or  a
Sikh…….”

         (Emphasis supplied)


17.   In S. Anbalagan v. B. Devarajan[2], which  is  a  case  pertaining  to
election from Rasipuram Parliamentary Constituency (reserved  for  Scheduled
Castes), a three-Judge Bench of this  Court  at  the  end  of  para  13  has
observed as under: -

“13.  ………….Now, if such a Christian becomes a Hindu, surely he  will  revert
to his original caste, if he had lost it at all. In fact this  process  goes
on continuously in India and generation by generation lost sheep  appear  to
return to the caste-fold and are once again assimilated in that  fold.  This
appears to be particularly so in  the  case  of  members  of  the  Scheduled
Castes, who embrace other religions  in  their  quest  for  liberation,  but
return to their old religion on finding that their disabilities  have  clung
to them with great tenacity. We do not think that  any  different  principle
will apply to  the  case  of  conversion  to  Hinduism  of  a  person  whose
forefathers had abandoned Hinduism and embraced another  religion  from  the
principle applicable to the case of reconversion to  Hinduism  of  a  person
who himself had abandoned Hinduism and embraced another religion.”


        (Emphasis supplied)


18.   In Kailash Sonkar v. Maya Devi[3], which arose out of election from  a
reserved Assembly constituency in Madhya Pradesh, another three-Judge  Bench
of this Court examined the question – whether  the  loss  of  the  caste  is
absolute, irrevocable so as not to revive  under  any  circumstance.   After
deriving the history of caste system, this Court observed following  guiding
principle to determine the question in paragraph 28: -

“Where a person belonging to a scheduled caste is converted to  Christianity
or Islam, the same involves loss of the caste unless the religion  to  which
he is converted is liberal enough to permit  the  convertee  to  retain  his
caste or the family laws by which he  was  originally  governed.  There  are
number of cases where members belonging to a particular  caste  having  been
converted to Christianity or even to Islam  retain  their  caste  or  family
laws and despite the new order they were permitted to be governed  by  their
old laws. But this can happen only  if  the  new  religion  is  liberal  and
tolerant enough to permit such a course of action. Where the  new  religion,
however, does not at all accept or believe in the caste system, the loss  of
the caste would be final and complete. In a large area of South and some  of
the North-Eastern States it is not unusual  to  find  persons  converted  to
Christianity retaining their original caste without violating the tenets  of
the new order which is done as a matter of  common  practice  existing  from
times immemorial. In such a category of cases, it is obvious that even if  a
person abjures his old religion and is converted to a new one, there  is  no
loss of caste. Moreover, it is a common feature of many converts  to  a  new
religion to  believe  or  have  faith  in  the  saints  belonging  to  other
religions. For instance, a  number  of  Hindus  have  faith  in  the  Muslim
saints, Dargahs, Imambadas which becomes a part  of  their  lives  and  some
Hindus even adopt Muslim names after the saints but this does not mean  that
they have discarded the old order and got themselves converted to Islam”.


19.   In above Kailash Sonkar (supra) this  Court  further  discussed  issue
relating to reconversion into Hinduism  by  the  members  of  the  community
whose forefathers converted to other religions.  Applying  the  doctrine  of
eclipse, this Court observed as under: -

“34. In our opinion, when a person is  converted  to  Christianity  or  some
other religion the original caste remains  under  eclipse  and  as  soon  as
during his/her lifetime the person is reconverted to the  original  religion
the eclipse disappears and the caste automatically revives. Whether  or  not
the revival of the caste depends on the will and discretion of  the  members
of the community of the caste is a question on which we refrain from  giving
any opinion because in the instant case there is  overwhelming  evidence  to
show that the respondent was accepted  by  the  community  of  her  original
Katia caste. Even so, if the fact of the acceptance by the  members  of  the
community is made a condition precedent to the  revival  of  the  caste,  it
would lead to grave consequences  and  unnecessary  exploitation,  sometimes
motivated by political considerations. Of course, if  apart  from  the  oral
views of the community there  is  any  recognised  documentary  proof  of  a
custom or code of conduct or rule of law binding on a particular  caste,  it
may be necessary to insist on the consent of the members of  the  community,
otherwise in normal circumstances the case  would  revive  by  applying  the
principles of doctrine of eclipse. We might pause here to  add  a  rider  to
what we have said i.e. whether it appears that  the  person  reconverted  to
the  old  religion  had  been  converted  to  Christianity   since   several
generations, it may be difficult to apply the doctrine  of  eclipse  to  the
revival of caste. However, that question does not arise here.”

