SEC. 304 B , 306 AND 498 A I.P.C. - When wife stated that she committed suicide as she was fed up with the acts of husband with out disclosing the activities - it can not be considered as an offence under sec. 304 B as there is no allegation that soon before her committing suicide the husband harassed her dowry etc., Apex court punished the husband under sec.306 and 498 A I.P.C. = Rajeev Kumar …… Appellant Versus State of Haryana ….. Respondent - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40946

SEC. 304 B , 306 AND 498 A I.P.C. - When wife stated that she committed suicide as she was fed up with the acts of husband with out disclosing the activities - it can not be considered as an offence under sec. 304 B as there is no allegation that soon before her committing suicide the husband harassed her dowry etc., Apex court punished the husband under sec.306 and 498 A I.P.C.  =

whether  the
        prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
        appellant has committed the offence of dowry  death  under  Section
        304B, IPC. 
The two dying declarations are  similarly  worded.   
We,
        therefore, extract hereinbelow only the dying declaration which was
        recorded by the Judicial Magistrate (Ext. PN):

        “Statement of Vandana, w/o Rajiv Singla, age 23  years,  occupation
        house wife, R/o Dabwali, u/s 164 Cr.P.C.


              I was married to Dr. Rajiv Singla 2 years back.   My  husband
        used to get upset on petty issues.  My  in-laws  lived  separately.
        They are living after the 6 months of my marriage.  My daughter  is
        of 2 months.  Today about 7.30 p.m., in evening I was fed  up  with
        activities of my husband and put on kerosene oil and  burn  myself.
        Earlier my husband used to taunt me for dowry.   Action  should  be
        taken against my husband.


                                        Sd/- R.C. Bangri
        RO & AC                              JMIC
                                       Dabwali, 26-2-91
        RTI of Vandana
        Identified
        Sd/-
        Madan Lal, ASI
        P.C. City Dabwali,
        Dated: 26-2-91”

It will be clear from the contents of the dying declaration (Ext.  PN)  that
the deceased was fed up with the activities of her husband  and  she  poured
kerosene oil on herself and burnt herself.  
What  those  activities  of  the
appellant were which prompted her to commit suicide have  not  been  clearly
stated, but she has stated that her husband  used  to  get  upset  on  petty
issues and earlier her husband used to taunt her for dowry.

When 304 B applies ?
With out framing charge can court punish the accused under lesser offences without remand ?
In K. Prema S. Rao and Another, etc.  v.  Yadla  Srinivasa  Rao  and
Others, etc. [(2003) 1 SCC 217], 
this Court on similar facts has  held  that
to attract the provisions of Section 304B, IPC, one of the main  ingredients
of the offence, which is required to be established, is  that  “soon  before
her death” she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in  connection  with
the demand for dowry” and this ingredient of the offence was  not  there  in
that case. 
This Court, however, held that it was not necessary to remit  the
matter to the trial court for framing a charge under Section 306,  IPC,  and
the accused also cannot complain for  want  of  opportunity  to  defend  the
charge under Section 306, IPC, if the facts found in  evidence  justify  the
conviction of the appellant under Sections 498A and 306, IPC instead of  the
graver offence under Section 304B, IPC.   
 In  that  case,  the  three-Judge
Bench of this  Court  held  the  appellant  guilty  of  the  offences  under
Sections 498A and 306, IPC instead  of  the  graver  offence  under  Section
304B, IPC.

 In this case also, we hold the appellant guilty of offences  under
      Sections 498A and 306, IPC.  Considering the  particular  conduct  of
      the appellant which drove the deceased to commit suicide, we impose a
      sentence of one year imprisonment and  fine  of  Rs.1,000/-  for  the
      offence under Section 498A, IPC and impose a sentence of three  years
      imprisonment and fine of Rs.2,000/- for  the  offence  under  Section
      306, IPC, and direct that in case of failure  to  pay  the  fine  for
      either of the two offences, the appellant  shall  undergo  a  further
      imprisonment for a period of six months.  We make it clear  that  the
      sentences of imprisonment for the two offences will run concurrently.
       If the appellant has already undergone  the  punishment  imposed  by
      this judgment, his bail bonds shall stand discharged.

Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 967 OF 2005

Rajeev Kumar                                                     ……
Appellant

                                   Versus

State of Haryana                                              …..
Respondent




                               J U D G M E N T

A. K. PATNAIK, J.


      This is an appeal by way of special leave under  Article  136  of  the
Constitution against  the  judgment  dated  16.09.2004  of  the  Punjab  and
Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No.337-SB of 1992.

Facts:

     2. The facts very briefly are that on 26.02.1991 at  11.20  P.M.,  the
        Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police of Police  Station-City  Dabwali,
        District Sirsa in  Haryana,  Madan  Lal  recorded  a  statement  of
        Vandana at CHC Hospital, Mandi Dabwali.  She stated that about  two
        years ago, she was married to the appellant and the appellant  used
        to taunt her on petty matters and earlier  the  appellant  used  to
        tease her for dowry and on being fed up  with  the  habits  of  the
        appellant, on 26.02.1991 between 7.00 and 7.30 P.M., she  sprinkled
        kerosene on her and set herself on fire.  The statement of  Vandana
        was registered as First Information Report (FIR)  by  the  S.I.  of
        P.S. Dabwali, Kuldeep Singh.  Soon thereafter  on  26.02.1991,  the
        Judicial Magistrate, First Class, R.S. Bagri, recorded a  statement
        of Vandana under Section 164 of the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,
        1973  (for  short  ‘Cr.P.C.’)  in  which  Vandana  reiterated   her
        statement to the Police.  On 27.02.1991 at 2.20 A.M., Vandana died.
         Post mortem was carried out on the body  of  Vandana  (hereinafter
        referred to as ‘the deceased’) by Dr. S.S. Bansal.  The Police then
        took up the investigation and submitted a charge-sheet against  the
        appellant.

     3. On 28.08.1991, the Sessions Court framed  a  charge  under  Section
        304B, IPC, against the appellant to which the appellant pleaded not
        guilty.  At the trial, the prosecution examined Kedar Nath, who had
        prepared the scaled plan (Ext. PA) on the place of  occurrence,  as
        PW-1; Dr. R.C. Chaudhary, Medical Officer, General Hospital,  Mandi
        Dabwali, who had examined the deceased and found the burn  injuries
        on her body as PW-2; S.I. Kuldeep Singh of P.S.  Dabwali,  who  had
        registered the FIR as PW-3; the landlord of the house in which  the
        deceased lived with her husband as PW-4; Niranjan  Ram  Gupta,  the
        father of the deceased, as PW-5; Bhupinder Kumar, the uncle of  the
        deceased as PW-6; Dr. S.S. Bansal, who conducted the post mortem on
        the body  of  the  deceased  as  PW-7;  R.S.  Bagri,  the  Judicial
        Magistrate, who  recorded  the  statement  of  the  deceased  under
        Section 164, Cr.P.C. as PW-8 and ASI Madan Lal,  the  Investigating
        Officer, as PW-9.  The statement  of  the  appellant  was  recorded
        under Section 313, Cr.P.C.   In  defence,  the  appellant  examined
        Ramesh Devra as DW-1; Jagdish Kumar as DW-2; Nihal Singh, Assistant
        Chief Medical Officer,  Sirsa,  as  DW-3;  Dr.  Ajay  Kumar  Gupta,
        Medical Officer, Civil  Hospital,  Sirsa,  as  DW-4  and  Dr.  J.L.
        Bhutani as DW-5.  After considering the evidence and the  arguments
        on behalf of the parties, the learned  Additional  Sessions  Judge,
        Sirsa, in his judgment dated 31.08.1992 held that  the  prosecution
        has been able  to  prove  the  charge  against  the  appellant  and
        accordingly convicted him under Section 304B, IPC.  Thereafter, the
        learned Additional Sessions Judge heard the accused on the  quantum
        of sentence and ordered that the appellant be  sentenced  to  seven
        years R.I. with a fine of Rs.2,000/- and in default of  payment  of
        fine, to undergo further imprisonment of six months.

