Land Acquisition Act = whether the officers of the Union Territory of Chandigarh other than the Administrator could issue notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the 1894 Act, = Notification dated 1.10.2002 cannot be saved at this belated stage and the Competent Authority cannot issue declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act after 11 years of the issue of notification under Section 4(1). - In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order is set aside and Notifications dated 1.10.2002 and 29.9.2003 are quashed insofar as the same relate to the lands of the appellants. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

                          reported in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40587                 
              NON-REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CIVIL APPEAL NO.5885   OF 2013
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 27221 of 2011)

Gurbinder Kaur Brar and another                          ...Appellants

                                   versus
Union of India and others
...Respondents
                                    With
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.5884  OF 2013
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 25387 of 2011)
Sardar Milkha Singh                                      ...Appellant
                                   versus
Union of India and others
...Respondents

                               J U D G M E N T
G.S. SINGHVI, J.
1.    Leave granted.

2.    These appeals are directed against order  dated  18.3.2011  passed  by
the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High  Court  whereby  the  writ
petitions filed by the appellants for  quashing  the  acquisition  of  their
land were dismissed along with a batch of other petitions.

3.    At the outset, we may mention that the impugned order  was  set  aside
by this Court in Surinder Singh Brar  and  others  v.  Union  of  India  and
others (2013) 1 SCC 403 and  Notifications  dated  26.6.2006,  2.8.2006  and
28.2.2007 issued by the Chandigarh Administration under  Sections  4(1)  and
6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the 1894 Act’)  for  the
acquisition of  land  for  Phase-III  of  Chandigarh  Technology  Park  were
quashed.

4.    By Notification dated 1.10.2002 issued under Section 4(1) of the  1894
Act, the Chandigarh Administration proposed the acquisition of  71.96  acres
land for various purposes including  the  Chandigarh  Technology  Park.  
The
appellants filed detailed objections under Section 5A(1) because their  land
were also included in Notification dated 1.10.2002.
After making a show  of
hearing the  objectors,  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer,  Union  Territory,
Chandigarh submitted report with the recommendation that the  land  notified
on 1.10.2002 may be acquired. 
The report of  the  Land  Acquisition  Officer
was  accepted  by  the  officers  of  the  Chandigarh   Administration   and
declaration dated 29.9.2003 was issued under Section 6(1) of  the  1894  Act
for 56.76 acres land.

5.    The appellants challenged the acquisition of their land in Civil  Writ
Petition No.8545/2004 titled Gurbinder Kaur Brar and  another  v.  Union  of
India and others and Civil Writ Petition No.12779/2004 titled  Milkha  Singh
v. Union of India and others.

6.    Similar petitions were filed by other landowners whose land  had  been
acquired for Phases-II and III of Chandigarh Technology Park. All  the  writ
petitions were dismissed by the Division Bench of  the  High  Court  by  the
impugned order.

7.    In Surinder Singh Brar  and  others  v.  Union  of  India  and  others
(supra), this Court reversed the order of the High  Court  and  quashed  the
acquisition of land for Phase-III of Chandigarh Technology Park and  various
other purposes specified in  Notifications  dated  26.6.2006,  2.8.2006  and
28.2.2007. While dealing with the  question
whether  the  officers  of  the
Union Territory of Chandigarh  other  than  the  Administrator  could  issue
notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6(1)  of  the  1894  Act,
this  Court
referred to  Article  239  of  the  Constitution  (unamended  and  amended),
Notifications dated 8.10.1968, 1.1.1970 and 14.8.1989  issued  under  Clause
(1)  of  that  Article,  Notification  dated   25.2.1988   issued   by   the
Administrator, Union Territory of  Chandigarh  under  Section  3(1)  of  the
Chandigarh (Delegation of Powers) Act, 1987 (for short, ‘the 1987 Act’)  and
observed:

           “The unamended  Article  239  envisaged  administration  of  the
           States specified  in  Part  C  of  the  First  Schedule  of  the
           Constitution by the President through a Chief Commissioner or  a
           Lieutenant Governor to  be  appointed  by  him  or  through  the
           Government of a neighbouring State. This was  subject  to  other
           provisions of Part VIII of the Constitution.  As  against  this,
           amended Article 239 lays down that subject to any law enacted by
           Parliament every Union Territory shall be  administered  by  the
           President acting through an Administrator appointed by him  with
           such designation as he may specify. In terms of  clause  (2)  of
           Article 239 (amended), the President can appoint the Governor of
           a State as an Administrator of an adjoining Union territory  and
           on his appointment, the Governor is  required  to  exercise  his
           function as an Administrator independently  of  his  Council  of
           Ministers. The difference in the language of the  unamended  and
           amended Article 239 makes it clear that prior to 1-11-1956,  the
           President  could  administer  Part  C  State  through  a   Chief
           Commissioner or a Lieutenant Governor, but, after the amendment,
           every Union Territory is required  to  be  administered  by  the
           President through an Administrator appointed by  him  with  such
           designation as he may specify. In terms of clause (2) of Article
           239  (amended),  the  President  is  empowered  to  appoint  the
           Governor of State as the Administrator  to  an  adjoining  Union
           Territory and once appointed, the Governor, in his  capacity  as
           Administrator, has  to  act  independently  of  the  Council  of
           Ministers of the State of which he is the Governor.

           A reading of the Notification issued on 1-11-1966  (set  out  in
           para 42) shows that in exercise of the power vested in him under
           Article 239(1), the President directed  that  the  Administrator
           shall exercise the power and  discharge  the  functions  of  the
           State Government under the laws which were in force  immediately
           before formation of the Union Territory of Chandigarh. This  was
           subject to the President’s own control and until further orders.
           By another notification issued on the same  day,  the  President
           directed that all orders and other instruments made and executed
           in the name of the Chief  Commissioner  of  Union  Territory  of
           Chandigarh shall be  authenticated  by  the  signatures  of  the
           specified officers. These notifications clearly brought out  the
           distinction between the position of the  Administrator  and  the
           Chief Commissioner insofar as the Union Territory of  Chandigarh
           was  concerned.  Subsequently,  the  President   appointed   the
           Governor of Punjab as Administrator of the  Union  Territory  of
           Chandigarh  and   separate   notifications   were   issued   for
           appointment  of  Adviser  to  the  Administrator.  The  officers
           appointed as  Adviser  are  invariably  members  of  the  Indian
           Administrative Service.

           After about 2 years of the issuance of  the  first  notification
           under Article 239(1) of the Constitution, by  which  the  powers
           and functions exercisable by the State Government under  various
           laws were generally entrusted to the Administrator, Notification
           dated 8-10-1968 (set out in para 44) was issued and the  earlier
           notification was modified insofar as it related to the  exercise
           of powers and functions by the Administrator under the  Act  and
           the President directed that subject to  his  control  and  until
           further orders, the powers and  functions  of  “the  appropriate
           Government” shall  also  be  exercised  and  discharged  by  the
           Administrator. The Notification dated 8-10-1968  was  superseded
           by the Notification dated 1-1-1970 (set out in para 45) and  the
           President directed that subject to his control and until further
           orders, the powers and functions of “the appropriate Government”
           shall also be exercised and discharged by the  Administrator  of
           every Union territory whether known as  the  Administrator,  the
           Chief  Commissioner  or  the  Lieutenant  Governor.   The   last
           Notification in the series was issued on 14-8-1989 (set  out  in
           para 46) superseding all previous notifications. The language of
           that  notification  is  identical  to  the   language   of   the
           Notification dated 1-1-1970.

