LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Wednesday, May 28, 2014

Service matter - Regulations 60(1)(b) - dismissed from service at preliminary enquiry stage - with out forming opinion whether to conduct regular inquiry or not - not valid- challanged - High court held that the disciplinary authority, the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, had not formed any opinion either to hold a regular inquiry or not as contemplated under Regulation 58 for imposing the major penalty and, accordingly, he quashed the order of punishment as well as the show cause notice.- Apex court held that opinion has to be founded on certain objective criteria. It must reflect some reason. It can neither be capricious or fanciful but demonstrative of application of mind. Therefore, it has to be in writing. It may be on the file and may not be required to be communicated to the employee but when it is subject to assail and, eventually, subject to judicial review, the competent authority of the Corporation is required to satisfy the Court that the opinion was formed on certain parameters indicating that there was no necessity to hold an enquiry. Thus, the High Court has correctly understood the principle stated in A. Prabhakar Rao (supra) and we do not find any fault with the same.= Food Corporation of India & Ors. |.. Appellant(s) | Versus |Sarat Chandra Goswami |.. Respondent(s) = 2014(May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41543

  Service matter - Regulations 60(1)(b) - dismissed from service at preliminary enquiry stage - with out forming opinion whether to conduct regular inquiry or not - not valid-  challanged - High court held that the  disciplinary authority, the Chairman-cum-Managing  Director,  had  not  formed  any opinion either to hold a regular inquiry or not as contemplated  under  Regulation 58 for imposing the  major  penalty  and,    accordingly,  he quashed the order of punishment as well as the show cause notice.- Apex court held that opinion has to be founded on certain objective criteria. It must reflect  some  reason.  It  can  neither  be  capricious  or fanciful but demonstrative of application of mind. Therefore,  it  has to be in writing.  It may be on the file and may not be required to be  communicated to the employee but when it is  subject  to  assail  and,  eventually, subject to judicial review, the competent authority of the  Corporation is required to satisfy the  Court  that  the  opinion  was formed on certain parameters indicating that there was no necessity to  hold an enquiry. Thus, the High Court has  correctly  understood  the principle stated in A. Prabhakar Rao (supra) and we do  not  find  any fault with the same.=

during  the  period
     15.7.99 to 21.1.02 while the respondent was working at North Lakhimpur
     Region, FCI in Assam had not faithfully carried out his  duties  as  a
     consequence of which the Corporation suffered financial  loss.   After
     the preliminary inquiry, a show cause notice was issued calling for  a
     representation and eventually the punishment for recovery of a sum  of
     rupees five lakhs and censure was passed against the respondent.

      2.    The aforesaid order of punishment constrained the respondent  to
      approach the High Court in Writ Petition No.16812(w) of 2006.   Before
      the writ court the singular contention that was highlighted  was  that
      the disciplinary authority had not complied with  Regulation  60(1)(b)
      of the Regulations and, therefore, the whole proceeding was  vitiated.
      
The learned Single Judge appreciating the facts and adverting  to  the
      submissions raised at the Bar  came  to  hold  that  the  disciplinary
      authority, the Chairman-cum-Managing  Director,  had  not  formed  any
      opinion either to hold a regular inquiry or not as contemplated  under
      Regulation 58 for imposing the  major  penalty  and,  accordingly,  he
      quashed the order of punishment as well as the show cause notice.=


Once it is held that there has to be formation  of  opinion  and
      such an opinion is assailable in a legal forum, we  are  of  the  view
      that the said 
opinion has to be founded on certain objective criteria. It must reflect  some  reason.  
 It  can  neither  be  capricious  or fanciful but demonstrative of application of mind. Therefore,  it  has to be in writing.  
It may be on the file and may not be required to be
      communicated to the employee but when it is  subject  to  assail  and,
      eventually, subject to judicial review, the competent authority of the
      Corporation is required to satisfy the  Court  that  the  opinion  was
      formed on certain parameters indicating that there was no necessity to
      hold an enquiry.  
Thus, the High Court has  correctly  understood  the
      principle stated in A. Prabhakar Rao (supra) and we do  not  find  any
      fault with the same.

      11.   In the result, we do not perceive any merit in these appeals and
      the same stand dismissed with no order as to costs.

2014(May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41543
DIPAK MISRA, N.V. RAMANA

                     IN THE  SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                      CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION


                    CIVIL  APPEAL NOs. 7201-7202 OF 2008




      |Food Corporation of India & Ors.                 |..    Appellant(s)        |




                          Versus


      |Sarat Chandra Goswami                            |..    Respondent(s)       |










                               J U D G M E N T




      Dipak Misra,




            The respondent while holding the post of  District  Manager  in
     the Food Corporation of  India  (for  short  the  FCI)  was  proceeded
     against in a disciplinary proceedings as contemplated under Regulation
     60 of the Food Corporation of India  (Staff)  Regulations,  1971  (for
     brevity “the Regulations”)  on  the  ground  that  during  the  period
     15.7.99 to 21.1.02 while the respondent was working at North Lakhimpur
     Region, FCI in Assam had not faithfully carried out his  duties  as  a
     consequence of which the Corporation suffered financial  loss.   After
     the preliminary inquiry, a show cause notice was issued calling for  a
     representation and eventually the punishment for recovery of a sum  of
     rupees five lakhs and censure was passed against the respondent.

      2.    The aforesaid order of punishment constrained the respondent  to
      approach the High Court in Writ Petition No.16812(w) of 2006.   Before
      the writ court the singular contention that was highlighted  was  that
      the disciplinary authority had not complied with  Regulation  60(1)(b)
      of the Regulations and, therefore, the whole proceeding was  vitiated.
      The learned Single Judge appreciating the facts and adverting  to  the
      submissions raised at the Bar  came  to  hold  that  the  disciplinary
      authority, the Chairman-cum-Managing  Director,  had  not  formed  any
      opinion either to hold a regular inquiry or not as contemplated  under
      Regulation 58 for imposing the  major  penalty  and,  accordingly,  he
      quashed the order of punishment as well as the show cause notice.


