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Tuesday, May 13, 2014

Rule 57A, 57B and 57D alongwith Rule 57CC- Modvat/ Cenvat Credit for the use of inputs in the manufacture of final products which are exempt or subject to nil rate of duty and the requirement of the assessee to maintain separate accounts with respect to inputs used in dutiable goods as well as exempted goods and the liability arising on the failure of the assessee to maintain such separate accounts. - High court allowed the writ petition at show cause notice stage itself - Apex court dismissed the appeal of Union Govt. confirming the lower court orders = Union of India & Ors. ….. Appellant(s) Versus M/s. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. …. Respondent (s)= 2014 ( May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41508

 Rule 57A, 57B and 57D alongwith  Rule  57CC - Modvat/ Cenvat  Credit  for  the  use  of inputs in the manufacture of final products which are exempt or subject to nil rate of duty and the requirement of  the  assessee  to  maintain separate accounts with respect to inputs used in dutiable goods as well as exempted goods and the liability  arising  on  the  failure  of  the assessee to maintain such separate accounts. - High court allowed the writ petition at show cause notice stage itself  - Apex court dismissed the appeal of Union Govt. confirming the lower court orders =

  i)    Hindustan Zinc Ltd. obtained zinc ore concentrate from the
           mines on the payment of excise duty which is used  as  an  input
           for the production of zinc. Zinc ore is predominantly  available
           as Zinc Sulphide (ZnS).
           
ii)   When ZnS is heated (calcined) at high temperature  in  the
           presence of oxygen, zinc oxide  (ZnO)  and  sulphuric  acid  are
           produced. Zinc  Oxide  is  further  oxidised  to  produce  zinc.
           Sulphur obtained as a technological necessity is a pollutant and
           is, therefore, converted into sulphur dioxide in the presence of
           catalysts  like  Vanadium  Pentaoxide   &   Hydrogen   Peroxide.
           Sulphuric acid is converted into sulphur and the respondent does
           not take  any  Cenvat  Credit  on  the  inputs  used  after  the
           emergence of sulphur dioxide. The sulphuric acid produced  as  a
           by-product  is  sold  on  payment  of  excise  duty  to  various
           industries. Some  quantities  of  sulphuric  acid  are  sold  to
           fertilizer plants in terms of notification No. 6/2002-CE on  the
           execution of bonds by the fertilizer plants to the  satisfaction
           of the excise authorities. The said sulphuric acid is  used  for
           the production of zinc.
           
iii)  The excise department took a view that in terms of Rule 57
           CC of the  Rules,  the  respondents  were  obliged  to  maintain
           separate accounts  and  records  for  the  inputs  used  in  the
           production of zinc and sulphuric acid and in the absence of  the
           same the respondents were obliged to pay 8% as an amount on  the
           sale price of sulphuric acid to the fertilizer plants  in  terms
           of Rule 57 CC. The respondent defended the  more  by  contending
           that the very purpose of the grant  of  exemption  to  sulphuric
           acid was  to  keep  the  input  costs  at  the  lowest  for  the
           production  of  fertilizers    during   the   relevant   period.
           Fertilizers themselves were wholly exempted from the payment  of
           excise duty because the government wanted the farmgate price  to
           the farmer should be at the  lowest.  In  fact,  the  government
           grants subsidies to the fertilizer  plants  for  the  difference
           between the cost of production and sale price determined by  the
           government. It was their defence that any  duty  demand  on  the
           sulphuric  acid  will  defeat  the  very  purpose  of  grant  of
           exemption and make the fertilizer cost higher than the desirable
           level. In such a scenario, such higher  cost  will  have  to  be
           compensated by the government as subsidy. =

entitlement  of
     the Respondents/ assessees to Modvat/ Cenvat  Credit  for  the  use  of
     inputs in the manufacture of final products which are exempt or subject
     to nil rate of duty and the requirement of  the  assessee  to  maintain
     separate accounts with respect to inputs used in dutiable goods as well
     as exempted goods and the liability  arising  on  the  failure  of  the
     assessee to maintain such separate accounts.=

 We have already noticed above that in  the  case  of
     Birla Copper (C.A. No. 2337 of  2011)  the  Tribunal  has  decided  the
     matter following the judgment in the case of Swadeshi Limited  (supra).
     
In that case, Ethylene Glycol was reacted with DMT to produce polyester
     and ethanol. Methanol was  not  excisable  while  Polyester  Fibre  was
     liable to excise duty. Credit was taken of duty paid on ethylene glycol
     wholly for the payment of duty on  polyester.  
The  department  took  a
     position that Ethylene Glycol was used in the  production  of  Methanol
     and proportionate credit taken on ethylene glycol was to  be  reversed.
     
This Court ruled that the emergence of  Methanol  was  a  technological
     necessity and no part of ethylene glycol could be  said  to  have  been
     used in production of Methanol and indeed it was held  that  the  total
     quantity of ethylene glycol was used for the production  of  polyester.
     
The fact in all these three appeals appear to be identical to the facts
     and the law laid down in  Swadeshi  Polytex  (supra).  Therefore,  this
     judgment is squarely applicable.
 26. Furthermore, the provisions of Rule 57CC cannot be read  in  isolation.
     In order to understand the scheme of Modvat Credit  contained  in  this
     Rule, a combined reading of Rule 57A, 57B and 57D alongwith  Rule  57CC
     becomes inevitable. We have already reproduced Rule 57D above.  
It  can
     be easily discerned from a combined reading of the aforesaid provisions
     that the terms  used  are  'inputs',  'final  products',  'by-product',
     'waste products' etc. 
We are of the opinion that these terms have  been
     used taking into account commercial reality in trade.
 In  that  context
     when we scan through Rule 57  CC,  reference  to  final  product  being
     manufactured with the same common inputs becomes  understandable.  
This
     Rule did not talk about emergence of final product and a by-product and
     still said that Rule 57 CC will apply. 
The  appellant  seeks  to  apply
     Rule 57CC when Rule 57D does not talk about application of Rule 57CC to
     final  product  and  by-product  when  the  by-product  emerged  as   a
     technological necessity. 
Accepting the argument of the appellant  would
     amount to equating by-product and final  product  thereby  obliterating
     the  difference  though   recognised   by   the   legislation   itself.
     
Significantly this interpretation by the Tribunal in  Sterlite  (supra)
     was not appealed against by the department.
 27. We are also  unable  to  agree  with  the  submission  of  the  learned
     Secretary General that judgment  in  GAIL's  Case  is  not  applicable.
     
Significantly, the question as to whether Rule 57 CC will apply when by-
     products are cleared without payment of duty  came  for  discussion  in
     that case
It was held that so long as the lean gas was obtained  as  a
     by-product and not as a final product, Rule 57 CC will  not  apply.  
We
     are, therefore, of the view that  the  respondent's  case  is  squarely
     covered by the judgment in GAIL's case.
 28. At the stage we should deal with the argument of non maintainability of
     the writ petition filed by  Hindustan  Zinc  Limited  before  the  High
     Court. 
No doubt, it had  filed  writ  petition  at  show  cause  stage.
     However, it was not merely the validity of show cause notice which  was
     questioned. 
In the writ petition even the vires  of  Rule  57  CC  were
     challenged. 
That was a reason because of which the writ petitions  were
     entertained, and rightly so,  it  is  a  different  matter  that  while
     interpreting the rule, the High Court chose to read down the said  rule
     and to give an interpretation which would save  it  from  the  vice  of
     unconstitutionality. Moreover, other  statutory  appeal  filed  by  the
     Department  is  against  the  order  of  CESTAT,  which  involves  same
     question. Matter is argued in appeal before us also at  length  and  we
     are deciding the same on merits. For all these reasons the argument  of
     alternate remedy has to be discarded.
 29. As a result of aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in these  appeals
     and dismiss the same with costs.   
2014 ( May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41508

ANIL R. DAVE, A.K. SIKRI
                                                             REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8621 OF 2010


     Union of India & Ors.                              ….. Appellant(s)


                                   Versus


     M/s. Hindustan Zinc Ltd.                           …. Respondent (s)


     WITH


     C.A. No. 1181 of 2012
     C.A. No. 2337 of 2011
     C.A. No. 5322 of 2010
     C.A. No. 8622 of 2010
     C.A. No. 8623 of 2010
     C.A. No. 8624 of 2010
     C.A. No. 8625 of 2010
     C.A. No. 8626 of 2010
     C.A. No. 8627 of 2010
     C.A. No. 8628 of 2010
     C.A. No. 8629 of 2010
     C.A. No. 8630 of 2010
     C.A. No. 8631 of 2010


                               J U D G M E N T


     A.K. SIKRI, J.


  1. All these appeals raise identical question of law, which has arisen  in
     almost similar circumstances. In fact, the issue involved  was  decided
     by the High Court in a batch of Writ Petitions filed by M/s.  Hindustan
     Zinc vide judgment dated 23.1.2007 against which SLP under Article  136
     of the Constitution was filed in which leave has been granted. In other
     case, same issue is decided  by  the  CESTAT  against  which  statutory
     appeal is preferred. That  is  precisely  the  reason  that  all  these
     appeals were bunched together and collectively heard.
  2. At the outset, the controversy involved may be  reflected  by  pointing
     out that the questions for consideration are as to the  entitlement  of
     the Respondents/ assessees to Modvat/ Cenvat  Credit  for  the  use  of
     inputs in the manufacture of final products which are exempt or subject
     to nil rate of duty and the requirement of  the  assessee  to  maintain
     separate accounts with respect to inputs used in dutiable goods as well
     as exempted goods and the liability  arising  on  the  failure  of  the
     assessee to maintain such separate accounts. In Civil Appeal Nos. 8621-
     8630 of 2010, we are concerned with sulphuric acid. In Civil Appeal No.
     8631 of 2010, it is caustic soda  flakes  and  trichloro  ethylene.  In
     Civil Appeal No. 2337 of 2011, the product is again sulphuric acid  and
     in the case of Civil Appeal No. 5322 of 2010 and  the  other  connected
     matter of M/s Rallis India Ltd, it is Phosphoryl A  and  Phosphoryl  B.
     The issue is as to whether the Assessees (respondents) are entitled  to
     Modvat/ Cenvat  Credit  on  inputs  used  in  the  manufacture  of  the
     aforementioned  exempted  (or  subject  to  NIL  rate  of  duty)  final
     products.
  3. In all these appeals filed by the Revenue, it has  taken  the  position
     with the common contention as to whether the Respondents are liable  to
     pay 8% excise duty as an amount under Rule 57CC of the  Central  Excise
     Rules, 1944 or 57AD of the Central Excise Rules, 2000 or Rule 6 of  the
     Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as 'Rules')  on  the
     value  of  by-product  namely  sulphuric  acid  which  was  cleared  to
     fertilizer plants under exemption in terms of the bonds executed by the
     fertilizer plants.
  4. At this stage we would describe the manufacturing process in all  three
     cases and the facts leading to the filing of the present appeal.