           There is marked distinction in the language of the notifications
           issued  under  Article  239(1)  of  the  Constitution.  By   the
           Notification dated 1-11-1966 (set out in para 42), the President
           generally delegated  the  powers  and  functions  of  the  State
           Government under various laws in force immediately before  1-11-
           1966 to the Administrator. By all other notifications, the power
           exercisable by “the appropriate Government” under  the  Act  and
           the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1963 were  delegated  to
           the Administrator. It is not too difficult to fathom the reasons
           for  this  departure  from  Notification  dated  1-11-1966.  The
           Council of Ministers whose advice constitutes the foundation  of
           the decision taken by the President was very much  conscious  of
           the fact that compulsory acquisition of land, though  sanctioned
           by the  provisions  of  the  Act  not  only  impacts  lives  and
           livelihood of the farmers and other small landholders, but  also
           adversely affects the agriculture, environment  and  ecology  of
           the area. Therefore, with a view to  avoid  any  possibility  of
           misuse of power  by  the  executive  authorities,  it  has  been
           repeatedly ordained that powers and  functions  vested  in  “the
           appropriate Government” under the Act and the 1963  Rules  shall
           be  exercised  only  by  the  Administrator.  The  use  of   the
           expression “shall also  be  exercised  and  discharged”  in  the
           Notifications dated 8-10-1968, 1-1-1970 and 14-8-1989 is a clear
           pointer in  this  direction.  The  seriousness  with  which  the
           Central Government has viewed such type of acquisition  is  also
           reflected from the decision taken by the Home Minister on  23-9-
           2010 (set out in para 35) in the context of the  report  of  the
           Special Auditor and the one-man committee. Thus, the acquisition
           of land for and on behalf  of  the  Union  Territories  must  be
           sanctioned  by  the  Administrator  of  the   particular   Union
           territory and no other officer  is  competent  to  exercise  the
           power vested in “the appropriate Government” under the  Act  and
           the Rules framed thereunder.

           We may now advert to the Notification dated 25-2-1988  (set  out
           in para 47) issued under Section 3(1)  of  the  1987  Act,  vide
           which the Administrator directed that any  power,  authority  or
           jurisdiction or any duty which he could exercise or discharge by
           or under the provisions of any  law,  rules  or  regulations  as
           applicable  to  the  Union  Territory  of  Chandigarh  shall  be
           exercised or discharged by the Adviser except in cases or  class
           of cases enumerated in the Schedule. There  is  nothing  in  the
           language of Section 3(1) of the 1987 Act from which  it  can  be
           inferred  that  the  Administrator  can   delegate   the   power
           exercisable by “the appropriate Government” under the Act  which
           was specifically entrusted to him by the President under Article
           239(1) of the Constitution. Therefore, the Notification dated 25-
           2-1988  cannot  be  relied  upon   for   contending   that   the
           Administrator  had  delegated  the  power  of  “the  appropriate
           Government” to the Adviser.”



The Court then considered the question whether the reports submitted by  the
Land Acquisition Officer under Section  5A(2)  were  vitiated  due  to  non-
consideration of the objections filed by the  landowners  and  answered  the
same in affirmative by recording the following observations:

           “A cursory reading of  the  reports  of  the  LAO  may  give  an
           impression that he had applied  mind  to  the  objections  filed
           under Section 5A(1) and assigned reasons  for  not  entertaining
           the same, but a careful analysis thereof leaves  no  doubt  that
           the officer concerned  had  not  at  all  applied  mind  to  the
           objections of the landowners and  merely  created  a  facade  of
           doing  so.   In  the  opening  paragraph   under   the   heading
           “Observations”, the LAO recorded that he had  seen  the  revenue
           records and conducted spot inspection. He  then  reproduced  the
           Statement of Objects and Reasons contained in the Bill which led
           to the enactment of the Punjab New Capital  (Periphery)  Control
           Act, 1952 and proceed to extract some  portion  of  reply  dated
           31.7.2006 sent by the Administrator to Surinder Singh Brar.

           In the context of the statement contained in the first  line  of
           the paragraph titled “Observations”, we  repeatedly  asked  Shri
           Sudhir Walia, learned counsel assisting Dr. Rajiv Dhawan to show
           as to when the LAO had summoned the revenue records and when  he
           had conducted spot inspection but the learned counsel could  not
           produce any document to substantiate the statement contained  in
           the two reports of the LAO.  This leads to an inference that, in
           both the reports, the  LAO  had  made  a  misleading  and  false
           statement  about  his  having  seen  the  revenue  records   and
           conducted spot  inspection.  That  apart,  the  reports  do  not
           contain any iota of consideration of the objections filed by the
           landowners. Mere reproduction of the substance of the objections
           cannot be equated with objective consideration  thereof  in  the
           light of the submission made by the objectors during the  course
           of hearing. Thus, the violation of the mandate of Section  5A(2)
           is writ large on the face of the reports prepared by the LAO.

           The reason why the LAO did not apply his mind to the  objections
           filed by the appellants and other landowners is obvious. He  was
           a minion in the hierarchy of the  administration  of  the  Union
           Territory of Chandigarh and  could  not  have  even  thought  of
           making recommendations contrary to what  was  contained  in  the
           letter sent by the Administrator to Surinder Singh Brar.  If  he
           had  shown  the  courage  of  acting  independently   and   made
           recommendation against the acquisition of land,  he  would  have
           surely been shifted from that post and  his  career  would  have
           been jeopardized.  In the system of  governance  which  we  have
           today, junior officers in the administration cannot  even  think
           of, what to say of, acting against the wishes/dictates of  their
           superiors. One who violates this unwritten code of conduct  does
           so at his own peril and is described as a foolhardy. Even  those
           constituting higher strata of services follow the path of  least
           resistance and find it most convenient to tow the line of  their
           superiors.  Therefore, the LAO cannot be blamed for having acted
           as  an  obedient  subordinate  of  the   superior   authorities,
           including  the  Administrator.  However,  that   cannot   be   a
           legitimate ground to approve the reports prepared by him without
           even a semblance of consideration of the objections filed by the
           appellants and other landowners and we  have  no  hesitation  to
           hold that the LAO failed to discharge the  statutory  duty  cast
           upon him to prepare a report after objectively  considering  the
           objections filed under Section 5A(1) and submissions made by the
           objectors during the course of personal hearing.”



