LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Tuesday, July 29, 2014

Suit for Declaration of title and injunction -Status of Wife - with out production of marriage register of temple in which the marriage was taken place - producing other records does not confirm the status of wife - Legal heirs of deceased filed the suit against alleged second wife of deceased in respect of A-schedule ancestral properties of deceased and B - schedule properties of deceased first wife - Trail court decreed the suit - first appellant court decreed the suit against B schedule only and dismissed the suit against A schedule - in second appeal - High court reversed the first appellant court order and confirmed the order of trial court - holding that first defendant is not the wife of deceased Gounder - Apex court held that when there is perverse in the judgment of first appellant court - High court in second appeal interfere the same and further held that Highcourt rightly uphled that first defendant is not the wife of Gounder - except producing receipts from temple showing payment of marriage tax with out placing the marriage register before the court and mere producing other documents like voter list, bank books, mortgage deed etc., in which she was depicted as wife of Gounder not amounts to prove of marriage - non-producing birth certificates is also fatal to show that she was the wife and also her long co-habitation does not cloth her with the status of wife to claim property and as such dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgement of high court = CIVIL APPEAL NO.1103 OF 2004 Easwari … Appellant :Versus: Parvathi & Ors. … Respondents = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41758

    Suit for Declaration of title and injunction -Status of Wife - with out  production of  marriage register of temple in which the marriage was taken place - producing other records does not confirm the status of wife -  Legal heirs of deceased filed the suit against alleged second wife of deceased  in respect of  A-schedule ancestral properties of deceased and B - schedule properties of deceased first wife - Trail court decreed the suit - first appellant court decreed the suit against B schedule only and dismissed the suit against A schedule - in second appeal -  High court reversed the first appellant court order and confirmed the order of trial court - holding that first defendant is not the wife of deceased Gounder -  Apex court held that when there is perverse in the judgment of first appellant court - High court in second appeal interfere the same and further held that Highcourt rightly uphled that first defendant is not the wife of Gounder - except producing receipts from temple showing payment of marriage tax with out placing the marriage register before the court and mere producing other documents like voter list, bank books, mortgage deed etc., in which she was depicted as wife of Gounder not amounts to prove of marriage - non-producing birth certificates is also fatal to show that she was the wife and also her long co-habitation does not cloth her with the status of wife to claim property and as such dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgement of high court =

The  plaintiffs,  respondents  herein,   filed
 Original  Suit  No.  59  of  1985  before   the
                            District Munsif Court at  Polur  
as  the  legal
                            heirs  of  deceased  Ponnangatti  Gounder.  
The
                            disputes pertained to the properties which were
                            held by deceased Ponnangatti  Gounder  and  his
                            first wife who  pre-deceased  him.  
Ponnangatti
                            Gounder acquired the suit “A” schedule property
                            through succession from his ancestors. 
The suit
                            property mentioned as schedule “B” property was
                            purchased by Muniammal by registered conveyance
                            deed dated September 14,  1970.  
Both  were  in
                            possession and enjoyment of Ponnangatti Gounder
                            and  Muniammal  and  
after  their   death   the
                            plaintiffs were and are in  possession  of  the
                            said properties. 
After the death of  Muniammal,
                            it is alleged by the first  defendant  and  her
                            brother, the second  defendant  that  the  said
                            Ponnangatti Gounder married the first defendant
                            as a result whereof she made a claim  over  the
                            suit property.

The respondents herein (plaintiffs before the  Trial  Court)  filed  a
suit for declaration and injunction with regard to the properties  described
as schedule “A” and schedule “B” properties and the Trial Court  passed  the
decree in favour  of  the  plaintiffs  for  both  the  schedule  properties.

The  Lower  Appellate   Court
confirmed  the  “B”  schedule  property  in   favour   of   the   plaintiffs
(respondents herein) but reversed the decree with  regard  to  “A”  Schedule
property culminating in filing the second appeal.