           Hindustan Zinc Ltd. (C.A. No. 8621-8630/2010)
           i)    Hindustan Zinc Ltd. obtained zinc ore concentrate from the
           mines on the payment of excise duty which is used  as  an  input
           for the production of zinc. Zinc ore is predominantly  available
           as Zinc Sulphide (ZnS).
           ii)   When ZnS is heated (calcined) at high temperature  in  the
           presence of oxygen, zinc oxide  (ZnO)  and  sulphuric  acid  are
           produced. Zinc  Oxide  is  further  oxidised  to  produce  zinc.
           Sulphur obtained as a technological necessity is a pollutant and
           is, therefore, converted into sulphur dioxide in the presence of
           catalysts  like  Vanadium  Pentaoxide   &   Hydrogen   Peroxide.
           Sulphuric acid is converted into sulphur and the respondent does
           not take  any  Cenvat  Credit  on  the  inputs  used  after  the
           emergence of sulphur dioxide. The sulphuric acid produced  as  a
           by-product  is  sold  on  payment  of  excise  duty  to  various
           industries. Some  quantities  of  sulphuric  acid  are  sold  to
           fertilizer plants in terms of notification No. 6/2002-CE on  the
           execution of bonds by the fertilizer plants to the  satisfaction
           of the excise authorities. The said sulphuric acid is  used  for
           the production of zinc.
           iii)  The excise department took a view that in terms of Rule 57
           CC of the  Rules,  the  respondents  were  obliged  to  maintain
           separate accounts  and  records  for  the  inputs  used  in  the
           production of zinc and sulphuric acid and in the absence of  the
           same the respondents were obliged to pay 8% as an amount on  the
           sale price of sulphuric acid to the fertilizer plants  in  terms
           of Rule 57 CC. The respondent defended the  more  by  contending
           that the very purpose of the grant  of  exemption  to  sulphuric
           acid was  to  keep  the  input  costs  at  the  lowest  for  the
           production  of  fertilizers    during   the   relevant   period.
           Fertilizers themselves were wholly exempted from the payment  of
           excise duty because the government wanted the farmgate price  to
           the farmer should be at the  lowest.  In  fact,  the  government
           grants subsidies to the fertilizer  plants  for  the  difference
           between the cost of production and sale price determined by  the
           government. It was their defence that any  duty  demand  on  the
           sulphuric  acid  will  defeat  the  very  purpose  of  grant  of
           exemption and make the fertilizer cost higher than the desirable
           level. In such a scenario, such higher  cost  will  have  to  be
           compensated by the government as subsidy.
           iv)   Respondent challenged the show  cause  notices  by  filing
           writ petitions under  Article  226  before  the  Rajasthan  High
           Court, primarily challenging the vires of  Rule  57  CC  on  the
           ground that the Central Government by  subordinate  legislation,
           can not fix rates of duties which  is  the  prerogative  of  the
           Parliament under Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944  read
           with  Central  Excise  Tariff   Act,  1975.  Other   contentions
           regarding the vires of Rule  57  CC  were  also  raised.  As  an
           alternative, it was pleaded that even if Rule 57  CC  is  to  be
           held as intra vires, the demand raised in the show cause notices
           will not survive on proper interpretation of Rule  57CC  of  the
           Rules and hence is to be quashed. The  High  Court  decided  the
           petition in favour of the respondents on the  interpretation  of
           Rule 57CC and Rule 57D itself, without going into  the  question
           relating to the vires. Department is in appeal before this Court
           against this judgment.
           Birla Copper (C.A. NO. 2337/2011)
           i)    The manufacturing process of copper from  the  copper  ore
           concentrate is similar to that of  zinc  and  the  emergence  of
           sulphuric acid as a by-product was conceded  by  the  department
           before the Tribunal. Here again, Birla Copper were  selling  the
           by-product sulphuric acid to various industries  on  payment  of
           duties and clearing the sulphuric acid without payment  of  duty
           to the fertilizer plant based  on  the  bonds  executed  by  the
           fertilizer plants. The Tribunal in this case decided the  matter
           in favour of the respondent following its own  judgment  in  the
           case of Sterlite Industries India Ltd. v. CCE reported  as  2005
           (191) ELT 401. In that case Sterlite was also a manufacturer  of
           copper and a competitor for Birla Copper using the same  process
           and the Tribunal held that excise duty was not payable under  57
           CC on the sulphuric acid cleared to fertiliser plants in view of
           this court's decision in the case of Swadeshi  Polytex  Ltd.  v.
           CCE reported as 1989 (44) ELT 794. The Tribunal also in the case
           of Sterlite (supra) held that 57 CC will apply  only  when  same
           inputs are being used  in  manufacture  of  two  or  more  final
           products, one of which is exempt from payment of excise duty and
           the assessee was not maintaining separate account  and  separate
           inventory. In this case, the Tribunal held that  sulphuric  acid
           was not a final product but only a by-product and hence Rule  57
           CC will not apply, particularly when we read  the  same  in  the
           light of Rule 57D. Department's appeal is against this order  of
           the Tribunal. Significantly, the department has not disputed the
           emergence of  sulphuric  acid  as  a  by-product.  We  are  also
           informed that the Department did not file any appeal challenging
           the decision of Sterlite (supra) and the same has been  accepted
           by the Department. In the present appeal, the contention of  the
           Department is that the  Sterlite  (supra)  will  apply  for  the
           period prior to 1.4.2000 when Rule 57 D was in  force  and  post
           1.4.2000, the Rule was deleted.
           Rallis India Ltd. (C.A. No. 5322/2010)
        i) Rallis India is engaged in the manufacture of Gelatin for use in
           pharmaceutical industry for manufacture of capsules. Gelatin  is
           produced by reacting Hydrochloric Acid with bovine animal bones.
           During the reaction, the bone converts into ossein which in turn
           is used  to  produce  gelatin.  The  inorganic  substances  like
           phosphorous etc. are washed with water which  is  called  mother
           liquor, spent  liquor  or  phosphoral  liquor.  When  these  by-
           products and waste products are cleared without payment of duty,
           the Excise Department demanded duty @ 8% in terms of Rule 57 CC.
           Here again, whether the mother liquor is a waste product or  by-
           product was not disputed by the Department before  the  Tribunal
           or before the Bombay High Court. The Tribunal decided the matter
           against the assessee by interpretating Rule 57 CC. The same  was
           challenged before the Bombay High Court, which has reversed  the
           decision of the Tribunal. The Department is  in  appeal  against
           the decision of the High Court.
     The aforesaid narration discloses the identity of  the  issue  in  the
     three set of appeals. Henceforth, in our discussion,  reference  would
     be to the Hindustan Zinc Ltd., as the respondent.
  5.  The  respondent  herein  is  a  Public  Limited  Company  and  it  was
     disinvested  in  April,  2002.  The  respondent  is  engaged   in   the
     manufacture of non-ferrous metals like zinc, lead as well as  Sulphuric
     Acid and Copper  Sulphate.  The  said  products  are  chargeable  under
     Chapter Sub-heading No. 2807.00, 7901.10 and  2833.10  respectively  of
     the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985  respectively
     among their other products. A show cause notice was issued on 15.3.2005
     to the assessee respondent for recovery of Rs. 48,39,883/-  under  Rule
     12 of the erstwhile CENVAT Credit Rules, 2002 and  Rule  14  of  CENVAT
     Credit Rules 2004 read with Section 11(e) of the  Central  Excise  Act,
     1944 along with interest and penal provisions.
  6. The respondent filed Writ Petition No. 6776 of  2005  before  the  High
     Court, Jodhpur challenging the constitutional validity of Rule 6 of the
     Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 as well as the  impugned  show  cause  notice
     dated 15.3.2005. The respondent submitted in  the  said  writ  petition
     that Sulphur Dioxide Gas is produced during the manufacture of Zinc and
     lead and due to environmental control requirements, they are prohibited
     from releasing the same in the air. Therefore, Sulphur Dioxide is  used
     for manufacture of Sulphuric Acid which is the input for manufacture of
     non-ferrous metals like zinc and lead cannot be  considered  as  common
     inputs for manufacture of Sulphuric Acid in as much as Sulphur  is  the
     only component in concentrate which goes into manufacture of  Sulphuric
     Acid. Further, the respondent contended  that  Rule  6  of  the  Cenvat
     Credit Rules is beyond the power of Central Government and hence  ultra
     vires the provisions of the Act. The constitutional  validity  of  Rule
     57CC of the erstwhile Modvat Credit Rules was also challenged.  It  was
     stated that the Tribunal in the judgment in the matter of  Binani  Zinc
     Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Cochin – 2005 (187) E.L.T.  390
     (Tri. - Bang.) has held that Rule 57CC does not  make  any  distinction
     between exempted final product and exempted bye-product and  hence,  no
     useful purpose would be served by approaching the Tribunal.
  7. The appellant contested the  said  Writ  Petition  by  way  of  counter
     affidavit in which  the  appellant  submitted  that  the  respondent  -
     assessee was not maintaining separate inventory  and  account  for  the
     receipt and use of inputs in relation the manufacture of final  product
     i.e. Sulphuric Acid cleared at Nil rate of duty as required in terms of
     provisions of Rule 6(2) of the Rules. That it was mandatory  to  follow
     the provisions of  the  Rules  if  common  inputs  were  used  for  the
     manufacture of dutiable final product and exempted goods. It  was  also
     contended that assuming without admitting that Sulphuric  Acid  is  by-
     product, it was mandatory to reverse an amount equal to 8% of the value
     of exempted goods as the words used in the provisions of Rule 6 of  the
     Rules “is exempted goods and not exempted final  product”.  By  way  of
     preliminary submission, it was pleaded that the Writ Petition  is  pre-
     mature and the assessee had not even replied to the show cause notice.
  8. The High Court after examining the manufacturing  process  as  well  as
     Rule position, came to the conclusion that prohibition against claiming
     Modvat Credit on exempted goods or subject to nil rate of duty  applies
     in case where such exemption from payment of duty or nil rate  of  duty
     on end product is predictably known at the time the recipient of inputs
     is entitled to take credit of duties paid on such inputs. The fact that
     due to subsequent notification or on  contingency  that  may  arise  in
     future, the end product is cleared  without  payment  of  duty  due  to
     exemption or nil rate of duty does not affect the  availing  of  modvat
     credit on the date of entitlement. If on the date of entitlement, there
     is no illegality or invalidity in taking credit of such modvat/  Cenvat
     Credit, the right to  utilize  such  credit  against  future  liability
     towards duty become indefeasible and is not liable to  be  reversed  in
     the contingency discussed above.
  9. On these findings, the High Court has allowed the Writ Petitions  filed
     by the respondent-Hindustan Zinc. In the process there  is  a  detailed
     discussion of  the  relevant  rules  explaining  the  scheme  contained
     therein; on the aspect of payment of 8% excise duty under Rule 57 CC of
     Central Excise Rules, 1944, 57AD of the Central Excise Rules, 2000  and
     Rule 6 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.
 10. From the aforesaid narration, it becomes apparent that  the  respondent
     wants to avail Modvat Credit on duties paid on inputs used  at  smelter
     by it vis-a-vis the part of  sulphuric  acid  produced  by  it  in  its
     sulphuric acid plant and sold to IFFCO, a manufacturer  of  fertilizer,
     who is entitled to avail concession of acquiring sulphuric acid used by
     it as an input in manufacture of fertilizers on payment  of  duties  in
     terms of the exemption notifications issued from time to time.  So  far
     as the sulphuric acid is concerned, as an end product it is  chargeable
     to duty under tariff head 28. The  rate  of  duty  provided  under  the
     Tariff Act is 16% ad velourm. There is no  exemption  as  such  to  the
     manufacture from the payment of duty on manufacture of  sulphuric  acid
     when removed. Under general exemption No. 66 issued under sub-section 1
     of Section 5A of the Central Excise  Act  the  Central  Government  has
     exempted exciseable goods of the description specified in  (3)  of  the
     table appended to the said Exemption Order.
 11. In so far as sulphuric  acid  which  is  used  in  the  manufacture  of
     fertilizers  is  concerned,  nil  duty  is  provided.  However,   table
     indicates that it is subject to condition No. 5.  Condition  No.  5  is
     mentioned in Annexure appended to General Exemption No. 66 which  reads
     as under:-
           “5.   Where such  use  is  elsewhere  than  in  the  factory  of
           production the exemption shall be allowed if the procedure  laid
           down in the Central Excise (Removal  of  Goods  at  Concessional
           Rate of Duty for manufacture of Excisable goods) Rules, 2001, is
           allowed.”