     4. Aggrieved, the appellant filed Criminal Appeal  No.337-SB  of  1992
        before the High Court. After hearing the appeal, the High Court  in
        the impugned judgment held that the deceased had indicated  in  her
        dying declarations (Exts.PG and PN) before ASI Madan  Lal  and  the
        Judicial Magistrate R.S. Bagri that she was being harassed  by  her
        husband with demands of dowry on account of which she had sprinkled
        kerosene on herself before setting herself ablaze. The  High  Court
        further held that the statement of the deceased in these two  dying
        declarations (Exts. PG and PN) that  she  was  being  harassed  for
        dowry stood corroborated by the  evidence  of  the  father  of  the
        deceased (PW-5) and uncle of the deceased (PW-6).  The  High  Court
        rejected the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that  the
        deceased was not in the medical condition to speak inasmuch as  her
        larynx and tracheae had been  charred  by  burns,  relying  on  the
        testimony of the medical experts Dr. R.C. Chaudhary (PW-2) and  Dr.
        J.L. Bhutani   (DW-5) as well as the testimony of the ASI Madan Lal
        (PW-9) and the Judicial  Magistrate  R.S.  Bagri  (PW-8),  who  had
        recorded the dying declarations of the deceased.   The  High  Court
        accordingly held that there was no ground  to  interfere  with  the
        orders of conviction and sentence passed by  the  trial  court  and
        dismissed the criminal appeal of the appellant.

Contentions of the learned counsel for the parties:

     5. Mr. S.B. Upadhyay, learned counsel  for  the  appellant,  submitted
        that the finding in the impugned judgment that  the  appellant  was
        harassing the deceased for dowry is not correct inasmuch  as  PW-4,
        the landlord of the house in which the  deceased  and  her  husband
        were living, has stated in his evidence that he did  not  hear  any
        sort of disharmony  or  fighting  between  the  appellant  and  the
        deceased and that they used to live and lead a normal married  life
        and both of them were blessed with a daughter, who was  aged  about
        six to seven months.  He further submitted that when  the  Judicial
        Magistrate (PW-8) recorded the  statement  of  the  deceased  under
        Section 164, Cr.P.C., Dr. R.C. Chaudhary (PW-2) was not present, as
        will be evident from the evidence of PW-8.  He submitted that PW-2,
        on  the  other  hand,  was  the  doctor  who  issued  the   fitness
        certificate to the Judicial Magistrate that the deceased was  in  a
        fit state to give the statement.  He referred to the opinion of Dr.
        S.S. Bansal (PW-7) to submit that the  larynx  and  tracheae  is  a
        voice box containing vocal cords through which a man speaks and  if
        they were charred by heat and burns, a person will not be  able  to
        speak.  He submitted that DW-2 was present in the hospital for  the
        whole night on 26.02.1991 and DW-2 has stated that the deceased was
        not in a position to speak when the alleged dying declarations  are
        said to have been made.  He submitted that the trial court and  the
        High Court, therefore, were not correct in  relying  on  the  dying
        declarations of the deceased recorded by the ASI Madan Lal and  the
        Judicial Magistrate R.S. Bagri for holding the appellant guilty.

     6. Mr. Upadhyay next  submitted  that  on  a  reading  of  the  entire
        evidence of PW-5 (the father of the deceased),  it  will  be  clear
        that the appellant and the deceased were happy with each other  and
        this will also be evident from the letters  exchanged  between  the
        family members between March 1989 and  January  1991  (Exts.  DE/2,
        DE/6, DE/7, DE/9, DE/12, DE/15, DE/17, DE/18, DE/19, DE/20,  DE/21,
        DE/22 and DE/23).  He submitted that this is, therefore, not a case
        where the appellant had made any demand of dowry  on  the  deceased
        and had subjected the deceased to  any  cruelty  or  harassment  in
        connection with the demand of dowry soon before her death and hence
        the ingredients of the offence under Section 304B, IPC, are missing
        in this case and, therefore, the appellant could not have been held
        guilty under Section 304B, IPC.

     7. Mr. Upadhyay cited the decisions of this Court in Sanjiv  Kumar  v.
        State of Punjab [(2009) 16 SCC 487], Durga Prasad & Anr.  v.  State
        of Madhya Pradesh [(2010) 9 SCC 73],  Gurdeep  Singh  v.  State  of
        Punjab & Ors. [(2011) 12 SCC 408] and Devinder  alias  Kala  Ram  &
        Ors. v. State of Haryana [2012) 10  SCC  763]  in  support  of  his
        submission that the offence under Section 304B, IPC,  is  not  made
        out against the appellant.  He submitted  that  at  the  worst  the
        appellant can be held guilty under Section  306,  IPC,  for  having
        abetted suicide by the deceased if the dying declaration is  to  be
        accepted.  He argued that the appellant has already  undergone  two
        years imprisonment and is now on bail and also has a young daughter
        to take care  of  and,  therefore,  the  appellant  should  not  be
        subjected to further imprisonment for  the  offence  under  Section
        306, IPC.

     8. Mr. Vikas Sharma,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  State  of
        Haryana,  on  the  other  hand,  submitted  that  the   two   dying
        declarations (Ext. PG and PN) of the deceased are  clear  that  the
        appellant used to harass the deceased for dowry and  being  fed  up
        with the habits of the appellant, the deceased  sprinkled  kerosene
        oil on herself and set  herself  ablaze.   He  submitted  that  the
        evidence of Dr. S.S. Bansal (PW-7) is clear that one can speak when
        the larynx and tracheae are in the process of  being  charred.   He
        submitted that even  DW-5,  the  medical  expert  produced  by  the
        accused in his defence, has admitted in cross-examination  that  in
        case of charring of vocal chords, the patient may be able to  speak
        and the trial court has relied on this admission made by DW-5.   He
        submitted that  Dr.  R.C.  Chaudhary  has  also  deposed  that  the
        deceased was fit to make the statement.   He  submitted  that  both
        these witnesses were medical experts and were rightly relied on  by
        the trial court and the High Court to reject the contention of  the
        appellant that the deceased was not in a fit condition to give  the
        statements to ASI Madan Lal and the Judicial Magistrate R.S. Bagri.
         Mr. Sharma also relied on the evidence of PW-5 that the  appellant
        used to give beatings to the deceased  and  demand  more  and  more
        dowry.  He submitted that the trial court and the High  Court  were
        therefore right in holding the  appellant  guilty  of  the  offence
        under Section 304B IPC.

     9. Mr. Sharma cited the decision of this Court in Bansi Lal  v.  State
        of Haryana [(2011) 11 SCC 359] in which it has been held that while
        considering a case under Section 304B, IPC, cruelty  in  connection
        with demand of dowry has to be proved in  close  proximity  to  the
        time of death because of the expression “soon before her death”  in
        Section 304B IPC, and  the Court  has  to  analyse  the  facts  and
        circumstances of each case leading to the death of the  victim  and
        decide if there is such proximate connection  between  the  act  of
        cruelty in connection with demand of dowry and death of the  woman.
        He also cited the decision of this Court in Smt. Shanti and Another
        v. State of Haryana [AIR 1991 SC 1226]  for  the  proposition  that
        once the death  of  a  woman  is  found  to  be  unnatural,  either
        homicidal or suicidal, Section 304B, IPC, has to be attracted.

