under Section 363 , 366 376 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code oral testimony can be classified into three categories, namely (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In case of wholly reliable testimony of a single witness, the conviction can be founded without corroboration. This principle applies with greater vigour in case the nature of offence is such that it is committed in seclusion. In case prosecution is based on wholly unreliable testimony of a single witness, the court has no option than to acquit the accused. In the background of the aforesaid legal position, when we consider the case in hand we are of the opinion that the statement of the prosecutrix is not at all reliable or in other words wholly unreliable. No other evidence has been led to support the allegation of rape. Hence, it shall be unsafe to base the conviction on her sole testimony. In her evidence she had stated that she was subjected to rape at 12.00 noon when her sister Jitendra, the wife of the accused had gone to purchase milk. However, during the course of investigation she alleged that she was subjected to rape at 06.30 A.M. When confronted with the 7Page 8 aforesaid contradiction in the cross-examination, she could not explain the aforesaid discrepancy. Her statement that she shouted for help when she was subjected to rape also does not find support from the evidence of Ramchandra Salvi (PW-11), the owner of the house where the incident is alleged to have taken place. Dr. Smt. Sushila (PW-12), has also not supported the allegation of rape as also the Forensic Science Laboratory Report. In the face of what we have observed above, the evidence of the prosecutrix cannot be said to be wholly reliable. In light of the aforesaid evidence the view taken by the trial court was the only possible view. Once it is held so the order of acquittal is not fit to be interfered with and the High Court rightly declined to grant leave against the judgment of acquittal.

Page 1
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 570 OF 2007
STATE OF RAJASTHAN     … APPELLANT
VERSUS
BABU MEENA      …RESPONDENT
       
J U D G M E N T
CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD, J.
State of Rajasthan, aggrieved by the order of
the High Court refusing to grant leave against the
judgment of acquittal, is before us with the leave
of the Court.
Prosecution  started  on  the  basis  of  a  first
information  report  lodged  by  PW-4,  Prem  Singh,
inter alia alleging that on 20th of April, 2005 his
daughter  Kirti  Chauhan,  aged  about  16  years  leftPage 2
the house and her whereabouts are not known.  The
informant  suspected  that  his  elder  daughter
Jitendra  had  allured  her.   He  further  disclosed
that  Jitendra  had  solemnized  inter-caste  marriage
with Babu Meena, the accused herein and was staying
in  Udaipur,  Rajasthan.   Accordingly,  informant
prayed that search be made to recover his daughter.
On the basis of the aforesaid information, a case
under Section 363 and 366 of the Indian Penal Code
was  registered.   During  the  course  of
investigation,  the  statements  of  informant  Prem
Singh,  his  wife  Pushpa  (PW-5)  and  their  daughter
Kirti Chauhan    (PW-3) were recorded.  During the
course  of  investigation,  it  surfaced  that  Kirti
Chauhan received a telephone call from her sister
Jitendra and her husband, the accused herein, who
enquired  about  her  marriage.   Kirti  replied  that
her marriage was going to be held soon on which her
sister  counseled  her  that  the  boy  with  whom  her
marriage  is  going  to  be  solemnized  is  a  vagabond
and asked her not to marry him.  They also told her
2Page 3
that the accused will go to her and she should come
along with him.  Kirti, as requested by her sister,
came along with the accused and, according to her,
she  was  treated  well  for  couple  of  days.   She
further  stated  during  the  course  of  investigation
that  the  accused  subjected  her  to  sexual
intercourse against her consent.
Police,  after  usual  investigation,  submitted
charge-sheet  and  the  accused  was  ultimately
committed  to  the  Court  of  Sessions  to  face  the
trial.  Charges under Section 363, 366, 376 and 323
of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  were  framed  against  the
accused.   The  accused  denied  the  charges  and
claimed to be tried.  To bring home the charges the
prosecution  has  examined  altogether  12  witnesses
besides  a  large  number  of  documents  were  also
exhibited.
The trial court, on appreciation of evidence,
came to the conclusion that Kirti was more than 18
years  of  age  and  she  had  left  the  house
3Page 4
voluntarily.   The  only  witness  to  support  the
allegation  of  rape  is  the  victim  herself.   Kirti
(PW-3) had stated in her evidence that the accused
committed rape at 12.00 noon but, in her statement
recorded  during  the  course  of  investigation,  her
allegation was that she was raped by the accused at
06.30  A.M.   To  establish  that  the  rape  was
committed without her consent she has deposed that
while  she  was  subjected  to  rape  she  shouted,  but
nobody  came  to  her  rescue.   However,  Ramchandra
Salvi (PW-11), the owner of the house in which the
alleged  rape  took  place  has  not  supported  the
victim.  Dr. Smt. Sushila (PW-12), who examined the
victim  had  also  not  supported  the  allegation  of
rape.  Further, the report of the Forensic Science
Laboratory also does not support the allegation of
rape.   Taking  into  account  the  aforesaid
infirmities  in  the  case  of  the  prosecution,  the
trial court held that the prosecution has not been
able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and
4Page 5
accordingly, gave the accused the benefit of doubt
and acquitted him of all the charges.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, State of
Rajasthan preferred an appeal and sought leave of
the High Court for filing such an appeal.  The High
Court  declined  to  grant  the  leave  inter  alia
observing  that  the  order  of  acquittal  has  been
rendered  on  proper  appreciation  of  evidence
available on record.
Mr. Ajay Veer Singh Jain appears on behalf of
the appellant.  Despite service, nobody has chosen
to appear on behalf of the accused-respondent.
Mr.  Jain  assails  the  acquittal  of  the
respondent  under  Section  376  of  the  Indian  Penal
Code  and  contends  that  the  trial  court  ought  to
have  accepted  the  evidence  of  Kirti  (PW-3).   He
submits  that  conviction  can  be  based  on  the  sole
testimony  of  the  prosecutrix  and  the  trial  court
5Page 6
erred in rejecting her evidence and acquitting the
respondent.   In  support  of  the  submission  he  has
placed  reliance  on  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in
the case of Vijay v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010)
8 SCC 191.  Relevant para of the judgment reads as
under:
“14. Thus, the law that emerges on
the  issue  is  to  the  effect  that  the
statement of the prosecutrix, if found
to be worthy of credence and reliable,
requires  no  corroboration.  The  court
may  convict  the  accused  on  the  sole
testimony of the prosecutrix.”
We  do  not  have  the  slightest  hesitation  in
accepting the broad submission of Mr. Jain that the
conviction  can  be  based  on  the  sole  testimony  of
the prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence
and  reliable  and  for  that  no  corroboration  is
required.  It  has  often  been  said  that  
oral
testimony can be classified into three categories,
namely (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable
and  (iii)  neither  wholly  reliable  nor  wholly
unreliable.  