 12. The appellant contends that clearance of sulphuric acid as a by-product
     to fertilizer plants attract nil rate of duty in terms of  notification
     no. 6/2002-CE, though on the basis of bonds posted  by  the  fertilizer
     plants, but nonetheless, the goods are cleared under total exemption or
     nil rate of duty and hence 57CC is attracted. It  is  their  contention
     that Rule 57 D has no application.
 13. Since the answer depends on  the  question  as  to  whether  Rule  57CC
     applies  or  Rule  57D  is  attracted,  as  well  as  on  the   correct
     interpretation of these  Rules,  we  reproduce  these  rules,  at  this
     juncture:-
           Rule 57CC -
           “Adjustment of credit on inputs used in exempted final  products
           or maintenance of separate inventory and accounts of  inputs  by
           the manufacturer, (1) Where a manufacturer  is  engaged  in  the
           manufacture of any final product which is chargeable to duty  as
           well as in any other final product  which  is  exempt  from  the
           whole of the duty of excise leviable there on or  is  chargeable
           to nil rate of duty and the manufacturer  takes  credit  of  the
           specified duty on any inputs (other than inputs  used  as  fuel)
           which is used as ordinarily  used  in  or  in  relation  to  the
           manufacture of both the aforesaid categories of final  products,
           whether directly or indirectly and whether contained in the said
           final  products  or  not,  the  manufacture  shall,  unless  the
           provisions of sub-rule (9) are  complied  with,  pay  an  amount
           equal to 8% of the price (excluding sales tax and  other  taxes,
           if any, payable on such goods) of the second category  of  final
           products charged by the manufacturer for the sale of such  goods
           at the time of their clearance from the factory.


           The amount  mentioned  in  sub-rule(1)  shall  be  paid  by  the
           manufacturers by adjustment in  the  credit  account  maintained
           under sub-Rule(7) of Rule 57G  or  in  the  accounts  maintained
           under Rule 9 or sub-Rule 173G and  if  such  adjustment  is  not
           possible for any reason, the amount shall be paid in cash by the
           manufacturer availing of credit under Rule 57A.


           The provisions of sub-rule(1) shall not apply to final  products
           falling under Chapter 50 to 63 of the Schedule  to  the  Central
           Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (5 of 1986).


           (4)   The provisions of sub-rule (1) shall also not apply to-
                (a)    Articles of plastics falling within Chapter 39;
                (b)    Tyres of a kind used  on  animal  drawn  vehicles  or
                handcarts and their tubes, falling within Chapter 40;
                (c)    Black  and  white  television  sets,  falling  within
                Chapter 85 and
                (d)    News  print,  in  rools  or  sheets,  falling  within
                Chapter heading No. 48.01; which are exempt from  the  whole
                of the duty of excise leviable thereon or chargeable to  nil
                rate duty.


           (5)   In the case of final products referred to in sub rule  (3)
           or sub-rule(4) and excluded from the provisions of  sub-rule(1),
           the manufacturer shall pay an amount equivalent to the credit of
           duty attributable to inputs contained in such final products  at
           the time of their clearance from the factory.
           The provisions of sub-rule (1) shall also  not  apply  to  final
           products  which  are  exported  under  bond  in  terms  of   the
           provisions of Rule 13.


           The provisions of sub-rule (1) shall apply even if the inputs on
           which credit has been taken are not actually used  or  contained
           in any particular clearance of final products.


           If any goods are not sold by the  manufacturer  at  the  factory
           gate but are sold from  a  depot  or  from  the  premises  of  a
           consignment  agent  or  from  any  other  premises,  the   price
           (excluding sales tax and other taxes, if any, payable) at  which
           such goods are ordinarily sold  by  the  manufacture  from  such
           depot or from the premises of a consignment agent  or  from  any
           other premises shall be deemed to be the price for  the  purpose
           of sub-Rule (1).


           In respect of inputs (other than inputs used as flue) which  are
           used in or in relation to the manufacturer of any  goods,  which
           are exempt from the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon
           or chargeable to  nil  rate  of  duty,  the  manufacturer  shall
           maintain separate inventory and accounts of the receipt and  use
           of inputs for the aforesaid purpose and shall not take credit of
           the specified duty paid on such inputs.”




           Rule 57D -


           “Credit  of  duty  not  to  be  denied  or  varied  in   certain
           circumstances – (1)    Credit of specified  duty  shall  not  be
           denied or varied on the  ground  that  part  of  the  inputs  is
           contained in any waste, refuse or by-product arising during  the
           manufacture of the final product, or that the inputs have become
           waste during the course of manufacture  of  the  final  product,
           whether or not such waste or refuse or by-product is exempt from
           the whole of the duty of excise leviable thereon  or  chargeable
           to nil rate of duty or is not specified as a final product under
           Rule 57A.”


