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Monday, July 28, 2014

Sec.138 and sec.141 of N.I. Act - Whether the complaint against the accused alone maintainable leaving the company set free -NO - High court quashed the summons issued against the company by trial court and confirmed the summons issued against the appellant - Apex court held that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh17 which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.” In the present case, the High Court by impugned judgment dated 13th August, 2007 held that the complaint against respondent no.2-Company was not maintainable and quashed the summon issued by the Trial Court against respondent no.2-Company. Thereby, the Company being not a party to the proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act and in view of the fact that part of the judgment referred to by the High Court in Anil Hada (supra) has been overruled by three Judge Bench of this Court in Aneeta Hada (supra), we have no other option but to set aside the rest part of the impugned judgment whereby the High Court held that the proceedings against the appellant can be continued even in absence of the Company. We, accordingly, set aside that part of the impugned judgment dated 13th August, 2007 passed by the High Court so far it relates to appellant and quash the summon and proceeding pursuant to complaint case No.698 of 2001 qua the appellant.The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observation.=Anil Gupta … APPELLANT VERSUS Star India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41752

 Sec.138 and sec.141 of N.I. Act - Whether the complaint against the accused alone maintainable leaving the company set free  -NO - High court quashed the summons issued against the company by trial court and confirmed the summons issued against the appellant - Apex court held that for maintaining the prosecution under  Section  141  of  the Act, arraigning of  a  company  as  an  accused  is  imperative.  The  other categories of  offenders  can  only  be  brought  in  the  drag-net  on  the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has  been  stipulated  in  the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the  ratio  laid  down  in  C.V. Parekh17 which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed  in Sheoratan Agarwal does not correctly lay down the law and,  accordingly,  is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada is overruled with the  qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery has to be  treated  to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.” In the present case, the High Court by impugned  judgment  dated  13th August, 2007 held that the complaint  against  respondent  no.2-Company  was not maintainable and quashed the summon issued by the  Trial  Court  against respondent no.2-Company. Thereby, the Company  being  not  a  party  to  the proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act and  in  view of the fact that part of the judgment referred to by the High Court in  Anil Hada (supra) has been overruled by  three  Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in Aneeta Hada (supra), we have no other option but to set aside the rest  part of the impugned judgment whereby the High Court held  that  the  proceedings against the appellant can be continued even in absence of the Company.   We, accordingly,  set aside that  part  of  the  impugned  judgment  dated  13th August, 2007 passed by the High Court so far it  relates  to  appellant  and quash the summon and proceeding pursuant to complaint case  No.698  of  2001 qua the appellant.The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observation.=


The aforesaid  three
cheques were presented before the Indian Overseas Bank, Gandhi Nagar,  Jammu
and  were  dishonoured  on  6.01.2004.  
Respondent  No.1  served  notice  on
respondent no.2-Company with a demand notice separately for  all  the  three
cheques.
Respondent no.2-Company replied to the said  notice  on  20.01.2004
informed respondent  no.1  that  payments  were  stopped  because  of  their
inability to stop the piracy due to which the cable operators did  not  make
payments.
      Thereafter, respondent no.1 issued second notice dated  28.01.2004  on
the appellant based on the  same  facts  and  based  on  the  same  memo  of
dishonor in respect of the aforesaid three cheques.  
Respondent  no.1  also
issued a corrigendum of the same date to  the  said  notice.
The  appellant
submitted reply to the said notice on 3.02.2004.

4.    Respondent no.1 filed a Criminal Complaint under Sections 138 and  141
of the Act on 17.03.2004 =

By the impugned judgment, the  High  Court  held  that
the complaint under Section 138 read with  Section  141  of  the  Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the, ‘Act’) was barred  by
limitation and quashed the summon order against respondent  no.2-Visionaries
Media Network (hereinafter referred to as the, ‘Company’). 
It  further  held
that the dispute qua the appellant (petitioner no.2 before  High  Court)  is
within limitation and affirmed the summon order against the appellant.=

Whether the complaint against the accused alone maintainable leaving the company set free 

Again the same question was considered by three Judge  Bench  of  this
Court in Aneeta Hada v.  Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 5  SCC
661. The Court noticed the decisions in Anil Hada (supra)  case  and  Aneeta
Hada (supra) case.   The  three  Judge  Bench  while  partly  overruled  the
finding of Anil Hada (supra) affirmed the decision of Aneeta  Hada  (supra).
This Court held

