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Wednesday, October 9, 2013

Criminal conspiracy = Non - examination of witness whether fatal ? - GULAM SARBAR Vs. STATE OF BIHAR (NOW JHARKHAND)- published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40871

 Criminal conspiracy = Non - examination of witness whether fatal ?

 Criminal Conspiracy = 
The essential ingredients of  Criminal  Conspiracy  are 
 (i)  an agreement between two or more persons; 
(ii) agreement must  relate  to
      doing or causing to be done either 
(a) an illegal act; or 
(b)  an  act
      which is not illegal in itself but is done by illegal means. 
What  is,
      therefore, necessary is to show  meeting  of  minds  of  two  or  more
      persons for doing or causing to be done an illegal act or  an  act  by
      illegal means. 
Mere knowledge or discussion or generation of  a  crime
      in the mind of  the  accused,  is  not  sufficient  to  constitute  an
      offence.

            The offence takes place  with  the  meeting  of  minds  even  if
      nothing further is  done.  
It  is  an  offence  independent  of  other
      offences and punishable separately. 
Thus, the prosecution is  required
      to establish the offence by applying the same legal  principles  which
      are  otherwise  applicable  for  the  purpose  of   proving   criminal
      misconduct on the part of an accused. 
Criminal conspiracy is generally
      hatched in secrecy thus direct evidence  is  difficult  to  obtain  or
      access. 
The offence can be proved by adducing circumstantial  evidence
      or by necessary implication. Meeting  of  minds  to  form  a  criminal
      conspiracy has to be proved by adducing substantive evidence in  cases
      where circumstantial evidence is incomplete or vague. 
The gist of  the
      offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the  act,  or  effecting
      the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in  attempting  to
      do them between the parties.  Agreement  is  essential.  
The  High  Court
      rightly observed that normally the perpetrator of crime in a  case  of
      conspiracy does not take part in the execution rather such conspirator
      hires some criminal directly or indirectly to execute the evil  design
      planned by him. 
There  may  be  circumstances  where  the  conspirator
      remains vigilant to conceal his identity and would  not  disclose  the
      actual motive behind the conspiracy.
      19.   Thus, we  do  not  see  any  reason  for  interfering  that  the
      prosecution  witnesses  have  deposed   falsely   to   implicate   the
      appellants.
Non- examination of witness -  question must be placed before I.O. =
 however, no  such  question  was
      put to him as to why those witnesses were not examined. In the absence
      of putting such an  issue  to  Jagdish  Prasad  (PW.8),  Investigating
      Officer, the appellants cannot seek any benefit of  such  omission  or
      error by the prosecution in conducting of trial.
In the matter of appreciation of evidence of  witnesses,  it  is
      not the number of witnesses but quality of  their  evidence  which  is
      important, as there is no requirement under the Law of  Evidence  that
      any particular number of witnesses is to be examined to prove/disprove
      a fact. It is a time- honoured principle that evidence must be weighed
      and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth,
      is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has
      laid emphasis on value provided  by  each  witness,  rather  than  the
      multiplicity  or  plurality  of  witnesses.  
It  is  quality  and  not
      quantity, which determines  the  adequacy  of  evidence  as  has  been
      provided by Section 134 of the Evidence Act. Even  in  Probate  cases,
      where the law requires the  examination  of  at  least  one  attesting
      witness, it has been held that production of more witnesses  does  not
      carry any weight. Thus, conviction can even be based on the  testimony
      of a sole  eye  witness,  if  the  same  inspires  confidence. 

                                                       REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1316  of 2012




     Gulam Sarbar
     …Appellant


                                   Versus


     State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand)
       …Respondent


                                    With


                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1967  of 2012






                               J U D G M E N T


      Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.


      1.    These appeals have been preferred against the impugned  judgment
      and order dated 22.3.2012 passed by the High  Court  of  Jharkhand  at
      Ranchi in Criminal Appeals (DB) Nos. 273 of 1998 (R) and 262  of  1998
      (R) affirming the judgment and order of conviction and sentence  dated
      26.8.1998 and 31.8.1998 respectively  passed  by  the  3rd  Additional
      Sessions Judge, Dhanbad in Sessions Trial No. 112 of  1997,  by  which
      and whereunder, the appellants in both these appeals  stood  convicted
      alongwith others, namely, Binod Kumar,  Asgar  Mian  @  Asgar  Ansari,
      Paiki Ramm @ Poki Ramm and Mantu Das under Sections 302 read with  120-
      B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to  as  the  `IPC’)
      and sentenced to undergo RI for life.


      2.    Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that:
      A.    As per the case of  the  prosecution,  Dr.  Gopal  Prasad  Sinha
      (PW.7), informant/complainant was going  alongwith  Sant  Kumar  Sinha
      (deceased), to Rajganj, Dhanbad on his motorcycle at about  8.00  P.M.
      on 6.9.1996.  When they reached near Sant Nirankari Chowk, they saw  a
      scooter and a motorcycle parked at  the  side  of  the  road  and  six
      persons including the appellants were standing in the close  proximity
      thereof, and they signalled the complainant to stop.
The  complainant
      stopped his motorcycle and enquired as to why they were waiting.   But
      within no time, Yakub Ansari and Dhiren Mahto  -  appellant  took  out
      their pistols from their waist and pointed towards them and asked  why
      Sant  Kumar  Sinha  (deceased)  was  disturbing  the  working  of  the
      institute run by  Binod  Kumar.  
They  threatened  Sant  Kumar  Sinha
      (deceased) to remain  away  from  the  institute.  
Sant  Kumar  Sinha
      (deceased) asked the accused persons how they were related to  running
      the affairs of the institute, which led to an exchange  of  hot  words
      between the deceased and the accused persons.  
Accused  Asgar  started
      inflicting blows by means of  a  knife  and  told  his  companions  to
      complete the task for which they had come.   
Immediately, Yakub opened
      fire at point blank range from his revolver on the left  side  of  the
      neck of  Sant  Kumar  Sinha  (deceased)  due  to  which  the  deceased
      collapsed and died immediately. 
The informant/complainant being scared
      ran away from the place of occurrence, leaving his motorcycle  at  the
      spot.  
He met a police party to whom he narrated the incident.  On the
      basis of the Fardbeyan of the informant, a case under Sections 302/120-
      B/379 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959  (hereinafter  referred
      to as  the  ‘Arms  Act’)  against  the  accused,  including  both  the
      appellants, was registered  vide  FIR  No.  175  of  1996.  Thus,  the
      investigation ensued accordingly.
      B.    After the conclusion of the investigation, a  charge  sheet  was
      filed against all the accused, showing Yakub @ Ayub as  an  absconder.
      Accordingly, the trial vide S.T. No. 112 of 1997  commenced.  The  co-
      accused Yakub @ Ayub was apprehended later and  was  tried  separately
      vide S.T. No. 405 of 1998.
      C.    In order to prove  its  case,  the  prosecution  examined  eight
      witnesses including Mithilesh Kumar Sinha (PW.1) – real brother of the
      deceased, Arvind Kumar (PW.2) – cousin of deceased, Dr. Dhiraj (PW.6),
      who conducted the post-mortem  examination,  Dr.  Gopal  Prasad  Sinha
      (PW.7), informant/complainant and  brother  of  deceased  and  Jagdish
      Prasad (PW.8), the Investigating Officer.
      D.    The defence  also  examined  three  witnesses.   Gurpreet  Singh
      Mittal (DW.1), was examined only to prove that there was no  light  in
      Sant Nirankari Bhawan at the relevant point of time,  and  further  to
      show that Nirankari Chowk was at a distance of about 200-250 feet away
      from Nirankari Bhawan.  Vijay  Kumar  Singh  (DW.2)  and  Suresh  Dass
      (DW.3) were merely formal witnesses.
      E.   As per the case of the prosecution, Gulam Sarbar,  appellant  ran
      away on Yakub’s motorcycle after the incident. He was  chased  by  the
      police and arrested at a short distance from the place  of  occurrence
      after he jumped a police barricade.
      F.    Similarly, Dhiren Mahto left the  place  of  occurrence  on  LML
      Vespa Scooter alongwith Asgar Mian. So far as Dhiren Mahto (appellant)
      is concerned, he was arrested after a few days on  secret  information
      of his presence at  Naya  Bazar.   At  the  time  of  raid,  the  said
      appellant tried to run away on the scooter after seeing the police but
      was chased and  captured near Bartad.
      G.     In  his  statement  under  Section  313  of  Code  of  Criminal
      Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as `Cr.P.C.’),  Gulam  Sarbar
      simply denied all allegations against him and even denied his presence
      at the place  of  occurrence.  
 Dhirendra  Chandra  Mahto  denied  his
      involvement by any means in the murder of  Sant Kumar Sinha (deceased)
      stating that he had nothing to do with the main accused  Binod  Kumar.
      He was a small contractor, however, he did not deny  his  presence  at
      the place of occurrence nor that he had run away on the scooter taking
      away Asgar Ansari as pillion rider.
      H.    After considering the material on record, the trial  court  vide
      its judgment and order dated 31.8.1998 convicted both  the  appellants
      under Sections 302 and 120-B IPC alongwith other accused and sentenced
      as referred to hereinabove but acquitted Dhirendra  Chandra  Mahto  of
      the charge under Section 27 of the Arms Act.
      I.    Aggrieved, they preferred appeals alongwith  others  before  the
      High Court which stood dismissed by the impugned  judgment  and  order
      dated 22.3.2012.
            Hence, these appeals.