Findings of the Court:

    10.  The first question that we have to decide is whether the  deceased
        was in a condition to make the dying declarations (Exts.PG and  PN)
        before ASI Madan Lal and the Judicial Magistrate  R.S.  Bagri  when
        her larynx and tracheae had been affected by burns.  PW-2, Dr. R.C.
        Chaudhary, has stated in his evidence that on  26.02.1991,  on  the
        application of the Police (Ext.PD), he gave his opinion in Ext.PD/1
        to the effect that the patient was fit to give  her  statement  and
        this opinion was given at 10.30 P.M.   PW-9,  ASI  Madan  Lal,  has
        deposed in his  evidence  that  the  doctor  vide  his  endorsement
        (Ext.PD/1) declared that Vandana was fit to give her statement  and
        then he recorded the statement of Vandana  (Ext.PG)  correctly  and
        after Vandana admitted the contents of the statement to be correct,
        she  gave  her  thumb  impression  in  Ext.PG  in  token   of   its
        correctness.  PW-9 has further stated that at that time Vandana was
        living and taking long sigh and she remained conscious at the  time
        of giving her statement (Ext. PG).  PW-9 has also  stated  that  he
        then went to  the  Judicial  Magistrate  R.S.  Bagri  (PW-8)  whose
        residence was near the hospital and R.S.Bagri  accompanied  him  to
        the hospital and recorded the statement of Vandana.   The  Judicial
        Magistrate R.S. Bagri has accordingly deposed that  ASI  Madan  Lal
        had approached him in person at his residence at 10.40  P.M.  along
        with application (Ext.PM) and he came to the hospital and moved  an
        application  (Ext.PM/1)  to  the  Medical  Officer  concerned   and
        thereafter he recorded her statement and at the time  of  recording
        the statement, Dr. R.C. Chaudhary was not present but he had  given
        a certificate (Ext.PM/2) on the application (Ext.PM/1) that Vandana
        was in a fit state to make a statement and she continued to  be  so
        during the making of the statement.  It  is  thus  clear  from  the
        evidence of the aforesaid three witnesses PW-2, PW-8 and PW-9  that
        at the time the statements of Vandana were recorded  by  ASI  Madan
        Lal (PW-9) and the Judicial Magistrate R.S. Bagri (PW-8),  she  was
        in a fit condition to make the statement.  When, however, the  post
        mortem was carried out on 27.02.1991 by Dr.S.S.  Bansal  (PW-7)  at
        4.00 P.M. he found that the larynx and  tracheae  of  the  deceased
        were charred by heat.  On questions being  put  to  him  whether  a
        person will be able to speak when  her  larynx  and  tracheae  were
        charred by heat, PW-7  has  clarified  that  when  the  larynx  and
        tracheae are charred, the person cannot speak, but when the  larynx
        and tracheae are in the process of being charred,  the  person  can
        speak.  Dr. J.L. Bhutani, DW-5, has given his opinion that  if  the
        vocal chord of larynx is charred, such person may be able to speak,
        but not clearly, and it  will  be  difficult  to  understand.   The
        opinions of the two medical experts, therefore, are not in variance
        of the ocular evidence of PW-2, PW-8 and PW-9 that Vandana was in a
        position to speak when her dying declarations were recorded on  the
        night of 26.02.1991.  Hence, the two dying declarations (Ext.PG and
        Ext.PN) can be relied on by the Court.

    11.  The  next  question  which  we  have  to  decide  is
whether  the
        prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
        appellant has committed the offence of dowry  death  under  Section
        304B, IPC. 
The two dying declarations are  similarly  worded.   
We,
        therefore, extract hereinbelow only the dying declaration which was
        recorded by the Judicial Magistrate (Ext. PN):

        “Statement of Vandana, w/o Rajiv Singla, age 23  years,  occupation
        house wife, R/o Dabwali, u/s 164 Cr.P.C.


              I was married to Dr. Rajiv Singla 2 years back.   My  husband
        used to get upset on petty issues.  My  in-laws  lived  separately.
        They are living after the 6 months of my marriage.  My daughter  is
        of 2 months.  Today about 7.30 p.m., in evening I was fed  up  with
        activities of my husband and put on kerosene oil and  burn  myself.
        Earlier my husband used to taunt me for dowry.   Action  should  be
        taken against my husband.


                                        Sd/- R.C. Bangri
        RO & AC                              JMIC
                                       Dabwali, 26-2-91
        RTI of Vandana
        Identified
        Sd/-
        Madan Lal, ASI
        P.C. City Dabwali,
        Dated: 26-2-91”

It will be clear from the contents of the dying declaration (Ext.  PN)  that
the deceased was fed up with the activities of her husband  and  she  poured
kerosene oil on herself and burnt herself.  What  those  activities  of  the
appellant were which prompted her to commit suicide have  not  been  clearly
stated, but she has stated that her husband  used  to  get  upset  on  petty
issues and earlier her husband used to taunt her for dowry.

12.   When, however, we scrutinize the evidence of PW-5, the father  of  the
deceased, we find that soon before the death of the deceased, the  appellant
had subjected the deceased to cruelty which was not  in  any  way  connected
with the demand of dowry.  The relevant part of  the  evidence  of  PW-5  is
quoted hereinbelow:


       “Smt. Vandhana deceased was my daughter.  I had married my  daughter
       Vandhana with Rajiv Kumar, accused  now  present  in  the  Court  on
       28.01.1989 at Kartarpur.  Out of her wed lock with the accused Rajiv
       Kumar, a female child was born on  2.7.90.   Vandhana  deceased  and
       Rajiv Kumar accused,  her  husband  used  to  reside/live  in  Mandi
       Dabwali.  After marriage, whenever Vandhana used to come to tell us,
       she used to tell me that her husband Rajiv Kumar gives  her  beating
       and demands more and more dowry.  We used to fulfill the  demand  of
       Rajiv Kumar accused in the shape of dowry put forward before  us  by
       my daughter and used to send her back after advising her that she is
       to live with her husband and should try  to  adjust  with  him.   On
       19.2.91 Vandhana came to me at Kartarpur and told me that  two  days
       prior to 19.2.91, Rajiv Kumar accused her husband gave her merciless
       beating.  She narrated this to me in the presence of  my  wife  Smt.
       Pushpa Rani and Bhupinder Singh my brother in fact, he is my friend.
        On the night of 24.2.91, I had received anonymous telephone call on
       the telephone no. 242 that Rajiv Kumar has  fled  away  leaving  his
       minor daughter alone.  On hearing this,  my  daughter  Vandhana  got
       perturbed and wanted us to leave her at Mandi  Dabwali  immediately.
       On 25.02.91 (25.2.91) we left Vandhana  at  Mandi  Dabwali.   I  was
       accompanied by my wife Pushpa Rani and Bhupinder Kumar.  On reaching
       at Dabwali we found Rajiv Kumar present in his clinic and  later  on
       he came to the house.  We  told  Rajiv  Kumar  that  he  should  not
       repeatedly give beating to Vandhana.  We told him that  it  was  not
       proper for him to do so.  We also advised our daughter  Vandhana  to
       adjust with her husband and to remain calm  and  quiet  and  not  to
       speak.  On 25.2.91 itself after advising Rajiv Kumar and Vandhana we
       came back to Kartarpur after  staying  at  night  at  Bhatinda.   On
       27.2.91,  I  received  a  telephonic  message  that  Vandhana  after
       sprinkling kerosene oil on her body has put herself  fire  and  that
       she is dead and no longer alive.”

From the aforesaid evidence of PW-5, it is clear that the  marriage  between
the appellant and the deceased took place on 28.01.1989 and  the  demand  of
dowry by the appellant and  the  beatings  for  more  dowry  was  after  the
marriage.  PW-5 has also stated that on 19.02.1991 the deceased came to  him
at Kartarpur and told him that two days prior to 19.02.1991,  the  appellant
gave her merciless beating.  PW-5 has, however, not stated that the  beating
that the appellant gave to the deceased  on  19.02.1991  was  in  connection
with demand of dowry.  One of the essential ingredients of  the  offence  of
dowry death under Section 304B, IPC is that the accused must have  subjected
a woman to cruelty in connection with demand of dowry soon before her  death
and this ingredient has to be proved by the  prosecution  beyond  reasonable
doubt and only then the Court will presume that the  accused  has  committed
the offence of dowry death under Section 113B of the  Indian  Evidence  Act.
As this ingredient of Section 304B, IPC, has not  been  established  by  the
prosecution, the trial court and the High Court were not correct in  holding
the appellant guilty of the offence of dowry death under Section 304B,  IPC.


  13.  We have perused the decision  of  this  Court  in  Smt.  Shanti  and
      Another v. State of Haryana (supra) cited by Mr. Sharma and  we  find
      that in the aforesaid case the facts were that Smt. Shanti was mother-
      in-law of the deceased and Smt. Krishna was  another  inmate  in  the
      matrimonial home in which the deceased was living and it was  alleged
      that both Smt. Shanti and Smt. Krishna were  harassing  the  deceased
      all the while after the marriage  for  not  bringing  a  scooter  and
      television as part of the dowry and  she  was  treated  cruelly.   On
      26.04.1988 at about 11.00 P.M., the father of the  deceased  came  to
      know that the deceased had been murdered  and  was  cremated  by  two
      ladies and he filed a report accordingly before the police.  Both the
      courts below held that the two ladies did not send  the  deceased  to
      her parents house and  drove  out  the  brother  and  father  of  the
      deceased complaining that a scooter and a  television  has  not  been
      given as dowry.  The evidence of the father, mother  and  brother  of
      the deceased was that they were not  even  informed  soon  after  the
      death of the deceased and the appellants had hurriedly  cremated  the
      dead  body.   In  these  circumstances,  this  Court  held  that  the
      presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act  that  the
      two ladies have committed the offence under Section  304B,  IPC,  was
      attracted.  This was, therefore, a case where  the  evidence  clearly
      disclosed that the deceased  had  been  subjected  to  harassment  or
      cruelty committed by the appellants soon before her death.