The Court also analysed the provisions of Sections 4(1),  5A,  6(1)  of  the
1894 Act, referred to several judgments and observed:

           “What needs to be emphasised is  that  hearing  required  to  be
           given under Section 5-A(2) to a  person  who  is  sought  to  be
           deprived of his land and who has filed objections under  Section
           5-A(1) must  be  effective  and  not  an  empty  formality.  The
           Collector who is enjoined with the task of hearing the objectors
           has the freedom of  making  further  enquiry  as  he  may  think
           necessary. In either eventuality,  he  has  to  make  report  in
           respect  of  the  land  notified  under  Section  4(1)  or  make
           different reports in respect of different parcels of  such  land
           to the appropriate Government containing his recommendations  on
           the objections and submit the same to the appropriate Government
           along with the  record  of  proceedings  held  by  him  for  the
           latter’s decision. The  appropriate  Government  is  obliged  to
           consider the report, if any, made under Section 5-A(2) and  then
           record its satisfaction that the particular land is needed for a
           public  purpose.  This  exercise  culminates   into   making   a
           declaration that the land is needed for a public purpose and the
           declaration is to be signed by a Secretary to the Government  or
           some other officer duly authorised to certify  its  orders.  The
           formation of opinion on the issue of need of land for  a  public
           purpose and suitability thereof is sine qua non for issue  of  a
           declaration under Section 6(1). Any violation of the substantive
           right of the landowners and/or other interested persons to  file
           objections or denial of opportunity of personal hearing  to  the
           objector(s) vitiates the recommendations made by  the  Collector
           and the decision taken by the  appropriate  Government  on  such
           recommendations.  The  recommendations  made  by  the  Collector
           without duly considering the objections filed under  Section  5-
           A(1) and submissions made at the hearing given under Section  5-
           A(2) or failure of the appropriate Government to take  objective
           decision on such objections in the light of the  recommendations
           made  by  the  Collector  will  denude  the  decision   of   the
           appropriate  Government  of  statutory  finality.  To   put   it
           differently,  the  satisfaction  recorded  by  the   appropriate
           Government that the particular  land  is  needed  for  a  public
           purpose and the declaration made  under  Section  6(1)  will  be
           devoid of legal sanctity  if  statutorily  engrafted  procedural
           safeguards are not adhered to by the  authorities  concerned  or
           there is violation of the principles  of  natural  justice.  The
           cases before us are illustrative of flagrant  violation  of  the
           mandate of Sections 5-A(2) and 6(1).”



8.    Shri Sudhir Walia, learned counsel for the  Chandigarh  Administration
made valiant effort to convince us that the view  taken  in  Surinder  Singh
Brar and others v. Union of India and others (supra) on  the  interpretation
of the provisions of the 1987 Act needs reconsideration but we do  not  find
any valid ground to accept the submission of the  learned  counsel.  In  our
view, Section 3(1) of the 1987 Act does not  empower  the  Administrator  to
delegate the functions of the “appropriate government”  to  any  officer  or
authority specified in the notification issued under  that  section  because
the Presidential notification does not provide for such delegation.

9.    We also agree with the learned counsel for  the  appellants  that  the
report of the Land Acquisition  Officer  was  vitiated  due  to  total  non-
application of mind by the concerned officer to large number of  substantive
objections raised by the appellants under  Section  5A(1).  He  mechanically
rejected  the   objections   and   senior   officers   of   the   Chandigarh
Administration accepted the report of the Land Acquisition  Officer  despite
the fact that the same had been prepared in violation of Section 5A(2).

10.   Shri Walia made a last  ditched  effort  to  save  Notification  dated
1.10.2002 and for this purpose he relied upon order dated  27.2.2013  passed
by the coordinate Bench in Civil Appeal No. 1964/2013 titled Lajja  Ram  and
others v. Union Territory, Chandigarh and others.  
We  have  carefully  gone
through that order and are of the view
that
Notification  dated  1.10.2002
cannot be saved at this belated stage and  the  Competent  Authority  cannot
issue declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act after 11 years of the  issue
of notification under Section 4(1).  
We may add that  in  view  of  the  law
laid down by the Constitution Bench in Padma Sundara Rao v. State  of  Tamil
Nadu (2002) 3 SCC 533, 
which was followed in a large  number  of  judgments,
the Chandigarh Administration cannot now issue a declaration  under  Section
6(1) after rectifying the  illegalities  committed  in  the  preparation  of
report under Section 5A(2) and issue of the earlier declaration.

11.   In the result, the appeals are allowed,  the  impugned  order  is  set
aside and Notifications dated 1.10.2002 and 29.9.2003  are  quashed  insofar
as the same relate to the lands of the appellants. The parties are  left  to
bear their own costs.


..........................................J.
                                             (G.S. SINGHVI)




..........................................J.
                                             (V. GOPALA GOWDA)
New Delhi;
July 22, 2013.






      -----------------------
11

grant of study leave = whether the appellant-institute is justified, in directing the respondent to refund the entire amount of Rs.12,32,126/- paid to him towards salary and other allowances for pursuing Ph.D studies at IIT, Kanpur, on failure to produce the certificate of obtaining the Ph.D, for which study leave was granted.= A Government servant or person like the respondent is given study leave with salary and allowances etc. so as to enable him to complete the course of study and to furnish the certificate of his successful completion, so that the institute which has sanctioned the study leave would achieve the purpose and object for granting such study leave. The purpose of granting study leave with salary and other benefits is for the interest of the Institution and also the person concerned so that once he comes back and joins the institute the students will be benefited by the knowledge and expertise acquired by the person at the expense of the institute. A candidate who avails of leave but takes no interest to complete the course and does not furnish the certificate to that effect is doing a disservice to the institute as well as the students of the institute. In other words, such a person only enjoys the period of study leave without doing any work at the institute and, at the same time, enjoys the salary and other benefits, which is evidentially not in public interest. Public money cannot be spent unless there is mutual benefit. Further, if the period of study leave was not extended or no decision was taken on his representation, he could have raised his grievances at the appropriate forum. 16. We notice that the appellant-institute has already recovered an amount of Rs.6.5 lacs as monthly installments from the salary of the respondent and the appellant-institute has also recovered an amount of Rs.1,75,000/- from the salary of the respondent and Rs.4,75,000/- from the arrears of revised scales admissible to the respondent with effect from 01.01.2006 and as such approximately Rs.6,50,000/- has been recovered from the respondent. Now the appellant-institute claims balance amount of Rs.6,18,000/-. 17. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the fact that the bond executed by the respondent is found to be vague, we find no reason for the appellant-institute to recover the balance amount of Rs.6,18,000/- from the respondent but the amount already recovered be not refunded, since public interest has definitely suffered due to non- obtaining of Ph.D by the respondent after availing of the entire salary and other benefits. We do so taking into consideration all aspects of the matter and to do complete justice between the parties. 18. Appeal is allowed to the above extent and the judgment of the learned Single Judge and Division Bench is modified accordingly and no further amount be recovered by the appellant-institute from the respondent.

                           reported in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40583               
                   Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5828  OF 2013
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.39067 of 2012)


Sant Longowal Instt. of Engg. & Tech. & Anr.       Appellant(s)

                                   Versus

Suresh Chandra Verma                               Respondent(s)



                               J U D G M E N T


K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.