                                                         (Emphasis supplied)

20.   In paragraphs 51 and 52 in Kailash Sonkar (supra),  on  the  facts  of
said case, this Court gave following conclusions: -

“51.  ……………

(1)   That the respondent was born of Christian parents and was educated  in
various schools or institutions where she was known as a Christian,

(2) That 3-4 years before the election, the respondent  was  reconverted  to
Hinduism and married Jai Prakash Shalwar, a member of the Katia  caste,  and
also performed the Shudhikaran ceremony,

(3)   That she was not only accepted but  also  welcomed  by  the  important
members, including the President and Vice-President, of the community,

(4)   There is no evidence  to  show  that  there  was  any  bar  under  the
Christian religion which could have prevented her from reconverting  herself
to Hinduism,

(5)   That there was no evidence to show that  even  her  parents  had  been
Christian from generation to generation.


52. In these circumstances, therefore,  this  case  fulfils  the  conditions
required for being reconverted to Hinduism from  Christianity  in  order  to
revive the original caste.”

21.   In K.P. Manu v.  Scrunity  Committee  for  Verification  of  Community
Certificate[4], one of the questions examined by this Court is – whether  on
re-conversion, a person born to Christian parents could, after  reconversion
to the Hindu religion, be eligible to claim  the  benefit  of  his  original
caste.  Referring to various case  laws,  including  those  referred  above,
this Court disagreed with the  finding  of  Scrutiny  Committee  that  caste
certificate issued to a person on the basis of  the  fact  that  though  the
great grandfathers  of  such  person  belonged  to  Pulaya  community  (i.e.
Scheduled Caste), but he was born after his ancestors embraced  Christianity
and thereafter, reconverted into Hindu  religion  is  not  entitled  to  the
Scheduled Caste certificate.  Constitution Bench decision in Guntur  Medical
College (supra) and three-Judge Bench decisions in S. Anbalagan (supra)  and
Kailash Sonkar (supra)  are  referred  to  and  relied  upon  in  K.P.  Manu
(supra).

22.   In the case at hand, admittedly  the  appellant  was  born  to  muslim
parents.  However, he has proved that his  family  members  though  followed
Islam but they belonged to “Doom” community.   It  is  settled  law  that  a
person can change his religion and faith but not  the  caste,  to  which  he
belongs, as caste has linkage to birth.  It is proved  on  the  record  that
the appellant was issued a caste certificate as he was found  to  be  member
of ‘Doom’ community by the competent authority, after he  declared  that  he
has embraced Sikhism, and he was accepted by the Sikh community.  It is  not
disputed that ‘Doom’ in Punjab  is  a  Scheduled  Caste  under  Constitution
(Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950.  The Scheduled Caste  Certificate  No.  6149
dated 25.08.2006 (Exh PG/2) was issued to the  appellant  by  the  competent
authority, and accepted by the returning officer.  Said certificate  appears
to have not been cancelled.  What is shown on behalf of  the  respondent  is
that  vide  communication  dated  17.11.2008  (Ext.  PJ)  State  authorities
informed and clarified to the Deputy  Commissioner  that  members  following
Islam are not entitled  to  the  certificate  of  Scheduled  Caste,  and  if
issued, certificates may be cancelled.  But  the  certificate  (PG/2)  dated
25.08.2006 already issued in favour of appellant, is  not  cancelled,  which
he obtained after his conversion to Sikhism.  It is  proved  on  the  record
that the appellant embraced Sikh religion on 13.04.2006, and  got  published
the declaration  on 04.01.2007 in the newspapers Hindustan  Times  (English)
Exh.RA, and Ajit (Punjabi) Exh RB.  Nomination for election in question  was
filed by him five years thereafter.  The appellant has further  sufficiently
explained that since he was popular as a singer with the  name  –  ‘Mohammad
Sadique’ as  such  without  changing  his  name,  he  accepted  Sikhism  and
followed all rites and traditions of Sikh Religion.

23.   It is not essential for anyone to change one’s name after embracing  a
different faith.  However, such change in name can be a  corroborating  fact
regarding conversion or reconversion into a  religion/faith  in  appropriate
cases.  Also it is not necessary in law  that  entire  family  of  a  person
should convert or reconvert to the religion to which he has converted.   RW-
5 Mohammad Sadique has stated that he not only followed Sikh traditions,  he
never offered Namaz, nor  observed  Roza  nor  went  to  Haj.   It  is  also
relevant to mention here that PW-7 Darbara Singh  Guru  (respondent-Election
Petitioner) in his cross-examination  admits  that  he  did  not  raise  any
objection at the time when nomination papers were filed by the appellant.