 14. Mr. Parasaran, the learned Solicitor General, opened his submissions by
     challenging the very approach of the High  Court  in  entertaining  the
     writ petitions as according to him, stage therefor had not ripened. His
     contention in this behalf was that  merely  a  show  cause  notice  was
     issued and no final decision was taken on the said show  cause  notice.
     However, instead of showing cause, writ petitions  were  filed  seeking
     quashing of the show cause notice which should have been  dismissed  as
     premature. He referred to certain judgments  of  this  court  as  well,
     wherein it is held that High Court,   normally,  should  not  entertain
     writ petition questioning the validity of the show cause notice.
 15. On merits, the learned Solicitor General argued that the interpretation
     furnished by the High Court to Rule 57CC of the Modvat Rules and Rule 6
     of CENVAT Rules, respectively was  not  correct.  The  High  Court  was
     required to apply literal rule of interpretation when the  language  of
     these rules is clear and unambiguous.
 16. Before we advert to the interpretations of the aforesaid provisions and
     to discuss the argument of the Union of India  as  to  whether  literal
     interpretation is to be given to Rule 57CC, it would  be  necessary  to
     understand the properties of sulphuric acid.  From  what  is  explained
     above including the use of sulphuric acid for the production  of  zinc,
     it becomes apparent that sulphuric acid  is  indeed  a  by-product.  In
     fact, it is so treated by the respondents in  their  balance  sheet  as
     well as various other documents which were filed by the respondents  in
     the courts below. It  is  also  a  common  case  of  the  parties  that
     Hindustan Zinc Limited and Birla Copper  were  established  to  produce
     zinc and copper respectively and not for the  production  of  sulphuric
     acid. It was argued by the learned Counsel for the  respondents,  which
     could not be disputed by the learned Solicitor General, that  emergence
     of sulphur dioxide in the calcination process of concentrated ore is  a
     technological necessity and then conversion of the same into  sulphuric
     acid as a non-polluting measure cannot elevate the  sulphuric  acid  to
     the status of  final  product.  Technologically,  commercially  and  in
     common  parlance,  sulphuric  acid  is  treated  as  a  by-product   in
     extraction of non-ferrous metals by companies not only in India but all
     over the world. That is the reason  why  the  department  accepted  the
     position before the Tribunal that sulphuric acid is a by-product.
 17. In these circumstances the position taken now  by  the  appellant  that
     sulphuric  acid  cannot  be  treated  as   a   by-product   cannot   be
     countenanced. Mr. S.K. Bagaria, learned Senior  Counsel  appearing  for
     the respondent while explaining the manufacturing  process  in  detail,
     also pointed out  that  the  ore  concentrates  (Zinc  or  Copper)  are
     completely utilised for the production of zinc and copper and  no  part
     of the metal, zinc or copper forms part of the sulphuric acid which  is
     cleared out. It was submitted that the extraction of zinc from the  ore
     concentrate will inevitably result in the emergence of sulphur  dioxide
     as a technological necessity. It is not as though the  Respondents  can
     use lesser quantity of zinc concentrate only to produce the  metal  and
     not produce sulphur dioxide. In other words, a given quantity  of  zinc
     concentrate will result in  emergence  of  zinc  sulphide  and  sulphur
     dioxide according to the chemical formula on which respondents have  no
     control.
 18. On these facts this court is inclined to  accept  the  version  of  the
     respondents that the ore concentrate  is  completely  consumed  in  the
     extraction of zinc and  no  part  of  the  metal  is  forming  part  of
     sulphuric acid.
 19. Once we proceed keeping in mind the  aforesaid  factual,  technological
     and commercial position available on the records, it has to be accepted
     that  the  respondents  have  consumed  the  entire  quantity  of  zinc
     concentrate in the production of zinc.
 20. Let us now examine  the  position  contained  in  Rule  57  CC  on  the
     touchstone of the aforesaid position. No doubt, Rule 57CC  requires  an
     assessee to maintain separate records for inputs which are used in  the
     manufacture of two or more final products one of which is dutiable  and
     the other is non-dutiable. In that event, Rule 57 CC  will  apply.  For
     example, a tyre manufacturer manufactures different kinds of tyres, one
     or more of which were exempt like tyre used in animal carts  and  cycle
     tyre, where car tyres and truck tyres attract excise duty. The  rubber,
     the accelerators, the  retarders,  the  fillers,  sulphur,  vulcanising
     agents which are used in production of tyres are indeed common to  both
     dutiable and exempt tyres.  Such  assesses  are  mandated  to  maintain
     separate records to avoid the duty demand of 8% on exempted tyres.  But
     when we find that in the case of the respondents, it is not  as  though
     some quantity of zinc ore concentrate has gone into the  production  of
     sulphuric acid, applicability of  Rule  57  CC  can  be  attracted.  As
     pointed out above, the entire quantity of zinc has indeed been used  in
     the production of zinc and no part can be traced in the sulphuric acid.
     It is for this reason, the respondents maintained the inventory of zinc
     concentrate for the production of zinc and we agree with the submission
     of the respondents that  there  was  no  necessity  and  indeed  it  is
     impossible, to maintain separate records for zinc concentrate  used  in
     the production of sulphuric acid. We, therefore, agree  with  the  High
     Court that the requirements of 57CC were fully met in the way in  which
     the Respondent was maintaining records and inventory and  the  mischief
     of recovery of 8% under Rule 57 CC on exempted sulphuric  acid  is  not
     attracted.
 21. As already pointed out, argument of the learned Solicitor  General  was
     that Rule 57CC and Rule 6 of  the  Modvat/  CENVAT  Rules  respectively
     require the literal rule of interpretation which needs to  be  applied,
     as the language of these was unambiguous in this behalf. We may  record
     that as per the learned Solicitor General, the provisions of Rule  57CC
     or Rule 6 envisage common use of inputs in two final products i.e.  one
     dutiable and other exempted from the  applicability  of  the  same.  He
     submitted that when two final products emerge  out  of  use  of  common
     inputs, one excisable and the other exempt, the provisions will  apply.
     The question of intention of the assessee to manufacture  the  exempted
     product is not relevant. It may be intended or unintended but  if  what
     results in the course of a manufacturing process is a  “final  product”
     falling within the meaning of the said provisions, the provisions  will
     apply in full with the attendant consequences. He also argued that Rule
     57D uses the words 'waste and refuse' alongwith “by-products”. The word
     'by-product' will necessarily have to take its colour and meaning  from
     the accompanying words “waste and refuse”. “By-products” cannot, in any
     event, mean “final products”. This Rule only means that  Modvat  Credit
     cannot be denied on the ground that in the course of  manufacture,  non
     excisable goods also arise.
 22. Elaborating this contention, the learned  Solicitor  General  submitted
     that the words “final products” in the context  of  Modvat  and  Cenvat
     Credit have to be understood giving the meaning as assigned  to  it  in
     the  Modvat/  Cenvat  Rules.  Rule  57A  inter  alia  states  that  the
     provisions of this Section shall  apply  to  such  finalised  excisable
     goods (referred to in that section as final products). Again, Rule 2(c)
     of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2002 defines “final  products”  as  meaning
     excisable goods manufactured or produced from  inputs  except  matches.
     Rule 2(h) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 defines “final products”  as
     meaning excisable goods manufactured or produced from input,  or  using
     in input service. Thus, final products referred  to  in  the  aforesaid
     provisions  can  only  mean  to  be   excisable   goods   produced   or
     manufactured. In the present set of cases, sulphuric acid, caustic soda
     flakes, trichloro ethylene  and  Phosphoryl  A  and  Phosphoryl  B  are
     excisable goods  manufactured  and  produced  in  India  falling  under
     different headings of the Central Excise Tariff Act. The submission was
     that if these products are exempt or subject to NIL rate of duty,  then
     the inputs on which Modvat/ Cenvat  Credit  are  claimed  used  in  the
     manufacture of the aforesaid final products will attract the  rigor  of
     Rule 57CC/ Rule 6 of the Modvat/ Cenvat Credit Rules.
 23. In this very direction, his further submission was that the  term  “by-
     products” is not defined either in the Act or in the Rules.  Dictionary
     meanings cannot be resorted to in this case as it would then mean  that
     final products would be treated  as  by-products  defeating  the  plain
     language of Rule  57CC  and  Rule  6  which  are  applicable  to  final
     products. The only test  is  “excisability  of  goods  manufactured  or
     produced” and only if the requirements of this test are satisfied,  the
     goods can be 'final products' and never 'by-products'. On  this  basis,
     the learned Solicitor General submitted that  even  an  admission  made
     before the Tribunal in the Birla Copper case of the goods being a  'by-
     product', cannot be relied on by the respondent.
 24. While pleading that the aforesaid  interpretation  to  these  Rules  be
     accepted by this Court, submission of Mr. Parasaran was that in such an
     eventuality the judgment in the case of Swadeshi Polytex Ltd.  v.  CCE;
     1989 (44) ELT 794 was not applicable, nor was the judgment  in  CCE  v.
     Gas Authority of India Ltd.; 2008 (232) ELT 7 relied upon  the  by  the
     respondent. Likewise his submission was that  judgment  of  the  Bombay
     High Court in the case of Rallis India Ltd. v.  Union  of  India;  2009
     (233) ELT 301 was erroneous wherein  view  taken  is  contrary  to  the
     aforesaid submission.
 25. These arguments may seem to be attractive. However,  having  regard  to
     the processes involved,  which  is  already  explained  above  and  the
     reasons afforded by us, we express our inability  to  be  persuaded  by
     these submissions. We have already noticed above that in  the  case  of
     Birla Copper (C.A. No. 2337 of  2011)  the  Tribunal  has  decided  the
     matter following the judgment in the case of Swadeshi Limited  (supra).
     In that case, Ethylene Glycol was reacted with DMT to produce polyester
     and ethanol. Methanol was  not  excisable  while  Polyester  Fibre  was
     liable to excise duty. Credit was taken of duty paid on ethylene glycol
     wholly for the payment of duty on  polyester.  The  department  took  a
     position that Ethylene Glycol was used in the  production  of  Methanol
     and proportionate credit taken on ethylene glycol was to  be  reversed.
     This Court ruled that the emergence of  Methanol  was  a  technological
     necessity and no part of ethylene glycol could be  said  to  have  been
     used in production of Methanol and indeed it was held  that  the  total
     quantity of ethylene glycol was used for the production  of  polyester.
     The fact in all these three appeals appear to be identical to the facts
     and the law laid down in  Swadeshi  Polytex  (supra).  Therefore,  this
     judgment is squarely applicable.
 26. Furthermore, the provisions of Rule 57CC cannot be read  in  isolation.
     In order to understand the scheme of Modvat Credit  contained  in  this
     Rule, a combined reading of Rule 57A, 57B and 57D alongwith  Rule  57CC
     becomes inevitable. We have already reproduced Rule 57D above.  It  can
     be easily discerned from a combined reading of the aforesaid provisions
     that the terms  used  are  'inputs',  'final  products',  'by-product',
     'waste products' etc. We are of the opinion that these terms have  been
     used taking into account commercial reality in trade. In  that  context
     when we scan through Rule 57  CC,  reference  to  final  product  being
     manufactured with the same common inputs becomes  understandable.  This
     Rule did not talk about emergence of final product and a by-product and
     still said that Rule 57 CC will apply. The  appellant  seeks  to  apply
     Rule 57CC when Rule 57D does not talk about application of Rule 57CC to
     final  product  and  by-product  when  the  by-product  emerged  as   a
     technological necessity. Accepting the argument of the appellant  would
     amount to equating by-product and final  product  thereby  obliterating
     the  difference  though   recognised   by   the   legislation   itself.
     Significantly this interpretation by the Tribunal in  Sterlite  (supra)
     was not appealed against by the department.
 27. We are also  unable  to  agree  with  the  submission  of  the  learned
     Secretary General that judgment  in  GAIL's  Case  is  not  applicable.
     Significantly, the question as to whether Rule 57 CC will apply when by-
     products are cleared without payment of duty  came  for  discussion  in
     that case. It was held that so long as the lean gas was obtained  as  a
     by-product and not as a final product, Rule 57 CC will  not  apply.  We
     are, therefore, of the view that  the  respondent's  case  is  squarely
     covered by the judgment in GAIL's case.
 28. At the stage we should deal with the argument of non maintainability of
     the writ petition filed by  Hindustan  Zinc  Limited  before  the  High
     Court. No doubt, it had  filed  writ  petition  at  show  cause  stage.
     However, it was not merely the validity of show cause notice which  was
     questioned. In the writ petition even the vires  of  Rule  57  CC  were
     challenged. That was a reason because of which the writ petitions  were
     entertained, and rightly so,  it  is  a  different  matter  that  while
     interpreting the rule, the High Court chose to read down the said  rule
     and to give an interpretation which would save  it  from  the  vice  of
     unconstitutionality. Moreover, other  statutory  appeal  filed  by  the
     Department  is  against  the  order  of  CESTAT,  which  involves  same
     question. Matter is argued in appeal before us also at  length  and  we
     are deciding the same on merits. For all these reasons the argument  of
     alternate remedy has to be discarded.
 29. As a result of aforesaid discussion, we find no merit in these  appeals
     and dismiss the same with costs.