     3.     Being dissatisfied, the Corporation preferred F.M.A.No.1187  of
     2007 and the Division Bench placing reliance on the decision  of  this
     Court in Food Corporation of India, Hyderabad & Ors. v.  A.  Prahalada
     Rao & Anr.[1] concurred with the view expressed by the learned  Single
     Judge and consequently  dismissed the appeal.


     4.     We have heard Mr. Dharmedra Kumar Sinha learned counsel for the
     appellants and Mr. Soumitra  G.  Chaudhuri  learned  counsel  for  the
     respondent.

      5.     The  controversy,  as  it   seems   to   us,   centres   around
      interpretation of Regulation 60 and hence, we think it appropriate  to
      reproduce the said Regulation.  It reads as follows:
                 "(60) Procedure for imposing minor penalties:
           (1)    Subject  to  the  provisions  of  Sub-regulation  (3)  of
           Regulation 59, no order imposing  on  an  employee  any  of  the
           penalties specified in clauses (i)  to  (iv)  of  Regulation  54
           shall be made except after:


           (a)   informing the employee in writing of the proposal to  take
           action against him  and  of  the  imputation  of  misconduct  or
           misbehaviour on which it is proposed to be taken, and giving him
           a reasonable opportunity of making such representation as he may
           wish to make against the proposal;


           (b)   holding an  inquiry  in  the  manner  laid  down  in  sub-
           regulation (3) to (23) of the Regulation 58, in  every  case  in
           which the disciplinary authority is of  the  opinion  that  such
           inquiry is necessary;


           (c)   taking  the  representation,  if  any,  submitted  by  the
           employee  under clause (a) and the record of  inquiry,  if  any,
           held under clause  (b) into consideration;


           (d)   recording a finding on each imputation  of  misconduct  or
           misbehaviour.


           (2)   Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (b)  of  Sub-
           Regulation (1, if in a case it is  proposed,  after  considering
           the representation, if any, made by the  employee  under  clause
           (a) of the Sub-regulation, to withhold increment of pay and such
           withholding of increments is  likely  to  affect  adversely  the
           amount of retirement benefits payable to  the  employees  or  to
           withhold  increments of a pay for a period exceeding 3 years  or
           to withhold increment of pay  with  cumulative  effect  for  any
           period,m an inquiry shall be held in the manner laid down in Sub-
           regulation (3) to (23) of Regulation 58 before making  any order
           imposing on the employee any such penalty.”


     6.     The interpretation of the said Regulation engaged the attention
     of this Court  in  A.  Prahalada  Rao  (supra).   A  two-Judge  Bench,
     adverting  to  the  anatomy  of  the  Regulation   and   taking   into
     consideration the submissions advanced with regard to the abuse of the
     Regulation, came to hold as follows:
           " In our  view,  on  the  basis  of  the  allegation  that  Food
           Corporation of India is misusing its  power  of  imposing  minor
           penalties, the Regulation cannot be interpreted contrary to  its
           language.   Regulation  60(1)(b)   mandates   the   disciplinary
           authority to form its opinion whether it is  necessary  to  hold
           inquiry in a particular  case or not.  But that would  not  mean
           that in all cases where an employee disputes  his  liability,  a
           full-fledged inquiry should  be  held.   Otherwise,  the  entire
           purpose of incorporating summary procedure  for  imposing  minor
           penalties would be frustrated.  If the  discretion  given  under
           Regulation 60(1)(b) is misused or is exercised in  an  arbitrary
           manner it is open to the employee to challenge the  same  before
           the appropriate forum.  It is for the disciplinary authority  to
           decide whether  regular  departmental  enquiry  as  contemplated
           under  Regulation  58  for  imposing  major  penalty  should  be
           followed  of  not.   This  discretion  cannot  be  curtailed  by
           interpretation,  which  is  contrary  to  the   language   used.
           Further, Regulation 60(2) itself provides that in a case  if  it
           is proposed to withhold increments of pay and  such  withholding
           of increments is  likely  to  affect  adversely  the  amount  of
           retirement benefits payable to an employee  and  in  such  other
           case as mentioned therein, the disciplinary authority shall hold
           inquiry in the manner laid down in Regulation 58  before  making
           any order imposing any such penalty."


     7.     It is submitted by Mr,  Chatterjee  that  the  High  Court  has
     erroneously understood the ratio and ruled that an opinion has  to  be
     formed in writing.  It is his further submission that when the reasons
     are manifest from the preliminary inquiry and from the show  cause  it
     was erroneous on the part of  the  High  Court  to  emphasise  on  the
     formation of opinion.


     8.     Per contra, Mr. Chaudhary heavily relied on the authority in A.
     Prabhakar Rao (supra) and urged that  the  discretion  vested  in  the
     disciplinary authority under the Regulations casts an obligation on it
     to form an opinion and formation of such opinion has to be in writing.