In case of wholly reliable testimony
6Page 7
of a single witness, the conviction can be founded
without corroboration.  
This principle applies with
greater  vigour  in  case  the  nature  of  offence  is
such that it is committed in seclusion. 
 In case
prosecution is based on wholly unreliable testimony
of a single witness, the court has no option than
to acquit the accused. 
In  the  background  of  the  aforesaid  legal
position, when we consider the case in hand we are
of  the  opinion  that  the  statement  of  the
prosecutrix  is  not  at  all  reliable  or  in  other
words  wholly  unreliable.   
No  other  evidence  has
been led to support the allegation of rape.  Hence,
it shall be unsafe to base the conviction on her
sole  testimony.   In  her  evidence  she  had  stated
that she was subjected to rape at 12.00 noon when
her  sister  Jitendra,  the  wife  of  the  accused  had
gone to purchase milk. 
 However, during the course
of investigation she alleged that she was subjected
to  rape  at  06.30  A.M.   
When  confronted  with  the
7Page 8
aforesaid  contradiction  in  the  cross-examination,
she  could  not  explain  the  aforesaid  discrepancy.
Her  statement  that  she  shouted  for  help  when  she
was  subjected  to  rape  also  does  not  find  support
from the evidence of Ramchandra Salvi (PW-11), the
owner of the house where the incident is alleged to
have  taken  place.   Dr.  Smt.  Sushila  (PW-12),  has
also not supported the allegation of rape as also
the  Forensic  Science  Laboratory  Report.   In  the
face of what we have observed above, the evidence
of  the  prosecutrix  cannot  be  said  to  be  wholly
reliable.  
In  light  of  the  aforesaid  evidence  the  view
taken  by  the  trial  court  was  the  only  possible
view.  Once it is held so the order of acquittal is
not fit to be interfered with and the High Court
rightly  declined  to  grant  leave  against  the
judgment of acquittal.  
8Page 9
In view of what we have observed above, we do
not  find  any  merit  in  the  appeal  and  it  is
dismissed accordingly.
                       ………………….………………………………….J.
(A.K. PATNAIK)
  ………..………..……………………………….J.
(CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)
NEW DELHI,
FEBRUARY 13, 2013.
9Page 10
10Page 11
11

severe strictures It is settled legal position that no adverse remark can be made against any judicial officer without giving an opportunity to explain the conduct.- “This conduct of the Chief Judicial Magistrate is deplorable and wholly mala fide and illegal.” “Vexatiously illegal.” “… and has done unpardonable injustice to the injured and the informant. His lack of sensitivity and utter callous attitude has left the accused of murderous assault to go scot-free to this day”. Our legal system acknowledges the fallibility of the Judges, hence it provides appeals and revisions. lower judicial officers mostly work under a charged atmosphere and are constantly under psychological pressure and they do not have the facilities which are available in the higher courts, we are of the view that the remarks/observations and strictures are to be avoided particularly if the officer has no occasion to put-forth his reasonings. We, once again, reiterate that harsh or disparaging remarks are not to be made against judicial officers and authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before courts of law unless it is really for the decision of the case as an integral part thereof. Under these circumstances, the adverse remarks passed in the impugned judgment and the final orders dated 01.03.2012 and 23.04.2012 insofar as the appellant is concerned are set aside. Since these appeals are confined only for expunging the strictures, the same are allowed as pointed above. No costs.

Page 1
                               
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1340-1341              OF 2013
           (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 18859-18860 of 2012)
Awani Kumar Upadhyay             .... Appellant(s)
Versus
The Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad and Ors.      ....
Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
P. Sathasivam, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) These appeals arise from the judgment and final
orders dated 01.03.2012 and 23.04.2012 passed by the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Second Appeal
No.  1444  of  2000  and  Civil  Misc.  Modification
Application No. 122702 of 2012 in Second Appeal No.
1444  of  2000  respectively,  whereby  the  High  Court,
while  allowing  the  second  appeal,  passed  severe
1Page 2
strictures against the appellant-herein  and forwarded a
copy of its judgment to Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High
Court to consider as to whether disciplinary proceedings
are warranted against him?
3) The case of the appellant, in brief, is as under:
a) The appellant, who is a Member of the U.P. Higher
Judicial  Service,  is  posted  as  Additional  District  and
Sessions Judge, Moradabad and, according to him, he is
having unblemished service career and has successfully
completed 30 years of service. 
b) The High Court, while allowing the Second Appeal
No. 1444 of 2000 titled U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad,
Lucknow  and  Another vs.  Lajja  Ram,  passed  severe
strictures against the appellant herein in the judgment
which, according to him, are ultimately going to affect
permanently not only his reputation but also his entire
service career.
c) It is the claim of the appellant that in the Second
Appeal  No.  1444  of  2000,  he  has  not  rendered  any
2Page 3
judgment as trial Court Judge or as the first Appellate
Court Judge.  According to him, a suit bearing No. 418 of
1997 was filed by Shri Lajja Ram against the U.P. Avas
Evam Vikas Parishad, Lucknow and another and the said
suit  was  decided  by  one  learned  Civil  Judge,  Senior
Division, Ghaziabad presided over by  Shri Chaturbhuj
by a judgment and order dated 02.05.1997.  Aggrieved
by the said judgment, a first appeal was filed being First
Appeal  No.  105  of  1997  in  the  Court  of   Shri  A.K.
Aggarwal,  second  Additional  Dist.  &  Sessions  Judge,
Ghaziabad.   The  first  Appellate  Court  framed  12
additional  issues  and  on  those  additional  issues,  the
matter was remanded to the Court of the appellant as
he  was  working  as  Civil  Judge,  Senior  Division,
Ghaziabad. Thereafter, in compliance with the order of
the first Appellate Court, after recording the evidence of
the parties, the appellant recorded the evidence of the
parties and gave his findings on 31.05.1999.
3Page 4
d) It is the case of the appellant that in the impugned
judgment  and  order,  the  High  Court  has  neither
furnished any independent finding on the issues which
were determined by the appellant herein nor anything
about  his  ultimate  decision.   The  present  appeal  is
confined only to the portion wherein the High Court has
made  certain  strictures.   The  appellant  has  also
asserted that the High Court has not considered that
the  appellant  has  not  rendered  any  decision  as  trial
Judge or as the Judge of the first Appellate Court.  On
the  direction  by  the  first  Appellate  Court,  only  12
additional  issues  were  adjudicated  by  the  appellant.
