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Monday, July 28, 2014

Sec.498 A, 304 B , 306 I.P.C. r/w 34 I.P.C. - Trial court convicted the accused - High court acquitted the accused - Apex court held that In the present case from the evidence of prosecution witnesses particularly of Santoshbai (PW-6), Geeta (PW-7), Chandrakanta (PW-8), Ranjit (PW-9) and Ranchhod Prasad Pande (PW-11), we find that the harassment of the deceased was with a view to coerce her to convince her parents to meet demand of dowry. The said willful conduct has driven the deceased to commit the suicide or not is a matter of doubt, in absence of specific evidence. Therefore, in the light of Clause (b) of Section 498-A IPC, when we hold all the accused Nos.1 to 6 guilty for the offence under Section 498-A IPC, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove that the deceased committed suicide. The accused are, therefore, acquitted for the offence under Section 306 r/w 34 IPC. This part of the judgment passed by the Trial Court thus cannot be upheld. The prosecution on the basis of evidence has successfully proved that the deceased died within 7 years of her marriage; the death of the deceased is caused by burns i.e. nor under normal circumstances. It has also been proved that soon before her death, during her pregnancy the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and relatives of accused that is accused No.1-Shivpujan, accused No.2-Rajendra, accused No.3-Malti Devi, accused No.4-Anita, accused No.5-Surendra and accused No.6-Virendra in connection with demand of dowry. Therefore, we hold that the prosecution successfully proved with beyond reasonable doubt that accused Nos.1 to 6 are guilty for the offence under Section 304-B, r/w 34 IPC. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the major part of the judgment dated 18th August, 2005 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Criminal Appeal NO.388 of 2005 except the part relating to offence under Section 306 r/w 34 IPC. = STATE OF MAHARASHTRA … APPELLANT VERSUS RAJENDRA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41754

   Sec.498 A, 304 B , 306 I.P.C. r/w 34 I.P.C. - Trial court convicted the accused - High court acquitted the accused - Apex court held that In the  present  case  from  the  evidence  of  prosecution  witnesses particularly  of  Santoshbai  (PW-6),  Geeta  (PW-7),  Chandrakanta  (PW-8), Ranjit  (PW-9)  and  Ranchhod  Prasad  Pande  (PW-11),  we  find  that   the harassment of the deceased was with a view to coerce  her  to  convince  her parents to meet demand of dowry. The said willful  conduct  has  driven  the deceased to commit the suicide or not is a matter of doubt,  in  absence  of specific evidence. Therefore, in the light of Clause (b)  of  Section  498-A IPC, when we hold all the accused Nos.1 to 6   guilty for the offence  under Section 498-A IPC, we hold that the prosecution failed  to  prove  that  the deceased committed suicide. The accused are, therefore,  acquitted  for  the offence under Section 306 r/w 34 IPC. This part of the  judgment  passed  by the Trial Court thus cannot be upheld. The prosecution on the basis of evidence has successfully proved  that the deceased died within 7 years of her marriage; the death of the  deceased is caused by burns i.e. nor under normal circumstances.  It  has  also  been
proved that soon before her death, during her  pregnancy  the  deceased  was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and relatives of  accused that is accused No.1-Shivpujan, accused  No.2-Rajendra,  accused  No.3-Malti Devi, accused No.4-Anita, accused No.5-Surendra  and  accused  No.6-Virendra in connection with demand of dowry. Therefore, we hold that the  prosecution successfully proved with beyond reasonable doubt that  accused  Nos.1  to  6
are guilty for the offence under Section 304-B, r/w 34 IPC. For the reasons  aforesaid,  we  set  aside  the  major  part  of  the judgment dated 18th August, 2005 passed by the High Court of  Judicature  at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Criminal Appeal NO.388 of  2005  except  the
part relating to offence under Section 306 r/w 34 IPC. =

 By the impugned judgment the  High  Court
held that unless the prosecution proves that death  was  suicidal  and  that
the deceased was treated with cruelty and was harassed by  direct  evidence,
the presumption  under  Section  113-A  does  not  apply  in  the  case  and
acquitted all the accused-respondents from the charges under Section  498-A,
Section 304-B and Section 306 IPC all read  with  Section  34  IPC,  thereby
reversing the finding of the Trial Court.=
The deceased sustained 98% burn injuries in the early morning  of  8th
April, 1999, in her matrimonial house i.e. the house of the  accused  Nos.1,
2, 3, 5 and 6. She was taken to Mayo Hospital, but  before  treatment  could
commence, she died at 9.30 a.m. on the same day itself and at that time  the
deceased was in the 7th month of her first pregnancy.=
Since  7th  month  of
the pregnancy of the deceased was to begin, on 8th April,  1999  at  6  a.m.
her father had been to her matrimonial house to fetch her. Accused  insulted
him on account of dowry demands and refused to send the deceased  with  him.
At 9 a.m. accused No.5-Surendra i.e.  elder  brother-in-law  (jeth)  of  the
deceased came to the house of parents of the deceased  and  told  them  that
their daughter had sustained  burns  and  that  she  was  admitted  in  Mayo
Hospital. The parents of the deceased immediately rushed to  Mayo  Hospital.
It was found that their daughter was already dead.=
Trial court convicted the accused - where as High court acquitted the accused=
Apex court held that
From the above mentioned facts, it is clear that there  was  a  demand
of  dowry  for  purchasing  Hero  Honda  Motorcycle  and  other  house  hold
articles. The evidence of torture is also  clear  from  the  fact  that  the
deceased was not provided food and as such she had become weak that  too  at
the time when she was in the 7th month of pregnancy.
24.   Section 304-B IPC relates to dowry death, which reads as follows:
304B. Dowry death.--(1) Where the death of a woman is caused  by  any  burns
or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances  within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her  death  she
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband  or  any  relative  of
her husband for, or in connection with, any demand  for  dowry,  such  death
shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be  deemed
to have caused her death.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry"  shall  have  the
same meaning as in section 2 of the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act,  1961  (28  of
1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with  imprisonment  for  a
term which shall not be less than  seven  years  but  which  may  extend  to
imprisonment for life.”

      The expression “soon before her death”  is  used  in  the  substantive
Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. No definite  period
has been indicated and  the  expression  “soon  before  her  death”  is  not
defined. The determination of period which can come within  the  term  “soon
before” is left to be determined by the Court depending upon the  facts  and
circumstances of each case. In this connection one may  refer  the  case  of
Yashoda and another vs. State of M.P., 2004 (3) SCC 98.
25.   The presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act  with  respect
to dowry death can be raised  only  on  the  proof  of  the  following  four
essential conditions:
1)    The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment,
2)    by the husband or his relatives;
3)    For or in connection with any demand for dowry;
4)    soon before her death.
Refer Kaliyaperumal vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2004 (9) SCC 157 [AIR  2003  SC
3828].

26.   Section 113-B of the Evidence Act reads as under:
113B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is whether  a  person
has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown  that  soon  before
her death such woman has  been  subjected  by  such  person  to  cruelty  or
harassment for, or in connection with,  any  demand  for  dowry,  the  Court
shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have  the
same meaning as in section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860).

27.   In dowry death cases direct evidence may not be available. Such  cases
may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Section 304-B IPC read with  113-B
of the Evidence Act indicates the rule of presumption of dowry death. If  an
unnatural death of a married woman occurs within  7  years  of  marriage  in
suspicious circumstances, like due to burns or any other bodily  injury  and
there is cruelty or harassment  by  her  husband  or  relatives  for  or  in
connection with any demand for dowry soon before her death then it shall  be
dowry death.
28.    Section 306 IPC relates to abetment to suicide as follows:
“306. Abetment of suicide.—If any person commits suicide, whoever abets  the
commission of such suicide, shall be punished with  imprisonment  of  either
description for a term which may extend to ten  years,  and  shall  also  be
liable to fine.”

29.   Section 113-A of the Evidence Act deals with  presumption  as  to  the
abetment to suicide by a married woman, read as follows:

“113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a  married  woman.—When  the
question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman  had  been  abetted
by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that  she  had
committed suicide within a period of  seven  years  from  the  date  of  her
marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had  subjected
her to cruelty, the Court may  presume,  having  regard  to  all  the  other
circumstances of the case,  that  such  suicide  had  been  abetted  by  her
husband or by such relative of her husband.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this  section,  “cruelty”  shall  have  the
same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]"

30.   For the purpose of Section 113-A  IPC  cruelty  shall  have  the  same
meaning as in Section 498-A IPC which reads as follows:
“498A. Husband  or  relative  of  husband  of  a  woman  subjecting  her  to
cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative  of  the  husband  of  a
woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be  punished  with  imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three years  and  shall  also  be  liable  to
fine.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to  drive  the
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb  or
health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the  woman  where  such  harassment  is  with  a  view  to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any  unlawful  demand  for
any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or  any
person related to her to meet such demand.”
31.   In the  present  case  from  the  evidence  of  prosecution  witnesses
particularly  of  Santoshbai  (PW-6),  Geeta  (PW-7),  Chandrakanta  (PW-8),
Ranjit  (PW-9)  and  Ranchhod  Prasad  Pande  (PW-11),  we  find  that   the
harassment of the deceased was with a view to coerce  her  to  convince  her
parents to meet demand of dowry. The said willful  conduct  has  driven  the
deceased to commit the suicide or not is a matter of doubt,  in  absence  of
specific evidence. Therefore, in the light of Clause (b)  of  Section  498-A
IPC, when we hold all the accused Nos.1 to 6   guilty for the offence  under
Section 498-A IPC, we hold that the prosecution failed  to  prove  that  the
deceased committed suicide. The accused are, therefore,  acquitted  for  the
offence under Section 306 r/w 34 IPC. This part of the  judgment  passed  by
the Trial Court thus cannot be upheld.
32.   The prosecution on the basis of evidence has successfully proved  that
the deceased died within 7 years of her marriage; the death of the  deceased
is caused by burns i.e. nor under normal circumstances.  It  has  also  been
proved that soon before her death, during her  pregnancy  the  deceased  was
subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and relatives of  accused
that is accused No.1-Shivpujan, accused  No.2-Rajendra,  accused  No.3-Malti
Devi, accused No.4-Anita, accused No.5-Surendra  and  accused  No.6-Virendra
in connection with demand of dowry. Therefore, we hold that the  prosecution
successfully proved with beyond reasonable doubt that  accused  Nos.1  to  6
are guilty for the offence under Section 304-B, r/w 34 IPC.
33.   For the reasons  aforesaid,  we  set  aside  the  major  part  of  the
judgment dated 18th August, 2005 passed by the High Court of  Judicature  at
Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Criminal Appeal NO.388 of  2005  except  the
part relating to offence under Section 306 r/w 34 IPC.  The  judgment  dated
20th July, 2005 passed by the Trial Court in Sessions Case  No.447  of  2000
holding accused Nos.1 to 6 guilty for the offence u/s 498A and 304B IPC.  is
upheld but the part of the judgment relating to offence  under  Section  306
r/w 34 IPC against the accused Nos.1 to 6 stands set aside by  the  judgment
passed by the High Court. The respondents- accused  No.1-Shivpujan,  accused
No.2-Rajendra, accused No.3-Malti Devi, accused  No.4-Anita,  accused  No.5-
Surendra and accused  No.6-Virendra  be  taken  into  custody  forthwith  to
undergo the remainder period of sentence for offence  under  Section   498-A
and 304-B read with 34 IPC.
34.   The appeals are allowed to the extent above.