      3.    Shri Amarendra  Sharan,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on
      behalf of Gulam Sarbar and Shri Ashok K.  Srivastava,  learned  senior
      counsel appearing on behalf of Dhiren Mahto, have submitted that
there
      is no material on record to prove the existence  of  a  conspiracy  to
      kill Sant  Kumar  Sinha  (deceased);  none  of  these  appellants  was
      involved in the affairs of the institute  for  which  there  was  some
      dispute between Sant Kumar Sinha (deceased) and Binod Kumar (accused).
     
In fact, both of them had been running a institute  jointly  and  one
      Shipra Sen Choudhery was working as a clerk in the institute with whom
      Binod Kumar (accused) developed illicit  relationship  which  was  not
      liked by Sant Kumar Sinha (deceased),  who  tried  to  persuade  Binod
      Kumar (accused) not to continue  that  relationship  but  he  was  not
      willing to give up the same.
Sant Kumar Sinha (deceased) also informed
      the wife of Binod Kumar (accused) about this  relationship  and  there
      was a quarrel between Shipra Sen Choudhery and Binod Kumar’s wife over
      the same.  Earlier, Binod Kumar had opened a new  institute  and  made
      Shipra Sen Choudhery its Director.
However, none of  these  appellants
      were involved in the entire episode.  Even the arrest of Gulam  Sarbar
      from a place near to the place of incident is doubtful.  Had  it  been
      so, the FIR which was registered after the  arrest  of  Gulam  Sarbar,
      would contain such facts.  Even the general diary did not mention what
      the distance was between the police station and the place  from  where
      Gulam Sarbar, appellant, was arrested. The investigation had not  been
      conducted properly and fairly.
The witnesses, particularly, Mithilesh
      Kumar Sinha (PW.1) and Arvind Kumar  (PW.2)  not  being  eye-witnesses
      could not be relied upon. No independent witness was examined  by  the
      prosecution to prove the arrest of any of the appellants nor to  prove
      alleged recoveries of the motor cycle and the  scooter  in  the  case.
      The prosecution case is based on speculation and conjecture thus,  the
      appeals deserve to be allowed and the judgment and order of the courts
      below are liable to be set aside.


      4.    Per contra,  Shri Ratan Kumar  Choudhuri  and  Shri  Krishnanand
      Pandeya, learned counsel appearing on behalf  of  the  State,  opposed
      both these appeals contending that there are  concurrent  findings  of
      facts and that both accused persons were well  acquainted  with  Binod
      Kumar, the main accused, and  had  been  seen  by  the  witnesses  and
      particularly by Dr. Gopal Prasad Sinha (PW.7) in the  institute  owned
      by Binod Kumar, accused, prior to the incident.
Their presence on the
      spot and the manner in  which  they  had  parked  their  vehicles  and
      stopped the motorcycle on which  the  complainant  and  deceased  were
      travelling is enough to prove the conspiracy.
There is no improvement
      or embellishment in the case of the prosecution against any individual
      accused.  The evidence has rightly  been  appreciated  by  the  courts
      below and ocular evidence is corroborated  by  the  medical  evidence.
      Thus, the appeals lack merit and are liable to be dismissed.



      5.    The essential ingredients of  Criminal  Conspiracy  are
 (i)  an agreement between two or more persons; 
(ii) agreement must  relate  to
      doing or causing to be done either 
(a) an illegal act; or 
(b)  an  act
      which is not illegal in itself but is done by illegal means. 
What  is,
      therefore, necessary is to show  meeting  of  minds  of  two  or  more
      persons for doing or causing to be done an illegal act or  an  act  by
      illegal means. 
Mere knowledge or discussion or generation of  a  crime
      in the mind of  the  accused,  is  not  sufficient  to  constitute  an
      offence.

            The offence takes place  with  the  meeting  of  minds  even  if
      nothing further is  done.  
It  is  an  offence  independent  of  other
      offences and punishable separately. 
Thus, the prosecution is  required
      to establish the offence by applying the same legal  principles  which
      are  otherwise  applicable  for  the  purpose  of   proving   criminal
      misconduct on the part of an accused. 
Criminal conspiracy is generally
      hatched in secrecy thus direct evidence  is  difficult  to  obtain  or
      access. 
The offence can be proved by adducing circumstantial  evidence
      or by necessary implication. Meeting  of  minds  to  form  a  criminal
      conspiracy has to be proved by adducing substantive evidence in  cases
      where circumstantial evidence is incomplete or vague. 
The gist of  the
      offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the  act,  or  effecting
      the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in  attempting  to
      do them between the parties.  Agreement  is  essential.  
(Vide:  Kehar
      Singh & Ors. v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1988 SC 1883; State  (NCT  of
      Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, AIR  2005  SC  3820;  Mir  Nagvi
      Askari v. CBI, AIR 2010 SC 528;  Baldev  Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab,
      (2009) 6 SCC 564; State of M.P. v. Sheetla Sahai & Ors., (2009) 8  SCC
      617; R. Venkatkrishnan v. CBI, AIR 2010 SC 1812; and  S.Arul  Raja  v.
      State of T.N., (2010) 8 SCC 233).

      6.    In Mohmed Amin @ Amin Choteli Rahim Miyan Shaikh & Anr. v.  CBI,
      (2008) 15 SCC 49, it was  held  that  in  order  to  come  under  this
      provision it is not necessary for the accused  to  know  the  detailed
      stages of conspiracy; mere knowledge of main object/  purpose  of  the
      conspiracy would suffice for this Section.

            Similarly, in Vikram Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab,  AIR  2010
      SC 1007, this Court dealt with a case where the accused had  purchased
      fortwin injection and chloroform. Thus, it was  held  that  since  the
      purchase of these materials was an initial step towards commission  of
      offence,  the presence of co-accused Sonia, though not referred to  by
      the witnesses at the time of actual kidnapping would  not  imply  that
      she was not privy to conspiracy and conviction of  the  accused  under
      Section 120-B IPC was upheld.


      7.    The evidence on record and particularly the  deposition  of  Dr.
      Gopal Prasad Sinha (PW.7) clearly  depicts  the  conspiracy  from  the
      manner in which the appellants and other accused were present  on  the
      crossing and stopped the complainant and  the  deceased.  
Admittedly,
      there was rivalry and ill-will between Binod Kumar (accused) and  Sant
      Kumar Sinha (deceased)   as  they  had  separated  their  business  of
      running of educational institution and Sant Kumar Sinha did  not  like
      the illicit relationship between Binod Kumar (accused) and Shipra  Sen
      Choudhery, Clerk.
Sant Kumar Sinha (deceased) tried to persuade Binod
      Kumar (accused) to desist from the said illicit relationship and  Sant
      Kumar Sinha (deceased) also revealed this fact to the  wife  of  Binod
      Kumar (accused) and there was not only a verbal fight between the wife
      of Binod Kumar and Shipra Sen Choudhery but  also  a  scuffle  between
      them on this issue and, subsequently, the wife of  Binod  Kumar  began
      living separately.
Therefore, relations between Binod Kumar  (accused)
      and Sant Kumar Sinha (deceased) had definitely been strained.


