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Monday, October 7, 2013

Sec. 45 Karnataka Land Reforms Act - cultivate tenant = HARSHA V. RAI Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR THROUGH LRS published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40860

Sec. 45 Karnataka Land Reforms Act - Cultivate tenant -  by1st of March, 1974 one must be a cultivating tenant - with out framing proper question , no case is to be determined - Hence the Apex court remanded the case on two counts
1.whether the property said to have been given on lease to  the
tenant on the appointed day, came within the definition of  land  under  the
Act. 
  2. whether the same was an agricultural land and was being cultivated  on
or before the appointed day by the  tenant  personally.  =

  According to the appellant, his mother  was  the  owner  of  the  land
measuring in all 14 cents in Survey No. 353/1 and 353/2 at  Village  Attavar
within Taluka Mangalore in the District of Dakshina Kannada.   
She  gave  on
lease the aforesaid land  to  Bhagirathi,  respondent  no.  2  herein  by  a
registered deed dated 26th of October, 1953 on an yearly rent of Rs. 42  and
the deed styled as vacant land “chalageni” was executed.  
According  to  the
appellant, the land at the time of lease  contained  five  standing  coconut
trees and respondent no. 2, hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  tenant,  was
entitled to make improvement therein to an extent of only Rs.  5,000/-.   
It
is the case of  the  appellant  that  in  terms  of  the  lease  the  tenant
constructed a residential house on the demised property and continued to  be
in occupation of       the same. =


  Section 44 of the  Act,  inter  alia,
provides that all land held by or in possession of the tenants  with  effect
from 1st of March, 1974(hereinafter to  be  referred  to  as  the  appointed
day), shall stand transferred to and vest in the State Government.   Section
45 of the Act, inter alia, provides that the land which a  tenant  has  been
cultivating personally before the date of vesting shall be  entitled  to  be
registered as an occupant.   A  tenant  entitled  to  be  registered  as  an
occupant was required to file a petition before  a  tribunal  under  Section
48A of the Act.


      Respondent no. 2, filed an application in the prescribed  form,  inter
alia, alleging that the tenancy in question is in  respect  of  agricultural
land and she was cultivating the same prior  to  1st  of  March,  1974  and,
therefore, she is entitled to be registered  as  an  occupant  in  terms  of
Section 45 of the Act.   -

 The dissenting Member expressed his view in the following words:
                 “………..It is learnt from the enquiry that the  petitioner’s
           husband is a truck (lorry) owner, the main source of  income  of
           the petitioner is from the income  derived  from  the  rent  and
           selling the fire-wood from the fire-wood depot.  The  petitioner
           is not an agriculturist, at  any  time.   Apart  from  this  the
           petitioner has no cultivable lands also,  because  there  are  5
           coconut trees in  the  courtyard  that  cannot  be  treated  the
           petition land as agricultural lands”

To satisfy the requirement of  Section  45  of  the
Act  to be registered as an occupant, the claimant has to satisfy that he  is
the tenant in respect of land which he  is  cultivating  personally  on  the
appointed day.  
  whether the property said to have been given on lease to  the
tenant on the appointed day, came within the definition of  land  under  the
Act.  
   whether the same was an agricultural land and was being cultivated  on
or before the appointed day by the  tenant  personally.   
The  tribunal  has
made spot inspection much later than the appointed  day  on  15th  December,
1987 which, in our opinion, has no relevance at all with the rights  of  the
parties.  
Here, the rights of the parties have to  be  crystallized  on  the
basis of what existed on the appointed day. 
Neither  the  Tribunal  nor  the
High Court has gone into this question in the right perspective.  
We are  of
the opinion that the impugned orders of the learned Single  Judge  and  that
of the Division Bench as also of the Tribunal deserve to be  set  aside  and
the  matter  remitted  back  to  the  tribunal  for  its  consideration   in
accordance with law.  
We make it clear that the  observation  made  in  this
order is for the purpose of its disposal and shall have no  bearing  on  the
merit of the case.

      In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the  impugned  judgment
and remit the matter back to the tribunal for reconsideration in  accordance
with law bearing in mind the  observations  aforesaid.   In  the  facts  and
circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.

                                                REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.9031 OF 2013
               (@SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 3928 OF 2006)

HARSHA V. RAI                                … APPELLANT

                                   VERSUS

STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.                   …RESPONDENTS



                               J U D G M E N T


CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.


      By the orders impugned the claim of respondent no. 2  Bhagirathi  Bai,
since deceased, to be registered as an occupant  under  Section  45  of  the
Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 in respect of the land measuring  14  cents
in Survey Nos. 353/1 and 353/2 in the Village Attavar  in  Taluka  Mangalore
in the District of Dakshina Kannada has been upheld.


      Leave granted.

      According to the appellant, his mother  was  the  owner  of  the  land
measuring in all 14 cents in Survey No. 353/1 and 353/2 at  Village  Attavar
within Taluka Mangalore in the District of Dakshina Kannada.   
She  gave  on
lease the aforesaid land  to  Bhagirathi,  respondent  no.  2  herein  by  a
registered deed dated 26th of October, 1953 on an yearly rent of Rs. 42  and
the deed styled as vacant land “chalageni” was executed.  
According  to  the
appellant, the land at the time of lease  contained  five  standing  coconut
trees and respondent no. 2, hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  tenant,  was
entitled to make improvement therein to an extent of only Rs.  5,000/-.   
It
is the case of  the  appellant  that  in  terms  of  the  lease  the  tenant
constructed a residential house on the demised property and continued to  be
in occupation of       the same.