      Leave granted.

2.    The question that has come up for  consideration  in  this  appeal  is
whether the appellant-institute is justified, in  directing  the  respondent
to refund the entire amount of Rs.12,32,126/- paid  to  him  towards  salary
and other allowances for pursuing Ph.D studies at IIT,  Kanpur,  on  failure
to produce the certificate of obtaining the Ph.D, for which study leave  was
granted.

3.    The appellant-institute was  established  by  the  Ministry  of  Human
Resource & Development, Government of India in the year 1989  and  has  been
fully funded by the Central Government.
The respondent joined  the  service
in  the  appellant-institute  as  Lecturer  in  Mechanical  Engineering   on
30.08.1993.
He applied for grant of study leave for pursuing  his  Ph.D  at
IIT, Kanpur.
The competent authority acceded to that  request  and  granted
three years study leave  commencing  from  24.07.1999  to  22.07.2002.  
The
respondent after executing  necessary  bond  proceeded  on  study  leave  on
24.07.1999 and three years period  was  completed  on  24.07.2002.  
Due  to
various reasons, the respondent could not complete his Ph.D studies  and  he
joined back in service as Lecturer in the Institute in November  2003.  
The
respondent was asked to produce  the  completion  certificate  of  the  Ph.D
course which respondent could not produce,  hence,  the  appellant-institute
demanded the refund of the amount of Rs. 12,32,126/- paid to him during  the
period of study for pursuing Ph.D as per the terms and  conditions  of  bond
executed by the respondent.

4.    Aggrieved by the steps taken by  the  appellant-institute  to  recover
the amount, the respondent filed Civil  Writ  Petition  No.  12555  of  2010
before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana.
Writ Petition was allowed  by  learned  Single  Judge  vide  judgment  dated
02.02.2012 quashing the demand notice and also ordered refund of the  amount
already recovered with interest from the respondent.

5.    Aggrieved by the same, the appellant preferred LPA  No.  363  of  2012
before the Division Bench of the High Court of  Punjab  &  Haryana  and  the
High Court vide judgment dated 23.08.2012 took the view that  the  appellant
could not point out any term in the bond executed by the respondent that  he
had to complete the Ph.D programme within a period of three years  and  that
the only condition was that the respondent had to serve for a period of  six
years after joining service on the expiry of the  study  leave.  The  appeal
was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court.


6.    Aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench  of  the  High  Court,
this appeal has been preferred.


7.    Shri Ajay Jain, learned counsel appearing for the appellant  submitted
that the High Court has completely misunderstood  terms  and  conditions  on
which the respondent was granted study leave which is reflected in the  bond
executed by the respondent on 5.05.1999.   Learned  counsel  submitted  that
the High Court has completely ignored the salutary principle of “no work  no
pay” and that the respondent during the period of study not only not  worked
in the appellant-institute but also was  not  successful  in  obtaining  the
Ph.D.  Consequently, neither the institute, the respondent nor the  students
have been benefited and public money has been spent for no use.


8.    Shri Himanshu Shekhar, learned counsel  for  the  respondent,  on  the
other hand, submitted that he has completed his  course  work  required  for
the Ph.D programme, completed comprehensive examination etc. but the  thesis
could not be completed due to retirement of  the  guide.   Further,  it  was
pointed out  that  the  respondent  had  also  made  a  written  request  on
24.05.2002 seeking extension of six months period  so  that  the  respondent
could  complete  his  thesis  work.   Another  representation  was  made  on
04.06.2002 and  all  those  representations  left  unattended.   Under  such
circumstances, he had to join duty without obtaining Ph.D.  Learned  counsel
also pointed out that similarly situated employee named Abanish Kumar  Singh
was provided extension of time but the same was not done in the case of  the
respondent.  Further, it was pointed out that there is no condition  in  the
bond that if the respondent could not complete  the  Ph.D  then  the  entire
salary and other benefits could be recovered from the  respondent.   Learned
counsel pointed out that the High Court has rightly  interpreted  terms  and
conditions of bond, consequently the demand made for  the  reimbursement  of
the salary and other allowances is not justified.

9.    We have gone through terms and conditions of the bond executed by  the
respondent on 05.05.1999.  Some of the relevant portions of  the  bond  read
as follows:
      “Whereas I, Suresh Chandra Varma, am granted (kind of  leave)  by  the
      Institute.


      And whereas for the better protection of the Institute, I have  agreed
      to execute this Bond with such conditions as hereunder is written.


      Now the condition of the above written obligation is that in the event
      of my failing of resume duty, or resigning or retiring from service or
      otherwise quitting service  without  returning  from  duty  after  the
      expiry of termination of the period of study  leave  or  at  any  time
      within a period of three years  after  my  return  to  duty,  I  shall
      forthwith pay to the institute or as may be directed by the Institute,
      on demand, pay & allowances received by me  during  study  leave,  the
      said amount of Rs.10,000/- (ten thousand only) together with  interest
      thereon from the date of demand at Govt. rates for the time  being  in
      force on Govt. loan.


      And upon my making such payment the above written obligation shall  be
      avoided and of no effect, otherwise I shall  be  and  remain  in  full
      force and virtue.


      The bond shall in all respects be governed by the laws  of  India  for
      the time being in force  and  the  rights  and  liabilities  hereunder
      shall, where necessary, be accordingly determined by  the  appropriate
      courts in India.”


10.   Further, it is the specific case of the appellant that the  respondent
herein is governed by the provisions of the Central Civil  Services  (Leave)
Rules, 1972 forming part of the Fundamental Rules and  Supplementary  Rules,
Part III framed by the Constitution of India.  We notice there is  no  clear
cut provision in the bond either expressly referring to Rule 63 or  strictly
imposing a condition that if a candidate fails to complete the course  study
during the period of sanctioned  leave,  he  will  have  to  refund  to  the
appellant-institute the total amount of leave,  salary  and  other  benefits
availed of by him during the period of study leave.


 11.  Of late, such a specific provision was incorporated  in  bond  by  the
 Board of Governors of the appellant-institute in its 22nd meeting  held  on
 28.06.2002, which reads as follows:
      TO APPROVE THE AMENDMENT IN BOND CONDITIONS  TO  BE  EXECUTED  BY  THE
      FACULTY MEMBERS WHILE PROCEEDING ON STUDY LEAVE.




      The Board of Governors of the Institute in its 22nd  meeting  held  on
      28.06.2002 decided that a faculty member, who is granted  study  leave
      for possessing higher education such as M.E./M.Tech. and Ph.D,  he/she
      is required to execute a bond to serve the Institute  for  double  the
      period of study leave after returning from study leave.


      The conditions of the bond are silent on  the  point  when  a  faculty
      member resume his/her  duty  but  fails  to  produce  the  educational
      qualifying certificate for which he/she was sanctioned study leave.