24.   In the above circumstances, we are inclined  to  hold  that  the  High
Court has erred in law, by ignoring the  above  facts  on  the  record,  and
giving importance to form of declaration, and the  interview  said  to  have
been given by appellant to PW 6 Gulzar  Singh  Shaunki,  author  of  book  -
“Sada Bahar Gayak – Mohammad Sadique : Jeevan Te Geet” (Exh.PK).   Statement
of  the  appellant  as  RW-5  regarding  conversion  to  Sikhism,  is  fully
corroborated by RW-11 Darshan Singh, Ex-Sarpanch of village  Kupkalan,  RW-6
Rachhpal Singh, Secretary of Gurudwara Sahib  Kupkalan,  RW-9  Ms.  Sukhjeet
Kaur, co-singer in Gurudwara, and RW-14  Sant  Shamsher  Singh  Jageda,  who
presented ‘Saropa’ to the appellant.

25.   Having re-appreciated the evidence on record, as  above,  and  keeping
in view the law laid down by this Court in  Guntur  Medical  College  v.  Y.
Mohan Rao1, S. Anbalagan v.  B.  Devarajan2,  and  Kailash  Sonkar  v.  Maya
Devi3, in our opinion, the  impugned  judgment  passed  by  the  High  Court
cannot be upheld.

26.   Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, and the  Election  Petition  filed
by the respondent is dismissed.  No order as to costs.
                                        ……………………………..J.
                                                              [Ranjan Gogoi]





                                                             ……………………………..J.

                                                          [Prafulla C. Pant]

New Delhi;

April 29, 2016.

-----------------------
[1]    (1976) 3 SCC 411

[2]    (1984) 2 SCC 112

[3]     (1984) 2 SCC 91

[4]    (2015) 4 SCC 1

1      (1976) 3 SCC 411
2      (1984) 2 SCC 112
3       (1984) 2 SCC 91


Monday, May 9, 2016

Mere Stop payment of Cheque -- could not absolve the criminal liability under Cheque Bounce case = the accused did not raise a probable defence. As noted earlier, the defence of the loss of a blank cheque was taken up belatedly and the accused had mentioned a different date in the `stop payment' instructions to his bank. Furthermore, the instructions to `stop payment' had not even mentioned that the cheque had been lost. A perusal of the trial record also shows that the accused appeared to be aware of the fact that the cheque was with the complainant. Furthermore, the very fact that the accused had failed to reply to the statutory notice under Section 138 of the Act leads to the inference that there was merit in the complainant's version. Apart from not raising a probable defence, the appellant-accused was not able to contest the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The fact that the accused had made regular payments to the complainant in relation to the construction of his house does not preclude the possibility of the complainant having spent his own money for the same purpose. As per the record of the case, there was a slight discrepancy in the complainant's version, in so far as it was not clear whether the accused had asked for a hand loan to meet the construction-related expenses or whether the complainant had incurred the said expenditure over a period of time. Either way, the complaint discloses the prima facie existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability since the complainant has maintained that his money was used for the construction-expenses. Since the accused did admit that the signature on the cheque was his, the statutory presumption comes into play and the same has not been rebutted even with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant.

                                              REPORTABLE

             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

            CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

          CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1020 OF 2010
         [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 407 of 2006]

Rangappa                                      ... Appellant

                            Versus

Sri Mohan                                    ... Respondent



                      JUDGMENT

K.G. Balakrishnan, C.J.I.

1. Leave granted.

2. In the present case, the trial court had acquitted the

appellant-accused in a case related to the dishonour of a

cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,

1881 [Hereinafter `Act']. This finding of acquittal had been

made by the Addl. JMFC at Ranebennur, Karnataka in

Criminal Case No. 993/2001, by way of a judgment dated

30-5-2005. On appeal by the respondent-complainant, the

High Court had reversed the trial court's decision and



                              1
recorded a finding of conviction while directing that the

appellant-accused should pay a fine of Rs. 75,000, failing

which he would have to undergo three months simple

imprisonment (S.I.). Aggrieved by this final order passed by the

High Court of Karnataka [in Criminal Appeal No. 1367/2005]

dated 26-10-2005, the appellant-accused has approached this

Court by way of a petition seeking special leave to appeal. The

legal question before us pertains to the proper interpretation of

Section 139 of the Act which shifts the burden of proof on to

the accused in respect of cheque bouncing cases. More

specifically, we have been asked to clarify the manner in which

this statutory presumption can be rebutted.