      By Section 34 of the Karnataka  Land  Reforms  (Amendment)  Act,  1973
(Karnataka Act 1 of 1974) Section 44 and Section 45  were  substituted  with
effect from 1st of March, 1974 in the  Karnataka  Land  Reforms  Act,  1961,
hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’.
Section 44 of the  Act,  inter  alia,
provides that all land held by or in possession of the tenants  with  effect
from 1st of March, 1974(hereinafter to  be  referred  to  as  the  appointed
day), shall stand transferred to and vest in the State Government.   Section
45 of the Act, inter alia, provides that the land which a  tenant  has  been
cultivating personally before the date of vesting shall be  entitled  to  be
registered as an occupant.   A  tenant  entitled  to  be  registered  as  an
occupant was required to file a petition before  a  tribunal  under  Section
48A of the Act.


      Respondent no. 2, filed an application in the prescribed  form,  inter
alia, alleging that the tenancy in question is in  respect  of  agricultural
land and she was cultivating the same prior  to  1st  of  March,  1974  and,
therefore, she is entitled to be registered  as  an  occupant  in  terms  of
Section 45 of the Act.
The appellant, hereinafter referred to as ‘the  land
owner’, resisted her claim and the tribunal  rejected  the  tenant’s  claim,
but the same was set aside by the High Court in  a  petition  filed  by  the
tenant  and  the  matter   was   remitted   back   to   the   tribunal   for
reconsideration.  While doing so, the High Court observed that the  tribunal
shall consider the “chalageni”.  After the  remand  the  tribunal  conducted
spot inspection on 15th of December, 1987 and found existence of a  dwelling
house, a    firewood-depot  and  a  few  coconut  trees.   The  tribunal  by
majority held that the land was not an agricultural  land  on  the  date  of
inspection but concluded that it was used as agricultural land  35-40  years
ago and accordingly upheld the claim of the tenant.  The dissenting  Member,
however, observed that the  land  in  question  cannot  be  said  to  be  an
agricultural land. The learned Member  found  that  part  of  the  land  was
leased out by tenant’s husband for firewood depot and he is a  truck  owner.
The dissenting Member expressed his view in the following words:
                 “………..It is learnt from the enquiry that the  petitioner’s
           husband is a truck (lorry) owner, the main source of  income  of
           the petitioner is from the income  derived  from  the  rent  and
           selling the fire-wood from the fire-wood depot.  The  petitioner
           is not an agriculturist, at  any  time.   Apart  from  this  the
           petitioner has no cultivable lands also,  because  there  are  5
           coconut trees in  the  courtyard  that  cannot  be  treated  the
           petition land as agricultural lands”

      Mr. Basava Prabhu S.Patil, learned Senior counsel  appears  on  behalf
of the  appellant  and  submits  that  the  land  in  question  was  not  an
agricultural land on the appointed  day.  Further  the  tenant  was  not  an
agriculturist and not cultivating the land personally on the said date  and,
therefore, cannot be registered as an occupant in terms  of  Section  45  of
the Act.  Mr. S.N. Bhat appearing  for  the  tenant  as  also  Ms.  Vishruti
Vijay, learned counsel representing  the  State  submit  that  the  land  in
question was an agricultural land which was being cultivated  personally  by
the tenant and, therefore, she was rightly registered as an occupant by  the
tribunal and the said order has rightly been affirmed  by  the  High  Court.
In view of the submission advanced it is advisable to refer  to  the  scheme
of the Act.  As the claim is raised under Section 45 of the Act, we deem  it
expedient to reproduce the same which reads as follows:
           “45. Tenants to be registered as occupants of  land  on  certain
           conditions.—(1) Subject to  the  provisions  of  the  succeeding
           sections of this Chapter,  every  person  who  was  a  permanent
           tenant, protected tenant or other tenant or where a  tenant  has
           lawfully sub-let, such sub-tenant shall, with effect on and from
           the date of vesting be entitled to be registered as an  occupant
           in respect of the lands of which  he  was  a  permanent  tenant,
           protected tenant or other tenant or sub-tenant before  the  date
           of vesting and which he has been cultivating personally.


           (2) If a tenant or other person referred to in sub-section (1),—




                 i) holds land partly as owner and partly as tenant but  the
                    area of the land held by him as owner  is  equal  to  or
                    exceeds a ceiling area he shall not be  entitled  to  be
                    registered as an occupant of the land held by him  as  a
                    tenant before the date of vesting;


                ii) does not hold and cultivate personally any  land  as  an
                    owner, but holds land as  tenant,  which  he  cultivates
                    personally in excess of a  ceiling  area,  he  shall  be
                    entitled to be registered as an occupant to  the  extent
                    of a ceiling area;

               iii) holds and cultivates personally as an owner of any  land
                    the area of which is less than a ceiling area, he  shall
                    be entitled to be  registered  as  an  occupant  to  the
                    extent of such area as will be sufficient to make up his
                    holding to the extent of a ceiling area.


           (3) The land held by a person before the date of vesting and  in
           respect of which he is not  entitled  to  be  registered  as  an
           occupant under this section shall be disposed of in  the  manner
           provided in section 77 after evicting such person.”