      8.    Both these appellants and other  accused  were  acquainted  with
      Binod Kumar (accused) as well as Sant Kumar Sinha (deceased) and  were
      also known to Dr. Gopal Prasad  Sinha  (PW.7).   They  had  been  seen
      earlier in the institute with Binod Kumar (accused).


      9.    The evidence of Dr. Gopal Prasad Sinha (PW.7) that Gulam  Sarbar
      had run away with the  accused Yakub @ Ayub on black coloured Kawasaki
      motorcycle and had been arrested within a close vicinity of the  place
      of incident, though Yakub successfully escaped,  inspires  confidence.
     
The names of the appellants and other accused had  been  mentioned  in
      the FIR. In such a fact-situation, not mentioning  that  Gulam  Sarbar
      had been arrested in the FIR is of no  significance.  
The  LML  Vespa
      Scooter BR17-B-4455 used in the crime was seized in  the  presence  of
      independent witnesses, namely, Sunil Mandal and Santosh  Vikral.   The
      seizure memo was prepared on which both the said panch  witnesses  put
      their signatures. The same was marked as Exhibit 6-1 and was proved by
      Jagdish Prasad (PW.8),  Investigating  Officer.
 In  respect  of  the
      arrest of Gulam Sarbar, Jagdish Prasad (PW.8) has clearly deposed that
      he was inspecting small  vehicles  in  front  of  the  police  station
      alongwith Constable Badre Alam at about 20.05 hrs., when  he  saw  two
      persons on one black coloured Kawasaki motorcycle crossing the barrier
      at a very high speed. 
They were given signal to stop but they did  not
      stop. On the contrary, they pushed the barrier and fled away on  which
      Jagdish Prasad (PW.8) and Constable Badre  Alam  chased  them.   Gulam
      Sarbar jumped from the motorcycle near Bartand Pulia and tried to flee
      but was controlled and captured by them  and  upon  interrogation,  he
      revealed that Yakub was the person who had run away on the motorcycle.
       Jagdish Prasad (PW.8) I.O.  received  secret  information   that  the
      motorcycle used in the crime had been hidden in  the  house  of  Yakub
      (accused).  
A search was conducted of his house  in  presence  of  two
      independent witnesses, namely, Muslim Ansari and Bhagirath  Razak  and
      the same was recovered. A seizure memo was prepared and was signed  by
      the said two witnesses. The said seizure memo was marked as Exhibit  -
      6 and proved by Jagdish Prasad (PW.8), Investigating Officer.


      10.    Jagdish  Prasad  (PW.8)  deposed  that   he   received   secret
      information about the whereabouts of the appellant Dhiren Mahto and he
      conducted raid at Naya Bazar  alongwith  other  police  officials  and
      Constable Badre Alam. Though he tried to escape,  he  was  apprehended
      and arrested and LML Vespa Scooter BR  17-B-4455  was  recovered.
The
      arrest memo and recovery memo of  the  scooter  was  prepared  in  the
      presence of independent witnesses namely,  Sunil  Mandal  and  Santosh
      Vikral and the seizure memo was signed by the said witnesses. The same
      was marked as Exhibit 6-1 and was proved by him.
            It was at a later stage that the other  accused  were  arrested.




      11.   Learned senior counsel appearing on  behalf  of  the  appellants
      have submitted that neither the witness of arrest memo  of  either  of
      the appellants nor the panch witness of the recovery  of  scooter  and
      motor cycle used in the crime has been examined  by  the  prosecution.
      Even the police Constable Badre Alam who  accompanied  Jagdish  Prasad
      (PW.8) I.O. at the time  of  arrest  of  Gulam  Sarbar  has  not  been
      examined. Therefore, the case of arrest of the appellants as  well  as
      the recovery of the vehicles is not worth  acceptance  and  the  whole
      case of the prosecution becomes doubtful.


      12.   We had been taken  through  the  entire  deposition  of  Jagdish
      Prasad (PW.8), Investigating Officer, however, no  such  question  was
      put to him as to why those witnesses were not examined. In the absence
      of putting such an  issue  to  Jagdish  Prasad  (PW.8),  Investigating
      Officer, the appellants cannot seek any benefit of  such  omission  or
      error by the prosecution in conducting of trial.


      13.   This Court in Laxmibai (Dead) Thr. L.Rs. & Anr. v.  Bhagwantbuva
      (Dead) Thr. L.Rs. & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 1204 dealt with the issue raised
      herein observing as under:
             “31. Furthermore, there cannot be any dispute with  respect  to
           the settled legal proposition, that if a party wishes  to  raise
           any doubt as regards the  correctness  of  the  statement  of  a
           witness, the said  witness  must  be  given  an  opportunity  to
           explain his statement by drawing his attention to that  part  of
           it, which has been objected to by  the  other  party,  as  being
           untrue.  Without  this,  it  is  not  possible  to  impeach  his
           credibility. Such a  law  has  been  advanced  in  view  of  the
           statutory provisions enshrined in Section 138  of  the  Evidence
           Act, 1872, which enable the opposite party  to  cross-examine  a
           witness as regards  information  tendered  in  evidence  by  him
           during his initial examination in chief, and the scope  of  this
           provision stands enlarged by Section 146 of  the  Evidence  Act,
           which permits a witness to be questioned, inter-alia,  in  order
           to test his veracity. Thereafter, the unchallenged part  of  his
           evidence is to be  relied  upon,  for  the  reason  that  it  is
           impossible for the witness to  explain  or  elaborate  upon  any
           doubts as regards the same, in the absence of questions  put  to
           him with respect to the circumstances which  indicate  that  the
           version of events provided by him, is not fit  to  be  believed,
           and the witness himself, is unworthy of credit. Thus, if a party
           intends  to  impeach  a  witness,  he  must   provide   adequate
           opportunity to the witness in the witness box, to  give  a  full
           and proper explanation. The same is  essential  to  ensure  fair
           play and fairness in dealing with witnesses.”


      (See also: Ravinder Kumar Sharma v. State of Assam & Ors., AIR 1999 SC
      3571; Ghasita Sahu v. State of  Madhya  Pradesh,  AIR  2008  SC  1425;
      Rohtash Kumar v. State of Haryana, JT 2013 (8) SC 181; and  Gian Chand
      & Ors. v. State of Haryana, JT 2013 (10) SC 515).


      14.   In the matter of appreciation of evidence of  witnesses,  it  is
      not the number of witnesses but quality of  their  evidence  which  is
      important, as there is no requirement under the Law of  Evidence  that
      any particular number of witnesses is to be examined to prove/disprove
      a fact. It is a time- honoured principle that evidence must be weighed
      and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth,
      is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has
      laid emphasis on value provided  by  each  witness,  rather  than  the
      multiplicity  or  plurality  of  witnesses.  It  is  quality  and  not
      quantity, which determines  the  adequacy  of  evidence  as  has  been
      provided by Section 134 of the Evidence Act. Even  in  Probate  cases,
      where the law requires the  examination  of  at  least  one  attesting
      witness, it has been held that production of more witnesses  does  not
      carry any weight. Thus, conviction can even be based on the  testimony
      of a sole  eye  witness,  if  the  same  inspires  confidence.  (Vide:
      Vadivelu Thevar & Anr. v. State of Madras; AIR 1957 SC  614;  Kunju  @
      Balachandran v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2008  SC  1381;  Bipin  Kumar
      Mondal v. State of West Bengal AIR 2010 SC  3638;  Mahesh  &  Anr.  v.
      State of Madhya Pradesh (2011) 9 SCC 626; Prithipal Singh  &  Ors.  v.
      State of Punjab & Anr., (2012) 1 SCC 10; and Kishan Chand v. State  of
      Haryana JT 2013( 1) SC 222).


      15.   If the prosecution had not examined the Panchnama witnesses  and
      witnesses to the arrest memos of the appellants, the appellants  could
      have examined them in their defence.




      16.   The prosecution has successfully established the involvement  of
      the appellants in the crime and the manner in which the crime has been
      committed  establishes  the  conspiracy.  The  appellants   in   their
      statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. did not furnish  any  satisfactory
      explanation of the circumstances under which they were present at  the
      place of occurrence.  More so, the manner  in  which  they  fled  away
      after the commission of the crime clearly indicates their  involvement
      in the offence to conduct a conspiracy. Gopal Prasad Sinha (PW.7)  has
      no enmity with either of the appellants and there was  no  reason  for
      him to involve them falsely in such a heinous crime.