“51. We have already opined that the  decision  in  Sheoratan  Agarwal  runs
counter to the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh which is  by  a  larger  Bench
and hence, is a binding  precedent.  On  the  aforesaid  ratiocination,  the
decision in Anil Hada has to be treated as not laying down the  correct  law
as far as  it  states  that  the  Director  or  any  other  officer  can  be
prosecuted without impleadment of the company. Needless  to  emphasise,  the
matter would stand  on  a  different  footing  where  there  is  some  legal
impediment  and  the  doctrine  of  lex  non  cogit  ad  impossibilia   gets
attracted.”

“53. It is to be borne in mind that Section 141  of  the  Act  is  concerned
with the offences by the company. It makes  the  other  persons  vicariously
liable for commission of an offence on the part of the company. As has  been
stated by us earlier,  the  vicarious  liability  gets  attracted  when  the
condition precedent laid down in Section 141 of the  Act  stands  satisfied.
There can be no dispute that as the liability is penal in nature,  a  strict
construction of the provision would  be  necessitous  and,  in  a  way,  the
warrant.”

“58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the  considered
opinion that commission of offence by the company is  an  express  condition
precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words  “as
well  as  the  company”  appearing  in  the  section  make   it   absolutely
unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted,  then  only  the
persons mentioned in the other categories could be  vicariously  liable  for
the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof.  One
cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a  juristic  person  and
it has its own respectability. If a  finding  is  recorded  against  it,  it
would create a concavity in its reputation. There  can  be  situations  when
the corporate reputation is affected when a Director is indicted.

59. In view of  our  aforesaid  analysis,  we  arrive  at  the  irresistible
conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under  Section  141  of  the
Act, arraigning of  a  company  as  an  accused  is  imperative.  The  other
categories of  offenders  can  only  be  brought  in  the  drag-net  on  the
touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has  been  stipulated  in  the
provision itself. We say so on the basis of the  ratio  laid  down  in  C.V.
Parekh17 which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed  in
Sheoratan Agarwal does not correctly lay down the law and,  accordingly,  is
hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada is overruled with the  qualifier
as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery has to be  treated  to
be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.”

15.   In the present case, the High Court by impugned  judgment  dated  13th
August, 2007 held that the complaint  against  respondent  no.2-Company  was
not maintainable and quashed the summon issued by the  Trial  Court  against
respondent no.2-Company. Thereby, the Company  being  not  a  party  to  the
proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act and  in  view
of the fact that part of the judgment referred to by the High Court in  Anil
Hada (supra) has been overruled by  three  Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in
Aneeta Hada (supra), we have no other option but to set aside the rest  part
of the impugned judgment whereby the High Court held  that  the  proceedings
against the appellant can be continued even in absence of the Company.   We,
accordingly,  set aside that  part  of  the  impugned  judgment  dated  13th
August, 2007 passed by the High Court so far it  relates  to  appellant  and
quash the summon and proceeding pursuant to complaint case  No.698  of  2001
qua the appellant.
16.   The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observation.

2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41752

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, V. GOPALA GOWDA

                                                                REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1364 OF 2014
                 (arising out of SLP(Crl.) No.7039 of 2007)

Anil Gupta                                         … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

Star India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.                        … RESPONDENTS





                               J U D G M E N T



SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA,J.