      The aforesaid section, inter alia, provides that a tenant holding  the
land and cultivating it personally on and from the date of vesting shall  be
entitled to be registered as an  occupant.   The  expression  ‘to  cultivate
personally’, ‘land’ and ‘tenant’ have  been  defined  under  Section  2(11),
2(18) and 2(34) of the Act.  The person  claiming  to  be  registered  as  a
tenant  has  to  satisfy  that  he  is  not  only  a  tenant  but  also   an
agriculturist who cultivates personally the land  held  on  lease.   Section
2(34) defines ‘tenant’ as follows:

           “2.Definitions.- (A) In this Act, unless the  context  otherwise
           requires,-


                   xxx      xxx              xxx

            (34) “Tenant” means an agriculturist who cultivates  personally
           the land he holds on lease from a landlord and includes—


                 (i) a person who is deemed to be a tenant under section 4;


                 (ii) a person who was protected from eviction from any land
                 by  the  Karnataka  Tenants  (Temporary   Protection   from
                 Eviction) Act, 1961;


                 (ii-a) a person who cultivates personally any land on lease
                 under a lease created contrary to the provisions of section
                 5 and before the date of commencement of the Amendment Act;


                 (iii) a person who is a permanent tenant; and


                 (iv) a person who is a protected tenant.


           Explanation.—A person who takes up a contract to cut  grass,  or
           together the fruits or other produce of any land, shall  not  on
           that account only be deemed to be a tenant;”

      It is an  inclusive  definition  and  in  the  present  case,  we  are
concerned with the main provision. To come within the definition  of  tenant
a person  has  to  be  an  agriculturist  and  such  a  person  is  required
personally to  cultivate  the  land  he  holds  on  lease.   The  expression
‘cultivate personally’ has been defined under  Section  2(11)  of  the  Act,
which reads as follows:

           “2.Definitions.- (A)  xxx       xxx   xxx


           (11) “To cultivate personally” means to cultivate land on  one’s
                  own account,—


                      i) by one’s own labour; or


                     ii) by the labour of any member of one’s family or;

                    iii) by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in
                         cash or kind, but not in  crop  share,  under  the
                         personal supervision of oneself or  by  member  of
                         one’s family;


                 Explanation I.— In the case of an educational, religious or
           charitable institution or society or trust, of a  public  nature
           capable of holding property, formed for  educational,  religious
           or charitable purpose, the land shall be deemed to be cultivated
           personally if such land is cultivated  by  hired  labour  or  by
           servants under the personal supervision of an employee or  agent
           of such institution or society or trust;


           Explanation II.— In the case of a joint family, the  land  shall
           be deemed to be cultivated personally, if it  is  cultivated  by
           any member of such family.;”


      As stated earlier, to satisfy the requirement of  Section  45  of  the
Act 
to be registered as an occupant, the claimant has to satisfy that he  is
the tenant in respect of land which he  is  cultivating  personally  on  the
appointed day.  
Neither the tribunal nor the High Court has  gone  into  the
question as to whether the property said to have been given on lease to  the
tenant on the appointed day, came within the definition of  land  under  the
Act.  
Further, the tribunal and the High Court have not addressed the  issue
as to whether the same was an agricultural land and was being cultivated  on
or before the appointed day by the  tenant  personally.   
The  tribunal  has
made spot inspection much later than the appointed  day  on  15th  December,
1987 which, in our opinion, has no relevance at all with the rights  of  the
parties.  
Here, the rights of the parties have to  be  crystallized  on  the
basis of what existed on the appointed day. 
Neither  the  Tribunal  nor  the
High Court has gone into this question in the right perspective.  
We are  of
the opinion that the impugned orders of the learned Single  Judge  and  that
of the Division Bench as also of the Tribunal deserve to be  set  aside  and
the  matter  remitted  back  to  the  tribunal  for  its  consideration   in
accordance with law.  
We make it clear that the  observation  made  in  this
order is for the purpose of its disposal and shall have no  bearing  on  the
merit of the case.

      In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the  impugned  judgment
and remit the matter back to the tribunal for reconsideration in  accordance
with law bearing in mind the  observations  aforesaid.   In  the  facts  and
circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.


                                                  ……………………..………………………………..J.


                          (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)






                                    …….….……….………………………………..J.
                                        (KURIAN JOSEPH)


NEW DELHI,
OCTOBER 7, 2013


                           -----------------------
13


Sec.306 of I.P.C. but not under sec.304 B I.P.C. - suicide of wife = STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. GIRIDHARI LAL Published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40859


When there is no evidence that the suicide was committed due to curelty and harassment by her husband for dowry soon before her death, Accused is liable to be punished only under sec.306 of I.P.C. but not under sec.304 B I.P.C. =

whether Babita’s death is  an  instance  of
dowry death or whether she was driven to commit suicide by her husband?

 under  Section  304B  which  is
required to be established by the State is 
whether “soon before  her  death”
Babita was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband,  “for  or  in connection with demand of dowry”, to allege “dowry death”.
It is  not  made  specific
as to whether Girdhari Lal demanded dowry.