2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41754

                                                              Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.719 OF 2010
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                            … APPELLANT
                             VERSUS
RAJENDRA & ORS.                                 … RESPONDENTS
With
Criminal Appeal No.720 of 2010
(Chandrakanta vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors.)

                               J U D G M E N T

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

      These appeals are directed against the  judgment  dated  18th  August,
2005 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench,  Nagpur
in Criminal Appeal No.388 of 2005. By the impugned judgment the  High  Court
held that unless the prosecution proves that death  was  suicidal  and  that
the deceased was treated with cruelty and was harassed by  direct  evidence,
the presumption  under  Section  113-A  does  not  apply  in  the  case  and
acquitted all the accused-respondents from the charges under Section  498-A,
Section 304-B and Section 306 IPC all read  with  Section  34  IPC,  thereby
reversing the finding of the Trial Court.
2.    Respondents – accused No.1, Shivpujan and  accused  No.3,  Malti  Devi
are husband and wife. Accused No.2, Rajendra,  accused  No.5,  Surendra  and
accused No.6, Virendra are their sons. Accused No.4, Anita is  the  daughter
of accused Nos.1 and 3 and is married to one Satyam Mishra who is in  Police
service. Accused Nos.1 and 5 are also in Police service. Accused Nos.  1  to
3, 5 and 6 reside together in Plot  No.96,  Adarsha  Colony,  behind  Police
Line Takli at  Nagpur.  Accused  No.4  resides  in  Police  Line,  Pathrigad
Quarter, Sadar at Nagpur. Accused  No.2-Rajendra  is  the  youngest  son  of
accused Nos.1 and  3.  Deceased  Ranjana  was  the  wife  of  accused  No.2-
Rajendra.
3.    Marriage of deceased took place with  accused  No.2-Rajendra  on  19th
April, 1998. She was the daughter  of  Ranchhod  Prasad  Pande  (PW-11)  and
Chandrakanta (PW-8)-the complainant. The deceased was the younger sister  of
Ranjit (PW-9). Parents and brothers of the deceased reside at Gandhi  Nagar,
Surendergarh, Nagpur. The distance between the house of the accused and  the
parental house of the deceased is about       1 km.
4.    The deceased sustained 98% burn injuries in the early morning  of  8th
April, 1999, in her matrimonial house i.e. the house of the  accused  Nos.1,
2, 3, 5 and 6. She was taken to Mayo Hospital, but  before  treatment  could
commence, she died at 9.30 a.m. on the same day itself and at that time  the
deceased was in the 7th month of her first pregnancy.
5.     The prosecution case is that the husband and the  mother-in-law  i.e.
accused Nos.2 and  3  used  to  beat  the  deceased  whereas  other  accused
together with accused Nos.2 and 3 used to mentally and physically  ill-treat
the deceased on account of dowry demand. Accused No.2-Rajendra  wanted  Hero
Honda Motor Cycle from the parents of the deceased. He always used to  press
his demand. The deceased  had  informed  her  parents  that  she  was  being
subjected to cruelty and that her in-laws behaved  with  her  like  animals.
Many a times father of the deceased went to fetch the deceased  but  accused
used to ask him that he should first bring money for Hero  Honda  Motorcycle
and then only he can take the deceased along with him. Since  7th  month  of
the pregnancy of the deceased was to begin, on 8th April,  1999  at  6  a.m.
her father had been to her matrimonial house to fetch her. Accused  insulted
him on account of dowry demands and refused to send the deceased  with  him.
At 9 a.m. accused No.5-Surendra i.e.  elder  brother-in-law  (jeth)  of  the
deceased came to the house of parents of the deceased  and  told  them  that
their daughter had sustained  burns  and  that  she  was  admitted  in  Mayo
Hospital. The parents of the deceased immediately rushed to  Mayo  Hospital.
It was found that their daughter was already dead.
6.    A.D. No.28/99 under Section 174 Cr.P.C. was registered at  10.50  a.m.
on 8th April, 1999 on the basis of report of Police Head  Constable  Diwakar
from Mayo Hospital Police Booth. The PSI-S.R.  Parvekar  thereafter  visited
the  spot  of  occurrence,  prepared  spot  panchanama  (Ext.40)  and   then
proceeded to Mayo Hospital and  prepared  inquest  panchanama  (Ext.43)  and
sent the dead body for its  postmortem.  Postmortem  was  conducted  by  Dr.
Ashish Wankhede  (PW-10)  and  report  is  Ext.62.  Thereafter,  the  report
(Ext.54) was lodged by PW.8, mother of the deceased  with  the  Police  Head
Constable Girish Pande (PW-14) upon which FIR  (Ext.55)  was  registered  at
7.10 p.m. on 8th April, 1999 for the offence punishable under Sections  498-
A, 306 r/w 34 IPC. Further investigation was  carried  out  by  Police  Sub-
Inspector, Parvekar. He recorded the statement of the father  of    deceased
and arrested accused No.2-Rajendra i.e.  husband  of  the  deceased  on  8th
April, 1999 itself. The further investigation  was  carried  out  by  Police
Inspector  Ravindra  Relgudwar  (PW.12)  and  then   Police   Sub-Inspector,
Dadasaheb Khade (PW.13). In the statements of witnesses i.e.  neighbours  of
the complainant, brother of the deceased,  supplementary  statement  of  the
complainant were recorded. Viscera of the deceased  that  was  preserved  at
the time of the postmortem examination, pieces of saree,  match  box  and  a
piece of burnt plastic  which  were  seized  at  the  time  of  drawing  the
panchanama were forwarded to the  Chemical  Analyser  for  examination.  The
marriage ceremony of the deceased and accused No.2-Rajendra was  shot  by  a
video shooting. Its video cassette was produced by  the  complainant  before
the Investigating Officer. It was seized (Ext.45). Pursuant to  a  direction
in Criminal Writ  Petition  No.168/99  filed  by  the  complainant,  offence
punishable under Section 304-B  IPC  was  also  added.  Other  accused  were
arrested and on completion of investigation, charge-sheet  was  sent  up  to
the Court of CJM, Nagpur who committed the case to the  Court  of  Sessions.
Charges for offence punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 306 r/w  34  IPC
were framed to which  the  accused  pleaded  not  guilty.   The  prosecution
produced altogether 14 witnesses. The witnesses  against  the  accused  made
their statements under Section 313 Cr. P.C.  (Ext.91 to  96)  and  submitted
their written statement (Ext.97).  Four  defence  witnesses  viz.  DW.1-Mohd
Asgar, DW.2-A.S.I., Chandrabhan Osare, DW.3-ASI  Pralhad  Kaware  and  DW.4-
Rajesh Soni were also examined. The defence, as  how  it  appears  from  the
cross-examination of the witnesses etc. is that of total denial with  regard
to the alleged cruelty. The stand was that  the  accused  always  gave  good
treatment to the deceased. They gave jewellery  to  the  deceased  and  also
invested money in her name in the post office. It was denied that they  ever
demanded any dowry from her parents. It is their case that the deceased  was
under pressure from her mother. They were disowned knowledge as to  how  the
deceased died.
7.    The Trial  Court,  as  noticed  above  on  appreciation  of  evidence,
statements of witnesses and  exhibits,  held  the  accused  guilty  for  the
offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 306 r/w Section 34 IPC.  However,  the
said finding was reversed by the Appellate Court for the  reasons  mentioned
in the preceding paragraphs.
8.    The appellant has challenged  the  impugned  judgment  mainly  on  the
following grounds:
(a)   The High Court in the impugned judgment, while quoting  some  portions
of the evidence of the  prosecution  witnesses  has  not  given  any  cogent
reason for disbelieving the evidence of those witnesses.
(b)   The impugned judgment is cryptic, unreasoned and  order  of  acquittal
was passed without discussion and appreciation of evidence.
(c)   The High Court recorded completely erroneous finding that  prosecution
has not proved suicidal death of Ranjana. In fact, the defence  itself  came
with the story of suicidal death of Ranjana.
(d)   The prosecution has proved the demand of dowry  and  cruelty  for  the
said demand. All ingredients for conviction under Sections 498-A  and  304-B
IPC were present. It was presumed that the case was that of a dowry death.
9.    The stand of the respondents is that  the  deposition  of  prosecution
witnesses after five years was improved  version  from  their  version  made
during the investigation. They added  allegation  to  attract  Section  304B
IPC. Chandra Kanta  (PW-8),  mother  of  the  deceased  and  Ranjit  (PW-9),
brother of the deceased both improved their version from  the  version  made
during the investigation on  material  aspect.  Same  is  the  situation  of
Ranchhod Prasad Pande (PW-1), father of the deceased. All  were  related  to
the deceased. Thus they were interested witnesses and their  credibility  is
considerably in question.
10.   Chandrakanta (PW-8), mother of the deceased  is  the  complainant.  In
her statement she stated that Ranjana (deceased) was  married  with  accused
No.2- Rajendra on 19th April, 1998. At the time of marriage it  was  decided
that Rs.25,000/- was to be paid, which was given apart from another  sum  of
Rs.25,000/- given for scooter and Rs.5,000/- in addition to  that,  a  total
amount of Rs.56,000/- was given when the marriage was settled. Prior to  2-4
days of the marriage, accused No.1 and accused No.2  asked  for  Hero  Honda
Motorcycle  although  the  amount  of  Rs.25,000/-  was  paid  for  scooter:
Deceased's family informed that they are unable to pay  more than  what  was
already agreed. The marriage was thereafter performed. At the time of  Barat
(procession) the accused had also created  chaos  when  the  bridegroom  was
about to enter the pandal of the marriage  hall  and  the  golden  ring  was
given to him. In the marriage, religious rites were going on throughout  the
night. The accused No1 did not take any meals or food. During  the  marriage
a golden chain of about 12 gms. was presented to accused No.2. Accused  No.2
was refusing to accept the said chain and wanted the chain of  2  tolas  (20
gms.) and the golden stick.  However, at that time they were convinced.  The
deceased had to come back to her  parents  house  after  8-10  days  of  the
marriage. She disclosed that her in-laws were torturing her  throughout  the
day for not giving the T.V. set, Cooler, Almirah and Hero Honda  Motorcycle.
She asked the deceased to convey the accused No.2  that  she  would  somehow
arrange for the motorcycle. After 3-4 months of the marriage they had  given
an amount of Rs.20,000/- to accused  No.2  for  Almirah,  Cooler  and  T.V.,
still the torture was continued. The deceased-Ranjana used to come  to  her.
The deceased was not sent whenever called  by  her  parents.  Accused  No.2-
Rajendra used to take the deceased  to  the  house  of  her  parents  at  an
interval of 3-4 days on some pretext or other. Initially, the  deceased  was
not disclosing freely even accused No.2 used to bring the deceased. He  used
to torture the deceased by forcing her to demand for the things and used  to
shout at her.
11,   She further stated that Ranjana had stayed with her for a span of  3-4
days when she had come after 8-10 days of marriage. Thereafter she  was  not
sent for residing, however, she was sent in January for 2-3  days.  At  that
time on enquiry the deceased disclosed that her in-laws  are  torturing  and
harassing her very much.  She  further  disclosed  that  she  was  also  not
provided food properly and she  was  treated  like  an  animal.  The  mother
enquired from the  deceased  as  to  who  had  harassed  her  to  which  she
disclosed that her father in-law, husband, brother  of  husband,  sister  of
husband and the husband of sister of accused No.2 vexed her.
12.   Chandrakanta (PW-8) further stated that her husband (PW-11)  had  been
to her daughter's materimonial house to bring her on  the  day  of  incident
i.e. 8th April, 1999 at 6.30 a.m. Some religious rites were to be  performed
but she did not come out. After one hour accused  No.5,  Surendra  came  and
inform about the burning incident happened with the deceased and took  PW-11
to mortuary. She entered the mortuary and noticed the dead body of  Ranjana.