 whether  the  first  defendant,  the
appellant herein, is the second wife of  the  deceased  Ponnangatti  Gounder
and whether she is entitled to  have  a  share  in  the  suit  “A”  schedule
property.
The High Court dealt with the matter at length.
                            It is stated by the appellant herein before the
                            Trial Court that Muniammal died ten  years  ago
                            i.e. in 1976. 
It  is  further  stated  that  on
                            December 15, 1977 Ponnangatti  married  to  the
                            first defendant, the appellant  herein  in  the
                            Devasthanam   of   Sri    Perianayaki    Saneda
                            Kanagagiri Eswarar at Devikapuram. 
To prove the
                            factum  of  marriage,  she  produced  a  temple
                            receipt before  the  High  Court  being  Ex.B-8
                            which was produced from the lawful  custody  of
                            the trustee of the  temple.  
Exs.B-9  and  B-10
                            were also produced and said to be the  accounts
                            for the gifts made at  the  time  of  the  said
                            marriage. 
The first  defendant/respondent  also
                            produced Exs.B-1 and B-2 which are  the  voters
                            list of 1978 and 1983 wherein it  appears  that
                            the first defendant was described as  the  wife
                            of Mannangatti and Ponnangatti. 
The pass  books
                            of the bank accounts for the year 1984 and 1985
                            being Exs. B-3 and B-4 and bankers’ reply  were
                            also produced to show that the first  defendant
                            was  described  as   wife   of   the   deceased
                            Ponnangatti  Gounder.  
The  High   Court   duly
                            assessed  all  documents  and  held   that   no
                            reliance can be placed on the Exh.B-3 to B-6 as
                            they only represent the unilateral  description
                            of the first defendant as wife  of  Ponnangatti
                            Gounder. 
Similarly, Ex.B-7 was a mortgage  deed
                            executed just prior to the filing of  the  suit
                            where also the unilateral  description  of  the
                            first defendant as wife of Ponnangatti  Gounder
                            can be seen.  
Similarly, Exs.B-9 and B-10  also
                            cannot be relied upon because it  is  not  very
                            difficult to prepare these  documents  for  the
                            said purpose. 
Hence  the  High  Court  did  not
                            place reliance on such exhibits.

                           The claim
                            of the respondent herein that Murugan and Selvi
                            were  born  to   Ponnangatti   but   no   birth
                            certificate was produced before the  Court  and
                            
in these circumstances the High Court held that
                            the  Lower  Appellate  Court,  without   proper
                            evidence of marriage  of  the  first  defendant
                            (appellant  herein)   with   Ponnangatti,   had
                            erroneously come to the conclusion  as  if  the
                            marriage   had   been    conducted    properly.
                            
Similarly, there could be no presumption  under
                            Section 114 of the  Evidence  Act  because  the
                            factor  of  long  cohabitation  has  not   been
                            established. 
In these circumstances,  the  High
                            Court allowed the Second Appeal, set aside  the
                            decree and  judgment  of  the  First  Appellate
                            Court and confirmed the decree  passed  by  the
                            Trial Court in respect of both Schedule “A” and
                            Schedule  “B”  properties  in  favour  of   the
                            plaintiffs. 
Apex court held that                             
In Mohan  v.  Santha  Bai  Ammal[8]  being  the  case  referred  to  in  the
abovementioned question, it has been  held  that  mere  receipt  of  showing
payment of money without obtaining and producing  the  marriage  certificate
or  without  summoning  production  of  the   original   marriage   register
maintained by the temple, may not be sufficient to establish  the  marriage.
In light of  the  same  the  High  Court  while  answering  the  substantial
question, found no substantial evidence  by  which  factum  of  marriage  is
established.

                        13. After perusing  the  documentary  evidence  and
                            other evidence before us, we are of the opinion
                            that the High Court was correct in entertaining
                            the matter in second appeal.  The  only  aspect
                            which needs to be considered by us is,  whether
                            the  High  Court  correctly   appreciated   the
                            evidence and concluded that the First Appellate
                            Court without proper evidence of marriage  held
                            that the marriage took place.

                        14.  In  our  opinion,  the  High  Court  correctly
                            assessed  and  appreciated  the  facts  in  the
                            instant case  and  we  concur  with  the  views
                            expressed by the High Court.  We  also  endorse
                            the reasoning given by the High Court.  In  our
                            opinion, from the evidence on record it  cannot
                            be said that the marriage  between  Ponnangatti
                            Gounder and Easwari was proved.






                        15. For the discussions and the reasoning given  in
                            the preceding paragraphs, we do not find  merit
                            in the appeal and  accordingly  we  affirm  the
                            judgment and order passed by the High Court and
                            dismiss this appeal.

2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41758



 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.1103  OF  2004

Easwari                                                                 …
Appellant

                                  :Versus:

Parvathi & Ors.                                                  …
Respondents






                               J U D G M E N T

Pinaki Chandra Ghose,  J.