1.   Section 113B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is  whether
           a person has committed the dowry death of  a  woman  and  it  is
                   shown that soon before her death  such  woman  has  been
                   subjected by such person to cruelty or  harassment  for,
                   or in connection with, any demand for dowry,  the  Court
                   shall presume that such  person  had  caused  the  dowry
                   death.



                 Explanation.- For the  purposes  of  this  section,  "dowry
           death" shall have the same meaning as in  section  304B  of  the
           Indian Penal Code(45 of 1860).

113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married  women.-When  the
                   question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman
           had been abetted by her husband or any relative of  her  husband
                   and it is shown that she had committed suicide within  a
                   period of seven years from the date of her marriage  and
                   that her husband or such relative  of  her  husband  had
                   subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume,  having
                   regard to all the other circumstances of the case,  that
                   such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by  such
                   relative of her husband.



                 Explanation – For the purposes of this  section,  "cruelty"
           shall have the same meaning as in section  498A  of  the  Indian
           Panel Code (45 of 1860).

         In the  instant  case,  it  is  established  from  the  ocular  and
documentary evidence that Babita was subjected to  cruelty  and  harassment.
As a result of such treatment of cruelty and harassment she  was  driven  to
meet the suicidal death. She had committed suicide  within  a  period  of  7
years from her marriage and that her husband had subjected her  to  cruelty.
Therefore, the Appellate Court rightly presumed, having regard to all  other
circumstances of the case, that  such  suicidal  had  been  abetted  by  her
husband Girdhari Lal and convicted him for the  offence  under  Section  306
IPC. Hence, no interference is called for.
14.      We find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.

                                                            REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1186 OF 2008

STATE OF RAJASTHAN                              ... APPELLANT

                                   Versus

GIRDHARI LAL                                  ...RESPONDENT


                               J U D G M E N T


SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.