      During the cross-examination she accepted that she  has  not  assigned
any reason as  to  why  she  has  not  stated  about  giving  an  amount  of
Rs.20,000/- after 3-4 months of the marriage for Almirah,  T.V.  and  Cooler
and still the torture continued.
13.   Ranjit (PW-9) is the brother of the  deceased.  In  his  statement  he
stated that at the time of Rakhi (probably in August, 1998) he had  been  to
the house of accused and disclosed to accused No.1 that he had come to  call
his sister Ranjana. Accused No.1 refused to send Ranjana and commented  that
he did not want to send beggar’s daughter. At that time  accused  No.2  also
came and started abusing and caught hold of his collar.  He  further  stated
that 10-15 days thereafter accused No.2 had come to their house  along  with
the deceased Ranjana. At that time his sister disclosed  him  that  her  in-
laws were demanding Hero Honda  Motorcycle,  Cooler,  Almirah  and  she  was
harassed for non-satisfying the demands. He  convinced  her  to  the  effect
that she will have to pull and  there  was  no  purpose  in  disturbing  the
family life.
       In  the  cross-examination,  he  specifically  stated  that  he  made
statement before the Police that after 10-15 days  after  accused  No.2  had
come to their house along with Ranjana, his sister disclosed  him  that  her
in-laws were demanding a motorcycle Hero Honda, Cooler, Almirah and she  was
vexed for non-satisfying the demands.
14.   Ranchhod Prasad Pande (PW-11) is the father of the  deceased.  In  his
statement he stated that her daughter disclosed that  the  accused  and  his
family members ill-treated her. Accused  No.2  was  asking  for  Hero  Honda
Motorcycle. She was physically abused on account of dowry. The accused  were
also demanding and asking for refrigerator. He further stated  that  on  8th
April, 1999 he had been to the house of accused to bring  Ranjana  for  some
religious rites, as she was pregnant of 7 months. He reached  the  house  of
the accused at 6.00-6.30 a.m. All the accused were  present  in  the  house.
Accused Nos.1 and 2 enquired from him as  to  whether  he  had  brought  the
amount for Hero Honda Motorcycle. He  told  that  he  had  not  brought  the
amount. Thereafter, he wanted to meet Ranjana in case if  the  accused  were
not ready to send Ranjana. At that time accused No.2  had  slapped  Ranjana.
Thereafter, he returned back. Ranjana was not sent along with him. At  about
8.30 a.m. accused No.5-Surendra Shukla came and disclosed that  Ranjana  had
poured kerosene oil on  her  and  set  herself  ablaze.  During  the  cross-
examination he accepted that he  has  not  stated  before  the  Police  that
accused No.1 and accused No.2-Rajendra were asking him  whether  he  brought
the amount for Hero Honda and  he  replied  that  he  had  not  brought  the
amount.
15.    Rajmani  (PW-5)  stated  that  at  the  time  of  marriage  dowry  of
Rs.25,000/-, one golden  ring  and  watch  was  demanded.  At  the  time  of
bethrotal ceremony (Tilak) the accused had also insisted for a  scooter  and
the total amount of Rs.56,000/- was given to the accused.
16.   Santoshbai (PW-6), a neighbour, stated that after  the  marriage  when
Ranjana had come at the time of Kajaltiz in her  parents’  house,  she  went
there. At that time there a telephone call came, Rajana  attended  the  said
call and started weeping. She enquired from her (deceased) as to  the  cause
of her weeping. She stated that her in-laws were harassing her. So also  her
other in-laws  were  vexing  her.  She  stated  that  the  incident  of  the
telephone message received by the deceased Ranjana had occurred  2-3  months
prior to her death.
17.   Geeta (PW-7), another neighbor, stated that Ranjana when  met  her  at
the time of Kajaltiz after 2-3 months of her marriage she was not  appearing
to be  happy.  At  that  time,  she  enquired  from  Ranjana  the  cause  of
unhappiness, she told that her in-laws were getting the complete  work  done
from her but murmuring at the time of meals. They used  to  ask  for  dowry.
Ranjana had also stated that in case she watched T.V.  her-in-laws  used  to
say that she should have brought the T.V. from her parents.
18.   The statement of Chandrakanta(PW-8)  that  Ranjana  had  come  to  him
after 8-10 days of marriage and told that the members of  her  in-laws  were
torturing her throughout the day for T.V., Cooler, Almirah  and  Hero  Honda
Motorcycle, is consistent with the FIR. Omission of certain facts  does  not
make any  difference  as  the  same  is  corroborated  by  PW-12.  Similarly
omission of  statement  that  Rs.20,000/-  was  given  to  the  accused  for
almirah, cooler and TV is corroborated by PW.6. Therefore the said  omission
is not fatal to the prosecution.
19.   Chandrakanta(PW-8) categorically stated on her  examination  that  the
deceased disclosed that her in-laws were harassing her very  much;  she  was
not provided with food properly. This evidence is un-shattered in the cross-
examination and it is stated in the FIR itself.
20.    There is un-shattered evidence of Santoshbai (PW-6) about  the  dowry
demand and cruelty. That is when she  enquired  her  as  to  cause  for  her
weeping she stated that her mother-in-law and the  brother  of  her  husband
were very much harassing her. So also her other  in-laws  were  vexing  her.
This evidence also corroborates  the  complainant  Chandrakanta(PW-8)  about
the payment of money to accused  No.2  for  purchasing  of  the  house  hold
articles.
21.   Geeta (PW-7) categorically stated that the deceased told that her  in-
laws were getting the complete work done from  her.  The  verbal  abuse  was
stated to be on account of dowry. She also stated that in case  she  watched
TV her in-laws said that she should bring TV from her parents.
      Prior to one month  of  her  death,  she  stated  that  there  was  no
certainty of her life, this evidence is not shaken in the  cross-examination
and there are no improvements in the evidence of PW-6 & PW-7.
22.   Ranjit (PW-9) categorically stated in  his  evidence  that  after  2-4
days they had received telephonic message from the nurse of the Hospital  of
Dr. Kunda Tayade regarding hospitalization of Ranjana. Thereafter,  he,  his
mother (PW-8) and father (PW-11) had been to Hospital of  Dr.  Kunda  Tayade
and he noticed that his sister Ranjana was lying on the  bed  and  that  too
alone. Ranjana at that time disclosed that since last 2  days  she  was  not
provided food and as such she became weak. At that time they  came  to  know
that Ranjana was pregnant. He further stated that by  that  time  they  were
talking with Ranjana, accused Nos.2,  3 and 6 came  to  the  same  room  and
abused them and enquired as to who provided the address of the Hospital  and
thereafter his mother and father went and he waited in the hospital. He  had
also a talk with accused No.3. He himself  paid  the  amount  of  Rs.2,000/-
towards the fees of hospitalization of Ranjana.
23.   From the above mentioned facts, it is clear that there  was  a  demand
of  dowry  for  purchasing  Hero  Honda  Motorcycle  and  other  house  hold
articles. The evidence of torture is also  clear  from  the  fact  that  the
deceased was not provided food and as such she had become weak that  too  at
the time when she was in the 7th month of pregnancy.
24.   Section 304-B IPC relates to dowry death, which reads as follows:
304B. Dowry death.--(1) Where the death of a woman is caused  by  any  burns
or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances  within
seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her  death  she
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband  or  any  relative  of
her husband for, or in connection with, any demand  for  dowry,  such  death
shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be  deemed
to have caused her death.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry"  shall  have  the
same meaning as in section 2 of the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act,  1961  (28  of
1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with  imprisonment  for  a
term which shall not be less than  seven  years  but  which  may  extend  to
imprisonment for life.”

