Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KK NPP) - Apex court made some directions - Affidavits filed implementation of the directions - Apex court held that there is no laxity on the part of the Respondents in not carrying out various directions of this Court. For full implementation of directions, evidently, it may take some more time and we are sure that the Respondents would make earnest efforts to give effect to all the directions of this Court in letter and spirit. Shri Prashant Bhushan, learned senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner, submitted that a team headed by a former Chairman of the AERB be constituted to examine as to whether these directions are being properly implemented or not. We find it unnecessary to appoint any Committee at this stage since the status report and the affidavits indicate that the Respondents are taking necessary steps so as to give effect to various directions, even though some of the directions are yet to be fulfilled, which naturally would take some more time. At the moment, we find no reason to give any further directions. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of as above, so also the I.A.= G. Sundarrajan …. Petitioner Versus Union of India & Ors. …. Respondents= 2014(May.Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41526

   Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KK NPP)  - Apex court made some directions - Affidavits filed implementation of the directions - Apex court held that there is no laxity on the part of the Respondents in not  carrying  out  various  directions   of   this   Court.     For   full
implementation of directions, evidently, it may take some more time and  we are sure that the Respondents would make earnest efforts to give effect  to all the directions of this Court in letter and spirit. Shri Prashant Bhushan,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the Petitioner, submitted that a team headed by a former Chairman of  the  AERB be constituted to examine as to whether these directions are being properly implemented or not. We find it unnecessary to appoint any Committee at this stage since  the  status  report  and  the  affidavits  indicate  that  the Respondents are taking necessary steps so as  to  give  effect  to  various directions, even though some of the directions are  yet  to  be  fulfilled, which naturally would take some more time.   At  the  moment,  we  find  no reason to give any further directions. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of as above, so also the I.A.=

This Court, while disposing of the case  titled  G.  Sundarrajan  vs.
Union of India  reported in (2013) 6 SCC 620, gave 15  directions  for  due
compliance by AERB, NPCIL, DAE, MoEF, TNPCB,  State  of  Tamil  Nadu,  etc.
Complaining  that  those  directions  had  not  been  complied  with,   the
Petitioner herein filed Writ Petition No.19286 of 2013  before  the  Madras
High Court praying for a declaration that the clearance granted by AERB for
‘First Approach to Criticality’ (FAC) of Unit 1 of Kudankulam Nuclear Power
Project (KK NPP) on July 11, 2013 be  declared  as  null  and  void. =

  After perusing the various affidavits filed by  the  Respondents,  we
notice that the directions given by this Court are being properly addressed
by the Respondents and there is no laxity on the part of the Respondents in
not  carrying  out  various  directions   of   this   Court.     For   full
implementation of directions, evidently, it may take some more time and  we
are sure that the Respondents would make earnest efforts to give effect  to
all the directions of this Court in letter and spirit.

9.    Shri Prashant Bhushan,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
Petitioner, submitted that a team headed by a former Chairman of  the  AERB
be constituted to examine as to whether these directions are being properly
implemented or not. We find it unnecessary to appoint any Committee at this
stage since  the  status  report  and  the  affidavits  indicate  that  the
Respondents are taking necessary steps so as  to  give  effect  to  various
directions, even though some of the directions are  yet  to  be  fulfilled,
which naturally would take some more time.   At  the  moment,  we  find  no
reason to give any further directions.

10.   The Special Leave Petition is disposed of as above, so also the I.A.

2014(May.Part)http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41526

K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, VIKRAMAJIT SEN
                                                          NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

               SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.36179 OF 2013

G. Sundarrajan                                       …. Petitioner


                             Versus


Union of India & Ors.                           …. Respondents

                                    WITH

                                  I.A. NO.3
                                     IN
                            C.A. NO.4440 OF 2013


                               J U D G M E N T


K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.

1.    This Court, while disposing of the case  titled  G.  Sundarrajan  vs.
Union of India  reported in (2013) 6 SCC 620, gave 15  directions  for  due
compliance by AERB, NPCIL, DAE, MoEF, TNPCB,  State  of  Tamil  Nadu,  etc.
Complaining  that  those  directions  had  not  been  complied  with,   the
Petitioner herein filed Writ Petition No.19286 of 2013  before  the  Madras
High Court praying for a declaration that the clearance granted by AERB for
‘First Approach to Criticality’ (FAC) of Unit 1 of Kudankulam Nuclear Power
Project (KK NPP) on July 11, 2013 be  declared  as  null  and  void.   Writ
Petition was heard along with few other writ petitions like WP No.15829  of
2013 and Writ Petition No.20161 of 2013 and the same were disposed of by  a
common judgment dated 29.7.2013,  against  which  the  Petitioner  in  Writ
Petition  No.19285 of 2013 has come up with this  Special  Leave  Petition.
The Petitioner has also moved I.A. No.3 of 2013 in Civil Appeal No.4440  of
2013 for a direction to the respondents not to  commission  the  Kudankulam
Nuclear Plant till each of the 15 directions given by  this  Court  in  the
aforementioned judgment has been complied with and till they  are  properly
verified by an independent expert committee appointed by this Court.

2.    When SLP (C) No.36179 of 2013 came up for hearing, we passed an order
on 17.2.2014 directing the respondents to file their response  with  regard
to steps they have taken to give effect to the fifteen directions given  by
this Court.   In compliance, the Respondents have  filed  their  affidavits
and status report.

3.    We heard  Mr.  Prashant  Bhushan,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
Petitioner, Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned Solicitor General of  India,  Shri
Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing for  the  State  of  Tamil
Nadu, Shri Subramonium Prasad, AAG and other learned counsel appearing  for
the contesting respondents.

4.    AERB in its affidavit dated 24.3.2014  explained  the  various  steps
they have taken so as to comply with the various directions issued by  this
Court. With regard to  the  concern  expressed  about  the  possibility  of
quality issues with equipment from specific source, it was also pointed out
that additional re-verification was carried out before FAC. While doing so,
it was stated that the quality aspects of the safety related  equipment  in
KK NPP from that source had not been compromised. AERB Observers  Team  re-
verified the implementation  of  QA  requirements  from  initial  stage  of
manufacturing  up  to  final  receipt  of  the  component/   equipment   at
Kudankulam.  It was pointed out,  no  non-conformance  of  significance  to
safety was observed.  With regard to direction no.5,  it  was  pointed  out
that SNF can be stored for a minimum period of  7  years  within  plant  in
Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) located in Reactor Building.   Design of the same, it
was pointed out, has been reviewed from the point of  adequacy  of  design,
surveillance requirements, monitoring provisions  to  ensure  safe  storage
considering plant and public safety.  For storage beyond 7 years, Away From
Reactor (AFR) facility is planned by NPCIL. NPCIL has submitted the roadmap
for design, construction and completion of AFR facility specifying that the
AFR facility would be operational by May, 2018  after  obtaining  clearance
from AERB.  With regard to direction no.7, it was pointed out that  DGR  is
to be set up based on  national  policy  and  regulatory  review  would  be
carried out as and when design for the same is evolved.  In  the  meantime,
as per the current regulatory practices, AERB would ensure safe storage  of
SNF  in  the  spent  fuel  pool  or  AFR  at  Site  and  ensure  that   the
transportation is in  accordance  with  the  AERB  requirements.   Detailed
response has been made to rest of the directions in the affidavit filed  by
AERB.