Inasmuch  as  “severe  strictures”,  if  allowed  to  stand,
would affect his entire future prospects of service, he
approached this Court by filing this appeal by way of
special leave.
e) While answering the substantial questions of law,
namely, 3, 4, 5 and 6, the High Court decided the same
in  favour  of  the  appellants  therein  and  against  the
4Page 5
respondents.  Ultimately, both the second appeals were
allowed with exemplary cost of Rs. 5 Lakhs in Second
Appeal  No.  1444  of  2000  and  Rs.  1  Lakh  in  Second
Appeal No. 1445 of 2000.  The High Court ultimately set
aside  the  decrees  passed  by  the  courts  below  and
dismissed both the suits.  The High Court also directed
that a FIR be lodged immediately against the plaintiffs
for  malicious  prosecution  and  manipulation  in  the
official records.  After issuing such directions the High
Court  passed  the  following  order,  with  which  we  are
concerned in these appeals:
“Severe stricture is passed against the Judge of the
trial  Court  as  well  as  of  lower  appellate  Court  for
passing extremely illegal and unjust judgments and
decrees.  A copy of this judgment shall be placed in
their service records and be also sent to Hon’ble the
Chief  Justice  to  consider  as  to  whether  disciplinary
proceedings are warranted against them.”  
f) On  coming  to  know  of  the  strictures  and  the
ultimate direction of the High Court, the appellant filed
a  Civil  Misc.  Modification  Application  No.  122702  of
2012 in Second Appeal No. 1444 of 2000 for expunging
5Page 6
the remarks made in the judgment dated 01.03.2012.
The High Court, after hearing the counsel for the judicial
officer without modifying the judgment, observed  that
“I did not intend to make any suggestion for initiating
disciplinary  proceedings  against  the  Judge  who  had
decided  the  remitted  issues  only”, and  by  saying  so
disposed of the said application, however, permitted the
appellant to make representation on the administrative
side of the High Court.  Not satisfied with the same, the
appellant  has  filed  the  above  appeal  for  a  limited
purpose of expunging those adverse remarks.
4) Heard Mr. Harshvir Pratap Sharma, learned counsel
for the appellant and Mr Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, learned
counsel  for  the  Registrar  General,  High  Court  of
Allahabad.   In the present  appeals, the other  parties
have been shown only as proforma respondents.
5) The questions which arise for consideration are:
(a) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the High Court was justified in making
6Page 7
severe  strictures  and  directions  against  the
appellant in its judgment dated 01.03.2012?
(b) Whether the direction to send the impugned
judgment to Hon’ble Chief Justice of the High
Court  with  a  request  to  consider  whether
disciplinary proceedings are warranted against
the appellant herein was justified?
(c) Whether the High Court is justified in disposing
of  the  application  for  modification  without
expunging  the  offending  portion  which  was
made  without  affording  opportunity  to  the
appellant?
6)  It is settled legal position that no adverse remark can
be  made  against  any  judicial  officer  without  giving  an
opportunity to explain the conduct.
It is useful to refer a
decision of this Court in Parkash Singh Teji vs. Northern
India  Goods  Transport  Company  Private  Limited  and
Another, (2009) 12 SCC 577 which is identical to the case
on hand.  In the above decision, the directions of the High
Court in its order dated 06.07.2006 reads as under:-
“Before parting, we wish to make it clear that the learned
Judge  who  passed  the  impugned  judgment  and  decree
need be careful in future, rather than adopting a hasty,
slipshod and perfunctory approach as is manifest from the
judgment delivered by him in this case.  We further direct
that  a  copy  of  this  order  shall  be  placed  on  the
7Page 8
personal/service record of the officer, while another copy
be  placed  before  the  Hon’ble  Inspecting  Judge  of  the
officer for His Lordship’s perusal.”
According to the appellant, by making such remarks and that
too behind his back, are not warranted.  Here again, after
adverting to the earlier decisions and principles enunciated
therein, this Court expunged the offending remarks made
against the appellant and allowed the appeal filed by him.
7) Apart  from  the  above  decision,  in  an  identical
circumstance,  this  Court  has  expunged  adverse  remarks
made against a judicial officer in Amar Pal Singh vs. State
of  Uttar  Pradesh  and  Another, (2012) 6 SCC 491.  The
appellant therein, a judicial officer, being aggrieved by the
comments and observations passed by the learned Single
Judge of the High Court of Judicature of Allahabad in Sunil
Solanki vs.  State  of  U.P (Criminal Revision No. 1541 of
2007,  order  dated  31.05.2007)  has  preferred  an  appeal
before this Court.  In this case, one Sunil Solanki had filed an
application  under  Section  156(3)  of the  Code  of Criminal
Procedure,  1973  before  the  CJM,  Bulandshahar  with  the
allegation that on 11.02.2007 at  9.30 p.m. when  he was
8Page 9
standing outside the front door of his house along with some
others, a marriage procession passed from in front of the
door of his house and  at  that  juncture,  one  Mauzzim  Ali
accosted him and eventually fired at him from his countrymade pistol which caused injuries in the abdomen area of
Shafeeque, one of his friends. However, he escaped unhurt.
Because of the said occurrence, Sunil Solanki endeavoured
hard to get the FIR registered at the police station concerned
but  the  entire  effort  became  an  exercise  in  futility  as  a
consequence of which he was compelled to knock at the
doors  of  the  learned  CJM  by  filing  an  application  under
Section 156(3) of the Code for issuance of a direction to the
police to register an FIR and investigate the matter.  While
dealing with the application, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, the
appellant  in  that  appeal,  ascribed  certain  reasons  and
dismissed the same.            
8) Being  dissatisfied,  the  appellant  therein  preferred  a
revision before the High Court and the learned Single Judge,
taking note of the allegations made in the application, found
that it was a fit case where the learned Magistrate should
9Page 10
have directed the registration of FIR and investigation into
the alleged offences.  While recording such a conclusion, the
learned single Judge has made certain observations which
are reproduced below:
“This conduct of the Chief Judicial Magistrate is deplorable
and wholly mala fide and illegal.”  
Thereafter, the learned single Judge treated the order to be
wholly hypothetical and commented it was:
“Vexatiously illegal.”
After stating so the learned single Judge further stated that
the Chief Judicial Magistrate has committed a blatant error of
law.  Thereafter, he further commented:
“… and has done unpardonable injustice to the injured and
the informant.   His lack of sensitivity  and utter  callous
attitude has left the accused of murderous assault to go
scot-free to this day”.
9) After making the aforesaid observations, the learned
Single Judge set aside the order and remitted the matter to
the Chief Judicial Magistrate to decide the application afresh
in accordance with law.  Thereafter, he directed as follows:
“Let a copy of this order be sent to the Administrative
Judge, Bulandshahar to take appropriate action against the
CJM concerned as he deems fit.”