      17.   Thus, the trial court after appreciating the  evidence  recorded
      the findings of fact regarding the presence of the appellants  at  the
      place of occurrence as well as the presence of  Dr. Gopal Prasad Sinha
      (PW.7). The said witness was well acquainted with all the accused  and
      particularly the appellants.  He had seen them alongwith  Binod  Kumar
      (accused) gathering all the accused at the place of occurrence.   Some
      of the accused persons particularly Gulam Sarbar engaged and  used  to
      sit together in a gumti and have tea there.  A conspiracy was  hatched
      by Binod Kumar (accused) as Sant Kumar Sinha  (deceased)  had  created
      problems in his family life as well as in  his  business  because  the
      deceased did not like the illicit  relationship  between  Binod  Kumar
      (accused) and Shipra Sen Choudhery.  The manner in which the crime was
      committed it seems that it  was  a  pre-planned  murder.    There  was
      sufficient light in the nearby building Nirankari Bhavan at  the  time
      of commission of the offence.  There was  no  material  contradiction,
      embellishment or improvement in the deposition  of  Dr.  Gopal  Prasad
      Sinha (PW.7).  The defence though examined three witnesses but none of
      them was relevant for their purpose.
            The trial court acquitted Dhiren  Mahto  of  the  charges  under
      Section 27 of the Arms Act giving cogent reasons.


      18.   The  High  Court  reappreciated  the  evidence  and  upheld  the
      findings of facts recorded by  the  trial  court  observing  that  the
      ocular evidence was in consonance and in conformity with  the  medical
      evidence and it was a clear cut case of conspiracy.  
The  High  Court
      rightly observed that normally the perpetrator of crime in a  case  of
      conspiracy does not take part in the execution rather such conspirator
      hires some criminal directly or indirectly to execute the evil  design
      planned by him. 
There  may  be  circumstances  where  the  conspirator
      remains vigilant to conceal his identity and would  not  disclose  the
      actual motive behind the conspiracy.
      19.   Thus, we  do  not  see  any  reason  for  interfering  that  the
      prosecution  witnesses  have  deposed   falsely   to   implicate   the
      appellants.


      20.   Thus, in view of the above, the facts and circumstances of these
      appeals do not warrant interference.  The appeals lack merit  and  are
      dismissed accordingly.


                                       ….………………..........J.            (DR.
                                       B.S. CHAUHAN)





      …...................................J.
                                                              (S.A. BOBDE)
      NEW DELHI;
      October 7, 2013







-----------------------
19


Monday, October 7, 2013

Bar Licence - not granted = SOMDEV KAPOOR Vs. STATE OF W.B. & ORS. published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40865

  Bar Licence - not  granted =

Rule 8 of the West Bengal Excise (Selection of New  Sites
      and Grant of License for Retail  Sale  of  Liquor  and  Certain  Other
      Intoxicants) Rules, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules of 2003”),
      as amended in the year 2004. Amended Rule 8 of the said Rules  imposed
      a ban on the grant of license for the retail sale  of  liquor  or  any
      other intoxicant at a new site which is  within  1000  feet  from  any
      college/educational institution /religious places.  =

  when the request of the appellant was considered  in  the  year  2010,
      Rules of 2003 as amended in 2004 had to be applied. On  the  basis  of
      these Rules, the appellant could not have  been  granted  for  foreign
      liquor bar and restaurant license as  there  are  many  religious  and
      educational institutions within the 1000 ft. of place from  where  the
      appellant is operating.

 when it is found  that  the  appellant  was  not
      entitled for bar license, the High Court has rightly  issued  mandamus
      not to renew the same. Even if, we presume that some other  person  is
      also operating in an infringing manner, that would  not  legalize  the
      license of the appellant.  That apart, after going through the record,
      we find that the case of respondent No.4 was not of a new license  but
      existing license.  Rule 8 applied to new sites only and in so  far  as
      those who were operating already and having existing license, they are
      not hit by the mischief of this Rule.

      15.   The result of the aforesaid discussion would be  to  uphold  the
      judgment of the High Court and dismiss the appeal  with  costs.  Since
      the license was renewed on the basis of interim orders passed by  this
      court, which is valid till December 2013,  it  would  not  be  renewed
      thereafter.  We order accordingly.


                                                     [REPORTABLE]

                       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9016/2013
            (arising out of  Special Leave Petition  (Civil) No. 255 OF 2013
      )


      SOMDEV KAPOOR                                 ……APPELLANT

                       VERSUS

      STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.              ……RESPONDENTS




                               J U D G M E N T

      A.K.SIKRI,J.

      1.    Leave granted.

      2.    The appellant herein is a proprietor of a Hotel  and  Restaurant
      under the name and style of “BHIMSAIN VAISHNAV’  which  is  being  run
      since 1954.  On 28th August 1992, he made an  application  before  the
      Collector of Excise, Calcutta (now known as Kolkata) for  issuance  of
      license  to  operate  foreign  liquor  bar   and   restaurant.    This
      application, for the reasons not available on record, kept pending for
      number of years.  Thereafter, on 1.11.2004 he made a request that  his
      earlier application dated 28th August 1992 may be processed and he  be
      granted foreign liquor bar and restaurant license.  It was followed by
      another reminder dated 8.9.2005.  Thereafter, the appellant was  given
      temporary license to run the liquor bar in January  2006,  purportedly
      on the basis of his application submitted in the year 1992.

      3.    Respondent  Nos.  5  and  6  herein,  namely,  Muslim  Khawateem
      Khilafat Tanzeem, a Society and  Nazia Elahi Khan,  President  of  the
      said society respectively, filed a Writ Petition  as  Public  Interest
      Litigation, with  the  prayers  to  cancel,  rescind  and  revoke  the
      aforesaid temporary license issued to the appellant.  The plea  raised
      was that it was not open for the appellant to run a liquor bar in  the
      said restaurant which was in the  vicinity  of  religious  places  and
      school, namely,  Gurudwara  Bara  Sikh  Sangar,  Shree  Digambar  Jain
      Vidyalaya,  Shree  Jain  Swetambere  Panchayati  Temple,  Shree  Laxmi
      Narayan Mandir, Shree Shree Satya Narayanji Mandir and also a  mosque.
      These respondents in the said Writ Petition alleged that the aforesaid
      religious places and school were situated within the distance  of  550
      feet of the premises where the license  to  operate  the  bar  by  the
      Excise Department was  granted  to  the  appellant  and  this  was  in
      violation of Rule 8 of the West Bengal Excise (Selection of New  Sites
      and Grant of License for Retail  Sale  of  Liquor  and  Certain  Other
      Intoxicants) Rules, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as “Rules of 2003”),
      as amended in the year 2004. Amended Rule 8 of the said Rules  imposed
      a ban on the grant of license for the retail sale  of  liquor  or  any
      other intoxicant at a new site which is  within  1000  feet  from  any
      college/educational institution /religious places.  This plea has been
      accepted by the High Court  and  vide  impugned  judgment  dated  14th
      December 2012, the Excise Department is  directed  not  to  renew  the
      license of the appellant which was expiring in the  month  of  January
      2013.

      4.    It is not in dispute that there are few religious places as well
      as a school within a distance of 1000 feet from the restaurant of  the
      appellant where he runs his liquor bar as well.  The precise  distance
      of these places from the appellant’s restaurant is as under:

                 Gurudwara Bara Sikh Sangar is at a distance  of  430  ft.,
           Shree Digambar Jain Vidyalaya is at a distance of 580 ft., Shree
           Jain Swetambar Panchayati Temple is at a distance  of  630  ft.,
           Shree Laxmi Narayan Mandir is at a  distance  of  730  ft.,  and
           Shree Shree Satya  Narayanji Ka Mandir  is at a distance of  780
           ft.




