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Tuesday, December 3, 2013

Allotment of civic amenity sites = Section 38A of the BDA Act, 1976 a civic amenity site could not have been leased, sold or otherwise transferred for a purpose other than the one for which such area is reserved. Since the site in question was earmarked/reserved for “bank”, it could not have been allotted for use as a petrol pump. - High court declared the allotment as null and void- Apex court confirmed the same and dismiss the appeal = Civil Appeal No.10747/2013 @ Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).31690/2011 PURUSHOTHAM Petitioner(s) VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. Respondent(s) = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41037

 Allotment of civic amenity sites = 
Section 38A of the BDA Act, 1976  a civic amenity site could  not
         have been leased, sold or otherwise transferred for a purpose other
        than the one for which such area is reserved.  Since  the  site  in
        question was earmarked/reserved for “bank”, it could not have  been
        allotted for use as a petrol pump. - High court declared the allotment as null and void- Apex court confirmed the same and dismiss the appeal =

the High Court has concluded -


           “We are satisfied that civil amenity site no. 2, at the time  of
           its allotment to respondent no.3 was expressly earmarked for use
           as “bank”. The aforesaid position has remained unaltered to this
           day. In terms of the mandate contained in Section  38-A  of  the
           Bangalore Development Authority Act, 19776  it  could  not  have
           been leased, sold or otherwise, transferred  for  purpose  other
           than the one “….for which such  area  is  reserved”.  Since  the
           civil  amenity  site  in  question  was  earmarked/reserved  for
           “bank”, we are satisfied that it could not  have  been  allotted
           for use as a “petrol station”.


      16.        From the above, it is evident that in fact,  the  site  had
      been originally earmarked to be developed as a public  park/playground
      in 1984. However, since the same has been converted to  a  residential
      area, respondents Nos. 4 to 14 have very fairly stated that  it  could
      not at this stage be restored to its original purpose without  causing
      havoc in the  lives  of  the  residents.  They  have,  therefore,  not
      insisted that the site be restored to its original purpose.


      17.        We also do not find any merit in the  submission  that  the
      term civic amenities would permit BDA to change the  reservation  from
      one particular user to another without the necessary amendment in  the
      development plan.  This would be contrary to the law laid down by this
      Court in the case of B.S. Muddappa (supra).
      18.        We also do not find any substance in the  submissions  that
      the High Court has wrongly distinguished the judgment of  the  earlier
      Division Bench of the High Court in Aicoboo  Nagar  Residents  Welfare
      Association (supra). 
A perusal of the paragraph 10  of  the  aforesaid
      judgment clearly shows that in that case, the  High  Court  considered
      the legality of allotment of civic amenity site no.3.  
There  was,  in
      fact, no change in the activity/purpose, as  the  site  had  not  been
      reserved for any specific purpose. 
The other question was 
whether  the
      lease in favour of the government company for opening  of  petrol  and
      diesel outlet would fall within the definition of  civic  amenity. 
 In
      the present case, it was not the case of the respondent nos. 4  to  14
      that petrol pump is not a civic amenity, therefore, the site could not
      have been allotted to  open  a  petrol  pump.  
The  grievance  of  the respondents (writ petitioners  in  the  High  Court)  was  that  civic amenity site no.2 had been earmarked for  a  bank  and  could  not  be allotted for a petrol pump without making necessary amendment  in  the site.  
Therefore,  the  High  Court  has  rightly  distinguished   the
      aforesaid judgment and not relied upon the same.
      19.        We, therefore, find no merit in the appeals  and  the  same
      are hereby dismissed.

ITEM NO.1B               COURT NO.9             SECTION IVA

            S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A
                         RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No.10747/2013 @
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).31690/2011

PURUSHOTHAM                                       Petitioner(s)

                 VERSUS

STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.                         Respondent(s)

WITH Civil Appeal No.10748/2013 @
SLP(C) NO. 31695 of 2011

Civil Appeal No.10749/2013 @
SLP(C) NO. 33184 of 2011

Civil Appeal No.10750/2013 @
SLP(C) NO. 33319 of 2011

Date: 29/11/2013  These matters were called on for pronouncement of
    Judgment today.
For Petitioner(s)
                     Dr. Sushil Balwada,Adv.

                        Mr. Rajeev Mishra, Adv.
                     Mr. Sanand Ramakrishnan
For Respondent(s)
                     Mr. Ankur S. Kulkarni,Adv.
                     Ms. Anitha Shenoy ,Adv
                     Mr. Rajesh Mahale ,Adv

                        Mr. Rajeev Mishra, Adv.
                     Mr. Sanand Ramakrishnan ,Adv

           UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
                               O R D E R

                 Leave granted.


                 Hon'ble Mr. Justice Surinder Singh  Nijjar  pronounced  the
        Judgment of the  Bench  comprising  His  Lordship  and  Hon'ble  Mr.
        Justice A.K. Sikri.
                 For the reasons recorded in the signed Reportable Judgment,
        the Appeals are dismissed.


        |(Vishal Anand)                        | |(Indu Bala Kapur)                   |
|Court Master                          | |Court Master                        |


             (Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)
                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.10747 OF 2013
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 31690 of 2011)


      Purushottam                                            …Appellant
      VERSUS
      State of Karnataka & Ors.                        ...Respondents
                                    With
                        Civil Appeal No.10748 of 2013
                 (Arising out of SLP (C)  No. 31695 of 2011)


      Mrs. Ramadevi                                          …Appellant
      VERSUS
      Bangalore Development Authority & Ors. ...Respondents
                                    With
                        Civil Appeal No.10749 of 2013
                 (Arising out of SLP (C)  No. 33184 of 2011)


      Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited     …Appellant
      VERSUS
      Subramanya & Ors.                                  ...Respondents


                                    With
                        Civil Appeal No.10750 of 2013
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 33319 of 2011)


      Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited    …Appellant
      VERSUS
      Dr. Harish V. Iyer & Ors.                          ...Respondents


                               J U D G M E N T
      SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.
     1. Leave granted.

     2. These four appeals arising out of SLP (C) No.31690 of 2011, SLP (C)
        No.31695 of 2011, SLP (C) No.33184 of 2011 and SLP (C) No.33319  of
        2011, impugn the judgment of a Division  Bench  of  Karnataka  High
        Court rendered in Writ Petition No. 5428  of  2006  (BDA-PIL),  and
        Writ Petition No. 5173 of 2006 (GM-RES/PIL), whereby the High Court
        has declared the allotment of civic amenity site no.  2  to  Bharat
        Petroleum Corporation (respondent No. 3)  for  establishment  of  a
        petrol pump, null and void.  The writ petitions have been  allowed.
         The allotment dated 4th August, 2005 made in favour of  respondent
        No. 3 has been set aside.