  14. We have also examined the decision of this  Court  in  Bansi  Lal  v.
      State of Haryana (supra), cited by Mr. Sharma, and we find  that  the
      facts in that case were that the appellant Bansi Lal was  married  to
      Sarla on 04.04.1988.  She was subjected to  cruelty,  harassment  and
      demand of dowry and on 25.06.1991 she died.  After  investigation  of
      the case, prosecution filed a charge-sheet against Bansi Lal and  his
      mother Smt. Shanti Devi and charges were framed  against  them  under
      Sections 498A, 304B and 306, IPC, and they  were  convicted  for  the
      said charges by the trial court.  The High Court, however,  acquitted
      Smt. Shanti Devi, but convicted Bansi Lal because of demand of  dowry
      and cruelty in connection with demand of dowry to which the  deceased
      was subjected to by him.   Bansi  Lal  had  made  a  statement  under
      Section 313, Cr.P.C. that Sarla was in love with  some  other  person
      but she was forced to marry Bansi Lal against her will due  to  which
      she felt suffocated and committed suicide, leaving a suicide note  to
      that effect.  On these facts, this Court held that once it  is  shown
      that soon before her death the deceased has been subjected to cruelty
      or harassment for or in connection with the  demand  for  dowry,  the
      Court shall presume that such person has caused the dowry death under
      Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, and if the case of the  Bansi  Lal
      was that Sarla  has  committed  suicide,  the  onus  was  on  him  to
      establish his defence by leading sufficient  evidence  to  rebut  the
      presumption that he has not caused the dowry death, but Bansi Lal has
      failed to discharge that onus.

15.      On the evidence on record, though the appellant is  not  guilty  of
the offence under Section 304B, IPC, he is certainly guilty of  offences  of
abetment of suicide and cruelty.  Section 113-A of the Indian  Evidence  Act
states as follows:


       “113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by  a  married  woman.-
       When the question is whether the commission of suicide  by  a  woman
       had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her  husband  and
       it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of  seven
       years from the date of her marriage and that  her  husband  or  such
       relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court  may
       presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of  the  case,
       that such suicide had  been  abetted  by  her  husband  or  by  such
       relative of her husband.


       Explanation.--For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have
       the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code”

The language of Section 113-A of the Indian  Evidence  Act  makes  it  clear
that if a woman has committed suicide within a period of  seven  years  from
the date of her marriage and that her husband had subjected her to  cruelty,
the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances  of  the
case, that such suicide had been abetted by her  husband.   The  Explanation
to Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act states that for the  purpose  of
Section 113-A “cruelty” shall have the same  meaning  as  in  Section  498A,
IPC.  The Explanation to Section 498A, IPC,  defines  ‘cruelty’  and  Clause
(a) of the Explanation states that cruelty means any willful  conduct  which
is of such nature as likely to drive a woman to commit suicide.   The  dying
declaration of the deceased (Ext. PN)  as  well  as  the  evidence  of  PW-5
extracted above are sufficient to  establish  that  the  appellant  used  to
fight on petty issues and give beatings to the  deceased,  which  drove  the
deceased to commit suicide.  This is, therefore,  a  clear  case  where  the
appellant had committed offences under Sections 498A and 306, IPC.

16.     In K. Prema S. Rao and Another, etc.  v.  Yadla  Srinivasa  Rao  and
Others, etc. [(2003) 1 SCC 217],
this Court on similar facts has  held  that
to attract the provisions of Section 304B, IPC, one of the main  ingredients
of the offence, which is required to be established, is  that  “soon  before
her death” she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in  connection  with
the demand for dowry” and this ingredient of the offence was  not  there  in
that case.
This Court, however, held that it was not necessary to remit  the
matter to the trial court for framing a charge under Section 306,  IPC,  and
the accused also cannot complain for  want  of  opportunity  to  defend  the
charge under Section 306, IPC, if the facts found in  evidence  justify  the
conviction of the appellant under Sections 498A and 306, IPC instead of  the
graver offence under Section 304B, IPC.  
 In  that  case,  the  three-Judge
Bench of this  Court  held  the  appellant  guilty  of  the  offences  under
Sections 498A and 306, IPC instead  of  the  graver  offence  under  Section
304B, IPC.

  17.    In this case also, we hold the appellant guilty of offences  under
      Sections 498A and 306, IPC.  Considering the  particular  conduct  of
      the appellant which drove the deceased to commit suicide, we impose a
      sentence of one year imprisonment and  fine  of  Rs.1,000/-  for  the
      offence under Section 498A, IPC and impose a sentence of three  years
      imprisonment and fine of Rs.2,000/- for  the  offence  under  Section
      306, IPC, and direct that in case of failure  to  pay  the  fine  for
      either of the two offences, the appellant  shall  undergo  a  further
      imprisonment for a period of six months.  We make it clear  that  the
      sentences of imprisonment for the two offences will run concurrently.
       If the appellant has already undergone  the  punishment  imposed  by
      this judgment, his bail bonds shall stand discharged.

18. The appeal is allowed to that extent.


                                                               .……………………….J.
                                                               (A. K.
Patnaik)


                                                               ………………………..J.
                                                               (Gyan Sudha
Misra)
New Delhi,
October 31, 2013.

M.V. Act - Death of a 19 year old Engineer student - Apex court enhanced compensation to Rs.7,00,000 from Rs. two lakhs = Radhakrishna and another ....Appellants versus Gokul and others ....Respondents = Reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40944

M.V. Act - Death of a 19 year old Engineer student - Apex court enhanced compensation to Rs.7,00,000  from Rs. two lakhs =

  Thus  the  grand  total compensation of the applicants is Rs.1,92,000/- entitled to  get  from Res 1-3 jointly or separately.”
The appellants challenged the award  of  the  Tribunal  by  filing  an
appeal under Section 173 of the Act but could not persuade  the  High  Court
to grant substantial enhancement in  the  amount  of  compensation  and  the
appeal was disposed of with a direction to respondent Nos. 1  to  3  to  pay
additional compensation of Rs.8,000 with interest at  the  rate  of  6%  per
annum. =
“So far as the award of compensation  in  case  of  children  is
           concerned, Shri Justice Chandrachud has divided  them  into  two
           groups, 
the first group between the age group of 5 to  10  years
           and 
the second group between the age group of 10 to 15 years.
 In
           case of children between the age group  of  5  to  10  years,  a
           uniform sum of Rs 50,000 has been held to be payable by  way  of
           compensation, 
to which the conventional figure of Rs 25,000  has
           been added and 
as such to  the  heirs  of  the  14  children,  a
           consolidated sum of Rs 75,000 each, has been awarded. 
So far  as
           the children in the age group of 10 to 15 years,  
there  are  10
           such children who died on the fateful day and having found their
           contribution to the family at Rs 12,000 per annum, 
11 multiplier
           has been applied, particularly, depending upon the  age  of  the
           father and 
then the conventional compensation of Rs  25,000  has
           been added to each case and 
consequently, the heirs of  each  of
           the  deceased  above  10  years  of  age,  have   been   granted
           compensation to the tune of Rs 1,57,000 each.  
In  case  of  the
           death of an infant, there may  have  been  no  actual  pecuniary
           benefit derived by its parents during the child's lifetime.  
But
           this will not necessarily bar the parents' claim and prospective
           loss  will  found  a  valid  claim  provided  that  the  parents
           establish that they had a reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary
           benefit if the child had lived. 
whether there
           exists a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage is always
           a mixed question of fact and  law.  
There  are  several  decided
           cases on this point, providing the guidelines for  determination
           of compensation in such cases but we do not think  it  necessary
           for us to advert, as the claimants had not adduced any materials
           on the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits,  which  the
           parents expected. 
In case of  a  bright  and  healthy  boy,  his
           performances in the school, it would be easier for the authority
           to arrive at the compensation amount,  which  may  be  different
           from another sickly, unhealthy, rickety child and  bad  student,
           but as has been stated earlier, not  an  iota  of  material  was
           produced before Shri Justice Chandrachud to enable him to arrive
           at a just compensation in such  cases  and,  therefore,  he  has
           determined the same on an approximation. 
“.......... Having considered several  subsequent  decisions  of
           this Court, we are of the  view  that  where  the  deceased  was
           married, the deduction towards personal and living  expenses  of
           the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where  the  number  of
           dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the
           number of dependent family members is  4  to  6,  and  one-fifth
           (1/5th) where the number of  dependent  family  members  exceeds
           six.