      Following provision may kindly be allowed to be  incorporated  in  the
      proforma of bond to be executed by a faculty member  while  proceeding
      on study leave / extra ordinary leave of study  /  special  leave  for
      training / sabbatical leave on the pattern of Central Government Rules
      to avoid legal complicacy.


      |Proforma of bond presently filled by a  |Proposed Proforma of bond to be  |
|faculty members while proceeding on     |filled by a faculty members while|
|study leave / extra ordinary leave of   |proceeding on study leave / extra|
|study/special leave for                 |ordinary leave of study / special|
|training/sabbatical leave               |leave for training / sabbatical  |
|                                        |leave.                           |
|KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS THAT     |KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS   |
|I,___________resident of ____________ at|THAT I, ________ resident of     |
|present employed as __________ in the   |_________ in the district of     |
|Sant Longowal Institute of Engineering &|___________ at present employed  |
|Technology, do hereby bind myself and my|as _______in the Sant Longowal   |
|heirs, executors and administrators to  |Institute of Engineering &       |
|pay to the Director, Sant Longowal      |Technology, do hereby bind myself|
|Institute of Engineering & Technology   |and my heirs, executors and      |
|(hereinafter called the Institute) on   |administrators to pay to the     |
|demand the sum of                       |Director, Sant Longowal Institute|
|Rs.____________(Rs.____________only)    |of Engineering & Technology      |
|together with interest thereon from the |(hereinafter called the          |
|date of demand at Government rates for  |Institute) the total amount of   |
|the time being in force on Government   |leave salary and other expenses  |
|loans or, if payment is made in a       |incurred by the Institute, if    |
|country other than India, the equivalent|any, along with bond money       |
|of the said amount in the currency of   |prescribed the Institute together|
|that country converted at the official  |with interest thereon from the   |
|rate of exchange between that country   |date of demand at Government     |
|and India AND TOGETHER WITH all costs   |Rates for the time being in force|
|between attorney and client and all     |on Government loans or if payment|
|charges and expenses that shall/or may  |is made in a country other than  |
|have incurred by the Institute.         |India, the equivalent of the said|
|                                        |amount in the currency of that   |
|WHEREAS I, ___________, am granted      |country converted at the official|
|______(kind of leave) by Institute.     |rate of exchange between that    |
|                                        |country and India AND TOGETHER   |
|AND WHEREAS for the better protection of|WITH all costs between attorney  |
|the Institute, I have agreed to execute |and client and all charges and   |
|this bond with such condition as        |expenses that shall/or may have  |
|hereunder is written                    |incurred by the Institute.       |
|                                        |WHEREAS I, ___________am granted |
|NOW THE CONDITION OF THE ABOVE WRITTEN  |___________(kind of leave) by    |
|OBLIGATION IS THAT in the event of my   |Institute.                       |
|failing to resume duty, or resigning or |                                 |
|retiring from service or otherwise      |AND WHEREAS FOR THE BETTER       |
|quitting service without returning to   |protection of the Institute, I   |
|duty after the expiry of termination of |have agreed to execute this bond |
|the period of study leave or at any time|with such condition as hereunder |
|within a double the period of study     |is written.                      |
|leave after my return to duty, I shall  |                                 |
|forthwith pay to the Institute or as may|AND WHEREAS for the better       |
|be, directed by the Institute on demand,|protection of the Institute, I   |
|the said sum of Rs.______________only   |have agreed to execute this bond |
|together with interest thereon from the |with such condition as hereunder |
|date of demand at Government Rates for  |is written.                      |
|the time being in force on Government   |                                 |
|loans.                                  |NOW THE CONDITION OF THE ABOVE   |
|                                        |WRITTEN OBLIGATION IS THAT in the|
|AND upon my making such payment the     |event of my failing to resume    |
|above written obligation shall be void  |duty, or resigning or retiring   |
|and of no effect, otherwise it shall be |from service or otherwise        |
|and remain in full force and virtue.    |quitting service without         |
|                                        |returning to duty after the      |
|The bond shall in all respects be       |expiry or termination of the     |
|governed by laws of India for the time  |period of study leave or failing |
|being in force and the rights and       |to complete the course of study  |
|liabilities hereunder shall, where      |or at any time within the period |
|necessary, be accordingly determined by |of sanctioned leave after my     |
|the appropriate courts in India.        |return to duty, I shall forthwith|
|                                        |pay to the Institute the total   |
|The Institute has agreed to bear the    |amount of leave salary and other |
|stamp duty payable on this bond.        |expenses incurred by the         |
|                                        |Institute, if any, along with    |
|Signed and dated this __________day of  |bond money prescribed by the     |
|one thousand nine hundred and signed and|Institute together with interest |
|delivered by in the presence of         |thereon from the date of demand  |
|_________________.                      |at Government Rates for the time |
|                                        |being in force on Government     |
|                                        |loans.                           |
|                                        |                                 |
|                                        |AND upon my making such payment  |
|                                        |the above written obligation     |
|                                        |shall be void and of no effect,  |
|                                        |otherwise it shall be and remain |
|                                        |in full force and virtue.        |
|                                        |                                 |
|                                        |The bond shall in all respects be|
|                                        |governed by the laws of India for|
|                                        |the time being in force and the  |
|                                        |rights and liabilities hereunder |
|                                        |shall, where necessary, be       |
|                                        |accordingly determined by the    |
|                                        |appropriate courts in India.     |




 12.  The above mentioned clause was inserted in the absence of  a  specific
 clause to that effect in the bond executed by the faculty members.


 13.  The question  as  to  whether  Rule  63  referred  to  above  is  also
 applicable to the  respondent  was  not  seen  specifically  urged  by  the
 appellant-institute either before the learned Single Judge  or  before  the
 Division Bench, hence, the High  Court  had  no  occasion  to  examine  its
 applicability.  In this connection, we may refer to Rule 63 which reads  as
 follows:
       “63. Resignation or retirement after study leave  or  non-completion
       of the course of study.


            1) If a Government servant resigns or retires  from  service  or
               otherwise quits service without returning  to  duty  after  a
               period of study leave or within a period of three years after
               such return to duty or fails to complete the course of  study
               and is thus unable to furnish  the  certificate  as  required
               under sub-rule (5) of Rule 53 he shall be required to refund-
               i) The actual amount of leave salary, study  allowance,  cost
                  of fees, travelling and other expenses, if  any,  incurred
                  by the Government of India; and
              ii) The actual amount, if any, of the cost incurred  by  other
                  agencies  such  as  foreign  Government,  Foundations  and
                  Trusts in connection with the course  of  study,  together
                  with interest thereon at rates for the time being in force
                  on Government loans from the date of  demand,  before  his
                  resignation is accepted or permission to retire is granted
                  or his quitting service otherwise.:
             iii) Provided that except in the case of employees who fail  to
                  complete the course of study nothing in  this  rule  shall
                  apply –
            a) To a Government servant who, after return to duty from  study
               leave,  is  permitted  to  retire  from  service  on  medical
               grounds; or
            b) To a Government servant who, after return to duty from  study
               leave, is deputed to serve in  any  Statutory  or  Autonomous
               Body or Institution under the control of the  Government  and
               is subsequently permitted to resign from  service  under  the
               Government with a view to his  permanent  absorption  in  the
               said Statutory or  Autonomous  body  or  Institution  in  the
               public interest.