      Leave granted.
2.    This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 13th  August,  2007
passed by the High Court of Delhi at New  Delhi  in  Criminal  Miscellaneous
Case No.2380 of 2004. By the impugned judgment, the  High  Court  held  that
the complaint under Section 138 read with  Section  141  of  the  Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as the, ‘Act’) was barred  by
limitation and quashed the summon order against respondent  no.2-Visionaries
Media Network (hereinafter referred to as the, ‘Company’). It  further  held
that the dispute qua the appellant (petitioner no.2 before  High  Court)  is
within limitation and affirmed the summon order against the appellant.
3.    The factual matrix of the case is as follows:
      A subscription agreement was entered  into  between  respondent  nos.1
and 2 whereby respondent no.2-Company was appointed as distributor  of  Star
Channels and collecting  subscription  fee  for  the  same.  On  27.12.2003,
respondent no.2-Company issued three cheques bearing nos.790913, 790912  and
790911  for  Rs.6,00,000/-,  Rs.5,00,000/-  and  Rs.5,00,000/-  respectively
drawn on the Indian Overseas Bank, Gandhi Nagar, Jammu. The aforesaid  three
cheques were presented before the Indian Overseas Bank, Gandhi Nagar,  Jammu
and  were  dishonoured  on  6.01.2004.  Respondent  No.1  served  notice  on
respondent no.2-Company with a demand notice separately for  all  the  three
cheques. Respondent no.2-Company replied to the said  notice  on  20.01.2004
informed respondent  no.1  that  payments  were  stopped  because  of  their
inability to stop the piracy due to which the cable operators did  not  make
payments.
      Thereafter, respondent no.1 issued second notice dated  28.01.2004  on
the appellant based on the  same  facts  and  based  on  the  same  memo  of
dishonor in respect of the aforesaid three cheques.   Respondent  no.1  also
issued a corrigendum of the same date to  the  said  notice.  The  appellant
submitted reply to the said notice on 3.02.2004.

4.    Respondent no.1 filed a Criminal Complaint under Sections 138 and  141
of the Act on 17.03.2004. According to appellant, respondent no,1  concealed
the material fact of having  earlier  issued  notice  dated  14.1.2004  with
regard to the aforesaid three  cheques  and  by  misleading  the  Court  got
summons issued by Metropolitan Magistrate in Complaint  No.698  of  2001  to
the appellant and respondent no.2-Company.

5.     Thereafter,  respondent  no.2-Company  and  appellant  jointly  filed
Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No.2380 of 2004 under  Section  482  of  the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 before the High Court of Delhi  at  New  Delhi
for quashing the aforesaid criminal complaint filed by respondent  no.1.  In
its  reply,  respondent  no.1  taken  the  plea  that  first  notice   dated
14.01.2004 was not a notice under Section 138 of the Act. It  was  contended
on behalf of the appellant that he was only vicariously liable on behalf  of
respondent no.2-Company. Learned counsel for the appellant  placed  reliance
on decisions of this Court in support of his claim.

6.    The High Court by impugned judgment while recording  the  stand  taken
by respondent no.1 that letter dated 14.01.2004 constituted a  valid  notice
under Section 138 of the Act and hence the complaint based on second  notice
against respondent no.2-Company was not maintainable and quashed the  summon
issued by the Trial Court against respondent no.2-Company. However,  so  far
as appellant is concerned, the High Court relying on decision of this  Court
in Anil Hada v.  Indian  Acrylic  Ltd.,  (2000)  1  SCC  1,  held  that  the
proceeding against the Director  can  be  issued  even  in  absence  of  the
Company being impleaded, The High Court  further  held  that  the  summoning
order was valid since the first notice was not addressed  to  the  appellant
and the second notice which was also addressed to the appellant  was  issued
within time and. therefore, criminal  complaint  filed  by  respondent  no.1
against the appellant on the basis of the said notice is maintainable.

7.    Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  appellant  contended  that
the order of the High Court is contrary to the law in as  much  as  this  is
not a case where proceedings were initiated against  the  Managing  Director
alone.  On  the  contrary,  the  proceedings  are  instituted  against   the
company/accused  and  its  Managing  Director.   In   the   event   of   the
company/accused  being  let  off,  the  same  cannot  continue  against  the
Managing Director who admittedly is only vicariously liable.

8.    It is further submitted that  even  as  per  law  laid  down  in  Anil
Handa’s case, the Director of a company/accused is only  liable  vicariously
and upon his showing that the principal accused is not liable he  cannot  be
held guilty.

9.    On the other hand, according  to  counsel  for  the  respondents,  the
issue is no longer res integra as held by the High Court.
10.    Section  138  of  the  Act  deals  with  dishonor   of   cheque   for
insufficiency etc. as follows:
      “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc.,  of  funds  in  the
account.—Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by  him
with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from  out
of that account for the discharge, in whole or  in  part,  of  any  debt  or
other liability, is returned by the  bank  unpaid,  either  because  of  the
amount of money standing to the credit of that account  is  insufficient  to
honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged  to  be  paid  from
that account by an arrangement made with that bank,  such  person  shall  be
deemed to have committed an offence and  shall,  without  prejudice  to  any
other provisions of this Act, be  punished  with  imprisonment  for  a  term
which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend  to  twice  the
amount of the cheque, or with both:

Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—

(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six  months
from the date on which it is drawn or within the  period  of  its  validity,
whichever is earlier;

(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque,  as  the  case  may
be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by  giving  a
notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty  days  of  the
receipt of information by him from the bank  regarding  the  return  of  the
cheque as unpaid; and
[pic]
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the  said  amount
of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder  in  due  course
of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.”