     9.     On a perusal of the order passed by the learned  Single  Judge,
     we find that he  has  taken  note  of  the  fact  that  there  was  no
     expression or formation of opinion.  He has further recorded that  the
     learned counsel for  the  Corporation  had  conceded  that  there  was
     nothing to show that the Chairman-cum-Managing Director who  had  made
     the final order had recorded any opinion in writing before making  the
     final order to the effect there was no need to hold a regular inquiry.
      From the principle stated by this Court in A. Prahalada Rao’s case it
     is quite limpid that though in all cases where the employees  disputes
     his liability, a full-fledged enquiry is not expected to  be  held  as
     that would frustrate the purpose of interpreting the summary procedure
     for imposing minor penalties, yet the discretion conferred  under  the
     Regulation 1960 (1)(b), if exercised in a arbitrary manner, it is open
     to the employee to challenge the same before  the  appropriate  forum.
     The Court had further opined that  the  Regulation  60(1)(b)  mandates
     the disciplinary authority to form its opinion whether it is necessary
     to hold an inquiry in a particular case or not.

      10.   Once it is held that there has to be formation  of  opinion  and
      such an opinion is assailable in a legal forum, we  are  of  the  view
      that the said opinion has to be founded on certain objective criteria.
       It must reflect  some  reason.   It  can  neither  be  capricious  or
      fanciful but demonstrative of application of mind. Therefore,  it  has
      to be in writing.  It may be on the file and may not be required to be
      communicated to the employee but when it is  subject  to  assail  and,
      eventually, subject to judicial review, the competent authority of the
      Corporation is required to satisfy the  Court  that  the  opinion  was
      formed on certain parameters indicating that there was no necessity to
      hold an enquiry.  Thus, the High Court has  correctly  understood  the
      principle stated in A. Prabhakar Rao (supra) and we do  not  find  any
      fault with the same.

      11.   In the result, we do not perceive any merit in these appeals and
      the same stand dismissed with no order as to costs.


                                                      ....................J.
                                                               [DIPAK MISRA]



                                                       ...................J.
                                                               [N.V. RAMANA]


      NEW DELHI,
      MAY 21, 2014.























-----------------------
[1]    (2001) 1 SCC 165

-----------------------
6




Service matter - Dismissal from service dispensing with a disciplinary inquiry -not valid- Sting operation - ASI caught in video while taking bribe - Telecasted in T.V. channels also - the S.P. dismissed ASI dispensing with disciplinary inquiry - challanged - High court dismissed the writ - Apex court held that No disciplinary authority is vested with power to dispense with a disciplinary proceedings and as such his orders are terminated as well as the orders of High court also as it is not merits and set aside the both orders and further held that the disciplinary authority is at liberty to initiate proceedings against appellant , the time taken in these proceedings shall be excluded for the purpose of limitation = Risal Singh Appellant VERSUS State of Haryana & Ors. Respondents = 2014 (May.Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41542

   Service matter - Dismissal from service dispensing with a disciplinary inquiry -not valid- Sting operation - ASI caught in video while taking bribe - Telecasted in T.V. channels also - the S.P. dismissed ASI dispensing with disciplinary inquiry - challanged - High court dismissed the writ - Apex court held that No disciplinary authority is vested with power to dispense with a disciplinary proceedings and as such his orders are terminated as well as the orders of High court also as it is not merits and set aside the both orders and further held that the disciplinary authority is at liberty to initiate proceedings against appellant , the time taken in these proceedings shall be excluded for the purpose of limitation = 

This is clear from the  following
             observation at page 270 of Tulsiram  case:  (SCC  p.504,  para
             130)


                         “A  disciplinary  authority  is  not  expected   to
                 dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily
                 or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid  the
                 holding of an inquiry  or  because  the  department's  case
                 against the government servant is weak and must fail.”


             The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot,
             therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned
             authority.  When the satisfaction of the  concerned  authority
             is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those  who
             support the order to show that the satisfaction  is  based  on
             certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim  or
             caprice of the concerned officer.”

Recently, in  Reena  Rani  v.  State  of  Haryana[3],  after
         referring to the various authorities in the field, the Court  ruled
         that when reasons are not  ascribed,  the  order  is  vitiated  and
         accordingly set  aside  the  order  of  dismissal  which  had  been
         concurred with by the Single Judge and directed  for  reinstatement
         in service with all consequential  benefits. It  has  also  been
         observed therein that the order passed  by  this  Court  would  not
         preclude the competent authority from  taking  action  against  the
         Appellant in accordance with law.


         10.    Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid  authorities,  the
         irresistible  conclusion  is  that  the   order   passed   by   the
         Superintendent of Police dispensing with  the  inquiry  is  totally
         unsustainable and is hereby annulled.  
As the foundation  founders,
         the order of the High Court giving the stamp  of  approval  to  the
         ultimate order without addressing the lis from a proper perspective
         is also indefensible and resultantly, the order of dismissal passed
         by the disciplinary authority has to pave the path of extinction.


         11.    Consequently, we allow the appeal and set  aside  the  order
         passed by the High Court and that of  the  disciplinary  authority.
         The appellant shall be deemed to be in service  till  the  date  of
         superannuation.  
As he has attained the age  of  superannuation  in
         the meantime, he shall be entitled to all  consequential  benefits.
         
The arrears shall be computed and paid to the  appellant  within  a
         period of three months hence. 
Needless to say, the respondents  are
         not precluded from  initiating  any  disciplinary  proceedings,  if
         advised in law.  
As the lis has been pending before the Court,  the
         period that has been spent in  Court  shall  be  excluded  for  the
         purpose of limitation for initiating the  disciplinary  proceedings
         as  per  rules.   
However,  we  may  hasten  to  clarify  that  our
         observations herein should not be construed as  a  mandate  to  the
         authorities to initiate the proceeding against the appellant.    
We
         may further proceed to add that the State Government shall  conduct
         itself as a model employer and act with the  objectivity  which  is
         expected from it.  There shall be no order as to costs.

2014 (May.Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41542
DIPAK MISRA, N.V. RAMANA
                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2839 OF 2011




         Risal Singh                                    Appellant


                                   VERSUS


         State of Haryana & Ors.                        Respondents








                               J U D G M E N T




         Dipak Misra, J.