       2) (a)     The study leave availed  of  by  such  Government  servant
          shall be converted into regular leave standing at  his  credit  on
          the date on which the study leave  commenced,  any  regular  leave
          taken in continuation of study leave being suitably  adjusted  for
          the purpose and the balance of the period of study leave, if  any,
          which cannot be so converted, treated as extraordinary leave.
            (b)   In addition to the amount to be refunded by the Government
       servant under sub-rule (1), he  shall  be  required  to  refund  any
       excess  of  leave  salary  actually  drawn  over  the  leave  salary
       admissible on conversion of the study leave.


            3)   Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in  this  rule,   the
               President may, if it is necessary  or  expedient  to  do  so,
               either in public interest or having regard  to  the  peculiar
               circumstances of the case or class of cases, by order,  waive
               or reduce the amount  required  to  be  refunded  under  sub-
               rule(1) by the  Government  servant  concerned  or  class  of
               Government servant.”


14.   If a Government servant resigns or retires from service  or  otherwise
quits service without returning to duty after a period  of  study  leave  or
within a period of three years  after  such  return  to  duty  or  fails  to
complete the course of study and is thus unable to furnish the  certificates
as required under sub-rule (5) of Rule 53, he shall be  required  to  refund
the  actual  amount  of  leave  salary,  study  allowance,  cost  of   fees,
travelling and other expenses, if any, incurred by the Government of India.


15.   The above mentioned provision has a laudable  object  to  achieve.
 A
Government servant or person like the respondent is given study  leave  with
salary and allowances etc. so as to enable him to  complete  the  course  of
study and to furnish the certificate of his successful completion,  so  that
the institute which  has  sanctioned  the  study  leave  would  achieve  the
purpose and object for granting such study leave.  The purpose  of  granting
study leave with salary and other  benefits  is  for  the  interest  of  the
Institution and also the person concerned so that once  he  comes  back  and
joins the institute the students will be  benefited  by  the  knowledge  and
expertise acquired by the  person  at  the  expense  of  the  institute.   A
candidate who avails of leave but takes no interest to complete  the  course
and does not furnish the certificate to that effect is  doing  a  disservice
to the institute as well as the students of the institute.  In other  words,
such a person only enjoys the period of study leave without doing  any  work
at the institute and,  at  the  same  time,  enjoys  the  salary  and  other
benefits, which is  evidentially  not  in  public  interest.   Public  money
cannot be spent unless there is mutual benefit.  Further, if the  period  of
study  leave  was  not  extended  or  no   decision   was   taken   on   his
representation, he could have  raised  his  grievances  at  the  appropriate
forum.

16.   We notice  that  the  appellant-institute  has  already  recovered  an
amount of Rs.6.5 lacs  as  monthly  installments  from  the  salary  of  the
respondent and the appellant-institute  has  also  recovered  an  amount  of
Rs.1,75,000/- from the salary of the respondent and Rs.4,75,000/-  from  the
arrears of revised scales admissible to  the  respondent  with  effect  from
01.01.2006 and as such approximately Rs.6,50,000/- has been  recovered  from
the respondent.   Now  the  appellant-institute  claims  balance  amount  of
Rs.6,18,000/-.

17.   Considering the facts and circumstances of the  case  and  considering
the fact that the bond executed by the respondent is found to be  vague,  we
find no reason for the appellant-institute to recover the balance amount  of
Rs.6,18,000/- from the respondent but the amount already  recovered  be  not
refunded,  since  public  interest  has  definitely  suffered  due  to  non-
obtaining of Ph.D by the respondent after availing of the entire salary  and
other benefits.  We do so taking  into  consideration  all  aspects  of  the
matter and to do complete justice between the parties.

18.   Appeal is allowed to the above extent and the judgment of the  learned
Single Judge and Division Bench  is  modified  accordingly  and  no  further
amount be recovered by the appellant-institute from the respondent.



                                                             ….…….…….……………J.
                                                (K.S. Radhakrishnan)






                                                             ………..………………….J.
                                                      (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)

New Delhi,
July 18, 2013

The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 & the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short ‘the 2000 Act’) = whether or not the appellant, who was admittedly not a juvenile within the meaning of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (for short ‘the 1986 Act’) when offences were committed but had not completed 18 years of age, on that date, will be governed by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short ‘the 2000 Act’) and be declared as a juvenile in relation to the offences alleged to have been committed by him. = the age of the appellant as on the date of the commission of the offence i.e. 06.05.1995 was 17 years, 11 months and 5 days and hence less than 18 years, and hence when we apply provisions of the 2000 Act, the appellant has to be treated as a juvenile, being less than 18 years of age on the date of the crime and hence entitled to get the benefit of the provisions of the 2000 Act read with Rules. 8. We are therefore inclined to affirm the order of conviction, however, the sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court is set aside and the matter is sent to the concerned Juvenile Justice Court for imposing adequate sentence. Appeal is allowed as above.

              reported in        http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40582                                   
         Reportable
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                      CRIMINAL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION

                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 556 OF 2004


Ketankumar Gopalbhai Tandel                        Appellant


                                   Versus

State of Gujarat                                   Respondent



                               J U D G M E N T


K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.

      The question that falls for consideration in this  appeal  is
whether
or not the appellant, who was admittedly not a juvenile within  the  meaning of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (for short ‘the 1986 Act’)  when  offences
were committed but had not completed 18 years of age, on that date, will  be governed by the Juvenile Justice (Care  and  Protection  of  Children)  Act, 2000 (for short ‘the 2000 Act’) and be declared as a juvenile  in  relation to the offences alleged to have been committed by him.

2.    The appellant herein was convicted by the Additional  Sessions  Judge,
Valsad (trial  court)  in  Sessions  Case  No.  133  of  1995  for  offences
punishable under Sections 302 and 324 of the Indian Penal  Code,  1860  (for
short ‘IPC’) and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and  to  pay
a fine of Rs1000/- and in default to  undergo  Simple  Imprisonment  for  15
days for an offence  punishable  under  Section  302,  IPC  and  to  undergo
Rigorous Imprisonment for 2 months and to pay a fine  of  Rs.1000/-  and  in
default to undergo Simple Imprisonment for 7 days for an offence  punishable
under  Section  324,  IPC.   Both  the  sentences  were   ordered   to   run
concurrently.  The accused preferred Criminal Appeal No. 366 of 1997  before
the High Court of Gujarat,  the  same  was  dismissed  vide  judgment  dated
24.07.2003 against which this appeal has been preferred.

3.    Shri S.C. Patel, learned counsel appearing for the appellant raised  a
preliminary contention that the appellant has to be treated  as  a  juvenile
on 06.05.1995 i.e. the date of occurrence, in view of the provision  of  the
2000 Act, since his date of birth being 01.06.1977.  On 06.05.1995,  it  was
pointed out that the appellant was 17 years, 11 months  and  5  days,  hence
less than 18 years and is, therefore, entitled to get  the  benefit  of  the
2000 Act.