5.    NPCIL has also filed an affidavit along with  Annexure  A  furnishing
the status report with regard to the directions issued by this Court in the
above-mentioned judgment.   NPCIL with regard to  direction  no.1,  pointed
out that the quality of equipment supplied by M/s Zio-Pololsk such as steam
generator,  cation  and  anion  filters,   mechanical   filters,   moisture
separators and re-heaters etc. are fully accessible for any inspection, and
none of Zio-Pololsk supplied equipment to  KKNPP  are  subject  to  neutron
irradiation.   Further, it was submitted that to fulfil the  directions  in
para no.230 of the judgment,  report  has  been  filed.    With  regard  to
direction no.7, it was stated that as the present storage capacity of  each
Spent Nuclear Fuel Bay (SNF Bay) is adequate to accommodate discharged fuel
for a period of seven years starting from its first  refuelling  operation,
and hence as such the AFR facilities would only  be  required  eight  years
after the First Criticality of the KKNPP  Unit-1.    Further,  it  is  also
stated that a Task Force for finalisation of design, design basis report to
construct Away From Reactor (AFR) facility for KKNPP Unit 1 &  2  has  been
constituted by NPCIL vide office Order dated May 15, 2013 and that the Task
Force has prepared a roadmap for the design and construction  of  AFR.   It
was further pointed out  that  NPCIL  is  committed  to  complete  the  AFR
facility within five years.   Reply has also been given to the rest of  the
directions as well.

6.    Detailed affidavit has  been  filed  on  behalf  of  the  Tamil  Nadu
Pollution Control Board stating the steps they have taken  to  comply  with
the directions.  Following the directions of this  Court,  it  was  pointed
out, the officials of the Board inspected the plant on 18.5.2013 along with
the members of the Department of the Atomic Energy, NPCIL,  MoEF,  etc.  to
verify the status of compliance of conditions stipulated by the Tamil  Nadu
Pollution Control Board in  the  consent  order  granted  under  the  Water
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and  the  Air   (Prevention
and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981.  It was  noticed  that  the  Unit  has
complied with the conditions and the consent  order  issued  to  the  Unit.
Further, it was  pointed  out  that  the  Unit  has  installed  temperature
measuring device both at the sea water intake and marine out fall facility,
and the difference between ambient temperature of the  sea  and  the  water
disposed into sea by the Unit is not exceeding 7ºC  as per  the  conditions
stipulated by the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board.

7.    The District Collector,  Tirunelveli  District,  submitted  a  status
report with specific reference to direction nos.11 to 15.  With  regard  to
direction no.11, it was pointed  out  that  the  first  off-site  emergency
exercise was conducted on 9.6.2012 at Unit at Nakkanery  village  with  the
support of the concerned Ministries of the Government of  India,  Officials
of the State Government and the local authorities, etc., and that the  next
exercise will  be  conducted  as  per  the  guidelines  shortly  after  the
Parliamentary Elections are over.  With regard to direction no.12,  it  was
pointed out that under the Neighbourhood Development Programme (NDP)  being
implemented by the Unit, a sum of Rs.200  crores  has  been  earmarked  for
various  projects.   It  was  pointed  out  that  the  projects  have  been
identified and that an Apex  Committee  has  been  constituted  to  oversee
implementation of the NDP.   Further, under NDP, a sum of Rs.45 crores  has
been sanctioned towards first instalment of  the  total  amount  of  Rs.200
crores and from the released funds, work  for  the  installation  of  Solar
Street Light (200 Nos.) and Solar Motor Pumps (32 Nos.) has been completed.
 Further, it was also stated that the upgradation  of  Koodankulam  Primary
Health Centre to Government Hospital and improvements  to  Chettikulam  Sub
Centre, construction of new PHC are nearing completion.   The  construction
of new PHC at Ovari is completed and the improvement and widening of  roads
(29 roads) around the Unit  has  been  completed.   Further,  it  was  also
pointed out that around the Kudankulam  surrounding  area,  the  Government
issued an order to construct 5000 houses at the estimate of  Rs.150  crores
during the year 2013-2014.  With regard to direction no.13, it was  pointed
out that training had  been  conducted  in  August,  2011,  for  the  State
Government officials of  various  departments  including  revenue,  police,
medical, fire, etc. and that a refresher  course  was  organised  in  June,
2012.  Further, it was stated,  schedule  for  refresher  course  is  being
planned in consultation  with  District  Administration.   With  regard  to
direction no.14 relating to the consent of  withdrawal  of  criminal  cases
filed against the agitators, it was pointed out that out of 349 cases,  248
cases had already been withdrawn since  in  those  cases  no  violence  was
noticed.  However, with regard to other  cases  i.e.  cases  of  lay  siege
through sea (6 cases), cases of violence against  private  individuals  (40
cases) and cases of violence against Government officials  (55  cases),  it
was stated, it is not possible to withdraw the cases as the violations  and
crimes committed are very serious in nature.    The  question  whether  the
rest of the cases be proceeded with or not is for the trial court to decide
on which we express no opinion.

8.    After perusing the various affidavits filed by  the  Respondents,  we
notice that the directions given by this Court are being properly addressed
by the Respondents and there is no laxity on the part of the Respondents in
not  carrying  out  various  directions   of   this   Court.     For   full
implementation of directions, evidently, it may take some more time and  we
are sure that the Respondents would make earnest efforts to give effect  to
all the directions of this Court in letter and spirit.

9.    Shri Prashant Bhushan,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the
Petitioner, submitted that a team headed by a former Chairman of  the  AERB
be constituted to examine as to whether these directions are being properly
implemented or not. We find it unnecessary to appoint any Committee at this
stage since  the  status  report  and  the  affidavits  indicate  that  the
Respondents are taking necessary steps so as  to  give  effect  to  various
directions, even though some of the directions are  yet  to  be  fulfilled,
which naturally would take some more time.   At  the  moment,  we  find  no
reason to give any further directions.

10.   The Special Leave Petition is disposed of as above, so also the I.A.




                                        ………………………….J.
                                        (K.S. Radhakrishnan)


                                        …………………………J.
                                        (Vikramajit Sen)
New Delhi,
May 08, 2014.

