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Wednesday, October 30, 2013

Rule 34 of CDA and Payment of Gratuity Act - Departmental enquiry - holding of Gratuity of a retired person - Since there is a conflict in opinion of three Bench judgment of this Court which is later in point of time. State Bank of India vs. Ram lal Bhaskar and Anr. 2011(10)SCC249. and the judgement of Jaswant Singh Gill vs. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 663. matter referred to larger bench - Referred to larger Bench = = Ch. cum Man. Director Mahanadi Coalfield Ltd. ...........Appellant Versus Rabindranath Choubey ........Respondent = http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40916

Rule 34 of CDA  and Payment of Gratuity Act - Departmental enquiry - holding of Gratuity of a retired person - Since there is a conflict in opinion of three Bench judgment of this  Court  which  is  later  in point of time.  State Bank of India  vs.  Ram  lal Bhaskar and Anr. 2011(10)SCC249.  and the judgement of Jaswant  Singh  Gill  vs.  Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 663. matter referred to larger bench  - Referred to larger Bench =
whether it is  permissible  in  law  for  the appellant to withhold the payment of  gratuity  to  the  respondent, even after his superannuation from service, because of the  pendency  of disciplinary proceedings against him.-
whether gratuity can be withheld in the wake of Rule 34  of  CDA  Rules when examined in juxtaposition with the provisions of the Gratuity Act.

The  Division
       Bench  of  the  High  Court  has  held  that   writ   petition   was
       maintainable. 
On merits, it ruled that the disciplinary  proceedings
       against the respondent were initiated prior to attaining the age  of
       superannuation.   
The   respondent   retired   from    service    on
       superannuation and hence the question of imposing a major penalty of
       removal or dismissal  from  service  would  not  arise  as  per  the
       decision of the Supreme Court  in  Jaswant  Singh  Gill  vs.  Bharat
       Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 663. 
The High Court has further
       held that the power to withhold payment of gratuity as contained  in
       Rule 34(3) of the Rules, 1978 shall be subject to the provisions  of
       the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. 
Therefore,  the  statutory  right
       accrued to the Respondent to get  gratuity  cannot  be  impaired  by
       reason of the Rules framed by the Coal India Ltd. which do not  have
       the force of a statute. 
On that basis, direction  is  given  to  the
       appellant  to  release  the  amount  of  gratuity  payable  to   the
       respondent. =

    To put it otherwise, whether in the scheme of  Gratuity  Act,  gratuity
    has to be  necessarily  released  to  the  concerned  employee  on  his
    retirement even if departmental proceedings are  pending  against  him.
    We find that Jaswant Singh Gill's case directly answers this  question,
    that too in the context of these very CDA Rules. However, it is because
    of the reason that the said judgment proceeds on the basis  that  after
    the retirement of an employee, penalty of dismissal cannot  be  imposed
    upon the retired  employee.  If  this  view  is  not  correct  and  the
    imposition of penalty of dismissal is still permissible, employer  will
    get the right to forfeit the  gratuity  of  such  an  employee  in  the
    eventualities provided under Sections 4(1)  & 4 (6) of the  Payment  of
    Gratuity Act which reads as under:-


            Section 4 - Payment of gratuity
     

        (1)       Gratuity  shall  be  payable  to  an  employee   on   the
        termination of his employment  after  he  has  rendered  continuous
        service for not less than five years,--

        (a) on his superannuation, or
        (b) on his retirement or resignation, or
        (c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease:

           Provided that the completion of continuous service of five years
        shall not be necessary where the termination of the  employment  of
        any employee is due to death or disablement:


           Provided further that in the case  of  death  of  the  employee,
        gratuity payable to hi m shall be paid to his  nominee  or,  if  no
        nomination has been made, to his heirs, and where any such nominees
        or heirs is a minor, the share of such minor,  shall  be  deposited
        with the controlling authority who shall invest the  same  for  the
        benefit of such minor in such bank or other financial  institution,
        as may be prescribed, until such minor attains majority.]


        Explanation.--For the purposes of this section,  disablement  means
        such disablement as incapacitates an employee for the work which he
        was capable of performing before the accident or disease  resulting
        in such disablement.


           xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


        (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),--


        (a)  the  gratuity  of  an  employee,  whose  services  have   been
        terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence  causing  any
        damage or loss to, or destruction of,  property  belonging  to  the
        employer' shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss so
        caused;


        (b) the gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly or  partially
        forfeited]--


        (i)      if the services of such employee have been terminated for
        his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on
        his part, or


          (ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any
        act  which  constitutes  an  offence  involving  moral   turpitude,
        provided that such offence is committed by hi m in  the  course  of
        his employment.






    24.    Thus for invoking Clause (a) or (b) of sub-section 6 of  Section
    4 necessary pre-condition is the termination of service on the basis of
    departmental enquiry or conviction in a criminal case.  This  provision
    would not get  triggered  if  there  is  no  termination  of  services.




    25.    It is the case of the appellant that in the charge sheet  served
    upon the respondent herein,  there  are  very  serious  allegations  of
    misconduct alleging dishonestly causing coal stock  shortage  amounting
    to Rs. 31.65 crores,  and  thereby  causing  substantial  loss  to  the
    employer.
 If such a charge is proved and  punishment  of  dismissal  is
    given thereupon, the provisions of  Section  4(6)  of  the  Payment  of
    Gratuity would naturally get attracted  and  it  would  be  within  the
    discretion of the appellant to forfeit  the  gratuity  payable  to  the
    respondent. 
As a corollary one can safely say  that  the  employer  has
    right to withhold the gratuity pending departmental  inquiry.  
However,
    as explained  above,  this  course  of  action  is  available  only  if
    disciplinary authority has necessary powers to impose  the  penalty  of
    dismissal upon the respondent even after his retirement. 
Having  regard
    to our discussion above of Jaswant  Singh  Gill  (supra)  and  Ram  Lal
    Bhaskar (supra), this issue needs to be considered authoritatively by a
    larger Bench. 
We, therefore, are of the opinion that present appeal  be
    decided by a Bench of three Judges.


    26.    We accordingly direct the Registry to place  the  matter  before
    Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench to hear  this
    appeal.

                                                           [REPORTABLE]


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                         CIVIL APPEAL NO.  9693/2013
              [SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL)NO. 31583 OF 2013]




    Ch. cum Man. Director Mahanadi Coalfield Ltd.
    ...........Appellant


    Versus


    Rabindranath Choubey
    ........Respondent




                               J U D G M E N T




    A.K. SIKRI, J.




