Eviction case - in the absence of dispute about legal status of petitioner - court should not misdirect itself for stray entire in one of the record with out considering the records and evidence - continued by sons of original owner who died pending case against the son of Tenant - Trial court decreed the case - High court dismissed as misdirected holding that the appellants here in are not the sons of Original owner basing of Ration card in which the father name of appellants was showned as Muneshwar Rao - Apex court held that Muneshwar Rao and Narayanappa are one the same as per Reg. Will Deed left by Narayanappa and further it is not case of the respondent that the petitioners are not the sons of Narayanappa - mere entry in Ration card can not over weigh the evidence - The car registration certificate attached present with affidavit when disputed can not be considered - Apex court set aside the High court judgement and restored the Trail court order = K. Narayanappa (D) By Lrs. .. Appellant(s) -vs- R. Prakash .. Respondent(s) =2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41539

 Eviction case - in the absence of dispute about legal status of petitioner -  court should not misdirect itself for stray entire in one of the record with out considering the records and evidence - continued by sons of original owner who died pending case against the son of Tenant - Trial court decreed the case - High court dismissed as misdirected holding that the appellants here in are not the sons of Original owner basing of Ration card in which the father name of appellants was showned as Muneshwar Rao - Apex court held that Muneshwar Rao and Narayanappa are one the same as per Reg. Will Deed left by Narayanappa and further it is not case of the respondent that the petitioners are not the sons of Narayanappa - mere entry in Ration card can not over weigh the evidence - The car registration certificate attached present with affidavit when disputed can not be considered - Apex court set aside the High court judgement and restored the Trail court order =

 We carefully considered the rival contentions.  
 Exh.P1  is  the
      original lease deed dated 29.5.1967 and as per  the  recitals  therein
      the  petition  property  was  let  out  to  late  Ramaiah,  father  of
      respondent no.1 herein, on a monthly rent  of  Rs.35/-  by  the  owner
      Narayanappa.  
The jural relationship of landlord  and  tenant  between
      late Narayanappa and late  Ramaiah  is  thus  established  and  it  is
      admitted by respondent no.1 herein as held by Courts below.  
The Trial
      Court found that the appellants  herein/petitioners  established  that
      they require petition premises for their own use  and  occupation  and
      ordered delivery of vacant possession to them besides the direction to
      pay the rental arrears.  
Considering the contention of respondent no.1
      herein that the appellants herein are not the legal heirs of  original
      lessor Narayanappa, 
the High Court directed the appellants  herein  to
      have their rights adjudicated before the  competent  Civil  Court  and
      thereafter to proceed with the Eviction Petition.

      8.    The respondent no.1 herein in support of his plea  produced  two
      documents, namely, Ration card and copy of Registration certificate of
      Car bearing no.KA-05-EX-2037.  
This Registration certificate, which is
      now annexed with the counter affidavit, was not part of record  before
      the  Courts  below  and  cannot  be  taken  into  consideration   more
      particularly when it is being disputed.  
The Trial Court while dealing
      with the entries in the  Ration  card,  took  into  consideration  the
      registered Will executed  by  late  K.  Narayanappa,  
wherein,  it  is
      recited that testator is K. Narayanappa @ Muneshwar Rao and rendered a
      finding that Narayanappa and  Muneshwar  Rao  are  one  and  the  same
      person.    
It is also relevant to point out that the Trial Court after
      conducting  inquiry,  ordered  the  impleadment  of  third   appellant
      Sundamma as  legal  representative  of  deceased  Narayanappa  in  the
      Eviction Petition and the said order has become final. 
 In any  event,
      the contention of the respondent no.1 herein that appellants 1  and  2
      herein are not the sons of late Narayanappa is liable to  be  rejected
      for the reason that all the three of them jointly filed  the  Eviction
      Petition  against  respondent  no.1  herein  and  in   the   petition,
      appellants 1 and 2 are described as  sons  of  late  Narayanappa.   
In
      other words Narayanappa declared appellants 1 and 2 herein as his sons
      while  seeking  eviction  of  respondent  no.1  herein.  
 It  is  also
      pertinent to point out that respondent no.1  herein,  in  his  counter
      filed in the Eviction Petition when Narayanappa  was  alive,  did  not
      raise any objection that appellants 1 and 2 herein, are not  the  sons
      of Narayanappa and on the other hand his only contention was  that  he
      has prescribed title to the petition premises by  adverse  possession.
      
The High Court misdirected itself  in  relegating  the  appellants  to
      Civil Court as rightly  contended  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the
      appellants and the order is unsustainable.

      9.    The appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the  High  Court
      is set aside and the order of the Trial Court is restored.   No  order
      as to costs.
2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41539
T.S. THAKUR, C. NAGAPPAN
 

                                                        NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  5569   OF 2014
      [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.26741 of  2011]





      K. Narayanappa (D) By Lrs.             ..           Appellant(s)

                                    -vs-

      R. Prakash                             ..           Respondent(s)




                               J U D G M E N T




      C. NAGAPPAN, J.




          1. Leave granted.




      2.    This appeal is directed against the order dated 9.2.2011  passed
      by the High Court of Karnataka at  Bangalore  in  H.R.R.P.  No.246  of
      2010.

      3.    Briefly the facts are as follows : Narayanappa while alive along
      with his two sons namely the appellants 1 and 2 herein filed  petition
      in HRC No.32 of 2006 under Section  27(2)(a)(c)(o)(p)(r)  and  Section
      31(1)(c) of the Karnataka Rent  Act  seeking  eviction  of  the  first
      respondent herein on the premise that  Narayanappa  was  the  absolute
      owner of the premises bearing no.15, new no.20 situated at Hoovadigara
      Galli, Chikpet, Bangalore measuring  25  x  25  ft.  with  dilapidated
      structure and he entered into a lease deed dated 29.5.1967  permitting
      Ramaiah, the late father of respondent no.1 herein,  to  demolish  the
      old structure and put up new structure and put him in  possession  for
      15 years with monthly rent of Rs.35/- and with the option to renew the
      lease for further period on  agreed  terms.   Ramaiah  demolished  the
      structure and built a new building and let it out to  several  persons
      and was collecting the rents.  It is further averred in  the  Eviction
      Petition that Ramaiah failed to  surrender  possession  after  fifteen
      years even after demand and failed to pay rent also and he died in the
      year 1986 and Narayanappa called upon his widow and children to vacate
      and they did not do so and the respondent  no.1  herein  admitted  the
      arrears of rent and issued cheque for  Rs.525/-  towards  arrear  upto
      2001 and it was accounted for.  On calculation it was found that a sum
      of Rs. 3,500/- was due as arrears of rent and Narayanappa issued legal
      notice dated 5.12.2005 to the respondent no.1 herein  and  others  and
      they failed to vacate and in their  reply  denied  the  right  of  the
      appellants to file eviction proceedings which led to the filing of the
      Eviction Petition by the appellants against the respondent no.1 herein
      and others.  Respondent no.1 herein, in  his  counter  filed  therein,
      admitted the lease agreement  dated  29.5.1967  entered  into  between
      Narayanappa and his father Ramaiah and the putting up of new structure
      by his father and renting it out to others.  However, it  was  further
      averred in the counter that after the  death  of  Ramaiah,  respondent
      no.1 herein along with respondent no.2 in the main petition,  were  in
      continuous possession of the premises for over 45  years,  even  after
      the expiry of 15 years lease  period  and  thus  prescribed  title  by
      adverse possession and there is no jural relationship of landlord  and
      tenant between the appellants and them.