           Where the deceased was a bachelor  and  the  claimants  are  the
           parents, the deduction follows a different principle. In  regard
           to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal  and  living
           expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor  would  tend  to
           spend more  on  himself.  
Even  otherwise,  there  is  also  the
           possibility of his getting married in a  short  time,  in  which
           event the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings  is  likely
           to be cut drastically.  
Further,  subject  to  evidence  to  the
           contrary, the father is likely to have his own income  and  will
           not be considered as a dependant and 
the mother  alone  will  be
           considered as a dependant. 
In the absence  of  evidence  to  the
           contrary,  brothers  and  sisters  will  not  be  considered  as
           dependants, because they will either be independent and earning,
           or married, or be dependent on the father.

           Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents  and  siblings,
           only the mother would be considered to be a dependant,  and  50%
           would be treated as the personal  and  living  expenses  of  the
           bachelor and 50% as the contribution  to  the  family.  
However,
           where the family of the bachelor is large and dependent  on  the
           income of the deceased, as in a case  
where  he  has  a  widowed
           mother and  large  number  of  younger  non-earning  sisters  or
           brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted  to
           one-third and contribution to the family will be taken  as  two-
           third.”


 “We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should  be  as
           mentioned in Column (4) of the table above (prepared by applying
           Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176, Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC 362
           and Charlie (2005) 10 SCC 720), 
which starts with  an  operative
           multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and  21  to  25
           years), 
reduced by one unit for every five years, that  is  
M-17
           for 26 to 30 years, 
M-16 for 31 to 35 years, 
M-15 for 36  to  40
           years, 
M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and 
M-13 for  46  to  50  years,
           
then reduced by two units for every five years,  that  is, 
 M-11
           for 51 to 55 years, 
M-9 for 56 to 60 years, 
M-7  for  61  to  65  years and 
M-5 for 66 to 70 years.”

 Thereafter, a conventional amount in the range of Rs 5000 to  Rs
           10,000 may be added as loss of estate.  Where  the  deceased  is
           survived by his widow, another conventional amount in the  range
           of 5000 to 10,000 should be added under  the  head  of  loss  of
           consortium. But no amount is to be awarded  under  the  head  of
           pain, suffering or hardship caused to the  legal  heirs  of  the
           deceased.


           The funeral expenses, cost of transportation  of  the  body  (if
           incurred) and cost of any  medical  treatment  of  the  deceased
           before death (if incurred) should also be added.”

  In Lata Wadhwa’s case, the accident had  occurred  on  03.03.1989  and
this Court awarded  compensation  of  Rs.4,10,000  to  the  parents  of  the
deceased children who were students of Classes VI to X.   
In  M.S.  Grewal’s
case,  the  accident  had  occurred  on  28.5.1995.   This   Court   awarded
compensation of  Rs.5,00,000  to  the  parents  of  the  children  who  were
students of IV, V  and  VI  classes.   
In  Anil  Kumar  Mishra’s  case,  the
accident had occurred on 23.6.1993 and the victim of  accident,  who  was  a
student of final year Engineering was awarded compensation of Rs.9,06,000.

14.   In  the  present  case,  the  accident  occurred  on  20.1.2003.   The
deceased was 19 years old and was a  student  of  Engineering  course.   The
Tribunal determined the compensation by  taking  his  annual  income  to  be
Rs.15,000 and deducted 1/3rd towards personal  expenses.   In  Arvind  Kumar
Mishra’s case, the Bench proceeded on the assumption that  after  completion
of the Engineering course,  the  appellant  could  have  been  appointed  as
Assistant Engineer and earn Rs.60,000 per annum.   However, keeping in  view
the degree of disability, his estimated earning was taken as  Rs.42,000  per
annum and accordingly the amount of compensation was awarded.   By  applying
the same yardstick and having regard to  the  age  of  the  parents  of  the
deceased, i.e., 45 and 42 respectively, we feel that ends  of  justice  will
be served by  awarding  a  lump  sum  compensation  of  Rs.7,00,000  to  the
appellants.

15.   In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.   The  impugned  judgment
is modified and it is declared that the  appellants  shall  be  entitled  to
compensation of Rs.7,00,000 with interest at the rate of  6%  per  annum  on
the enhanced amount with effect from  the  date  of  filing  petition  under
Section 166 of the Act.

16.    Respondent  No.3  is  directed  to  pay  the   amount   of   enhanced
compensation and interest  within  a  period  of  three  months  by  getting
prepared two demand drafts of equal amount in the names of  appellant  Nos.1
and 2.  It will be open to respondent No.3 to recover from respondent  Nos.1
and 2 their respective shares of the compensation.

                                                      NON-REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9858  OF 2013
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 1056 of 2008)


Radhakrishna and another                                 ....Appellants

                                   versus

Gokul and others                                         ....Respondents






                               J U D G M E N T

G.S. SINGHVI, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    Feeling dissatisfied with the meagre enhancement of  Rs.8,000  granted
by the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High  Court  in  the  amount  of
compensation  determined  by  Additional  Motor  Accident  Claims  Tribunal,
Barwaha (West), Nimar (for  short,  ‘the  Tribunal’),  the  appellants  have
filed this appeal.
3.    Nilesh (son of the appellants) was killed in a  road  accident,  which
occurred on 20.1.2003, when the motorcycle on which he was going along  with
his friend Rohit was hit by the truck belonging to respondent No.1.

4.    The appellants filed  a  petition  under  Section  166  of  the  Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’) for award of compensation  to  the
tune of Rs.50,60,000.  
Their claim was founded on the following assertions:
      (i)   The accident was caused due to rash  and  negligent  driving  of
      the truck owned by respondent No.1, which was insured with  respondent
      No.3 – United India Insurance Co.
      (ii)  At the time of accident, the deceased was 19 years  old  and  he
      was a student of degree course in Engineering.
      (iii) After completion of study, the deceased was expected  to  get  a
      good job as an Engineer and earn substantial salary.

5.    In the written statement filed by  them,  the  owner  and  the  driver
(respondent Nos. 1 and 2) claimed that  the  truck  was  duly  insured  with
respondent No.3 and the compensation, if  any,  was  payable  by  respondent
No.3.  In a separate statement, respondent  No.3  denied  its  liability  by
asserting that the driver of the truck and the  motorcyclist  did  not  have
valid driving licences.  It was further pleaded that the appellants are  not
entitled to compensation because the deceased was travelling  as  a  pillion
rider.

6.    On the pleadings of the parties, the  Tribunal  framed  the  following
issues:
      “1.   Whether the Resp-2 by driving the truck No. MP-11A/2453 in  rash
      & negligent manner caused the accident with the motor cycle No. MP  10
      D 42/4 driven by Resp-4 coming from opposite direction?


      2.    Whether the pillion rider on the motor cycle, i.e., the  son  of
      applicants Nilesh died due to physical injuries received in  the  said
      accident?


      3.    Whether the truck No. MP/11A/2454 was being driven in  violation
      of Insurance policy & provision  of  the  M.V.  Act  at  the  time  of
      accident, If yes its effect?


      4.    Whether the motor cycle No. MP 10 D 4214  was  being  driven  in
      violation of Insurance policy & provision of M.V.  Act?  If  Yes,  its
      effect?