    1. Leave granted.
    2. The respondent was working as  Chief  General  Manager  (Production)
       since 17.2.2006 at Rajmahal area under Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd., the
       appellant herein. 
A memo containing articles of charge was issued to
       him on 1.10.2007 alleging that there was shortage of stock  of  coal
       in Rajmahal Group of  mines  which  was  under  his  management  and
       enquiry was proposed to be conducted under Rule 29 of  the  Conduct,
       Discipline & Appeal Rules.
    3. During the pendency of the departmental proceeding,  the  Respondent
       was  allowed  to  retire  on  31.7.2010  on  attaining  the  age  of
       superannuation.
The Respondent submitted an application on 21.9.2010
       to the Director (Personnel) for payment of  gratuity.  
On  the  same
       date, he  also  submitted  an  application  before  the  Controlling
       Authority  under  Payment  of  Gratuity  Act   cum-Regional   Labour
       Commissioner for payment of gratuity.
    4. Notice was issued to the Appellant to appear. The appellant appeared
       and stated that the payment of gratuity was withheld due  to  reason
       that disciplinary case  is  pending  against  him.  The  controlling
       authority held that the claim of the Respondent was pre-mature.
    5. The respondent challenged the order by filing the writ petition. The
       single Judge dismissed the writ petition holding that in view of the
       existence of an appellate forum against  the  order  passed  by  the
       Authority, the Respondent may file an appeal  before  the  Appellate
       Authority within 21 days from the date of passing  of  the  impugned
       order.
    6. The Respondent then filed Intra  Court  Writ  Appeal.  
The  Division
       Bench  of  the  High  Court  has  held  that   writ   petition   was
       maintainable. 
On merits, it ruled that the disciplinary  proceedings
       against the respondent were initiated prior to attaining the age  of
       superannuation.   
The   respondent   retired   from    service    on
       superannuation and hence the question of imposing a major penalty of
       removal or dismissal  from  service  would  not  arise  as  per  the
       decision of the Supreme Court  in  Jaswant  Singh  Gill  vs.  Bharat
       Coking Coal Ltd. & Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 663. 
The High Court has further
       held that the power to withhold payment of gratuity as contained  in
       Rule 34(3) of the Rules, 1978 shall be subject to the provisions  of
       the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. 
Therefore,  the  statutory  right
       accrued to the Respondent to get  gratuity  cannot  be  impaired  by
       reason of the Rules framed by the Coal India Ltd. which do not  have
       the force of a statute. 
On that basis, direction  is  given  to  the
       appellant  to  release  the  amount  of  gratuity  payable  to   the
       respondent.
    7. In  the  aforesaid  circumstances,  the  question  which  falls  for
       consideration is as to
whether it is  permissible  in  law  for  the appellant to withhold the payment of  gratuity  to  the  respondent, even after his superannuation from service, because of the  pendency  of disciplinary proceedings against him.
    8. Before we proceed to answer this question in the light of  arguments
       advanced by Counsel on either side, we would like to point out  that
       the question of maintainability of the  writ  petition  against  the
       order of the Controlling Authority under the  Payment  Gratuity  Act
       was not raised before us by the learned Counsel for  the  appellant.
       Thus, the learned Counsel did not challenge the approach of the writ
       appeal Court in entertaining the writ appeal on merits by giving the
       reason that it was so doing to avoid confusion and  ambiguity,  more
       so when there were no disputed facts involved and the issue involved
       was pure question of law. We are,  therefore,  not  called  upon  to
       decide  as  to  whether  the  approach  of  the  Division  Bench  in
       entertaining the writ appeal on merits was erroneous or not.
    9. Reverting to the issue framed above, before we examine the same,  we
       would also like to narrate some more facts for  clear  understanding
       of the issue involved. The appellant- Ch.-cum-Man. Director Mahanadi
       Coalfield Limited (CIL) has framed the Conduct Discipline and Appeal
       Rules, 1978 (hereinafter to be referred as 'CDA Rules').  These  are
       applicable to the employees of the appellant company as well.
   10. Rule 27  of  these  CDA  Rules  mentions  the  authorities  who  are
       empowered to impose  various  punishments  which  are  specified  in
       column III of the Schedule attached to these Rules. Rule 29  enlists
       the procedure  for  imposing  major  penalties  for  misconduct  and
       misbehaviour. The CDA Rules are not statutory  in  nature.  However,
       they govern the employees of the appellant.
   11. When the respondent was served with charge sheet dated 1.10.2007, he
       was posted as Chief General Manager, Rajmahal, Group of Mines,  ECL.
       Shortly, after the service of charge sheet, respondent was  made  to
       join as Chief General Manager, Mining in M-3 Grade on  transfer  and
       was posted as Chief General Manager, Production, MCL.  On  9.2.2008,
       he was suspended from service under Rule 24.1.  of  the  CDA  Rules,
       pending departmental inquiry against him. This suspension,  however,
       was revoked from 27.2.2009 without  prejudice  to  the  departmental
       inquiry. On completion of  60  years  of  age,  the  respondent  was
       superannuated with  effect  from  31.7.2010  for  which  notice  for
       retirement on superannuation was  given  by  the  appellant  to  the
       respondent vide letter dated 8.2.2010.
   12. It would also be pertinent to mention that the inquiry  against  the
       respondent was concluded on 25.3.2009. However,  thereafter  nothing
       has been heard by the respondent. It is not known as to whether  the
       Inquiry Officer has submitted the report on the said inquiry and  if
       a report is submitted whether he has exonerated  the  respondent  or
       held him guilty of the charges. Be as it may even if  there  is  any
       report, no further action has been taken on the said report  by  the
       disciplinary authority till date and more than 4 ½ years have lapsed
       in the meantime.
   13. On the aforesaid facts, the case of the respondent before the courts
       below was that his statutory rights to receive  the  gratuity  could
       not be interdicted and as per the provisions of Payment of  Gratuity
       Act he  was  entitled  to  have  the  payment  of  gratuity  on  his
       superannuation.
Since, the  appellant  had  referred  to  the  Rules
       framed under which gratuity could be withheld pending inquiry,  this
       position was sought  to  be  countered  by  the  respondent  with  a
       submission that such Rules which were non-statutory in nature  could
       not thwart the right of the respondent to claim the  gratuity  which
       was statutorily recognised  in  his  favour  under  the  Payment  of
       Gratuity Act, 1972. 
As noted above, while giving brief narration  of
       facts, the High  Court  has  accepted  the  aforesaid  plea  of  the
       respondent and while doing so it has referred  to  the  judgment  of
       this Court in the case of Jaswant Singh Gill v. Bharat  Coking  Coal
       Ltd. and Ors. (supra). Some of the judgments cited by the  appellant
       before the High Court, which would be referred to at a later  stage,
       have been distinguished by the High Court holding that they are  not
       applicable.
   14. The arguments of the learned Counsel for the  respondent  were  same
       which were  addressed  before  the  High  Court.
Likewise,  learned
       Counsel for the appellant also made the very  same  submissions.  He
       argued that in view of Rule 34 of the CDA Rules, the management  had
       a right to withhold payment of gratuity. He also submitted that this
       rule was not contrary to any provisions of the Payment  of  Gratuity
       Act.
The submission in this behalf was that in Payment  of  Gratuity
       Act there is no provision that gratuity has to be released even when
       departmental proceedings  are  pending  against  an  employee.   
The
       learned Senior Counsel for the appellant placed strong  reliance  on
       the judgment of this Court in  State  Bank  of  India  vs.  Ram  Lal
       Bhaskar and Anr. ; 2011(11)SCALE 589; 2011(10)SCC249.
   15. In so far as rule position is concerned, it is  not  in  doubt  that
       Rule 34 permits the management to withhold the gratuity  during  the
       pendency of the disciplinary proceedings. Rule 34.2 and 34.3 of  the
       CDA Rules are relevant in  this  behalf  which  make  the  following
       reading:


           “34.2 Disciplinary proceeding, if instituted while the  employee
           was in service whether before his retirement or during  his  re-
           employment shall, after the final retirement of the employee, be
           deemed to be proceeding and shall be continued and concluded  by
           the authority by which it was commenced in the same manner as if
           the employee had continued in service.