1Page 11
10) Aggrieved by the said direction, the appellant therein
approached this Court by way of a special leave petition to
delete  the  aforesaid  comments,  observations  and  the
ultimate direction.
11) After referring all the various earlier decisions of this
Court on this point expunged the remarks and set aside the
said observation/comments and the direction made against
the judicial officer.  This Court also directed that if the said
remarks have been entered into the annual confidential roll
of the judicial officer, the same shall stand expunged and
also marked a copy of the judgment to the Registrar General
of the High Court, Allahabad to be placed on the personal file
of the judicial officer concerned.
12) It  is  made  clear  that  we  are  not  undermining  the
ultimate decision of the High Court on merits.  
However, we
are constrained to observe that the higher courts every day
come across orders of the lower courts which are not justified
either in law or in fact and modify them or set them aside.
Our legal system acknowledges the fallibility of the Judges,
hence it provides appeals and revisions. 
 Inasmuch as the
1Page 12
lower  judicial  officers  mostly  work  under  a  charged 
atmosphere and are constantly under psychological pressure
and they do not have the facilities which are available in the
higher  courts,  we  are  of  the  view  that  the
remarks/observations  and  strictures  are  to  be  avoided
particularly if the  officer has no occasion to put-forth his
reasonings.  Further, if the passage complained of is wholly
irrelevant and unjustifiable and its retention on the records
will cause serious harm to the persons to whom it refers and
its expunction will not affect the reasons for the judgment or
order,  request  for  expunging  those  remarks  are  to  be
allowed.  We, once again, reiterate that harsh or disparaging
remarks  are not to be made  against judicial officers and
authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before
courts of law unless it is really for the decision of the case as
an integral part thereof.  
13) We hold that the adverse remarks made against the
appellant were neither justified nor called for.  The perusal of
the impugned judgment would show that the word “severe
strictures” is mentioned whereas no logical reasoning has
1Page 13
been given as to what is the fault of the appellant and the
High Court has not adduced any finding as to why it has
disagreed  with  the  reasoning  given  by  the  appellant
particularly when the appellant asserted that neither he has
rendered any decision as trial Court Judge nor as the first
Appellate Court Judge except deciding 12 additional issues
on the directions issued by his predecessor.  The strictures
passed against the appellant are neither warranted nor is in
conformity with the settled law as propounded by this Court.
14) Under  these  circumstances,  the  adverse  remarks
passed in the impugned judgment and the final orders dated
01.03.2012  and  23.04.2012  insofar  as  the  appellant  is
concerned are set aside.  Since these appeals are confined
only for expunging the strictures, the same are allowed as
pointed above.  No costs.  
               
...…………………………………J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
...…………………………………J.
       (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)
1Page 14
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 13, 2013.
1

“transportation for life” A sentence of transportation for life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person's natural life. The petitioner – a life convict has filed this contempt petition against the respondents – the State of West Bengal and its officers for disobeying the order dated 24.11.2010 passed by this Court by not complying with the same within the prescribed period of eight weeks and failure to release him in accordance with the statute. - “The life convict was convicted on 18.01.1990 under Section 302/34 IPC and detained in connection with S.T. No. 01 of June 1989. He was released on parole from Presidency Correctional Home on 29.04.2005 in compliance with Hon’ble Supreme Court’s order in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 279 of 2004. The police authority vehemently opposed the premature release of the life convict on the following grounds: (a) He was a notorious fellow in the area before his conviction. (b) He still maintains relationship with his old associates. 20Page 21 (c) He is within the age of 52 years with sound health. (d) His socio economic condition is not sound. (e) In case of his premature release there is every possibility of his reverting to criminality. (f) During his parole he has been technically serving life imprisonment binding him to refrain from criminal activities for the time being. There is every possibility of his committing further crimes. Considering the above fact, the Review Board did not find any reason to recommend premature release of the life convict now on parole.” It is seen that after careful consideration of all the aspects, the Review Board in its meeting held on 27.01.2011 did not recommend the petitioner for his premature release. The recommendation of the Review Board was placed before the State Government and the State Government accepted the recommendation of the State Sentence Review Board. The decision of the State Government was communicated to the petitioner vide letter No. 790-J dated 09.02.2012. In view of the decision of the State Sentence Review Board, approval by the State Government and the principles enunciated in various decisions of this Court including the decision of the Constitution Bench in Gopal Vinayak Godse’s case (supra), we find no merit in the contempt petition, consequently, the same is dismissed.

Page 1
        REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                           ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) No. 363 OF 2011
IN
WRIT PETITION (CRL.) No. 279 OF 2004
Life Convict Bengal @ Khoka
@ Prasanta Sen   .... Petitioner (s)
Versus
B.K. Srivastava & Ors.                         .... Alleged Contemnors/
Respondent(s)
   
J U D G M E N T
P.Sathasivam,J.
1) The petitioner – a life convict has filed this contempt
petition against the respondents – the State of West Bengal
and its officers for disobeying the order dated 24.11.2010
passed by this Court by not complying with the same within
the prescribed period of eight weeks and failure to release
him in accordance with the statute.
1Page 2
2) Brief facts:
(a) Prior to the above contempt petition, the petitioner filed
a writ of Habeas Corpus being W.P. (Crl.) No. 279 of 2004 -
for his immediate release in which it was stated that as per
his  calculation,  he  has  undergone  total  sentence  of
imprisonment for a period of 22 years 2 months and 16 days
including earned remission.  According to him, even as per
the  stand  taken  by  the  respondents  in  their  counter
affidavits, he had undergone sentence for a period of 20
years 1 month and 17 days including remission and set off
as  on  31.12.2004.   In  other  words,  according  to  the
petitioner,  he  has  already undergone  full sentence  of 20
years with remission.
(b) By order dated 24.11.2010, this Court disposed of W.P.
(Crl.) Nos. 20 and 279 of 2004 with the following directions:
“In  the  light  of  the  decision  of  this  Court  in  State  of
Haryana  &  Ors. vs.  Jagdish,  2010  (4)  SCC  216  and
considering the relief prayed in both the writ petitions, we
dispose of the writ petitions by the following directions:
The State of West Bengal is directed to consider the
claim of both the writ petitioners, life convicts and proceed
to conclude the sentence for the purpose of consideration
of remission as per the Statute/Policy applicable on the
date of conviction and pass appropriate orders in terms of
2Page 3
the above decision within a period of eight weeks from the
date of the receipt of the copy of this order.
The Writ Petitions are disposed of.
Sd/-
            (P.Sathasivam,J.)
   Sd/-
                (Dr. B.S.ChauhanJ.)”