      4.    During the pendency of the Eviction Petition Narayanappa died on
      13.7.2006 and his wife namely the  third  appellant  herein  filed  an
      application in I.A. No.7 in the Eviction Petition seeking  to  implead
      her also as a legal representative of Narayanappa.   That  application
      was contested by respondent no.1 herein by pleading  that  Narayanappa
      died as a bachelor and the appellants herein are not his legal  heirs.
      After inquiry the Trial Court allowed the application  and  the  third
      appellant herein was brought  on  record.   In  the  trial  the  first
      appellant herein examined  himself  as  PW1  and  one  Chandrappa  was
      examined as PW2 and Exh.P1 to P14 came to be  marked  on  their  side.
      Respondent no.1 herein examined himself as RW1 and marked documents at
      R1 and R25 on his side.

      5.    The  Trial  Court  on  consideration  of  oral  and  documentary
      evidence by order dated 27.7.2010 allowed the petition  directing  the
      respondent no.1 herein and others to pay arrears of rent at  the  rate
      of Rs.35/- per month from 1.12.2001 to  the  date  of  the  order  and
      further directed the respondent no.1 herein and  others  to  quit  and
      deliver  the  vacant  possession  of  the  schedule  premises  to  the
      appellants herein, within three months from the  date  of  the  order.
      Respondent no.1 herein preferred revision in H.R.R.P. No.246  of  2010
      and the High Court after  hearing  both  sides  allowed  the  Revision
      Petition and stayed the proceeding in HRC No.32  of  2008  before  the
      Trial Court by directing the appellants herein to  have  their  rights
      adjudicated before the competent Civil Court.   Challenging  the  said
      order the appellants have preferred the present appeal.

      6.    The learned counsel appearing for the appellants contended  that
      appellants 1 and 2 herein were arrayed as sons of   Narayanappa  along
      with him in the Eviction Petition and all the three appellants are the
      original petitioners therein and later third  appellant  Sundamma  was
      impleaded as wife of late Narayanappa after inquiry by the Trial Court
      and that order was never challenged and  became  final  and  when  the
      jural relationship  is  admitted  it  is  respondent  no.1  herein  to
      approach the Civil Court seeking for decree that  the  appellants  are
      not owners of the petition property and the impugned order of the High
      Court relegating the appellants to Civil Court is not justifiable  and
      it is liable to be set aside.  Per contra Mr. Sri  Gurukrishna  Kumar,
      learned senior counsel  appearing  for  the  respondent  no.1  herein,
      contended  that  Narayanappa  died  as  a  bachelor  and  the  marital
      relationship between third appellant Sundamma and late Narayanappa has
      not been proved and there is no proof for the claim of the  appellants
      that Narayanappa was also called as Muneshwar Rao and these are issues
      that are to be decided by the competent Civil Court as rightly held by
      the High Court.

      7.    We carefully considered the rival contentions.   Exh.P1  is  the
      original lease deed dated 29.5.1967 and as per  the  recitals  therein
      the  petition  property  was  let  out  to  late  Ramaiah,  father  of
      respondent no.1 herein, on a monthly rent  of  Rs.35/-  by  the  owner
      Narayanappa.  The jural relationship of landlord  and  tenant  between
      late Narayanappa and late  Ramaiah  is  thus  established  and  it  is
      admitted by respondent no.1 herein as held by Courts below.  The Trial
      Court found that the appellants  herein/petitioners  established  that
      they require petition premises for their own use  and  occupation  and
      ordered delivery of vacant possession to them besides the direction to
      pay the rental arrears.  Considering the contention of respondent no.1
      herein that the appellants herein are not the legal heirs of  original
      lessor Narayanappa, the High Court directed the appellants  herein  to
      have their rights adjudicated before the  competent  Civil  Court  and
      thereafter to proceed with the Eviction Petition.

      8.    The respondent no.1 herein in support of his plea  produced  two
      documents, namely, Ration card and copy of Registration certificate of
      Car bearing no.KA-05-EX-2037.  This Registration certificate, which is
      now annexed with the counter affidavit, was not part of record  before
      the  Courts  below  and  cannot  be  taken  into  consideration   more
      particularly when it is being disputed.  The Trial Court while dealing
      with the entries in the  Ration  card,  took  into  consideration  the
      registered Will executed  by  late  K.  Narayanappa,  wherein,  it  is
      recited that testator is K. Narayanappa @ Muneshwar Rao and rendered a
      finding that Narayanappa and  Muneshwar  Rao  are  one  and  the  same
      person.    It is also relevant to point out that the Trial Court after
      conducting  inquiry,  ordered  the  impleadment  of  third   appellant
      Sundamma as  legal  representative  of  deceased  Narayanappa  in  the
      Eviction Petition and the said order has become final.  In any  event,
      the contention of the respondent no.1 herein that appellants 1  and  2
      herein are not the sons of late Narayanappa is liable to  be  rejected
      for the reason that all the three of them jointly filed  the  Eviction
      Petition  against  respondent  no.1  herein  and  in   the   petition,
      appellants 1 and 2 are described as  sons  of  late  Narayanappa.   In
      other words Narayanappa declared appellants 1 and 2 herein as his sons
      while  seeking  eviction  of  respondent  no.1  herein.   It  is  also
      pertinent to point out that respondent no.1  herein,  in  his  counter
      filed in the Eviction Petition when Narayanappa  was  alive,  did  not
      raise any objection that appellants 1 and 2 herein, are not  the  sons
      of Narayanappa and on the other hand his only contention was  that  he
      has prescribed title to the petition premises by  adverse  possession.
      The High Court misdirected itself  in  relegating  the  appellants  to
      Civil Court as rightly  contended  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the
      appellants and the order is unsustainable.

      9.    The appeal is allowed and the impugned order of the  High  Court
      is set aside and the order of the Trial Court is restored.   No  order
      as to costs.