         This appeal has been preferred by the State  of  Rajasthan  against
the judgment and order dated 14th March, 2007 passed by the  Division  Bench
of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench. By  the  impugned  judgment,  the
Division Bench partly allowed the appeal filed  by  the  respondent-Girdhari
Lal, modified the sentence and convicted him under Section 306  IPC  instead of 304B IPC.
For the said offence,  the  Division  Bench  sentenced  him  to
undergo five years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/-,  in  default
he has to  further  suffer  six  months  rigorous  imprisonment.  Since  the
respondent-Girdhari Lal had already undergone imprisonment for a  period  of
more than six years, the High Court directed to release  him  forthwith,  if
not required to be detained in any other case.
2.       The case of the prosecution in nutshell is that:
         The informant-Jugal Kishore(PW.1) – father of the  deceased  Babita
in his written complaint on 11th August, 1998 informed  that  his  daughter-
Babita (since deceased) was married to respondent-Girdhari  Lal  four  years
back. Her in-laws were harassing Babita in connection with demand for  dowry
from the initial days of her marriage.  Earlier also the in-laws  of  Babita
made attempt to set her ablaze and neighbourers rescued her.  Later, the in-
laws assured her parents that they will  not  harass  Babita,  but  she  was
burnt to death on 10th August, 1998.
3.       On the said complaint a case under Section 304B and  498A  IPC  was
registered  and  investigation  was  commenced.  After   the   investigation
chargesheet was filed. In due course, the case came  up  for  trial  to  the
Additional Sessions Judge, Jhunjhunu. The  charge  under  Section  304B  IPC
framed  against  the  respondent  was  denied  by  him  who  claimed  trial.
Altogether 9  witnesses  were  examined  in  support  of  the  case  of  the
prosecution. In his explanation under Section 313 Cr. P.C.,  the  respondent
claimed innocence. Two defence  witnesses  were  also  examined.  The  trial
court on appreciation of evidence and on hearing the parties  convicted  the
respondent under Section  304-B  IPC  and  sentenced  him  to  undergo  life
imprisonment.
         On appeal, as noticed above, the Division Bench of the  High  Court
partly allowed the appeal, convicted the respondent under  Section  306  IPC
instead of 304B IPC  and  sentenced  him  to  undergo  five  years  rigorous
imprisonment with fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default he has  to  further  suffer
six months rigorous imprisonment.
4.        Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant-State  submitted  that   the
deceased-Babita  died  within  7  years  of  her  marriage  under  unnatural
circumstances and respondent did not inform  the  parents  of  the  deceased
regarding  the  incident.  The  burden  to  prove  innocence  lies  on   the
respondent after the prosecution has proved that  the  deceased  died  under
the  unnatural  circumstances  within  seven  years  of  marriage.  Further,
according to the learned counsel for the State, the High  Court  has  failed
to appreciate that Jugal Kishore (PW.1), Nand  Lal  (PW.4)  and  Smt.  Bimla
(PW.7) have made statements regarding harassment and torture by the  in-laws
of the deceased  in  relation  to  the  demand  for  dowry  which  has  been
corroborated by the statement  of  other  witnesses  and  the  documents  on
record. The aforesaid facts were not properly appreciated by the High  Court
while converting the conviction  from  Section  304B  IPC  to  306  IPC  and
reducing the sentence from life imprisonment to five years imprisonment.
5.       Learned counsel appearing for the  respondent  on  the  other  hand
supported the decision rendered by the High Court.
6.       We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone  through
the materials on record.
7.       Coming to the evidence adduced at the trial, we notice that  Babita
died of burn injuries within 5 to 6 years of her marriage  with  respondent-
Girdhari Lal,  thereby  the  death  occurred  otherwise  than  under  normal
circumstances. A bare look at the postmortem  report  (Ext.P-6)  shows  that
the deceased died because of the extensive burns.  Therefore,  the  question
that arises for determination is
whether Babita’s death is  an  instance  of
dowry death or whether she was driven to commit suicide by her husband?
8.       The main ingredient of the offence  under  Section  304B  which  is
required to be established by the State is 
whether “soon before  her  death”
Babita was subjected to cruelty and harassment by her husband,  “for  or  in connection with demand of dowry”, to allege “dowry death”.
         Jugal Kishore (PW.1) is himself the complainant and is  the  father
of the deceased-Babita. He stated that his daughter was married to  Girdhari
Lal about 6 or 7 years back. The said statement was recorded on  12th  June,
2000 and the incident occurred on 10th  August,  1998.  Shyam  Lal  Mahajan,
another resident of the Village Chhavsari, where the marriage of Babita  was
solemnised, by  his  statement  stated  that  the  marriage  of  Babita  was
solemnised with accused Girdhari Lal in the year 1992-93.  Similar  was  the
statement made on 12th June, 2000 by Jagdish Prasad  (PW.3)  and  he  stated
that the marriage of Babita was solemnised with  the  accused  Girdhari  Lal
about 6 or 7 years back. Therefore, it is clear that  the  death  of  Babita
happened within 7 years of her marriage.
9.       The death of Babita was caused by the  burn  injuries  and  thereby
death occurred otherwise than  under  normal  circumstances.  The  statement
made by Dr. J.P. Bugalia (PW.6)  proved the fact that death was  caused  due
to the burns. He stated that on 10th August, 1998 he was working as  Medical
Jurist in B.D.K. Hospital, Jhunjhunu. He along with Dr. P.S. Sahu  conducted
the postmortem of Babita who was admitted in the Hospital  on  10th  August,
1998 at 1.50 p.m. and died during the treatment  at  4.00  p.m.  There  were
burn injuries all over her body.
10.      So far as  the  harassment  and  cruelty  are  concerned,  Rajender
Prasad (PW.8) stated that Girdhari Lal used to beat  her  for  dowry.  Jugal
Kishore(PW.1)  has also supported the fact that she was being  subjected  to
cruelty in connection with dowry demand by stating that  Girdhari  Lal  used
to beat and harass Babita for dowry after her marriage. Once  he  was  asked
not to do so but he did not mend his ways. He also stated that Girdhari  Lal
earlier tried to burn her alive by pouring kerosene by confining  her  in  a
room and when he came to know about this incident, he went  to  her  in-laws
house alongwith Shyam Lal, Phool Chand, Rajender, Jagdish, Neki Ram and  Man
Roop where Girdhari Lal and his father begged their pardon for their act  of
burning her alive and assured that they will not repeat the incident.  Bimla
Devi (PW.7), mother of  the  deceased  stated  in  her  statement  that  the
accused Girdhari Lal and Babita came to their village  Chhavsari  one  month
prior to the incident and stayed there for one hour. Jugal Kishore  was  not
present at the house at that time and Babita told her  mother  to  send  her
father to her  in-laws  because  Girdhari  Lal  used  to  harass  her.
 This
statement clearly indicates that Babita was being subjected to  cruelty  and
harassment soon before the death.
11.      Now, the question arises as to
whether  Babita  was  subjected  to
such cruelty and harassment by her husband soon before her death for, or  in connection with the demand of dowry.
The period which can  come  within  the
term “soon before” cannot be put within the four corners of time  frame. 
 It is left to the Court for its determination  depending  upon  the  facts  and circumstances of each case.
         In the present case,  Jugal Kishore (PW.1) and  Bimla  Devi  (PW.7)
has made ominous  statements  regarding  demand  of  dowry  that  after  the
marriage demand of dowry was made by the in-laws. 
It is  not  made  specific
as to whether Girdhari Lal demanded dowry.
12.      Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which deals with  the
presumption as to dowry death reads as follows:

1 Section 113B. Presumption as to dowry death.-When the question is  whether
           a person has committed the dowry death of  a  woman  and  it  is
                   shown that soon before her death  such  woman  has  been
                   subjected by such person to cruelty or  harassment  for,
                   or in connection with, any demand for dowry,  the  Court
                   shall presume that such  person  had  caused  the  dowry
                   death.



                 Explanation.- For the  purposes  of  this  section,  "dowry
           death" shall have the same meaning as in  section  304B  of  the
           Indian Penal Code(45 of 1860).

         In the present case there is no evidence on record to come  to  the
definite conclusion that soon before her  death,  Babita  was  subjected  to
cruelty or harassment by her husband, Girdhari Lal  for,  or  in  connection
with any, demand of dowry. In absence of  such  ingredient  the  presumption
that  Girdhari  Lal  had  caused  the  dowry  death  cannot  be  drawn.  The
prosecution thereby cannot take advantage of  Section  113B  of  the  Indian
Evidence Act, 1872.
13.       Section  113A  of  the  Indian  Evidence  Act,  1872  relates   to
presumption as to abetment of suicide by a  married  woman  which  reads  as
follows:

2 113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married  women.-When  the
                   question is 
whether the commission of suicide by a woman
           had been abetted by her husband or any relative of  her  husband
                   and it is shown that she had committed suicide within  a
                   period of seven years from the date of her marriage  and
                   that her husband or such relative  of  her  husband  had
                   subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume,  having
                   regard to all the other circumstances of the case,  that
                   such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by  such
                   relative of her husband.