     3. The facts as narrated in C.A. No. 10747 of 2013 arising out of  SLP
        (C) No. 31690 of 2011 are as under:-

            • On 29th August, 1990 a Notification was issued by  the  State
              of  Karnataka  Government  under  Section  2bb(vi)   of   the
              Bangalore  Development  Authority  Act,   1976   (hereinafter
              referred to as “BDA  Act,  1976”)  to  the  effect  that  the
              amenities such as liquefied  petroleum  gas  godowns,  retail
              domestic fuel depots, petrol retail outlets  are  the  “civic
              amenities”  for the purposes of the aforesaid Act.

            • Thereafter, the State Government issued another  Notification
              on 29th April, 1994, inviting objections  or  suggestions  to
              the Revised Comprehensive Development Plan of Bangalore  City
              Planning Area, prepared  under  Karnataka  Town  and  Country
              Planning Act, 1961, (Karnataka Act 11  of  1963),  which  had
              been provisionally approved by the Government.

            • On 5th  January,  1995,  Site  No.2  is  reserved  for  civic
              amenities (hereinafter referred to as “CA Site No.2”)

            •  On  31st  January,  2000,  Bangalore  Development  Authority
              (hereinafter referred to as “BDA”) passed Resolution  No.  28
              of 2000 empowering the Chairman or the Commissioner to  allot
              Civil Amenity Site to any Government Body, State  or  Central
              Government undertaking.

            • On 1st January, 2001, BDA allotted CA Site No.2 and 3 in HRBR
              Layout III Block each measuring 2195.35 sq. mtrs. and  629.18
              sq. mtrs. in favour of Bangalore Water  Supply  and  Sewerage
              Board (hereinafter referred to as “BWSSB”)  on  lease  for  a
              period of 30 years for the purpose  of  service  station  and
              pump house.




            • On 28th March, 2002, a detailed representation was  submitted
              by one Mr. Padmanabha Reddy on the subject : Requisition  for
              Allotment of Civic Amenity Site No.2 & 3 in  HRBR  UI  Block,
              Bangalore  –  43  as  park.   It  was  pointed  out  in  this
              representation that the III Block of the  HRBR  Layout  is  a
              residential layout, with homes situated, chock-a-block,  with
              absolutely no ventilation space.  It was pointed out that  in
              these circumstances, the  provision  for  a  park/ventilation
              space is a crying-need of the locality.   The  representation
              also mentions that the objectors had  an  opportunity  to  go
              through the Revised Comprehensive  Development  Plan  –  2011
              (RCDP) pertaining to  District  No.7,  which  clearly  showed
              that, a squarish block of land, situated on the western  side
              of Civic Amenity site wherein the BWSSB  has  already  housed
              the Twin Ground Level reservoirs had  been  earmarked  for  a
              park. The other  surprise  in  store  in  the  RCDP  was  the
              earmarking of CA Site No.2, which was the bone of contention,
              as Commercial Area/Zone.  It is pointed out that in  reality,
              much before 1995, when the RCDP had allegedly been finalized,
              the BDA had already accomplished the task of converting  this
              squarish block of land  into  residential  sites  and  either
              allotted or auctioned such sites.  The land had been  clearly
              shown as earmarked for  a  park  or  a  playground.   Another
              similar block  of  land,  which  was  also  earmarked  to  be
              developed as a park has continued to  be  used  as  a  burial
              ground.  The representationist also brought to the notice  of
              the BDA sentiments expressed by this Court  in  the  case  of
              Bangalore  Medical  Trust  Vs.  B.S.   Muddappa   &   Ors.[1]
              Particular  attention  of  the  authorities  was   drawn   to
              Paragraphs 18, 19, 24, 25, 27, 37 and  48  with  the  comment
              that  the  observations  made  in  the  aforesaid  paragraphs
              reflect the aspirations  of  the  respondent  Nos.  4  to  14
              (petitioners in the High Court).  Legally it was stated  that
              the action of the BDA is contrary to Section  38A(2)  of  the
              BDA Act, 1976.  It was ultimately stated  that  the  land  on
              which,  now,  reservoirs  had  been  developed   was   beyond
              “redemption and resumption”.  The other  area  earmarked  for
              the park can not be used as a park since it has already  been
              used as a graveyard.  Their only intention was  to  save  the
              remaining part which has now been allotted for the use as the
              petrol pump.

            • On 9th February, 2005, the State Government passed  an  order
              for continuation of revised CDP 1995 till 2015.

            • On 30th June, 2005, Bharat Petroleum Corporation  (respondent
              No.3) requested BDA to allot land for development of a retail
              outlet.

            • On 4th August, 2005, BDA allotted CA Site No.2 in  favour  of
              respondent No.3.

            • Thereafter, on 7th October, 2005, the  lease  deed  was  duly
              executed between BDA and respondent No.3 for a period  of  30
              years.  Dealership licence was granted in favour of  wife  of
              the appellant by respondent No.3 on 4th February, 2006.

            • Thereafter on 21st February, 2006, BDA has approved the  plan
              for establishment of petrol  pump  in  favour  of  respondent
              No.3.  Aggrieved by the aforesaid action, Writ  Petition  No.
              5428 of 2006 and others were  filed  in  public  interest  to
              challenge the  decision  of    BDA
              dated  21st  February,  2006  with  a  prayer  to  quash  the
              allotment of CA Site No.2 in favour of  respondent  No.3  for
              establishing a petrol pump and to convert the same to a  park
              for the elderly and a playground for the young.

     4. By the impugned judgment, the  Division  Bench  of  Karnataka  High
        Court on interpretation of Section 38A concluded that the allotment
        was in violation of Section 38A sub-section (2).   The  High  Court
        has concluded that CA Site No.2 at the time  of  its  allotment  to
        respondent  No.3  was  expressly  earmarked  for  use  as   “bank”.
        Therefore, in terms of Section 38A of the BDA Act, 1976  could  not
        have been leased, sold or otherwise transferred for a purpose other
        than the one for which such area is reserved.  Since  the  site  in
        question was earmarked/reserved for “bank”, it could not have  been
        allotted for use as a petrol pump. The High Court  also  held  that
        the allotment of the site was null  and  void  as  it  was  not  in
        consonance of Section 38A sub-section (2).  The High Court  further
        observed that even though both “bank” and “petrol pump”  are  civic
        amenities within the meaning of Section 2(bb) of the BDA Act, 1976,
        yet the mandate of Section 38A is clear and unambiguous.  It is for
        the very civic amenity, for which the area is reserved,  for  which
        it has to be put to use.