                  In this appeal, by special leave, the  assail  is  to  the
         defensibility of the judgment and order dated 21.11.2008 passed  by
         the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh  in  C.W.P.  No.
         19816/2008 whereby the Division Bench has concurred with the  order
         of dismissal of  the  appellant  passed  by  the  Government  after
         dispensing with the inquiry as provided under Article 311(2)(b)  of
         the Constitution.


         2.     The broad essential facts which need to  be  adumbrated  for
         the decision of the present  appeal  are  that  the  appellant,  an
         Assistant Sub-Inspector  (Ad  hoc  Sub-Inspector)  serving  in  the
         Department of Police in the  State  of  Haryana,  as  alleged,  was
         involved in a corruption sting operation in a  television  channel.
         Because of the said alleged sting operation, the Superintendent  of
         Police, Mewat at Nuh, vide order dated 19.06.2008, after  referring
         to the news item in the television channel, proceeded to  pass  the
         following order:
             “.....
             2.   The above said act on the part of  above  official  shows
             his criminal activities.  He being a member of  a  disciplined
             force is responsible for protecting the life and  property  of
             the citizen of this country, but instead  of  discharging  his
             duty  honestly  and  sincerely  he  himself  has  indulged  in
             criminal activities.  As such he has not  only  tarnished  the
             image of the Haryana Police but also has rudely  shaken  faith
             of the citizens of Haryana in the entire Police force, who  is
             supposed to be their protectors.   He  has  acted  in  a  most
             reprehensible manner.  Which is unexpected from  a  member  of
             disciplined force and undoubtedly extremely prejudicial to the
             person safety and security of citizen.


             3.   The  involvement  of  said  police  official  in  such  a
             shameful criminal activity has  eroded  the  faith  of  common
             people and his continuance in the force  is  likely  to  cause
             further irreparable loss to the functioning and credibility of
             Haryana Police.  The defaulter has acted in  a  manner  highly
             unbecoming of police official.   After  such  act  of  serious
             misconduct.  If he is allowed to continue in the Police force,
             it would be detrimental to public interest.


             4.   Keeping  in  view  the  overall  circumstances  of  above
             operation, I K.K. Rao, IPS, Superintendent of Police, Mewat at
             Nuh,  in  exercise  of  the  powers  conferred  under  Article
             311(2)(b)  of  Constitution  of  India  I  hereby  order   the
             dismissal of SI  Rishal  Singh   No.  133/GGN  with  immediate
             effect.  A copy of this order be  delivered  to  him  free  of
             cost.”


         3.     Being  aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid  order,  the  appellant
         preferred  a  civil  writ  petition  and  the  High  Court  without
         adverting to the essential  contention  that  no  reason  had  been
         ascribed for dispensing with the inquiry  under  Article  311(2)(b)
         opined that prompt  action  was  required  to  be  taken  to  avoid
         spreading of trouble  and,  therefore,  the  order  passed  by  the
         authority was justified.


         4.     Ms.  S.  Janani,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  has
         submitted that the power with the employer rests to  dispense  with
         the inquiry invoking the constitutional provision, yet  appropriate
         reasons have to  be  ascribed  and  in  absence  of  ascription  of
         reasons, the order is vitiated in law and the eventual  consequence
         would be quashment of the order of dismissal.


         5.     Mr. Manjit Singh, learned counsel for  the  State  submitted
         that  regard  being  had  to  the  nature   of   allegations,   the
         Superintendent of Police, who is the competent  authority,  thought
         it appropriate to dispense with the inquiry and, hence,  the  order
         of dismissal cannot be flawed.


         6.     We have already reproduced the order passed by the competent
         authority.  On a bare perusal of the same, it is clear as day  that
         it is bereft of reason.  Non-ascribing of reason while  passing  an
         order  dispensing  with  enquiry,  which  otherwise  is   a   must,
         definitely invalidates such an action.  In this context,  reference
         to the authority in Union of India and Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel[1] is
         apposite. In the said case the Constitution  Bench,  while  dealing
         with the exercise of power under Article 311(2)(b), has ruled thus:


                “130. The condition precedent for the application of  clause
                (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary  authority  that
                “it is not  reasonably  practicable  to  hold”  the  inquiry
                contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent
                to  note  is  that  the  words  used  are  “not   reasonably
                practicable”  and  not  “impracticable”.  According  to  the
                Oxford English Dictionary “practicable”  means  “Capable  of
                being put into practice, carried out  in  action,  effected,
                accomplished,  or  done;  feasible”.  Webster’s  Third   New
                International  Dictionary  defines  the  word  “practicable”
                inter alia as meaning “possible to  practice  or  perform  :
                capable of being put into practice,  done  or  accomplished:
                feasible”. Further, the words used are not “not practicable”
                but  “not  reasonably  practicable”.  Webster’s  Third   New
                International Dictionary defines the  word  “reasonably”  as
                “in a reasonable manner: to  a  fairly  sufficient  extent”.
                Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or  not
                must be judged in the context of whether it  was  reasonably
                practicable to  do  so.  It  is  not  a  total  or  absolute
                impracticability which is required by clause  (b).  What  is
                requisite  is  that  the  holding  of  the  inquiry  is  not
                practicable in the opinion of  a  reasonable  man  taking  a
                reasonable view of the prevailing situation.”