Land acquisition - Rejection of Sale Deeds on surmises not valid - High court too not corrected the error - Apex court held that In the order of the Reference Court as well as in the order of the High Court there is no indication on what basis the said finding had been arrived at. What had led the learned courts below to come to the conclusion that the appellants had prior knowledge of the proposed acquisition and on that basis had executed the sale deeds “in a hurry to dispose of the plots which had been carved out” also is not known. The further conclusion that the vendees of the aforesaid sale deeds, not being local residents, did not know about the acquisition proceedings and they were charged fanciful prices for the land is plainly unacceptable in the absence of any materials on record to the said effect. Evidence of vital nature furnished by the two sale deeds dated 13.06.1969 (Exbt.1) and 16.10.1969 (Exbt.2) could not have been rejected on the basis of such surmises and conjectures as has been done in the present case. =M/S MAHAMAYA GEN. FINANCE ... APPELLANT (S) CO. LTD. VERSUS STATE OF U.P. & ORS. ... RESPONDENT (S)= 2014 ( May. Part ) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41525

Land acquisition - Rejection of Sale Deeds on surmises not valid - High court too not corrected the error - Apex court held that In  the  order  of   the Reference Court as well as in the order  of  the  High  Court  there  is  no indication on what basis the said finding had been  arrived  at.    What  had led the learned courts below to come to the conclusion that  the  appellants had prior knowledge of the  proposed  acquisition  and  on  that  basis  had executed the sale deeds “in a hurry to dispose of the plots which  had  been carved out” also is not known.  The further conclusion that the  vendees  of the aforesaid sale deeds, not being local residents, did not know about  the acquisition proceedings and they were charged fanciful prices for  the  land is plainly unacceptable in the absence of any materials  on  record  to  the said effect.   Evidence of vital nature  furnished  by  the  two  sale  deeds dated 13.06.1969 (Exbt.1)  and  16.10.1969  (Exbt.2)  could  not  have  been rejected on the basis of such surmises and conjectures as has been  done  in the present case.  =

The appellant sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act.   Before
the Reference Court the appellant filed sale deeds dated  13.06.1969  (Ex.1)
and 16.10.1969 (Ex.2) executed by it in respect of land in the  vicinity  of
the land acquired. The Reference Court, however, refused to accept and  rely
on the said sale deeds on the ground that  the  appellant,  having  come  to
know of the acquisition proceedings, had sold land at  inflated  price;  the
correct price was not known to the vendors who were not local  residents  of
Meerut.   The  Reference  Court,  by  order  dated  26.08.1975,  accordingly
maintained the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. - High court also dismissed the appeal = 

The finding of the Reference Court, upheld  by  the  High
Court, to the effect that the  sales  covered  by  Exbt.1  and  Exbt.2  were
executed at inflated rates by  the  appellant  on  coming  to  know  of  the
acquisition  proceeding  cannot  be  appreciated.   
In  the  order  of   the
Reference Court as well as in the order  of  the  High  Court  there  is  no
indication on what basis the said finding had been  arrived  at.   
What  had
led the learned courts below to come to the conclusion that  the  appellants
had prior knowledge of the  proposed  acquisition  and  on  that  basis  had
executed the sale deeds “in a hurry to dispose of the plots which  had  been
carved out” also is not known.  
The further conclusion that the  vendees  of
the aforesaid sale deeds, not being local residents, did not know about  the
acquisition proceedings and they were charged fanciful prices for  the  land
is plainly unacceptable in the absence of any materials  on  record  to  the
said effect.  
Evidence of vital nature  furnished  by  the  two  sale  deeds
dated 13.06.1969 (Exbt.1)  and  16.10.1969  (Exbt.2)  could  not  have  been
rejected on the basis of such surmises and conjectures as has been  done  in
the present case.  
The High Court having failed  to  rectify  the  aforesaid
apparent errors we are of the view that the  transactions  effected  by  the
two sale deeds  dated  13.06.1969  (Exbt.1)  and  16.10.1969  (Exbt.2)  must
receive due consideration in the determination of the  compensation  payable
to the appellant.

 In the aforesaid circumstances, we set aside the compensation  awarded
by the learned Acquisition Officer as affirmed by the  Reference  Court  and
the High Court by the orders under appeal.   Instead,  we  direct  that  the
compensation payable to the appellant shall now be computed by  taking  into
account the average of the price, at which  the  two  transactions  by  sale
deeds dated 13.06.1969 (Exbt.1) and 16.10.1969 (Exbt.2)  were  effected,  as
noted above, along with solatium and interest  as  payable  under  the  Act.
The Special Land  Acquisition  Officer,  Ghaziabad,  U.P.,  shall  make  the
necessary computation in terms of the present order  so  as  to  enable  the
appellant to receive the balance amount of compensation along with  solatium
and interest as payable, forthwith, and in  any  case  within  three  months
from the date of receipt of this order.



13.   Both the appeals shall now  stand  allowed  to  the  extent  indicated
above.
2014 ( May. Part ) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41525
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, RANJAN GOGOI

                               NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                      CIVIL APPEAL  NO.  5514  OF 2014
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 2715 OF 2009)


M/S MAHAMAYA GEN. FINANCE                 ...    APPELLANT (S)
CO. LTD.

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ORS.                      ...  RESPONDENT (S)

                                    WITH

                     CIVIL APPEAL  NO.    5515  OF 2014
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 11371 OF 2009)


                               J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.     By notification dated 21.10.1969 issued under Section 4 of  the  Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the  Act”)  approximately
455 acres of land situated in villages Prahlad Garhi, Maharajpur and  Karket
Madan was proposed to be acquired in favour of the Uttar Pradesh  Industrial
Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “the Corporation’).   An
area measuring 42 bighas belonging to the  appellant  was  included  in  the
said Notification.

3.    Consequential Notifications under Section 6 and 17(1) of the Act  were
published on 23.6.1970.  Possession of the acquired land was taken  over  on
10.09.1970 and the award was made by the Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer
on 4.5.1972 granting compensation at the rate of Rs.1.33  per  square  yard.
In doing so, a sale deed dated 20.1.1969 in respect of an area of about  200
square yard situated in the village Maharajpur sold for Rs.400/-  was  taken
as the base exemplar.  33% deduction was made on account  of  the  smallness
of  the  area  covered  by  the  aforesaid  sale  deed,  thereby,  assessing
compensation for the acquired land at Rs.1.33 per square yard.

4.    The appellant sought a reference under Section 18 of the Act.   Before
the Reference Court the appellant filed sale deeds dated  13.06.1969  (Ex.1)
and 16.10.1969 (Ex.2) executed by it in respect of land in the  vicinity  of
the land acquired. The Reference Court, however, refused to accept and  rely
on the said sale deeds on the ground that  the  appellant,  having  come  to
know of the acquisition proceedings, had sold land at  inflated  price;  the
correct price was not known to the vendors who were not local  residents  of
Meerut.   The  Reference  Court,  by  order  dated  26.08.1975,  accordingly
maintained the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer.