4.    Ms. Hemantika Wahi,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  respondent
submitted that the appellant is governed by the 1986 Act and under the  1986
Act all persons who were above the age of  16  years  on  the  date  of  the
commission of the offence would not be treated as juveniles  and  since  the
appellant was aged more than 16 years on the date of occurrence hence  would
not get the benefit of  juvenility.   Learned  counsel  submitted  that  the
trial court as well as the High Court has rightly  convicted  and  sentenced
the appellant and thus calls for no interference by this Court.

5.    We have gone through the judgment of the trial court as well  as  that
of the High Court and also the oral and  documentary  evidences  adduced  in
this case and we find no reason to interfere with the  order  of  conviction
passed by the trial court, confirmed by the  High  Court.   Learned  counsel
for the appellant has also not canvassed the  correctness  or  otherwise  of
the order of conviction but confined his arguments,  as  already  indicated,
on the plea of juvenility.  The question posed in this  case  is  no  longer
res integra. On exhaustive survey of the previous  judgments  on  the  point
this Court in Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) and  Another  (2010)  5  SCC
344 held as follows:

     “It is, thus, manifest from a conjoint reading of Sections 2(k),  2(l),
     7-A, 20 and 49 of the Act of 2000 read with Rules  12  and  98  of  the
     Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 that all
     persons who were below the  age  of  eighteen  years  on  the  date  of
     commission of the offence even prior to 1-4-2001 would  be  treated  as
     juveniles even if the claim of juvenility is  raised  after  they  have
     attained the age of eighteen  years  on  or  before  the  date  of  the
     commencement of the Act of 2000  and  were  undergoing  sentences  upon
     being convicted.  In the view we have taken, we are  fortified  by  the
     dictum of this Court in a recent decision  in  Hari  Ram  v.  State  of
     Rajasthan.”


6.    This Court,  when  the  matter  came  up  for  hearing,  directed  the
Sessions Judge, Valsad (Gujarat) to find out the age  of  the  appellant  on
the date of occurrence of the crime.  The Sessions  Judge  vide  his  report
dated 11.04.2011 stated that the appellant was not juvenile on the  date  of
occurrence i.e. 06.05.1995.  Such a view was taken by the Sessions Judge  on
the basis of the 1986 Act.  If we apply the provisions of the 1986 Act  then
the appellant was not a juvenile on the date of the crime but  if  we  apply
Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7-A, 20 and 49 of the 2000 Act read with Rules  12  and
98 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection  of  Children)  Rules,  2007
(for short ‘the Rules’) all persons who were below the age of  18  years  on
the date of commission of the offence  even  prior  to  1-4-2001,  would  be
treated as juveniles even if the claim of juvenility is  raised  after  they
have attained the age of 18 years on or before the date of the  commencement
of the 2000 Act and were undergoing sentences upon being convicted.

7.    So far as the present case is concerned,  as  already  indicated,  the
age of the appellant as on the date of the commission of  the  offence  i.e.
06.05.1995 was 17 years, 11 months and 5 days and hence less than 18  years,
and hence when we apply provisions of the 2000 Act, the appellant has to  be
treated as a juvenile, being less than 18 years of age on the  date  of  the
crime and hence entitled to get the benefit of the provisions  of  the  2000
Act read with Rules.

8.    We are therefore inclined to affirm the order of conviction,  however,
the sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High  Court  is
set aside and the matter is sent to the  concerned  Juvenile  Justice  Court
for imposing adequate sentence.  Appeal is allowed as above.




                                                             ….…….…….……………J.
                                                (K.S. Radhakrishnan)






                                                             ………..………………….J.
                                                      (Pinaki Chandra Ghose)

New Delhi,
July 18, 2013

Service matter - appointment of trained teachers in the vacancies in the post of primary teachers in the state of Bihar = several trained teachers for a direction upon the State of Bihar to appoint them in the vacancies in the post of primary teachers in the State of Bihar. = Be that as it may, in the event, some discrepancies had crept in the final select list, the individual grievances contained various anomalies, which it is difficult for us to unravel. Accordingly, we modify our order dated 13th October, 2011, and allow the applicants to approach the High Court for redressal of their grievances. We also direct that the applications, special leave petitions and writ petitions filed before us be treated as withdrawn, with liberty to the parties to approach the High Court individually or otherwise, for relief, if any, but without, in any way, affecting the appointments of those teachers who have already been appointed against the vacant 34,540 posts and are working. We have been informed during the hearing that about 2413 posts out of the 34,540 posts were still left to be filled up. All the applications, Special Leave Petitions and Writ Petitions are, therefore, disposed of in the light of the aforesaid observations. We make it clear that none of the persons appointed out of the 34,540 vacancies should be disturbed in any way, but the question of filling up the balance vacancies may be taken into consideration, while disposing of the applications in question.

                 Reported in      http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40581                                       
   REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA



                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


               SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.26824 OF 2012







          YASHWANT SINGH & ORS.             … PETITIONERS



                    VS.



          STATE OF BIHAR & ORS.             … RESPONDENTS



                                    WITH


      I.A.Nos. 668, 669, 671, 674, 675, 676, 677, 679, 680, 681,   and   Dy.
      Nos.96650,102358, 102908, 107866/2011  and  1117,  1251,  3372,  3363,
      4307,  4775,  5820, 4785, 5802, 7277, 8002, 7861, 7860,  8223,   8232,
      8025,  8709,  9296,  9291, 9610, 9582,  10029,  10303,  10783,  10777,
      10773, 10772, 10817,  10822,  11173, 4069, 11080, 11355, 11872, 12010,
      12009, 12012, 12523, 4473,  13535,  13533, 13883, 14230, 14529, 14902,
      14901, 15677, 5602, 17890, 17893, 19256,  20919, 20920,  5727,  22003,
      30504/2012  and  Contempt   Petition   (C)   No.87/2013   in  Contempt
      Petition (C) No.297/2007 in S.L.P. (C) No.22882 of 2004


      W.P. (C) No.49 of 2013


      S.L.P. (C) No.5946 of 2013


      Writ Petition (C) No.344 of 2012







                                  O R D E R







      ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.




      1.  Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 22882-22888 of 2004 were filed by several trained teachers for a direction upon the State of Bihar to appoint them in the vacancies in the post of primary teachers  in  the State of Bihar.  
The same was withdrawn on  an  undertaking  given  on
      behalf of the State of Bihar on 18th January, 2006, 
whereby the  State
      of Bihar committed itself to recruiting  and  filling  up  the  vacant
      posts of teachers in  primary  schools  with  trained  teachers.   
The
      undertaking given by the State of Bihar reads as follows:
           "That in the meantime, it has been decided that trained teachers
           be recruited on the vacant  posts  available  in  the  State  of
           Bihar. 
The Bihar Elementary  Teachers  Appointment  Rules,  2003
           having been quashed by the Patna  High  Court,  new  recruitment
           rules are contemplated to facilitate   recruitment   of  trained
           teachers  in  a  decentralized  manner,  by  giving   them   age
           relaxation as ordered by the High Court.