         7.     In Jaswant Sing v. State of Punjab and Others[2]  the Court,
         while dealing with the exercise of power as  conferred  by  way  of
         exception under Article 311(2)(b) of the  Constitution,  opined  as
         follows:


             “Clause (b) of the second proviso to  Article  311(2)  can  be
             invoked only when the authority is satisfied from the material
             placed before him that it is  not  reasonably  practicable  to
             hold a departmental enquiry. This is clear from the  following
             observation at page 270 of Tulsiram  case:  (SCC  p.504,  para
             130)


                         “A  disciplinary  authority  is  not  expected   to
                 dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily
                 or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid  the
                 holding of an inquiry  or  because  the  department's  case
                 against the government servant is weak and must fail.”


             The decision to dispense with the departmental enquiry cannot,
             therefore, be rested solely on the ipse dixit of the concerned
             authority.  When the satisfaction of the  concerned  authority
             is questioned in a court of law, it is incumbent on those  who
             support the order to show that the satisfaction  is  based  on
             certain objective facts and is not the outcome of the whim  or
             caprice of the concerned officer.”


         8.     After so stating, the two-Judge Bench quashed the  order  of
         dismissal and directed the appellant to be  reinstated  in  service
         forthwith with the monetary benefits.  Be it  noted,  it  was  also
         observed therein that it would be  open  to  the  employer,  if  so
         advised, notwithstanding the lapse of time,  to  proceed  with  the
         disciplinary proceedings.


         9.     Recently, in  Reena  Rani  v.  State  of  Haryana[3],  after
         referring to the various authorities in the field, the Court  ruled
         that when reasons are not  ascribed,  the  order  is  vitiated  and
         accordingly set  aside  the  order  of  dismissal  which  had  been
         concurred with by the Single Judge and directed  for  reinstatement
         in service with all consequential  benefits.    It  has  also  been
         observed therein that the order passed  by  this  Court  would  not
         preclude the competent authority from  taking  action  against  the
         Appellant in accordance with law.


         10.    Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid  authorities,  the
         irresistible  conclusion  is  that  the   order   passed   by   the
         Superintendent of Police dispensing with  the  inquiry  is  totally
         unsustainable and is hereby annulled.  As the foundation  founders,
         the order of the High Court giving the stamp  of  approval  to  the
         ultimate order without addressing the lis from a proper perspective
         is also indefensible and resultantly, the order of dismissal passed
         by the disciplinary authority has to pave the path of extinction.


         11.    Consequently, we allow the appeal and set  aside  the  order
         passed by the High Court and that of  the  disciplinary  authority.
         The appellant shall be deemed to be in service  till  the  date  of
         superannuation.  As he has attained the age  of  superannuation  in
         the meantime, he shall be entitled to all  consequential  benefits.
         The arrears shall be computed and paid to the  appellant  within  a
         period of three months hence. Needless to say, the respondents  are
         not precluded from  initiating  any  disciplinary  proceedings,  if
         advised in law.  As the lis has been pending before the Court,  the
         period that has been spent in  Court  shall  be  excluded  for  the
         purpose of limitation for initiating the  disciplinary  proceedings
         as  per  rules.   However,  we  may  hasten  to  clarify  that  our
         observations herein should not be construed as  a  mandate  to  the
         authorities to initiate the proceeding against the appellant.    We
         may further proceed to add that the State Government shall  conduct
         itself as a model employer and act with the  objectivity  which  is
         expected from it.  There shall be no order as to costs.




                                           ...............................J.
                                                               (DIPAK MISRA)






                                           ...............................J.
                                                               (N.V. RAMANA)


         NEW DELHI
         MAY 13, 2014



-----------------------
[1]     (1985) 3 SCC 398
[2]     (1991) 1 SCC 362
[3]     (2012) 10 SCC 215

-----------------------
9


Tuesday, May 27, 2014

REJECTION OF NOMINATION PAPERS - FOR NON FILING OF ELECTORAL ROLL AS HE BELONGS TO ANOTHER CONSTITUENCY - HIGH COURT SET ASIDE THE ELECTION OF RETURNED CANDIDATE AND REINSTATED THE PETITIONER ON THE GROUND NO ONE FILED - APEX COURT HELD THAT HIGH COURT DID WRONG . AS PER SEC.33 (5) ANOTHER CONSTITUTION PERSON IF CONTESTED HAS TO FILE ELECTORAL ROLL OF LATEST - HELD THAT accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the High Court, treat the election of the appellant as valid and further direct that the appellant shall get the entire remuneration for the period for which he was elected as a member of the legislative Council and we say so on the basis of the Constitution Bench decision in Kirpal Singh, M.L.A. v. Uttam Singh and another[5].= Balram Singh Yadav@ Balram Yadav … Appellant Versus Abhay Kumar Singh …Respondent = 2014 (May. Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41545

 REJECTION OF NOMINATION PAPERS - FOR NON FILING OF ELECTORAL ROLL AS HE BELONGS TO ANOTHER CONSTITUENCY - HIGH COURT SET ASIDE THE ELECTION OF RETURNED CANDIDATE AND REINSTATED THE PETITIONER ON THE GROUND NO ONE FILED  - APEX COURT HELD THAT HIGH COURT DID WRONG  . AS PER SEC.33 (5) ANOTHER CONSTITUTION PERSON IF CONTESTED HAS TO FILE ELECTORAL ROLL OF LATEST - HELD THAT accordingly, we set aside the  judgment of the High Court, treat the election of the appellant  as  valid  and further direct that the appellant shall get  the  entire  remuneration for the period for which he was elected as a member of the legislative Council and we say so on the basis of the Constitution Bench  decision  in Kirpal Singh, M.L.A. v. Uttam Singh and another[5].=

The  Returning  Officer,   while
      accepting the nomination papers of all the  candidates,  rejected  the
      nomination paper of the respondent on the ground that he had not filed
      the relevant electoral roll which was required  to  be  done,  for  he
      belonged to another constituency.=

   Section 33(5) of the Act is seemly.  It reads as follows:
      -


           “”Where the candidate is an elector of a different constituency,
           a copy of the electoral roll of  that  constituency  or  of  the
           relevant part thereof  or  a  certified  copy  of  the  relevant
           entries in such roll shall, unless it has been filed along  with
           the nomination paper, be produced before the  returning  officer
           at the time of scrutiny.”