      5.    Whether the applicant is entitled to get compensation.  If  yes,
      what amount and from whom?


      6.    Relief and Cost.”




7.    After analyzing the evidence produced by  the  parties,  the  Tribunal
answered issues No.1 to 4 in favour of the appellants.
While  dealing  with
the issue relating to the quantum of compensation, the Tribunal referred  to
the  statement  of  appellant  No.1  Radhakrishna  Soni  and  the  documents
produced by him and observed:
      “The age of Nilesh is stated to be 19 years by the  applicant  at  the
      time of accident which is supported by school record. 
As the  deceased
      was studying at  the  time  of  death,  his  probable  income  can  be
      determined at Rs.15,000/- p.a. from which  1/3  is  deducted  for  the
      annual dependency  of  the  applicants.  
It  is  proper  to  apply  17
      multiplier keeping in view the age of the  deceased.  Accordingly  the
      total  dependency  amount  is  Rs.10,000x17=Rs.1,70,000.  
Due  to  the
      untimely death of son the applicant are deprived from love & affection
      of son. 
So each applicant is  entitled  to  Rs.10,000  is  the  annual
      dependency of the applicants. 
It is  proper  to  apply  17  multiplier
      keeping in view the age of the deceased Rs.1,70,000. 
Apart  from  this
      Rs.2000/- is awarded  for  funeral  expenses.  
Thus  the  grand  total compensation of the applicants is Rs.1,92,000/- entitled to  get  from Res 1-3 jointly or separately.”



8.    The appellants challenged the award  of  the  Tribunal  by  filing  an
appeal under Section 173 of the Act but could not persuade  the  High  Court
to grant substantial enhancement in  the  amount  of  compensation  and  the
appeal was disposed of with a direction to respondent Nos. 1  to  3  to  pay
additional compensation of Rs.8,000 with interest at  the  rate  of  6%  per
annum.

9.    We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the  record.
 For deciding the question whether the appellants  are  entitled  to  higher
compensation, it will be useful to notice some of the precedents.  In  Sarla
Verma v. D.T.C. (2009) 6 SCC 121, a  two-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  took
cognizance  of  the  lack  of  uniformity  and   consistency   in   awarding
compensation to the victims of accidents caused by motor vehicles,  referred
to the judgments in U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC  362,  G.M.,
Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas (1994)  2  SCC  176  and  made  the  following
observations:

           “Assessment   of   compensation   though    involving    certain
           hypothetical considerations, should nevertheless  be  objective.
           Justice  and  justness  emanate  from  equality  in   treatment,
           consistency and thoroughness in adjudication, and  fairness  and
           uniformity in the decision-making  process  and  the  decisions.
           While it may not be possible to have mathematical  precision  or
           identical awards in  assessing  compensation,  same  or  similar
           facts should  lead  to  awards  in  the  same  range.  When  the
           factors/inputs are the same, and  the  formula/legal  principles
           are the same, consistency and uniformity, and not divergence and
           freakiness, should be the result of adjudication  to  arrive  at
           just compensation. In Susamma Thomas  (1994)  2  SCC  176,  this
           Court stated:

                 “16. … The proper method of computation is  the  multiplier
                 method.  Any   departure,   except   in   exceptional   and
                 extraordinary  cases,  would  introduce  inconsistency   of
                 principle,  lack  of   uniformity   and   an   element   of
                 unpredictability, for the assessment of compensation.”

           Basically only  three  facts  need  to  be  established  by  the
           claimants for assessing compensation in the case of death:
                 (a) age of the deceased;
                 (b) income of the deceased; and
                 (c) the number of dependants.
                 The issues to be determined by the Tribunal  to  arrive  at
                 the loss of dependency are:
                 (i) additions/deductions to be made  for  arriving  at  the
                 income;
                 (ii) the deduction to be made towards the  personal  living
                 expenses of the deceased; and
                 (iii) the multiplier to be applied with  reference  to  the
                 age of the deceased.


           If these determinants are standardised, there will be uniformity
           and consistency in the decisions. There will be lesser need  for
           detailed evidence. It will also  be  easier  for  the  insurance
           companies to settle accident claims without delay.

           To  have  uniformity  and  consistency,  the  Tribunals   should
           determine compensation in cases of death, by the following well-
           settled steps:


           Step 1 (Ascertaining the multiplicand)
           The income of the deceased per annum should be  determined.  Out
           of the said income a deduction should be made in regard  to  the
           amount which the deceased would have spent on himself by way  of
           personal and living expenses. The balance, which  is  considered
           to be the contribution to the dependant family, constitutes  the
           multiplicand.


           Step 2 (Ascertaining the multiplier)
           Having regard to the age of the deceased and  period  of  active
           career, the appropriate multiplier should be selected. This does
           not mean ascertaining the number of years he would have lived or
           worked  but  for  the  accident.  Having   regard   to   several
           imponderables  in  life  and  economic  factors,  a   table   of
           multipliers with reference to the age  has  been  identified  by
           this Court. The multiplier should be chosen from the said  table
           with reference to the age of the deceased.


           Step 3 (Actual calculation)
           The  annual  contribution  to  the  family  (multiplicand)  when
           multiplied by such multiplier gives the “loss of dependency”  to
           the family.


           Thereafter, a conventional amount in the range of Rs 5000 to  Rs
           10,000 may be added as loss of estate.  Where  the  deceased  is
           survived by his widow, another conventional amount in the  range
           of 5000 to 10,000 should be added under  the  head  of  loss  of
           consortium. But no amount is to be awarded  under  the  head  of
           pain, suffering or hardship caused to the  legal  heirs  of  the
           deceased.


           The funeral expenses, cost of transportation  of  the  body  (if
           incurred) and cost of any  medical  treatment  of  the  deceased
           before death (if incurred) should also be added.”



      The Bench  then  considered  the  question  whether  there  should  be
addition to the income for future prospects and observed:
           “In view of the  imponderables  and  uncertainties,  we  are  in
           favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an  addition  of  50%  of
           actual salary to  the  actual  salary  income  of  the  deceased
           towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job
           and was below 40 years. (Where  the  annual  income  is  in  the
           taxable range, the words  “actual  salary”  should  be  read  as
           “actual salary less tax”). The addition should be  only  30%  if
           the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years. There should  be  no
           addition, where the age of the deceased is more than  50  years.
           Though the evidence  may  indicate  a  different  percentage  of
           increase, it is necessary to standardise the addition  to  avoid
           different yardsticks  being  applied  or  different  methods  of
           calculation being adopted. Where the deceased was  self-employed
           or  was  on  a  fixed  salary  (without  provision  for   annual
           increments, etc.), the courts will usually take only the  actual
           income at the time of death. A  departure  therefrom  should  be
           made only  in  rare  and  exceptional  cases  involving  special
           circumstances.”



      The next issue considered by the Bench was  whether  there  should  be
deduction  for  personal  and  living   expenses.    After   noticing   some
precedents, the Bench observed:

           “.......... Having considered several  subsequent  decisions  of
           this Court, we are of the  view  that  where  the  deceased  was
           married, the deduction towards personal and living  expenses  of
           the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where  the  number  of
           dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the
           number of dependent family members is  4  to  6,  and  one-fifth
           (1/5th) where the number of  dependent  family  members  exceeds
           six.

           Where the deceased was a bachelor  and  the  claimants  are  the
           parents, the deduction follows a different principle. In  regard
           to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal  and  living
           expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor  would  tend  to
           spend more  on  himself.  
Even  otherwise,  there  is  also  the
           possibility of his getting married in a  short  time,  in  which
           event the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings  is  likely
           to be cut drastically.  
Further,  subject  to  evidence  to  the
           contrary, the father is likely to have his own income  and  will
           not be considered as a dependant and 
the mother  alone  will  be
           considered as a dependant. 
In the absence  of  evidence  to  the
           contrary,  brothers  and  sisters  will  not  be  considered  as
           dependants, because they will either be independent and earning,
           or married, or be dependent on the father.

           Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents  and  siblings,
           only the mother would be considered to be a dependant,  and  50%
           would be treated as the personal  and  living  expenses  of  the
           bachelor and 50% as the contribution  to  the  family.  
However,
           where the family of the bachelor is large and dependent  on  the
           income of the deceased, as in a case  
where  he  has  a  widowed
           mother and  large  number  of  younger  non-earning  sisters  or
           brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted  to
           one-third and contribution to the family will be taken  as  two-
           third.”