                 Explanation – For the purposes of this  section,  "cruelty"
           shall have the same meaning as in section  498A  of  the  Indian
           Panel Code (45 of 1860).

         In the  instant  case,  it  is  established  from  the  ocular  and
documentary evidence that Babita was subjected to  cruelty  and  harassment.
As a result of such treatment of cruelty and harassment she  was  driven  to
meet the suicidal death. She had committed suicide  within  a  period  of  7
years from her marriage and that her husband had subjected her  to  cruelty.
Therefore, the Appellate Court rightly presumed, having regard to all  other
circumstances of the case, that  such  suicidal  had  been  abetted  by  her
husband Girdhari Lal and convicted him for the  offence  under  Section  306
IPC. Hence, no interference is called for.
14.      We find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is dismissed.


                                             ……………………………………………………………………………J.
                             (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)




                                              …………………………………………………………………………J.
                                       (A.K. SIKRI)
NEW DELHI,
OCTOBER 7,2013.


Saturday, October 5, 2013

sec. 354 outrage the modesty of women is to be considered stringy, no lenient view - Ajahar Ali ... Appellant VERSUS State of West Bengal ... Respondent published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40857

 Sec. 354 outrage the modesty of women is to be considered stringy, no lenient view should be taken while granting punishment - Due to delay of 18 years, the accused is not entitled  to any benefit under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 - No lenient view
The provisions of Section 354 IPC has been enacted to  safeguard
      public morality and decent behaviour.  Therefore, if any  person  uses
      criminal force upon any woman with the intention or knowledge that the
      woman’s modesty will be outraged, he is to be punished. =

 In Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 3011
      and Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC  625,
      this court held that the offence relating to modesty of  woman  cannot
      be treated as  trivial  and  a  lenient  view  by  giving  six  months
      imprisonment  on  the  ground   of   juvenility   does   not   require
      consideration.
      18.   In Chinnadurai v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR  1996  SC  546,  this
      Court  rejected  the  plea  for  reduction  of  sentence  in  view  of
      considerable delay and other circumstances observing that sentence has
      to be awarded taking into consideration the gravity of the injuries.
 In view of the above, we are of considered opinion that  as  the
      appellant had been awarded only six months  imprisonment,  considering
      the matter under the JJ Act, 2000 would not serve any purpose at  such
      a belated stage.   The  High  Court  had  been  of  the  opinion  that
      appellant had been dealt with very leniently and it  was  a  fit  case
      where the High Court wanted to enhance the  sentence  but  considering
      the fact  that  the  incident  occurred  long  back,  the  High  Court
      refrained to do so.
      22.   Thus, the  appeal  fails  and  is  accordingly  dismissed.   The
      appellant is directed to surrender within a period of  four  weeks  to
      serve out the sentence, failing which the Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,
      Malda, is directed to take him into custody to serve out the sentence.
       A copy of the order be sent to Chief Judicial Magistrate,  Malda  for
      information and action.
                                                                  REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1623 OF 2013
                (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2817 of 2013)


      Ajahar Ali
      ... Appellant


                                   VERSUS


      State of West Bengal
      ... Respondent




                               J U D G M E N T


      Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.




        1. Leave granted.


        2. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and
           order dated 19.9.2012  passed by the High Court of  Calcutta  in
           Criminal Revision No. 3240 of 2012  affirming the  judgment  and
           order of the learned Sessions Judge dated  22.8.2012  dismissing
           the appeal of the appellant against the judgment  and  order  of
           the learned Magistrate dated 9.5.2012, by which  and  whereunder
           the learned Magistrate had found the appellant  guilty  for  the
           offence punishable under Section 354 of Indian Penal Code,  1860
           (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’).  He had  been  sentenced
           to suffer SI for 6 months and further to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-
           , and in default of payment of fine, further to undergo  SI  for
           two months.

        3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to appeal are that:
      A.    On 6.11.1995, Nasima Begum (PW.1), aged about 16 years  filed  a
      complaint alleging that on that day while she was going to attend  her
      tuition alongwith her friend Nilufa Khatun, she met the  appellant  on
      the way who suddenly came and forcibly caught hold  of  her  hair  and
      planted a kiss, resultantly, she suffered a cut over her lower lip and
      started bleeding.
      B.     A  case  under  Section  354/324  IPC  was  registered.   After
      conducting the trial, the court of Ist Judicial Magistrate, Ist Court,
      Malda vide judgment and  order  dated  9.5.2012  found  the  appellant
      guilty for offence under Section 354 IPC and sentenced him as referred
      to hereinabove.
      C.    Aggrieved, the appellant  preferred  Criminal  Appeal  No.2/2012
      before the learned Sessions Judge,  Malda  and  the  said  appeal  was
      dismissed vide judgment and order dated 22.8.2012.
      D.     Appellant  challenged  both  the  aforesaid  orders  by  filing
      Criminal Revision before the High Court which has  been  dismissed  by
      the impugned judgment and order dated 19.9.2012.
            Hence, this appeal.