      14.   The said provision came to be interpreted in B. Dandapani  Patra
      v.  Returning  Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional   Officer,   Berhampur   and
      others[3], wherein a two-Judge Bench placed reliance on  Ranjit  Singh
      v. Pritam Singh[4] and came to hold as follows: -


           “… it has been held that when Section  33(5)  of  the  said  Act
           refers to a copy of the relevant part of the electoral roll,  it
           means a part as defined in Rule 5 of the  said  Rules  of  1960.
           The complete copy would carry the various amendments made in the
           roll to enable the Returning Officer to see whether the name  of
           the candidate continues in the roll.”


      15.   The facts of the aforesaid decision would show that  
unless  the
      current electoral roll is filed along with the nomination paper,  that
      would tantamount to non-compliance of Section 33(5) of  the  Act.   
In
      the instant case, on a perusal of evidence  of  PW-1,  the  respondent
      herein, and the Returning Officer, it is  perceptible  that  the  said
      respondent had not filed the electoral roll  of  1998  which  was  the
      latest electoral roll as on 1.1.2002.  
On the date  of  scrutiny,  the respondent was absent.  

The High Court, as noticeable, has referred to
      the order of rejection of nomination paper by  the  Returning  Officer
      and opined that none had filed the electoral  roll  of  1.1.2002  and,
      therefore, the nomination paper could not  have  been  rejected.   
The
      aforesaid view is the resultant of erroneous perception of fact.   
The
      ground that was indicated by the Returning Officer was that the  valid
      electoral roll as on 1.1.2002 had not been filed.  It has come in  the
      evidence that no electoral roll was prepared  on  that  date  and  the
      latest electoral roll was that of 1998.  The respondent had not  filed
      the same.   In fact, he had filed the electoral roll of 1995.   It  is
      also clear from the evidence that at the time of scrutiny, he was  not
      present.


      16.   In view of the foregoing analysis, we have no scintilla of doubt
      that the High Court has fallen into serious error by setting aside the
      election of the appellant and, 
accordingly, we set aside the  judgment
      of the High Court, treat the election of the appellant  as  valid  and
      further direct that the appellant shall get  the  entire  remuneration
      for the period for which he was elected as a member of the legislative
      Council and we say so on the basis of the Constitution Bench  decision
      in Kirpal Singh, M.L.A. v. Uttam Singh and another[5].


      17.   The appeal is accordingly allowed.  There shall be no  order  as
      to costs.
2014 (May. Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41545
DIPAK MISRA, N.V. RAMANA
                                                           Reportable


                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 888 OF 2009


      Balram Singh Yadav@ Balram Yadav                    … Appellant


                                   Versus


      Abhay Kumar Singh                                      …Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T
      Dipak Misra, J.
            In this appeal, the question that is required to  be  determined
      is whether the High Court by  the  order  impugned  was  justified  in
      invalidating the election of the appellant who was elected as a member
      of Bihar Legislative Assembly in the election held on 10.7.2003.
      2.    Bereft of unnecessary details, the facts which are essential  to
      be stated are that the respondent filed  his  nomination  paper  along
      with fifty others to enter into the contest as  the  member  of  Bihar
      Legislative Council  from  20-Saharsha-cum-Medhepura-cum-Supaul  Local
      Authority  Election  Constituency.    The  Returning  Officer,   while
      accepting the nomination papers of all the  candidates,  rejected  the
      nomination paper of the respondent on the ground that he had not filed
      the relevant electoral roll which was required  to  be  done,  for  he
      belonged to another constituency.
      3.    After the election was over, the respondent instituted  Election
      Petition No.  4  of  2003  in  the  High  Court  of  Patna  seeking  a
      declaration that rejection of his nomination paper was  incorrect  and
      inappropriate, and hence, the election of the  elected  candidate  was
      void.  Challenge to the rejection was based  on  two  counts,  namely,
      that he had filed the requisite voters’  list  as  contemplated  under
      Section 33(5) of the Representation  of  the  People  Act,  1951  (for
      brevity, ‘the Act’) and second, the Returning Officer, at the time  of
      scrutiny, had not pointed out the defect  to  him  for  which  he  was
      deprived of the opportunity of rectifying the mistake.
      4.    In the election petition it was asseverated that  the  Returning
      Officer accepted the electoral roll for other candidates for the  year
      1998, but as far as the respondent was concerned, there was insistence
      for production of the valid electoral roll as on  1.1.2002  which  was
      not essential.  The  stand  and  stance  put  forth  by  the  election
      petitioner was seriously controverted by the present appellant on many
      a ground including the one that in the absence of any pleadings in the
      petition to substantiate the fact his contesting in the election would
      have materially affected the results of  the  election,  the  election
      petition was totally devoid of any substance.
      5.     The  High  Court  framed  the   following   four   issues   for
      adjudication:
           “(1)  Whether this election petition, as framed is maintainable?
           (2)   Whether this election petition is vitiated by  non-joinder
                 of necessary parties?
           (3)    Whether  the  nomination  paper  of  the  petitioner  was
                 improperly rejected by the Returning Officer?
           (4)   Whether the  petitioner  is  entitled  to  any  relief  or
                 reliefs?”