     5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
     6. It is submitted by the learned counsel  that  the  High  Court  has
        erred in holding that any area of particular civic  amenity  cannot
        be subsequently changed to another user which also falls within the
        definition of a civic amenity.  It  is  submitted  by  the  learned
        senior counsel appearing for all the appellants that the High Court
        has failed to appreciate that the sites still remain allotted to  a
        civic amenity.  Merely, because the  user  has  been  changed  from
        public park to bank and now to petrol pump would  not  violate  the
        provisions contained in Section 38A(1) and (2).   It  is  submitted
        that since the Notification was duly issued that petrol pump  would
        be a civic amenity as provided under Section 2(bb)(vi) of the  Act,
        there was no violation of Section 38A(2).
     7. Learned counsel for the appellants  have  submitted  that  in  fact
        there is no resolution passed by the BDA to show that the  site  in
        question has been earmarked for a bank.  It  is  further  submitted
        that the change of purpose or user for a particular piece  of  land
        as a civic amenity is permissible under Rule 3(1) of the  Bangalore
        Development Authority (Civic Amenity Site)  Allotment  Rules,  1989
        (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “BDAA  Rules,  1989”)  as  amended.
        According to the learned senior counsel, once the land is  reserved
        as  a  civic  amenity  and  allotted  in  favour  of  a  Government
        department or statutory authority of the  Central  Government,  the
        BDA Rules, 1989 has no application.  It was further submitted  that
        the Division Bench has erred in distinguishing the earlier judgment
        of the Division Bench of the same  Court  Aicoboo  Nagar  Residents
        Welfare Association & Anr.  Vs.  Bangalore  Development  Authority,
        Bangalore & Anr.[2] in which it has been  clearly  laid  down  that
        “the use of site  as  a  civic  amenity  for  the  distribution  of
        petroleum products also  would  come  within  the  scope  of  civic
        amenity”.
     8. Learned counsel appearing for the BDA and the  State  of  Karnataka
        have supported the case pleaded by the appellants. Learned  counsel
        appearing for respondent Nos. 4 to 14, however, submitted that  the
        High Court has correctly interpreted Section 38A(1)  and  (2)  that
        any area reserved for a particular civic amenity cannot be diverted
        to any other civic amenity on the ground that civic  amenity  is  a
        general term.  According to the learned counsel,  the  judgment  of
        the High Court is in consonance with the  law  laid  down  by  this
        Court in the case of B.S. Muddappa (supra).  The aforesaid judgment
        has been subsequently followed by this Court in R.K. Mittal &  Ors.
        Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.[3]  It has been submitted that in
        view of the law declared by this Court, the  impugned  judgment  of
        the High Court does not call for any interference.
     9. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel  for
        the parties.
    10. In our opinion, it is no longer necessary for us  to  consider  the
        issues raised by the appellants on first principle, as the issue is
        no longer res integra.  In the case of B.S. Muddappa (supra),  this
        Court examined the entire issue wherein, it has been held “that the
        legislative  intent  of   the   Bangalore   Development   Authority
        (Amendment) Act, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as “BDA  (Amendment)
        Act, 1991”), which came into force w.e.f. 16th January, 1991 is  to
        prevent the diversion of the user of an area reserved for a  public
        park or playground or civic amenity to another user.
    11. Original Section 38A of the BDA Act, 1976 has been substituted with
        the present Section 38A w.e.f. 21st April,  1984,  which  reads  as
        under:-
           “‘38-A. Grant of area reserved for civic amenities etc.—


           (1) The Authority  shall  have  the  power  to  lease,  sell  or
           otherwise transfer any area reserved for civic amenities for the
           purpose for which such area is reserved.


           (2) The Authority shall not sell or  otherwise  dispose  of  any
           area  reserved  for  public  parks  and  playgrounds  and  civic
           amenities, for any other purpose and  any  disposition  so  made
           shall be null and void:


           Provided that where the allottee commits breach of  any  of  the
           conditions of allotment,  the  Authority  shall  have  right  to
           resume such site after affording an opportunity of  being  heard
           to such allottee.”
    12. Interpreting the aforesaid provision, this Court has held as under:-


           “This new Section 38-A, as clarified in the Statement of Objects
           and Reasons and in the Explanatory Statement  attached  to  L.A.
           Bill 6 of 1991, removed the prohibition against lease or sale or
           any other transfer of any area reserved  for  a  civic  amenity,
           provided the transfer is for the same purpose for which the area
           has been reserved. This means that once an area has been stamped
           with the character of a particular civic amenity by  reservation
           of that area for purpose, it cannot be diverted to any other use
           even when it is transferred to another party. The  rationale  of
           this restriction is that  the  scheme  once  sanctioned  by  the
           government must operate universally and the areas allocated  for
           particular objects must not be diverted to other  objects.  This
           means that a site for a school or hospital or  any  other  civic
           amenity must remain reserved for that purpose, although the site
           itself may change hands. This is the purpose of sub-section  (1)
           of Section 38-A as now substituted. Sub-section (2)  of  Section
           38-A, on the other hand, emphasises the  conceptual  distinction
           between ‘public parks and playgrounds’ forming one  category  of
           ‘space’ and ‘civic amenities’ forming another category of sites.
           While public parks and playgrounds cannot be parted with by  the
           BDA for transfer to private hands by reason of  their  statutory
           dedication to the general public, other areas reserved for civic
           amenities may be transferred to private parties for the specific
           purposes for  which  those  areas  are  reserved.  There  is  no
           prohibition, as such, against transfer of open  spaces  reserved
           for  public  parks  or   playgrounds,   whether   or   not   for
           consideration, but the transfer is limited to public authorities
           and their user is limited to the purposes  for  which  they  are
           reserved under the scheme. The distinction is that while  public
           parks and playgrounds are dedicated to the public at  large  for
           common use, and must therefore remain  with  the  State  or  its
           instrumentalities, such as the BDA or a Municipal Corporation or
           any other authority, the civic amenities are not  so  dedicated,
           but only reserved for particular or special purposes……………………


           24. Protection of the environment, open  spaces  for  recreation
           and fresh air,  playgrounds  for  children,  promenade  for  the
           residents, and other conveniences or amenities  are  matters  of
           great public concern and of vital interest to be taken  care  of
           in a development scheme. It is that  public  interest  which  is
           sought to be promoted by the Act by establishing  the  BDA.  The
           public interest in the  reservation  and  preservation  of  open
           spaces for parks and playgrounds cannot be sacrificed by leasing
           or selling such sites to private persons for conversion to  some
           other user. Any such act would be contrary  to  the  legislative
           intent  and  inconsistent  with  the   statutory   requirements.
           Furthermore,  it  would  be  in   direct   conflict   with   the
           constitutional mandate  to  ensure  that  any  State  action  is
           inspired by the basic values of individual freedom  and  dignity
           and addressed to the attainment of a quality of life which makes
           the guaranteed rights a reality for all the citizens.

           25. Reservation of open spaces  for  parks  and  playgrounds  is
           universally recognised as a  legitimate  exercise  of  statutory
           power rationally related to the protection of the  residents  of
           the locality from the ill-effects of urbanisation.


           27. The statutes in force in India  and  abroad  reserving  open
           spaces for parks and playgrounds are the legislative attempt  to
           eliminate the misery of disreputable housing condition caused by
           urbanisation. Crowded urban areas tend to spread disease,  crime
           and immorality. As stated by the U.S. Supreme  Court  in  Samuel
           Berman v. Andrew Parker: (L Ed pp. 37-38 : US pp. 32-33)


                 “… They may also  suffocate  the  spirit  by  reducing  the
                 people who live there to the status  of  cattle.  They  may
                 indeed make living an almost insufferable burden. They  may
                 also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community which  robs
                 it of charm, which makes it a place from  which  men  turn.
                 The misery of housing may despoil a community  as  an  open
                 sewer may ruin a river.