      The expression “soon before her death”  is  used  in  the  substantive
Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. No definite  period
has been indicated and  the  expression  “soon  before  her  death”  is  not
defined. The determination of period which can come within  the  term  “soon
before” is left to be determined by the Court depending upon the  facts  and
circumstances of each case. In this connection one may  refer  the  case  of
Yashoda and another vs. State of M.P., 2004 (3) SCC 98.
25.   The presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act  with  respect
to dowry death can be raised  only  on  the  proof  of  the  following  four
essential conditions:
1)    The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment,
2)    by the husband or his relatives;
3)    For or in connection with any demand for dowry;
4)    soon before her death.
Refer Kaliyaperumal vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 2004 (9) SCC 157 [AIR  2003  SC
3828].

26.   Section 113-B of the Evidence Act reads as under:
113B. Presumption as to dowry death.—When the question is whether  a  person
has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown  that  soon  before
her death such woman has  been  subjected  by  such  person  to  cruelty  or
harassment for, or in connection with,  any  demand  for  dowry,  the  Court
shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have  the
same meaning as in section 304B, of the Indian Penal Code, (45 of 1860).

27.   In dowry death cases direct evidence may not be available. Such  cases
may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Section 304-B IPC read with  113-B
of the Evidence Act indicates the rule of presumption of dowry death. If  an
unnatural death of a married woman occurs within  7  years  of  marriage  in
suspicious circumstances, like due to burns or any other bodily  injury  and
there is cruelty or harassment  by  her  husband  or  relatives  for  or  in
connection with any demand for dowry soon before her death then it shall  be
dowry death.
28.    Section 306 IPC relates to abetment to suicide as follows:
“306. Abetment of suicide.—If any person commits suicide, whoever abets  the
commission of such suicide, shall be punished with  imprisonment  of  either
description for a term which may extend to ten  years,  and  shall  also  be
liable to fine.”

29.   Section 113-A of the Evidence Act deals with  presumption  as  to  the
abetment to suicide by a married woman, read as follows:

“113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a  married  woman.—When  the
question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman  had  been  abetted
by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that  she  had
committed suicide within a period of  seven  years  from  the  date  of  her
marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had  subjected
her to cruelty, the Court may  presume,  having  regard  to  all  the  other
circumstances of the case,  that  such  suicide  had  been  abetted  by  her
husband or by such relative of her husband.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this  section,  “cruelty”  shall  have  the
same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]"

30.   For the purpose of Section 113-A  IPC  cruelty  shall  have  the  same
meaning as in Section 498-A IPC which reads as follows:
“498A. Husband  or  relative  of  husband  of  a  woman  subjecting  her  to
cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative  of  the  husband  of  a
woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be  punished  with  imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three years  and  shall  also  be  liable  to
fine.

Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to  drive  the
woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb  or
health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the  woman  where  such  harassment  is  with  a  view  to
coercing her or any person related to her to meet any  unlawful  demand  for
any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or  any
person related to her to meet such demand.”
31.   In the  present  case  from  the  evidence  of  prosecution  witnesses
particularly  of  Santoshbai  (PW-6),  Geeta  (PW-7),  Chandrakanta  (PW-8),
Ranjit  (PW-9)  and  Ranchhod  Prasad  Pande  (PW-11),  we  find  that   the
harassment of the deceased was with a view to coerce  her  to  convince  her
parents to meet demand of dowry. The said willful  conduct  has  driven  the
deceased to commit the suicide or not is a matter of doubt,  in  absence  of
specific evidence. Therefore, in the light of Clause (b)  of  Section  498-A
IPC, when we hold all the accused Nos.1 to 6   guilty for the offence  under
Section 498-A IPC, we hold that the prosecution failed  to  prove  that  the
deceased committed suicide. The accused are, therefore,  acquitted  for  the
offence under Section 306 r/w 34 IPC. This part of the  judgment  passed  by
the Trial Court thus cannot be upheld.
32.   The prosecution on the basis of evidence has successfully proved  that
the deceased died within 7 years of her marriage; the death of the  deceased
is caused by burns i.e. nor under normal circumstances.  It  has  also  been
proved that soon before her death, during her  pregnancy  the  deceased  was
subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband and relatives of  accused
that is accused No.1-Shivpujan, accused  No.2-Rajendra,  accused  No.3-Malti
Devi, accused No.4-Anita, accused No.5-Surendra  and  accused  No.6-Virendra
in connection with demand of dowry. Therefore, we hold that the  prosecution
successfully proved with beyond reasonable doubt that  accused  Nos.1  to  6
are guilty for the offence under Section 304-B, r/w 34 IPC.
33.   For the reasons  aforesaid,  we  set  aside  the  major  part  of  the
judgment dated 18th August, 2005 passed by the High Court of  Judicature  at
Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Criminal Appeal NO.388 of  2005  except  the
part relating to offence under Section 306 r/w 34 IPC.  The  judgment  dated
20th July, 2005 passed by the Trial Court in Sessions Case  No.447  of  2000
holding accused Nos.1 to 6 guilty for the offence u/s 498A and 304B IPC.  is
upheld but the part of the judgment relating to offence  under  Section  306
r/w 34 IPC against the accused Nos.1 to 6 stands set aside by  the  judgment
passed by the High Court. The respondents- accused  No.1-Shivpujan,  accused
No.2-Rajendra, accused No.3-Malti Devi, accused  No.4-Anita,  accused  No.5-
Surendra and accused  No.6-Virendra  be  taken  into  custody  forthwith  to
undergo the remainder period of sentence for offence  under  Section   498-A
and 304-B read with 34 IPC.
34.   The appeals are allowed to the extent above.

                                                          …………………………………………J.
                                   (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)



                                                          …………………………………………J.
NEW DELHI,                              (V. GOPALA GOWDA)
JULY 8, 2014.

ITEM NO.IA                   COURT NO.6               SECTION IIA
(For judgment)

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Criminal Appeal No(s). 719/2010

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA                               Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

RAJENDRA & ORS.                                    Respondent(s)

WITH

Criminal Appeal No. 720 of 2010

Date : 08/07/2014 These appeals were called on for judgment today.

For Appellant(s)
                     Mr. Aniruddha P. Mayee ,Adv.

For Respondent(s)
                       Mr. K.L. Taneja, Adv.
                       Mr. Sanjay Jain,Adv.
                       Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, Adv.


            Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya  pronounced  the
judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and  Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  V.
Gopala Gowda.

            The appeals are allowed to the extent indicated  in  the  signed
judgment.



(Sukhbir Paul Kaur)                            (Usha Sharma)
   Court Master                                 Court Master

            (Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)






Death - Strangulation - Case Reg. under sec.174 Cr.P.C. as Suicide & Reported - after one year Fir was Reg. under sec.302/34 - Trial convicted the accused - High court confirmed the same though find that prosecution acted biased - Apex court held that material omissions like non-explanation of delay of one year in registering FIR, non-marking of Marg report reg. under sec.174 Cr.P.C. - Balram Singh, Assistant Sub- Inspector of Mau Police Station, who registered the Marg under Section 174 CrPC was not examined in the trial - non-explanation of Eye witnesses from lodging FIR against the accused immediately - examination of additional new witnesses after one year of the FIR - a slipshod investigation - though high court found the latches but simply discarded without assigning valid reasons High court fell in error and as such Apex court set aside convict orders of lower courts as prosecution failed to prove it's case beyond all reasonable doubts and acquitted the accused by allowing appeal =Sobaran Singh & Ors. .. Appellant(s) versus State of M.P. .. Respondent(s) =2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41753

Death - Strangulation - Case Reg. under sec.174 Cr.P.C. as Suicide & Reported - after one year Fir was Reg. under sec.302/34 - Trial convicted the accused - High court confirmed the same though find that prosecution acted biased - Apex court held that material omissions like non-explanation of delay of one year in registering FIR, non-marking of Marg report reg. under sec.174 Cr.P.C. - Balram Singh,  Assistant  Sub- Inspector of Mau Police Station, who registered the Marg under  Section  174 CrPC was not examined in the trial - non-explanation of Eye witnesses from lodging FIR against the accused immediately - examination of additional new witnesses after one year of the FIR - a slipshod investigation - though high court found the latches but simply discarded without assigning valid reasons  High court fell in error and as such Apex court set aside convict orders of lower courts as prosecution failed to prove it's case beyond all reasonable doubts and acquitted the accused by allowing appeal =

On 6.9.1994  at  8.00  a.m.  PW5  Satyendra
Singh and PW16 Brijendra Singh had gone to attend  call  of  nature  in  the
drain (Nalah) and they heard the sound of weeping and alarm raised  by  PW10
Om Prakash and they went there and saw Narendra  lying  on  the  ground  and
accused no.3 Sardar Khan put his knee on his chest after  holding his  hands
tight and accused no.1 Sobaran Singh and accused no.2 Suraj Singh  tied  his
neck with a muffler (Safee) and accused no.1 Sobaran Singh was armed with  a
12-bore gun and due to fear, they did  not  go  near  Narendra  and  in  the
meanwhile, PW6 Uday Singh and PW11 Vishwanath  Sharma  also  rushed  to  the
spot and on seeing them, accused nos.1 to 3 ran away.  They  found  Narendra
alive with injuries on the neck, chest and right knee and they  carried  him
to the tube-well and thereafter, put him on the  tractor-trolley  and  drove
him to the hospital at Mau where he was declared dead by the  Doctor.   PW14
Dr. O.P. Tengar conducted the post-mortem at 12.30  p.m.  on  6.9.1994  over
the body of Narendra and found the following :

Abrasion admeasuring 3.0 cm x 1.0 cm on calf muscle of right leg;

 Abrasion multiple in number size varies from 2.5” to  3.0”  in  length  and
linear in width over right side of neck 2” below the  ear  lobule  and  2.2”
above the clavicle;

Abrasion 2 in number size  2.2”,  2.0”  x  linear  just  over  the  cricoids
cartilage;

Contusion 1.5” x 1.0” on the middle sternum.