5.    Aggrieved, the appellant filed a first appeal before  the  High  Court
seeking enhanced  compensation.   The  claim  was  refused  by  order  dated
17.8.2004 primarily on the  ground  that  before  determining  the  rate  of
compensation, the Land Acquisition Officer had verified  66  sale  deeds  in
respect of lands situated in the neighbourhood which were  sold  within  one
year of/from the date of issuance of the Notifications in question.

6.    Not satisfied, the appellant sought a review of  the  aforesaid  order
dated 17.8.2004 which was declined by the High  Court  by  its  order  dated
26.08.2008.  The appeal arising out of SLP (C)  No.2715  of  2009  has  been
instituted in respect of the  order  of  the  High  Court  dated  26.08.2008
passed in the review application whereas SLP (C) No.11371 of 2009  has  been
filed against the main order of the High Court dated 17.08.2004.

7.    We have heard Mr. B.P. Gupta, learned counsel for  the  appellant  and
Mr. Rakesh Uttamchandra Upadhyay, learned counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of
the respondent.

8.    Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the  order  dated
26.08.1975 passed by the Reference Court is ex-facie erroneous  inasmuch  as
the sale deeds dated 13.06.1969 (Ex.1) and  16.10.1969  (Ex.2)  which  could
have furnished a reasonable basis  for  computing  the  correct  quantum  of
compensation was brushed aside by the learned Reference  Court  for  reasons
that are plainly unacceptable.  Learned counsel has drawn our  attention  to
the fact that Exhibit-1 (sale deed dated  12.6.1969)  pertains  to  an  area
measuring 233  square  yards  and  the  sale  transaction  was  effected  at
Rs.5126/- i.e. Rs.22/- per square yards whereas Exhibit-2 (sale  deed  dated
16.10.1969) pertains to an area of 675 square yards which  was  sold  for  a
total consideration of Rs.13,320/-  i.e.  Rs.19.73  per  square  yards.  The
aforesaid sale transactions being in respect of land  located  in  the  same
village i.e. Maharajpur and additionally belonging to the appellant  itself,
the Reference Court was  not  right  in  brushing  aside  the  same  on  the
grounds, already noticed.  It is urged that the High Court having failed  to
correct the aforesaid error, appropriate interference by this Court will  be
justified.

 9.   Controverting the submissions advanced on  behalf  of  the  appellant,
learned counsel for the respondent No.2 has contended that the  compensation
determined by the Land Acquisition Officer, as  affirmed  by  the  Reference
Court and the High Court, was preceded by an elaborate exercise  wherein  as
many as 66 contemporaneous sale deeds were verified.   That  apart,  leaving
aside the two sale deeds dated 13.06.1969 (Ex.1) and 16.10.1969  (Ex.2),  no
other material was laid by the appellant at any stage of the  proceeding  to
show that in respect  of  same  acquisition  higher  compensation  has  been
awarded to any land owner.  The award made by the Land  Acquisition  Officer
as upheld  by  the  Reference  Court  and  the  High  Court  is,  therefore,
contended to be fair and reasonable not justifying any interference.

10.   We have considered the submissions advanced on behalf the parties  and
the materials on record.  The compensation awarded to the appellants at  the
rate of Rs.1.33 per square yard is based on the sale deed  dated  20.01.1969
(Ex. A-1) in respect of a plot measuring 200 square yards  situated  in  the
village Maharajpur which was sold by one Naseerudin for Rs.400/-.  The  sale
deeds dated 13.06.1969 and 16.10.1969 exhibited by the appellant before  the
Reference Court were not considered for  the  reasons  already  noted.   The
close proximity of the dates of aforesaid two sale deeds with  the  date  of
the acquisition which  has  been  cited  as  one  of  the  reasons  for  not
accepting Exbt.1 and Exbt.2 sale deeds does not commend  to  us.   That  the
said sale deeds are in close proximity of  time  with  the  acquisition  and
being in respect of land located in one of  the  villages,  covered  by  the
acquisition  Notification  and  above  all  the  land  being  owned  by  the
appellant itself, in our considered view, are vital factors that  could  not
have been ignored. The finding of the Reference Court, upheld  by  the  High
Court, to the effect that the  sales  covered  by  Exbt.1  and  Exbt.2  were
executed at inflated rates by  the  appellant  on  coming  to  know  of  the
acquisition  proceeding  cannot  be  appreciated.   In  the  order  of   the
Reference Court as well as in the order  of  the  High  Court  there  is  no
indication on what basis the said finding had been  arrived  at.   What  had
led the learned courts below to come to the conclusion that  the  appellants
had prior knowledge of the  proposed  acquisition  and  on  that  basis  had
executed the sale deeds “in a hurry to dispose of the plots which  had  been
carved out” also is not known.  The further conclusion that the  vendees  of
the aforesaid sale deeds, not being local residents, did not know about  the
acquisition proceedings and they were charged fanciful prices for  the  land
is plainly unacceptable in the absence of any materials  on  record  to  the
said effect.  Evidence of vital nature  furnished  by  the  two  sale  deeds
dated 13.06.1969 (Exbt.1)  and  16.10.1969  (Exbt.2)  could  not  have  been
rejected on the basis of such surmises and conjectures as has been  done  in
the present case.  The High Court having failed  to  rectify  the  aforesaid
apparent errors we are of the view that the  transactions  effected  by  the
two sale deeds  dated  13.06.1969  (Exbt.1)  and  16.10.1969  (Exbt.2)  must
receive due consideration in the determination of the  compensation  payable
to the appellant.

11.   The acquisition in the present case was proposed in the year 1969  and
the possession of the land had been taken from the appellant as far back  as
in the year 1970.  Due to long efflux of time that has occurred  we  are  of
the view that the present is a fit case wherein the  task  of  determination
of the basis for quantification of the compensation due and payable  to  the
appellant should be undertaken by us in order to give a quietus to  the  lis
between the parties.

12.   In the aforesaid circumstances, we set aside the compensation  awarded
by the learned Acquisition Officer as affirmed by the  Reference  Court  and
the High Court by the orders under appeal.   Instead,  we  direct  that  the
compensation payable to the appellant shall now be computed by  taking  into
account the average of the price, at which  the  two  transactions  by  sale
deeds dated 13.06.1969 (Exbt.1) and 16.10.1969 (Exbt.2)  were  effected,  as
noted above, along with solatium and interest  as  payable  under  the  Act.
The Special Land  Acquisition  Officer,  Ghaziabad,  U.P.,  shall  make  the
necessary computation in terms of the present order  so  as  to  enable  the
appellant to receive the balance amount of compensation along with  solatium
and interest as payable, forthwith, and in  any  case  within  three  months
from the date of receipt of this order.