3) It is the claim of the petitioner that in spite of the said
order of this Court dated 24.11.2010 and in view of the West
Bengal Correctional Services Act, 1992 (West Bengal Act 32
of  1992)  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  W.B.Act”),  the
respondents have not released him which necessitated him
to file the above contempt petition.
4) Pursuant to the notice issued by this Court, Mr. B.K.
Srivastava, respondent No.1, Secretary to the Government of
West  Bengal,  Judicial  Department  has  filed  the  counter
affidavit highlighting their stand.  In addition to the same,
Dr.  G.D.  Gautama,  respondent  No.2,  Additional  Chief
Secretary  to  the  Government  of  West  Bengal,  Home
Department  and  Mr.  Biplab  Das  -  respondent  No.3,
Superintendent of the Presidency Correctional Home have
filed  counter  affidavits  reiterating  their  stand.   In  these
counter  affidavits,  the  State  Government  has  highlighted
3Page 4
that on going into the period of custody, other particulars
and the provisions of the West Bengal Act, it rejected the
prayer of the petitioner for his premature release, hence,
according  to  them,  there  is  no  violation  of  order  dated
24.11.2010 passed by this Court and prayed for dismissal of
the present contempt petition.
5) We heard Mr. B.S. Malik, learned senior counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. Avijit Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for
the respondents.
Discussion:
6) In order to appreciate the claim of both the parties, it is
useful  to  refer  relevant  provisions  relating  to  release  of
prisoners under the W.B. Act.  Section 2(c) of the W.B. Act
defines “correctional home” which reads as under:
“2(c)  “correctional  home”  means  any  place  used
permanently or temporarily under the orders of the State
Government for detention of persons, whether under-trial
or convicted, in accordance with any order for confinement
under any law providing for preventive detention or any
other law for the time being in force, but does not include a
place for confinement of a person under the custody of the
police;”
Chapter XVII of the said Act deals with remission, release
and parole.  Section 58 speaks about remission, Section 59
4Page 5
relates to special remission to examinees and Section 61,
with which we are concerned, speaks about release.  Section
61 contains 6 sub-sections and thereafter Explanation has
been appended to.  Mr. B.S. Malik, learned senior counsel for
the petitioner heavily relied on the Explanation to Section 61
which reads as under:
“Explanation – For the purpose of calculation of the total
period of imprisonment under this section, the period of
imprisonment for life shall be taken to be equivalent to the
period of imprisonment for 20 years.”
7) Relying on the Explanation and in view of the fact that
even according to the State, the petitioner has crossed 20
years in correctional home (prison), according to the learned
senior counsel, as per order of this Court dated 24.11.2010,
the respondents ought to have released the petitioner on
completion of a period of 20 years.  The above claim was
resisted by Mr. Avijit Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the
respondents.  According to him, it cannot be construed that
the  period  of  imprisonment  for  life  is  equivalent  to
imprisonment for 20 years.  He further pointed out that in
the absence of remission order for the whole period by the
State Government, the petitioner cannot be released.
5Page 6
8) Even  at  the  outset,  Mr.  B.S.  Malik,  learned  senior
counsel for the petitioner, relied on a decision rendered by
this Court on 16.09.2011 in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 38 of 2011
titled Harpal Singh vs. State of Haryana & Another.  The
said writ petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution, was
filed by one Harpal Singh for issuing a writ of Habeas Corpus
and to set him at liberty forthwith from his illegal detention
in the prison beyond 20 years of his sentence.  This Court,
after going into the Jail Custody Certificate dated 28.08.2011
issued  by  the  Superintendent  Central  Jail,  Ambala  and
finding that the petitioner had undergone imprisonment of
more than 20 years with remissions, allowed the writ petition
and directed the authorities to release him forthwith from
the jail unless his presence in jail is needed with reference to
any other case.
9) After going into the relevant provisions, viz., Section 57
of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”), Sections 2(c)
and 61 of the W.B. Act as well as various decisions of this
6Page 7
Court on this point, we are unable to accept the claim of the
petitioner for the following reasons.
10) Before adverting to  various decisions,  it is useful to
reproduce Section 57 of IPC which reads as under:
“57.  Fractions of term of punishment – In calculating
fractions of  terms of punishment, imprisonment for life
shall be reckoned as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty
years.”
11) At the foremost, it is useful to refer the decision of the
Constitution Bench of this Court in  Gopal  Vinayak  Godse
vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 600.
In  that  case,  a  writ  petition,  under  Article  32  of  the
Constitution, was filed for an order in the nature of Habeas
Corpus claiming that the petitioner therein has justly served
his sentence and should, therefore, be released forthwith.
Among other questions, the main question considered by the
Constitution Bench was whether there is any provision of law
whereunder a sentence for life imprisonment, without any
formal  remission  by  appropriate  Government,  can  be
automatically  treated  as  one  for  a  definite  period?   The
Constitution Bench, in an answer to the above question, said
7Page 8
“No”.  The following discussion and ultimate conclusion are
relevant:
“5………… No such provision is found in the Indian Penal
Code,  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  or  the  Prisons  Act.
Though the Government of India stated before the Judicial
Committee in the case cited supra that, having regard to
Section  57  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  20  years'
imprisonment  was  equivalent  to  a  sentence  of
transportation  for  life,  the  Judicial  Committee  did  not
express  its  final  opinion  on  that  question.  The  Judicial
Committee observed in that case thus at p. 10:
“Assuming that the sentence is to be regarded as
one of twenty years, and subject to remission for
good conduct, he had not earned remission sufficient
to  entitle  him  to  discharge  at  the  time  of  his
application, and it was therefore rightly dismissed,
but in saying this, Their Lordships are not to be taken
as meaning that a life sentence must in all cases be
treated as one of not more than twenty years, or that
the convict is necessarily entitled to remission.”
Section  57  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  has  no  real
bearing  on  the  question  raised  before  us.  For
calculating  fractions  of  terms  of  punishment  the
section provides that transportation for life shall be
regarded as equivalent to imprisonment for twenty
years. It does not say that transportation for life shall
be deemed to be transportation for twenty years for
all purposes; nor does the amended section which
substitutes  the  words  “imprisonment  for  life”  for
“transportation for life” enable the drawing of any
such  all  embracing  fiction.  A  sentence  of
transportation for life or imprisonment for life must
prima  facie  be  treated  as  transportation  or
imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period
of the convicted person's natural life.”
“7. It is common case that the said rules were made
under the Prisons Act, 1894 and that they have statutory
force. But the Prisons Act does not confer on any authority
a power to commute or remit sentences; it provides only
for  the  regulation  of  prisons  and  for  the  treatment  of
prisoners confined therein. Section 59 of the Prisons Act
8Page 9
confers a power on the State Government to make rules,
inter  alia, for  rewards  for  good  conduct.  Therefore,  the
rules made under the Act should be construed within the
scope of the ambit of the Act. The rules, inter alia, provide
for three types of remissions by way of rewards for good
conduct, namely, (i) ordinarily, (ii) special and (iii) State.