                         1.  This  appeal  has  been  filed  assailing  the
                            judgment and order dated July 22,  2003  passed
                            by the High Court of Judicature  at  Madras  in
                            Second Appeal No.1806 of 1992. The  High  Court
                            after perusing the facts and  the  evidence  on
                            record by the said judgment and  order  allowed
                            the second appeal confirming the order  of  the
                            Trial Court and setting aside the order  passed
                            by the first appellate court.


                         2. The brief facts of the case are as follows:


      The respondents herein (plaintiffs before the  Trial  Court)  filed  a
suit for declaration and injunction with regard to the properties  described
as schedule “A” and schedule “B” properties and the Trial Court  passed  the
decree in favour  of  the  plaintiffs  for  both  the  schedule  properties.
Assailing the said Trial Court’s decision  the  appellant  herein  filed  an
appeal  before  the  Lower  Appellate  Court.  The  Lower  Appellate   Court
confirmed  the  “B”  schedule  property  in   favour   of   the   plaintiffs
(respondents herein) but reversed the decree with  regard  to  “A”  Schedule
property culminating in filing the second appeal.






                         3.  The  plaintiffs,  respondents  herein,   filed
                            Original  Suit  No.  59  of  1985  before   the
                            District Munsif Court at  Polur  as  the  legal
                            heirs  of  deceased  Ponnangatti  Gounder.  The
                            disputes pertained to the properties which were
                            held by deceased Ponnangatti  Gounder  and  his
                            first wife who  pre-deceased  him.  Ponnangatti
                            Gounder acquired the suit “A” schedule property
                            through succession from his ancestors. The suit
                            property mentioned as schedule “B” property was
                            purchased by Muniammal by registered conveyance
                            deed dated September 14,  1970.  Both  were  in
                            possession and enjoyment of Ponnangatti Gounder
                            and  Muniammal  and  after  their   death   the
                            plaintiffs were and are in  possession  of  the
                            said properties. After the death of  Muniammal,
                            it is alleged by the first  defendant  and  her
                            brother, the second  defendant  that  the  said
                            Ponnangatti Gounder married the first defendant
                            as a result whereof she made a claim  over  the
                            suit property.





                         4. Issues were framed by the Trial Court and after
                            assessing   the   evidence,   both   oral   and
                            documentary, the Trial Court decreed  the  suit
                            for both “A” and  “B”  schedule  properties  in
                            favour of the plaintiffs.  Assailing  the  said
                            decree an appeal was preferred by  the  present
                            appellant before the First Appellate Court. The
                            First Appellate Court reversed  the  decree  in
                            respect of the schedule  “A”  property  in  the
                            suit.  Assailing  such  judgment  and   decree,
                            second appeal was filed before the  High  Court
                            by the plaintiffs.






                         5. So far as the dispute, as it appears, cannot be
                            extended with regard to schedule  “B”  property
                            which  belonged  to  Muniammal,  since  it  was
                            purchased by her on September 14, 1970  through
                            Ex.B-6 in respect of which the decree passed by
                            the Trial Court  was  confirmed  by  the  Lower
                            Appellate Court, the  defendant  has  no  claim
                            over the same. The dispute between the  parties
                            is only in respect of the schedule “A” property
                            in the suit.


      Looking at the facts of the case, the primary question as  it  appears
to us, which has to be dealt  with  is  whether  the  first  defendant,  the
appellant herein, is the second wife of  the  deceased  Ponnangatti  Gounder
and whether she is entitled to  have  a  share  in  the  suit  “A”  schedule
property.





                         6. The High Court dealt with the matter at length.
                            It is stated by the appellant herein before the
                            Trial Court that Muniammal died ten  years  ago
                            i.e. in 1976. It  is  further  stated  that  on
                            December 15, 1977 Ponnangatti  married  to  the
                            first defendant, the appellant  herein  in  the
                            Devasthanam   of   Sri    Perianayaki    Saneda
                            Kanagagiri Eswarar at Devikapuram. To prove the
                            factum  of  marriage,  she  produced  a  temple
                            receipt before  the  High  Court  being  Ex.B-8
                            which was produced from the lawful  custody  of
                            the trustee of the  temple.  Exs.B-9  and  B-10
                            were also produced and said to be the  accounts
                            for the gifts made at  the  time  of  the  said
                            marriage. The first  defendant/respondent  also
                            produced Exs.B-1 and B-2 which are  the  voters
                            list of 1978 and 1983 wherein it  appears  that
                            the first defendant was described as  the  wife
                            of Mannangatti and Ponnangatti. The pass  books
                            of the bank accounts for the year 1984 and 1985
                            being Exs. B-3 and B-4 and bankers’ reply  were
                            also produced to show that the first  defendant
                            was  described  as   wife   of   the   deceased
                            Ponnangatti  Gounder.  The  High   Court   duly
                            assessed  all  documents  and  held   that   no
                            reliance can be placed on the Exh.B-3 to B-6 as
                            they only represent the unilateral  description
                            of the first defendant as wife  of  Ponnangatti
                            Gounder. Similarly, Ex.B-7 was a mortgage  deed
                            executed just prior to the filing of  the  suit
                            where also the unilateral  description  of  the
                            first defendant as wife of Ponnangatti  Gounder
                            can be seen.  Similarly, Exs.B-9 and B-10  also
                            cannot be relied upon because it  is  not  very
                            difficult to prepare these  documents  for  the
                            said purpose. Hence  the  High  Court  did  not
                            place reliance on such exhibits.