      5.    It is also not in  dispute  that  Rule  8  proscribes  grant  of
      license for retail sale of liquor or any other  intoxicant  at  a  new
      site which comes within the range of 1000 ft.  However, case set up by
      the appellant is that since the application for grant of  license  was
      filed in the year 1992, the rules which were prevailing at  that  time
      would be applicable to the case of the appellant. Under  Rules,  1993,
      the restriction was within a distance of 300 ft. from such places  and
      since the religious places and school pointed out by respondent Nos. 5
      and 6 are situated beyond the vicinity of 300  ft.,  the  license  was
      validly granted.  In  this  scenario,  the  question  that  falls  for
      determination is as to whether Rules, 1993 would govern  the  case  of
      the appellant or the license was to be granted keeping in mind  Rules,
      2003 (as amended).  Before we  embark  on  this  issue,  it  would  be
      essential to tread the events  leading  to  the  promulgation  of  the
      aforesaid Rules and certain  Government  instructions  issued  in  the
      matter.

      6.    As mentioned above, the appellant had applied for Foreign Liquor
      Bar and Restaurant license on 28.8.1992. Within  few  months  thereof,
      West Bengal Excise Rules,  1993  were  promulgated  vide  Notification
      dated 22nd March 1993.  These Rules were made in  exercise  of  powers
      conferred by Sections 85, 86 read with Section 30, 31, 36, 37 and  37A
      of the West Bengal Excise Act, 1909.  As per Rule 8 of Rules 1993,  in
      its original form, there was bar for grant of license for retail  sale
      of spirit or any other intoxicant at a new site which is  situated  in
      “close proximity” to an educational institution or  traditional  place
      of worship, hospital or bathing ghat for public  use.   There  was  no
      specific distance stipulated therein, defining the  expression  “close
      proximity” in arithmetical/ numerical terms. However, when Rules, 2003
      came into force in supersession of earlier Rules 1993 with effect from
      29.9.2003, the words “close proximity” were replaced by the expression
      “vicinity”. The term “vicinity” was defined as a distance of  300  ft.
      Rule 8 of Rules, 2003 was amended with effect from  15.4.2004  and  as
      per the amended provision, distance of 1000 ft. was prescribed in  the
      definition of ‘vicinity’.  Thus, there was a shift from  the  position
      contained in Rules, 1993 which prohibited the grant of license for the
      retail sale of spirit or any other  intoxicant  in  “close  proximity”
      from the educational institution and  religious  places  etc.  to  the
      grant of license  within  “vicinity  of  such  places”  and  the  term
      ‘vicinity’ was explicitly and precisely defined to be  a  distance  of
      300 ft. in the unamended Rule 8 of Rules, 2003 and increased  to  1000
      ft. by way of amendment in the year 2004, from educational institution
      and religious places.

      7.    Reverting to the case of the appellant, we would  also  like  to
      emphasize here that Rule 8 of Rules, 1993 as well as Rule 8 of  Rules,
      2003  apply  only  to  new  sites.  Its  implication  is  that   those
      restaurants/ hotels etc. who  were  already  granted  license,  before
      coming into force the respective  Rules,  would  not  be  hit  by  the
      mischief of these rules and are allowed the continuation of such a bar
      license, as pointed out, though the application of the  appellant  was
      made in the year 1992, it  was  processed  much  after  2004  and  the
      license  is  also  granted  after  2004.   Therefore,   normally   the
      application would be governed by the Rules prevalent on  the  date  of
      grant of liquor license.  However, Mr. K.K.Venugopal,  learned  senior
      counsel appearing for the appellant drew our attention to the Circular
      dated 28.9.2005 issued by the Excise Commissioner, West Bengal to  its
      functionaries and on that basis, he made emphatic  plea  that  pending
      applications were to be considered on the basis of  un-amended  Rules,
      2003.  Since the entire foundation of the appellant’s  case  rests  on
      this communication, we  would  like  to  reproduce  the  same  in  its
      entirety:

                       “Sub: Settlement of Excise Licenses in favour of the
           applicants/licensees  who  have  applied  for  the  same  before
           publication of the Excise Department’s Notification  No.  527-Ex
           dated 02.04.2004.

                       Sir,

                       With reference to above noted subject, it  has  come
           to the notice of the undersigned that several applications  have
           been received by the District Authorities for grant  of  Foreign
           Liquor ‘On’ Shop Licenses as well as shifting  of  the  existing
           shop before the Excise Department’s Notification No.527-EX dated
           02.04.2004  came into force.

                       It is further noticed that some  applicants/licenses
           who applied for ‘On’ shop License/shifting of existing  licenses
           and who were not granted licenses as the sites proposed by  them
           attracted the provisions of the  aforesaid  notification,  moved
           the Hon’ble High Court  for  processing  their  applications  in
           terms of the provisions existing prior to coming into  force  or
           Notification No.527-EX dated 02.04.2004.

                       After  careful  consideration  of  the  matter,  the
           following…………..;

           (a)   All the applications received before the 15th April,  2004
                 being the date of publication of the above notification, by
                 the concerned District Authorities  for  grant  of  Foreign
                 Liquor ‘On’ Shop Licenses and not rejected by the Collector
                 may kindly  be  sent  to  this  Directorate,  if  not  sent
                 already, after suitable processing as per Rule 8(1) of  the
                 Excise Department’s Notification No.800-EX dated 29.7.2003.

           (b)   All the petitions received before 15th  April,  2004  duly
                 rejected by this Directorate and/or the Collectors  due  to
                 coming into force of the Excise  Department’s  Notification
                 No. 527-EX dated 02.04.2004 should also  be  sent  to  this
                 Directorate for further consideration, after processing  of
                 the same in terms of Rule 8(1) of the  Excise  Department’s
                 Notification No.800-EX dated 29.7.2003;

           (c)    If the licenses in respect of Foreign Liquor  ‘On’  Shops
                 duly approved by the Govt.   In the Excise  Department  and
                 communicated    to    the    district    authorities     by
                 this…………………………..also be  sent  to  this  Directorate  after
                 necessary   processing   as   per    Excise    Department’s
                 Notification No.800-EX dated 29.7.2003.

           (d)    It has also come to the notice of  the  undersigned  that
                 several applications for grant of Foreign Liquor ‘On’  Shop
                 Licenses received by the District  Excise  Authorities  are
                 being rejected at their end.

                        All  such  applications  should  be  sent  to   the
           undersigned in terms of Rule 9(3)  of  the  Rules  framed  under
           Excise Department’s Notification No.800-EX dated 29.7.2003.

                       You are,  therefore,  requested  to  take  necessary
           steps  in  the  matter  and  ensure  the  compliance  of   these
           instructions.”




      8.    Seeking to draw sustenance  from  the  aforesaid  circular,  Mr.
      Venugopal’s endeavour was to make us  agree  to  his  submission  that
      those applications which were received before 15th April, 2004 and had
      not been rejected by the time circular  dated  28.9.2005  came  to  be
      issued, were to be processed as per unamended Rule 8 which  fixed  the
      upper limit of 300 ft. as prohibitory limit. However,  we  don’t  feel
      persuaded by this plea. In our view, this circular has no  application
      to the facts of the present case for the reasons stated hereafter.

      9.    On the face of it, it is visible that the  circular  deals  with
      the situation  where  applications  for  grant  of  license  had  been
      submitted  after  29.7.2003  when   Rules,   2003   were   promulgated
      prescribing a distance of 300 ft. in  Rule  8(1)  of  those  Rules  to
      define ‘vicinity’ and before this definition of “vicinity” was amended
      vide Notification dated 2.4.2004.  The  question  was  as  to  whether
      applications which were given after  29.7.2003  but  before  2.4.2004,
      were to be governed by original Rules 8(1) or the amended  Rule  8(1).
      It seems that a Writ Petition was filed in the High Court of  Calcutta
      by those who were not granted license because of  the  amended  Rules.
      During the  pendency  of  the  said  Writ  Petition,  the  matter  was
      considered and the  decision  was  taken  that  all  the  applications
      received before the amended Rules came into force, which had not  been
      rejected by the Collector, should be processed in terms  of  unamended
      Rules and sent to the Directorate.  Even those applications which were
      received before 15th  April,  2004  and  had  been  rejected  applying
      amended Rule were also directed to be  sent  to  the  Directorate  for
      further consideration, after processing in terms of  unamended  Rules.
      These applications were to be sent in terms of Rule 9(3) of the Rules.
      Ex-facie, the case of the appellant has no such factual parity.