For  the working  out of the said remissions, under Rule
1419(c), transportation for life is ordinarily to be taken as
15  years'  actual  imprisonment.  The  rule  cannot  be
construed  as  a  statutory  equation  of  15  years'  actual
imprisonment for transportation for life. The equation is
only for a particular purpose, namely, for the purpose of
“remission  system”  and not  for  all  purposes.  The  word
“ordinarily” in the rule also supports the said construction.
The  non  obstante  clause  in  sub-rule  (2)  of  Rule  1447
reiterates that notwithstanding anything contained in Rule
1419  no  prisoner  who  has  been  sentenced  to
transportation for life shall be released on completion of
his  term  unless  orders  of  the  Government  have  been
received on a report submitted to it. This also indicates
that the period of 15 years' actual imprisonment specified
in  the  rule  is  only  for  the  purpose  of  calculating  the
remission  and that the  completion  of  the  term on that
basis does not ipso facto confer any right upon the prisoner
to release. The order of the Government contemplated in
Rule  1447  in  the  case  of  a  prisoner  sentenced  to
transportation for life can only be an order under Section
401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for in the case of a
sentence  of  transportation  for  life  the  release  of  the
prisoner can legally be effected only by remitting the entire
balance of the sentence. Rules 934 and 937(c) provide for
that contingency. Under the said rules the orders of an
appropriate  Government  under  Section  401  Criminal
Procedure Code, are a pre-requisite for a release. No other
rule  has  been  brought  to  our  notice  which  confers  an
indefeasible right on a prisoner sentenced to transportation
for  life  to  an  unconditional  release  on  the  expiry  of  a
particular term including remissions. The rules under the
Prisons  Act  do  not  substitute  a  lesser  sentence  for  a
sentence of transportation for life.
8. Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before Act 26
of  1955  a  sentence  of  transportation  for  life  could  be
undergone by a prisoner by way of rigorous imprisonment
for life in a designated prison in India. After the said Act,
such a convict shall be dealt with in the same manner as
one  sentenced  to  rigorous  imprisonment  for  the  same
9Page 10
term. Unless the said sentence is commuted or remitted by
appropriate authority under the relevant provisions of the
Indian Penal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, a
prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law to
serve the life term in prison. The rules framed under the
Prisons Act enable such a prisoner to earn remissions —
ordinary, special and State — and the said remissions will
be given credit towards his term of imprisonment. For the
purpose  of  working  out  the  remissions  the  sentence  of
transportation for life is ordinarily equated with a definite
period, but it is only for that particular purpose and not for
any other purpose. As the sentence of transportation for
life or its prison equivalent, the life imprisonment, is one of
indefinite  duration,  the  remissions  so  earned  do  not  in
practice help such a convict as it is not possible to predict
the time of his death. That is why the Rules provide for a
procedure to enable the appropriate Government to remit
the sentence under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure  on  a  consideration  of  the  relevant  factors,
including the period of remissions earned. The question of
remission  is  exclusively  within  the  province  of  the
appropriate Government; and in this case it is admitted
that,  though  the  appropriate  Government  made  certain
remissions  under  Section  401  of  the  Code  of  Criminal
Procedure,  it  did  not  remit  the  entire  sentence.  We,
therefore, hold that the petitioner has not yet acquired any
right to release.”
From the above decision, it is clear that in the absence of
subsequent  order  of  remission  by  the  competent
Government either based on Section 57 of IPC or any other
provision  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1973,  the  life
convict  cannot  be  released.   The  above  decision  of  the
Constitution Bench has been followed in various subsequent
decisions.
10Page 11
12) In  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh vs.  Ratan  Singh  &
Ors.,  (1976)  3  SCC  470,  following  the  decision  of  the
Constitution  Bench  in  Gopal  Vinayak Godse’s  case
(supra), this Court held as under:
“4. As regards the first point, namely, that the prisoner
could be released automatically on the expiry of 20 years
under the Punjab Jail Manual or the Rules framed under the
Prisons Act, the matter is no longer res integra and stands
concluded by a decision of this Court in  Gopal Vinayak
Godse v. State of Maharashtra where the Court, following a
decision of the Privy Council in Pandit Kishori Lal v. KingEmperor,AIR 1945 PC 64 observed as follows:
“Under that section, a person transported for life
or any other term before the enactment of the said
section would be treated as a person sentenced to
rigorous imprisonment for life or for the said term.
If so, the next question is whether there is any
provision  of  law  whereunder  a  sentence  for  life
imprisonment,  without  any  formal  remission  by
appropriate  Government,  can  be  automatically
treated  as  one  for  a  definite  period.  No  such
provision is found in the Indian Penal Code, Code of
Criminal Procedure or the Prisons Act.
* * *
A  sentence  of  transportation  for  life  or
imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated as
transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the
remaining period of the convicted person's natural
life.”
The Court further observed thus:
“But  the  Prisons  Act  does  not  confer  on  any
authority a power to commute or remit sentences; it
provides only for the regulation of prisons and for the
treatment of prisoners confined therein. Section 59
of  the  Prisons  Act  confers  a  power  on  the  State
Government to make rules, inter alia, for rewards for
good conduct. Therefore, the rules made under the
Act  should  be  construed  within  the  scope  of  the
11Page 12
ambit of the Act.... Under the said rules the orders of
an appropriate Government under Section 401 of the
Criminal  Procedure  Code,  are  a  prerequisite  for  a
release. No other rule has been brought to our notice
which  confers  an  indefeasible  right  on  a  prisoner
sentenced  to  transportation  for  life  to  an
unconditional release on the expiry of a particular
term  including  remissions.  The  rules  under  the
Prisons Act do not substitute a lesser sentence for a
sentence of transportation for life.
The question of remission is exclusively within the
province of the appropriate Government; and in this
case  it  is  admitted  that,  though  the  appropriate
Government made certain remissions under Section
401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did not
remit the entire sentence. We, therefore, hold that
the  petitioner  has  not  yet  acquired  any  right  to
release.”