                                                               ………………………….J.
                                                               (T.S. Thakur)




                                                               ……………………………J.
                                                               (C. Nagappan)
    New Delhi;
    May   9, 2014

Reduction of Sentence - Embezzlement of Rs.43,500/- - Deposited Rs.5,76,000/- for alleged embezzlement in to trial court as per order of Apex court - Appellants are aged person - not keeping good health - Apex court held that In the totality of the circumstances, therefore, we are inclined to modify the sentence awarded to the appellants suitably. Accordingly, we reduce the sentences awarded to the appellants in both the appeals to the period already undergone by them. The deposit of Rs.5,76,000/- made by the appellants in the present case will not prejudice them in so far as other cases pending against them and the said deposit shall be deemed to be compensation in terms of Section 357 Cr.PC towards embezzlement allegedly committed by the appellants and the same shall be released to the complainant-bank, if not already released. With the above modification in sentence, these appeals are partly allowed and disposed of.= Dayanand Ramkrishna Shet … Appellant(s) versus State of Karnataka … Respondent(s) = 2014(May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41538

  Reduction of Sentence - Embezzlement of Rs.43,500/- - Deposited Rs.5,76,000/- for alleged embezzlement in to trial court as per order of Apex court - Appellants are aged person - not keeping good health - Apex court held that In the totality of the circumstances, therefore, we  are  inclined  to modify the sentence awarded to the appellants suitably. Accordingly, we reduce the sentences awarded to  the  appellants in both the appeals to the period  already  undergone  by  them.   The deposit of Rs.5,76,000/- made by the appellants in  the  present  case  will not prejudice them in so far as other cases pending against  them    and the said deposit shall be deemed to be compensation  in  terms  of Section 357 Cr.PC towards  embezzlement  allegedly  committed  by  the appellants and the same shall be released to the complainant-bank,  if not already released.  With the above modification in sentence,  these  appeals are partly allowed and disposed of =

 The charges in the present case pertained  to  embezzlement   of
      the amount of Rs.43,500/- for the period from 30.3.1995 to  3.11.1995.
      We  also  find  that  the  total  amount  of  Rs.5,76,000/-  allegedly
      embezzled by the appellants have already  been  deposited  before  the
      Trial Court pursuant to our order dated 2.1.2013.  The appellants  are
      aged persons as on date and are said to be not  keeping  good  health.
      In the totality of the circumstances, therefore, we  are  inclined  to
      modify the sentence awarded to the appellants suitably.

      8.    Accordingly, we reduce the sentences awarded to  the  appellants
      in both the appeals to the period  already  undergone  by  them.   The
      deposit of Rs.5,76,000/- made by the appellants in  the  present  case
      will not prejudice them in so far as other cases pending against  them
      and the said deposit shall be deemed to be compensation  in  terms  of
      Section 357 Cr.PC towards  embezzlement  allegedly  committed  by  the
      appellants and the same shall be released to the complainant-bank,  if
      not already released.  With the above modification in sentence,  these
      appeals are partly allowed and disposed of.

2014(May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41538

T.S. THAKUR, C. NAGAPPAN

                                                           NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1166    OF 2014
        [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.84 of 2013]
                                    With

                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1181   OF 2014
        (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.85 of 2013)






      Dayanand Ramkrishna Shet                     …     Appellant(s)

                                   versus

      State of Karnataka                                     … Respondent(s)




                               J U D G M E N T




      C. NAGAPPAN, J.




      1.    Leave granted in both the special leave petitions. CRMP  No.3134
      of 2013 and CRMP No.13115  of  2013  seeking  extension  of  time  for
      deposit are allowed.




      2.    The appeals are preferred against the judgment  dated  13.9.2011
      passed by the High Court of Karnataka  Circuit  Bench  at  Dharwad  in
      Criminal Appeal no.838 of 2005.

      3.    The appellants in both the appeals are  accused  nos.  1  and  2
      respectively in C.C. no.135 of 2001 on the file of Principal J.M.F.C.,
      Honnavar and  they  were  tried  for  the  offences  punishable  under
      Sections 409 and 467 of IPC and the Trial Court acquitted them of  the
      charges.  Challenging the same the State preferred appeal in  Criminal
      Appeal no.838 of 2005 on the file of the High Court of  Karnataka  and
      the High Court after hearing both sides allowed  the  appeal  and  set
      aside the judgment of acquittal and found both the accused  guilty  of
      the charges framed and sentenced them each to undergo one year  simple
      imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default  to  undergo
      simple imprisonment for three months for the offence punishable  under
      Section 467 read with Section 34 IPC and further sentenced  them  each
      to undergo  one  year  simple  imprisonment  and  to  pay  a  fine  of
      Rs.10,000/-, in default to undergo three  months  simple  imprisonment
      for the offence punishable under Section 409 read with Section 34  IPC
      and directed the  sentences  to  run  concurrently.   Challenging  the
      conviction and sentence both the accused have  individually  preferred
      these appeals.

      4.    Briefly the facts of the case are as follows  :   Accused  no.1-
      Dayanand Ramkrishna Shet was the Manager  and  accused  no.2-Marthappa
      Radhakrishna Shet  was  the  Assistant  Manager  in  Suvarnakarar  Co-
      operative Society Ltd. and they were empowered to sanction  the  loans
      to the customers of the bank on the security by pledging gold and gold
      ornaments.  During the audit conducted for the period from 1.4.1997 to
      31.3.1998, PW26-Balakrishna Subraya Naik found that an amount  to  the
      tune of Rs.5,76,000/- has been misappropriated by  the  accused  nos.1
      and 2 by forging the documents and falsifying the  accounts.   On  the
      complaint at the instance of  the  Deputy  Registrar  of  Co-operative
      Society a case under Crime no.285 of 1999 came  to  be  registered  on
      1.12.1999 against both the accused for the offences punishable  mainly
      under  Sections  467  and  409  read  with  Section  34  IPC  for  the
      misappropriation of the amount of Rs.43,500/- during the  period  from
      30.3.1995 to 3.11.1995 and after investigation the final  report  came
      to be filed.  The Trial Court framed charges under  Sections  467  and
      409 read with Section 34 IPC and the prosecution examined PW1 to  PW35
      and marked Exs. P1 to P72 besides MOs 1 to 22.  Ex.D1  was  marked  as
      side of the defence.  The Trial Court acquitted both the accused  only
      on the ground that the sanction to prosecute  as  required  under  the
      provisions of the Karnataka Co-operative Society Act was not obtained.
       The State preferred the appeal and  the  High  Court  set  aside  the
      judgment of  acquittal  by  allowing  the  appeal  and  convicted  and
      sentenced both the accused as directed above.

      5.     Challenging  the  conviction  and  sentence  both  the  accused
      preferred independent appeals and this Court  by  common  order  dated
      2.1.2013 directed both the appellants to deposit a sum of Rs.2,88,000/-
       each being the sum embezzled by them, before the Trial  Court  within
      four weeks  and  subject  to  that  condition  issued  notice  to  the
      respondent to the question of sentence only and further  directed  the
      Trial Court to release the said amount to the complainant bank.

      6.    The learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  submitted  that  the
      appellants have deposited the entire sum as  directed  and  have  also
      paid the fine and  the  appellants  are  now  aged  64  and  52  years
      respectively and not keeping good health.  We also heard  the  learned
      counsel appearing for respondent-State.

      7.    The charges in the present case pertained  to  embezzlement   of
      the amount of Rs.43,500/- for the period from 30.3.1995 to  3.11.1995.
      We  also  find  that  the  total  amount  of  Rs.5,76,000/-  allegedly
      embezzled by the appellants have already  been  deposited  before  the
      Trial Court pursuant to our order dated 2.1.2013.  The appellants  are
      aged persons as on date and are said to be not  keeping  good  health.
      In the totality of the circumstances, therefore, we  are  inclined  to
      modify the sentence awarded to the appellants suitably.

      8.    Accordingly, we reduce the sentences awarded to  the  appellants
      in both the appeals to the period  already  undergone  by  them.   The
      deposit of Rs.5,76,000/- made by the appellants in  the  present  case
      will not prejudice them in so far as other cases pending against  them
      and the said deposit shall be deemed to be compensation  in  terms  of
      Section 357 Cr.PC towards  embezzlement  allegedly  committed  by  the
      appellants and the same shall be released to the complainant-bank,  if
      not already released.  With the above modification in sentence,  these
      appeals are partly allowed and disposed of.