                                       …..................................J.
                                                              [Anil R. Dave]






                                       …..................................J.
                                                                [A.K. Sikri]




     New Delhi
     May 06, 2014

Sec.498 A, 304 B of I.P.C.- A 1-husband acquitted - A 2 sentence was reduced - mitigating circumstances - A1 husband and A2 mother in law - In dying declaration and in her letter , the deceased said that A 1- husband is innocent and further gave credit marks in her letters - Apex court acquitted the husband A1- as far as mother-in-law concerned A2 - she has been demanding for gold chain - Apex court confirmed the one year sentence of imprisonment for sec.498 A and whereas for sec. 304B dispute was taken place on that night between A2 and deceased but not by A1 and so she committed suicide - but not burnt by A 2 - and further more deceased expressed unhappiness in respect of her marriage with A1 which was also one of the cause to commit suicide - Apex court Acquit the A1- husband from sec.304 B and reduced the sentence of A2 from 10 years to 7 years imprisonment and allowed the appeal partly = SATISH CHANDRA & ANR. Vs. STATE OF M.P. 2014 ( May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41506

Sec.498 A, 304 B of I.P.C.-  A 1-husband acquitted - A 2 sentence was reduced - mitigating circumstances - A1 husband and A2 mother in law - In dying declaration and in her letter , the deceased said that A 1- husband is innocent and further gave credit marks in her letters - Apex court acquitted the husband A1- as far as mother-in-law concerned A2 - she has been demanding for gold chain - Apex court confirmed the one year sentence of imprisonment for sec.498 A and whereas for sec. 304B dispute was taken place on that night  between A2 and deceased but not by A1 and so she committed suicide - but not burnt by A 2 - and further more deceased expressed unhappiness in respect of her marriage with A1 which was also one of the cause to commit suicide - Apex court Acquit the A1- husband from sec.304 B and reduced the sentence of A2 from 10 years to 7 years imprisonment and allowed the appeal partly = 

Section 498A IPC reads as under:-
                 “498A.           Husband or relative of husband of a  woman
           subjecting her to cruelty. -
                 Whoever, being the husband or the relative of  the  husband
           of a woman, subjects such woman to  cruelty  shall  be  punished
           with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and
           shall also be liable to fine.
                 Explanation. - For the purposes of this Section,  'cruelty'
           means –
                 (a)   any wilful conduct which is of such a  nature  as  is
           likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or  to  cause  grave
           injury or danger to life, limb  or  health  (whether  mental  or
           physical) of the woman; or
                 (b)   harassment of the woman where such harassment is with
           a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet  any
           unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or  is  on
           account of failure by her or any person related to her  to  meet
           demand.”
            We  find  that  ingredients  of  the  aforesaid  Section  stand
      satisfied qua Appellant No. 2 as deceased was subject to  cruelty  on
      account of unlawful demand  for  property  viz.  gold  chain  in  the
      instant case and failure on her part to meet that demand. So much so,
      it ultimately had driven Sunita to commit suicide.
      33.   In so far as Appellant No. 1 is concerned it  is  difficult  to
      sustain his conviction  under  Section  498A.  The  deceased  in  her
      statement has accused only her mother-in-law  and  sister-in-law  for
      this demand. She has not blamed her husband at all. On the  contrary,
      she has categorically stated that her husband is innocent. May be  at
      times Appellant No. 1 had beaten his wife on the saying of her mother-
      in-law but the deceased had not connected this with demand of  dowry.
      Therefore, it is not conclusively proved that there was any “cruelty”
      on his part. Here, reading the statement of the deceased  along  with
      various letters becomes somewhat important. Tenor of  those  letters,
      in so far as they relate to Appellant No. 1, indicates that as far as
      Appellant No. 1 is concerned, he is not to be  blamed.  In  fact,  in
      order to please and satisfy his wife, Appellant No. 1 was making  all
      efforts to become something in life and was struggling for  that.  We
      thus, are persuaded to give benefit of doubt to Appellant No.  1  for
      change under Section 498A.  As  a  consequence  while  upholding  the
      conviction of Appellant No. 2 under Section 498A of  IPC,  we  acquit
      Appellant No. 1 from this charge.
      34.   With this, we come to the question of conviction under  Section
      304B of IPC. It is couched in the following language:-
      “304B. Dowry death. - (1)   Where the death of a woman  is  caused  by
      any burns or bodily injury  or  occurs  otherwise  than  under  normal
      circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown  that
      soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty  or  harassment  by
      her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with,
      any demand for dowry, such death shall be  called  'dowry  death'  and
      such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
      Explanation. - For the purposes of  this  sub-section,  'dowry'  shall
      have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act,
      1961 (28 of 1961)
      (2)   Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with  imprisonment
      for a term which shall not be less than  seven  years  but  which  may
      extend to imprisonment for life.

    35.   Undoubtedly, death  of  Sunita  is  caused  by  burns  and  has
      occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. It  has  happened
      within 7 years of  her  marriage.  Further,  the  trigger  point  for
      committing suicide was the quarrel between her and her  mother-in-law
      on the fateful day. At the same time it is also to be borne  in  mind
      that it is not a case where appellants have poured kerosene  and  put
      her on fire. That is the act of deceased herself and  thus  it  is  a
      case of suicide. 
The question is  whether  the  quarrel  between  the
      deceased and her mother-in-law  can  be  treated  as  satisfying  the
      condition that “soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or
      harassment for, or in connection with, in demand for dowry”.  
On  the
      reading the statement in  totality,  it  becomes  clear  that  cause/
      reason for regular fights was dowry. One can clearly  find  out  from
      the statement that on that day also Appellant No. 2 fought  with  her
      for that reason. We are, therefore, of the opinion that commission of
      offence  under  Section  304B  against   Appellant   No.   2   stands
      conclusively proved in view of  iron  clad  dying  declaration.  
Here
      again, for the reason stated by us while  discussing  the  accusation
      against Appellant No. 1 under Section 498A of IPC, it cannot be  said
      that he had committed any act of  “cruelty”  soon  before  her  death
      which forced the deceased to take such a step. 
She has nowhere stated
      that on that date when her  mother-in-law  had  quarreled  with  her,
      Appellant No. 1 was associated or even responsible for that. We  thus
      acquit Appellant No. 1 of charge under Section 304B as well.
      36.   Coming to the sentence of Appellant No. 2  in  respect  of  the
      aforesaid offences, we maintain the sentence  of  one  year  rigorous
      imprisonment (R.I.) for offence under Section 498A of  IPC.  
However,
      in so far as Section 304B of IPC is concerned we are of  the  opinion
      that there are certain extenuating and mitigating circumstances which
      persuade us to reduce the sentence of 10 years  R.I.  as  awarded  to
      Appellant No. 2. First of all,  even  when  the  immediate  cause  to
      commit suicide was the fight, at the same time it has to be  kept  in
      mind that deceased was not happy with her matrimonial life for  other
      reasons as well. In fact, she was not happy with this marriage at all
      which she stated in some of the letters to her mausi  or  mausa.   We
      are of the view that ends of justice would be sub served by  reducing
      the sentence from 10 years to  7  years  Rigorous  Imprisonment.  The
      appeals are partly allowed in the  aforesaid  terms.   The  Appellant
      no.2 shall be taken into custody to serve remaining sentence.

2014 ( May.Part) http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41506
SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, A.K. SIKRI

                                                                  REPORTABLE


                       IN THE SUPREME  COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 211 OF 2010




      Satish Chandra & Anr.                  ….........Appellant(s)




                                   Versus


      State of M.P.                                ….........Respondent(s)




                               J U D G M E N T


      A.K. SIKRI, J.