           34.3  During the pendency of the disciplinary  proceedings,  the
           Disciplinary Authority may withhold  payment  of  gratuity,  for
           ordering the recovering from gratuity of the whole  or  part  of
           any pecuniary loss caused to the company if have been guilty  of
           offences/ misconduct as mentioned in Sub-section (6) of  Section
           4 of the payment  of  gratuity  act,  1972  or  to  have  caused
           pecuniary loss to  the  company  by  misconduct  or  negligence,
           during his service including service rendered on  deputation  or
           on re-employment after retirement. However,  the  provisions  of
           Section 7(3) and 7(3A) of  the  Payment  of  Gratuity  Act  1972
           should be kept in view in the event of delayed  payment  in  the
           case the employee is fully exonerated.”






    16.    The bone of contention is as to
whether this rule is contrary to the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act and, therefore, this rule being non-statutory is to be ignored and the provisions of the Gratuity Act are to be preferred. In this behalf we will  have  to  examine  the
    scheme of the Gratuity Act to find
whether as  per  the  Gratuity  Act,
    such a person like the respondent, would become entitled to receive the
    gratuity under this Act.
    17.    It is because of the reason  that  a  statutory  right  accrued,
    thus, cannot be impaired by reason of a rule which does  not  have  the
    force of statute.
It will bear  repetition  to  state  that  the  Rules
    framed by Respondent No. 1 or its holding company are not statutory  in
    nature.
    18.    It would be of interest to note that the  inter  play  of  these
    very CDA Rules, 1978 of CIL and the Provisions of Gratuity Act came for
    consideration in the case of Jaswant Singh Gill (supra) and this  Court
    explained the legal position  of  CDA  Rules  vis-a-vis  Gratuity  Act/
    gratuity of an employee in the following manner:-


           “The Act was enacted with a view to provide  for  a  scheme  for
           payment of gratuity to employees engaged inter  alia  in  mines.
           Section 3 of the Act provides for appointment of an  officer  to
           be the controlling authority. Controlling  authority  is  to  be
           responsible   for   administration   of   the   act.   Different
           authorities, however, may  be  appointed  for  different  areas.
           Section 4 of the Act entitles an employee to gratuity  after  he
           has rendered continuous service for not  less  than  five  years
           inter alia on his superannuation. Sub- Section (6) of Section  4
           contains a non-obstante clause stating:

               (a)    the gratuity of an employee, whose services have been
               terminated for  any  act,  willful  omission  or  negligence
               causing any damage or loss to, or destruction  of,  property
               belonging to the employer, shall be forfeited to the  extent
               of the damage or loss so caused;

               (b)    the gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly  or
               partially forfeited

                    (i)  if  the  services  of  such  employee   have   been
                    terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or  any
                    other act or violence on his part, or

                    (ii)  if  the  services  of  such  employee  have   been
                    terminated for any  act  which  constitutes  an  offence
                    involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is
                    committed by him in the course of his employment.

           9. The Rules framed by the Coal India Limited are not  statutory
              rules.  They  have  been  made  by  the  holding  company  of
              Respondent No. 1. The provisions of the Act, therefore,  must
              prevail over the Rules. Rule 27 of  the  Rules  provides  for
              recovery from gratuity only to the extent of loss  caused  to
              the company by negligence  or  breach  of  orders  or  trust.
              Penalties, however, must  be  imposed  so  long  an  employee
              remains in service. Even if  a  disciplinary  proceeding  was
              initiated  prior   to   the   attaining   of   the   age   of
              superannuation, in  the  event,  the  employee  retires  from
              service, the question of imposing a major penalty by  removal
              or dismissal from service would not arise. Rule 34.2 no doubt
              provides  for  continuation  of  a  disciplinary   proceeding
              despite retirement of employee  if  the  same  was  initiated
              before his retirement  but  the  same  would  not  mean  that
              although he was permitted to retire and his services had  not
              been extended for the said purpose, a major penalty in  terms
              of  Rule  27  can  be  imposed.  Power  to  withhold  penalty
              contained in Rule 34.3 of the Rules must be  subject  to  the
              provisions of the Act. Gratuity becomes payable  as  soon  as
              the  employee  retires.  The  only  condition  therefore   is
              rendition of five years continuous service. A statutory right
              accrued, thus, cannot be impaired by reason of a  rule  which
              does not have the force of a statute. It will bear repetition
              to state that the Rules framed by Respondent  No.  1  or  its
              holding company are not statutory in nature. The Rules in any
              event do not provide for withholding of retrial  benefits  or
              gratuity.




          10. The Act provides for a  closely  neat  scheme  providing  for
              payment  of  gratuity.  It  is  a  complete  code  containing
              detailed provisions covering the essential  provisions  of  a
              scheme for a gratuity. It not only creates a right to payment
              of  gratuity  but  also  lays   down   the   principles   for
              quantification thereof as also the conditions on which he may
              be denied therefrom. As noticed hereinbefore, Sub-section (6)
              of Section 4 of the Act contains a non- obstante clause  vis.
              Sub-section (1) thereof. As by reason thereof, an accrued  or
              vested right is sought to be taken away, the conditions  laid
              down thereunder must be fulfilled. The  provisions  contained
              therein must, therefore, be scrupulously observed. Clause (a)
              of Sub-section  (6)  of  Section  4  of  the  Act  speaks  of
              termination of service of an employee for  any  act,  willful
              omission or  negligence  causing  any  damage.  However,  the
              amount liable to be forfeited would be only to the extent  of
              damage or loss caused. The  disciplinary  authority  has  not
              quantified the loss or damage. It  was  not  found  that  the
              damages or loss caused to Respondent No. 1 was more than  the
              amount of gratuity payable to the appellant.  Clause  (b)  of
              Sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the  Act  also  provides  for
              forfeiture of the whole amount of gratuity  or  part  in  the
              event his services had been terminated  for  his  riotous  or
              disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on  his  part
              or if he has been convicted for an  offence  involving  moral
              turpitude.  Conditions  laid  down  therein  are   also   not
              satisfied. Termination of services  for  any  of  the  causes
              enumerated in Sub-section  (6)  of  Section  4  of  the  Act,
              therefore, is imperative.”













    19.    The principles which are laid down in the aforesaid judgment are
    recapitulated below:-
           (i)        No  doubt,  Rule  34.2  of  CDA  Rules  provides  for
                continuation of disciplinary proceedings despite  retirement
                of  an  employee  if  the  same  was  initiated  before  his
                retirement However, after his retirement, major  penalty  in
                terms of Rule 27 cannot be imposed. We may state  here  that
                rule 27 of CDA Rules provides for the  nature  of  penalties
                including 'recovery from pay or gratuity of the  whole  part
                of any back loss cause  to  the  company  by  negligence  or
                breach of orders  for  trust'.  Major  penalties  which  are
                prescribed under Rule 27 are reduction  to  a  lower  grade,
                compulsory retirement, removal from service  and  dismissal.
                The Court thus, held that these major  penalties  cannot  be
                imposed upon a retired employee.


           (ii)  Gratuity  Act  gives  right  to  an  employee  to  receive
                gratuity  on  rendition  of  5  years  continuous   service.
                Gratuity become payable as soon  as  the  employee  retires.
                This statutory right which accrues to an employee cannot  be
                impaired by reason of a rule which does not have  the  force
                of a statute. Therefore, Rule 34.3 of the CDA  Rules,  which
                is non-statutory in nature, is contrary to the provisions of
                the Gratuity Act. As such, gratuity cannot  be  withheld  on
                the  retirement  of  an  employee   even   if   departmental
                proceedings were initiated against him before his retirement
                and are pending at the time of retirement.