                                                              …………………………….J.
                                             (T.S. Thakur)




                                                               ……………………………J.
                                             (C. Nagappan)
      New Delhi;
      May   9, 2014

No - Quash Sec.482 Cr.P.C. - Section 420/120B IPC - High court misapplied the law and quashed the FIR - Having no title, the accused induced the complainant and extracted a sum of Rs. 5,00,001/- from the complainant with an intention not to transfer the land infavour of complainant - Apex court held that The averments in the complaint would prima facie make out a case for investigation by the authority.The High Court has adopted a strictly hypertechnical approach and such an endeavour may be justified during a trial, but certainly not during the stage of investigation. At any rate it is too premature a stage for the High Court to step in and stall the investigation by declaring that it is a civil transaction wherein no semblance of criminal offence is involved. The appellant, is therefore right in contending that the First Information Report should not have been quashed in this case and the investigation should have been allowed to proceed. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order.= Mosiruddin Munshi … Appellant(s) versus Md. Siraj and another … Respondent(s) = 2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41537

No - Quash Sec.482 Cr.P.C. - Section 420/120B IPC - High court misapplied the law and quashed the FIR - Having no title, the accused induced the complainant and extracted a sum of Rs. 5,00,001/- from the complainant with an intention not to transfer the land infavour of complainant - Apex court held that The  averments  in  the complaint would prima facie make out a case for  investigation by  the authority.The High Court has adopted a  strictly  hypertechnical  approach and  such an endeavour may be justified during a  trial, but certainly  not during the  stage  of  investigation.   At  any  rate  it  is  too  premature a stage for  the  High  Court  to  step  in  and  stall  the  investigation by declaring that it is a civil transaction  wherein  no
 semblance of criminal offence is involved. The appellant, is therefore right in contending that  the  First Information Report should not have been quashed in this case  and  the investigation should have been allowed to proceed.  We, therefore, allow this appeal  and  set  aside  the  impugned order.=


Yet again in Mahesh Chaudhary Vs. State of Rajasthan (2009)
      4 SCC 443) this Court stated the law thus :

             “11.      The principle providing for exercise of the power  by
             a High  Court  under  Section  482  of  the  Code  of  Criminal
             Procedure to quash a criminal proceeding  is  well  known.  The
             Court shall ordinarily exercise the  said  jurisdiction,  inter
             alia, in the event the allegations contained in the FIR or  the
             complaint petition even if  on  face  value  are  taken  to  be
             correct in their entirety, does not disclose commission  of  an
             offence.”




      7.    In the present case the complaint does make averments so  as  to
      infer  fraudulent  or  dishonest   inducement  having  been  made   by
      Respondent  No.1  herein  and  accused  No.2  pursuant  to  which  the
      appellant parted with money.  It is the case  of  the  appellant  that
      Respondent No.2 does not  have  title  over  the  property  since  the
      settlement deed was not a registered one and  Respondent  No.1  herein
      and accused No.2  had   entered  into  criminal  conspiracy  and  they
      fraudulently induced the appellant to deliver a sum  of  Rs.5,00,001/-
      with no intention to complete the sale  deal.  The  averments  in  the
      complaint would prima facie make out a case for  investigation by  the
      authority.

9.    The High Court has adopted a  strictly  hypertechnical  approach
      and  such an endeavour may be justified during a  trial, but certainly
      not during the  stage  of  investigation.   At  any  rate  it  is  too
      premature a stage for  the  High  Court  to  step  in  and  stall  the
      investigation by declaring that it is a civil transaction  wherein  no
      semblance of criminal offence is involved.




      10.   The appellant, is therefore right in contending that  the  First
      Information Report should not have been quashed in this case  and  the
      investigation should have been allowed to proceed.




      11.   We, therefore, allow this appeal  and  set  aside  the  impugned
      order.


2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41537
T.S. THAKUR, C. NAGAPPAN


                                                                REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1168    OF 2014
              [ Arising out of  SLP (Crl.) No.5529 OF 2011]






   Mosiruddin Munshi                               …     Appellant(s)

                                   versus

   Md. Siraj and another                                   …
   Respondent(s)




                               J U D G M E N T

   C. NAGAPPAN, J.




   1.       Leave granted.  CRMP No.12896 of 2011 seeking impleadment  as  a
   party is dismissed.




   2.       This appeal is preferred against  order  dated  June  29,  2010,
   passed by the High Court of Calcutta in CRR No.1978 of 2006 in FIR No.251
   dated 10.11.2005 on the file of Amherst Street Police Station  registered
   for the alleged offences under Section 420/120B IPC including  the  order
   dated 28.10.2005 in case  No.C/949  of  2005  passed  by  the  Additional
   Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta.



   3.       Briefly the facts  are  as  follows  :   The  appellant  herein/
   complainant  was  looking  for  a  plot  of  land  for  construction   of
   residential house in January 2005 and accused No.2, Masud Alam, a  public
   servant  represented  that  he  could  arrange  for  the  said  plot  and
   introduced the appellant to respondent No.1/accused No.1 who stated  that
   he had a plot of land and the appellant believing the representation made
   by the accused  No.2 entered into an agreement for sale  with  respondent
   No.1 herein/accused No.1 and also paid a sum of Rs.5,00,001/- in    cash.
   The respondent No.1 herein refused  to  hand  over  the  necessary  title
   documents to the appellant which led to issuance of legal notice  by  the
   appellant.  All other methods to compel respondent No.1 to  complete  the
   sale having failed the appellant    filed a complaint  on  28.10.2005  in
   the Court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate,  Calcutta  against
   respondent No.1 herein/accused No.1 and accused  No.2  for  the  offences
   punishable under Section 420, read with Section  120B  of  the  IPC.  The
   Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate forwarded the complaint  to  the
   officer in-charge of the  Amherst Street   Police  Station  for   causing
   investigation under Section 156(3) of Criminal Procedure Code by treating
   the   complaint   as   First   Information   Report.    Respondent   No.1
   herein/accused No.1 filed application under  Section  482  of  Cr.PC  for
   quashing the said proceedings including the FIR.   Though  the  appellant
   herein/complainant was impleaded as a party no attempt was made to  serve
   notice on him  with the result that the learned single Judge of the  High
   Court quashed the complaint proceedings in the absence of  the  appellant
   herein.  Challenging the said order the appellant herein preferred appeal
   to this Court in Criminal  Appeal  No.852  of  2008  and  this  Court  by
   judgment dated May 09, 2008  allowed the appeal and remitted the case  to
   the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with  law.   Thereafter
   the High Court heard both the parties and by impugned order  dated  June,
   29, 2010 allowed the  application under Section 482  Cr.P.C  and  quashed
   the complaint proceedings.  Aggrieved by the  same  the  complainant  has
   preferred the present appeal.