      Finally, the complex issue relating to application of  multiplier  was
examined and decided in the following words:

           “We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used should  be  as
           mentioned in Column (4) of the table above (prepared by applying
           Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176, Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC 362
           and Charlie (2005) 10 SCC 720), 
which starts with  an  operative
           multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and  21  to  25
           years), 
reduced by one unit for every five years, that  is  
M-17
           for 26 to 30 years, 
M-16 for 31 to 35 years, 
M-15 for 36  to  40
           years, 
M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and 
M-13 for  46  to  50  years,
           
then reduced by two units for every five years,  that  is, 
 M-11
           for 51 to 55 years, 
M-9 for 56 to 60 years, 
M-7  for  61  to  65  years and 
M-5 for 66 to 70 years.”


10.   However, the issue relating to award of compensation  to  the  parents
of the deceased, who was a student was neither dealt  with  nor  decided  in
Sarla Verma’s case.   In Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (2001) 8 SCC  197,  a
three-Judge Bench of this Court entertained  a  writ  petition  filed  under
Article 32 of the Constitution for ordering prosecution of the  officers  of
the Tata Iron and Steel Company  and  their  agents  and  servants  for  the
alleged negligence in organizing  a  function  at  Jamshedpur  in  which  60
people were killed due to fire accident and for issue of a direction to  the
State Government as well as the company to pay compensation to the  victims.
  For  assessing  the  compensation  payable  to  the  victims,  this  Court
requested the former Chief Justice Shri  Y.V.  Chandrachud  to  examine  the
matter and submit a report.  The first part of the report submitted by  Shri
Justice Y.V. Chandrachud dealt with the cases of death and the  second  part
dealt with the cases of burn  injury.   After  taking  cognizance  of  three
judgments of the Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court  in  Chairman,  A.P.  SRTC  v.
Shafiya Khatoon 1985 ACJ 212, Bhagwan Das v. Mohd. Arif 1987  ACJ  1052  and
A.P. SRTC v. G. Ramanaiah 1988 ACJ 223 and the  views  of  the  British  Law
Commission wherein adoption of  the  multiplier  method  was  advocated  and
approved, Justice Chandrachud took the contribution  of  children  above  10
years of age at Rs.12,000 per annum, applied multiplier of 11 and  suggested
award of conventional amount of Rs.25,000.  After considering the  arguments
of Ms. Rani Jethmalani and  Shri  F.S.  Nariman,  learned  counsel  for  the
parties, this Court directed payment of higher compensation.  While  dealing
with the cases of children, the Court observed as under:

           “So far as the award of compensation  in  case  of  children  is
           concerned, Shri Justice Chandrachud has divided  them  into  two
           groups, 
the first group between the age group of 5 to  10  years
           and 
the second group between the age group of 10 to 15 years.
 In
           case of children between the age group  of  5  to  10  years,  a
           uniform sum of Rs 50,000 has been held to be payable by  way  of
           compensation, 
to which the conventional figure of Rs 25,000  has
           been added and 
as such to  the  heirs  of  the  14  children,  a
           consolidated sum of Rs 75,000 each, has been awarded. 
So far  as
           the children in the age group of 10 to 15 years,  
there  are  10
           such children who died on the fateful day and having found their
           contribution to the family at Rs 12,000 per annum, 
11 multiplier
           has been applied, particularly, depending upon the  age  of  the
           father and 
then the conventional compensation of Rs  25,000  has
           been added to each case and 
consequently, the heirs of  each  of
           the  deceased  above  10  years  of  age,  have   been   granted
           compensation to the tune of Rs 1,57,000 each.  
In  case  of  the
           death of an infant, there may  have  been  no  actual  pecuniary
           benefit derived by its parents during the child's lifetime.  
But
           this will not necessarily bar the parents' claim and prospective
           loss  will  found  a  valid  claim  provided  that  the  parents
           establish that they had a reasonable  expectation  of  pecuniary
           benefit if the child had lived. 
This principle was laid down  by
           the House of Lords in the famous  case  of  Taff  Vale  Rly.  v.
           Jenkins and Lord Atkinson said thus:

                 “… all that is necessary is that a  reasonable  expectation
                 of pecuniary benefit should be entertained  by  the  person
                 who sues. It is quite  true  that  the  existence  of  this
                 expectation is an inference of fact — there must be a basis
                 of fact from which the inference can reasonably  be  drawn;
                 but  I  wish  to  express  my  emphatic  dissent  from  the
                 proposition that it is necessary  that  two  of  the  facts
                 without which the inference cannot  be  drawn  are,  first,
                 that the deceased earned money in the  past,  and,  second,
                 that he or she contributed to the support of the plaintiff.
                 These are, no doubt, pregnant pieces of evidence, but  they
                 are only pieces of evidence; and  the  necessary  inference
                 can, I think, be drawn from circumstances  other  than  and
                 different from them.”

           At the same time, it  must  be  held  that  a  mere  speculative
           possibility of benefit is not sufficient. 
Question whether there
           exists a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage is always
           a mixed question of fact and  law.  
There  are  several  decided
           cases on this point, providing the guidelines for  determination
           of compensation in such cases but we do not think  it  necessary
           for us to advert, as the claimants had not adduced any materials
           on the reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits,  which  the
           parents expected. 
In case of  a  bright  and  healthy  boy,  his
           performances in the school, it would be easier for the authority
           to arrive at the compensation amount,  which  may  be  different
           from another sickly, unhealthy, rickety child and  bad  student,
           but as has been stated earlier, not  an  iota  of  material  was
           produced before Shri Justice Chandrachud to enable him to arrive
           at a just compensation in such  cases  and,  therefore,  he  has
           determined the same on an approximation. 
Mr  Nariman,  appearing
           for TISCO on his own, submitted that the compensation determined
           for the children of all age groups could be doubled, as  in  his
           views also, the determination made is grossly  inadequate.  
Loss
           of a child to the parents is  irrecoupable,  and  no  amount  of
           money  could  compensate  the  parents.  Having  regard  to  the
           environment  from  which  these  children  were  brought,  their
           parents being reasonably well-placed officials of Tata Iron  and
           Steel Company, and on considering the submission of Mr  Nariman,
           
we would direct that the compensation amount  for  the  children
           between the age group of 5 to 10 years should be three times. 
In
           other  words,  it  should  be  Rs  1.5  lakhs,  to   which   the
           conventional figure of Rs 50,000 should be added  and  thus  the
           total amount in each case would be Rs 2.00 lakhs. 
So far as  the
           children between the age group of 10 to 15 years, they  are  all
           students of Class VI to Class X and are children of employees of
           TISCO. 
TISCO itself has a tradition that every employee can  get
           one of his children employed in the Company.  
Having  regard  to
           these facts, in their case, the contribution of  Rs  12,000  per
           annum appears to  us  to  be  on  the  lower  side  and  in  our
           considered opinion, the contribution should  be  Rs  24,000  and
           instead of 11 multiplier, the appropriate  multiplier  would  be
           15. 
Therefore, the compensation, so calculated on the  aforesaid
           basis should be worked  out  to  Rs  3.60  lakhs,  to  which  an
           additional sum of Rs 50,000 has to be  added,  thus  making  the
           total amount payable at Rs 4.10 lakhs for each of the  claimants
           of the aforesaid deceased children.”




11.   In M.S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood (2001) 8 SCC 151, a two-Judge  Bench
considered issues of  negligence  resulting  in  death  of  14  students  of
Dalhausie Public School.
The students died due to drowning in  River  Beas.
After holding that the teachers of the  school  were  negligent,  the  Court
referred to the judgment in Lata Wadha’s case as also the judgment in  G.M.,
Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas (supra) and proceeded to observe:

           “In Lata Wadhwa case however, this Court came  to  a  conclusion
           that upon acceptability of the multiplier method  and  depending
           upon the fact situation, namely, the involvement of TISCO in its
           tradition that every  employee  can  get  one  of  his  children
           employed in the Company and having regard to the  multiplier  15
           the compensation  was  calculated  at  Rs  3.60  lakhs  with  an
           additional sum of Rs 50,000 as a conventional figure making  the
           total amount payable at Rs 4.10 lakhs for each of the  claimants
           of the deceased children.

           The decision in Lata Wadhwa thus, is definitely a guiding factor
           in the matter of award of compensation wherein children died due
           to an unfortunate incident as noticed more fully hereinbefore in
           this judgment.