3. Before addressing the legal question, it would be apt to

survey   the     facts   leading    up   to   the   present   litigation.

Admittedly, both the appellant-accused and the respondent-

claimant   are     residents   of   Ranebennur,      Karnataka.     The

appellant-accused is a mechanic who had engaged the services

of the respondent-complainant who is a Civil Engineer, for the

purpose of supervising the construction of his house in


                                    2
Ranebennur. The said construction was completed on 20-10-

1998 and this indicates that the parties were well acquainted

with each other.



4. As per the respondent-complainant, the chain of facts

unfolded in the following manner. In October 1998, the

accused had requested him for a hand loan of Rs. 45,000 in

order to meet the construction expenses. In view of their

acquaintance, the complainant had paid Rs. 45,000 by way of

cash. On receiving this amount, the appellant-accused had

initially assured repayment by October 1999 but on the failure

to do so, he sought more time till December 2000. The

accused had then issued a cheque bearing No. 0886322,

post-dated for 8-2-2001 for Rs. 45,000 drawn on Syndicate

Bank, Kudremukh Branch. Consequently, on 8-2-2001, the

complainant had presented this cheque through Karnataka

Bank, Ranebennur for encashment. However, on 16-2-2001

the said Bank issued a return memo stating that the `Payment

has been stopped by the drawer' and this memo was handed

over to the complainant on 21-2-2001. The complainant had


                              3
then issued notice to the accused in this regard on 26-2-2001.

On receiving the same, the accused failed to honour the

cheque within the statutorily prescribed period and also did

not reply to the notice sent in the manner contemplated under

Section 138 of the Act. Following these developments, the

complainant had filed a complaint (under Section 200 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure) against the accused for the

offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act.



5. The appellant-accused had raised the defence that the

cheque in question was a blank cheque bearing his signature

which had been lost and that it had come into the hands of

the complainant who had then tried to misuse it. The

accused's case was that there was no legally enforceable debt

or liability between the parties since he had not asked for a

hand loan as alleged by the complainant.



6. The trial judge found in favour of the accused by taking

note of some discrepancies in the complainant's version. As

per the trial judge, in the course of the cross-examination the


                              4
complainant was not certain as to when the accused had

actually issued the cheque. It was noted that while the

complaint stated that the cheque had been issued in

December 2000, at a later point it was conceded that the

cheque had been handed over when the accused had met the

complainant to obtain the work completion certificate for his

house in March 2001. Later, it was stated that the cheque had

been with the complainant about 15-20 days prior to the

presentation of the same for encashment, which would place

the date of handing over of the cheque in January 2001.

Furthermore, the trial judge noted that in the complaint it had

been submitted that the complainant had paid Rs. 45,000 in

cash as a hand loan to the accused, whereas during the

cross-examination it appeared that the complainant had spent

this amount during the construction of the accused's house

from time to time and that the complainant had realised the

extent of the liability after auditing the costs on completion of

the construction. Apart from these discrepancies on part of the

complainant, the trial judge also noted that the accused used

to pay the complainant a monthly salary in lieu of his services


                               5
as a building supervisor apart from periodically handing over

money which was used for the construction of the house. In

light of these regular payments, the trial judge found it

unlikely that the complainant would have spent his own

money on the construction work. With regard to these

observations, the trial judge held that there was no material to

substantiate that the accused had issued the cheque in

relation to a legally enforceable debt. It was observed that the

accused's failure to reply to the notice sent by the complainant

did not attract the presumption under Section 139 of the Act

since the complainant had failed to prove that he had given a

hand loan to the accused and that the accused had issued a

cheque as alleged. Furthermore, the trial judge erroneously

decided that the offence made punishable by Section 138 of

the Act had not been committed in this case since the alleged

dishonour of cheque was not on account of insufficiency of

funds since the accused had instructed his bank to stop

payment. Accordingly, the trial judge had recorded a finding of

acquittal.




                               6
7. However, on appeal against acquittal, the High Court

reversed the findings and convicted the appellant-accused.