It is, therefore, manifest from the decision of this Court
that the Rules framed under the Prisons Act or under the
Jail Manual do not affect the total period which the prisoner
has  to  suffer  but  merely  amount  to  administrative
instructions regarding the various remissions to be given to
the  prisoner  from  time  to  time  in  accordance  with  the
rules. This Court further pointed out that the question of
remission of the entire sentence or a part of it lies within
the exclusive domain of the appropriate Government under
Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and neither
Section 57 of the Indian Penal Code nor any Rules or local
Acts  can  stultify  the  effect  of  the  sentence  of  life
imprisonment given by the court under the Indian Penal
Code. In other words, this Court has clearly held that a
sentence for life would enure till the lifetime of the accused
as  it  is  not  possible  to  fix  a  particular  period  of  the
prisoner's  death  and  remissions  given  under  the  Rules
could not be regarded as a substitute for a sentence of
transportation for life. In these circumstances, therefore, it
is clear that the High Court was in error in thinking that the
respondent  was  entitled  to  be  released  as  of  right  on
completing the term of 20 years including the remissions.
For these reasons, therefore, the first contention raised by
the Learned Counsel for the appellant is well founded and
must prevail.
12Page 13
9. From  a  review  of  the  authorities  and  the  statutory
provisions  of the Code of Criminal Procedure  the following
propositions emerge:
“(1) that a sentence of imprisonment for life does not
automatically expire at the end of 20 years including
the remissions, because the administrative rules framed
under the various Jail Manuals or under the Prisons Act
cannot supersede the statutory provisions of the Indian
Penal Code. A sentence of imprisonment for life means
a sentence for the entire life of the prisoner unless the
appropriate  Government  chooses  to  exercise  its
discretion to remit either the whole or a part of the
sentence  under Section  401  of the  Code  of  Criminal
Procedure;
(2)  that  the  appropriate  Government  has  the
undoubted discretion to remit or refuse to remit the
sentence and where it refuses to remit the sentence no
writ can be issued directing the State Government to
release the prisoner;
(3)  that  the  appropriate  Government  which  is
empowered to grant remission under Section 401 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure is the Government   of
the State where the prisoner has been convicted and
sentenced, that is to say, the transferor State and not
the transferee State where the prisoner may have been
transferred  at  his  instance  under  the  Transfer  of
Prisoners Act; and
(4) that where the transferee State feels that the
accused  has  completed  a  period  of  20  years  it  has
merely to forward the request of the prisoner to the
concerned  State  Government,  that  is  to  say,  the
Government  of  the  State  where  the  prisoner  was
convicted  and  sentenced and even  if  this  request is
rejected  by  the  State  Government  the  order  of  the
Government cannot be interfered with by a High Court
in its writ jurisdiction.”
After holding so, this Court set aside the order of the High
Court  releasing  the  prisoner  therein  from  Central  Jail,
Amritsar.
13Page 14
13) In Kartar Singh & Ors.  vs. State of Haryana, (1982)
3  SCC  1,  a  Bench  of  three  Judges  of  this  Court  while
considering the similar claim held as under:
“6……Further,  Section  57  IPC  or  the  remission  rules
contained in Jail Manual (e.g. para 516-B of Punjab/Haryana
Jail Manual) are irrelevant in this context. Section 57 IPC
provides that imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as
equivalent to imprisonment for 20 years for the specific
purpose  mentioned  therein,  namely,  for  the  purpose  of
calculating fractions of terms of punishment and not for all
purposes;  similarly  remission  rules  contained  in  Jail
Manuals cannot override statutory provisions contained in
the Penal Code and the sentence of imprisonment for life
have to be regarded as a sentence for the remainder of the
natural  life  of  the  convict.  The  Privy  Council  in  Pandit
Kishori Lal case and this Court in Gopal Godse case have
settled this position once and for all by taking the view that
a sentence for transportation for life or imprisonment for
life must be treated as transportation or imprisonment for
the  whole  of  the  remaining  period  of  the  convicted
person's natural life. This view has been confirmed and
followed by this Court in two subsequent decisions — in
Ratan Singh case,  and Maru Ram case In this view of the
matter life convicts would not fall within the purview of
Section 428 CrPC.”
The Bench also considered Gopal Godse case  (supra) and
the decision of the Privy Council in Pandit Kishori Lal vs.
King Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 64.
14) In Laxman Naskar vs. Union of India & Ors., (2000)
2 SCC 595, this Court reiterated the same proposition.
15) The last decision which is directly on the point similar to
the case on hand is  Mohd. Munna vs.  Union of India  &
14Page 15
Ors. etc. (2005) 7 SCC 417.  The said case arose in a writ
petition filed under Art. 32 of the Constitution.  According to
the  petitioner  therein,  the  length  of  duration  of
imprisonment for life is equivalent to 20 years’ imprisonment
and that too subject to further remission admissible under
law.  It was further pointed out that on completion of this
term, he was liable to be released under Rule 751(c) of the
West Bengal Jail Code.  The petitioner relied on Explanation
to Section 61 of the West Bengal Correctional Services Act,
1992  (West  Bengal  Act  32  of  1992)  whereunder
imprisonment  for  life  is  equated  to  a  term  of  20  years’
imprisonment.  As said earlier, it is a case identical to the
case on hand.  Here again, Explanation to Section 61 of the
West Bengal Act was pressed into service.  After going into
the very same provisions and considering the decision of the
Privy Council in Pandit Kishori Lal’s case  (supra) as well
as the decision of the Constitution Bench in Gopal Vinayak
Godse’s case (supra), this Court concluded thus:
“13. The counsel contended that by virtue of Rule 751(c) of
the West Bengal Jail Code, the petitioner was liable to be
released  from  jail on completion  of  twenty years.  He  also
relied on the Explanation to Section 61 of the West Bengal
15Page 16
Correctional Services Act, 1992 (W.B. Act 32 of 1992) wherein
the imprisonment for life is equated to a term of twenty years'
simple imprisonment for the purpose of remission. But there
is no provision either in the Indian Penal Code or in the Code
of  Criminal  Procedure  whereby  life  imprisonment  could  be
treated as fourteen years or twenty years without there being
a formal remission by the appropriate Government. Section
57 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
“57.  Fractions  of  terms  of  punishment.—In
calculating  fractions  of  terms  of  punishment,
imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalent to
imprisonment for twenty years.”
The  above  section  is  applicable  for  the  purpose  of
remission  when  the  matter  is  considered  by  the
Government under the appropriate provisions. This very
plea was placed before the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council in  Kishori Lal v.  Emperor5 and the Privy
Council held as under: (AIR p. 67)
“Assuming that the sentence is to be regarded as
one  of  20  years,  and  subject  to  remission  for  good
conduct,  he  had  not  earned  remission  sufficient  to
entitle him to discharge at the time of his application
and it was therefore  rightly  dismissed but, in saying
this, Their Lordships are not to be taken as meaning
that a life sentence must and in all cases be treated as
one of not more than 20 years or that the convict is
necessarily entitled to remission.”