      6.    Both the  parties  adduced  oral  evidence  and  marked  certain
      documents as exhibits.  The High Court treated  issue  No.  3  as  the
      principal issue and the issue No.  4  as  consequential  to  it.   The
      respondent brought on record the order  of  rejection  passed  by  the
      Returning Officer as Ext. P-2.  There was no dispute before  the  High
      Court that the first respondent did not  belong  to  the  constituency
      and, therefore, he was required to comply with Section 33(5)  of  Act.
      The High Court, adverting to the said aspect, observed as follows: -
           “Petitioner does not deny that he had filed an extract  of  1995
           electoral roll and even in the electoral roll of 1998  the  Part
           and Serial  Number  where  the  petitioner’s  name  figured  was
           identical.  If the Returning Officer had bothered  to  turn  the
           pages of 1998 electoral roll at the time of  scrutiny  then  the
           above declaration of the  petitioner  in  the  nomination  paper
           would have stood verified and corroborated.  But then the reason
           for rejection of the nomination of the petitioner  is  not  that
           the petitioner had not annexed 1998 electoral roll.  The  reason
           assigned is that he did not have the Aharta as on  1.1.2002  and
           he had not annexed Styapit (certified) extract of the  electoral
           roll in the regard.”


      7.    Thereafter, considering the oral evidence, the High Court opined
      thus: -
           “The Court also decides to have a look  at  the  oral  evidences
           which have been adduced on  this  score.   Five  witnesses  were
           produced on behalf of the petitioner.  P.W. 1 is the  petitioner
           himself where he has stated that he was one  of  the  candidates
           for the “Constituency” of the Local Body and was a voter of 110-
           Raghopur Assembly Constituency.  He stated that  his  nomination
           papers were illegally rejected.  He filed two sets of nomination
           papers which were duly signed by him and his proposers.  In  one
           of the nomination papers a detailed  reason  for  rejection  was
           recorded but in the second nomination paper the  word  “Aswikrit
           Karta Hun” (rejected) only  mentioned.   He  has  furnished  the
           details of his name, the Part and  the  Serial  Number  of  110-
           Raghopur Assembly Constituency which is reflected in  the  voter
           list of 1998.  His name figured at serial no. 444  in  Part  11.
           He also states that a demand of voter list for  the  year,  2002
           was made from him orally but there was no voter list of the year
           available to his knowledge.  He also denied that he had received
           any kind of memo much less memo no. 10.  He does accept that  he
           was personally not present at the time of scrutiny  but  he  had
           authorized one Sri Prabhakar Singh, Advocate to  participate  in
           the same but he was not allowed to go to the place of scrutiny.”

      8.    We have heard Mr. Nagendra Rai, learned senior counsel  for  the
      appellant.  Despite service of  notice,  there  is  no  appearance  on
      behalf of the respondent.

      9.    To appreciate the controversy from a proper perspective,  it  is
      apposite to refer to Section 100 of the Act.  It reads as follows:-
           “100. Grounds for declaring election to be void.- (1) Subject to
           the provisions of sub-section  (2)  if  the  High  Court  is  of
           opinion-
           a) that on the date of his election a returned candidate was not
              qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen to fill the seat
              under the Constitution or this Act or the Government of Union
              Territories Act, 1963 (20 of 1963); or



           b) that any corrupt practice has been committed  by  a  returned
              candidate or his election agent or by any other  person  with
              the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent; or



           c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected; or



           d) that the result of the election, in so far as it  concerns  a
              returned candidate, has been materially affected –



                    i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination, or


                   ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interests of
                       the returned candidate by an  agent  other  than  his
                       election agent, or


                  iii) by the improper reception, refusal  or  rejection  of
                       any vote or the reception of any vote which is  void,
                       or


                   iv) by any non-compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the
                       Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or orders
                       made under this Act,
           the High Court  shall  declare  the  election  of  the  returned
           candidate to be void.”


      10.   Be it stated, before this  provision  was  incorporated  by  the
      Representation of  the  People  (2nd  amendment)  Act,  1956,  Section
      100(1)(c) read as follows:-
           “If the Tribunal is of opinion that the result of  the  election
           has been materially  affected  by  the  improper  acceptance  or
           rejection of any nomination,  the  Tribunal  shall  declare  the
           election to be wholly void.”


           Interpreting the  said  provision,  the  Constitution  Bench  in
      Surendra Nath Khosla and another v. S. Dalip Singh and others[1] ruled
      thus:-
           “It appears that though the words of the section are in  general
           terms with equal application to the case of improper acceptance,
           as also of improper rejection of a nomination  paper,  case  law
           has made a distinction between the two classes of cases. So  far
           as the latter class of cases is concerned, it may be pointed out
           that almost all the  Election  Tribunals  in  the  country  have
           consistently taken the view that there is a presumption  in  the
           case of improper rejection of a nomination  paper  that  it  has
           materially affected the result of the election. Apart  from  the
           practical difficulty, almost the impossibility, of demonstrating
           that the electors would have cast their votes  in  a  particular
           way, that is to say, that a substantial  number  of  them  would
           have cast their votes in favour of the rejected  candidate,  the
           fact that one of several candidates for  an  election  had  been
           kept  out  of  the  arena  is  by   itself   a   very   material
           consideration. Cases can  easily  be  imagined  where  the  most
           desirable candidates from the point of view of electors and  the
           most formidable candidate from the point of view  of  the  other
           candidates may have been wrongly kept out from seeking election.
           By keeping out such a desirable candidate, the officer rejecting
           the nomination paper may have prevented the electors from voting
           for the best candidate available. On the other hand, in the case
           of an improper acceptance  of  a  nomination  paper,  proof  may
           easily be forthcoming to demonstrate that the  coming  into  the
           arena of an additional candidate has not had any effect  on  the
           election of the best candidate  in  the  field.  The  conjecture
           therefore is permissible  that  the  legislature  realising  the
           difference  between  the  two  classes  of   cases   has   given
           legislative sanction to the view by amending Section 100 by  the
           Representation of the People (Second Amendment) Act, 27 of 1956,
           and by going  to  the  length  of  providing  that  an  improper
           rejection of any nomination paper is  conclusive  proof  of  the
           election being void. For the reasons aforesaid, in our  opinion,
           the majority decision on the fourth issue is also correct.”