On dissection of the body, he found  contusion  on  sternum  and  ecchymosed
underneath the contusion (rupture of small capillaries and ventricles)  with
tracheal rings and cricoids cartilage fractured.  Pharynx  and  larynx  were
congested.  He expressed opinion that death was caused due to  strangulation
(Asphyxia), 4-6 hours  prior  to  autopsy  and  issued  Exh.P16  post-mortem
report.
Thereafter,
PW6 Uday Singh went to Mau Police Station and lodged  a
report, which was registered in the shape of Marg, under  Section  174  CrPC
by  Assistant  Sub-Inspector   of   Police   Balram   Singh.    During   the
investigation of Marg,  statements  of  the  witnesses  were  recorded.  
On
7.8.1995, PW9 Assistant Sub-Inspector Ram Naresh Singh Kushwah registered  a
case in Crime No.76/1995 against accused nos.1 to 3 for the alleged  offence
under Section 302 read  with  Section  34  IPC  and  prepared  Exh.P13  FIR.
   =
PW5  Satyendra
Singh and PW16 Brijendra Singh - Though both the above witnesses claimed to  have
seen the occurrence, during which the accused  attacked  Narendra  resulting
in his death, they have not lodged a complaint in  the  police  station  and
had not taken  immediate  steps  for  the  arrest  of  the  accused.   Their
testimonies do not inspire confidence and conduct belies their version.=
The investigation in this case is slip-shod.  Balram Singh,  Assistant  Sub-
Inspector of Mau Police Station, who registered the Marg under  Section  174
CrPC was not examined in the trial.   No  explanation  was  offered  by  the
prosecution for his non-examination.  PW12 Bharat  Singh  Sikarwar,  who  is
the station in-charge, has admitted that during Marg enquiry  he  could  not
ascertain the names of culprits nor could register the crime.  In  fact,  at
the instance of the higher police authority, the FIR came to  be  registered
against the accused on 10.8.1995, after a period of 11 months from the  date
of occurrence and the statements were recorded  on  10.8.1995  and  only  in
those statements, for the first time, PWs 5, 6, 10, 11 and  16  have  stated
that they saw the accused persons attacking Narendra during the  occurrence.
 The Marg Intimation Report, which was recorded, was neither  exhibited  nor
proved by prosecution in  the  trial.   The  Investigation  Officer  Santosh
Singh Gaur, who conducted part of  investigation  did  not  testify  in  the
trial.  The High Court has elaborately dealt  with  the  said  omissions  in
paragraph nos.19 and 25 of  the  judgment  and  proceeded  to  observe  that
investigation agency cannot be  permitted  to  conduct  investigation  in  a
tainted  and  biased  manner  and  concludes  that  the  investigation   was
defective and tainted and the defective investigation by itself cannot be  a
ground for acquittal.=
 Our independent analysis of the evidence on  the  record  coupled  with  the
infirmities which we have noticed above has created  an  impression  on  our
minds, that the prosecution has not been able to bring  home  guilt  to  the
appellants beyond a reasonable doubt.  The High Court  even  after  noticing
the infirmities, in our opinion, fell in error in confirming the  conviction
of the appellants.  The reasons given by the High Court do  not  commend  to
us to sustain the conviction and sentence. They are neither  sufficient  nor
adequate or cogent much less compelling to uphold the impugned judgment.
As a result of our above discussion, we  hold  that  the  case  against  the
appellants has not been proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  and  they  are
entitled to benefit of doubt.  Their  appeal  consequently  succeed  and  is
allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed on them are  set  aside  and
they shall be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case.
     

2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41753

T.S. THAKUR, V. GOPALA GOWDA, C. NAGAPPAN
                                                   REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1466 OF 2012


Sobaran Singh & Ors.         ..   Appellant(s)

                                   versus

State of M.P.                     ..         Respondent(s)

                               J U D G M E N T



C. NAGAPPAN, J.



This appeal is preferred against the judgment dated 16.3.2012 passed by  the
High Court of Madhya Pradesh Bench at Gwalior in Criminal Appeal  No.353  of
2004.



The appellants herein are accused nos.1 to 3 in the case in  Sessions  Trial
No.8/97, on the file of Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Gohad,  District-Bhind
(M.P.) and they were tried for the  offence  punishable  under  Section  302
read with Section 34 IPC and the Trial Court convicted  them  for  the  said
offence and sentenced each one of them to undergo imprisonment for life  and
to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in default to undergo Rigorous  Imprisonment  for
one month.



Challenging the conviction and sentence, the  accused  preferred  appeal  in
Criminal Appeal No.353 of 2004 in the High Court and the  same  came  to  be
dismissed by the impugned judgment and that is now under challenge  in  this
appeal.



Briefly, the case of the prosecution is as follows :

      PW5 Satyendra Singh, PW16 Brijendra Singh and deceased Narendra  Singh
are sons of PW7 Hanumant Singh.  PW6 Uday Singh  and  PW10  Om  Prakash  are
brothers of PW7 Hanumant Singh.  On 6.9.1994  at  8.00  a.m.  PW5  Satyendra
Singh and PW16 Brijendra Singh had gone to attend  call  of  nature  in  the
drain (Nalah) and they heard the sound of weeping and alarm raised  by  PW10
Om Prakash and they went there and saw Narendra  lying  on  the  ground  and
accused no.3 Sardar Khan put his knee on his chest after  holding his  hands
tight and accused no.1 Sobaran Singh and accused no.2 Suraj Singh  tied  his
neck with a muffler (Safee) and accused no.1 Sobaran Singh was armed with  a
12-bore gun and due to fear, they did  not  go  near  Narendra  and  in  the
meanwhile, PW6 Uday Singh and PW11 Vishwanath  Sharma  also  rushed  to  the
spot and on seeing them, accused nos.1 to 3 ran away.  They  found  Narendra
alive with injuries on the neck, chest and right knee and they  carried  him
to the tube-well and thereafter, put him on the  tractor-trolley  and  drove
him to the hospital at Mau where he was declared dead by the  Doctor.   PW14
Dr. O.P. Tengar conducted the post-mortem at 12.30  p.m.  on  6.9.1994  over
the body of Narendra and found the following :

Abrasion admeasuring 3.0 cm x 1.0 cm on calf muscle of right leg;

 Abrasion multiple in number size varies from 2.5” to  3.0”  in  length  and
linear in width over right side of neck 2” below the  ear  lobule  and  2.2”
above the clavicle;

Abrasion 2 in number size  2.2”,  2.0”  x  linear  just  over  the  cricoids
cartilage;

Contusion 1.5” x 1.0” on the middle sternum.

On dissection of the body, he found  contusion  on  sternum  and  ecchymosed
underneath the contusion (rupture of small capillaries and ventricles)  with
tracheal rings and cricoids cartilage fractured.  Pharynx  and  larynx  were
congested.  He expressed opinion that death was caused due to  strangulation
(Asphyxia), 4-6 hours  prior  to  autopsy  and  issued  Exh.P16  post-mortem
report.  Thereafter, PW6 Uday Singh went to Mau Police Station and lodged  a
report, which was registered in the shape of Marg, under  Section  174  CrPC
by  Assistant  Sub-Inspector   of   Police   Balram   Singh.    During   the
investigation of Marg,  statements  of  the  witnesses  were  recorded.   On
7.8.1995, PW9 Assistant Sub-Inspector Ram Naresh Singh Kushwah registered  a
case in Crime No.76/1995 against accused nos.1 to 3 for the alleged  offence
under Section 302 read  with  Section  34  IPC  and  prepared  Exh.P13  FIR.
During investigation of the case, witnesses were examined and  final  report
was filed.  Charge under Section 302 IPC was framed  against  accused  nos.1
to 3 and they were found guilty and were sentenced  as  narrated  above  and
the appeal preferred by them was dismissed by the High  Court.   Challenging
the same, accused nos.1 to 3 have preferred this appeal.

The learned counsel for the appellants contended that  the  Marg  Intimation
Report shows that the complainant had only a suspicion against  the  accused
and he has not stated about their involvement in the crime and  the  accused
have been convicted merely on the evidence of the informant  and  other  eye
witnesses, who are none else,  but  the  family  members  of  the  deceased,
having enmity against the accused and the First Information Report  came  to
be registered after nearly a  year  from  the  date  of  occurrence  and  on
deliberation and afterthought, the  statements  of  the  material  witnesses
have  been  recorded  falsely  implicating  the  accused   and   there   are
embellishment  and  material  contradictions  in  the  statements   of   the
witnesses and the investigation is biased and tainted  and  the  prosecution
has failed to prove the charge against the  accused  persons  and  the  High
Court fell in error while confirming the conviction  imposed  by  the  Trial
Court and the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.



Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent State contended that  the
courts below, relying on the testimonies of the ocular witnesses have  found
the accused guilty of the offence charged and the  conviction  and  sentence
imposed are sustainable and does not call for any interference.



Narendra died of Homicidal violence is sought to be proved by  testimony  of
the post-mortem Doctor and opinion of the  Forensic  Science  Expert.   PW14
Dr. O.P. Tengar  conducted  autopsy  on  the  body  of  Narendra  and  found
abrasions multiple in number with varying size over the right  side  of  the
neck and on dissection of the body,  contusion  on  sternum  and  ecchymosed
underneath with tracheal rings and cricoids cartilage fractured and  pharynx
and larynx congested.  In his post-mortem report, he  has  opined  that  the
death was caused  due  to  strangulation  (Asphyxia),  4-6  hours  prior  to
autopsy.



PW15 Dr. Ashok Sharma, Junior Forensic  Specialist  has  testified  that  he
perused the post-mortem  report,  the  Case  Diary  and  all  the  materials
collected and was of  the  view  that  there  was  no  scientific  basis  to
disagree with the opinion of the Autopsy Surgeon.  Exh.P18  is  the  written
opinion expressed by him.  Accepting the medical evidence it is  clear  that
Narendra died of Asphyxia by strangulation.



The prosecution case is that accused nos.1 to  3  in  furtherance  of  their
common intention committed the murder of Narendra by strangulating him  with
a muffler (Safee) and to prove the same, they examined PW5 Satyendra  Singh,
PW6 Uday Singh, PW10 Om Prakash, PW11 Vishwanath Sharma and  PW16  Brijendra
Singh as  having  witnessed  the  occurrence.   PW10  Om  Prakash  and  PW11
Vishwanath Sharma did not support the case of the prosecution  in  full  and
were treated as hostile.  Two  among  the  remaining  ocular  witnesses  are
brothers of deceased Narendra.