                 … The concept of the public welfare is broad and  inclusive
                 …. The values  it  represents  are  spiritual  as  well  as
                 physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is  within  the
                 power of the legislature to determine  that  the  community
                 should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
                 clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the
                 present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have
                 made determinations that take into account a  wide  variety
                 of values ….” (Per Douglas, J.).”
    13. In our opinion, the aforesaid observations are a complete answer to
        all the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants.




    14. This apart on the interpretation of Section  38A(1)  and  (2),  the
        inescapable conclusion is that under Section  38A  (1),  BDA  would
        have the authority to lease, sell or otherwise  transfer  any  area
        reserved for the purpose for which such area is  reserved,  and  no
        other.  This clearly means that the  Government  can  pass  on  the
        responsibility to another concern, be  it  individual,  company  or
        corporation for the purposes of carrying on the activity for  which
        the plot has been reserved as a civic amenity.  It does not give  a
        licence to the BDA to convert the area reserved for civic amenities
        for activities which do not fall within  the  definition  of  civic
        amenities.  Sub-section (2) of Section 38 is an embargo  that  even
        such sale or disposal otherwise of  an  area  reserved  for  public
        parks, playground  would  not  be  permitted  to  private  parties.
        Though such spaces, playgrounds and parks  can  be  transferred  to
        public authorities, but their user would be limited to the purposes
        for  which  they  are  reserved  under  the  scheme.   In  case,  a
        disposition is made for a purpose other than the one for  which  it
        is reserved, the Act has declared that, it shall be null and  void.
        In our opinion, Rule 3 of  which  the  support  is  sought  by  the
        appellants can not be permitted to override the statutory provision
        contained in Section 38A(1) and (2).  Even otherwise, the rule only
        reiterates the statutory provision in Section 38A(1) and  (2).   We
        also do not find any substance in the submission that the site  was
        never allotted as a bank, and, therefore, it could be allotted as a
        petrol pump. The High Court upon perusal of the pleadings  as  well
        as annexure ‘c’ appended to the  writ  petition  has  recorded  the
        following facts :
           “In so far as the factual matrix is concerned, it  is  necessary
           to record that the site in question was originally earmarked  as
           park/playground  in   1984.   This   factual   position   stands
           acknowledged at the hands of the Bangalore Development Authority
           in paragraph 5 of its  counter  affidavit.  Subsequently,  three
           civic amenity sites came to be carved out, in the  area  earlier
           earmarked for park/play ground. The first of these is  presently
           being used by the Bangalore Water supply and Sewerage Board. The
           second site, which is the one in question was earmarked for  use
           as a “bank”. So far as the  instant  aspect  of  the  matter  is
           concerned, our attention has been invited to Annexure-C appended
           to the writ petition, wherein civic amenity site no.2  has  been
           shown as earmarked for “bank”. The aforesaid Annexure-C came  to
           be executed on 06.01.1996. Civil amenity site no.2  is  indicted
           therein, as measuring 2195.35 sq. meters. In the  column  titled
           “purpose for which earmarked”, Annexure-C specifies  “bank”.  It
           is the contention of the petitioners that,  civic  amenity  site
           no.2 which was earmarked exclusively for use as “bank” has never
           undergone any change at the hands of the  Bangalore  Development
           Authority. Civic amenity site no. 3  is  not  relevant  for  the
           instant case, and as such we refrain, for  reasons  of  brevity,
           from recording any details in connection therewith.”


      15.  Upon consideration of the submissions of the learned counsel  for
      the parties,
 the High Court has concluded -


           “We are satisfied that civil amenity site no. 2, at the time  of
           its allotment to respondent no.3 was expressly earmarked for use
           as “bank”. The aforesaid position has remained unaltered to this
           day. In terms of the mandate contained in Section  38-A  of  the
           Bangalore Development Authority Act, 19776  it  could  not  have
           been leased, sold or otherwise, transferred  for  purpose  other
           than the one “….for which such  area  is  reserved”.  Since  the
           civil  amenity  site  in  question  was  earmarked/reserved  for
           “bank”, we are satisfied that it could not  have  been  allotted
           for use as a “petrol station”.


      16.        From the above, it is evident that in fact,  the  site  had
      been originally earmarked to be developed as a public  park/playground
      in 1984. However, since the same has been converted to  a  residential
      area, respondents Nos. 4 to 14 have very fairly stated that  it  could
      not at this stage be restored to its original purpose without  causing
      havoc in the  lives  of  the  residents.  They  have,  therefore,  not
      insisted that the site be restored to its original purpose.


      17.        We also do not find any merit in the  submission  that  the
      term civic amenities would permit BDA to change the  reservation  from
      one particular user to another without the necessary amendment in  the
      development plan.  This would be contrary to the law laid down by this
      Court in the case of B.S. Muddappa (supra).
      18.        We also do not find any substance in the  submissions  that
      the High Court has wrongly distinguished the judgment of  the  earlier
      Division Bench of the High Court in Aicoboo  Nagar  Residents  Welfare
      Association (supra). 
A perusal of the paragraph 10  of  the  aforesaid
      judgment clearly shows that in that case, the  High  Court  considered
      the legality of allotment of civic amenity site no.3.  
There  was,  in
      fact, no change in the activity/purpose, as  the  site  had  not  been
      reserved for any specific purpose. 
The other question was 
whether  the
      lease in favour of the government company for opening  of  petrol  and
      diesel outlet would fall within the definition of  civic  amenity. 
 In
      the present case, it was not the case of the respondent nos. 4  to  14
      that petrol pump is not a civic amenity, therefore, the site could not
      have been allotted to  open  a  petrol  pump.  
The  grievance  of  the respondents (writ petitioners  in  the  High  Court)  was  that  civic amenity site no.2 had been earmarked for  a  bank  and  could  not  be allotted for a petrol pump without making necessary amendment  in  the site.  
Therefore,  the  High  Court  has  rightly  distinguished   the
      aforesaid judgment and not relied upon the same.
      19.        We, therefore, find no merit in the appeals  and  the  same
      are hereby dismissed.



                                             ...………………….….….J.
                                                      [Surinder  Singh
                                             Nijjar]








                                             ………………………….J.
                                             [A.K.Sikri]
        New Delhi;
        November 29, 2013.