      From the aforesaid provision, it is clear that only the drawer of  the
cheque falls within the ambit of Section 138 of the Act whether human  being
or a body corporate or even a firm.

11.   The guilt for offence under Section 138 will  be  deemed  to  be  upon
other persons connected with the Company in view of Section 141 of the  Act,
which reads as follows:
 “141. Offences by companies.—(1) If the person committing an offence  under
Section 138 is a company, every person who, at  the  time  the  offence  was
committed, was in charge of, and was responsible  to  the  company  for  the
conduct of the business of the company, as well as  the  company,  shall  be
deemed to be guilty of the offence and  shall  be  liable  to  be  proceeded
against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any  person
liable  to  punishment  if  he  proves  that  the  offence   was   committed
[pic]without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all  due  diligence  to
prevent the commission of such offence.
(2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  sub-section  (1),  where  any
offence under this Act has been committed by a  company  and  it  is  proved
that the offence has been committed with the consent or  connivance  of,  or
is attributable to, any neglect on  the  part  of,  any  director,  manager,
secretary  or  other  officer  of  the  company,  such  director,   manager,
secretary or other officer shall  also  be  deemed  to  be  guilty  of  that
offence  and  shall  be  liable  to  be  proceeded  against   and   punished
accordingly.”


12.   Similar question was raised and considered by two Judge Bench of  this
Court in Anil Hada v. India Acrylic Ltd. (2000) 1 SCC 1.  This  Court  held:

“12. Thus when the drawer of the  cheque  who  falls  within  the  ambit  of
Section 138 of the Act is a human being or a body corporate  or  even  firm,
prosecution proceedings can  be  initiated  against  such  drawer.  In  this
context the phrase “as well as” used in sub-section (1) of  Section  141  of
the Act has some importance. The  said  phrase  would  embroil  the  persons
mentioned in the first category within the tentacles of  the  offence  on  a
par with the offending company. Similarly the words  “shall  also”  in  sub-
section (2) are capable of bringing the third category persons  additionally
within the dragnet of the offence on an equal par.  The  effect  of  reading
Section 141 is that when the company  is  the  drawer  of  the  cheque  such
company is the principal offender under Section  138  of  the  Act  and  the
remaining persons are made offenders by virtue of the legal fiction  created
by the legislature as per the section. Hence the actual offence should  have
been committed by the company, and then alone the other  two  categories  of
persons can also become liable for the offence.

13. If the offence was committed by a company it can  be  punished  only  if
the company is prosecuted. But instead  of  prosecuting  the  company  if  a
payee opts to prosecute only the persons falling within the second or  third
category the payee can succeed in the case only if he  succeeds  in  showing
that  the  offence  was  actually  committed  by  the  company.  In  such  a
[pic]prosecution the accused can show that the  company  has  not  committed
the offence, though such company is not  made  an  accused,  and  hence  the
prosecuted accused is not liable to  be  punished.  The  provisions  do  not
contain a condition that prosecution of the company  is  sine  qua  non  for
prosecution of the other persons who fall within the second  and  the  third
categories mentioned  above.  No  doubt  a  finding  that  the  offence  was
committed by the  company  is  sine  qua  non  for  convicting  those  other
persons. But if a company is  not  prosecuted  due  to  any  legal  snag  or
otherwise, the other prosecuted persons cannot, on that score alone,  escape
from the penal liability created through  the  legal  fiction  envisaged  in
Section 141 of the Act.”

“21. We, therefore, hold that even if the  prosecution  proceedings  against
the Company were not taken or could not be  continued,  it  is  no  bar  for
proceeding against the other persons falling  within  the  purview  of  sub-
sections (1) and (2) of Section  141  of  the  Act.  In  the  light  of  the
aforesaid view we do not consider it necessary to deal  with  the  remaining
question whether winding-up order of a company would render the company non-
existent.”