     1. The two appellants before us are the son and the mother.  Appellant
        No. 1 was the husband and Appellant No. 2  was  the  mother-in-law,
        respectively,  of  the  deceased  Smt.  Sunita.  Marriage   between
        Appellant No. 1 and Smt. Sunita was solemnised in April, 1988. Smt.
        Sunita committed suicide on 14.1.1991 i.e. within  three  years  of
        the marriage. This led to the prosecution of the two appellants  as
        well as father and sister of Appellant No. 1 under  Sections  304-B
        and 498-A of Indian Penal Code (IPC).
     2. We may mention that as per the prosecution, just before her  death,
        she even gave a statement which was recorded as Ex. P.9. After  her
        death, it was treated as dying declaration and case was  registered
        against  the  accused  persons.  After  the   completion   of   the
        investigation they were all committed to their trial.  The  accused
        persons did not admit to the charge and abjured their guilt. As per
        them  they  were  falsely  implicated  in  the  matter.  The  trial
        proceeded. Various prosecution  witnesses  were  examined.  On  the
        basis of the oral and documentary evidence brought on  record,  the
        Sessions Court returned the verdict of guilty  qua  the  appellants
        herein, as well as sister of Appellant no.1.
     3. The Trial Court sentenced both the appellants as  well  as  Sunita,
        sister of Appellant no.1 to undergo one year rigorous  imprisonment
        (R.I.) for offence under Section 498 A of IPC. A fine of Rs. 1,000/-
         on each of the appellants was also  imposed  and  in  default  the
        appellants were to undergo an additional R.I. for six  months.  For
        offence under Section 304-B, both the appellants were sentenced  to
        10 years rigorous  imprisonment  with  Rs.  1,000/-  as  fine  with
        similar default clause.
     4. The appellants filed the appeal before the High Court  against  the
        said conviction  and  sentence.  By  the  impugned  judgment  dated
        21.10.2008 the High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh  has  affirmed  the
        conviction and sentence, thereby dismissing the  appeal  qua  these
        two Appellants. However, Sunita has been acquitted.  Special  Leave
        Petition was filed questioning the validity of the said verdict  of
        the High Court in which leave was granted. This is how the  present
        appeal has been heard finally by this Court.
     5. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court would demonstrate  that
        the High Court has primarily  relied  upon  the  dying  declaration
        (Exhibit P9) which according to the High Court  is  a  strong  iron
        clad testimony from the clutches of  which  the  appellants  cannot
        escape. It has found that the said dying declaration is  worthy  of
        credence which was recorded  in  the  presence  of  the  Magistrate
        (P.W.2) that too with certification from the Doctor (P.W.5) to  the
        effect that Sunita  was  in  a  fit  state  of  mind  to  give  the
        statement, notwithstanding  the  fact  that  she  has  suffered  92
        percent burns. In so far as charge under Section 498A is concerned,
        the High Court has found that this was proved on the basis  of  Ex.
        P8, which was a letter written by  the  deceased  stating  she  was
        being treated with cruelty. The High Court also recorded  that  the
        dying declaration as well as allegations in letter (Ex.  P.8)  were
        duly supported by the testimony of the father (P.W.1), the  brother
        (P.W.7) and the uncle (P.W.4) of the deceased. It is observed  that
        even when they are interested witnesses being close relation of the
        deceased, there was no reason to discard their testimony. More  so,
        when their testimony was  supported  by  written  documents  namely
        letters written by the deceased which were Exhibit P1, P3,  P4  and
        P5.
     6. Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, learned Senior  Counsel  appearing  for  the
        appellants  endeavoured to find loopholes  in  the  depositions  of
        various  witnesses.  Thrust  of  his  argument   was   that   their
        testimonies could not have been relied upon to record the guilt  of
        the appellants for both the charges i.e. under Section 498A as well
        as 304B of I.P.C. In this attempt, he referred to various  portions
        of the testimonies of these witnesses with the purpose to show that
        there was an acceptance on their part that no dowry  was  taken  at
        the time of Marriage; there was no demand of dowry even  thereafter
        and the deceased was not treated with cruelty at all.  His  further
        endeavour was to show  that  the  deceased  had  committed  suicide
        because of her own reasons and  frustrations  which  could  not  be
        attributed to the appellants and for which appellants could not  be
        held responsible in any manner in as much as she was not happy with
        her marriage with Appellant No. 1. which was her creation  with  no
        blemish on the part of the appellants. Before we take note of these
        arguments in detail and deal with them, it  would  be  apposite  to
        take note of the testimonies  of  material  witnesses  as  well  as
        documentary evidence produced. It is only thereafter the  arguments
        of Mr. Jain would be better discernible  and  appreciated  for  our
        analysis/ discussion.
     7. As per Rameshwar Dayal (P.W.1), whenever his daughter  Sunita  used
        to come to  Guna  she  would  say  that  her  parents  in  law  had
        persistent demand for gold chain. In the month of  Shravan  in  the
        year 1989, they had come to Jaora to take  the  daughter  then  her
        mother-in-law had beaten her in his presence. Rameshwar  Dayal  has
        also said that it was guessed from the letters of the girl that her
        husband and parents in law were harassing her.
     8. Ashok Sharma (PW. 7) stated that he was sent a letter  Ex.  P.5  by
        his sister to him. Rameshwar Dayal has also stated letters Ex.  P.3
        and P4 to have been written by Sunita.  It  is  revealed  from  the
        statement of Ashok Sharma that Sunita had  told  him  in  Guna  and
        Sagar that in laws had demanded gold chain and money. Also, she was
        troubled in her in-laws house. Ashok Sharma had  met  Sunita  about
        one and half months before death when she had gone to Sagar.
     9. Ram Behari Lal Sharma (P.W.4) is the mousa of  deceased  Sunita.The
        police had prepared the map of  the  place  of  occurrence  in  his
        presence. The police had seized letters Ex. P3, P4 and P5 from  Ram
        Behali Lal Sharma. Ram Behari Lal Sharma had got the information of
        burning of Sunita when he was in school. Thereupon, he reached  the
        spot and later on he had gone to Sunita in the Hospital.
    10. Naib Tehsildar SPS Chauhan (P.W.2) had recorded the statement  (Ex.
        P.9) of Sunita, before her  death.  This  witness  has  proved  the
        statement from  B  to  B  in  Ex.  P.9  by  Sunita.  Before  taking
        statement, the certificate of the doctor was taken. Dr.  S.K.  Jain
        (PW. 5) had examined Sunita and had advised to take her  statement.
        Report relating to it is  Ex.  P.15.  After  death  Dr.  Chandelkar
        (P.W.6) had performed postmortem of Sunita. Dr. Jain has  mentioned
        about the smell of kerosene from Sunita's body  and  that  she  had
        suffered 92% burns. As per him, the cause of death is the  burning,
        flowing of water from the body and the state of shock arising  from
        loss of chemicals. Dr. Chandelkar has also mentioned about kerosene
        smell from the body. The postmortem report  given  by  him  is  Ex.
        P.16.
    11. The defence side produced one witness viz. Pravin Dixit, brother-in-
        law of Appellant No. 1 who is the husband of his sister Sunita.
    12. Perusal of the judgment of the  Trial  Court  shows  that  detailed
        submissions   were   made   by   the   defence   questioning    the
        trustworthiness  of  the  prosecution  case.  It  was  argued  that
        deceased was not treated with cruelty, much less on the  ground  of
        dowry. The defence also  attacked  the  dying  declaration  of  the
        deceased – Sunita, on    the plea that it was unreliable because of
        many loopholes therein. The Trial Court stated that there were  two
        decisive questions which were to be determined and they were:
           “(i)  Whether the accused  used  to  behave  with  cruelty  with
           Sunita wife of Satish Chandra  Trivedi  for  illegal  object  of
           getting more dowry.
           (ii)  Whether the  accused  tortured  Sunita  on  the  night  of
           14.1.1991 in fulfilment of the illegal object  of  getting  more
           dowry and Sunita died  in  the  manner  different  from  natural
           death?”




      13.   While answering the aforesaid questions, apart from relying  on
      oral testimonies of the witnesses, the trial court referred to Ex. P-
      3, which is a letter written by Sunita to her  aunt  (Mausi)  stating
      that she would do nothing except but to give up her life. Mention was
      also made to Ex. P-8 which Satish had written to his father-in-law as
      well as Ex. P-1 which was a letter written by deceased Sunita to  her
      parents 15 days before her death, mentioning that there was no change
      in the atmosphere and she was not happy  in  her  matrimonial  house.
      From these letters coupled with oral  testimonies,  the  Trial  Court
      concluded that there was a demand  of  dowry  because  of  which  the
      deceased was harassed.


    14. The Trial Court also discussed Ex. P-9, namely, the dying statement
        and returned the finding that since the statement  was  taken  only
        after certifying the state of health of Sunita by the  doctor  that
        she was in a proper state of mind to make  such  a  statement.  The
        Trial Court also discarded the theory of the  defence  that  Sunita
        was tutored by her Mausa in giving the statement. From the  reading
        of this dying statement, the trial court  came  to  the  conclusion
        that there was in fact a quarrel which took place on  the  date  of
        occurrence immediately before she put herself on fire. On the basis
        of such discussion, the Trial Court returned  the  verdict  of  the
        guilty against the appellants and sister of Appellant no.1  in  the
        manner mentioned in the beginning of this judgment.
      15.   The High Court went through the gamut of  all  the  issues  and
      upheld the judgment qua these two appellants recording the  following
      reasons:
           “(i)  On considering the above submissions, I find that there is
           no merit in the appeal, primarily, on the  ground  that  because
           evidence of the prosecution is supported and corroborated by the
           documentary evidence available on record, the dying  declaration
           Ex. - P/9 is a strong iron clad testimony from the  clutches  of
           which the accused cannot escape. Ex. P/9 is recorded and  proved
           in accordance with law. Dr. S.K. Jain PW-5  has  certified  that
           although deceased Sunita had recorded 92% burn, she was in a fit
           state of mind. The dying declaration of the  deceased  has  been
           recorded in presence of the Magistrate Shri S.P.S. Chauhan  PW-2
           and no fault can be found  in  the  same.  The  letter  Ex.  P/8
           available on record also amply  proved  that  the  deceased  was
           being treated with cruelty.


           (ii)  It would be profitable to rely  on  the  decision  of  the
           Supreme Court in the matter of Muthu Kutty and another v.  State
           of T.N. (2005) 9 SCC 113 whereby the Apex Court  has  held  that
           conviction  can  be  accorded  solely  on  the  basis  of  dying
           declaration, if it is  worthy  and  reliable  and  there  is  no
           infirmity  in  it  reinforcing   the   maxim   'Nemo   Moriturus
           praesumitur', which means that a person will not meet his  maker
           with a lie in his mouth.


           (iii) Then, in this light it is important to consider  the  fact
           that the dying declaration is duly supported by the testimony of
           Rameshwar Dayal PW-1; Ashok Sharma PW-7 and Rambiharilal  Sharma
           P4-4 the father, the brother  and  uncle  of  the  deceased  and
           although they are interested  witnesses  being  related  to  the
           deceased. It is only natural  in  the  circumstances  since  the
           offence under Section 498-A pertains to cruelty being meted  out
           to the deceased soon before her  death  and  she  was  bound  to
           report the same to these persons only. Besides  their  testimony
           is duly supported by written documents, letters Ex. P1,  P3,  P4
           and P5 by the deceased Sunita. The fact that Rameshwar Dayal PW-
           1 has stated in his deposition that accused Sohanbai had slapped
           his daughter in his presence is corroborated by letter Ex. P5 to
           the brother that she (deceased Sunita) was aboused in  front  of
           her father who had watched helplessly and  the  situation  could
           never be rectified.”


      16.   However, in so far as sister of Appellant No. 1  is  concerned,
      benefit of doubt was given as after the marriage she had been  living
      separately at Indore.