                         7. Accordingly, the High Court was left only  with
                            the documentary evidence of Ex.B-8 on  the  one
                            hand and Exs.B-1 and B-2  on  the  other  hand.
                            Ex.B-8 was produced from the lawful custody  of
                            trustee of the  temple  and  the  said  trustee
                            while examining, deposed before  the  Court  in
                            his cross-examination  that  he  did  not  know
                            about the actual marriage  said  to  have  been
                            conducted   in    the    temple.    In    these
                            circumstances, the probative value  of  Ex.B-8,
                            as correctly appreciated and held by  the  High
                            Court, gets diluted. Other Exhibits being  Exs.
                            B-1 and B-2 were also specifically  dealt  with
                            by the High Court  and  the  High  Court  after
                            assessing  the  document  held  that  different
                            descriptions of the  name  of  husband  of  the
                            first respondent are given in the voters  list.
                            Therefore, the High Court  did  not  place  any
                            reliance on the said voters list.



                         8. The High Court also placed reliance on  Bhaurao
                            Shankar Lokhande & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra
                            and Anr.[1] and found that mere  going  through
                            certain ceremonies with intention  of  marriage
                            will not make the ceremonies as  prescribed  by
                            law or approved by any established custom.  The
                            bare fact of  a  man  and  a  woman  living  as
                            husband and wife does not  normally  give  them
                            the status of husband and wife.



                         9. With regard  to  co-habitation  also  the  High
                            Court held that there is no evidence of long co-
                            habitation, even assuming that Exs. B-1 and B-2
                            are true, they only show  the  cohabitation  of
                            only one year in 1978 and another year in 1983.
                            In these circumstances,  the  High  Court  held
                            that the alleged marriage should be proved only
                            on the basis of legal presumption of  long  co-
                            habitation which is not present in the instance
                            case. For the proof of marriage,  there  is  no
                            evidence  except  Ex.B-8  which  although   was
                            produced from lawful custody of the trustee  of
                            the temple, but it  did  not  mention  anything
                            about the marriage ceremony or the conduct  and
                            solemnization of the marriage at all. The claim
                            of the respondent herein that Murugan and Selvi
                            were  born  to   Ponnangatti   but   no   birth
                            certificate was produced before the  Court  and
                            in these circumstances the High Court held that
                            the  Lower  Appellate  Court,  without   proper
                            evidence of marriage  of  the  first  defendant
                            (appellant  herein)   with   Ponnangatti,   had
                            erroneously come to the conclusion  as  if  the
                            marriage   had   been    conducted    properly.
                            Similarly, there could be no presumption  under
                            Section 114 of the  Evidence  Act  because  the
                            factor  of  long  cohabitation  has  not   been
                            established. In these circumstances,  the  High
                            Court allowed the Second Appeal, set aside  the
                            decree and  judgment  of  the  First  Appellate
                            Court and confirmed the decree  passed  by  the
                            Trial Court in respect of both Schedule “A” and
                            Schedule  “B”  properties  in  favour  of   the
                            plaintiffs.