PW5 Satyendra  Singh  and  PW16  Brijendra  Singh  have  testified  that  on
6.9.1994 at 8.00 a.m. they had gone to Nalah to attend call  of  nature  and
they heard the sound of weeping and the alarm raised by PW10 Om Prakash  and
went there and found Narendra lying on the ground and  accused  no.3  Sardar
Khan put his knee on the chest of Narendra and holding his hands  tight  and
accused no.1 Sobaran Singh and accused no.2 Suraj Singh  pressing  the  neck
of Narendra by tying a muffler (Safee) and accused no.1  Sobaran  Singh  was
armed with a 12-bore gun and due to fear, they did not go near  and  in  the
meanwhile, PW6 Uday Singh and PW11 Vishwanath Sharma rushed to the spot  and
on seeing them, the accused left the place and they  took  injured  Narendra
to the hospital at Mau in a tractor-trolley, where he was declared dead.



Immediately after the occurrence, during Marg investigation,  PW5  Satyendra
Singh was examined and in the said statement, he  has  stated  that  he  was
ploughing his Banjara field with  tractor  on  6.9.1994  and  his  uncle  Om
Prakash came running to his field  and  informed  him  about  the  death  of
Narendra and this statement was put to PW5 Satyendra  Singh  in  the  cross-
examination and, of course, he has denied the same.  In this context  it  is
also  relevant  to  point  out  that,  after  registration  of   the   First
Information Report on  10.8.1995,  the  statement  of  Satyendra  Singh  was
recorded by the Investigation Officer, wherein, for the first time,  he  has
stated about having witnessed the occurrence.



In the Marg investigation, Brijendra Singh  was  not  examined  and  he  was
examined only after registration of the FIR on 10.8.1995, which is almost  a
year after the occurrence.  Though both the above witnesses claimed to  have
seen the occurrence, during which the accused  attacked  Narendra  resulting
in his death, they have not lodged a complaint in  the  police  station  and
had not taken  immediate  steps  for  the  arrest  of  the  accused.   Their
testimonies do not inspire confidence and conduct belies their version.



It is the testimony of  PW6 Uday Singh that on 6.9.1994 at about  8.00  a.m.
he went to the tube-well and met Vishwanath Sharma and they heard the  alarm
raised by PW10 Om Prakash and they rushed there and he saw from  a  distance
that Narendra lying on the ground with accused no.3 Sardar Khan  armed  with
a 12-bore gun sitting on his chest after holding both his  hands  tight  and
accused no.1 Sobaran Singh and accused no.2 Suraj Singh  pressing  the  neck
of Narendra by trying a muffler and PW5 Satyendra Singh and  PW16  Brijendra
Singh also reached there and on seeing them, all the accused  ran  away  and
they took injured Narendra in the tractor-trolley to the hospital  where  he
was declared dead by the doctor and he went to  police  station  and  lodged
Exh.D1 Complaint.  In his complaint PW6 Uday Singh has stated  that  on  the
occurrence day around 8.00 a.m. he went  from  his  house  for  grazing  the
cattle and around 9.00 a.m. his brother Om Prakash told  him  that  Narendra
is lying unconscious at the Har and thereafter, he, PW11  Vishwanath  Sharma
and PW5 Satyendra Singh went to Har and saw Narendra  lying  unconscious  on
the ground and a safee  was  there  around  his  neck  and  there  were  red
coloured marks on the chest  and  they  took  him  in  the  tractor  to  the
hospital at Mau, where he was declared  dead  and  he  came  to  the  police
station for filing the report and he  has  doubt  on  accused  no.1  Sobaran
Singh and  accused  no.3  Sardar  Khan.   In  the  Marg  Investigation,  his
statement was recorded, in which the same version has been told by him.   As
already seen, about 11 months after the occurrence,  the  First  Information
Report came to be registered on 10.8.1995 and the statement  of  Uday  Singh
was recorded and in that statement, for the first time, Uday Singh has  come
out with the version that he witnessed the attack made  by  the  accused  on
Narendra, which resulted in death.  If  really,  Uday  Singh  had  seen  the
attack made by the accused persons on Narendra  during  the  occurrence,  he
must have stated so  in  his  complaint  given  before  the  police  station
implicating the accused.  On the other hand, Uday Singh has  only  expressed
his suspicion on accused no.1 and accused no.3 in his complaint and has  not
whispered about witnessing the occurrence for a period of 11 months.



Exh.D2 is the statement of PW6 Uday Singh given on 6.9.1994 to  the  police,
wherein, he has stated that around 9.00 a.m.  on  the  occurrence  day,  his
brother PW10 Om Prakash told him at the tube-well  that  Narendra  is  lying
unconscious near the drain (Nalah) and  he  and  his  nephew  Satyendra  and
Vishwanath Sharma went to the drain and  found  Narendra  lying  unconscious
with injuries and there was safee around his neck and they  took  him  in  a
tractor-trolley to the hospital at Mau where he was  declared  dead  and  he
has doubt on accused no.1 Sobaran Singh and accused no.3 Sardar Khan as  the
dispute  is  going  on  with  them.   During  cross-examination,  the   said
statement was put to PW6 Uday Singh and he simply denied it and stated  that
he informed the police about the accused attacking Narendra.  In short,  the
testimony of PW6 Uday Singh does not inspire confidence and no credence  can
be given to it.



The complainant PW10 Om Prakash has testified that on 6.9.1994 at 8.00  a.m.
he took buffaloes for grazing to Banjara field and saw the  accused  persons
beating his nephew Narendra and  he  cried  and  thereafter,  PW5  Satyendra
Singh, PW6 Uday Singh and PW16 Brijendra Singh came there  and  the  accused
fled away and they took injured Narendra to the hospital  at  Mau  where  he
was pronounced dead.  It is his further testimony,  in  examination-in-chief
that he could not see by which  weapon  the  accused  persons  were  beating
Narendra and due to the impairment of vision, he could not say  whether  the
signatures found in the spot map and seizure memo were that of  his  and  he
was treated as hostile by the prosecution.



In the cross-examination, PW10 Om Prakash admitted that he was  examined  by
police on the date of occurrence itself, namely 6.9.1994, and the said  Marg
diary statement is  Exh.D/2-A,  and  he  has  stated  therein  that  on  the
occurrence day in the morning Narendra took buffaloes to  Banjara  wale  Har
and after sometime, he went with his buffaloes and  saw  Narendra  lying  in
the grass with white liquid coming from mouth and  nose  and  he  saw  at  a
distance that accused no.2 Suraj Singh with  a  12-bore  gun,  accused  no.3
Sardar Khan and another person, who could not be identified, going  down  by
crossing the drain (Nalah) and he ran to  the  tube-well  and  informed  the
same to others and he along with PW5 Satyendra Singh,  PW6  Uday  Singh  and
PW11 Vishwanath Sharma went  to  the  occurrence  place  and  found  injured
Narendra alive and they took him to  the  hospital  at  Mau,  where  he  was
declared dead  and  he  has  doubt  on  accused  nos.1  and  3  about  their
involvement in the death of Narendra.  The above version is the earliest  in
point of time wherein, he has not  stated  about  the  attack  made  by  the
assailants on Narendra.  Moreover, he did not support the  prosecution  case
in full and was declared as hostile.



PW11 Vishwanath Sharma is an independent witness and he was staying  in  the
tube-well of PW10 Om Prakash on 6.9.1994 and according to him, he heard  the
cry of PW10 Om Prakash and he along with PW5 Satyendra Singh  and  PW6  Uday
Singh ran there and  saw  Narendra  lying  seriously  injured  and  saw  the
accused  proceeding  towards  village  from  Nalah  and  they  took  injured
Narendra to the hospital in the tractor-trolley and he  was  dead  by  then.
This witness was  also  treated  as  hostile  by  the  prosecution  and  his
testimony does not help the prosecution case in any way.



The investigation in this case is slip-shod.  Balram Singh,  Assistant  Sub-
Inspector of Mau Police Station, who registered the Marg under  Section  174
CrPC was not examined in the trial.   No  explanation  was  offered  by  the
prosecution for his non-examination.  PW12 Bharat  Singh  Sikarwar,  who  is
the station in-charge, has admitted that during Marg enquiry  he  could  not
ascertain the names of culprits nor could register the crime.  In  fact,  at
the instance of the higher police authority, the FIR came to  be  registered
against the accused on 10.8.1995, after a period of 11 months from the  date
of occurrence and the statements were recorded  on  10.8.1995  and  only  in
those statements, for the first time, PWs 5, 6, 10, 11 and  16  have  stated
that they saw the accused persons attacking Narendra during the  occurrence.
 The Marg Intimation Report, which was recorded, was neither  exhibited  nor
proved by prosecution in  the  trial.   The  Investigation  Officer  Santosh
Singh Gaur, who conducted part of  investigation  did  not  testify  in  the
trial.  The High Court has elaborately dealt  with  the  said  omissions  in
paragraph nos.19 and 25 of  the  judgment  and  proceeded  to  observe  that
investigation agency cannot be  permitted  to  conduct  investigation  in  a
tainted  and  biased  manner  and  concludes  that  the  investigation   was
defective and tainted and the defective investigation by itself cannot be  a
ground for acquittal.



Our independent analysis of the evidence on  the  record  coupled  with  the
infirmities which we have noticed above has created  an  impression  on  our
minds, that the prosecution has not been able to bring  home  guilt  to  the
appellants beyond a reasonable doubt.  The High Court  even  after  noticing
the infirmities, in our opinion, fell in error in confirming the  conviction
of the appellants.  The reasons given by the High Court do  not  commend  to
us to sustain the conviction and sentence. They are neither  sufficient  nor
adequate or cogent much less compelling to uphold the impugned judgment.



As a result of our above discussion, we  hold  that  the  case  against  the
appellants has not been proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  and  they  are
entitled to benefit of doubt.  Their  appeal  consequently  succeed  and  is
allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed on them are  set  aside  and
they shall be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case.