-----------------------
[1]      (1991`) 4 SCC 54
[2]      ILR 2002 Kar. 4705
[3]      (2012) 2 SCC 232

Monday, December 2, 2013

Jurisdiction of courts under Reg.Trademarks Act & Copy Rights Act = Original jurisdiction Sec. 20 of C.P.C., Or. 2 , rule 3 of C.P.C - where the cause of action arose , there the case has to be filed under Registration of Trademarks Act : Special Jurisdiction under sec.62(2) of Copy Rights Act - Confirming on the courts where the plaintiff resides = Clubbing of both causes of actions in one suit - is a composite suit - When it is a composite suit, the court where the defendants goods are not available , nor do the defendants carry on business and reside within the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court, that court holds no jurisdiction under Registration of Trademarks Act simply because the plaintiff is residing : but the same court holds jurisdiction under sec.62(2) of Copy right Act for copyright violation suit = M/s. Paragon Rubber Industries …Appellant VERSUS M/s. Pragathi Rubber Mills & Ors. ...Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41036

   Jurisdiction of courts under Reg.Trademarks Act & Copy Rights Act =   Original jurisdiction Sec. 20 of C.P.C., Or. 2 , rule 3 of C.P.C - where the cause of action arose , there the case has to be filed under Registration of Trademarks Act : Special Jurisdiction under sec.62(2) of Copy Rights Act - Confirming on the courts where the plaintiff resides   =   Clubbing  of both  causes of actions in one suit - is a composite suit -   When it is a composite suit, the court where the defendants goods are not available ,  nor do the defendants  carry  on  business  and  reside  within  the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court, that court holds no jurisdiction under Registration of Trademarks Act simply because the plaintiff is residing : but the same court holds jurisdiction under sec.62(2) of Copy right Act for copyright violation suit = 
The Plaintiff is 
       engaged in the business  of  manufacturing  and
      marketing of footwear since 1975, under the registered  trademark  for
      which it also possesses the registered  copyright.  
The  Plaintiff  is located in Kerala. 
The  Defendant,  which  is  located  in  Jalandhar,
      Punjab,  also  manufactures  and  markets  its  footwear   under   the
      registered trademark and copyright PRAGATI/PARAGATI with a  device  of  lion.

      4. On 19th March, 2001, the Plaintiff filed a suit being O.S. No. 2 of
      2001 at District Courts in Kottayam, Kerala  against  the  defendants,
      claiming relief under the Copyright Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to
      as  “1957  Act”)  and  the  Trade  and  Merchandise  Marks  Act,  1958
      (hereinafter referred to as the “1958 Act”)
The suit  is  pending  in the trial court. 
The defendant filed I.A. No. 322 of 2004, under order
      VII Rule XI CPC, with a prayer for rejection of  plaint  for  want  of
      territorial jurisdiction.  - Lower court dismissed the petition holding it's jurisdiction - but the high court set aside the order of lower court and allowed the petition giving an opportunity to the plaintiff to amend the plaint suitable to hold jurisdiction under sec. 62(2) of Copyright Act = Apex court confirmed the High court order and dismissed the both appeal and counter appeal filed by both parties question the High court order = 

  “Though the defendants goods are not available in Kottayam,  nor
           do the defendants  carry  on  business  and  reside  within  the
           jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court, yet this Hon’ble  Court  has
           the jurisdiction to try and  entertain  this  suit  at  Kottayam
           having  regard  to  the  provisions  of  Section  62(2)  of  the
           Copyright Act for the plaintiff carries on business and  resides
           within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.”

    We are, however, of the opinion that the  High  Court  has
      correctly held that the provision contained in Section 134 of the 1999
      Act, would not come to the aid of the plaintiff.  
Although,  the  1999
      Act was enacted on 30th December, 1999, it came  into  force  on  15th
      September,  2003  vide  S.O.  1048(E),  dated  15th  September,  2003,
      published in the  Gazette  of  India,  Extra.,  Pt.  II,  Sec.  3(ii),
             dated 15th September, 2003.  Since the suit in  this  case  was
      filed on 19th March, 2001, it would be adjudicated under the 1958 Act.
      The 1958 Act does not contain a provision  similar  to  the  provision
      contained in         Section 62(2) of the 1957 Act.  Parliament  being
      aware of the provisions of the 1957 Act still did not incorporate  the
      same in the 1958 Act. Therefore, it can not be read into the 1958  Act
      by implication. The High Court had correctly concluded that  the  suit
      of the plaintiff (appellant) was a composite one.
       22. Having said this, we are still not inclined  to  interfere  with
           the order passed by the High Court permitting the  plaintiff  to
           amend the plaint.  
The High Court was mindful of the  fact  that
           under the 1999 Act, a composite suit could be filed and would be
           maintainable by the Court at Kottayam.  
The Court was aware that
           the plaintiff has filed the suit on 19th March,  2001,  but  the
           1999 Act was not enforced till  15th  September,  2003.  
In  our
           opinion, the High Court has passed the order in exercise of  its
           discretionary powers taking into consideration the entire  facts
           and circumstances of the case.  
The discretion exercised by  the
           High Court can not be said to be either erroneous  or  perverse.
           It has been exercised only to avoid multiplicity of  litigation.
           
The defendant (respondent) could not dispute that in so  far  as
           suit predicated on the Copy Right is  concerned,  the  Court  at
           Kottayam  is  having  requisite  jurisdiction  in  view  of  the
           provisions of Section 62(2) of the Copy Right  Act.   
Therefore,
           had the suit been filed for violation of copy right  alone,  the
           Court  at  Kottayam  could  validly  entertain  the  same. 
   By
           permitting the plaintiff to amend the plaint so as that the suit
           will be maintainable before the  District  Court,  Kottayam,  no
           error was committed by the High Court.






      23.        In view of the observations made above,  both  the  appeals
      are dismissed with no order as to costs.
       

       REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.10745 OF 2013
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22280 of 2011)


      M/s. Paragon Rubber Industries            …Appellant
      VERSUS
      M/s. Pragathi Rubber Mills & Ors.         ...Respondents
                                    With
                        Civil Appeal No.10746 of 2013
                 (Arising out of SLP (C)  No. 33453 of 2011)


      M/s. Pragathi Rubber Mills & Ors.            …Appellants
      VERSUS
      M/s. Paragon Rubber Industries               ...Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T
      SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.
     1. Leave granted.

     2. This judgment shall dispose of  C.A.No.10745  of  2013  @  SLP  (C)
        No.22280 of 2011 and C.A.No. 10746 of 2013 @ SLP  (C)  No.33453  of
        2011. Both the appeals impugn the judgment of  the  High  Court  of
        Kerala at Ernakulam dated  15th  March,  2011,  rendered  in  Civil
        Revision Petition No.1417 of 2004.

     3. Since these are cross appeals, the parties shall be referred to  as
        plaintiff  and  defendant.  The  facts  at  the  centre   of   this
        controversy are as follows:

         
The Plaintiff is 
       engaged in the business  of  manufacturing  and
      marketing of footwear since 1975, under the registered  trademark  for
      which it also possesses the registered  copyright.  
The  Plaintiff  is located in Kerala. 
The  Defendant,  which  is  located  in  Jalandhar,
      Punjab,  also  manufactures  and  markets  its  footwear   under   the
      registered trademark and copyright PRAGATI/PARAGATI with a  device  of  lion.