The High Court in its order noted that in the course of the trial

proceedings, the accused had admitted that the signature on

the impugned cheque (No. 886322, dated 8-2-2001) was

indeed his own. Once this fact has been acknowledged,

Section 139 of the Act mandates a presumption that the

cheque pertained to a legally enforceable debt or liability. This

presumption is of a rebuttal nature and the onus is then on

the accused to raise a probable defence. With regard to the

present facts, the High Court found that the defence raised by

the accused was not probable. In respect of the accused's

stand that he had lost a blank cheque bearing his signature,

the High Court noted that in the instructions sent by the

accused to his Bank for stopping payment, there is a reference

to cheque No. 0886322, dated 20-7-1999. This is in conflict

with the complainant's version wherein the accused had given

instructions for stopping payment in respect of the same

cheque, albeit one which was dated 8-2-2001. The High Court

also noted that if the accused had indeed lost a blank cheque


                               7
bearing his signature, the question of his mentioning the date

of the cheque as 20-7-1999 could not arise. At a later point in

the order, it has been noted that the instructions sent by the

accused to his bank for stopping payment on the cheque do

not mention that the same had been lost. However, the

correspondence    does   refer   to   the   cheque   being   dated

20-7-1999. Furthermore, during the cross-examination of the

complainant, it was suggested on behalf of the accused that

the complainant had the custody of the cheque since 1998.

This suggestion indicates that the accused was aware of the

fact that the complainant had the cheque, thereby weakening

his claim of having lost a blank cheque. Furthermore, a

perusal of the record shows that the accused had belatedly

taken up the defence of having lost a blank cheque at the time

of his examination during trial. Prior to the filing of the

complaint, the accused had not even replied to the notice sent

by the complainant since that would have afforded an

opportunity to raise the defence at an earlier stage. All of these

circumstances led the High Court to conclude that the




                                 8
accused had not raised a probable defence to rebut the

statutory presumption. It was held that:



     `6. Once the cheque relates to the account of the accused
     and he accepts and admits the signatures on the said
     cheque, then initial presumption as contemplated under
     Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has to be
     raised by the Court in favour of the complainant. The
     presumption referred to in Section 139 of the N.I. Act is a
     mandatory presumption and not a general presumption,
     but the accused is entitled to rebut the said
     presumption. What is required to be established by the
     accused in order to rebut the presumption is different
     from each case under given circumstances. But the fact
     remains that a mere plausible explanation is not
     expected from the accused and it must be more than a
     plausible explanation by way of rebuttal evidence. In
     other words, the defence raised by way of rebuttal
     evidence must be probable and capable of being accepted
     by the Court. The defence raised by the accused was that
     a blank cheque was lost by him, which was made use of
     by the complainant. Unless this barrier is crossed by the
     accused, the other defence raised by him whether the
     cheque was issued towards the hand loan or towards the
     amount spent by the complainant need not be
     considered. ...'




Hence,   the   High   Court    concluded    that   the   alleged

discrepancies on part of the complainant which had been

noted by the trial court were not material since the accused



                              9
had   failed   to   raise   a   probable   defence   to   rebut   the

presumption placed on him by Section 139 of the Act.

Accordingly, the High Court recorded a finding of conviction.



8. In the course of the proceedings before this Court, the

contentions related to the proper interpretation of Sections

118(a), 138 and 139 of the Act. Before addressing them, it

would be useful to quote the language of the relevant

provisions:



      118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. -
      Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions
      shall be made:
      (a) of consideration: that every negotiable instrument was
      made or drawn for consideration, and that every such
      instrument when it has been accepted, endorsed,
      negotiated or transferred, was accepted, endorsed,
      negotiated or transferred for consideration;
      ...

      138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of
      funds in the account. - Where any cheque drawn by a
      person on an account maintained by him with a banker
      for payment of any amount of money to another person
      from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in
      part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the
      bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money
      standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to
      honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount


                                  10
      arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement
       made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to
       have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice
       to any other provision of this Act, be punished with
       imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years,
       or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the
       cheque, or with both:

         Provided that nothing contained in this section shall
         apply unless-
     (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a
         period of six months from the date on which it is drawn
         or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier.
     (b)the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as
         the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the
         said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to
         the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt
         of information by him from the bank regarding the return
         of the cheque as unpaid; and
     (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of
         the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case
         may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within
         fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.

     Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, `debt or
     other liability' means a legally enforceable debt or other
     liability.

     139. Presumption in favour of holder.- It shall be
     presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of
     a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in
     Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any
     debt, or other liability.