13.   Both the appeals shall now  stand  allowed  to  the  extent  indicated
above.

                                                     ……………………....…………………………J
                       [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]


                       ……………………....…………………………J
                       [RANJAN GOGOI]
NEW DELHI,
MAY  08, 2014.
-----------------------
9

Delhi Rent control Act - Leave to defend - Bonafide requirement of shop rented situated in main road for his business purpose as his business is located in a lane in exchange and not getting good business - Leave to defendant was rejected as there is no triable point - High court granted leave permission - Apex court held that What the tenant contends is that the landlord has several other shop houses from which he is carrying on different business and further that the landlord has other premises from where the business proposed from the tenanted premises can be effectively carried out. It would hardly require any reiteration of the settled principle of law that it is not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the property belonging to the landlord should be utilized by him for the purpose of his business.Also, the fact that the landlord is doing business from various other premises cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted premises so long as he intends to use the said tenanted premises for his own business. The grounds on which leave to defend was sought by the tenant and has been granted by the High Court runs counter to the fundamental principles governing the right of a tenant to contest the claim of bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the landlord under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. Even assuming the assertions made by the tenant to be correct, the same do not disclose any triable issue so as to entitle the tenant to grant of leave to defend.We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned order dated 20.09.2012 of the High Court of Delhi is not legally sustainable. We, accordingly, set aside the same and allow this appeal and restore the order dated 02.09.2011 passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, Delhi.= Anil Bajaj & Anr. ... APPELLANT (S) VERSUS Vinod Ahuja ... RESPONDENT (S) = 2014 (May. Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41524

  Delhi Rent control Act - Leave to defend - Bonafide requirement of shop rented situated in main road for  his business purpose as his business is located in a lane  in exchange and not getting good business - Leave to defendant was rejected as there is no triable point - High court granted leave permission - Apex court held that What the tenant contends is that the landlord has  several  other shop houses from which he is carrying  on  different  business  and  further that the landlord has other premises from where the business  proposed  from the tenanted premises can be  effectively  carried  out.   It  would  hardly require any reiteration of the settled principle of law that it is  not  for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the  property  belonging  to the landlord should be utilized by him for  the  purpose  of  his  business.Also, the fact that the  landlord  is  doing  business  from  various  other premises cannot foreclose his right  to  seek  eviction  from  the  tenanted premises so long as he intends to use the said  tenanted  premises  for  his own business.  The grounds on which  leave  to  defend  was  sought  by  the tenant and  has  been  granted  by  the  High  Court  runs  counter  to  the fundamental principles governing the right of a tenant to contest the  claim of bonafide requirement of the suit  premises  by  the  landlord  under  the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.  Even assuming  the  assertions  made  by  the tenant to be correct, the same do not disclose any triable issue  so  as  to entitle the tenant to grant of leave to defend.We  are,  therefore,  of  the  view  that  the  impugned  order  dated 20.09.2012 of the High Court of Delhi is not legally sustainable.  We, accordingly, set aside the same and allow this appeal and restore  the order  dated  02.09.2011  passed  by  the  learned   Additional Rent Controller, Delhi.=

The appellants, who are the landlords, seek to  challenge  the  order
dated 20.09.2012 passed by the High Court of Delhi  granting  leave  to  the
respondent-tenant to contest the proceedings for his eviction under  Section
14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,  1958.  The order of the High  Court
is in reversal of the order dated 02.09.2011 passed by the  Additional  Rent
Controller who had refused to grant leave to defend to the tenant. =

In the present case it is clear that  while  the  landlord  (appellant
No. 1) is carrying on his business from a shop premise located in  a  narrow
lane, the tenant is in occupation of the premises located on the  main  road
which the landlord considers to be more suitable for his own business.   
The
materials on record, in fact, disclose that the landlord had offered to  the
tenant the premises located in the narrow lane in exchange for the  tenanted
premises which offer was declined by the tenant.  
It  is  not  the  tenant’s
case that the landlord-appellant No. 1  does  not  propose  to  utilize  the
tenanted premises from which eviction is sought  for  the  purposes  of  his
business.  
It is also not the tenant’s case that the  landlord  proposes  to
rent out/keep  vacant  the  tenanted  premises  after  obtaining  possession
thereof or to use the same is any way inconsistent  with  the  need  of  the
landlord.  
What the tenant contends is that the landlord has  several  other
shop houses from which he is carrying  on  different  business  and  further
that the landlord has other premises from where the business  proposed  from
the tenanted premises can be  effectively  carried  out.   
It  would  hardly
require any reiteration of the settled principle of law that it is  not  for
the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the  property  belonging  to
the landlord should be utilized by him for  the  purpose  of  his  business.

Also, the fact that the  landlord  is  doing  business  from  various  other
premises cannot foreclose his right  to  seek  eviction  from  the  tenanted
premises so long as he intends to use the said  tenanted  premises  for  his
own business.  
The grounds on which  leave  to  defend  was  sought  by  the
tenant and  has  been  granted  by  the  High  Court  runs  counter  to  the
fundamental principles governing the right of a tenant to contest the  claim
of bonafide requirement of the suit  premises  by  the  landlord  under  the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.  
Even assuming  the  assertions  made  by  the
tenant to be correct, the same do not disclose any triable issue  so  as  to
entitle the tenant to grant of leave to defend.

We  are,  therefore,  of  the  view  that  the  impugned  order  dated
      20.09.2012 of the High Court of Delhi is not legally sustainable.  We,
      accordingly, set aside the same and allow this appeal and restore  the
      order  dated  02.09.2011  passed  by  the  learned   Additional   Rent
      Controller, Delhi.

2014 (May. Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41524
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, RANJAN GOGOI

                             NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                      CIVIL APPEAL  NO.   5513  OF 2014
        (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 35943 OF 2012)


Anil Bajaj & Anr.                                  ...  APPELLANT (S)

                                   VERSUS

Vinod Ahuja                                   ...  RESPONDENT (S)



                               J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.     The appellants, who are the landlords, seek to  challenge  the  order
dated 20.09.2012 passed by the High Court of Delhi  granting  leave  to  the
respondent-tenant to contest the proceedings for his eviction under  Section
14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,  1958.  The order of the High  Court
is in reversal of the order dated 02.09.2011 passed by the  Additional  Rent
Controller who had refused to grant leave to defend to the tenant.

3.    The matter lies within a short compass notwithstanding  the  elaborate
application filed by the respondent-tenant seeking leave duly  supported  by
an affidavit and the detailed manner in which  the  appellant-landlords  had
contested the claim of the tenant.

      Briefly stated, leave was sought by the tenant on the ground that  the
landlords own several other properties  in  the  vicinity  of  the  tenanted
premises from where they are carrying on business or  have  rented  out  the
same.  As such, the tenanted premises i.e. No.38-UB,  Jawahar  Nagar,  Kamla
Nagar, Delhi is not bonafide required for the use of the landlords.