      4. On 19th March, 2001, the Plaintiff filed a suit being O.S. No. 2 of
      2001 at District Courts in Kottayam, Kerala  against  the  defendants,
      claiming relief under the Copyright Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to
      as  “1957  Act”)  and  the  Trade  and  Merchandise  Marks  Act,  1958
      (hereinafter referred to as the “1958 Act”).
The suit  is  pending  in the trial court. 
The defendant filed I.A. No. 322 of 2004, under order
      VII Rule XI CPC, with a prayer for rejection of  plaint  for  want  of
      territorial jurisdiction.
The trial court dismissed the application on
      22nd March, 2004, with the observations that the issue of jurisdiction
      will be decided at the final stage of the suit.
The  defendant  filed
      CRP No.363 of 2004 in the High Court against the aforesaid order.  The
      High Court by order dated 16th June, 2004, allowed the civil  revision
      and directed the trial court to determine  the  issue  of  territorial
      jurisdiction afresh.

     5. In view of the aforesaid directions issued by the High  Court,  the
        trial court treated the issue with regard to  the  jurisdiction  as
        the preliminary issue.
Upon consideration  of  the  entire  matter
        again the trial court in its order dated  6th  October,  2004  held
        that it has the jurisdiction to  entertain  the  suit  in  view  of
        Section 62(2) of  the  1957  Act.
The  petitioner  challenged  the
        aforesaid order in the High Court by  filing  C.R.P.  No.  1417  of
        2004.
The High Court, upon consideration of the matter has, by the
        impugned order dated 15th March, 2011, held  as under:-

           “The court below held in the order impugned  that  the  suit  as
           such is maintainable before the District Court, Kottayam.   That
           finding is not correct in view of the decisions of  the  Supreme
           Court referred to above.  Accordingly, the order passed  by  the
           court below is set aside.  The plaintiff  is  given  liberty  to
           amend the plaint, so that the suit will be  maintainable  before
           the District Court, Kottayam, in the  light  of  the  principles
           laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decisions.  When
           an application is filed for amendment of the plaint,  the  court
           below shall consider the same on the merits, after affording  an
           opportunity of being heard to both sides.

           The Civil Revision Petition is allowed as above.”

      6. A perusal of the above shows that the High Court,  having  come  to
      the  correct  conclusion  that  a  composite   suit   would   not   be
      maintainable, has set aside the  order  passed  by  the  trial  court.
      Thereafter, the Plaintiff has been given liberty to amend  the  plaint
      so that the suit will  be  maintainable  before  the  District  Court,
      Kottayam.

The plaintiff aggrieved by the aforesaid  order  has  filed
      SLP (C) No.22280 of 2011 giving rise to C.A.No.10745 of 2013.




      7.  The  defendant/petitioner  in  SLP  (C)  No.  33453  of  2011  has
      challenged the impugned order on the ground that having  come  to  the
      conclusion that a composite suit under the 1957 Act and 1958  Act  was
      not maintainable, the High Court erred in permitting the plaintiff  to
      amend the plaint rather than rejecting the same on the ground of  lack
      of jurisdiction.

      8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

      9. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the Plaintiff
that  the
      suit  was  maintainable  before  the  District  Judge,  Kottayam   for
      violation of the copyright in view of Section 62(2) of the  1957  Act,
      which permits the filing of the suit at the place where the  plaintiff
      resides. 
It is further submitted by the learned counsel that the  High
      Court has wrongly held that a composite suit claiming relief under the
      1957 Act and the 1958 Act would not be  maintainable.
Mr.  Siddhartha
      Dave, learned counsel appearing for the  plaintiff  further  submitted
      that the relief claimed under the 1958 Act in the suit  filed  by  the
      plaintiff under the 1957 Act was  incidental  to  the  relief  claimed
      under the 1957 Act. Such  a  composite  suit  would  be  maintainable.
      According to the learned counsel, this Court in  the  case  of  Dhodha
      House vs. S.K.Maingi[1] examined and only partly answered the question
      as to whether a composite suit seeking relief of injunction under both
      the 1957 Act and the 1958 Act is maintainable when filed in the  court
      where the plaintiff resides.  In  support  of  the  submissions  made,
      learned counsel relied on para 54 and 55 of the judgment.

      10.        Learned counsel further submitted that this  Court  in  the
      case of Dabur India Ltd. Vs. K.R.Industries[2] answered  the  question
      as to what would be meant by a composite suit?
Answering the aforesaid
      question, this Court has held that the ratio in  the  case  of  Dhodha
      House (supra) is that the provisions contained in Section 62(2) of the
      1957 Act have been specially designed to confer an extra benefit  upon
      the  parties  who  were  not  in  a  position  to  initiate  copyright
      proceedings in two different courts. 
In other words, it prescribes  an
      additional ground for attracting the jurisdiction of  the  court  over
      and above the normal grounds as laid down in Section 20 of the Code of
      Civil Procedure, 1908.
Mr. Dave also pointed  out  that  there  is  an
      earlier judgment of this Court in Exphar SA vs. Eupharma  Laboratories
      Ltd.[3]
in which it has been held that  a  composite  suit  would  be
      maintainable where the plaintiff resides in view of the provisions  of
      the 1957 Act.
In Dabur India’s Case, it has been incorrectly  observed
      that the case of Exphar SA (supra) was not considered in Dhodha  House
      (supra).
Therefore, according to  the  learned  counsel,  there  is  a
      slight confusion and conflict  between  the  decision  in  Exphar  and
      Dhodha House on the one hand and Dabur  case  on  the  other.
It  is, therefore, submitted that the aforesaid three  decisions  need  to  be clarified and referred to a larger bench.

      11.        In the alternative, it is submitted that the relief claimed
      under the 1958 Act was only incidental to the relief claimed under the
      1957 Act and such a composite suit would be maintainable  in  view  of
      the ratio of law laid down in the case of Dhodha House Case as well as
      in the Dabur Case. 
Additionally, it is submitted that under the  Trade
      Marks Act, 1999, (hereinafter referred  to  as  the  ‘1999  Act’)  the
      provisions  similar  to  Section  62(2)  of  the  1957  Act  has  been
      incorporated thereby conferring the jurisdiction on  the  court  where
      the plaintiff resides.
 In view of this provision, even though the  Act
      was enforced with effect from 15th September,  2003,  the  High  Court
      ought to have allowed the proceedings to continue in  Kottayam  rather
      than truncating the suit, which would  otherwise  have  to  be  partly
      tried in Kottayam and partly in Jalandhar.

      12.        On the other hand, the defendant submitted  that  the  suit
      filed by the plaintiff is in the nature of composite suit. It has been
      admitted by the plaintiff that the defendant’s goods are not available
      in Kottayam, nor do the defendant reside or carry on  business  within
      the jurisdiction of that Court. The plaintiffs have chosen to file the
      suit at Kottayam only on the ground that  the  jurisdiction  would  be
      vested in the District Court of Kottayam by virtue of Section 62(2) of
      the 1957 Act. It is further submitted
that the reliance placed by  the
      plaintiff on the provisions contained in Section 134 of the  1999  Act
      is misplaced. The defendant also placed reliance on Section 159(4)  of
      the 1999 Act and submitted that the proceedings  initiated  under  the
      1958 Act would  be  governed  by  the  same  Act  notwithstanding  the
      provisions contained in the 1999 Act.