   4.       The  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  contended  that  the
   contents  of  the  complaint   would  disclose  the  commission  of   the
   cognizable offences alleged and the High Court at the  preliminary  stage
   would not be justified in embarking upon  an  inquiry  and  quashing  the
   proceedings and hence the impugned order is liable to be set aside.   Per
   contra the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1/accused No.1 contended
   that the dispute involved in the complaint is of civil nature and none of
   the acts allegedly committed by the Respondent  No.1  gave  rise  to  any
   criminal liability as rightly held by the High Court.  In support of  the
   submission he relied on the following decisions of this Court in  Hridaya
   Ranjan Prasad Verma and others Vs. State of Bihar and  another  (2000)  4
   SCC 168, Murari Lal Gupta Vs. Gopi Singh  (2005)  13  SCC  699  and   Ram
   Biraji Devi and another Vs. Umesh Kumar Singh and another  (2006)  6  SCC
   669.




   5.       The legal position with regard to exercise  of  jurisdiction  by
   the High Court for quashing the First  Information  Report  is  now  well
   settled.  It is not necessary for us  to  delve  deep  thereinto  as  the
   propositions of law have been stated by this  Court  in  R.  Kalyani  Vs.
   Janak C. Mehta (2009) 1 SCC 516  in the following terms :

      “15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions are :




              1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise  its  inherent
                 jurisdiction  to  quash  a  criminal  proceeding  and,   in
                 particular,  a  first   information   report   unless   the
                 allegations contained therein, even if given face value and
                 taken  to  be  correct  in  their  entirety,  disclosed  no
                 cognizable offence.




              2) For the said purpose the Court, save and  except  in  very
                 exceptional circumstances, would not look to any  document
                 relied upon by the defence.




              3)  Such a power should be exercised very sparingly.  If  the
                 allegations made in the  FIR  disclose  commission  of  an
                 offence, the Court shall not go beyond the same  and  pass
                 an order in favour of the  accused to hold absence of  any
                 mens rea or actus reus.




              4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute,  the  same  by
                 itself may not be  a  ground  to  hold  that  the  criminal
                 proceedings should not be allowed to continue.




      6.         Yet again in Mahesh Chaudhary Vs. State of Rajasthan (2009)
      4 SCC 443) this Court stated the law thus :

             “11.      The principle providing for exercise of the power  by
             a High  Court  under  Section  482  of  the  Code  of  Criminal
             Procedure to quash a criminal proceeding  is  well  known.  The
             Court shall ordinarily exercise the  said  jurisdiction,  inter
             alia, in the event the allegations contained in the FIR or  the
             complaint petition even if  on  face  value  are  taken  to  be
             correct in their entirety, does not disclose commission  of  an
             offence.”




      7.    In the present case the complaint does make averments so  as  to
      infer  fraudulent  or  dishonest   inducement  having  been  made   by
      Respondent  No.1  herein  and  accused  No.2  pursuant  to  which  the
      appellant parted with money.  It is the case  of  the  appellant  that
      Respondent No.2 does not  have  title  over  the  property  since  the
      settlement deed was not a registered one and  Respondent  No.1  herein
      and accused No.2  had   entered  into  criminal  conspiracy  and  they
      fraudulently induced the appellant to deliver a sum  of  Rs.5,00,001/-
      with no intention to complete the sale  deal.  The  averments  in  the
      complaint would prima facie make out a case for  investigation by  the
      authority.




      8.    In the decisions relied  on  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the
      respondent No.1, cited supra, this Court on the   facts  therein  held
      that the allegations in the complaint read as a whole prima facie  did
      not disclose commission of offences  alleged and quashed the  criminal
      proceedings.  Those decisions do not  apply to  the fact situation  of
      the present case.




      9.    The High Court has adopted a  strictly  hypertechnical  approach
      and  such an endeavour may be justified during a  trial, but certainly
      not during the  stage  of  investigation.   At  any  rate  it  is  too
      premature a stage for  the  High  Court  to  step  in  and  stall  the
      investigation by declaring that it is a civil transaction  wherein  no
      semblance of criminal offence is involved.




      10.   The appellant, is therefore right in contending that  the  First
      Information Report should not have been quashed in this case  and  the
      investigation should have been allowed to proceed.




      11.   We, therefore, allow this appeal  and  set  aside  the  impugned
      order.







                                                              …………………………….J.
                                             (T.S. Thakur)




                                                               ……………………………J.
                                             (C. Nagappan)
      New Delhi;
      May  9, 2014

Or.2 rule 2 of C.P.C- when there is possibility of filing one suit for two reliefs and when there is no proper explanation for filing two suits on the same cause of action, Or.2 rule 2 certainly bars the second suit - Two suits on the same cause of action for non-issuing of ICO STAMPS , the plaintiff sustained huge loss on different dates - though the claims in both suit are for different amounts but the cause of action is one and same , Trial court dismissed the later suit but high court partly allowed the suit claim - Apex court held that we are of the opinion that suits should have been merged with the claims against coffee purchased between July 25,1982 and September 8, 1982, (a period arising from the merging of the two periods claimed in the suits wherein eight days overlapped each other) clubbed together in the same suit from which two reliefs, first being the losses due to delayed shipment and second being the costs and losses arising due to the recall of the shipment, could have been claimed. In the present factual matrix both the reliefs are being claimed separately in the two concerned suits. This scenario negates the principle of Order 2, Rule 2 in absence of any explanation as to why the respondent failed to claim the relief by way of a single suit when the cause of action was the same in the both. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the Trial Court in its judgment dated March 17, 2005 correctly held that in light of O.S. No. 3150 of 1985 the present suit is barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code.In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that the High Court has misappreciated the facts in the light of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code and thereby the reasoning of the High Court cannot be sustained in the eye of law. The said suit (O.S.No.4763 of 1986) is barred. Considering the facts, as discussed above, we set aside the judgment and order of the High Court and uphold the order of the Trial Court. Accordingly, the present appeal is allowed and the suit of the respondent is dismissed.= Coffee Board .… Appellant versus M/S. Ramesh Exports Pvt. Ltd. ....Respondents = 2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41536

Or.2 rule 2 of C.P.C- when there is possibility of filing one suit for two reliefs and when there is no proper explanation for filing two suits on the same cause of action, Or.2 rule 2 certainly bars the second suit - Two suits on the same cause of action for non-issuing of ICO STAMPS , the plaintiff sustained huge loss on different dates - though the claims in both suit are for different amounts but the cause of action is one and same , Trial court dismissed the later suit but high court partly allowed the suit claim - Apex court held that we are of the opinion that suits should  have been merged with the claims against coffee  purchased  between  July  25,1982 and September 8, 1982, (a period arising from the merging of the two periods claimed in the suits wherein eight days  overlapped  each  other) clubbed together in the same suit from which two reliefs, first being the losses due to delayed shipment and second  being  the  costs  and  losses arising due to the recall of the shipment, could have been claimed. In the present  factual  matrix  both  the  reliefs are being  claimed separately  in  the  two  concerned  suits.  This  scenario  negates  the principle of Order 2, Rule 2 in absence of any explanation as to why  the respondent failed to claim the relief by way of a single  suit  when  the cause of action was the same in  the  both.  Therefore,  we  are  of  the opinion that the Trial  Court  in  its  judgment  dated  March  17,  2005 correctly held that in light of O.S. No. 3150 of 1985 the present suit is barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code.In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that  the  High  Court  has misappreciated the facts in the light of Order 2 Rule 2 of the  Code  and thereby the reasoning of the High Court cannot be sustained in the eye of  law. The said suit (O.S.No.4763  of  1986)  is  barred.  Considering  the  facts, as discussed above, we set aside the judgment  and  order  of  the  High Court and uphold the order of  the  Trial  Court.  Accordingly,  the  present appeal is allowed and the suit of the respondent is dismissed.=