9. Ordinarily in cheque bouncing cases, what the courts have

to    consider   is   whether   the    ingredients   of   the   offence



                                  11
enumerated in Section 138 of the Act have been met and if so,

whether the accused was able to rebut the statutory

presumption contemplated by Section 139 of the Act. With

respect to the facts of the present case, it must be clarified

that contrary to the trial court's finding, Section 138 of the Act

can indeed be attracted when a cheque is dishonoured on

account of `stop payment' instructions sent by the accused to

his bank in respect of a post-dated cheque, irrespective of

insufficiency of funds in the account. This position was

clarified by this Court in Goa Plast (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula

D'Souza, (2003) 3 SCC 232, wherein it was held:


     "Chapter XVII containing Sections 138 to 142 was
     introduced in the Act by Act 66 of 1988 with the object of
     inculcating faith in the efficacy of banking operations and
     giving credibility to negotiable instruments in business
     transactions. These provisions were intended to
     discourage people from not honouring their commitments
     by way of payment through cheques. The court should
     lean in favour of an interpretation which serves the object
     of the statute. A post-dated cheque will lose its credibility
     and acceptability if its payment can be stopped routinely.
     The purpose of a post-dated cheque is to provide some
     accommodation to the drawer of the cheque. Therefore, it
     is all the more necessary that the drawer of the cheque
     should not be allowed to abuse the accommodation given
     to him by a creditor by way of acceptance of a post-dated
     cheque. In view of Section 139, it has to be presumed


                                12
    that a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other
     liability. The presumption can be rebutted by adducing
     evidence and the burden of proof is on the person who
     wants to rebut the presumption. This presumption
     coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act leads
     to the conclusion that by countermanding payment of a
     post-dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get
     away from the penal provision of Section 138. A contrary
     view would render S. 138 a dead letter and will provide a
     handle to persons trying to avoid payment under legal
     obligations undertaken by them through their own acts
     which in other words can be said to be taking advantage
     of one's own wrong. ..."


10. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant-accused

that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does

not extend to the existence of a legally enforceable debt or

liability and that the same stood rebutted in this case, keeping

in mind the discrepancies in the complainant's version. It was

reasoned that it is open to the accused to rely on the materials

produced by the complainant for disproving the existence of a

legally enforceable debt or liability. It has been contended that

since the complainant did not conclusively show whether a

debt was owed to him in respect of a hand loan or in relation

to expenditure incurred during the construction of the

accused's house, the existence of a legally enforceable debt or



                               13
liability had not been shown, thereby creating a probable

defence for the accused. Counsel appearing for the appellant-

accused has relied on a decision given by a division bench of

this Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G.

Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54, the operative observations from

which are reproduced below (S.B. Sinha, J. at Paras. 29-32,

34 and 45):

     "29. Section 138 of the Act has three ingredients viz.:
          (i)   that there is a legally enforceable debt
          (ii) that the cheque was drawn from the account
                of bank for discharge in whole or in part of any
                debt or other liability which presupposes a
                legally enforceable debt; and
          (iii) that the cheque so issued had been returned
                due to insufficiency of funds.

     30. The proviso appended to the said section provides for
     compliance with legal requirements before a complaint
     petition can be acted upon by a court of law. Section 139
     of the Act merely raises a presumption in regard to the
     second aspect of the matter. Existence of legally
     recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption under
     Section 139 of the Act. It merely raises a presumption in
     favour of a holder of the cheque that the same has been
     issued for discharge of any debt or other liability.

     31. The courts below, as noticed hereinbefore, proceeded
     on the basis that Section 139 raises a presumption in
     regard to existence of a debt also. The courts below, in
     our opinion, committed a serious error in proceeding on
     the basis that for proving the defence the accused is
     required to step into the witness box and unless he does


                              14
    so he would not be discharging his burden. Such an
     approach on the part of the courts, we feel, is not correct.