      13.        We have considered the  submissions  made  by  the  learned
      counsel for the parties.
In our opinion,  the  issues  raised  in  the
      present proceedings are no longer res integra  being  covered  by  the ratio of judgments of this Court in the case of Dhodha  House  (supra) and Dabur India (supra).

      14.         It is not disputed before us that in the plaint itself  it
      is pleaded as under :

           “Though the defendants goods are not available in Kottayam,  nor
           do the defendants  carry  on  business  and  reside  within  the
           jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court, yet this Hon’ble  Court  has
           the jurisdiction to try and  entertain  this  suit  at  Kottayam
           having  regard  to  the  provisions  of  Section  62(2)  of  the
           Copyright Act for the plaintiff carries on business and  resides
           within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble Court.”

      15.        The aforesaid averments make  it  abundantly  clear  that
      even the plaintiff was aware that the court at Kottayam will have no
      jurisdiction under the 1958 Act, but tried to camouflage the same by
      confusing it and mixing it up or intermingling it  with  the  relief
      contained under the 1957 Act.
From the averments made in the plaint,
      it is apparent that the plaintiff had filed a composite suit. Such a
      suit would not be maintainable unless the court has jurisdiction  to
      entertain the suit in relation to the entire cause of action and the
      entire relief.

      16.        We have noticed earlier that the issue is no  longer  res
      integra. The same issue has been examined in Dhodha  House  (supra).
      In  paragraph  43,  this   Court   formulated   the   question   for
      consideration which is as under:

           “43. The short question which arises for consideration is as  to
           whether causes of action in terms of both the 1957 Act  and  the 1958 Act although may be different, would a suit be maintainable in a court only because it has the jurisdiction to entertain the same in terms of Section 62(2) of the 1957 Act?”




      17.        It was answered as follows :-
           “44. A cause of action in a given case both under the  1957  Act
           as also under the 1958 Act may be overlapping  to  some  extent.
           The territorial jurisdiction conferred upon the court  in  terms
           of the provisions of the Code of  Civil  Procedure  indisputably
           shall apply to a suit or proceeding under the 1957 Act  as  also
           the 1958 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section  62  of  the  1957  Act
           provides for an additional  forum.  
Such  additional  forum  was
           provided so as to enable the author to file a suit who  may  not
           otherwise be in a position to file a suit  at  different  places
           where his copyright was violated.
 Parliament while enacting  the
           Trade and Merchandise Marks Act in the year 1958  was  aware  of
           the provisions of the 1957 Act. It still did not choose to  make
           a similar provision therein. 
Such an omission may be held to  be
           a conscious action on the part of Parliament. The  intention  of
           Parliament in not providing for an additional forum in  relation
           to the violation of  the  1958  Act  is,  therefore,  clear  and
           explicit. 
Parliament while enacting the Trade  Marks  Act,  1999
           provided for such an additional forum  by  enacting  sub-section
           (2) of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. 
The court shall  not,
           it  is  well  settled,  readily   presume   the   existence   of
           jurisdiction of a court which was not conferred by the  statute.
           
For the purpose of attracting the jurisdiction  of  a  court  in
           terms of sub-section (2) of Section 62  of  the  1957  Act,  the
           conditions precedent specified therein must  be  fulfilled,  the
           requisites wherefore are that the plaintiff  must  actually  and
           voluntarily reside to carry on business or personally  work  for
           gain.


           For the purpose of invoking the jurisdiction  of  a  court  only
           because two causes of action joined in terms of  the  provisions
           of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same  would  not  mean  that
           thereby the jurisdiction can be conferred upon a court which had
           jurisdiction to try only the suit in respect  of  one  cause  of
           action and not the other.  
Recourse  to  the  additional  forum,
           however, in a given case, may be taken if  both  the  causes  of
           action  arise  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court   which
           otherwise had the  necessary  jurisdiction  to  decide  all  the
           issues.”




      18.        This legal position has been  reiterated  in  the  case  of
      Dabur India (supra) as under:-
           “34. What then would be meant by a composite suit?
A  composite
           suit would not entitle a court to entertain a  suit  in  respect
           whereof it has no jurisdiction, territorial or otherwise.
Order
           2 Rule 3 of the Code specifically states so and, thus, there  is
           no reason as to why the same should be ignored.
A composite suit
           within the provisions of the 1957 Act as  considered  in  Dhodha
           House1, therefore, would mean  the  suit  which  is  founded  on
           infringement of a copyright and wherein the incidental power  of
           the court is required to be invoked.  A  plaintiff  may  seek  a
           remedy which can otherwise be granted by the court. It was  that
           aspect of the matter which had not  been  considered  in  Dhodha
           House but it never meant that two suits having different  causes
           of action can be clubbed together as a composite suit.”


      19.        We see no conflict in the ratio of law  laid  down  in  the
      aforesaid two cases. In both the cases, it has been held that for  the
      purpose of invoking the jurisdiction of the court in a composite suit,
      both the causes of action must arise within the  jurisdiction  of  the
      court which otherwise had the necessary jurisdiction to decide all the
      issues.
However, the jurisdiction cannot be conferred by  joining  two
      causes of action in the same suit when the court has  jurisdiction  to
      try the suit only in respect of one cause of action and not the other.
      In Dabur India (supra) the ratio in Dhodha House has  been  explained.
      In Dhodha House, the law was stated in the following terms:
           “54. For the purpose of invoking the  jurisdiction  of  a  court
           only because two  causes  of  action  joined  in  terms  of  the
           provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, the  same  would  not
           mean that thereby the jurisdiction can be conferred upon a court
           which had jurisdiction to try only the suit in  respect  of  one
           cause of action and not the other. Recourse  to  the  additional
           forum, however, in a given case, may be taken if both the causes
           of action arise within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court  which
           otherwise had the  necessary  jurisdiction  to  decide  all  the
           issues.


           55. In this case we have not examined the question as to whether
           if a cause of action arises under the 1957 Act and the violation
           of the provisions of the Trade Marks Act is only  incidental,  a
           composite suit will lie or not, as  such  a  question  does  not
           arise in this case.”