the respondent filed two suits against the  appellant  Board
   in the Court of City Civil Judge, Bangalore, one being O.S.  No.3150  of
   1985 praying for a decree of Rs.5,32,012.31 p. with interest at the rate
   of 19% per annum and costs of the suit and another suit being  O.S.  No.
   4763 of 1986 praying for a decree of Rs.11,70,446.39 p. with interest at
   the rate of 19% per annum and costs of the  suit.
However, the other suit being O.S. No. 4763 of  1986
   was dismissed by the Trial Court by judgment dated March  17,  2005  and
   aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed R.F.A. No.1033  of  2005  before
   the High Court of Karnataka. After considering the submissions  of  both
   the parties, the High Court partly allowed the  regular  first  appeals.=

In both the suits the fact required  to  be  proved  by  the  respondent
   (being the plaintiff therein), to succeed  in  its  claims  was  that  on
   account of the failure of the appellant (being the defendant) to  provide
   the required ICO stamps as assured by it, the respondent  had  to  suffer
   losses. The two separate reliefs claimed by the respondent are  dependent
   on the same fact being the omission of duty by the appellant. The grounds
   of disparity in the suits are the amount of coffee and the dates when the
   same was purchased, however it must be  noted  that  the  period  between
   August 11, 1982 and August 18, 1982 is common to both the suits and there
   are no specific pleadings differentiating  the  same.   Furthermore,  the
   suits were filed within a span of nine days of each other.


20. In the light of the above, we are of the opinion that suits should  have
   been merged with the claims against coffee  purchased  between  July  25,
   1982 and September 8, 1982, (a period arising from the merging of the two
   periods claimed in the suits wherein eight days  overlapped  each  other)
   clubbed together in the same suit from which two reliefs, first being the
   losses due to delayed shipment and second  being  the  costs  and  losses
   arising due to the recall of the shipment, could have been claimed.


21. In the present  factual  matrix  both  the  reliefs  are  being  claimed
   separately  in  the  two  concerned  suits.  This  scenario  negates  the
   principle of Order 2, Rule 2 in absence of any explanation as to why  the
   respondent failed to claim the relief by way of a single  suit  when  the
   cause of action was the same in  the  both.  Therefore,  we  are  of  the
   opinion that the Trial  Court  in  its  judgment  dated  March  17,  2005
   correctly held that in light of O.S. No. 3150 of 1985 the present suit is
   barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code.


22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that  the  High  Court  has
   misappreciated the facts in the light of Order 2 Rule 2 of the  Code  and
   thereby the reasoning of the High Court cannot be sustained in the eye of
   law. The said suit (O.S.No.4763  of  1986)  is  barred.  Considering  the
   facts, as discussed above, we set aside the judgment  and  order  of  the
   High Court and uphold the order of  the  Trial  Court.  Accordingly,  the
   present appeal is allowed and the suit of the respondent is dismissed.

2014 (May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41536
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE

                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                     CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5527      OF  2014
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.26157 of 2012)


Coffee Board                                                       .…
Appellant

                                   versus

M/S. Ramesh Exports Pvt. Ltd.                               ....Respondents





                               J U D G M E N T


Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.


1. Leave granted.


2. This appeal is preferred against the judgment and  order  dated  December
   19, 2011 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at  Bangalore  in  Regular
   First Appeal No.1033 of 2005 partly allowing  the  appeal  filed  by  the
   respondent herein and partly decreeing the Original Suit being  O.S.  No.
   4763 of 1986 filed by the respondent being the  original  plaintiff.  The
   said original suit was dismissed by a judgment and decree dated March 17,
   2005.


3. Pre-liberalization, till 1996 all the coffee grown in  India  was  pooled
   with the appellant-Board which is a statutory body under the Coffee  Act,
   1942. The appellant-Board (hereinafter referred to as  “Board”)  marketed
   the pooled coffee and distributed the net realization to the  growers  in
   proportion the quantity pooled by them. The  Board  marketed  the  pooled
   coffee by means of auctions and separate auctions were  held  for  export
   and domestic market. Only registered exporters are allowed to participate
   in the said auctions and the successful bidders amongst them  enter  into
   contracts with the Board for the purchase of the coffee. The Board  is  a
   member of the International Coffee Organization (hereinafter referred  to
   as “ICO”) which is the main  intergovernmental  organization  controlling
   and regulating the global coffee  export  and  import.  Majority  of  the
   coffee growing and consuming countries are members of the ICO. The import
   and export of coffee is regulated by ICO by fixing quotas on  the  member
   countries in accordance with  the  quantum  produced.  As  per  the  then
   International Coffee Agreement  of  1983  the  export  quota  system  was
   supported by an obligatory system of controls. Each export  by  a  Member
   was covered by a Certificate of Origin.  Importing Members did not  admit
   coffee from Members unless the Certificate was validated by coffee export
   stamps issued by the Organization.  When quotas were in effect  importing
   Members were required to limit their imports from non-members and exports
   to non-members were closely monitored.


4. Accordingly, India being a member of ICO through the  Board  was  subject
   to the same agreement and as per the fixed quota for exporting coffee the
   Board received stamps from ICO for each quarter  through  State  Bank  of
   India. Thus, the Board subject to ICO rules and regulations regulated the
   coffee production and marketing  in  India  by  accordingly  distributing
   stamps to the exporters who had successfully purchased  coffee  from  the
   auctions. The respondent M/s. Ramesh Exports Pvt. Ltd. being the original
   plaintiff was registered with the Board as an exporter during the  coffee
   year     October     1,     1981     to      September     30,      1982.




5. In this backdrop, the facts leading to the present appeal are as under:


1. On August 24, 1980, the appellant Board sent the ‘Terms  and  Conditions
   of Sale of Coffee in the Course of Export’, after amendment  of  certain
   clauses, to all the registered exporters of coffee. On October  9,  1980
   the appellant Board issued a Circular regarding introduction  of  Coffee
   Export stamp system for export of coffee to member  importing  countries
   of ICO from November 1, 1980.   The respondent purchased coffee  at  the
   export auction. The respondent shipped 230.4 tonnes of coffee to USA and
   Germany who were members of ICO, on 1st, 2nd  and  3rd  September,  1982
   without valid ICO certificate of origin.  On  September  22,  1982,  the
   respondent wrote to the appellant Board requesting for  ICO  stamps  for
   export of 230.4  tonnes  of  coffee  and  on  September  29,  1982,  the
   respondent  wrote  to  the  appellant  Board  for  issue  of   necessary
   permit/authority to re-import 230.4 tonnes of  coffee  into  India.  The
   appellant Board issued a show cause notice to  the  respondent  alleging
   that the respondent has committed breach of terms of  ICO  Agreement  by
   making false statement. The respondent replied to the show cause notice.
   Thereafter, the respondent filed two suits against the  appellant  Board
   in the Court of City Civil Judge, Bangalore, one being O.S.  No.3150  of
   1985 praying for a decree of Rs.5,32,012.31 p. with interest at the rate
   of 19% per annum and costs of the suit and another suit being  O.S.  No.
   4763 of 1986 praying for a decree of Rs.11,70,446.39 p. with interest at
   the rate of 19% per annum and costs of the  suit.  The  appellant  Board
   resisted the suits and denied the claims made by the respondent.