      10.   We would like to  point  out,  at  this  stage,  that  when  the
      application of the appellant, which was submitted in 1992 but had  not
      been taken up for consideration at all for number of years,  even  the
      appellant had not taken any steps by sending any reminder or  followed
      it up with any request to the department to grant him bar  license  on
      the basis of said application. This position remained even during  the
      operation of Rules, 1993 which remained operative  for  10  years  and
      were replaced by Rules, 2003.  During this period also, no steps  were
      taken.  After Rules, 2003 there was an amendment in  Rule  8  thereof.
      Thereafter the Excise Commissioner, West Bengal  issued  clarification
      in the year 2005 in  respect  of  applications  which  were  submitted
      pursuant to Rules, 2003 but either had not been dealt  with  upto  the
      amendment notified on 2.4.2004 or were rejected  after  2004  applying
      the amended Rules. Though, this circular was totally  unconnected  and
      unrelated to the case of the appellant, at this stage,  the  appellant
      woke up from  slumber  and  started  insisting  that  his  application
      submitted in the year 1992 be considered.   The  appellant  very  well
      knew that on the basis of new Rules he would not be able  to  get  bar
      license. Therefore,  the  strategy  adopted  was  to  resuscitate  the
      application of 1992 and demand its consideration on the basis  of  un-
      amended rules.  In fact, Mr. Kailash Vasdev,  learned  senior  counsel
      appearing for respondent Nos. 5 and 6 is right in submitting that  his
      application of the year 1992 was not even proper and valid application
      as no fee etc. was paid along with the said application.   That  would
      be the reason that the said  application  was  never  processed.   The
      application has to be supported by appropriate fee which was not given
      earlier. Such a fee was deposited only in the year 2006 in  compliance
      with the provisions of Rule 9 of the Rules, 2003.  In his letter dated
      1.11.2004 the appellant  referred  to  his  application  submitted  on
      28.8.1992 in which the appellant stated that he had  applied  for  the
      license as per the  copy  of  letter  which  he  enclosed  along  with
      communication dated 1.11.2004 and it shows  that  only  a  letter  was
      submitted, though, as per the Rules, application was  to  be  made  in
      Form I or Form II annexed with these Rules.

      11.   Before filing the Writ Petition, respondent Nos.  5  and  6  had
      obtained information from the department under  Right  to  Information
      Act.  Information supplied to them mentions  that  the  appellant  had
      first made application on 28.8.1992 and then again on 8.9.2005  giving
      reference to the first application.  Thus,  we  find  that  the  first
      application was not even proper application and second application was
      dated 8.9.2005.  It had to be governed by the new Rules, namely, Rules
      2003, as amended in 2004.

      12.   It would also be significant to state that as per the  law  laid
      down by this Court, Rules which are prevalent on  the  date  when  the
      application is considered are to be applied and not the date when  the
      application is made.  This is so held in State of Kerala  &  Ors.  Vs.
      Kandath Distilleries 2013 (2) SCALE 789 in the following words:

                       “We have gone through  the  Government  Order  dated
           11.10.2006 in extenso and we are not prepared to  say  that  the
           application of the respondent was rejected solely on the  ground
           that the application dated 12.1.1987 could not be treated as  an
           application put forward by a firm  based on a partnership  deed,
           which came into existence on 10.4.1991, as per Clause 3  of  the
           Partnership Deed but on various  other  grounds  as  well.   The
           State Government, in our view,  has considered the  respondent’s
           application dated 12.1.1987 with regard to the  conditions  that
           existed  in  the  year   1998.   The  Government  letter   dated
           28.6.1994 would indicate that, apart from  the  respondent,  few
           other applications were also pending prior  to  the  year  1994.
           Over and above, the State Government during the year 1998,  from
           3.2.1998  to  21.11.1998,  had  received  52  applications   for
           establishing compounding, blending and bottling units  in  IMFLs
           in various parts of the State.  The Excise Commissioner vide his
           letter  dated  25.11.1998  had  reported  that  there   was   an
           unprecedented flow  of  applications,  that  was  the  situation
           prevailing in the year 1998, a factor which was taken note of in
           not entertaining the respondent’s application,  whether  it  was
           submitted on 12.1.1987 or on 22.11.1998.  We cannot, in any way,
           activate  an out-modeled, outdated, forgotten liquor  policy  of
           1998, in the year 2013, by a Writ of Mandamus.”




      13.   We fail to comprehend as to how the application  filed  in  1992
      could be considered in 2010.  In any case, as per the dicta aforesaid,
      when the request of the appellant was considered  in  the  year  2010,
      Rules of 2003 as amended in 2004 had to be applied. On  the  basis  of
      these Rules, the appellant could not have  been  granted  for  foreign
      liquor bar and restaurant license as  there  are  many  religious  and
      educational institutions within the 1000 ft. of place from  where  the
      appellant is operating.

      14.   Mr. Venugopal has tried to make an attempt to  impute  malafides
      on the part of the respondent Nos. 5 and  6  alleging  that  there  is
      another restaurant run by respondent No.4 which is also operating from
      a place that is less than 1000 ft. from religious places etc. However,
      proceedings against the said respondents were  dropped  by  respondent
      Nos. 5 & 6.  First of all, this argument would be of no avail  to  the
      appellant inasmuch as when it is found  that  the  appellant  was  not
      entitled for bar license, the High Court has rightly  issued  mandamus
      not to renew the same. Even if, we presume that some other  person  is
      also operating in an infringing manner, that would  not  legalize  the
      license of the appellant.  That apart, after going through the record,
      we find that the case of respondent No.4 was not of a new license  but
      existing license.  Rule 8 applied to new sites only and in so  far  as
      those who were operating already and having existing license, they are
      not hit by the mischief of this Rule.

      15.   The result of the aforesaid discussion would be  to  uphold  the
      judgment of the High Court and dismiss the appeal  with  costs.  Since
      the license was renewed on the basis of interim orders passed by  this
      court, which is valid till December 2013,  it  would  not  be  renewed
      thereafter.  We order accordingly.

                                                                ……………………….J.
                                                       [K.S.Radhakrishnan]






                                                               ………………………..J.
                                                       [A.K.Sikri]
      New Delhi,
      October 7, 2013



power of state govt. in varying salary of constitutional appointee ; Binding nature of judgment = G.L. BATRA Vs. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40864

 State Govt. is not competent to vary the remuneration fixed to the constitutional appointee ; Earlier judgment of same bench is binding on the later bench of same quorum;

 The earlier  judgment
      may seem to be not correct yet it will have the binding effect on  the
      latter bench of coordinate jurisdiction. =

  In State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer @ Kalika Singh and  others  AIR
      2003 SC 2443 
this Court held that when an earlier decision  may  seems
      to be incorrect to a Bench of a  coordinate  jurisdiction  considering
      the question later, on the  ground  that  a  possible  aspect  of  the
      matter was not considered or not  raised  before  the  Court  or  more
      aspects should have been gone into by the Court  deciding  the  matter
      earlier but it would not be a reason to  say  that  the  decision  was
      rendered per incuriam and liable to be ignored.  
The earlier  judgment
      may seem to be not correct yet it will have the binding effect on  the
      latter bench of coordinate jurisdiction. 
 The  Court  held  that  easy
      course of saying that earlier decision was rendered  per  incuriam  is
      not permissible and the matter will have to be resolved  only  in  two
      ways – either to follow the earlier decision or refer the matter to  a
      larger Bench to examine the issue, in case it  is  felt  that  earlier
      decision is not correct on merits. 
whether  the State Government is competent to vary  the  remuneration  fixed  to  a constitutional appointee to his disadvantage, after his appointment. =

We find that after the appellant was appointed as Chairman    of
      the Haryana PSC, the Government passed an order on 18.03.1996 relaxing
      the provision contained in Regulation 6 and re-fixed the  remuneration
      of the appellant as Chairman of the  Haryana  PSC  as  Rs.7500/-  p.m.
      w.e.f. 06.07.1994  as  a  “personal  measure  to  him.”   We  find  it
      difficult to appreciate the stand of the State Government  as  to  how
      they could withdraw that benefit vide  notification  dated  29.11.1996
      and then re-fix the same vide order dated 15.04.1997 as Rs.4135/- p.m.
       The Government after having recognized the status of the appellant as
      a constitutional appointee, and relaxed Regulation 6  so  far  as  the
      appellant is concerned vide its order dated 18.03.1996, has  no  power
      to  withdraw  the  same,  especially  when  no  master   and   servant
      relationship has been established between a  constitutional  appointee
      and the State Government.  True, the appellant’s conditions of service
      were governed  by  the  1972  Regulations,  but  when  the  Government
      themselves had  relaxed  the  same,  especially  Regulation  6,  as  a
      personal measure to him, then we fail to see how they  could  withdraw
      that benefit to his  disadvantage  which,  in  our  view,  is  clearly
      discriminatory and violative of Article  14  of  the  Constitution  of
      India.