    20.    Jaswant Singh Gill (supra) was a judgment delivered by two judge
    Bench. 
Mr. Mahavir Singh, learned  senior  counsel  has  placed  strong
    reliance to a three Bench judgment of this  Court  which  is  later  in
    point of time. 
This case is known as State Bank of India  vs.  Ram  lal
    Bhaskar and Anr. 2011(10)SCC249.
In that case, Rule 19(3) of the  State
    Bank of India Officers Service Rules, 1992 came up  for  interpretation
    which was para materia with rule 13.42 of  the  CDA  Rules.  
Said  rule
    19(3)  of  SBI  Officers  Service  Rules  also   permits   disciplinary
    proceedings to continue even after the retirement  of  an  employee  if
    those were instituted when the delinquent employee was in service. 
Then
    for the purpose of such proceedings the otherwise retired  employee  is
    deemed to be in service and those proceedings shall  be  continued  and
    concluded as if the employee had continued in service.  
Thus,  such  an
    employee is deemed to be in service for limited and  specified  purpose
    only viz. for  the  purposes  of  continuance  and  conclusion  of  the
    proceedings. 
In that case, charge sheet was served upon the  respondent
    before his retirement. 
The proceedings continued after  his  retirement
    and were conducted in accordance with relevant  rules  wherein  charges
    were proved. 
On that basis punishment of dismissal was  imposed. 
 After
    exhausting the departmental remedies, the  respondent  filed  the  writ
    petition in the High Court which was allowed and order of dismissal was
    quashed. 
This Court reversed the  said  decision  of  the  High  Court.
    
However, we find that there is  no  direct  discussion,   in  the  said
    judgment, on the issue   as  to  whether  it  is  permissible  for  the
    disciplinary authority to impose the penalty of  dismissal  of  service
    after the retirement of the employee.  
In fact  the  Court  had  dealt
    with two aspects.
One question which was deliberated was as to
whether
    inquiry could continue after the  retirement  of  the  respondent  from
    service. 
This question was answered in the affirmative having regard to
    Rule 19(3) of the SBI Officers Service Rules.
The  Court  distinguished
    another  judgment  in  UCO  Bank  &  Anr.  vs.  Rajinder  Lal   Capoor;
    2007(6)SCC694 on a ground that in the said case the delinquent  officer
    had already been superannuated and the charge sheet  was  served  after
    his retirement.  
In these circumstances the court had taken the view in
    Rajinder Lal  Capoor’s  case  that  when  an  employee  is  allowed  to
    superannuate, no inquiry  can  be  initiated  against  him  thereafter.
    However, if charge sheet is served before the  retirement  enquiry  can
    continue even after the retirement as per Rule 19(3).  
This proposition
    thus stands settled viz. if  the Rules  permit,  enquiry  can  continue
    even after the retirement of the employee.
    21.    Other  aspect which was dealt with was as to  whether  the  High
    Court could interdict the findings of disciplinary authority and arrive
    at its conclusion that the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer was
    not substantiated by any officer on record on  the  basis  of  evidence
    produced.   This  Court  held  that  so  long  the  findings   of   the
    disciplinary authority are supported by some evidence, the  High  Court
    is not empowered  to  re-appreciate  the    evidence  as  an  appellate
    authority and came to a different and independent findings on the basis
    of that evidence. This is not the issue before us in the instant case.
    22.    It is thus, clear that the question as  to  whether  penalty  of
    dismissal could be imposed after a  retirement  was  not  categorically
    raised or dealt with. No doubt, penalty of dismissal was inflicted upon
    the employee in that case.  But it was not  specifically  on  in  clear
    terms contended that such a penalty could not be imposed on an employee
    who is already permitted to retire. At the  same  time,  innuendo,  the
    judgment gives a  semblance  of  indication  that  such  a  penalty  is
    permissible because of the reason  that  as  per  the  rules,  for  the
    purposes of enquiry, the employee shall be deemed to be in service.  As
    a sequittor, one can deduce the  principle  that  when  the  Rules,  by
    creating fiction, treat the officer still in service,  albeit  for  the
    limited purpose of the continuance and conclusion of such  proceedings,
    then any of the prescribed  penalties,  including  dismissal,   can  be
    imposed.  However,  as  we  have  pointed  out  above,  the  issue   of
    permissibility of penalty of dismissal on such a retired  official  was
    neither raised nor any direct discussion followed  thereupon.   At  the
    same time, fact remains that  penalty  of  dismissal,  even  after  the
    retirement, was upheld.  This goes contrary to the dicta laid  down  in
    Jaswant Singh Gill (supra) which took the view that no major penalty is
    permissible after retirement was not even referred to.
    23.    The issue which confronts us in the  instant  appeal  is  as  to
    whether gratuity can be withheld in the wake of Rule 34  of  CDA  Rules when examined in juxtaposition with the provisions of the Gratuity Act.
    To put it otherwise, whether in the scheme of  Gratuity  Act,  gratuity
    has to be  necessarily  released  to  the  concerned  employee  on  his
    retirement even if departmental proceedings are  pending  against  him.
    We find that Jaswant Singh Gill's case directly answers this  question,
    that too in the context of these very CDA Rules. However, it is because
    of the reason that the said judgment proceeds on the basis  that  after
    the retirement of an employee, penalty of dismissal cannot  be  imposed
    upon the retired  employee.  If  this  view  is  not  correct  and  the
    imposition of penalty of dismissal is still permissible, employer  will
    get the right to forfeit the  gratuity  of  such  an  employee  in  the
    eventualities provided under Sections 4(1)  & 4 (6) of the  Payment  of
    Gratuity Act which reads as under:-


            Section 4 - Payment of gratuity
   

        (1)       Gratuity  shall  be  payable  to  an  employee   on   the
        termination of his employment  after  he  has  rendered  continuous
        service for not less than five years,--

        (a) on his superannuation, or
        (b) on his retirement or resignation, or
        (c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease:

           Provided that the completion of continuous service of five years
        shall not be necessary where the termination of the  employment  of
        any employee is due to death or disablement:


           Provided further that in the case  of  death  of  the  employee,
        gratuity payable to hi m shall be paid to his  nominee  or,  if  no
        nomination has been made, to his heirs, and where any such nominees
        or heirs is a minor, the share of such minor,  shall  be  deposited
        with the controlling authority who shall invest the  same  for  the
        benefit of such minor in such bank or other financial  institution,
        as may be prescribed, until such minor attains majority.]


        Explanation.--For the purposes of this section,  disablement  means
        such disablement as incapacitates an employee for the work which he
        was capable of performing before the accident or disease  resulting
        in such disablement.


           xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx


        (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),--


        (a)  the  gratuity  of  an  employee,  whose  services  have   been
        terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence  causing  any
        damage or loss to, or destruction of,  property  belonging  to  the
        employer' shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss so
        caused;


        (b) the gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly or  partially
        forfeited]--


        (i)      if the services of such employee have been terminated for
        his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on
        his part, or


          (ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any
        act  which  constitutes  an  offence  involving  moral   turpitude,
        provided that such offence is committed by hi m in  the  course  of
        his employment.






    24.    Thus for invoking Clause (a) or (b) of sub-section 6 of  Section
    4 necessary pre-condition is the termination of service on the basis of
    departmental enquiry or conviction in a criminal case.  This  provision
    would not get  triggered  if  there  is  no  termination  of  services.