           That Chapters 6 and 7 of the Bihar Education  Code  relating  to
           oriental education and hostels and messes will be kept in  mind,
           as directed by the Patna High Court, while making recruitment of
           teachers.


           That it is respectfully  submitted  that  since  the  number  of
           available trained teachers in the State is expected to  be  less
           than the available vacancies, no test for selection is  required
           to that  extent,  a  reference  to  this  Bihar  Public  Service
           Commission for initiating the process of recruitment of  trained
           teachers may not be necessary, and the  order  of  this  Hon'ble
           Court and of  the  Patna  High  Court  in  this  regard  may  be
           modified"



      2.          The application made for withdrawal of the  Special  Leave
      Petition was  disposed  of  by  this  Court  on  23rd  January,  2006.
      Subsequently,  when  the  State  of  Bihar  failed  to  abide  by  its
      commitments and assurances, the Petitioner, Nand Kishore  Ojha,  filed
      Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 207 of 2006, and the same  was  disposed
      of with  a  direction  upon  the  State  of  Bihar  to  implement  the
      undertaking given earlier, upon a  categorical  statement  being  made
      that priority would be given to the trained  teachers  in  matters  of
      appointment in the said posts.


      3.          Thereafter, on account of further default on the  part  of
      the State  of  Bihar  to  honour  its  commitments,  another  Contempt
      Petition, being Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 297 of 2007,  was  filed
      and several applications were made in the Contempt Petition by trained
      teachers similarly situated, for being impleaded  as  parties  to  the
      proceedings.
Ultimately, the learned Attorney General appeared before
      us on 25th August, 2009, and assured us that it was not the  intention
      of the State of Bihar to resile from  the  undertaking  given  on  its
      behalf.  Since there had been a change in the administrative set up in
      the State of Bihar, the situation had become more complex and  it  had
      become difficult to work out  a  solution  to  the  problem  posed  in
      filling up the vacancies  in  the  post  of  primary  school  teachers
      throughout the State of Bihar.
When Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 297
      was taken up for consideration, we heard the same along  with  several
      interlocutory applications filed by several teachers having individual
      grievances and reserved judgment.


      4. By our order dated 13th October, 2011,  on  the  Contempt  Petition
      filed in SLP(C) No. 22882 of  2004,  arising  out  of  the  breach  of
      undertaking given on 18th January, 2006, by the State of Bihar and the
      order passed on the  basis  thereof  on  23rd  January,  2006  in  the
      aforesaid SLP,
we  had  passed  orders  directing  that  the  trained
      teachers who at one time were less than the number  of  vacant  posts,
      should be given appointment in  the  vacancies  that  were  available.
      
Subsequently, however, there was some discrepancy as to the number  of
      vacancies  available  as  against  the  number  of  teachers   to   be
      accommodated.  
Accordingly, we adopted a figure from an advertisement,
      which had been published for recruitment of  primary  school  teachers
      and took the number of available  vacancies  to  be  34,540.   
We  had
      further directed that the said vacancies be filled up  with  the  said
      number of trained teachers as a one time measure to give effect to the
      undertakings given on 18th January, 2006 and 23rd January, 2006.


      5. Subsequently,
it came  to  light  that  the  number  of  candidates
      available were much more than the number of vacancies and  there  were
      also serious doubts raised  about  the  eligibility  of  some  of  the
      candidates and the genuineness of some of the institutions from  which
      they alleged to have received their training.
In our  order  of  19th
      January, 2011, we had indicated that certain  incongruities  had  been
      pointed out on behalf of the Petitioners with regard to  the  list  of
      eligible candidates furnished by the State of Bihar.


      6. When the said dispute could not be resolved in terms  of  the  list
      produced by the State of Bihar,
we thought it fit to entrust a neutral
      person with the work and, accordingly,
we had appointed  Justice  V.A.
      Mohta, a retired Judge of the Bombay High Court, who retired as  Chief
      Justice of the Orissa High Court, as Special Officer in whose presence
      the list could be settled.
However, since Justice Mohta expressed his
      desire to be relieved of the responsibility, by our order  dated  24th
      February, 2011, while relieving Justice V.A. Mohta, we  appointed  Mr.
      Justice S.K. Chattopadhyay, a retired Judge of the Patna High Court in
      his place, to take up and complete the finalization of  the  seniority
      list.
After much debate, the list submitted by Justice  Chattopadhyay
was  accepted  and  in  terms  of  the  recommendations  made,  34,540 candidates were appointed in different primary schools in the State of Bihar.


      7.          The matter did not end there.
On account of the fact that
      some  of  the  candidates,  who  had  not  appeared   before   Justice
      Chattopadhyay, came up with fresh applications  in  support  of  their
      cases and urged that there  were  various  omissions  from  the  final
      select  list,  we  decided  to  entertain   the   said   applications,
      particularly, on account of the directions, which we had given, in our
      judgment and order dated 13th  October,  2011,  that  no  court  would
      entertain any objection or applications with regard  to  the  list  of
      candidates, who had already been appointed, in terms  of  our  earlier
      order.


      8.          During the hearing of these  applications,  special  leave
      petitions and writ  petitions,  what  emerged  is  that  most  of  the
      applicants  were  aggrieved  by  some  defect  or  the  other  in  the
      preparation of the select list,  which  occurred  on  account  of  the
      failure of the  candidates  to  give  their  relevant  particulars  to
      Justice Chattopadhyay.


      9.          Be that as it may, in the event,
some  discrepancies  had
      crept in the final select list, the  individual  grievances  contained
      various  anomalies,  which  it  is  difficult  for  us   to   unravel.
      
Accordingly, we modify our order dated 13th October, 2011,  and  allow
      the applicants to approach the  High  Court  for  redressal  of  their
      grievances.
We also  direct  that  the  applications,  special  leave
      petitions and
writ petitions filed before us be treated as  withdrawn,
with liberty to the parties to approach the High Court individually or
otherwise, for relief, if any, but without, in any way, affecting  the
appointments of those teachers who have already been appointed against the vacant 34,540 posts and are working.  
We have been informed during
      the hearing that about 2413 posts out of the 34,540 posts  were  still
      left to be filled up.  All the applications, Special  Leave  Petitions
      and Writ Petitions are, therefore, disposed of in  the  light  of  the
      aforesaid observations.
We make it clear that  none  of  the  persons
appointed out of the 34,540 vacancies should be disturbed in any  way,
 but the question of filling up the balance vacancies may be taken into consideration, while disposing of the applications in question.
                                                     …………………………………………………CJI.

                                               (ALTAMAS KABIR)



                                                     ………………………………………………………J.

                                                   (ANIL      R.       DAVE)


                                                     ………………………………………………………J.

                                               (VIKRAMAJIT SEN)

      New Delhi
      Dated: July 18,2013.