      17.   We, therefore, allow this appeal  and  set  aside  the  impugned
      judgment of the High Court and quash the orders passed by the State of
      Haryana dated 29.11.1996 and  15.04.1997.  The  appellant,  therefore,
      would be entitled to all consequential benefits which would be paid to
      him within a period of three months  from  the  date  of  this  order.
      State of Haryana is also directed to pay an award  of  Rs.50,000/-  to
      the appellant by way of cost.


                                                                REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


                        CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION


                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.  9015  OF 2013
       (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.4692 of 2010)


      G.L. Batra                                         …. Appellant


                                   Versus


      State of Haryana and others                    …. Respondents






                               J U D G M E N T






      K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.




            Leave granted.


      2.    We are in this case concerned  with  the  question
whether  the State Government is competent to vary  the  remuneration  fixed  to  a constitutional appointee to his disadvantage, after his appointment.


      3.    The appellant herein was working, in the  post  of  senior  most
      Additional Secretary, in the Lok  Sabha  during  the  years  1991-1994
      drawing a salary of Rs.7500/- per month as basic pay for the  post  in
      the pay scale of Rs.7500-7600 which was revised in the  pay  scale  of
      Rs.22400-525-24500 and DA @ 32% w.e.f. 01.01.1996.
According  to  the
      appellant, he had the prospect of promotion to the Secretary  General,
      Lok Sabha, a post equivalent to Cabinet Secretary which is in the  pay
      scale of Rs.30,000/- fixed and DA @ 32%.
The  age  of  retirement  of
      Secretary General, Lok Sabha, when the appellant joined Haryana Public
      Service Commission, was 60 years, which  was  later  increased  to  62
      years.


      4.     The  appellant,  while  he  was  working  as  the  senior  most
      Additional Secretary in the Lok Sabha, was appointed  as  Chairman  of
      the Haryana Public Service Commission (for short ‘the Haryana PSC’) by
      the Haryana State Government on 06.07.1994 in exercise of  the  powers
      conferred by Article 316 of  the  Constitution  of  India  along  with
      Ravinder Sharma and Ram Phal Singh as Members of the Haryana PSC.   On
      joining duty, conditions of services of the appellant were governed by
      the  Haryana  Public  Service  Commission  (Conditions   of   Service)
      Regulations, 1972 (for short ‘1972 Regulations’).
At that  time,  the
      existing basic pay of the Chairman of the Haryana PSC as per rules was
      Rs.7000/- per month.  The appellant then preferred a representation on
      04.10.1994 requesting the Government to re-fix his pay as Rs.7500/- on
      06.07.1994 and Rs.7600/- w.e.f. 01.09.1994 by relaxing the Rules.


      5.    The Government of Haryana examining the said request  passed  an
      order on 18.03.1996, fixing the remuneration of the Chairman,  Haryana
      PSC as Rs.7500/- per month w.e.f. 06.07.1994 as a personal measure, in
      relaxation of the provisions contained in Regulation  6  of  the  1972
      Regulations.  Noticing that the above-mentioned order was silent as to
      from which date the allowances, as mentioned in Regulation 6  were  to
      be given to the appellant, the Commission wrote a letter on 20.06.1996
      to the State Government to clarify as to whether the  allowances  were
      to be given  w.e.f.  01.01.1986  as  was  given  to  the  other  State
      Government employees  or  w.e.f.  01.01.1989  when  Regulation  6  was
      amended to include ‘allowances’ in addition to  the  basic  pay.   The
      State Government referring to the said letter  replied  on  23.06.1996
      stating that DA was to be paid w.e.f. 01.01.1989 only and  not  w.e.f.
      01.01.1986 as admissible to other State Government employees.


      6.    The appellant then wrote a Demi Official letter dated  24.9.1996
      to the Chief Secretary, Haryana PSC stating that he  was  entitled  to
      the Dearness Allowance, which he was drawing while he  was  Additional
      Secretary and if the DA was paid only w.e.f. 08.02.1989, then the same
      would be in pursuance to Regulation 6, which already stood relaxed  in
      his case.  It was  also  pointed  that  that  when  Regulation  6  was
      relaxed, all conditions laid down under the said Regulation also stood
      automatically  relaxed.   The  Government,  however,  reiterated   the
      earlier stand through their letter dated 23.10.1996.  Over and  above,
      the Government passed yet another order on 29.11.1996 withdrawing  its
      earlier order dated 18.03.1996 whereby  the  appellant’s  remuneration
      was fixed by relaxing Regulation 6 and a direction was also issued  to
      recover the  excess  payment  already  made  to  the  appellant.   The
      appellant then filed a representation on 03.02.1997 to the  Government
      of Haryana stating his grievances but the State Government  passed  an
      order on 15.04.1997 re-fixing the remuneration  of  the  appellant  in
      pursuance to the Regulation 6 of the 1972 Regulations as Rs.4135/- per
      month.  The appellant subsequently made  various  representations  but
      his grievances were not redressed.  The appellant then  preferred  CWP
      No.13029 of 1997 before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana seeking a
      declaration that the first and second proviso to  Regulation  6(2)  of
      the Regulation are unconstitutional and ultra vires to Articles 14 and
      16 of  the  Constitution  of  India  and  to  quash  the  order  dated
      29.11.1996 and 15.04.1997.  While the writ petition was  pending,  the
      appellant retired from service as  Chairman  of  the  Haryana  PSC  on
      19.09.1999.


      7.    The writ petition filed by the appellant was later heard by  the
      Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and the  same  was
      dismissed on 04.11.2009.  Aggrieved by the same this appeal  has  been
      preferred by special leave.


      8.    We have  heard  Shri  K.K.  Venugopal,  learned  senior  counsel
      appearing for the appellant and Mr. Manjit Singh,  learned  Additional
      Advocate General appearing for the State of Haryana.


      9.    The appellant was appointed as Chairman of the  Haryana  PSC  by
      the Governor of the State of Haryana in exercise of  powers  conferred
      under Article 316 (1A) of the Constitution of India.   The  conditions
      of service of the Chairman and the Members are governed  by  the  1972
      Regulations.  Regulation 6, with which we are concerned in this  case,
      reads as follows:
           “6.   (1) The Chairman shall receive  a  remuneration  of  seven
           thousand and five hundred rupees a month and each of  the  other
           Members a remuneration of six thousand and five hundred rupees a
           month.  They shall be entitled to such other allowances  as  may
           be admissible  in  future  from  time  to  time,  to  Government
           employees drawing the same pay  (in  addition  to  four  hundred
           rupees a month as car allowances provide a care is maintained).


           (2)  The  Chairman  or  the  Member  if,  at  the  time  of  his
           appointment as such, is a retired Government employee he will be
           entitled to the remuneration mentioned in sub-regulation (1)  in
           addition to the pension sanctioned to him.


                 Provided that the amount of remuneration  plus  the  gross
           amount of pension or the pension equivalent to  other  forms  of
           retirement benefits does not exceed the pay last  drawn  by  him
           before his retirement or  the  remuneration  mentioned  in  sub-
           regulation (1) whichever is higher.


                 Provided further that  the  total  remuneration  plus  the
           gross amount of pension and  the  pension  equivalent  to  other
           forms of retirement benefits, excluding the allowances, shall in
           no case exceed eight thousand rupees per month.


           (3)   The Chairman or  the  Members  who  at  the  time  of  the
           appointment as such, in the service  of  the  Central  or  State
           Government and does not exercise option under sub-regulation (1)
           of regulation 9 shall be paid  the  remuneration  drawn  by  him
           immediately before his appointment as Chairman or Member, as the
           case may be, or the remuneration  mentioned  in  sub-regulations
           (1) whichever is higher, till the date of  his  retirement  from
           Government service in  the  normal  course  and  thereafter  his
           remuneration shall be regulated as  provided  in  sub-regulation
           (2).