                        10. The case of the appellant before us is based on
                            two  grounds;  firstly,  that  the  High  Court
                            incorrectly allowed the Second  Appeal  without
                            formulating a substantial question  of  law  in
                            light of  this  Court’s  decision  in  Veerayee
                            Ammal vs. Seeni Ammal[2]  wherein it  has  been
                            held that as per Section 100  of  the  Code  of
                            Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred  to
                            as  “the  Code”)  the  High  Court   can   only
                            entertain a  second  appeal  when  there  is  a
                            substantial question of law involved; secondly,
                            it has been submitted by  the  learned  counsel
                            for the appellant that the High Court erred  in
                            terming  the  marriage  of  the  appellant  and
                            deceased Ponnangatti Gounder as invalid inspite
                            of this Court’s decision in  S.  Nagalingam  v.
                            Sivagami[3]  wherein it was held that:
      “17. …..In the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, there is a State amendment by
      the State of Tamil Nadu, which has been inserted as Section  7-A.  The
      relevant portion thereof is as follows:



           “Section 7-A. Special  provision  regarding  suyamariyathai  and
           seerthiruththa marriages.—(1) This section shall  apply  to  any
           marriage between any two Hindus, whether  called  suyamariyathai
           marriage or  seerthiruththa  marriage  or  by  any  other  name,
           solemnised in  the  presence  of  relatives,  friends  or  other
           persons—

           (a) by each party to the  marriage  declaring  in  any  language
           understood by the parties that each takes the other  to  be  his
           wife or, as the case may be, her husband; or

           (b) by each party  to  the  marriage  garlanding  the  other  or
           putting a ring upon any finger of the other; or

           (c) by the tying of the thali.

           (2)(a) Notwithstanding anything  contained  in  Section  7,  but
           subject to the other provisions of this Act,  all  marriages  to
           which this section applies solemnised after the commencement  of
           the Hindu Marriage (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act,  1967,  shall  be
           good and valid in law.

           (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7  or  in  any
           text, rule or interpretation of Hindu law or any custom or usage
           as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement
           of the Hindu Marriage (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act,  1967,  or  in
           any other law in force immediately before such  commencement  or
           in any judgment, decree or order of any court,  but  subject  to
           sub-section (3), all marriages to  which  this  section  applies
           solemnised at any time before such commencement, shall be deemed
           to  have  been,  with  effect  on  and  from  the  date  of  the
           solemnization of each  such  marriage,  respectively,  good  and
           valid in law.

           (3)   *     *    *

           (a)   *     *    *

           (i) - (ii)  *    *     *

           (b) - (c)   *    *     *

           (4)   *     *    *”

      18. Section 7-A applies to any marriage between two Hindus  solemnised
      in the presence of relatives,  friends  or  other  persons.  The  main
      thrust of this provision is that the  presence  of  a  priest  is  not
      necessary for the performance of a valid marriage. Parties  can  enter
      into a marriage in the presence  of  relatives  or  friends  or  other
      persons and each party to the marriage should declare in the  language
      understood by the parties that each takes the other to be his wife or,
      as the case may be, her husband, and the marriage would  be  completed
      by a simple ceremony requiring the parties to the marriage to  garland
      each other or put a ring upon any finger of the other or tie a  thali.
      Any of these ceremonies, namely, garlanding each other  or  putting  a
      ring upon any finger of the other or tying a thali would be sufficient
      to complete a  valid  marriage.  Sub-section  (2)(a)  of  Section  7-A
      specifically says that notwithstanding anything contained  in  Section
      7, all marriages to which this provision applies and solemnised  after
      the commencement of the Hindu Marriage  (Tamil  Nadu  Amendment)  Act,
      1967, shall be good and valid in law.



                        11.  The  appellant  has   first   challenged   the
                            correctness of the High Court in  allowing  the
                            Second Appeal under Section 100  of  the  Code,
                            which  is reproduced as under:

      “Section 100- Second appeal- (1) Save as otherwise expressly  provided
      in the body of this Code or by any other law for  the  time  being  in
      force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree  passed
      in appeal by any Court subordinate to the  High  Court,  if  the  High
      Court is satisfied that the case involves a  substantial  question  of
      law.

      (2) An appeal may lie under this  section  from  an  appellate  decree
      passed exparte.

      (3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum  of  appeal  shall
      precisely state the  substantial  question  of  law  involved  in  the
      appeal.

      (4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial  question  of
      law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.

      (5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so  formulated  and  the
      respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be  allowed  to  argue
      that the case does not involve such question :

      Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away
      or abridge the power of the Court to hear, for reasons to be recorded,
      the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by
      it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.”



A plain reading of the said  provision  conveys  that  a  second  appeal  be
allowed only when  there  is  a  ‘substantial’  question  of  law  involved.
However, it is settled law that the  High  Court  can  interfere  in  second
appeal when finding of the First Appellate Court is not  properly  supported
by evidence. In Vidhyadhar v. Manikrao & Anr.[4] this Court held as under

      “3. The findings of fact concurrently recorded by the Trial  Court  as
      also by the Lower Appellate Court could not have been legally upset by
      the High Court in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC unless it  was
      shown that the findings were perverse, being based on no  evidence  or
      that on the evidence on record, no reasonable person could  have  come
      to that conclusion.”