    25.    It is the case of the appellant that in the charge sheet  served
    upon the respondent herein,  there  are  very  serious  allegations  of
    misconduct alleging dishonestly causing coal stock  shortage  amounting
    to Rs. 31.65 crores,  and  thereby  causing  substantial  loss  to  the
    employer.
 If such a charge is proved and  punishment  of  dismissal  is
    given thereupon, the provisions of  Section  4(6)  of  the  Payment  of
    Gratuity would naturally get attracted  and  it  would  be  within  the
    discretion of the appellant to forfeit  the  gratuity  payable  to  the
    respondent. 
As a corollary one can safely say  that  the  employer  has
    right to withhold the gratuity pending departmental  inquiry.  
However,
    as explained  above,  this  course  of  action  is  available  only  if
    disciplinary authority has necessary powers to impose  the  penalty  of
    dismissal upon the respondent even after his retirement. 
Having  regard
    to our discussion above of Jaswant  Singh  Gill  (supra)  and  Ram  Lal
    Bhaskar (supra), this issue needs to be considered authoritatively by a
    larger Bench. 
We, therefore, are of the opinion that present appeal  be
    decided by a Bench of three Judges.


    26.    We accordingly direct the Registry to place  the  matter  before
    Hon'ble the Chief Justice for constituting a larger Bench to hear  this
    appeal.





                                  ….......................................J.
                                                        [K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN]






                                 …........................................J.
                                                                [A.K. SIKRI]




    New Delhi
    October  29 , 2013




Or.22, rule 10 of C.P.C - In a suit by partnership firm of two partners , when one partner dies pending suit, the suit can be continued by another partner M/s AVK Traders ... Appellant Versus Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited … Respondent = Reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40915

Or.22, rule 10 - In a suit by partnership firm of two partners , when one partner dies pending suit, the suit can be continued by another partner despite of non-joining of uninterested legal heirs of deceased partner as the entire interest devolves on the surviving partner as per rule 10 of Or. 22 of C.P.C. =

Whether on  dissolution  of  the
partnership firm on the death of the partner, could the suit already  filed be proceeded with by the  remaining  so-called partner.   =
under the Partnership Deed dated 4.11.2002 contained the following clause :-

      “In the event of  retirement  of  partner  or  refusal  of  the  legal
      representative of the deceased partner to become the  partner  of  the
      partnership as on the expiry of the period given  to  them  to  become
      partners or on the expiry of  the  period  given  to  them  to  become
      partner, the other partner shall have the power to purchase his  share
      by giving notice to retired partner or the legal representative of the
      deceased partner in writing  to  that  effect  within  three  calendar
      months or receipt of the notice by the retained partner or  the  legal
      representative of the deceased partner.  If the surviving partner fail
      to purchase the share of the partnership or the  legal  representative
      fail to express their interest within the said period, the partnership
      shall dissolve as on the expiry of three months mentioned earlier……”

During the pendency of the suit on 2.2.2009, the father  of  the  Appellant,
who was a partner, expired.  The Appellant and  his  sister  were  the  only
legal representatives of the deceased father.  On the death of  the  father,
the partnership stood dissolved w.e.f. 24.5.2009 since the  sister  was  not
interested in becoming a partner of the firm.

3.     In  view  of  the  above-mentioned  clause,  though  the  firm  stood
dissolved on 24.5.2009,  the  sole  surviving  partner  could  continue  the
business of the firm  as  a  proprietary  concern.   Consequently,  all  the
interests of the firm stood devolved upon the Appellant and  he  filed  I.A.
No.817 of 2002 in O.S. No.39 of 2008 for leave to continue to prosecute  the
suit for and on behalf of M/s AVK Traders  as  a  proprietary  concern.  The
Appellant also preferred I.A. No.814 of 2012 seeking necessary amendment  of
the plaint.  Appellant also filed I.A. No.815  of  2012  under  Order  XXIII
Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC praying for recalling and  examining  PW1.
The Subordinate Court by a common  order  dated  8.2.2012  allowed  all  the
aforementioned applications preferred by the Appellant.  
a  registered
partnership firm, consisting of only two partners, filing a suit when  both
the partners were alive and 
during the pendency of the  suit,  one  of  the partners died and 
legal heir of the  deceased  partner  did  not  show  any
interest either in the assets of the firm or in  the  liabilities  and  had
refused to join as a partner.  
The  question  is,  on  dissolution  of  the
partnership firm on the death of the partner, could the suit already  filed be proceeded with by the  remaining  so-called partner.   
We  notice,  the
Subordinate Court has allowed that prayer  possibly  bearing  in  mind  the
principle laid down in Order  XXII  Rule  10  CPC,  which  deals  with  the
procedure in case of assignment before the final order of the  suit.   
Rule
10 refers to “devolution of any interest” during the pendency of the  suit.
In such a case, the Court can grant leave to prosecute the suit against the
person to or upon whom such interest has been  devolved.   
Admittedly,  the
partner who died is none other than the father of  the  Appellant  and  the
other sole  surviving  heir  is  his  sister.   
Sister  is  admittedly  not
interested in joining the firm and, therefore, she is not taking  over  the
assets and liabilities of the firm.  
Therefore, there has been  a  complete
devolution  of  interest  in  favour   of   the   Appellant.    
Under   the
circumstances,  the  Subordinate  Court  had  allowed  the  amendment   and
permitted the Appellant  to  proceed  with  the  suit,  granting  necessary
amendment, which, according to the Subordinate Court, was necessary  for  a
proper and effective adjudication of real dispute between the parties.  
The
High Court, in our view, by taking a hypertechnical approach held  that  if
such a prayer is allowed, the same would alter the nature and character  of
the suit.  
In our view, such a stand cannot be countenanced considering the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

10.   We are of the view that the legal consequences  pointed  out  by  the
High Court might apply in a case 
where one of the several partners dies  in
the suit instituted in the name of the partnership firm as compared to when
one of the two partners of the partnership dies.   
Further, the High  Court
failed to notice that if the partnership firm succeeds  in  the  suit,  the
decree so granted would not be executable, and hence a  nullity.  
 In  such
circumstances, we are inclined to allow this appeal and set aside the order
of the High Court interfering with  the  order  of  the  Subordinate  Court
allowing the application for amendment and permission to prosecute the suit
as prayed for.  Ordered accordingly.

                                                            REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       Civil Appeal No.  9697 of 2013
                  (Arising out of SLP (C) No.20563 of 2012)


M/s AVK Traders                         ... Appellant

           Versus

Kerala State Civil Supplies
Corporation Limited                          … Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T

K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    OS No.39 of 2008 was a suit preferred on 1.1.2008 by M/s AVK  Traders,
a partnership firm, for realization of an amount of  Rs.53,39,648/-  against
the Respondent Corporation for claims with regard to various  supplies  made
to the Corporation during the year 2004-06.   
Respondent  Corporation  filed
its written statement on 26.5.2008 denying the claim.  M/s AVK  Traders  was
a partnership firm with only two partners, the  Appellant  and  his  father.
The partnership was later  re-constituted.
The  re-constituted  partnership
under the Partnership Deed dated 4.11.2002 contained the following clause :-

      “In the event of  retirement  of  partner  or  refusal  of  the  legal
      representative of the deceased partner to become the  partner  of  the
      partnership as on the expiry of the period given  to  them  to  become
      partners or on the expiry of  the  period  given  to  them  to  become
      partner, the other partner shall have the power to purchase his  share
      by giving notice to retired partner or the legal representative of the
      deceased partner in writing  to  that  effect  within  three  calendar
      months or receipt of the notice by the retained partner or  the  legal
      representative of the deceased partner.  If the surviving partner fail
      to purchase the share of the partnership or the  legal  representative
      fail to express their interest within the said period, the partnership
      shall dissolve as on the expiry of three months mentioned earlier……”

During the pendency of the suit on 2.2.2009, the father  of  the  Appellant,
who was a partner, expired.  The Appellant and  his  sister  were  the  only
legal representatives of the deceased father.  On the death of  the  father,
the partnership stood dissolved w.e.f. 24.5.2009 since the  sister  was  not
interested in becoming a partner of the firm.