2. By judgment dated February  14,  2002,  the  Trial  Court  decreed  O.S.
   No.3150 of 1985 with costs and interest at 6% per  annum.  Aggrieved  by
   the judgment and decree dated February 14,  2002  passed  by  the  Trial
   Court, the appellant Board filed R.F.A. No.901 of 2002 before  the  High
   Court of Karnataka. However, the other suit being O.S. No. 4763 of  1986
   was dismissed by the Trial Court by judgment dated March  17,  2005  and
   aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed R.F.A. No.1033  of  2005  before
   the High Court of Karnataka. After considering the submissions  of  both
   the parties, the High Court partly allowed the  regular  first  appeals.
   Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated December 19,  2011  passed  by
   the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Regular First Appeal No.1033
   of 2005, the appellant Board has come up before this Court.


6. The case of the appellant before us is based on two grounds. Firstly,  it
   has been contended by the learned counsel  appearing  for  the  appellant
   that the High Court has incorrectly held that  the  Original  Suit  being
   O.S. No.4763 of 1986 is not barred by the provisions of Rule 2 of Order 2
   of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the
   Code”). In support of the same, it has  been  submitted  by  the  learned
   counsel that the High Court  incorrectly  determined  the  above  without
   considering the specific pleadings in O.S. No.3150 of 1985 filed  by  the
   respondent, as against the pleadings in  the  original  suit  being  O.S.
   No.4763 of 1986. It was further submitted that the High  Court  also  did
   not consider the cogent findings of the judgment  dated  March  17,  2005
   passed by the Trial Court in O.S. No.4763 of 1986.


7. The second ground raised by the learned counsel for the appellant  is  on
  merits wherein it has been contended that when the respondent  by  letter
  dated September 29, 1982 agreed to re-import 230.4 tonnes of coffee  into
  India which was exported without ICO Stamps by them in haste and  against
  the ICO Regulations of which they were aware and which  entailed  in  the
  debarring of India from the membership of ICO,  then  they  are  estopped
  from claiming any damages and  costs  being  freight  and  other  charges
  arising due to the re-import.


8. Having heard the arguments advanced by  the  counsel  appearing  for  the
   parties and considering the documents on record in light of the averments
   of the parties, we will first consider the  procedural  validity  of  the
   original suit and would accordingly proceed with the merits.


9. It is the claim of the appellant being  the  original  defendant  in  the
   original suit being O.S. No.4763 of 1986 that the present suit is  barred
   by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code. The  said  provision  should  be  read  in
   context of Rule 1 of Order 2. The relevant rules are reproduced below for
   ready reference:

      “1. Frame of suit.—Every suit shall as far as practicable be framed so
      as to afford ground for final decision upon the  subjects  in  dispute
      and to prevent further litigation concerning them.
      2. Suit to include the whole claim.—(1) Every suit shall  include  the
      whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in  respect
      of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion  of
      his claim in order to bring the suit within the  jurisdiction  of  any
      court.
      (2) Relinquishment of part of claim.—Where a plaintiff omits to sue in
      respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of  his  claim,
      he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion  so  omitted  or
      relinquished.
      (3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs.—A person  entitled  to
      more than one relief in respect of the same cause of  action  may  sue
      for all or any of such reliefs; but if he omits, except with the leave
      of the court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue
      for any relief so omitted.”




10. The above rules are  offshoots  of  the  ancient  principle  that  there
   should be an end to litigation traced in the Full Bench decision  of  the
   Court in Lachmi vs. Bhulli[1] and approved by this Court in many  of  its
   decisions. The principle which emerges from the  above  is  that  no  one
   ought to be vexed twice for the same cause. In light of the above, from a
   plain reading of Order 2 Rule 2, it emerges that if different reliefs and
   claims arise out of the same cause of  action  then  the  plaintiff  must
   place all his claims before the Court in one suit and cannot omit one  of
   the reliefs or claims except without the leave of the Court. Order 2 Rule
   2 bars a plaintiff from omitting one part of claim and raising  the  same
   in a subsequent suit. (See: Deva Ram & Anr. vs. Ishwar Chand &  Anr.[2]).
   Furthermore, this Court in  Alka Gupta v. Narender Kumar Gupta[3]  stated
   that:

      “The object of Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code  is  twofold.  First  is  to
      ensure that no defendant is sued and vexed twice in regard to the same
      cause of action. Second is to prevent a plaintiff  from  splitting  of
      claims and remedies based on the same cause of action. The  effect  of
      Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code is to  bar  a  plaintiff  who  had  earlier
      claimed certain remedies in regard to a cause of action, from filing a
      second suit in regard to other reliefs based  on  the  same  cause  of
      action. It does not however bar a second suit based on a different and
      distinct cause of action.”


11. The bar of Order 2 Rule 2  comes  into  operation  where  the  cause  of
   action on which the previous suit was filed, forms the foundation of  the
   subsequent suit; and when the plaintiff could  have  claimed  the  relief
   sought in the subsequent suit, in the earlier suit; and  both  the  suits
   are between the same parties. Furthermore, the bar under Order 2  Rule  2
   must be specifically pleaded by the defendant in the suit and  the  Trial
   Court should specifically frame a specific issue in that  regard  wherein
   the pleading in the earlier suit must be examined and  the  plaintiff  is
   given an opportunity to demonstrate that  the  cause  of  action  in  the
   subsequent suit is different. This was held by this Court in  Alka  Gupta
   v. Narender Kumar Gupta (supra) which referred to decision of this  Court
   in Gurbux Singh vs. Bhooralal[4] wherein it was held that:
       “6. In order that a plea of a bar under Order  2  Rule  2(3)  of  the
      Civil Procedure Code should succeed the defendant who raises the  plea
      must make out: (1) that the second suit was in  respect  of  the  same
      cause of action as that on which the previous suit was based; (2) that
      in respect of that cause of action the plaintiff was entitled to  more
      than one relief; (3) that being thus entitled to more than one  relief
      the plaintiff, without leave obtained from the court  omitted  to  sue
      for the relief for which the second suit had  been  filed.  From  this
      analysis it would be seen that the defendant would have  to  establish
      primarily and to start with, the precise cause of  action  upon  which
      the previous suit was filed, for unless there is identity between  the
      cause of action on which the earlier suit was filed and that on  which
      the claim in the later suit is based there would be no scope  for  the
      application of the bar.”



12. The Courts in order to determine whether a suit is  barred  by  Order  2
   Rule 2 must examine the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiff  in  his
   plaints filed in the relevant suits (See: S. Nazeer Ahmed v.  State  Bank
   of Mysore & Ors.[5]). Considering the technicality of the plea of Order 2
   Rule 2, both the plaints must be read as a whole to identify the cause of
   action, which is necessary to establish a  claim  or  necessary  for  the
   plaintiff to prove if traversed. Therefore, after identifying  the  cause
   of action if it is found that the cause of action  pleaded  in  both  the
   suits is identical and the relief claimed in the  subsequent  suit  could
   have been pleaded in the earlier suit, then the subsequent suit is barred
   by Order 2 Rule 2.