                                                              …………………………….J.
                                             (T.S. Thakur)


                                                              …………………………….J.
                                             (V. Gopala Gowda)


                                                               ……………………………J.
                                             (C. Nagappan)

New Delhi;
July  7, 2014


Sec.138 and sec.141 of N.I. Act - Whether the complaint against the accused alone maintainable leaving the company set free -NO - High court quashed the summons issued against the company by trial court and confirmed the summons issued against the appellant - Apex court held that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh17 which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.” In the present case, the High Court by impugned judgment dated 13th August, 2007 held that the complaint against respondent no.2-Company was not maintainable and quashed the summon issued by the Trial Court against respondent no.2-Company. Thereby, the Company being not a party to the proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act and in view of the fact that part of the judgment referred to by the High Court in Anil Hada (supra) has been overruled by three Judge Bench of this Court in Aneeta Hada (supra), we have no other option but to set aside the rest part of the impugned judgment whereby the High Court held that the proceedings against the appellant can be continued even in absence of the Company. We, accordingly, set aside that part of the impugned judgment dated 13th August, 2007 passed by the High Court so far it relates to appellant and quash the summon and proceeding pursuant to complaint case No.698 of 2001 qua the appellant.The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observation.=Anil Gupta … APPELLANT VERSUS Star India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41752

 Sec.138 and sec.141 of N.I. Act - Whether the complaint against the accused alone maintainable leaving the company set free  -NO - High court quashed the summons issued against the company by trial court and confirmed the summons issued against the appellant - Apex court held that for maintaining the prosecution under  Section  141  of  the Act, arraigning of  a  company  as  an  accused  is  imperative.  The  other categories of  offenders  can  only  be  brought  in  the  drag-net  on  the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has  been  stipulated  in  the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the  ratio  laid  down  in  C.V. Parekh17 which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed  in Sheoratan Agarwal does not correctly lay down the law and,  accordingly,  is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada is overruled with the  qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery has to be  treated  to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.” In the present case, the High Court by impugned  judgment  dated  13th August, 2007 held that the complaint  against  respondent  no.2-Company  was not maintainable and quashed the summon issued by the  Trial  Court  against respondent no.2-Company. Thereby, the Company  being  not  a  party  to  the proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act and  in  view of the fact that part of the judgment referred to by the High Court in  Anil Hada (supra) has been overruled by  three  Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in Aneeta Hada (supra), we have no other option but to set aside the rest  part of the impugned judgment whereby the High Court held  that  the  proceedings against the appellant can be continued even in absence of the Company.   We, accordingly,  set aside that  part  of  the  impugned  judgment  dated  13th August, 2007 passed by the High Court so far it  relates  to  appellant  and quash the summon and proceeding pursuant to complaint case  No.698  of  2001 qua the appellant.The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observation.=


The aforesaid  three
cheques were presented before the Indian Overseas Bank, Gandhi Nagar,  Jammu
and  were  dishonoured  on  6.01.2004.  
Respondent  No.1  served  notice  on
respondent no.2-Company with a demand notice separately for  all  the  three
cheques.
Respondent no.2-Company replied to the said  notice  on  20.01.2004
informed respondent  no.1  that  payments  were  stopped  because  of  their
inability to stop the piracy due to which the cable operators did  not  make
payments.
      Thereafter, respondent no.1 issued second notice dated  28.01.2004  on
the appellant based on the  same  facts  and  based  on  the  same  memo  of
dishonor in respect of the aforesaid three cheques.  
Respondent  no.1  also
issued a corrigendum of the same date to  the  said  notice.
The  appellant
submitted reply to the said notice on 3.02.2004.

4.    Respondent no.1 filed a Criminal Complaint under Sections 138 and  141
of the Act on 17.03.2004 =

By the impugned judgment, the  High  Court  held  that
the complaint under Section 138 read with  Section  141  of  the  Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the, ‘Act’) was barred  by
limitation and quashed the summon order against respondent  no.2-Visionaries
Media Network (hereinafter referred to as the, ‘Company’). 
It  further  held
that the dispute qua the appellant (petitioner no.2 before  High  Court)  is
within limitation and affirmed the summon order against the appellant.=

Whether the complaint against the accused alone maintainable leaving the company set free 

Again the same question was considered by three Judge  Bench  of  this
Court in Aneeta Hada v.  Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 5  SCC
661. The Court noticed the decisions in Anil Hada (supra)  case  and  Aneeta
Hada (supra) case.   The  three  Judge  Bench  while  partly  overruled  the
finding of Anil Hada (supra) affirmed the decision of Aneeta  Hada  (supra).
This Court held

“51. We have already opined that the  decision  in  Sheoratan  Agarwal  runs
counter to the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh which is  by  a  larger  Bench
and hence, is a binding  precedent.  On  the  aforesaid  ratiocination,  the
decision in Anil Hada has to be treated as not laying down the  correct  law
as far as  it  states  that  the  Director  or  any  other  officer  can  be
prosecuted without impleadment of the company. Needless  to  emphasise,  the
matter would stand  on  a  different  footing  where  there  is  some  legal
impediment  and  the  doctrine  of  lex  non  cogit  ad  impossibilia   gets
attracted.”

“53. It is to be borne in mind that Section 141  of  the  Act  is  concerned
with the offences by the company. It makes  the  other  persons  vicariously
liable for commission of an offence on the part of the company. As has  been
stated by us earlier,  the  vicarious  liability  gets  attracted  when  the
condition precedent laid down in Section 141 of the  Act  stands  satisfied.
There can be no dispute that as the liability is penal in nature,  a  strict
construction of the provision would  be  necessitous  and,  in  a  way,  the
warrant.”

“58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the  considered
opinion that commission of offence by the company is  an  express  condition
precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words  “as
well  as  the  company”  appearing  in  the  section  make   it   absolutely
unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted,  then  only  the
persons mentioned in the other categories could be  vicariously  liable  for
the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof.  One
cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a  juristic  person  and
it has its own respectability. If a  finding  is  recorded  against  it,  it
would create a concavity in its reputation. There  can  be  situations  when
the corporate reputation is affected when a Director is indicted.

59. In view of  our  aforesaid  analysis,  we  arrive  at  the  irresistible
conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under  Section  141  of  the
Act, arraigning of  a  company  as  an  accused  is  imperative.  The  other
categories of  offenders  can  only  be  brought  in  the  drag-net  on  the
touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has  been  stipulated  in  the
provision itself. We say so on the basis of the  ratio  laid  down  in  C.V.
Parekh17 which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed  in
Sheoratan Agarwal does not correctly lay down the law and,  accordingly,  is
hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada is overruled with the  qualifier
as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery has to be  treated  to
be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.”

15.   In the present case, the High Court by impugned  judgment  dated  13th
August, 2007 held that the complaint  against  respondent  no.2-Company  was
not maintainable and quashed the summon issued by the  Trial  Court  against
respondent no.2-Company. Thereby, the Company  being  not  a  party  to  the
proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act and  in  view
of the fact that part of the judgment referred to by the High Court in  Anil
Hada (supra) has been overruled by  three  Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in
Aneeta Hada (supra), we have no other option but to set aside the rest  part
of the impugned judgment whereby the High Court held  that  the  proceedings
against the appellant can be continued even in absence of the Company.   We,
accordingly,  set aside that  part  of  the  impugned  judgment  dated  13th
August, 2007 passed by the High Court so far it  relates  to  appellant  and
quash the summon and proceeding pursuant to complaint case  No.698  of  2001
qua the appellant.
16.   The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observation.

2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41752

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, V. GOPALA GOWDA

                                                                REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1364 OF 2014
                 (arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.7039 of 2007)

Anil Gupta                                         … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

Star India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.                        … RESPONDENTS





                               J U D G M E N T



SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA,J.

      Leave granted.
2.    This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 13th  August,  2007
passed by the High Court of Delhi at New  Delhi  in  Criminal  Miscellaneous
Case No.2380 of 2004. By the impugned judgment, the  High  Court  held  that
the complaint under Section 138 read with  Section  141  of  the  Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the, ‘Act’) was barred  by
limitation and quashed the summon order against respondent  no.2-Visionaries
Media Network (hereinafter referred to as the, ‘Company’). It  further  held
that the dispute qua the appellant (petitioner no.2 before  High  Court)  is
within limitation and affirmed the summon order against the appellant.
3.    The factual matrix of the case is as follows:
      A subscription agreement was entered  into  between  respondent  nos.1
and 2 whereby respondent no.2-Company was appointed as distributor  of  Star
Channels and collecting  subscription  fee  for  the  same.  On  27.12.2003,
respondent no.2-Company issued three cheques bearing nos.790913, 790912  and
790911  for  Rs.6,00,000/-,  Rs.5,00,000/-  and  Rs.5,00,000/-  respectively
drawn on the Indian Overseas Bank, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu. The aforesaid  three
cheques were presented before the Indian Overseas Bank, Gandhi Nagar,  Jammu
and  were  dishonoured  on  6.01.2004.  Respondent  No.1  served  notice  on
respondent no.2-Company with a demand notice separately for  all  the  three
cheques. Respondent no.2-Company replied to the said  notice  on  20.01.2004
informed respondent  no.1  that  payments  were  stopped  because  of  their
inability to stop the piracy due to which the cable operators did  not  make
payments.
      Thereafter, respondent no.1 issued second notice dated  28.01.2004  on
the appellant based on the  same  facts  and  based  on  the  same  memo  of
dishonor in respect of the aforesaid three cheques.   Respondent  no.1  also
issued a corrigendum of the same date to  the  said  notice.  The  appellant
submitted reply to the said notice on 3.02.2004.

4.    Respondent no.1 filed a Criminal Complaint under Sections 138 and  141
of the Act on 17.03.2004. According to appellant, respondent no,1  concealed
the material fact of having  earlier  issued  notice  dated  14.1.2004  with
regard to the aforesaid three  cheques  and  by  misleading  the  Court  got
summons issued by Metropolitan Magistrate in Complaint  No.698  of  2001  to
the appellant and respondent no.2-Company.

5.     Thereafter,  respondent  no.2-Company  and  appellant  jointly  filed
Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.2380 of 2004 under  Section  482  of  the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 before the High Court of Delhi  at  New  Delhi
for quashing the aforesaid criminal complaint filed by respondent  no.1.  In
its  reply,  respondent  no.1  taken  the  plea  that  first  notice   dated
14.01.2004 was not a notice under Section 138 of the Act. It  was  contended
on behalf of the appellant that he was only vicariously liable on behalf  of
respondent no.2-Company. Learned counsel for the appellant  placed  reliance
on decisions of this Court in support of his claim.