      20.         In  our  opinion,  the  aforesaid  observation   is   self
      explanatory and need no further clarification. We also do not find any
      substance in the submission of Mr. Dave that  there  is  any  conflict
      between the law laid down in Dabur (supra) and Exphar SA  (supra).  In
      the case of Dabur  (supra),  this  Court  distinguished  the  judgment
      Exphar SA in the following terms :
           “31. Exphar SA cannot be said to have  any  application  in  the
           instant case. The question which arose for consideration therein
           was as to whether the jurisdiction of a court under  sub-section
           (2) of Section 62 of the 1957 Act is  wider  than  that  of  the
           court specified under the Code of Civil  Procedure  and  thus  a
           person instituting a suit having any claim on the  ownership  of
           the copyright which has been infringed, would not  be  a  ground
           for holding that he would not come within the  purview  of  sub-
           section (2) Section 62 of the 1957 Act, as he  had  been  served
           with a “cease and desist” notice, opining: (SCC p. 693, para 13)


                 “13. It is, therefore, clear that the object and reason for
                 the introduction of sub-section (2) of Section 62  was  not
                 to restrict the owners of the copyright to  exercise  their
                 rights but to remove any impediment from  their  doing  so.
                 Section 62(2) cannot be read as limiting  the  jurisdiction
                 of the District  Court  only  to  cases  where  the  person
                 instituting the suit or other proceeding,  or  where  there
                 are more than one such persons, any of  them  actually  and
                 voluntarily resides or carries  on  business  or  presently
                 works for gain. It  prescribes  an  additional  ground  for
                 attracting the jurisdiction of a court over and  above  the
                 ‘normal’ grounds as laid down in Section 20 of the Code.”


           32. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that Parliament  having inserted sub-section (2) in Section 62  of  the  1957  Act,  the  jurisdiction of the court there under would be wider than the one under Section 20  of  the  Code.
The  object  and  reasons  for
           enactment of sub-section (2) of Section  62  would  also  appear
           from the report of the Committee, as has been  noticed  by  this
           Court being a provision which has  been  specially  designed  to
           confer an extra benefit upon the  authors  who  were  not  in  a
           position to instate copyright infringement proceeding before the
           courts. It is in the aforementioned context the law laid down by
           this Court in para 13 of Dhodha House must be understood.


           33. If the impediment is sought to be removed  by  inserting  an
           incidental provision, there cannot be any doubt the court  could
           be entitled to pass an interim order, but the same by no stretch
           of imagination can be extended to a cause  of  action  which  is
           founded on separate set of facts as also rights and  liabilities
           of a party under a different  Act.  In  Dhodha  House,  although
           Exphar Sa was not noticed, the  distinction  would  be  apparent
           from the following: (Dhodha House case, SCC p. 56, paras 50-51)


                 “50. In this case, the Delhi  High  Court  could  not  have
                 invoked its jurisdiction in terms  of  the  1957  Act.  The
                 primary ground upon which the jurisdiction of the  Original
                 Side of the High Court was invoked was the violation of the
                 1958 Act, but in relation thereto, the provisions  of  sub-
                 section (2) of Section 62 of the  1957  Act  could  not  be
                 invoked.
           51. The plaintiff was not a resident of Delhi. It has  not  been
           able to establish that it carries on any business at Delhi.  For
           our purpose, the question as to whether the defendant  had  been
           selling its produce in Delhi or not is wholly irrelevant  (sic).
           It is possible that the goods manufactured by the plaintiff  are
           available in the market of Delhi or they are sold in  Delhi  but
           that by itself would not mean that the plaintiff carries on  any
           business in Delhi.”


      21.         We are, however, of the opinion that the  High  Court  has
      correctly held that the provision contained in Section 134 of the 1999
      Act, would not come to the aid of the plaintiff.
Although,  the  1999
      Act was enacted on 30th December, 1999, it came  into  force  on  15th
      September,  2003  vide  S.O.  1048(E),  dated  15th  September,  2003,
      published in the  Gazette  of  India,  Extra.,  Pt.  II,  Sec.  3(ii),
             dated 15th September, 2003.  Since the suit in  this  case  was
      filed on 19th March, 2001, it would be adjudicated under the 1958 Act.
      The 1958 Act does not contain a provision  similar  to  the  provision
      contained in         Section 62(2) of the 1957 Act.  Parliament  being
      aware of the provisions of the 1957 Act still did not incorporate  the
      same in the 1958 Act. Therefore, it can not be read into the 1958  Act
      by implication. The High Court had correctly concluded that  the  suit
      of the plaintiff (appellant) was a composite one.
       22. Having said this, we are still not inclined  to  interfere  with
           the order passed by the High Court permitting the  plaintiff  to
           amend the plaint.  
The High Court was mindful of the  fact  that
           under the 1999 Act, a composite suit could be filed and would be
           maintainable by the Court at Kottayam.  
The Court was aware that
           the plaintiff has filed the suit on 19th March,  2001,  but  the
           1999 Act was not enforced till  15th  September,  2003.  
In  our
           opinion, the High Court has passed the order in exercise of  its
           discretionary powers taking into consideration the entire  facts
           and circumstances of the case.  
The discretion exercised by  the
           High Court can not be said to be either erroneous  or  perverse.
           It has been exercised only to avoid multiplicity of  litigation.
         
The defendant (respondent) could not dispute that in so  far  as
           suit predicated on the Copy Right is  concerned,  the  Court  at
           Kottayam  is  having  requisite  jurisdiction  in  view  of  the
           provisions of Section 62(2) of the Copy Right  Act.  
Therefore,
           had the suit been filed for violation of copy right  alone,  the
           Court  at  Kottayam  could  validly  entertain  the  same.
   By
           permitting the plaintiff to amend the plaint so as that the suit
           will be maintainable before the  District  Court,  Kottayam,  no
           error was committed by the High Court.






      23.        In view of the observations made above,  both  the  appeals
      are dismissed with no order as to costs.






                                             ...………………….….….J.
                                                      [Surinder  Singh
                                             Nijjar]








                                             ………………………….J.
                                             [A.K.Sikri]
        New Delhi;
        November 29, 2013.


ITEM NO.1A               COURT NO.9             SECTION XIA
            S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A
                         RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal No.10745/2013 @
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No(s).22280/2011

M/S PARAGON RUBBER INDUSTRIES                  Petitioner(s)

                 VERSUS

M/S PRAGATI RUBBER MILLS & ORS.                Respondent(s)
WITH Civil Appeal No.10746/2013 @
SLP(C) NO. 33453 of 2011

Date: 29/11/2013  These matters were called on for
pronouncement of Judgment today.
For Petitioner(s)
                     Mr. A. Raghunath,Adv.

                        Mr. Atul Jha, Adv.
                        Ms. Divya Balasundaram, Adv.
                        Mr. Sandeep Jha, Adv.
                     Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Sinha
For Respondent(s)
                        Mr. Atul Jha, Adv.
                        Ms. Divya Balasundaram, Adv.
                        Mr. Sandeep Jha, Adv.
                     Mr. Dharmendra Kumar Sinha,Adv.

                     Mr. A. Raghunath

           UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
                               O R D E R
                 Leave granted.
                 Hon'ble Mr. Justice Surinder Singh  Nijjar  pronounced  the
        Judgment of the  Bench  comprising  His  Lordship  and  Hon'ble  Mr.
        Justice A.K. Sikri.
                 For the reasons recorded in the signed Reportable Judgment,
        both the Appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.
|(Vishal Anand)                        | |(Indu Bala Kapur)                   |
|Court Master                          | |Court Master                        |


             (Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)

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[1]      (2006) 9 SCC 41
[2]      (2008) 10 SCC 595
[3]      (2004) 3 SCC 688

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