      4.    Shri S.C. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has
      half-heartedly challenged the findings of fact recorded by the  courts
      below.
However, we are not inclined to re-appreciate the evidence  and
      disturb the findings recorded  by  the  three  courts,  therefore,  he
      argued that since the incident occurred more than 18 years ago and  at
      that time the appellant as well as the complainant were about 16 years
      of age, the court should not send the appellant to   jail  at  such  a
      belated stage.
Considering the fact that the appellant  was  juvenile
      in view of the provisions of Juvenile Justice Act,  2000  (hereinafter
      referred to as the ‘JJ Act 2000’), he ought to have been tried  before
      the Juvenile Justice Board and not by the criminal court, as was done.
     
Even otherwise, considering the time gap of 18 years and the fact that
      the appellant as well as the complainant have  settled  in   life  and
      both of them are married and have children, their lives should not  be
      disturbed.  In all circumstances, the court should give the benefit to
      the appellant under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
      (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act  1958’).  Therefore,  the  appeal
      deserves to be allowed.
      5.    On the other hand, Shri Anip Sachthey, learned Standing  counsel
      appearing for  the  State  of  West  Bengal  has  opposed  the  appeal
      contending that considering the nature of offence wherein the  modesty
      of a young girl was outraged, the question of showing any leniency  or
      granting the benefit of the Act 1958 is not  warranted.  Even  if  the
      case of the appellant is considered under the JJ Act 2000, the maximum
      punishment that can be awarded is of 3 years,  while  in  the  instant
      case, the appellant had been  sentenced  only  for  a  period  of  six
      months. Therefore, it will be a futile exercise to consider  the  case
      of the appellant on that anvil. Thus,  the  appeal  is  liable  to  be
      dismissed.


      6.    We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel
      for the parties and perused the record.


      7.    In view of the concurrent findings recorded by the three  courts
      below, we are not inclined to re-appreciate the  evidence.   The  same
      is also not warranted in view of the fact that the complainant, Nasima
      Begum who had no enmity against the appellant has been very consistent
      about the factual matrix not only in her statement under  Section  161
      of Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  (hereinafter  referred  to  as
      `Cr.P.C.’) but also before the court and had supported the prosecution
      case fully. Her version was corroborated by  several  other  witnesses
      and the courts below have recorded a finding that  the  appellant  was
      guilty beyond reasonable doubt.


      8.    Learned counsel for the appellant pleads  for  leniency  on  the
      ground that the trial has gone on for a long time; furthermore, he has
      no previous criminal history and that he may lose his  job.   For  the
      purpose of seeking a benefit under the Act 1958 he has placed reliance
      on the judgment of this Court in Mohamed Aziz Mohamed Nasir  v.  State
      of Maharashtra, AIR 1976 SC 730, wherein the benefit of the  Act  1958
      was given observing further that even if such plea had not been raised
      before the court below, it can be raised for  the  first  time  before
      this court.   That was a case under Section 379 r/w Section 34 IPC and
      the charge against the said appellant was snatching  two  sarees  from
      one Govind who was carrying them from the shop of  his master to  that
      of a washer and dyer.


      9.    In Musa Khan & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1976  DV  2566,
      this Court observed that the purpose of the provisions of the Act 1958
      is to reform the juvenile offenders though  that was a case of Section
      149 IPC and the court held that culpable liability does not arise from
      mere  presence  in  the  assembly  and  even  participation  does  not
      necessarily lead to  the  conclusion  that  he  joined  that  unlawful
      assembly willingly.


      10.   This Court in Karamjit Singh v. State of Punjab,  (2009)  7  SCC
      178, to which one of us (Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.) was  a  member  of  the
      Bench, after considering various earlier  judgments  and  particularly
      Om Prakash & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2001) 10 SCC 477 and  Manjappa
      v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 6 SCC 231; held  that a relief under the
      Act 1958 should be granted in the offences which were not  of  a  very
      grave nature or where the mens rea is absent.


      11.   In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Dharam Pal, (2004)  9  SCC  681,
      this Court considered the appeal of  the  State  of  Himachal  Pradesh
      wherein the benefit of the Act 1958 had been given to the accused  who
      was held guilty for offence under Section 376/511  IPC for attempt  to
      commit rape. This Court in the peculiar  facts  and  circumstances  of
      that case did  not interfere with the judgment and order of  the  High
      Court, but at the same time did not approve of the reasoning given  by
      the High Court. The court held as under :


           “According to us, the offence of an attempt to commit rape is  a
           serious offence, as ultimately if translated into the act  leads
           to an assault on the most valuable possession of  a  woman  i.e.
           character, reputation, dignity and honour. In a traditional  and
           conservative country like India, any  attempt  to  misbehave  or
           sexually assault a woman is one of the most depraved  acts.  The
           Act is intended to reform the persons who can  be  reformed  and
           would cease to be a nuisance in the society. But the  discretion
           to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 4 is  hedged  with  a
           condition about the nature of offence and the character  of  the
           offender. Section 6 of the Act makes the  provisions  applicable
           in  cases  where  offenders  are  under  21  years  of  age,  as
           restrictions on imprisonment of offenders have been indicated in
           the said provision. In a  case  involving  similar  facts,  this
           Court in State of Haryana v. Prem Chand, (1997) 7 SCC 756 upheld
           the judgment of the High Court which  extended  the  benefit  of
           provisions under Section 4 of the Act. Considering the  peculiar
           circumstances of the case and taking into account the fact  that
           on the date of occurrence the accused was  less  than  21  years
           old, we feel this is a case where no interference is called  for
           with the  judgment  of  the  High  Court,  though  some  of  the
           conclusions arrived at  by  the  High  Court  do  not  have  our
           approval.”