           Having considered the matter in its proper perspective  and  the
           applicability of the multiplier  method  and  without  even  any
           further material on record, we do feel it expedient to note that
           though Mr Bahuguna attributed the quantum granted  by  the  High
           Court as strangely absurd, we, however, are not in a position to
           lend our concurrence therewith. It is  not  that  the  award  of
           compensation at Rs 5 lakhs can be attributed to be the resultant
           effect of either emotions or  sentiments  or  the  High  Court's
           anguish over the incident.
The High Court  obviously  considered
           the  overall  situation  as  regards  social  placement  of  the
           students. 
As stated hereinafter the School presently is  one  of
           the affluent schools in the country and the  fee  structure  and
           other incidentals are so high  that  it  would  be  a  well-nigh
           impossibility to think of admission in the School  at  even  the
           upper middle class level.
Obviously the  School  caters  to  the
           need of the upper strata  of  the  society  and  if  the  Second
           Schedule of the Motor Vehicles Act  can  be  termed  to  be  any
           guide, the compensation could have been a much larger sum.
Thus
           in the factual situation, award of compensation at  Rs  5  lakhs
           cannot by  any  stretch  be  termed  to  be  excessive.
Another
           redeeming feature of Mr Bahuguna's submissions pertains  to  the
           theory of ability to pay: audited accounts  have  been  produced
           for the year 1995 depicting a situation, though  not  of  having
           stringency but the situation truly cannot but be ascribed to  be
           otherwise comfortable to pay as directed by the High Court.  The
           matter, however, was prolonged in the law courts  in  the  usual
           manner and it took nearly  six  years  for  its  final  disposal
           before this Court — these six years, however, had  rendered  the
           financial stability of the  School  concerned  in  a  much  more
           stronger situation than what it was in the year 1995.
 The School
           as of date stands out to be one of the most affluent schools  in
           the country, as such ability to pay cannot be termed  to  be  an
           issue in the matter and in the wake thereto we are not  inclined
           to deal with the same in any further detail.”




12.   At this stage, we may usefully notice the  judgment  in  Arvind  Kumar
Mishra v. New India Assurance Company Limited (2010) 10 SCC  254.
 In  that
case,  a  two-Judge  Bench  considered  the  issue  relating  to  award   of
compensation to the appellant who had suffered grievous injuries in  a  road
accident.
At the time of the accident, the appellant’s  age  was  25  years
and he was a student of Bachelor of Engineering (Mechanical).
The  Tribunal
had awarded compensation of Rs.2,50,000.  The  High  Court  enhanced  it  to
Rs.3,50,000.
After noticing the judgments in G.M., Kerala SRTC  v.  Susamma
Thomas (supra) and Sarla Verma  v.  DTC  (supra),  the  Bench  enhanced  the
amount of compensation to  Rs.9,06,000.  
The reasons for this  approach  are
discernible from paragraphs 13 to 15 of the judgment,  which  are  extracted
below:

         
“13. The appellant at the time of  accident  was  a  final  year
           Engineering (Mechanical) student in a reputed college. 
He was  a
           remarkably brilliant student  having  passed  all  his  semester
           examinations  in  distinction.  
Due  to  the  said  accident  he
           suffered grievous injuries and remained in coma  for  about  two
           months. 
His studies got interrupted as he was moved to different
           hospitals for surgeries and other treatments.  
For  many  months
           his condition remained serious; his right hand was amputated and
           vision seriously affected. 
These  multiple  injuries  ultimately
           led  to  70%  permanent  disablement.  
He  has   been   rendered
           incapacitated and a career ahead of him in his  chosen  line  of
           Mechanical Engineering got dashed for  ever. 
 He  is  now  in  a
           physical condition that he requires domestic help throughout his
           life. 
He has been deprived of pecuniary benefits which he  could
           have  reasonably  acquired  had  he   not   suffered   permanent
           disablement to the extent of 70% in the accident.

           14.   On completion of Bachelor of Engineering (Mechanical) from
           the prestigious institute like BIT, it can be reasonably assumed
           that he would have got a good job. 
The appellant has  stated  in
           his evidence that in the campus interview  he  was  selected  by
           Tata as well as Reliance Industries and was offered pay  package
           of Rs. 3,50,000 per annum. 
Even if that is not accepted for want
           of any evidence in support thereof, there would  not  have  been
           any difficulty for him in getting some decent job in the private
           sector. 
Had he  decided  to  join  government  service  and  got
           selected, he would have been put in the pay scale for  Assistant
           Engineer and would have at least earned Rs.  60,000  per  annum.
           
Wherever he joined, he had a fair chance of some  promotion  and
           remote chance of some high position. 
But uncertainties  of  life
           cannot be ignored taking relevant factors into consideration. In
           our opinion, it is fair and  reasonable  to  assess  his  future
           earnings  at  Rs.  60,000  per  annum  taking  the  salary   and
           allowances payable to an Assistant Engineer in public employment
           as the basis. 
Since he suffered 70%  permanent  disability,  the
           future earnings may be discounted by 30%  and,  accordingly, 
 we
           estimate upon the facts that  the  multiplicand  should  be  Rs.
           42,000 per annum.

           15.   The appellant at the time of accident was about 25  years.
           As per the decision of this Court in  Sarla  Verma  v.  DTC  the
           operative multiplier would be 18. The loss of future earnings by
           multiplying the multiplicand of Rs. 42,000 by a multiplier of 18
           comes to Rs. 7,56,000. The damages to compensate  the  appellant
           towards loss of future earnings,  in  our  considered  judgment,
           must be Rs. 7,56,000. The  Tribunal  awarded  him  Rs.  1,50,000
           towards treatment including the medical expenses.  The  same  is
           maintained as it  is  and,  accordingly,  the  total  amount  of
           compensation  to  which  the  appellant  is  entitled   is   Rs.
           9,06,000.”



13.   In Lata Wadhwa’s case, the accident had  occurred  on  03.03.1989  and
this Court awarded  compensation  of  Rs.4,10,000  to  the  parents  of  the
deceased children who were students of Classes VI to X.   
In  M.S.  Grewal’s
case,  the  accident  had  occurred  on  28.5.1995.   This   Court   awarded
compensation of  Rs.5,00,000  to  the  parents  of  the  children  who  were
students of IV, V  and  VI  classes.   
In  Anil  Kumar  Mishra’s  case,  the
accident had occurred on 23.6.1993 and the victim of  accident,  who  was  a
student of final year Engineering was awarded compensation of Rs.9,06,000.

14.   In  the  present  case,  the  accident  occurred  on  20.1.2003.  
 The
deceased was 19 years old and was a  student  of  Engineering  course.   The
Tribunal determined the compensation by  taking  his  annual  income  to  be
Rs.15,000 and deducted 1/3rd towards personal  expenses.  
 In  Arvind  Kumar
Mishra’s case, the Bench proceeded on the assumption that  after  completion
of the Engineering course,  the  appellant  could  have  been  appointed  as
Assistant Engineer and earn Rs.60,000 per annum.   
However, keeping in  view
the degree of disability, his estimated earning was taken as  Rs.42,000  per
annum and accordingly the amount of compensation was awarded.   
By  applying
the same yardstick and having regard to  the  age  of  the  parents  of  the
deceased, i.e., 45 and 42 respectively, we feel that ends  of  justice  will
be served by  awarding  a  lump  sum  compensation  of  Rs.7,00,000  to  the
appellants.

15.   In the result, the appeal is partly allowed.   The  impugned  judgment
is modified and it is declared that the  appellants  shall  be  entitled  to
compensation of Rs.7,00,000 with interest at the rate of  6%  per  annum  on
the enhanced amount with effect from  the  date  of  filing  petition  under
Section 166 of the Act.

16.    Respondent  No.3  is  directed  to  pay  the   amount   of   enhanced
compensation and interest  within  a  period  of  three  months  by  getting
prepared two demand drafts of equal amount in the names of  appellant  Nos.1
and 2.  It will be open to respondent No.3 to recover from respondent  Nos.1
and 2 their respective shares of the compensation.

                                                       ......………………………..….J.
                                              [G.S. SINGHVI]



New Delhi,                                        ...….……..…..………………..J.
October 31, 2013.                                 [GYAN SUDHA MISRA]





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