3.     In  view  of  the  above-mentioned  clause,  though  the  firm  stood
dissolved on 24.5.2009,  the  sole  surviving  partner  could  continue  the
business of the firm  as  a  proprietary  concern.   Consequently,  all  the
interests of the firm stood devolved upon the Appellant and  he  filed  I.A.
No.817 of 2002 in O.S. No.39 of 2008 for leave to continue to prosecute  the
suit for and on behalf of M/s AVK Traders  as  a  proprietary  concern.  The
Appellant also preferred I.A. No.814 of 2012 seeking necessary amendment  of
the plaint.  Appellant also filed I.A. No.815  of  2012  under  Order  XXIII
Rule 17 read with Section 151 CPC praying for recalling and  examining  PW1.
The Subordinate Court by a common  order  dated  8.2.2012  allowed  all  the
aforementioned applications preferred by the Appellant.
With regard to  the
prayer for continuing the suit, the Subordinate Court held as follows :-
      “In the instant case, out of two partners in the plaintiff  firm,  one
      partner died  during  the  pendency  of  the  suit  and  as  such  the
      partnership got dissolved.  Therefore, I hold that the  other  partner
      viz. the 2nd petitioner is entitled  to  continue  the  suit.   Hence,
      necessary amendment is also required to the plaint. Therefore,  for  a
      proper and effective adjudication of  the  real  dispute  between  the
      parties the proposed amendment is also liable to be allowed……”

4.    The Respondent Corporation preferred I.A. No.809 of 2012  under  Order
XIV Rule 5 CPC seeking framing of additional issues.  The Subordinate  Court
vide order dated 8.2.2012  dismissed  I.A.  No.809  of  2012  filed  by  the
Respondent Corporation.

5.    Aggrieved by the above-mentioned orders,  the  Respondent  Corporation
preferred Original Petition (Civil) No.631 of 2012 before the High Court  of
Kerala seeking the following reliefs :-


      “(a)  To call for the records leading to Ext.P11, P11(a), P11(b) & P12
           and set aside the same.
      (b)   To declare that the  respondent/plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to
           continue the suit as a Proprietary concern.
      (c)   To direct the Court below to frame additional issues  as  prayed
           for in Ext.P-4.
      (d)   To issue any  other  appropriate  order  or  direction  as  this
           Hon’ble  Court  may  deem  fit  and  proper  in  the  facts  and
           circumstances of the case.”

The High Court did not allow the prayer for amendment of the  plaint  moved
by the surviving partner and held as follows :-
      “When the above be the settled position of law,  the  application  for
      amendment moved by the surviving partner to alter the cause  title  to
      convert the suit as one by the proprietary concern  with  him  as  its
      ‘proprietor’, which was instituted in the name  of  a  firm,  for  the
      reason  of  the  death  of  the  Managing  Partner   and   also   non-
      interestedness of the legal heirs of that partner to come  on  record,
      has no basis or merit at all, as the death of the Managing Partner  in
      no way affects the continuance of the suit  instituted  in  the  ‘firm
      name’, in view of the protection afforded under Order XXX  Rule  4  of
      the Code.”


6.    The High Court also took the  view  that  there  is  no  question  of
altering and amending the plaintiff firm as a proprietary concern  as  that
would alter  the  nature  and  character  of  the  suit,  which  cannot  be
permitted.  Further, it was also held by the Court that no further dilation
over that aspect is called for in the case other than pointing out that the
indefeasible rights of the legal heirs of a  deceased  partner  in  a  suit
filed by a firm are insulated under sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order XXX  of
the Code.   The High Court, however, did not interfere with  the  order  of
the Subordinate Court  allowing  the  application  for  recalling  PW1  for
further  examination.   With  regard  to  the  prayers  of  the  Respondent
Corporation for raising additional issues, the High  Court  took  the  view
that the same should have been allowed.  Consequently, the prayer  made  by
the Respondent Corporation  for  framing  additional  issues  was  allowed.
Aggrieved by the above-mentioned order, this appeal has been  preferred  by
the Appellant.

7.    Learned counsel appearing for the Appellant  submitted  that  on  the
death of one of the partners of a partnership firm consisting of  only  two
partners, remaining partner has become the sole proprietor/owner  with  all
assets and liabilities and as such he can always proceed with the  suit  as
per the provisions contained under Order XXII Rule 10 CPC.  Learned counsel
also submitted that the reasoning of the High Court, if at all apply, could
apply in a case where there are more than one partners after the death of a
partner, in the event of which the firm could continue with minimum of  two
partners.   In  such  a  situation,  learned  counsel  suggested  that  the
provision of sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of Order XXX of the Code  would  apply.
Learned  counsel  placed  reliance  on  the  judgment  of  this  Court   in
Purushottam  Umedbhai  &  Co.  v.  Manilal  &  Sons  [AIR  1961  SC   325],
particularly para 9 of the said judgment in  support  of  this  contention.
Learned counsel also made reference to the judgment of this Court in CIT v.
Seth Govindram Sugar Mills [AIR 1966 SC 24].

8.    Learned counsel appearing for  the  Respondent  Corporation,  on  the
other hand, submitted that if the Appellant is allowed to continue the suit
in the name of the firm, all the defence set up by  the  defendant  in  the
written statement would be frustrated.    Learned  counsel  also  submitted
that if the amendment sought for is  allowed,  that  will  alter  the  very
nature and character of the suit  and  that  the  High  Court  has  rightly
rejected that prayer which calls for no interference by this Court.

9.    We  are  in  this  case  faced  with  a  situation  of
 a  registered
partnership firm, consisting of only two partners, filing a suit when  both
the partners were alive and 
during the pendency of the  suit,  one  of  the partners died and 
legal heir of the  deceased  partner  did  not  show  any
interest either in the assets of the firm or in  the  liabilities  and  had
refused to join as a partner.  
The  question  is,  on  dissolution  of  the
partnership firm on the death of the partner, could the suit already  filed be proceeded with by the  remaining  so-called partner. 
We  notice,  the
Subordinate Court has allowed that prayer  possibly  bearing  in  mind  the
principle laid down in Order  XXII  Rule  10  CPC,  which  deals  with  the
procedure in case of assignment before the final order of the  suit.   
Rule
10 refers to “devolution of any interest” during the pendency of the  suit.
In such a case, the Court can grant leave to prosecute the suit against the
person to or upon whom such interest has been  devolved.   
Admittedly,  the
partner who died is none other than the father of  the  Appellant  and  the
other sole  surviving  heir  is  his  sister.   
Sister  is  admittedly  not
interested in joining the firm and, therefore, she is not taking  over  the
assets and liabilities of the firm.  
Therefore, there has been  a  complete
devolution  of  interest  in  favour   of   the   Appellant.    
Under   the
circumstances,  the  Subordinate  Court  had  allowed  the  amendment   and
permitted the Appellant  to  proceed  with  the  suit,  granting  necessary
amendment, which, according to the Subordinate Court, was necessary  for  a
proper and effective adjudication of real dispute between the parties.  
The
High Court, in our view, by taking a hypertechnical approach held  that  if
such a prayer is allowed, the same would alter the nature and character  of
the suit.  
In our view, such a stand cannot be countenanced considering the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