13.   In Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours  Pvt.  Ltd.,  (2008)  13
SCC 703, taking note of the maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia,  two  Judge
Bench of this Court observed:

      “54. True interpretation, in my opinion, of the said  provision  would
be that a company has to be made an accused but applying  the  principle  of
lex non cogit ad impossibilia i.e. if  for  some  legal  snag,  the  company
cannot be proceeded against without obtaining sanction of a court of law  or
other authority, the trial as against the other  accused  may  be  proceeded
against if the ingredients of Section 138 as also Section 141 are  otherwise
fulfilled. In such an event, it would not be a case where  the  company  had
not been made an accused but would  be  one  where  the  company  cannot  be
proceeded against due to existence of a legal bar.  A  distinction  must  be
borne in mind between cases where a company had not  been  made  an  accused
and the one where despite making it  an  accused,  it  cannot  be  proceeded
against because of a legal bar.”


14.   Again the same question was considered by three Judge  Bench  of  this
Court in Aneeta Hada v.  Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 5  SCC
661. The Court noticed the decisions in Anil Hada (supra)  case  and  Aneeta
Hada (supra) case.   The  three  Judge  Bench  while  partly  overruled  the
finding of Anil Hada (supra) affirmed the decision of Aneeta  Hada  (supra).
This Court held

“51. We have already opined that the  decision  in  Sheoratan  Agarwal  runs
counter to the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh which is  by  a  larger  Bench
and hence, is a binding  precedent.  On  the  aforesaid  ratiocination,  the
decision in Anil Hada has to be treated as not laying down the  correct  law
as far as  it  states  that  the  Director  or  any  other  officer  can  be
prosecuted without impleadment of the company. Needless  to  emphasise,  the
matter would stand  on  a  different  footing  where  there  is  some  legal
impediment  and  the  doctrine  of  lex  non  cogit  ad  impossibilia   gets
attracted.”

“53. It is to be borne in mind that Section 141  of  the  Act  is  concerned
with the offences by the company. It makes  the  other  persons  vicariously
liable for commission of an offence on the part of the company. As has  been
stated by us earlier,  the  vicarious  liability  gets  attracted  when  the
condition precedent laid down in Section 141 of the  Act  stands  satisfied.
There can be no dispute that as the liability is penal in nature,  a  strict
construction of the provision would  be  necessitous  and,  in  a  way,  the
warrant.”

“58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the  considered
opinion that commission of offence by the company is  an  express  condition
precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words  “as
well  as  the  company”  appearing  in  the  section  make   it   absolutely
unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted,  then  only  the
persons mentioned in the other categories could be  vicariously  liable  for
the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof.  One
cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a  juristic  person  and
it has its own respectability. If a  finding  is  recorded  against  it,  it
would create a concavity in its reputation. There  can  be  situations  when
the corporate reputation is affected when a Director is indicted.

59. In view of  our  aforesaid  analysis,  we  arrive  at  the  irresistible
conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under  Section  141  of  the
Act, arraigning of  a  company  as  an  accused  is  imperative.  The  other
categories of  offenders  can  only  be  brought  in  the  drag-net  on  the
touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has  been  stipulated  in  the
provision itself. We say so on the basis of the  ratio  laid  down  in  C.V.
Parekh17 which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed  in
Sheoratan Agarwal does not correctly lay down the law and,  accordingly,  is
hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada is overruled with the  qualifier
as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery has to be  treated  to
be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.”

15.   In the present case, the High Court by impugned  judgment  dated  13th
August, 2007 held that the complaint  against  respondent  no.2-Company  was
not maintainable and quashed the summon issued by the  Trial  Court  against
respondent no.2-Company. Thereby, the Company  being  not  a  party  to  the
proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act and  in  view
of the fact that part of the judgment referred to by the High Court in  Anil
Hada (supra) has been overruled by  three  Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in
Aneeta Hada (supra), we have no other option but to set aside the rest  part
of the impugned judgment whereby the High Court held  that  the  proceedings
against the appellant can be continued even in absence of the Company.   We,
accordingly,  set aside that  part  of  the  impugned  judgment  dated  13th
August, 2007 passed by the High Court so far it  relates  to  appellant  and
quash the summon and proceeding pursuant to complaint case  No.698  of  2001
qua the appellant.
16.   The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observation.

                                                          …………………………………………J.
                                               (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)


                                                          …………………………………………J.
                                 (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

NEW DELHI,
JULY 07, 2014.

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