      17.   We now proceed to take note of the detailed submissions  of  Mr.
      Jain,  learned  Senior  Counsel  for  the  appellants.  He  began  his
      submission by arguing that at the time of marriage the father  of  the
      deceased did not consider the fact that Appellant No.  1  was  not  in
      service. He was under the wrong impression that  boy's  father  was  a
      wealthy person and his daughter would  be  happy  in  the  matrimonial
      house even if Appellant No. 1  was  earning  his  livelihood  only  by
      running a  small  shop  i.e.  namkeen  selling  business.  He  further
      submitted that there  was  no  question  of  demanding  any  dowry  as
      marriage between the parties was a part of group  marriage  solemnised
      on that day.
      18.   According to him, reading of the letters as well as  testimonies
      of the prosecution witnesses would bring out that the real problem was
      the unemployment of Appellant No. 1 which became the  villain  of  the
      peace. Thus, he tried to weave the story in his  own  way,  presenting
      the events in the following manner:-
           Appellant No. 1 was continuing his studies (he  was  doing  LLB)
           which is clear from the letter dated 29.1.1998  written  by  the
           brother of the deceased. In this letter Shri Ashok,  brother  of
           the deceased also wrote that deceased was kept  with  affection.
           The deceased Sunita  was  a  graduate.  She  did  not  like  the
           business of Namkeen being run by Appellant  No.  1  in  a  small
           shop. She forced Appellant No. 1 to close the said business. The
           fact that the said business was closed at the  instance  of  the
           deceased and/or her brother  is  clear  from  the  letter  dated
           29.1.1989 written by Ashok Kumar  Sharma,  the  brother  of  the
           deceased to Appellant No. 1's family, wherein he wrote:-
      “Ch. Satish ji how your business is going on. You had  told  to  close
      the shop. How it is going on? LL.B result  would  have  not  been  out
      yet.”
            In another letter dated 22.9.1989  the  deceased  brother  Ashok
      Kumar Sharma had written to the deceased -
           “How the shop is functioning. The shop must have been closed.”
           After closing of the shop, Appellant No. 1 and the deceased, who
      was a graduate, took job as teachers in private school as  is  evident
      from the statement of Rameshwar Dayal Sharma P.W.1, the father of  the
      deceased, himself. Further at the instance of the deceased,  Appellant
      No. 1 started living separately from his parents. This was done at the
      advice of the deceased brother Ashok Kumar Sharma,  who  has  admitted
      this in his statement.
           The deceased lost her job. This is evident from Ex. D-6  wherein
      P.W. 7 Ashok Kumar Sharma, brother of deceased  had  asked  Sunita  to
      prepare a certificate of domicile of any district  of  Madhya  Pradesh
      and send the same to him. Mr. Jain argued that this letter also  shows
      that deceased's brother  was  also  trying  to  find  a  job  for  the
      deceased. On account of losing the job by the deceased, Appellant  No.
      1 and the deceased trapped in a  financial  crisis.  With  the  meager
      income as primary school teacher in private school, it  was  difficult
      for Appellant No. 1 to carry on the family. On  account  of  financial
      crisis Appellant No. 1 again came back to his parents, as  is  evident
      from the testimony of P.W.1 Rameshwar  Dayal  Sharma,  father  of  the
      deceased. He thus, argued that it is this financial crisis  which  led
      the deceased go into depression. Otherwise, various letters written by
      the relatives show their cordial relations.
      19.   Coming specifically to  charge  under  Section  498A  of  I.P.C.
      namely that of harassment, Mr. Jain submitted that even P.W.1  in  his
      cross-examination had stated:
                 “11.  Ex. P-8 letter was written by  my  son-in-law  Satish
           Chandra before the death of my daughter. It is correct  that  my
           daughter Sunita did not make any complaint to me with regard  to
           the behaviour of her husband i.e. accused Satish  or  any  other
           complainant whatsoever.”
                 P.W.7  Ashok Kumar Sharma, brother of the  deceased  Sunita
           also admitted:
                 “6........My sister never told or complained me  about  her
           husband i.e, accused Satish Chandra that he ever tortured her or
           ever demanded dowry or torment her. She has certainly said  that
           her husband does not say anything when  her  mother-in-law  does
           such things.”
            Mr. Jain submitted that in view of the aforesaid  statements  of
      none else than the father and brother of the deceased, the  conviction
      of Appellant No. 1 under Section 498A and thereby under Section  304-B
      I.P.C. is ex-facie untenable.
            For this he placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the
      case of Satkar Singh and Ors. v. State of Haryana reported  in  (2004)
      11 SCC 291 wherein it is, inter alia, held:-
                 “23.  It is based on these  erroneous  inference  drawn  on
           unproved facts and placing reliance on statements of  interested
           witnesses whose evidence  has  not  stood  the  test  of  cross-
           examination, the trial court came to a wrong  conclusion  as  to
           the guilt of the accused persons. It  is  to  be  noted  that  3
           letters, Exts. P-28, DA and DB which though not  very  proximate
           in time clearly show that  there  was  no  demand  as  has  been
           alleged by the prosecution by the accused and  the  contents  of
           the said letter clearly show that the allegation made after  the
           death of Devinder Kaur of dowry demand or harassment leading  to
           cruelty is unsubstantiated. For all these reasons we are of  the
           opinion that the trial Court committee serious error  in  coming
           to the conclusion that the prosecution had established its  case
           against the appellants.”


      20.   It was argued by Mr. Jain that the learned Trial Court  has  not
      found Appellant No. 1 ever made any demand of dowry.  The  High  Court
      has further acquitted  Sunita  (sister)  and,  therefore,  so  far  as
      Appellant No. 1 (husband) is concerned, neither there is any  evidence
      nor any finding by the learned trial court or the High Court  that  he
      ever demanded dowry. In the absence of any  evidence  with  regard  to
      dowry, the conviction of Appellant No. 1 (husband) under  Section  304
      (B) IPC is ex-facie untenable in  as  much  as  Section  304  (B)  IPC
      envisages “that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty  or
      harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband  for,  or  in
      connection with, any demand for dowry.”
      21.   Questioning the veracity of  the  dying  declaration,  Mr.  Jain
      argued that it was tutored one in as much as the same was recorded  in
      the presence of family members of the deceased and when Appellant  No.
      2 was sitting outside. More over, in this very statement the  deceased
      had stated about Appellant No. 1 that “he is innocent”. He also argued
      that this dying declaration was not recorded in a proper manner namely
      in the form of questions and answers.
      22.   Mr. Jain concluded his submission by arguing that the  aforesaid
      facts amply prove that this is not a case of demand of dowry but is  a
      case where on account of family circumstances  the  deceased  did  not
      adjust herself and placed herself  in  a  situation  where  first  she
      forced her husband to  close  his  business  of  Namkeen,  forced  her
      husband to separate from his parents and to take up a job in a private
      school and she also joined service in a private school. On account  of
      the fact that when the deceased became unemployed and it was difficult
      for the couple to  bear  the  expenses,  this  resulted  in  financial
      problem and forced the Appellant No. 1 to go  back  to  the  house  of
      parents, which he left before marriage of his sister. In  the  present
      matter it is also borne out from the record that the deceased tried to
      take  away  all  the  ornaments  of  the  family  resulting  in   some
      altercation between Appellant No. 2 and the  deceased  which  was  the
      solitary incident where allegation of physical assault  was  made.  He
      submitted that under the circumstances no case under Section 498A   or
      304-B was made out. He  referred  to  the  decision  in  the  case  of
      Mahendra Singh reported in 1005 Supp. (3) SCC 371  wherein  the  Court
      has observed as under:-
                 “Abetment has been defined in Section 107 IPC to mean  that
           a person abets the doing of a thing who firstly  instigates  any
           person to do a thing, or secondly,  engages  with  one  or  more
           persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act
           or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy,
           and  in  order  to  the  doing  of  that  thing,   or   thirdly,
           intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of
           that thing. Neither of the ingredients  of  abetment  are  under
           Section 306 IPC merely on the allegation of  harassment  to  the
           deceased is  not  sustainable.  The  appellants  deserve  to  be
           acquitted of the charge.”


      23.   He also drew sustenance from another judgment  of  the  case  of
      Kishori Lal vs. State of M.P. reported in 2007 (10) SCC 797  observing
      as under:
           “7.   In cases of alleged abetment  of  suicide  there  must  be
           proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission
           of suicide. The mere fact that the husband treated the  deceased
           wife with cruelty is not enough. Merely  on  the  allegation  of
           harassment conviction  in  terms  of  Section  306  IPC  is  not
           sustainable. There is ample evidence on record that the deceased
           was disturbed because she had not given birth to any child.  Pws
           8, 10  and 11 have categorically stated that  the  deceased  was
           disappointed due to the said fact that her failure  to  beget  a
           child and she was upset due to this.”
           If the background facts analysed it is crystal  clear  that  the
           prosecution has failed to establish its case. That being so, the
           appeal deserves to be allowed, which we direct.”


      24.   The learned Counsel  for  the  State,  countered  the  aforesaid
      submissions by arguing that there was clinching evidence against  both
      the appellants, thereby proving the charges of commission of  offences
      under Sections 304 B and 498 A of I.P.C., beyond any reasonable doubt.
      He referred to the testimony of P.W.1, P.W.3 and P.W.7 in  support  of
      the charges of demand of dowry and harassment on that account. He also
      read out from the letters Exhibits P1, P3, P4 and P5 of  the  deceased
      and her relatives, which according to him, proved  that  the  deceased
      was living in a miserable condition because of  the  harassment  meted
      out at her at the hands of the appellants.  He further submitted  that
      there was no  reason  to  disbelieve  the  dying  declaration  of  the
      deceased which was rightly acted upon by the  Courts  below.  He  also
      referred to the reasons advanced by the Trial Court as  well  as  High
      Court in holding the appellants guilty of the aforesaid  offences.  He
      further submitted that the truthfulness of the  aforesaid  prosecution
      witnesses namely P.W.1, P.W.3 and P.W.7 could be gauged from the  fact
      that they never  indulged  in  over  stating  the  events  and  fairly
      accepted some of the suggestions put  forth  in  cross-examination  to
      them truthfully. His submission was that the entire statement of these
      witnesses was to be read to arrive at  correct  conclusion  which  was
      done by the Courts below.


      25.   We have given our due consideration to the aforesaid submissions
      of the Counsel for the parties with reference to the record. It is now
      time to have analytical critique of these submissions to find  out  as
      to whether the conviction and sentence as recorded by the Trial  Court
      and affirmed by the High Court for these appellants is sustainable  or
      not.
      26.   There is no dispute about the fact that  Smt.  Sunita  committed
      suicide on 14.1.1991 by  pouring  kerosene  on  her  person  and  then
      putting herself on fire. Marriage between her and Appellant No. 1  was
      solemnised sometime in April 1988. Thus, this  incident  had  occurred
      within a period of 3 years from the date  of  marriage.  Since  it  is
      within 7 years of the marriage, presumption under Section     304 B of
      I.P.C. will stand attracted if the ingredients of the said Section are
      established.
      27.   In the statement, the deceased had given the description of the
      incident namely the manner in which she committed  suicide.  She  has
      also given the reason for  taking  such  a  step  and  described  the
      behaviour of her in laws towards her. There is a specific  allegation
      that her mother-in-law (Appellant No. 2) and  Sister-in-law  used  to
      tease her on the ground that her parents had not given gold chain and
      they used to fight on account of dowry. This fact was  known  to  her
      father. She had stated that she was putting an end  to  her  life  on
      account of continuous fight. She has also  stated  that  her  husband
      (Appellant No. 1) has come under the influence of  her  mother-in-law
      because of which he would beat her up, but otherwise he was innocent.