10.   We are of the view that the legal consequences  pointed  out  by  the
High Court might apply in a case 
where one of the several partners dies  in
the suit instituted in the name of the partnership firm as compared to when
one of the two partners of the partnership dies.   
Further, the High  Court
failed to notice that if the partnership firm succeeds  in  the  suit,  the
decree so granted would not be executable, and hence a  nullity.  
 In  such
circumstances, we are inclined to allow this appeal and set aside the order
of the High Court interfering with  the  order  of  the  Subordinate  Court
allowing the application for amendment and permission to prosecute the suit
as prayed for.  Ordered accordingly.



                                                            ……..……………………..J.
                                             (K.S. Radhakrishnan)



                                                               ……………………………J.
                                           (A.K. Sikri)
New Delhi,
October 29, 2013

Sec.163 - A , sec. 140 of M.V. Act - due to conflicte judgment over scope of sec. 163 -A in United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shila Datta and others [(2011) 10 SCC 509], and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi [(2002) 7 SCC 456]. , it was referred to larger bench = United India Insurance Company Ltd. ... Appellant Versus Sunil Kumar & Anr. … Respondents - Reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40914

Sec.163 - A , sec. 140 of M.V. Act - due to conflicte judgment over scope of sec. 163 -A in United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shila Datta  and  others  [(2011)  10 SCC 509],  and National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi  [(2002)  7  SCC  456]. , it was referred to larger bench   = 

We are, therefore, of the view that  
liability  to  make  compensation
under Section 163-A is on the principle of  no  fault  and,  
therefore,  the question as to who is at fault is  immaterial  and  foreign  to  an  enquiry
under Section 163-A.   
Section  163-A  does  not  make  any  provision  for apportionment of the  liability.  
If  the  owner  of  the  vehicle  or  the
insurance company is permitted to prove contributory negligence  or  default
or wrongful act on the part of the victim or claimant,  naturally  it  would
defeat  the  very  object  and  purpose  of  Section  163-A  of   the   Act.
Legislature never wanted the claimant to plead or  establish negligence  on the part of the owner or the driver.  
Once it is established that  death  or
permanent disablement occurred during the course of the user of the
vehicle and the vehicle is insured, the insurance company or the owner, as the  case may be, shall be liable to  pay  the 
compensation,  which  is  a  statutory obligation.

9.    We, therefore, find ourselves unable to agree with  the  reasoning  of the Two-Judge Bench in Sinitha’s case (supra) Consequently, the matter  is placed before the learned Chief Justice of India for  referring  the  matter to a larger Bench for a correct interpretation of the scope of Section  163- A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as well as the  points  no.(iii)  to  (v) referred to in Shila Datta’s case (supra)


                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        Civil Appeal No. 9694 of 2013
              (@Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.7586 of 2012)


United India Insurance Company Ltd.          ... Appellant

                                   Versus

Sunil Kumar & Anr.                                  … Respondents



                               REFERENCE ORDER


K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    Heard learned counsel for the parties.  Learned counsel appearing  for
the Respondent submitted that 
in view of  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in
United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shila Datta  and  others  [(2011)  10 SCC 509],  this  matter  will  have  to  be  referred  to  a  larger  Bench,
especially with regard to points no.(iii) to (v) referred to in  the  above-
mentioned judgment, which are in conflict with the judgment  of  this  Court
in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi  [(2002)  7  SCC  456].
The impugned order, we notice, is  based  on  the  principle  laid  down  in
Nicolletta Rohtagi’s case (supra), the correctness of which  is  doubted  in
Shila Datta’s case (supra).
In the present case,  the  claim  petition  was
filed by the Respondent under Section  163-A  of  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act,
1988, claiming compensation for the  injury  sustained  by  him  in  a  road
accident occurred on 20.11.2006.  
The Tribunal after recording the  evidence
and after hearing the parties, vide its  order  dated  16.8.2011  passed  an
award for a sum of Rs.3,50,000/- along with interest at the rate of  7%  per
annum from the  date  of  the  filing  of  the  petition  till  realization.
Aggrieved by the same, the Insurance Company  filed  an  appeal  before  the
High Court of Delhi.
The High Court placing reliance  on  the  judgment  in
Nicolletta Rohtagi’s case (supra) dismissed the appeal since  the  Insurance
Company failed to comply with Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act and  the
Insurance Company has come up with this appeal.   
Learned  counsel  for  the
Respondent contended that the question
whether  permission  is  required  or
not under Section 170 stands referred to a larger Bench.

3.    We have yet another issue to be examined.  As already  indicated  that
in the instant case,
claim petition was filed under  Section  163-A  of  the
Motor Vehicles Act, which was resisted by the Insurance  Company  contending
that the same is not maintainable since the injured himself was driving  the
vehicle and that no disability certificate was produced.
A Two-Judge  Bench
of this Court in National Insurance Company Limited v.  Sinitha  and  others
[(2012) 2 SCC 356]  examined  the  scope  of  Section  163-A  of  the  Motor
Vehicles Act and took the view that  Section  163-A  of  the  Act  has  been
founded under “fault liability principle”.
Referring  to  another  judgment
of a  co-equal Bench in  Oriental  Insurance  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Hansrajbhai  V.
Kodala [(2001) 5 SCC 175], the learned  Judges  took  the  view  that  while
determining
whether Section  163-A  of  the  Motor  Vehicles  Act,  1988  is
governed by the fault or the no-fault liability principle,  Sections  140(3)
and (4) are relevant.  
The Bench noticed under Section  140(3),  the  burden
of pleading and  establishing  whether  or  not  wrongful  act,  neglect  or
default was committed by the person (for or on  whose  behalf)  compensation
is claimed under Section 140,  would  not  rest  on  the  shoulders  of  the
claimant.  
The Court also noticed that Section 140(4) of the Motor  Vehicles
Act further reveals that a claim for compensation under Section 140  of  the
Act cannot be defeated because of any of the fault  grounds  (wrongful  act,
neglect or default).

4.    The Division Bench in Sinitha’s case (supra), then took the view  that
under Section 140 of the Act so also under Section 163-A of the Act,  
it  is not essential for a claimant seeking  compensation  to plead  or  establish
that the accident out of which the claim arises suffers  from wrongful  act or neglect or default of the offending vehicle.  The  Bench  then  expressed
the view that  the  legislature  designedly  included  the  negative  clause
through Section 140(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act,  but  consciously  omitted
the same in the scheme  of  Section  163-A  of  the  Act  intentionally  and
purposefully.
The Court also concluded, on a conjoint  reading  of  Sections
140 and 163-A, the legislative intent is clear, namely,  that  a  claim  for
compensation raised under Section 163-A of the Act  need  not  be  based  on
pleadings or proof  at  the  hands  of  the  claimants  showing  absence  of
wrongful act, being neglect or default, but the Bench concluded that  it  is
not sufficient to determine whether the  provision  falls  under  the  fault
liability principle. 
 The Court held that to decide  whether  the  provision
is governed by the  fault  liability  principle,  the  converse  has  to  be
established i.e. whether a claim raised thereunder can be  defeated  by  the
party concerned (the  owner  or  the  insurance  company)  by  pleading  and
proving wrongful act, neglect or default.
Interpreting  Section  163-A  of
the Act, the Judges in Sinitha’s case (supra) held that it is  open  to  the
owner or the insurance company, as the case may be, to defeat a claim  under
Section 163-A of  the  Act  by  pleading  and  establishing  through  cogent
evidence a fault ground (wrongful act or neglect or  default).    The  Court
concluded that Section 163 of the Act is founded under the  fault  liability
principle.