      In response, the landlords contend  that  the  first  appellant,  Anil
Bajaj is running a kiryana shop in premises No. 25-UB, Jawahar Nagar,  which
is located in a lane 15 feet in  width.   According  to  the  appellants  on
account of the location of the tenanted  premises,  the  appellant  No.1  is
unable to generate sufficient business causing acute hardship to  his  large
family.  Therefore, the appellants  need  the  tenanted  premises  which  is
situated on the main road.  According to the  appellants  they  had  offered
the premises in possession of  the  Appellant  No.1  i.e.  No.25-UB  Jawahar
Nagar to the tenant in  exchange  for  the  tenanted  premises  i.e.  38-UB,
Jawahar Nagar which offer has been declined by the  tenant.  The  appellants
have further averred that while most of the other properties alleged  to  be
in their ownership are not presently owned by  the  appellants,  some  other
items of property mentioned by the tenant in the application  seeking  leave
to defend are owned and utilized by other family members of  the  appellants
and the first appellant has no connection with such properties  or  business
carried on by the other members of the family.

4.     On  the  aforesaid  broad  pleadings  of  the  parties,  the  learned
Additional Rent Controller thought it fit to come  to  the  conclusion  that
the contentions made by the tenant are mere  assertions  without  any  basis
and that no triable issue is disclosed warranting grant of leave to  defend.
 In reversal, the High Court held that the precise relationship between  the
two appellants and the holding/interest of  the  first  appellant  in  other
items of property standing in the name of other  family  members  require  a
probe for which leave ought to be granted. Hence the impugned order and  the
present appeal arising therefrom.

5.    The principles governing grant or refusal of  leave  to  defend  under
the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 had been  squarely  dealt  with  in  Charan
Dass Duggal vs. Brahma Nand[1].  The issue has been aptly summarized in  the
following observations of the Court.
      “5. What should be the approach when leave to defend is sought?  There
      appears to be a mistaken belief that unless the tenant at  that  stage
      makes out such a strong case as would non-suit the landlord, leave  to
      defend cannot be granted. This approach is wholly improper. When leave
      to defend is sought, the tenant must make out such a prima facie  case
      raising such pleas that a triable issue would emerge and that  in  our
      opinion should be sufficient to grant leave. The test is the test of a
      triable issue and not the final success in  the  action  (see  Santosh
      Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh[2]). At  the  stage  of  granting  the  leave
      parties rely in support of their rival contentions on  affidavits  and
      assertions and counter-assertions on affidavits may  not  afford  such
      incontrovertible evidence to lead to an affirmative conclusion one way
      or the other. Conceding that when possession is sought on  the  ground
      of personal requirement, an absolute need is not to be satisfied but a
      mere desire equally is not sufficient. It has  to  be  something  more
      than a mere desire. And being an enabling provision, the burden is  on
      the landlord to establish his case affirmatively. …… …… ……. ….




      7. The genesis of our procedural laws is to be traced to principles of
      natural justice, the principal amongst them being that  no  one  shall
      suffer civil or evil or pecuniary  consequence  at  his  back  without
      giving him an adequate and effective  opportunity  to  participate  to
      disprove the  case  against  him  and  prove  his  own  case.  Summary
      procedure does not clothe an authority with  power  to  enjoy  summary
      dismissal. Undoubtedly wholly frivolous  defence  may  not  entitle  a
      person leave to defend. But equally a triable issue raised, enjoins  a
      duty to grant leave. May be in the end the defence  may  fail.  It  is
      necessary to bear in mind that when leave to  defend  is  refused  the
      party seeking leave is denied an opportunity to test the truth of  the
      averments  of  the  opposite  party  by  cross-examination  and  rival
      affidavits may not furnish reliable evidence for concluding the  point
      one way or the other. It is not for a moment suggested that  leave  to
      defend must be granted on mere asking but it is  equally  improper  to
      refuse to grant  leave  though  triable  issues  are  raised  and  the
      controversy can be properly adjudicated after ascertainment  of  truth
      through  cross-examination  of  witnesses   who   have   filed   their
      affidavits.”

6.    In the present case it is clear that  while  the  landlord  (appellant
No. 1) is carrying on his business from a shop premise located in  a  narrow
lane, the tenant is in occupation of the premises located on the  main  road
which the landlord considers to be more suitable for his own business.   The
materials on record, in fact, disclose that the landlord had offered to  the
tenant the premises located in the narrow lane in exchange for the  tenanted
premises which offer was declined by the tenant.  It  is  not  the  tenant’s
case that the landlord-appellant No. 1  does  not  propose  to  utilize  the
tenanted premises from which eviction is sought  for  the  purposes  of  his
business.  It is also not the tenant’s case that the  landlord  proposes  to
rent out/keep  vacant  the  tenanted  premises  after  obtaining  possession
thereof or to use the same is any way inconsistent  with  the  need  of  the
landlord.  What the tenant contends is that the landlord has  several  other
shop houses from which he is carrying  on  different  business  and  further
that the landlord has other premises from where the business  proposed  from
the tenanted premises can be  effectively  carried  out.   It  would  hardly
require any reiteration of the settled principle of law that it is  not  for
the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the  property  belonging  to
the landlord should be utilized by him for  the  purpose  of  his  business.
Also, the fact that the  landlord  is  doing  business  from  various  other
premises cannot foreclose his right  to  seek  eviction  from  the  tenanted
premises so long as he intends to use the said  tenanted  premises  for  his
own business.  The grounds on which  leave  to  defend  was  sought  by  the
tenant and  has  been  granted  by  the  High  Court  runs  counter  to  the
fundamental principles governing the right of a tenant to contest the  claim
of bonafide requirement of the suit  premises  by  the  landlord  under  the
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.  Even assuming  the  assertions  made  by  the
tenant to be correct, the same do not disclose any triable issue  so  as  to
entitle the tenant to grant of leave to defend.


   6. We  are,  therefore,  of  the  view  that  the  impugned  order  dated
      20.09.2012 of the High Court of Delhi is not legally sustainable.  We,
      accordingly, set aside the same and allow this appeal and restore  the
      order  dated  02.09.2011  passed  by  the  learned   Additional   Rent
      Controller, Delhi.
                                                                          7.
                                               …………………...........………………………J.
                    [SUDHANSHU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]


                                               .…………………..........………………………J.
                       [RANJAN GOGOI]
NEW DELHI,
MAY    08, 2014.
-----------------------
[1]    (1983) 1 SCC 301
[2]    1958 SCR 1211

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7

PD Act sec.3 - Detention order more than 3 months and for 12 months at a stretch - not valid - when habeas corpus writ filed - High court dismissed the same with cryptic order with out going into the merits of the case - Apex court held that Undisputedly, the detenu was detained on 5th October, 2013 which means that he remained under detention for about seven months at a stretch without any periodical review as envisaged by law. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the detention order passed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh in this case is in contravention to the provisions of law. On this ground alone, without going into other issues, we thought this appeal has to be allowed and the order of detention has to be quashed. We accordingly allow the appeal quashing the detention order issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh and setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. The detenu shall be set at liberty forthwith.= CHERUKURI MANI … APPELLANT W/O NARENDRA CHOWDARI VERSUS THE CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF … RESPONDENTS ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.= 2014(May. Part ) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41522