13. In the present case we have found the first suit is claimed to  be  O.S.
   No. 3150 of 1985 and the subsequent suit is claimed to be O.S. No.4763 of
   1986. The first suit was filed by Ramesh Enterprises which is admitted to
   be the Coffee Division of Ramesh Exports Pvt. Ltd. which is the plaintiff
   in the second suit. It has also been admitted by  the  plaintiff  in  the
   second suit that Ramesh Exports Pvt. Ltd. is a wholly owned subsidiary of
   Ramesh Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. Both the entities are operated  out  of  the
   same premises and suits were filed  by  their  Director  who  is  Mr.  T.
   Thangapalam. Therefore, we are of the opinion that de facto  the  parties
   are the same in both the suits. Having perused the written  statement  of
   the defendant being the appellant before us in O.S. No.4763  of  1986  we
   have found that the defendant in paragraph 14(c) of his written statement
   has specifically pleaded that:


      “The suit is barred under Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC as the  plaintiff
      having filed O.S. No. 3150/1985 in respect of the alleged  failure  of
      the board to supply stamps for the coffees purchased by it between 11-
      8-1982 and 8-9-1982, the claim now made must be deemed  to  have  been
      relinquished.”






The Trial Court also in its  judgment  dated  March  17,  2005  specifically
framed the following issue:


      “(5) Whether Defendant prove that this is barred as per para 14 (c) of
      the Written Statement?”






14. It is  evident  from  the  above  that  the  two  requirements  for  the
   operation of bar under Order 2 Rule 2 are met with and what remains to be
   seen is whether the cause of action in the subsequent suit  is  the  same
   and the relief claimed therein could have been  claimed  in  the  earlier
   suit. For the same, both the plaints  are  discussed  in  the  subsequent
   paragraphs.


15. In the plaint in O.S. No. 3150 of 1985 being the earlier  suit,  it  has
   been claimed by the respondent  being  the  plaintiff  therein  that  the
   appellant being the defendants failed to supply  ICO  Stamps  for  268.08
   tonnes of coffee purchased by him for export between August 11, 1982  and
   September 8, 1982, inspite of its assurances  leading  to  delay  in  the
   shipment of the coffee resulting in losses to the plaintiff. On the basis
   of the same, the respondent claimed for the losses suffered by him  along
   with damages. The respondent further averred that the cause of action for
   the suit arose on various dates when the respondent purchased coffee from
   the appellant in the auctions held by them on the assurance that the  ICO
   Stamps will be supplied by the appellant to them.


16. The cause of action in the above suit is the failure of  ICO  to  supply
   stamps to the respondent inspite of its  assurances.  The  respondent  to
   ensure the success of his claim, was required to prove that on account of
   the omission of the appellant i.e. failure to provide ICO Stamps for  the
   coffee purchased by them, the respondent suffered losses.


17. Inspite of the different wording of the  plaint  in  O.S.  No.  4763  of
   1986, being the subsequent suit, the  respondent  has  primarily  claimed
   that inspite of the assurance given by the appellant  regarding  the  ICO
   stamps by its Circular dated August 18, 1982,  the  appellant  failed  to
   provide the requisite ICO Stamps for 230.4 tonnes coffee purchased by  it
   between July 25, 1982 and August 18, 1982.  That  on  the  basis  of  the
   assurance of the appellant the respondent started making preparations for
   the shipment and after requesting for the ICO Stamps on August  28,  1982
   and waiting for the same, he  was  forced  for  shipment  of  the  coffee
   without the necessary stamps which lead to the  recalling  of  the  ship.
   That the respondent had to bear to and  fro  freight  charges  and  other
   costs being the damages  to  importers  for  delay  in  shipment  as  the
   shipment was called back wrongfully; on account of the  omission  of  the
   appellant for which the respondent is not accountable; and the  appellant
   is liable  for  the  cost  arising  from  the  recall  of  the  shipment.
   Furthermore, as per the plaintiff, the cause of  action  arose  when  the
   circular assuring the availability of stamps was issued, when the  coffee
   was shipped and subsequently called back.


18. Though the plaint in the subsequent suit is more specific,  we  however,
   find that the respondent so as to recover the cost of the freight charges
   and other costs suffered by it, must prove that the appellant was under a
   duty to provide ICO stamps; and its failure to provide the stamps  timely
   lead to the coffee being shipped without the stamps and  ultimately  lead
   to the losses being suffered by the respondent.


19. In both the suits the fact required  to  be  proved  by  the  respondent
   (being the plaintiff therein), to succeed  in  its  claims  was  that  on
   account of the failure of the appellant (being the defendant) to  provide
   the required ICO stamps as assured by it, the respondent  had  to  suffer
   losses. The two separate reliefs claimed by the respondent are  dependent
   on the same fact being the omission of duty by the appellant. The grounds
   of disparity in the suits are the amount of coffee and the dates when the
   same was purchased, however it must be  noted  that  the  period  between
   August 11, 1982 and August 18, 1982 is common to both the suits and there
   are no specific pleadings differentiating  the  same.   Furthermore,  the
   suits were filed within a span of nine days of each other.


20. In the light of the above, we are of the opinion that suits should  have
   been merged with the claims against coffee  purchased  between  July  25,
   1982 and September 8, 1982, (a period arising from the merging of the two
   periods claimed in the suits wherein eight days  overlapped  each  other)
   clubbed together in the same suit from which two reliefs, first being the
   losses due to delayed shipment and second  being  the  costs  and  losses
   arising due to the recall of the shipment, could have been claimed.


21. In the present  factual  matrix  both  the  reliefs  are  being  claimed
   separately  in  the  two  concerned  suits.  This  scenario  negates  the
   principle of Order 2, Rule 2 in absence of any explanation as to why  the
   respondent failed to claim the relief by way of a single  suit  when  the
   cause of action was the same in  the  both.  Therefore,  we  are  of  the
   opinion that the Trial  Court  in  its  judgment  dated  March  17,  2005
   correctly held that in light of O.S. No. 3150 of 1985 the present suit is
   barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code.


22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we find that  the  High  Court  has
   misappreciated the facts in the light of Order 2 Rule 2 of the  Code  and
   thereby the reasoning of the High Court cannot be sustained in the eye of
   law. The said suit (O.S.No.4763  of  1986)  is  barred.  Considering  the
   facts, as discussed above, we set aside the judgment  and  order  of  the
   High Court and uphold the order of  the  Trial  Court.  Accordingly,  the
   present appeal is allowed and the suit of the respondent is dismissed.




                                       ………………..…....……....…………..J.
                                                 (Chandramauli Kumar Prasad)




                                       ………………..…....……....…………..J.
                                                          (Pinaki Chandra
Ghose)
New Delhi;
May 9, 2014.






-----------------------
[1]    ILR (1927) 8 Lah 384
[2]    (1995) 6 SCC 733
[3]    (2010) 10 SCC 141
[4]    AIR 1964 SC 1810
[5]    (2007) 11 SCC 75