      11.   After the amendment, a three-Judge Bench in Mahadeo v. Babu Udai
      Partap Singh  and  others[2],  after  referring  to  the  decision  in
      Surendra Nath Khosla (supra), opined as follows:-


           “11. This position has now been  clarified  by  the  Legislature
           itself by amending S. 100 in 1956. The amended S. 100(1)(a), (b)
           and (c) refer to three classes of cases where  the  election  is
           set aside on proof of facts  enumerated  in  the  said  clauses.
           Clause (a) refers to a case where a returned candidate  was  not
           qualified, or was disqualified, to be chosen to  fill  the  seat
           under the Constitution or this Act at the date of his  election.
           As soon as this fact is  proved,  his  election  is  set  aside.
           Similarly, under Cl. (b), if any corrupt practice  is  shown  to
           have been committed by a  returned  candidate  or  his  election
           agent or by any other person with  the  consent  of  a  returned
           candidate or his election agent, the election  of  the  returned
           candidate is set aside and  declared  void.  Likewise,  Cl.  (c)
           provides that the election of  a  returned  candidate  shall  be
           declared void if it  is  shown  that  any  nomination  has  been
           improperly rejected. It would thus be seen that the  view  which
           the Election Tribunals and  the  Courts  had  been  consistently
           taking in dealing with the question  about  the  effect  of  the
           improper rejection of any nomination paper, has  been  confirmed
           by the Legislature and now, the position is that if it is  shown
           that at any election, any nomination paper has  been  improperly
           rejected, the improper rejection  itself  renders  the  election
           void without any further proof about the material effect of this
           importer rejection.”



      12.   In view of the abovestated enunciation of  law,  the  submission
      that there was no pleading and no evidence was  adduced  to  establish
      that the election of the elected candidate was materially affected, is
      sans substance.  Once the court  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  the
      nomination paper had been improperly rejected, it is obliged in law to
      declare the election void.


      13.   Presently, we shall proceed to deal with the issue  whether  the
      High Court was justified in accepting the plea of the respondent  that
      his  nomination  paper  was  improperly  rejected.   In  this  regard,
      reference to Section 33(5) of the Act is seemly.  It reads as follows:
      -


           “”Where the candidate is an elector of a different constituency,
           a copy of the electoral roll of  that  constituency  or  of  the
           relevant part thereof  or  a  certified  copy  of  the  relevant
           entries in such roll shall, unless it has been filed along  with
           the nomination paper, be produced before the  returning  officer
           at the time of scrutiny.”


      14.   The said provision came to be interpreted in B. Dandapani  Patra
      v.  Returning  Officer-cum-Sub-Divisional   Officer,   Berhampur   and
      others[3], wherein a two-Judge Bench placed reliance on  Ranjit  Singh
      v. Pritam Singh[4] and came to hold as follows: -


           “… it has been held that when Section  33(5)  of  the  said  Act
           refers to a copy of the relevant part of the electoral roll,  it
           means a part as defined in Rule 5 of the  said  Rules  of  1960.
           The complete copy would carry the various amendments made in the
           roll to enable the Returning Officer to see whether the name  of
           the candidate continues in the roll.”


      15.   The facts of the aforesaid decision would show that  unless  the
      current electoral roll is filed along with the nomination paper,  that
      would tantamount to non-compliance of Section 33(5) of  the  Act.   In
      the instant case, on a perusal of evidence  of  PW-1,  the  respondent
      herein, and the Returning Officer, it is  perceptible  that  the  said
      respondent had not filed the electoral roll  of  1998  which  was  the
      latest electoral roll as on 1.1.2002.  On the date  of  scrutiny,  the
      respondent was absent.  The High Court, as noticeable, has referred to
      the order of rejection of nomination paper by  the  Returning  Officer
      and opined that none had filed the electoral  roll  of  1.1.2002  and,
      therefore, the nomination paper could not  have  been  rejected.   The
      aforesaid view is the resultant of erroneous perception of fact.   The
      ground that was indicated by the Returning Officer was that the  valid
      electoral roll as on 1.1.2002 had not been filed.  It has come in  the
      evidence that no electoral roll was prepared  on  that  date  and  the
      latest electoral roll was that of 1998.  The respondent had not  filed
      the same.   In fact, he had filed the electoral roll of 1995.   It  is
      also clear from the evidence that at the time of scrutiny, he was  not
      present.


      16.   In view of the foregoing analysis, we have no scintilla of doubt
      that the High Court has fallen into serious error by setting aside the
      election of the appellant and, accordingly, we set aside the  judgment
      of the High Court, treat the election of the appellant  as  valid  and
      further direct that the appellant shall get  the  entire  remuneration
      for the period for which he was elected as a member of the legislative
      Council and we say so on the basis of the Constitution Bench  decision
      in Kirpal Singh, M.L.A. v. Uttam Singh and another[5].


      17.   The appeal is accordingly allowed.  There shall be no  order  as
      to costs.



                                                               ………………………..J.
                                                               [Dipak Misra]




                                                               ………………………..J.
                                                               [N.V. Ramana]
      New Delhi;
      May 13, 2014.



-----------------------
[1]    AIR 1957 SC 242
[2]    AIR 1966 SC 824
[3]    (1990) 1 SCC 505
[4]    (1996) 3 SCR 543
[5]    (1985) 4 SCC 621