      12.   In the instant case, as the appellant has  committed  a  heinous
      crime and with the social condition prevailing  in  the  society,  the
      modesty of a woman has to be strongly guarded  and  as  the  appellant
      behaved like a road side Romeo, we do not think it is a fit case where
      the benefit of the Act 1958 should be given to the appellant.
      13.   This brings us to the next question regarding the  applicability
      of JJ Act 2000. This issue has been raised for the first time in  this
      court and the appellant can do so in view of the larger Bench judgment
      of this Court in Abuzar Hossain @  Gulam  Hossain  v.  State  of  West
      Bengal, (2012) 10 SCC 489, wherein  it  was  held  that  the  plea  of
      juvenility can be raised at any stage irrespective of delay in raising
      the same. But the question that would arise  is  if  the  matter  came
      before the Juvenile Justice Board, the maximum sentence  that  can  be
      awarded in such a case is of  3  years.   In  the  instant  case,  the
      punishment awarded is only six months so the cause of the appellant is
      not prejudiced.
      14.   The provisions of Section 354 IPC has been enacted to  safeguard
      public morality and decent behaviour.  Therefore, if any  person  uses
      criminal force upon any woman with the intention or knowledge that the
      woman’s modesty will be outraged, he is to be punished.
      15.   In State of Punjab v. Major Singh, AIR 1967 SC  63,  this  Court
      observed that modesty is the quality of being modest which  means   as
      regards women, decent in  manner  and  conduct,  scrupulously  chaste,
      though the word ‘modesty’ has  not  been  defined  in  the  Code.  The
      ultimate test for determining whether modesty  has  been  outraged  is
      whether the action of the offender as such can  be  perceived  as  one
      which is capable of lowering the sense of decency of a woman.
      (See also: Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana,  AIR  2004  SC  1497;  Raju
      Pandurang Mahale v. State  of  Maharashtra,  AIR  2004  SC  1677;  and
      Turkeshwar Sahu v. State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC  560).


      16.   In Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Anr.,
      AIR 1996 SC 309,  slapping  a  woman  on  her  posterior  amounted  to
      outraging of her modesty within the meaning of Sections  354  and  509
      IPC.
      17.   In Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 3011
      and Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra, AIR 1999 SC  625,
      this court held that the offence relating to modesty of  woman  cannot
      be treated as  trivial  and  a  lenient  view  by  giving  six  months
      imprisonment  on  the  ground   of   juvenility   does   not   require
      consideration.
      18.   In Chinnadurai v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR  1996  SC  546,  this
      Court  rejected  the  plea  for  reduction  of  sentence  in  view  of
      considerable delay and other circumstances observing that sentence has
      to be awarded taking into consideration the gravity of the injuries.


      19.   In State of U.P. v.  Shri Kishan, AIR 2005 SC 1250,  this  Court
      has emphasised that just and proper sentence should be  imposed.   The
      Court held:
            “…… Any liberal attitude by imposing meager sentences or taking
           too sympathetic view merely on  account  of  lapse  of  time  in
           respect of such offences will be result-wise counter  productive
           in the long run and against societal interest which needs to  be
           cared for and strengthened by string of  deterrence  inbuilt  in
           the sentencing system.
                 The Court will  be  failing  in  its  duty  if  appropriate
           punishment is not awarded for a crime which has  been  committed
           not only against the individual  victim  but  also  against  the
           society to which the criminal and victim belong. The  punishment
           to be awarded for a crime must not be irrelevant but  it  should
           conform to and be consistent with  the  atrocity  and  brutality
           with which the crime has been perpetrated, the enormity  of  the
           crime warranting public abhorrence and it should ‘respond to the
           society's cry for justice against the criminal’.”

           (Emphasis added)




      20.   In Sadhupati Nageswara Rao v.  State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2012
      SC 3242, this Court observed that the courts cannot take lenient  view
      in awarding sentence on the ground of sympathy or delay  as  the  same
      cannot be any ground for reduction of sentence.


      21.   In view of the above, we are of considered opinion that  as  the
      appellant had been awarded only six months  imprisonment,  considering
      the matter under the JJ Act, 2000 would not serve any purpose at  such
      a belated stage.   The  High  Court  had  been  of  the  opinion  that
      appellant had been dealt with very leniently and it  was  a  fit  case
      where the High Court wanted to enhance the  sentence  but  considering
      the fact  that  the  incident  occurred  long  back,  the  High  Court
      refrained to do so.
      22.   Thus, the  appeal  fails  and  is  accordingly  dismissed.   The
      appellant is directed to surrender within a period of  four  weeks  to
      serve out the sentence, failing which the Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,
      Malda, is directed to take him into custody to serve out the sentence.
       A copy of the order be sent to Chief Judicial Magistrate,  Malda  for
      information and action.
                                       ….………………..........J.            (DR.
                                       B.S. CHAUHAN)



      …...................................J.
          NEW DELHI;                               (S.A. BOBDE)
      October 4,  2013
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