5.    We find difficult to accept the reasoning expressed by  the  Two-Judge
Bench in Sinitha’s case (supra).
In our view, the principle  laid  down  in
Hansrajbhai V. Kodala’s case (supra) has not been  properly  appreciated  or
applied by the Bench.  In fact, another Division Bench of  this  Court  vide
its order dated 19.4.2002 had doubted the correctness  of  the  judgment  in
Hansrajbhai V. Kodala’s case (supra) and referred the  matter  to  a  Three-
Judge Bench to examine  the  question  whether  claimant  could  pursue  the
remedies simultaneously under Sections 166 and 163-A of the Act.
The Three-
Judge Bench of this Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni & Ors. v.  United  India
Insurance Co. Ltd., Baroda [(2004) 5 SCC 385] made a  detailed  analysis  of
the scope of Sections 166 and 163-A and held that 
the remedy for payment  of
compensation both under Sections 163-A and 166 being final  and  independent
of each other,  as  statutorily  provided,  a  claimant  cannot  pursue  his
remedies thereunder simultaneously. 
The Court also extensively examined  the
scope of Section 163-A and held that Section 163-A  was  introduced  in  the
Act by way of a social security scheme and is a Code by itself.   
The  Court
also held that Section 140 of the Act deals with  interim  compensation  but
by inserting Section 163-A, the Parliament intended to  provide  for  making
of an award consisting of a pre-determined sum without insisting on a  long-
drawn trial or without proof of negligence in  causing  the  accident.   
The
Court noticed that Section 163-A was inserted making a  deviation  from  the
common law liability under the Law of Torts and also in  derogation  of  the
provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act.   
The  Three-Judge  Bench  also  held
that Section 163-A  has  an  overriding  effect  and  provides  for  special
provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis.   
Sub-
section (1) of Section  163-A  contains  a  non-obstante  clause,  in  terms
whereof the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorized insurer  is  liable
to pay, in the case of  death  or  permanent  disablement  due  to  accident
arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated  in  the
Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may  be.  
The
Court also held that the scheme of  the  provisions  of  Section  163-A  and
Section 166 are distinct and separate  in  nature.  
In  Section  163-A,  the
expression "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in  any  other
law for the time being in force" has been used, which goes to show that  the
Parliament intended to insert a non-obstante clause  of  wide  nature  which
would mean that the provisions of Section  163-A  would  apply  despite  the
contrary provisions existing in the said Act or any other law for  the  time
being  in  force.   
Section  163-A  of  the  Act  covers  cases  where  even
negligence is on the part of the victim. It is by way  of  an  exception  to
Section 166 and the concept of social justice has been duly taken  care  of.
The above-mentioned Three-Judge Bench judgment was  not  placed  before  the
learned Judges who decided the Sinitha’s case (supra).

6.    We find, both Sections 140 and 163-A deal with the case of  death  and
permanent disablement.
The  expression  “permanent  disablement”  has  been
defined under Section 142, so far as Section 140 is concerned.
So  far  as
Section 163-A is concerned,  the  expression  "permanent  disability"  shall
have the same meaning and extent  as  in  the  Workmen's  Compensation  Act,
1923. 
Both Sections 140 and 163-A deal with cases of no fault liability. 
 In
order to prefer a claim under Section 140(2), claimant  need  not  plead  or
establish that death or permanent disablement, in  respect  of  which  claim
has been made, was due to any  wrongful  act,  neglect  or  default  of  the
deceased or the  disabled  person.  Similarly,  under  Section  163-A  also,
claimant shall  not  be  required  to  plead  or  establish  that  death  or
permanent disablement, in respect of which claim has been made, was  due  to
any wrongful act, neglect or default of the deceased or the injured, as  the
case may be. In other words, an enquiry as to who is at fault is foreign  to
the determination of a claim under Section 140 as  well  as  Section  163-A.

Claim under Section 140 as well as Section 163-A shall not  be  defeated  by
the Insurance Company or the owner of the vehicle, as the case  may  be,  by
reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in  respect  of
whose death or permanent disablement claim has been  made.    
So  also,  the
quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such  death  or  permanent
disablement be reduced  on  the  basis  of  share  of  such  person  in  the
responsibility for his death or permanent disablement.


7.    We find, in Sinitha’s case (supra), one of the factors  which  weighed
with the learned Judges was the absence of a  similar  provision  like  sub-
section (4) of Section 140 in Section 163-A which, according to the  learned
Judges, has been intentionally and purposefully  done  by  the  legislature.
We find it difficult to accept that view.
We are of the view that  if  such
an interpretation is given, the very purpose and  object  of  Section  163-A
would be defeated and render the  provision  otiose  and  a  claimant  would
prefer to make a claim under Section 140, rather than  under  Section  163-A
of the Act by exercising option under Section 163-B of  the  Act.   
Because,
if a claim under Section 140, is raised because of Section  140(4),  such  a
claim would not be defeated by the owner of the  vehicle  or  the  insurance
company, as the  case  may  be,  and  the  claimant  may  get  a  fixed  sum
prescribed under Section 140(2).   
Sub-section (4) of Section 140  has  been
introduced by the  legislature  since  claim  under  Section  140  would  be
followed by Section 166.  
So far as Section 163-A  is  concerned,  claim  is
restricted on the basis of pre-determined formula, unlike  in  the  case  of
application under Section 166.

8.    We are, therefore, of the view that  
liability  to  make  compensation
under Section 163-A is on the principle of  no  fault  and,  
therefore,  the question as to who is at fault is  immaterial  and  foreign  to  an  enquiry
under Section 163-A.   
Section  163-A  does  not  make  any  provision  for apportionment of the  liability.  
If  the  owner  of  the  vehicle  or  the
insurance company is permitted to prove contributory negligence  or  default
or wrongful act on the part of the victim or claimant,  naturally  it  would
defeat  the  very  object  and  purpose  of  Section  163-A  of   the   Act.

Legislature never wanted the claimant to plead or  establish negligence  on the part of the owner or the driver.  
Once it is established that  death  or
permanent disablement occurred during the course of the user of the
vehicle and the vehicle is insured, the insurance company or the owner, as the  case may be, shall be liable to  pay  the 
compensation,  which  is  a  statutory obligation.

9.    We, therefore, find ourselves unable to agree with  the  reasoning  of the Two-Judge Bench in Sinitha’s case (supra).  Consequently, the matter  is placed before the learned Chief Justice of India for  referring  the  matter to a larger Bench for a correct interpretation of the scope of Section  163- A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as well as the  points  no.(iii)  to  (v) referred to in Shila Datta’s case (supra)



                             ……..……………………..J.
                                        (K.S. Radhakrishnan)



                             ……………………………J.
                                        (A.K. Sikri)
New Delhi,
October 29, 2013