     32. An accused for discharging the burden of proof
     placed upon him under a statute need not examine
     himself. He may discharge his burden on the basis of the
     materials already brought on record. An accused has a
     constitutional right to maintain silence. Standard of proof
     on the part of the accused and that of the prosecution in
     a criminal case is different.
     ...
     34. Furthermore, whereas prosecution must prove the
     guilt of an accused beyond all reasonable doubt, the
     standard of proof so as to prove a defence on the part of
     the accused is `preponderance of probabilities'. Inference
     of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only
     from the materials brought on record by the parties but
     also by reference to the circumstances upon which he
     relies."
                                           (emphasis supplied)



Specifically in relation to the nature of the presumption

contemplated by Section 139 of the Act, it was observed;


     "45. We are not oblivious of the fact that the said
     provision has been inserted to regulate the growing
     business, trade, commerce and industrial activities of the
     country and the strict liability to promote greater
     vigilance in financial matters and to safeguard the faith
     of the creditor in the drawer of the cheque which is
     essential to the economic life of a developing country like
     India. This however, shall not mean that the courts shall
     put a blind eye to the ground realities. Statute mandates
     raising of presumption but it stops at that. It does not
     say how presumption drawn should be held to have been


                               15
     rebutted.   Other    important   principles    of   legal
      jurisprudence, namely, presumption of innocence as a
      human right and the doctrine of reverse burden
      introduced by Section 139 should be delicately balanced.
      Such balancing acts, indisputably would largely depend
      upon the factual matrix of each case, the materials
      brought on record and having regard to legal principles
      governing the same."
                                          (emphasis supplied)



11. With respect to the decision cited above, counsel appearing

for   the   respondent-claimant     has   submitted     that   the

observations to the effect that the `existence of legally

recoverable debt is not a matter of presumption under Section

139 of the Act' and that `it merely raises a presumption in

favour of a holder of the cheque that the same has been issued

for discharge of any debt or other liability' [See Para. 30 in

Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra)] are in conflict with the

statutory provisions as well as an established line of

precedents of this Court. It will thus be necessary to examine

some of the extracts cited by the respondent-claimant. For

instance, in Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee, (2001)

6 SCC 16, it was held (Ruma Pal, J. at Paras. 22-23):




                               16
"22. Because both Sections 138 and 139 require that the
Court `shall presume' the liability of the drawer of the
cheques for the amounts for which the cheques are
drawn, ..., it is obligatory on the Court to raise this
presumption in every case where the factual basis for the
raising of the presumption has been established. It
introduces an exception to the general rule as to the
burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on
to the accused (...). Such a presumption is a presumption
of law, as distinguished from a presumption of fact which
describes provisions by which the court may presume a
certain state of affairs. Presumptions are rules of
evidence and do not conflict with the presumption of
innocence, because by the latter all that is meant is that
the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The obligation on the
prosecution may be discharged with the help of
presumptions of law or fact unless the accused adduces
evidence showing the reasonable probability of the
non-existence of the presumed fact.

23. In other words, provided the facts required to form
the basis of a presumption of law exists, the discretion is
left with the Court to draw the statutory conclusion, but
this does not preclude the person against whom the
presumption is drawn from rebutting it and proving the
contrary. A fact is said to be proved when, after
considering the matters before it, the Court either
believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable
that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of
the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it
exists. Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be
conclusively established but such evidence must be
adduced before the Court in support of the defence that
the Court must either believe the defence to exist or
consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the
standard of reasonability being that of the prudent man."
                                       (emphasis supplied)



                          17
12. The respondent-claimant has also referred to the decision

reported as Mallavarapu Kasivisweswara Rao v. Thadikonda

Ramulu Firm & Ors., 2008 (8) SCALE 680, wherein it was

observed:

     "Under Section 118(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
     the court is obliged to presume, until the contrary is
     proved, that the promissory note was made for
     consideration. It is also a settled position that the initial
     burden in this regard lies on the defendant to prove the
     non-existence of consideration by bringing on record
     such facts and circumstances which would lead the
     Court to believe the non-existence of the consideration
     either by direct evidence or by preponderance of
     probabilities showing that the existence of consideration
     was improbable, doubtful or illegal. ..."


This decision then proceeded to cite an extract from the earlier

decision in Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Company

v. Amin Chand Pyarelal, (1993) 3 SCC 35 (Para. 12):


     "Upon consideration of various judgments as noted
     hereinabove, the position of law which emerges is that
     once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the
     presumption under Section 118(a) would arise that it is
     supported by a consideration. Such a presumption is
     rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non-existence of
     a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the
     defendant is proved to have discharged the initial onus of
     proof showing that the existence of consideration was