6.    The High Court by impugned judgment while recording  the  stand  taken
by respondent no.1 that letter dated 14.01.2004 constituted a  valid  notice
under Section 138 of the Act and hence the complaint based on second  notice
against respondent no.2-Company was not maintainable and quashed the  summon
issued by the Trial Court against respondent no.2-Company. However,  so  far
as appellant is concerned, the High Court relying on decision of this  Court
in Anil Hada v.  Indian  Acrylic  Ltd.,  (2000)  1  SCC  1,  held  that  the
proceeding against the Director  can  be  issued  even  in  absence  of  the
Company being impleaded, The High Court  further  held  that  the  summoning
order was valid since the first notice was not addressed  to  the  appellant
and the second notice which was also addressed to the appellant  was  issued
within time and. therefore, criminal  complaint  filed  by  respondent  no.1
against the appellant on the basis of the said notice is maintainable.

7.    Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  appellant  contended  that
the order of the High Court is contrary to the law in as  much  as  this  is
not a case where proceedings were initiated against  the  Managing  Director
alone.  On  the  contrary,  the  proceedings  are  instituted  against   the
company/accused  and  its  Managing  Director.   In   the   event   of   the
company/accused  being  let  off,  the  same  cannot  continue  against  the
Managing Director who admittedly is only vicariously liable.

8.    It is further submitted that  even  as  per  law  laid  down  in  Anil
Handa’s case, the Director of a company/accused is only  liable  vicariously
and upon his showing that the principal accused is not liable he  cannot  be
held guilty.

9.    On the other hand, according  to  counsel  for  the  respondents,  the
issue is no longer res integra as held by the High Court.
10.    Section  138  of  the  Act  deals  with  dishonor   of   cheque   for
insufficiency etc. as follows:
      “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc.,  of  funds  in  the
account.—Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by  him
with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from  out
of that account for the discharge, in whole or  in  part,  of  any  debt  or
other liability, is returned by the  bank  unpaid,  either  because  of  the
amount of money standing to the credit of that account  is  insufficient  to
honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged  to  be  paid  from
that account by an arrangement made with that bank,  such  person  shall  be
deemed to have committed an offence and  shall,  without  prejudice  to  any
other provisions of this Act, be  punished  with  imprisonment  for  a  term
which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend  to  twice  the
amount of the cheque, or with both:

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—

(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six  months
from the date on which it is drawn or within the  period  of  its  validity,
whichever is earlier;

(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque,  as  the  case  may
be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by  giving  a
notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty  days  of  the
receipt of information by him from the bank  regarding  the  return  of  the
cheque as unpaid; and
[pic]
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the  said  amount
of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder  in  due  course
of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.”

      From the aforesaid provision, it is clear that only the drawer of  the
cheque falls within the ambit of Section 138 of the Act whether human  being
or a body corporate or even a firm.

11.   The guilt for offence under Section 138 will  be  deemed  to  be  upon
other persons connected with the Company in view of Section 141 of the  Act,
which reads as follows:
 “141. Offences by companies.—(1) If the person committing an offence  under
Section 138 is a company, every person who, at  the  time  the  offence  was
committed, was in charge of, and was responsible  to  the  company  for  the
conduct of the business of the company, as well as  the  company,  shall  be
deemed to be guilty of the offence and  shall  be  liable  to  be  proceeded
against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any  person
liable  to  punishment  if  he  proves  that  the  offence   was   committed
[pic]without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all  due  diligence  to
prevent the commission of such offence.
(2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub-section  (1),  where  any
offence under this Act has been committed by a  company  and  it  is  proved
that the offence has been committed with the consent or  connivance  of,  or
is attributable to, any neglect on  the  part  of,  any  director,  manager,
secretary  or  other  officer  of  the  company,  such  director,   manager,
secretary or other officer shall  also  be  deemed  to  be  guilty  of  that
offence  and  shall  be  liable  to  be  proceeded  against   and   punished
accordingly.”


12.   Similar question was raised and considered by two Judge Bench of  this
Court in Anil Hada v. India Acrylic Ltd. (2000) 1 SCC 1.  This  Court  held:

“12. Thus when the drawer of the  cheque  who  falls  within  the  ambit  of
Section 138 of the Act is a human being or a body corporate  or  even  firm,
prosecution proceedings can  be  initiated  against  such  drawer.  In  this
context the phrase “as well as” used in sub-section (1) of  Section  141  of
the Act has some importance. The  said  phrase  would  embroil  the  persons
mentioned in the first category within the tentacles of  the  offence  on  a
par with the offending company. Similarly the words  “shall  also”  in  sub-
section (2) are capable of bringing the third category persons  additionally
within the dragnet of the offence on an equal par.  The  effect  of  reading
Section 141 is that when the company  is  the  drawer  of  the  cheque  such
company is the principal offender under Section  138  of  the  Act  and  the
remaining persons are made offenders by virtue of the legal fiction  created
by the legislature as per the section. Hence the actual offence should  have
been committed by the company, and then alone the other  two  categories  of
persons can also become liable for the offence.

13. If the offence was committed by a company it can  be  punished  only  if
the company is prosecuted. But instead  of  prosecuting  the  company  if  a
payee opts to prosecute only the persons falling within the second or  third
category the payee can succeed in the case only if he  succeeds  in  showing
that  the  offence  was  actually  committed  by  the  company.  In  such  a
[pic]prosecution the accused can show that the  company  has  not  committed
the offence, though such company is not  made  an  accused,  and  hence  the
prosecuted accused is not liable to  be  punished.  The  provisions  do  not
contain a condition that prosecution of the company  is  sine  qua  non  for
prosecution of the other persons who fall within the second  and  the  third
categories mentioned  above.  No  doubt  a  finding  that  the  offence  was
committed by the  company  is  sine  qua  non  for  convicting  those  other
persons. But if a company is  not  prosecuted  due  to  any  legal  snag  or
otherwise, the other prosecuted persons cannot, on that score alone,  escape
from the penal liability created through  the  legal  fiction  envisaged  in
Section 141 of the Act.”

“21. We, therefore, hold that even if the  prosecution  proceedings  against
the Company were not taken or could not be  continued,  it  is  no  bar  for
proceeding against the other persons falling  within  the  purview  of  sub-
sections (1) and (2) of Section  141  of  the  Act.  In  the  light  of  the
aforesaid view we do not consider it necessary to deal  with  the  remaining
question whether winding-up order of a company would render the company non-
existent.”

13.   In Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours  Pvt.  Ltd.,  (2008)  13
SCC 703, taking note of the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia,  two  Judge
Bench of this Court observed:

      “54. True interpretation, in my opinion, of the said  provision  would
be that a company has to be made an accused but applying  the  principle  of
lex non cogit ad impossibilia i.e. if  for  some  legal  snag,  the  company
cannot be proceeded against without obtaining sanction of a court of law  or
other authority, the trial as against the other  accused  may  be  proceeded
against if the ingredients of Section 138 as also Section 141 are  otherwise
fulfilled. In such an event, it would not be a case where  the  company  had
not been made an accused but would  be  one  where  the  company  cannot  be
proceeded against due to existence of a legal bar.  A  distinction  must  be
borne in mind between cases where a company had not  been  made  an  accused
and the one where despite making it  an  accused,  it  cannot  be  proceeded
against because of a legal bar.”


14.   Again the same question was considered by three Judge  Bench  of  this
Court in Aneeta Hada v.  Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 5  SCC
661. The Court noticed the decisions in Anil Hada (supra)  case  and  Aneeta
Hada (supra) case.   The  three  Judge  Bench  while  partly  overruled  the
finding of Anil Hada (supra) affirmed the decision of Aneeta  Hada  (supra).
This Court held

“51. We have already opined that the  decision  in  Sheoratan  Agarwal  runs
counter to the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh which is  by  a  larger  Bench
and hence, is a binding  precedent.  On  the  aforesaid  ratiocination,  the
decision in Anil Hada has to be treated as not laying down the  correct  law
as far as  it  states  that  the  Director  or  any  other  officer  can  be
prosecuted without impleadment of the company. Needless  to  emphasise,  the
matter would stand  on  a  different  footing  where  there  is  some  legal
impediment  and  the  doctrine  of  lex  non  cogit  ad  impossibilia   gets
attracted.”

“53. It is to be borne in mind that Section 141  of  the  Act  is  concerned
with the offences by the company. It makes  the  other  persons  vicariously
liable for commission of an offence on the part of the company. As has  been
stated by us earlier,  the  vicarious  liability  gets  attracted  when  the
condition precedent laid down in Section 141 of the  Act  stands  satisfied.
There can be no dispute that as the liability is penal in nature,  a  strict
construction of the provision would  be  necessitous  and,  in  a  way,  the
warrant.”

“58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the  considered
opinion that commission of offence by the company is  an  express  condition
precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words  “as
well  as  the  company”  appearing  in  the  section  make   it   absolutely
unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted,  then  only  the
persons mentioned in the other categories could be  vicariously  liable  for
the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof.  One
cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a  juristic  person  and
it has its own respectability. If a  finding  is  recorded  against  it,  it
would create a concavity in its reputation. There  can  be  situations  when
the corporate reputation is affected when a Director is indicted.

59. In view of  our  aforesaid  analysis,  we  arrive  at  the  irresistible
conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under  Section  141  of  the
Act, arraigning of  a  company  as  an  accused  is  imperative.  The  other
categories of  offenders  can  only  be  brought  in  the  drag-net  on  the
touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has  been  stipulated  in  the
provision itself. We say so on the basis of the  ratio  laid  down  in  C.V.
Parekh17 which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed  in
Sheoratan Agarwal does not correctly lay down the law and,  accordingly,  is
hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada is overruled with the  qualifier
as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery has to be  treated  to
be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.”

15.   In the present case, the High Court by impugned  judgment  dated  13th
August, 2007 held that the complaint  against  respondent  no.2-Company  was
not maintainable and quashed the summon issued by the  Trial  Court  against
respondent no.2-Company. Thereby, the Company  being  not  a  party  to  the
proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act and  in  view
of the fact that part of the judgment referred to by the High Court in  Anil
Hada (supra) has been overruled by  three  Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in
Aneeta Hada (supra), we have no other option but to set aside the rest  part
of the impugned judgment whereby the High Court held  that  the  proceedings
against the appellant can be continued even in absence of the Company.   We,
accordingly,  set aside that  part  of  the  impugned  judgment  dated  13th
August, 2007 passed by the High Court so far it  relates  to  appellant  and
quash the summon and proceeding pursuant to complaint case  No.698  of  2001
qua the appellant.
16.   The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observation.

                                                          …………………………………………J.
                                               (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)


                                                          …………………………………………J.
                                 (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

NEW DELHI,
JULY 07, 2014.