 PD Act sec.3 - Detention order more than 3 months and for 12 months at a stretch - not valid - when habeas corpus writ filed - High court dismissed the same with cryptic order with out going into the merits of the case - Apex court held that  Undisputedly, the detenu was detained on 5th October,  2013 which means that he remained under detention for about  seven  months  at  a stretch  without  any  periodical  review  as  envisaged  by  law.  We  are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the detention order passed by  the Government of Andhra Pradesh  in  this  case  is  in  contravention  to  the provisions of law. On this ground alone, without going  into  other  issues, we thought this appeal has to be allowed and the order of detention  has  to be quashed. We accordingly allow the  appeal  quashing the detention order issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh  and  setting aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. The detenu shall  be  set  at liberty forthwith.=

The writ petition was dismissed by the  High
Court by the impugned order dated 28th October, 2013 stating that until  and
unless the competent Court of law decides the order of detention as  illegal
and invalid, it cannot be said that it is unauthorized detention.=

When the appellant challenged the detention of her husband before  the
High Court in a habeas corpus Writ Petition, the High  Court  dismissed  the
same with a cryptic order. In our considered view, when habeas  corpus  writ
petition is filed, even though the petitioner has not  properly  framed  the
petition and not sought appropriate relief, it is expected  from  the  Court
to at least go into the issue  and  decide  on  merits.  Normally,  in  such
matters where liberty of a person is at  stake,  the  Courts  would  take  a
liberal approach  in  the  procedural  aspects.  But  unfortunately  in  the
instant case, the  High  Court  has  dismissed  the  writ  petition  at  the
threshold itself.

whether  the  State
Government has the power to pass a detention order to detain a person  at  a
stretch for a period of 12 months under the provisions of the Act.
 Section 3: Power to make orders detaining certain persons  :
Provided that the period specified in the order made by the Government
      under this sub-section shall not in the first instance,  exceed  three
      months, but the Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that  it  is
      necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period  from  time
      to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time.=

Undisputedly, the detenu was detained on 5th October,  2013
which means that he remained under detention for about  seven  months  at  a
stretch  without  any  periodical  review  as  envisaged  by  law.  We  are,
therefore, of the considered opinion that the detention order passed by  the
Government of Andhra Pradesh  in  this  case  is  in  contravention  to  the
provisions of law. On this ground alone, without going  into  other  issues,
we thought this appeal has to be allowed and the order of detention  has  to
be quashed.                
18.    We accordingly allow the  appeal  quashing
the detention order issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh  and  setting
aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. The detenu shall  be  set  at
liberty forthwith.
2014(May. Part ) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41522
RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, N.V. RAMANA

                                                            REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1133  OF 2014
                               ARISING OUT OF
                SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) NO. 2531 OF 2014


CHERUKURI MANI                                … APPELLANT
W/O NARENDRA CHOWDARI

VERSUS

THE CHIEF SECRETARY, GOVERNMENT OF  … RESPONDENTS
ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS.


                                  JUDGMENT

N.V. RAMANA, J.

      Leave granted.
2.     The  appellant,  who  is  the  wife   of   one   Cherukuri   Narendra
Chowdari—detenu,  filed  a  writ   petition  under  Article   226   of   the
Constitution before the High Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh  alleging  that  her
husband has been unauthorisedly detained and the detention order passed  was
illegal and sought his release. The writ petition was dismissed by the  High
Court by the impugned order dated 28th October, 2013 stating that until  and
unless the competent Court of law decides the order of detention as  illegal
and invalid, it cannot be said that it is unauthorized detention.  Aggrieved
by the said order, the appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.
3.    The facts which are necessary for the  disposal  of  this  appeal  are
that the Collector & District Magistrate,  East  Godavari  District,  Andhra
Pradesh (Respondent No. 2) issued  a  preventive  detention  order  on  30th
September,  2013,  under  the  Andhra  Pradesh   Prevention   of   Dangerous
Activities  of  Bootleggers,  Dacoits,  Drug  Offenders,  Goondas,   Immoral
Traffic Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (for short “the Act”)  stating
that the husband of the appellant (detenu)  has got all  the  attributes  to
be called as a ‘goonda’ as envisaged under Section 2(g)  of the Act.  It  is
also mentioned that he was involved in several cases of theft of  Government
and private properties as well as cases of destruction of public  properties
and his antisocial activities are harmful to the society and general  public
and referred 11 cases registered against him.
4.    It is significant to note that while passing the detention order,  the
Collector  made  it  clear  that  the  detenu  has  a  right   to   make   a
representation to the Government under Section 8(1) of the Act and the  case
will be referred to the Advisory Board for review and opinion under  Section
10 of the Act and the detenu can be heard personally by the Advisory  Board.
The Collector also indicated that the Government, on the  basis  of  opinion
of the Advisory Board, may confirm and continue the detention for  a  period
not exceeding 12 months from the date of detention.
5.    After having served with a copy of the detention order along with  the
grounds of detention, the husband of the appellant was  taken  into  custody
by Respondent No. 3 and from 5th  October,  2013  he  was  detained  in  the
Central Prison, Rajahmundry till date.
6.    It appears that on the basis of the recommendation  of  the  Collector
and after obtaining a report from the  Advisory  Board,  the  Government  of
Andhra Pradesh issued  G.O.Rt.  No.  4803,  dated  6th  November,  2013  and
directed detention of the detenu for a period  of  twelve  months  from  the
date on which he was detained i.e. 5th October, 2013.
7.    When the appellant challenged the detention of her husband before  the
High Court in a habeas corpus Writ Petition, the High  Court  dismissed  the
same with a cryptic order. In our considered view, when habeas  corpus  writ
petition is filed, even though the petitioner has not  properly  framed  the
petition and not sought appropriate relief, it is expected  from  the  Court
to at least go into the issue  and  decide  on  merits.  Normally,  in  such
matters where liberty of a person is at  stake,  the  Courts  would  take  a
liberal approach  in  the  procedural  aspects.  But  unfortunately  in  the
instant case, the  High  Court  has  dismissed  the  writ  petition  at  the
threshold itself.
8.    Before us, learned counsel for the appellant mainly contended that  as
per the provisions of  the  Act,  the  period  of  detention  in  the  first
instance shall not exceed more than three months and a person cannot be  put
under detention without facing trial for a long period. When the husband  of
the appellant—detenu is already facing charges under various  provisions  of
the Indian Penal Code in around 11 cases, the invocation of  detention  laws
against him and not permitting him to face the trial is bad in  law  and  it
is also contrary to Clause (4)(a) of  Article  22  of  the  Constitution  of
India.  He further contended that the Government Order  directing  detention
of the detenu for a period of 12 months is contrary to the proviso  to  sub-
Section (2) of Section 3 of the Act, and on this ground alone, the order  of
detention is liable to be set aside. To support his arguments,  he  strongly
relied on decisions of this Court in Rekha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2011)  5
SCC 244 and Munagala Yadamma Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh  &  Ors.  (2012)  2
SCC 386.
9.    On behalf of the State,  Mr.  A.T.M.  Rangaramanujam,  learned  senior
counsel supported the detention order and  sought  time  till  after  summer
vacation.
10.   Now the issue  for  consideration  before  us  is  whether  the  State
Government has the power to pass a detention order to detain a person  at  a
stretch for a period of 12 months under the provisions of the Act.
11.   To answer the above issue, it is necessary  to  examine  the  relevant
provisions of the Act. Section 3  of  the  Act  empowers  the  detention  of
certain  category  of  persons,  as  defined  under  the  Act.  Apart   from
conferring of power, the section regulates the manner of passing the  orders
of detention as well as their duration. It reads thus:

      Section 3: Power to make orders detaining certain persons  :  (1)  The
      Government may, if satisfied with respect to any  bootlegger,  dacoit,
      drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender or  land-grabber  that
      with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to
      the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so  to  do,  make  an
      order directing that such person be detained.


      (2) If, having regard to the circumstances  prevailing  or  likely  to
      prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction  of  a
      District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police,  the  Government  are
      satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they may, by order in writing
      direct that during such period as may be specified in the order,  such
      District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also,  if  satisfied
      as provided in Sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred  by  the
      said sub-section:


      Provided that the period specified in the order made by the Government
      under this sub-section shall not in the first instance,  exceed  three
      months, but the Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that  it  is
      necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period  from  time
      to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one time.


      (3) When any order is made under the section by an  officer  mentioned
      in Sub-section  (2),  he  shall  forthwith  report  the  fact  to  the
      Government together with the grounds on which the order has been  made
      and such other particulars as in his opinion, have a  bearing  on  the
      matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more  than  twelve
      days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime,  it  has  been
      approved by the Government.


12.   A reading of the above  provisions  makes  it  clear  that  the  State
Government,  District  Magistrate  or  Commissioner  of   Police   are   the
authorities, conferred with the power to pass orders of detention. The  only
difference is that the order of detention passed  by  the  Government  would
remain in force for a period of three months in the first Instance,  whereas
similar orders passed by the District  Magistrate  or  the  Commissioner  of
Police shall remain  in  force  for  an  initial  period  of  12  days.  The
continuance of detention beyond 12 days would depend upon  the  approval  to
be accorded by the Government in this regard.  Sub-section  (3)  makes  this
aspect very clear. Section 13 of the Act mandates that  the  maximum  period
of detention under the Act is 12 months.


13.   Proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 3 is very clear in its  purport,
as to the operation of the order of detention from time to  time.  An  order
of detention would in the first instance be in force for a period  of  three
months. The Government alone is conferred  with  the  power  to  extend  the
period, beyond three months.  Such  extension,  however,  cannot  be  for  a
period, not exceeding three months,  at  a  time.  It  means  that,  if  the
Government intends to detain an individual under the  Act  for  the  maximum
period of 12 months, there must be an  initial  order  of  detention  for  a
period of three months, and at  least,  three  orders  of  extension  for  a
period not exceeding three months each. The expression "extend  such  period
from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at any one  time"
assumes significance in this regard.

14.   The requirement to pass order of detention from time to  time  in  the
manner referred  to  above,  has  got  its  own  significance.  It  must  be
remembered that restriction of initial period of detention to three  months,
is nothing but implementation of the mandate contained in Clause  (4)(a)  of
Article 22 of the Constitution of India. It reads as under:
      Clause 4 : No law providing for preventive detention  shall  authorize
      the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless
      -

      (a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are or have  been,  or
      are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has  reported
      before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is
      in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention:


      Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorize the detention
      of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made  by
      Parliament under Sub-clause (b) of Clause (7); or


      (b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions  of  any
      law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of Clause (7).


15.   Where the law prescribes a thing to be done  in  a  particular  manner
following a particular procedure, it  shall  be  done  in  the  same  manner
following the provisions of  law,  without  deviating  from  the  prescribed
procedure. When the provisions of Section 3 of the Act clearly mandated  the
authorities to pass an order of detention at  one  time  for  a  period  not
exceeding three months only, the  Government  Order  in  the  present  case,
directing detention of the husband of the appellant for a period  of  twelve
months at a  stretch  is  clear  violation  of  the  prescribed  manner  and
contrary to the provisions of law. The Government cannot  direct  or  extend
the period of detention up to the maximum period of twelve  months,  in  one
stroke, ignoring the cautious legislative intention that even the  order  of
extension of detention must  not  exceed  three  months  at  any  one  time.
One should not ignore the underlying  principles  while  passing  orders  of
detention  or  extending  the  detention   period   from   time   to   time.
          16.     Normally, a person who is detained  under  the  provisions
of the Act  is  without  facing  trial  which  in  other  words  amounts  to
curtailment of his liberties and denial of  civil  rights.  In  such  cases,
whether continuous detention of such person is necessary or not,  is  to  be
assessed and reviewed from time to time.  Taking  into  consideration  these
factors, the Legislature has specifically provided the  mechanism  “Advisory
Board” to review the detention of a person. Passing a detention order for  a
period of twelve months at a stretch, without proper  review,  is  deterrent
to the rights of the detenu. Hence, the impugned Government Order  directing
detention for the maximum period of twelve  months  straightaway  cannot  be
sustained in  law.          
17.    Even  though,  learned  senior  counsel
appearing for the State sought for an adjournment  beyond  summer  vacation,
we are unable to accept his prayer for the simple reason that  maximum  part
of the period of detention of the detenu is going to complete by the end  of
summer vacation. Undisputedly, the detenu was detained on 5th October,  2013
which means that he remained under detention for about  seven  months  at  a
stretch  without  any  periodical  review  as  envisaged  by  law.  We  are,
therefore, of the considered opinion that the detention order passed by  the
Government of Andhra Pradesh  in  this  case  is  in  contravention  to  the
provisions of law. On this ground alone, without going  into  other  issues,
we thought this appeal has to be allowed and the order of detention  has  to
be quashed.                
18.    We accordingly allow the  appeal  quashing
the detention order issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh  and  setting
aside the impugned judgment of the High Court. The detenu shall  be  set  at
liberty forthwith.

                                  ………………………………….J.
                                  (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)




                                  …………………………………J.
                                  (N.V. RAMANA)
NEW DELHI,
MAY 08, 2014.
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