                               18
    improbably or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus
     would shift to the plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it
     as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would
     disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the
     negotiable instrument. The burden upon the defendant of
     proving the non-existence of the consideration can be
     either direct or by bringing on record the preponderance
     of probabilities by reference to the circumstances upon
     which he relies. In such an event, the plaintiff is entitled
     under law to rely upon all the evidence led in the case
     including that of the plaintiff as well. In case, where the
     defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of proof by
     showing the non-existence of the consideration, the
     plaintiff would invariably be held entitled to the benefit of
     presumption arising under Section 118(a) in his favour.
     The court may not insist upon the defendant to disprove
     the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence
     as the existence of negative evidence is neither possible
     nor contemplated and even if led, is to be seen with a
     doubt. The bare denial of the passing of the consideration
     apparently does not appear to be any defence. Something
     which is probable has to be brought on record for getting
     the benefit of shifting the onus of proving to the plaintiff.
     To disprove the presumption, the defendant has to bring
     on record such facts and circumstances upon
     consideration of which the court may either believe that
     the consideration did not exist or its non-existence was
     so probable that a prudent man would, under the
     circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that it did
     not exist."
                                            (emphasis supplied)



Interestingly, the very same extract has also been approvingly

cited in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra).




                               19
13. With regard to the facts in the present case, we can also

refer to the following observations in M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Anr.

v. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 234

(Para. 19):

     "... The authority shows that even when the cheque is
     dishonoured by reason of stop payment instruction, by
     virtue of Section 139 the Court has to presume that the
     cheque was received by the holder for the discharge in
     whole or in part, of any debt or liability. Of course this is
     a rebuttable presumption. The accused can thus show
     that the `stop payment' instructions were not issued
     because of insufficiency or paucity of funds. If the
     accused shows that in his account there was sufficient
     funds to clear the amount of the cheque at the time of
     presentation of the cheque for encashment at the drawer
     bank and that the stop payment notice had been issued
     because of other valid causes including that there was no
     existing debt or liability at the time of presentation of
     cheque for encashment, then offence under Section 138
     would not be made out. The important thing is that the
     burden of so proving would be on the accused. ..."
                                      (emphasis supplied)



14. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the

respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by

Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a

legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the

impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra)



                               20
may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast

doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it

was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As

noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a

rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise

a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or

liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that

there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant.

Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause

that has been included in furtherance of the legislative

objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments.

While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal

remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable

presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue

delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be

remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138

can be better described as a regulatory offence since the

bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong

whose impact is usually confined to the private parties

involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the


                               21
test of proportionality should guide the construction and

interpretation     of   reverse         onus   clauses    and     the

accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly

high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling

justifications,   reverse   onus    clauses    usually   impose   an

evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this

in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to

rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of

proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities'.

Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence

which creates doubts about the existence of a legally

enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As

clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials

submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence

and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not

need to adduce evidence of his/her own.

15. Coming back to the facts in the present case, we are in

agreement with the High Court's view that the accused did not

raise a probable defence. As noted earlier, the defence of the

loss of a blank cheque was taken up belatedly and the accused


                                   22
had mentioned a different date in the `stop payment'

instructions to his bank. Furthermore, the instructions to

`stop payment' had not even mentioned that the cheque had

been lost. A perusal of the trial record also shows that the

accused appeared to be aware of the fact that the cheque was

with the complainant. Furthermore, the very fact that the

accused had failed to reply to the statutory notice under

Section 138 of the Act leads to the inference that there was

merit in the complainant's version. Apart from not raising a

probable defence, the appellant-accused was not able to

contest the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability.

The fact that the accused had made regular payments to the

complainant in relation to the construction of his house does

not preclude the possibility of the complainant having spent

his own money for the same purpose. As per the record of the

case, there was a slight discrepancy in the complainant's

version, in so far as it was not clear whether the accused had

asked for a hand loan to meet the construction-related

expenses or whether the complainant had incurred the said

expenditure over a period of time. Either way, the complaint


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discloses the prima facie existence of a legally enforceable debt

or liability since the complainant has maintained that his

money was used for the construction-expenses. Since the

accused did admit that the signature on the cheque was his,

the statutory presumption comes into play and the same has

not been rebutted even with regard to the materials submitted

by the complainant.



16. In conclusion, we find no reason to interfere with the final

order of the High Court, dated 26-10-2005, which recorded a

finding of conviction against the appellant. The present appeal

is disposed of accordingly.



                                ...................................... CJI
                                (K.G. BALAKRISHNAN)


                                ........................................J.
                                (P. SATHASIVAM)


                                .......................................J.
                                (J.M. PANCHAL)

NEW DELHI
MAY 07, 2010





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