           (4)   A member who in the absence of the Chairman  on  leave  or
           otherwise, is asked to perform  the  additional  duties  of  the
           Chairman, shall be entitled to an additional remuneration at the
           rate of two hundred rupees a month:


                 Provided that such additional duties are performed  for  a
           period of not less than fourteen days.”


      10.   We find that after the appellant was appointed as Chairman    of
      the Haryana PSC, the Government passed an order on 18.03.1996 relaxing
      the provision contained in Regulation 6 and re-fixed the  remuneration
      of the appellant as Chairman of the  Haryana  PSC  as  Rs.7500/-  p.m.
      w.e.f. 06.07.1994  as  a  “personal  measure  to  him.”   We  find  it
      difficult to appreciate the stand of the State Government  as  to  how
      they could withdraw that benefit vide  notification  dated  29.11.1996
      and then re-fix the same vide order dated 15.04.1997 as Rs.4135/- p.m.
       The Government after having recognized the status of the appellant as
      a constitutional appointee, and relaxed Regulation 6  so  far  as  the
      appellant is concerned vide its order dated 18.03.1996, has  no  power
      to  withdraw  the  same,  especially  when  no  master   and   servant
      relationship has been established between a  constitutional  appointee
      and the State Government.  True, the appellant’s conditions of service
      were governed  by  the  1972  Regulations,  but  when  the  Government
      themselves had  relaxed  the  same,  especially  Regulation  6,  as  a
      personal measure to him, then we fail to see how they  could  withdraw
      that benefit to his  disadvantage  which,  in  our  view,  is  clearly
      discriminatory and violative of Article  14  of  the  Constitution  of
      India.


      11.   We are also of the view, as rightly contended by learned  senior
      counsel for the appellant, that the High Court has committed a serious
      error in ignoring the judgment of the learned  Single  Judge  in  Writ
      Petition No.15159 of 1996 titled Ram Phal Singh v. State of Haryana  &
      others decided on 8th September, 2004, a case relating to  the  Member
      of the Haryana Public Service  Commission,  who  was  appointed  as  a
      Member along  with  the  appellant  by  the  Haryana  Government  vide
      notification dated 16.07.1994. Learned Single Judge in that case  held
      that first proviso under  Regulation  6(2)  of  the  1972  Regulations
      which restricts the remuneration payable to a  Member  of  the  Public
      Service Commission (who was drawing wages under the  Government  at  a
      level higher than the remuneration fixed under Regulation 6(1) of 1972
      Regulations), the last pay drawn by him under the  government  at  the
      time of his appointment as a member of the Public Service  Commission,
      is violative of the proviso under Clause (b) of  Article  318  of  the
      Constitution of India.


      12.   A Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High  Court   placing
      reliance on Ram Phal Singh’s case (supra), rendered  the  judgment  in
      M.B. Pandove v. State of Punjab and others on 26.2.2005.  Against  the
      said judgment,  Special  Leave  Petition  (C)  No.12336  of  2005  was
      preferred  before  this  Court  which  was  dismissed  on  13.07.2005.
     
 Further, we notice that LPA No.115 of 2005 filed against the  judgment
      in Ram Phal Singh v. State of Haryana & others CWP 15159 of  1995  was
      also dismissed by a Division Bench of  the  Punjab  and  Haryana  High
      Court on 19.03.2007


      13.   We find that the  above-mentioned  facts  were  brought  to  the
      knowledge of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana  High  Court
      when they rendered the  impugned  judgment  but  the  Division  Bench,
      however, over-ruled the judgment in Ram  Phal  Singh’s  case  (supra),
      which was also affirmed by another Division Bench  in  LPA  No.115  of
      2005 vide its judgment  dated  19.03.2007.   We  fail  to  see  how  a
      coordinate bench of the High Court could over-rule  a  judgment  of  a
      learned Single Judge which was already affirmed by another  coordinate
      bench.  The Division Bench  has  committed  a  serious  error  of  the
      highest order.  The Division Bench should have referred the matter  to
      a larger Bench, if it was in disagreement with  the  judgment  of  the
      learned Single Judge which had already been affirmed by a  co-ordinate
      bench and on the doctrine of merger, the judgment of the Single  Judge
      had merged with that of the Division Bench.   Thus,  in  essence,  the
      Division Bench has overruled the judgment of a co-ordinate bench which
      is clearly inadmissible.  Over and above, it may also  be  noted  that
      the judgment in Ram Phal Singh’s case (supra) was followed by  another
      coordinate Division Bench of the High Court in M.P.  Pandove  (supra).
      Special Leave  Petition  (C)  No.12336  of  2005  filed  against  that
      judgment was also dismissed by this Court.  In the impugned  judgment,
      all these aspects are conveniently sidetracked and overlooked.


      14.   Law on this point has been dealt with by this Court  in  several
      Judgments.
In Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho v. Jagdish (2001) 2 SCC 247, this
      Court held as follows:
              “As the learned Single Judge was not in  agreement  with  the
           view expressed in Devilal case it would  have  been  proper,  to
           maintain judicial discipline, to refer the matter  to  a  larger
           Bench rather than to take a different  view.  We  note  it  with
           regret and distress that the said course was not followed. It is
           well-settled  that  if  a  Bench  of   coordinate   jurisdiction
           disagrees with another Bench of coordinate jurisdiction  whether
           on the  basis  of  “different  arguments”  or  otherwise,  on  a
           question of law, it is appropriate that the matter  be  referred
           to a larger Bench for resolution of the  issue  rather  than  to
           leave two conflicting judgments to operate, creating  confusion.
           It is  not  proper  to  sacrifice  certainty  of  law.  Judicial
           decorum, no  less  than  legal  propriety  forms  the  basis  of
           judicial procedure and it must be respected at all costs.”



      15.   In State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer @ Kalika Singh and  others  AIR
      2003 SC 2443 
this Court held that when an earlier decision  may  seems
      to be incorrect to a Bench of a  coordinate  jurisdiction  considering
      the question later, on the  ground  that  a  possible  aspect  of  the
      matter was not considered or not  raised  before  the  Court  or  more
      aspects should have been gone into by the Court  deciding  the  matter
      earlier but it would not be a reason to  say  that  the  decision  was
      rendered per incuriam and liable to be ignored.  
The earlier  judgment
      may seem to be not correct yet it will have the binding effect on  the
      latter bench of coordinate jurisdiction. 
 The  Court  held  that  easy
      course of saying that earlier decision was rendered  per  incuriam  is
      not permissible and the matter will have to be resolved  only  in  two
      ways – either to follow the earlier decision or refer the matter to  a
      larger Bench to examine the issue, in case it  is  felt  that  earlier
      decision is not correct on merits. 
 In this respect reference may also
      be made to the Judgment of this Court in Union of India and others  v.
      Godfrey Philips  India  Ltd.  AIR  1986  SC  806,  Sundarjas  Kanyalal
      Bhathija and others v. The Collector, Thane,  Maharashtra  and  others
      AIR 1990 SC 261 and  Tribhovandas  Purshottamdas  Thakkar  v.  Ratilal
      Motilal Patel AIR 1968 SC 372 etc.


      16.   Applying the above-mentioned principle, we are  clearly  of  the
      view that the High Court has committed a grave  error  in  over-ruling
      the judgment of the learned Single Judge  in  Ram  Phal  Singh’s  case
      (supra), which stood merged into the judgment of a Division  Bench  as
      it was affirmed by a  coordinate  bench  in  LPA  No.115  of  2005  on
      19.03.2007 and failed to  remedy  the  illegality  meted  out  to  the
      appellant.


      17.   We, therefore, allow this appeal  and  set  aside  the  impugned
      judgment of the High Court and quash the orders passed by the State of
      Haryana dated 29.11.1996 and  15.04.1997.  The  appellant,  therefore,
      would be entitled to all consequential benefits which would be paid to
      him within a period of three months  from  the  date  of  this  order.
      State of Haryana is also directed to pay an award  of  Rs.50,000/-  to
      the appellant by way of cost.




                                                            .……………………………..J.
                            (K.S. Radhakrishnan)




                                              ……………………………..J.
                                              (A.K. Sikri)
      New Delhi,
      October 07, 2013.