      28.   In view of the above disclosure in the said dying  declaration,
      according to us starting point should be  to  decide  as  to  whether
      deceased had made such a statement and it is believable or not.
      29.   The said statement is recorded  by  the  Executive  Magistrate,
      Jawra. As per this document  at  the  time  when  the  statement  was
      recorded,  no  police  officer  was  present.  Before  the  Executive
      Magistrate started recording the statement of Sunita, Dr.  S.K.  Jain
      certified that she was fully conscious and was in a position to  give
      her statement. It  is  again  testified  by  the  doctor  that  while
      recording of her statement, she remained fully conscious.  Primarily,
      two objections are raised questioning  the  veracity  of  this  dying
      declaration. It is stated that Sunita was tutored before she made the
      statement as it was made in the presence of the family members of the
      deceased and Appellant No.  2  was  made  to  sit  outside  when  the
      statement was being recorded. Secondly, it is  not  recorded  in  the
      form of questions and answers. On the facts of this case  both  these
      contentions are to be  rejected.  It  is  clear  that  the  Executive
      Magistrate took due precautions and  even  obtained  the  certificate
      about the state of health of Sunita before recording  her  statement.
      He has entered the witness box as P.W.2 and deposed to  this  effect.
      There is nothing on record which would indicate that Sunita may  have
      been tutored by her Mausa. Nothing could be pointed out to show  that
      after reaching hospital, she had occasion to meet her  Mausa  and  he
      got an opportunity to tutor her. It is also to be borne in mind  that
      in some of her letters written to her relatives prior to the date  of
      occurrence, she had categorically stated that she was not happy  with
      her matrimonial life and may put end to same. There  is  a  different
      slant which is sought to be given by the defence, to  these  letters.
      We will revert to that aspect  at  the  appropriate  stage.  At  this
      juncture we are only highlighting that Sunita was not happy with  her
      matrimonial life and she had expressed so  on  earlier  occasions  as
      well. This fact has  now  surfaced  in  her  statement.  It  is  also
      pertinent to point out that she has primarily blamed  her  mother-in-
      law and sister-in-law. There is no accusation against her husband  to
      the effect that he was also demanding dowry.  She  is  forthright  in
      stating that whatever her husband did was under the influence of  her
      mother-in-law, and he was even beating her  occasionally.  Otherwise,
      she has categorically stated that her husband is innocent. Had  there
      been any tutoring, it would not  have  come  in  such  a  form  which
      appears to be more natural and voluntary. For all these reasons we do
      not agree with the contention of Mr. Jain  that  Sunita  was  tutored
      before she made the statement.
      30.   Simply because the statement is not recorded  in  the  form  of
      questions and answers, is  no  reason  to  discard  it  once.  It  is
      otherwise found to be trustworthy and can be  treated  as  the  dying
      declaration admissible under Section  32  of  the  Evidence  Act.  No
      doubt, it is emphasised by  this  Court  that  recording  of  such  a
      statement in the form of question  and  answer  is  more  appropriate
      method which should generally be resorted to. However, that would not
      mean that if such a statement otherwise meets all the requirements of
      Section 32 and is found to  be  worthy  of  credence,  it  is  to  be
      rejected only on the ground that it was not recorded in the  form  of
      questions and answers.  As  pointed  out  above,  all  the  requisite
      precautions  were  taken  before  recording  the  statement  by   the
      Executive Magistrate (P.W.2). It  has  come  on  record  that  Sunita
      remained conscious even after concluding her statement and during the
      period when her statement was being  recorded,  Certificate  to  this
      effect was also obtained by P.W.2.
      31.   Having held that the aforesaid statement of  the  deceased  was
      rightly accepted as admissible under Section 32 of the  Evidence  Act
      treating the same as the dying declaration,  we  proceed  further  to
      find out as to whether conviction of  the  appellants  under  Section
      498A and 304B of IPC is rightly recorded by the  Courts  below.  From
      the tenor of the letters, reference to which have  been  made  above,
      there may be a possibility that  deceased  was  not  happy  with  her
      matrimonial life also because of  the reason that her husband was not
      well off and settled in life. Possibility also cannot  be  ruled  out
      that she was not happy with the small business of Namkeen  which  was
      being carried on  by  Appellant  No.  1  in  a  small  shop  and  her
      aspirations were much higher. She made him wind up that business  and
      both of them viz. the husband and the  deceased  had  started  joined
      service as teachers in a private school. Later she even lost that job
      of hers. But the question is as to whether this was  the  reason  for
      her to commit suicide?  This question  has  to  be  answered  in  the
      negative  having  regard  to  her  statement  made   in   the   dying
      declaration. She has very categorically stated that her mother-in-law
      used to fight with her regularly on account of demand of  gold  chain
      which her parents could not fulfill. She had fight on that  day  also
      and being tired of such regular fights she poured kerosene oil on her
      and set herself on fire. It is thus, clear that  immediate  cause  of
      committing suicide was regular fights with mother-in-law  on  account
      of  dowry  demand.  It,  thus,  stands  established  that  there  was
      continuous dowry demand by Appellant  No.  2,  mother-in-law  of  the
      deceased and Appellant No. 2 was even treating her with  cruelty  for
      not fulfilling this demand.
      32.   Section 498A IPC reads as under:-
                 “498A.           Husband or relative of husband of a  woman
           subjecting her to cruelty. -
                 Whoever, being the husband or the relative of  the  husband
           of a woman, subjects such woman to  cruelty  shall  be  punished
           with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and
           shall also be liable to fine.
                 Explanation. - For the purposes of this Section,  'cruelty'
           means –
                 (a)   any wilful conduct which is of such a  nature  as  is
           likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or  to  cause  grave
           injury or danger to life, limb  or  health  (whether  mental  or
           physical) of the woman; or
                 (b)   harassment of the woman where such harassment is with
           a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet  any
           unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or  is  on
           account of failure by her or any person related to her  to  meet
           demand.”
            We  find  that  ingredients  of  the  aforesaid  Section  stand
      satisfied qua Appellant No. 2 as deceased was subject to  cruelty  on
      account of unlawful demand  for  property  viz.  gold  chain  in  the
      instant case and failure on her part to meet that demand. So much so,
      it ultimately had driven Sunita to commit suicide.
      33.   In so far as Appellant No. 1 is concerned it  is  difficult  to
      sustain his conviction  under  Section  498A.  The  deceased  in  her
      statement has accused only her mother-in-law  and  sister-in-law  for
      this demand. She has not blamed her husband at all. On the  contrary,
      she has categorically stated that her husband is innocent. May be  at
      times Appellant No. 1 had beaten his wife on the saying of her mother-
      in-law but the deceased had not connected this with demand of  dowry.
      Therefore, it is not conclusively proved that there was any “cruelty”
      on his part. Here, reading the statement of the deceased  along  with
      various letters becomes somewhat important. Tenor of  those  letters,
      in so far as they relate to Appellant No. 1, indicates that as far as
      Appellant No. 1 is concerned, he is not to be  blamed.  In  fact,  in
      order to please and satisfy his wife, Appellant No. 1 was making  all
      efforts to become something in life and was struggling for  that.  We
      thus, are persuaded to give benefit of doubt to Appellant No.  1  for
      change under Section 498A.  As  a  consequence  while  upholding  the
      conviction of Appellant No. 2 under Section 498A of  IPC,  we  acquit
      Appellant No. 1 from this charge.
      34.   With this, we come to the question of conviction under  Section
      304B of IPC. It is couched in the following language:-
      “304B. Dowry death. - (1)   Where the death of a woman  is  caused  by
      any burns or bodily injury  or  occurs  otherwise  than  under  normal
      circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown  that
      soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty  or  harassment  by
      her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with,
      any demand for dowry, such death shall be  called  'dowry  death'  and
      such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
      Explanation. - For the purposes of  this  sub-section,  'dowry'  shall
      have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the  Dowry  Prohibition  Act,
      1961 (28 of 1961)
      (2)   Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with  imprisonment
      for a term which shall not be less than  seven  years  but  which  may
      extend to imprisonment for life.




      35.   Undoubtedly, death  of  Sunita  is  caused  by  burns  and  has
      occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. It  has  happened
      within 7 years of  her  marriage.  Further,  the  trigger  point  for
      committing suicide was the quarrel between her and her  mother-in-law
      on the fateful day. At the same time it is also to be borne  in  mind
      that it is not a case where appellants have poured kerosene  and  put
      her on fire. That is the act of deceased herself and  thus  it  is  a
      case of suicide. The question is  whether  the  quarrel  between  the
      deceased and her mother-in-law  can  be  treated  as  satisfying  the
      condition that “soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or
      harassment for, or in connection with, in demand for dowry”.  On  the
      reading the statement in  totality,  it  becomes  clear  that  cause/
      reason for regular fights was dowry. One can clearly  find  out  from
      the statement that on that day also Appellant No. 2 fought  with  her
      for that reason. We are, therefore, of the opinion that commission of
      offence  under  Section  304B  against   Appellant   No.   2   stands
      conclusively proved in view of  iron  clad  dying  declaration.  Here
      again, for the reason stated by us while  discussing  the  accusation
      against Appellant No. 1 under Section 498A of IPC, it cannot be  said
      that he had committed any act of  “cruelty”  soon  before  her  death
      which forced the deceased to take such a step. She has nowhere stated
      that on that date when her  mother-in-law  had  quarreled  with  her,
      Appellant No. 1 was associated or even responsible for that. We  thus
      acquit Appellant No. 1 of charge under Section 304B as well.
      36.   Coming to the sentence of Appellant No. 2  in  respect  of  the
      aforesaid offences, we maintain the sentence  of  one  year  rigorous
      imprisonment (R.I.) for offence under Section 498A of  IPC.  However,
      in so far as Section 304B of IPC is concerned we are of  the  opinion
      that there are certain extenuating and mitigating circumstances which
      persuade us to reduce the sentence of 10 years  R.I.  as  awarded  to
      Appellant No. 2. First of all,  even  when  the  immediate  cause  to
      commit suicide was the fight, at the same time it has to be  kept  in
      mind that deceased was not happy with her matrimonial life for  other
      reasons as well. In fact, she was not happy with this marriage at all
      which she stated in some of the letters to her mausi  or  mausa.   We
      are of the view that ends of justice would be sub served by  reducing
      the sentence from 10 years to  7  years  Rigorous  Imprisonment.  The
      appeals are partly allowed in the  aforesaid  terms.   The  Appellant
      no.2 shall be taken into custody to serve remaining sentence.


                    ......................................................J.
                                               [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]








                       ...................................................J.
                                                                [A.K. SIKRI]




      New Delhi
      May 6, 2014