Furthermore, in Yadarao Dajiba Shrawane (dead) by LRS v. Nanilal  Harakchand
Shah (Dead) & Ors.[5] this Court stated:

      “31. From the discussions in the judgment it is clear  that  the  High
      Court has based its findings on the  documentary  evidence  placed  on
      record and statements made by some witnesses which can be construed as
      admissions or conclusions. The position is well settled that when  the
      judgment of the final court of fact is based on  misinterpretation  of
      documentary evidence or on consideration of inadmissible  evidence  or
      ignoring material evidence the High Court in second appeal is entitled
      to interfere with the judgment. The position is also well settled that
      admission of  parties  or  their  witnesses  are  relevant  pieces  of
      evidence and should be given due weightage by  courts.  A  finding  of
      fact ignoring such admissions or concessions is vitiated  in  law  and
      can be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal.”




The above view of the Court must be read in consonance with the decision of
this Court in Rattan Dev v. Pasam Devi[6] wherein it was specifically
stated that:

      “Non-application of mind by the appellate  court  to  other  material,
      though available, and consequent failure of  the  appellate  court  to
      discharge its judicial obligation, did raise a question of law  having
      a substantial impact on the rights of the parties, and therefore,  the
      second appeal deserved to be heard on merits.”



In light of the above decisions we are of the opinion that  the  High  Court
cannot be precluded from reversing the  order  and  judgment  of  the  Lower
Appellate Court  if  there  is  perversity  in  the  decision  due  to  mis-
appreciation of evidence.  This  holds  good  especially  in  light  of  the
principle that even when both the Trial  Court  and  the  lower  court  have
given concurrent findings, there is no absolute ban on  the  High  Court  in
second appeal to interfere with the facts (See:  Hafazat  Hussain  v.  Abdul
Majeed[7])

                        12. Having perused the  impugned  judgment  in  the
                            Second Appeal and the  judgment  of  the  First
                            Appellate Court which has been set aside by the
                            High Court,  we are of  the  opinion  that  the
                            High Court correctly formulated the substantial
                            question of law, the same is produced as under:

“Whether the Lower Appellate Court erred in not taking into account the  law
laid down in 1989 (2) L.W. 197 (DB)?”




In Mohan  v.  Santha  Bai  Ammal[8]  being  the  case  referred  to  in  the
abovementioned question, it has been  held  that  mere  receipt  of  showing
payment of money without obtaining and producing  the  marriage  certificate
or  without  summoning  production  of  the   original   marriage   register
maintained by the temple, may not be sufficient to establish  the  marriage.
In light of  the  same  the  High  Court  while  answering  the  substantial
question, found no substantial evidence  by  which  factum  of  marriage  is
established.

                        13. After perusing  the  documentary  evidence  and
                            other evidence before us, we are of the opinion
                            that the High Court was correct in entertaining
                            the matter in second appeal.  The  only  aspect
                            which needs to be considered by us is,  whether
                            the  High  Court  correctly   appreciated   the
                            evidence and concluded that the First Appellate
                            Court without proper evidence of marriage  held
                            that the marriage took place.

                        14.  In  our  opinion,  the  High  Court  correctly
                            assessed  and  appreciated  the  facts  in  the
                            instant case  and  we  concur  with  the  views
                            expressed by the High Court.  We  also  endorse
                            the reasoning given by the High Court.  In  our
                            opinion, from the evidence on record it  cannot
                            be said that the marriage  between  Ponnangatti
                            Gounder and Easwari was proved.






                        15. For the discussions and the reasoning given  in
                            the preceding paragraphs, we do not find  merit
                            in the appeal and  accordingly  we  affirm  the
                            judgment and order passed by the High Court and
                            dismiss this appeal.





                                                            ………………………………..J.
                                                   (Chandramauli Kr. Prasad)





New Delhi;
………....…………………….J.
July 10, 2014                                        (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)



-----------------------
[1] (AIR 1965 SC 1564)
[2] (2002) 1 SCC 134
[3] (2001) 7 SCC 487
[4] (1999) 3 SCC 573
[5] (2002) 6 SCC 404
[6] (2002) 7 SCC 441
[7] (2001) 7 SCC 189
[8]  1989 (2) L.W. 197