14. The Prisons Rules are made under the Prisons Act and
the  Prisons  Act by  itself does  not  confer  any authority  or
power to commute or remit sentence. It only provides for the
regulation of the prisons and for the terms of the prisoners
confined  therein.  Therefore,  the  West  Bengal  Correctional
Services Act or the West Bengal Jail Code do not confer any
special right on the petitioner herein.
15. In  Godse case6, the Constitution Bench of this Court
held that the sentence of imprisonment for life is not for any
definite  period  and  the  imprisonment  for  life  must,  prima
facie,  be  treated  as  imprisonment  for  the  whole  of  the
remaining period of the convicted person's natural life. It was
also held in AIR para 5 as follows: (SCR pp. 444-45)
“It does not say that transportation for life shall be
deemed to be transportation for twenty years for all
purposes;  nor  does  the  amended  section  which
substitutes  the  words  ‘imprisonment  for  life’  for
‘transportation for life’ enable the drawing of any such
16Page 17
all-embracing fiction. A sentence of transportation for
life or imprisonment for life must prima facie be treated
as transportation or imprisonment for the whole of the
remaining period of the convicted person's natural life.”
16. Summarising the decision, it was held in AIR para 8 as
under: (SCR p. 447)
“Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before Act 26
of 1955 a sentence of transportation for life could be
undergone  by  a  prisoner  by  way  of  rigorous
imprisonment for life in a designated prison in India.
After the said Act, such a convict shall be dealt with in
the  same  manner  as  one  sentenced  to  rigorous
imprisonment  for  the  same  term.  Unless  the  said
sentence  is  commuted  or  remitted  by  appropriate
authority  under the  relevant provisions  of the  Indian
Penal  Code  or  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  a
prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound in law
to serve the life term in prison. The Rules framed under
the  Prisons  Act  enable  such  a  prisoner  to  earn
remissions — ordinary, special and State — and the said
remissions  will  be  given  credit  towards  his  term  of
imprisonment.  For  the  purpose  of  working  out  the
remissions  the  sentence  of  transportation  for  life  is
ordinarily equated with a definite period, but it is only
for  that  particular  purpose  and  not  for  any  other
purpose. As the sentence of transportation for life or its
prison  equivalent,  the  life  imprisonment,  is  one  of
indefinite duration, the remissions so earned do not in
practice  help  such a convict  as it is  not possible  to
predicate the time of his death. That is why the Rules
provide  for  a  procedure  to  enable  the  appropriate
Government to remit the sentence under Section 401 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure on a consideration of
the relevant factors, including the period of remissions
earned. The question of remission is exclusively within
the province of the appropriate Government; and in this
case  it  is  admitted  that,  though  the  appropriate
Government made certain remissions under Section 401
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did not remit the
entire sentence. We, therefore, hold that the petitioner
has not yet acquired any right to release.”
We  are  bound  by  the  above  dicta  laid  down  by  the
Constitution Bench and we hold that life imprisonment is not
17Page 18
equivalent to imprisonment for fourteen years or for twenty
years as contended by the petitioner.
17. Thus, all the contentions raised by the petitioner fail
and the petitioner is not entitled to be released on any of the
grounds urged in the writ petition so long as there is no order
of remission passed by the appropriate Government in his
favour. We make it clear that our decision need not be taken
as expression of our view that the petitioner is not entitled to
any remission at all. The appropriate Government would be at
liberty  to  pass  any  appropriate  order  of  remission  in
accordance with law.”
16) It is clear that neither Section 57 IPC nor Explanation to
Section 61 of the W.B. Act lays down that a life imprisonment
prisoner has to be released after completion of 20 years.  20
years mentioned in Explanation to Section 61 of the W.B. Act
is only for the purpose of ordering remission.  If the State
Government  taking  into  consideration  various  aspects
refused  to  grant  remission  of  the  whole  period  then  the
petitioner cannot take advantage of the above Explanation
and even Section 57 IPC and seek for pre-mature release.
Further the question of remission of the entire sentence or a
part of it lies within the exclusive domain of the appropriate
Government  under  Section  401  of  the  Code  of  Criminal
Procedure, 1973 and neither Section 57 of the IPC nor any
rules or local Acts (in the case on hand W.B. Act) can stultify
the effect of the sentence of life imprisonment given by the
18Page 19
Court  under  the  IPC.   To  put  it  clear,  once  a  person  is
sentenced  to  undergo  life  imprisonment  unless
imprisonment  for  life  is  commuted  by  the  competent
authority, he has to undergo imprisonment for the whole of
his life.  It is equally well settled that Section 57 of the IPC
does not, in any way, limit the punishment of imprisonment
for life to a term of 20 years.
17) In the case on hand, it is highlighted by the learned
counsel for the respondents that in West Bengal there is a
duly  constituted  Review  Board  for  consideration  of
applications for premature release made by life convicts.  It
consists of:
1. Additional  Chief  Secretary,  Home  Department  –
Chairman of the Review Board;
2. Commissioner of Police, Kolkata – Member
3. Chief Probation Officer, West Bengal – Member
4. Inspector General of Prisons, West Bengal – Member
5. Judicial Secretary, West Bengal – Convener
6. Director General and Inspector General of Police, West
Bengal – Member
7. Principal  Secretary,  Jails  Department,  West  Bengal  –
Member
19Page 20
On receipt of the application for premature release except
under  Article  161  of  the  Constitution,  the  Review  Board
would  go  into  all  the  details  and  place  it  before  the
Government.  Ultimately on approval of the Hon’ble Chief
Minister, the convict is prematurely released under Section
432  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  1973.   Insofar  as
application under Article 161 is concerned, it was explained
that the procedure followed remains the same but the file is
finally  placed  before  His  Excellency  the  Governor  of  the
State through the Hon’ble Chief Minister.
18) In the counter affidavits filed by the State, it is pointed
out  that  regarding  the  case  of  the  petitioner  –Khoka  @
Prasanta  Sen,  the  Sentence  Review  Board  observed  as
under:
“The  life  convict  was  convicted  on  18.01.1990  under
Section 302/34 IPC and detained in connection with S.T.
No. 01 of June 1989.  He was released on parole from
Presidency  Correctional  Home  on  29.04.2005  in
compliance  with  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court’s  order  in Writ
Petition (Criminal) No. 279 of 2004.  The police authority
vehemently  opposed  the  premature  release  of  the  life
convict on the following grounds:
(a) He  was  a  notorious  fellow  in  the  area  before  his
conviction.
(b) He still maintains relationship with his old associates.
20Page 21
(c) He is within the age of 52 years with sound health.
(d) His socio economic condition is not sound.
(e) In  case  of  his  premature  release  there  is  every
possibility of his reverting to criminality.
(f) During his parole he has been technically serving life
imprisonment binding him to refrain from criminal
activities  for  the  time  being.   There  is  every
possibility of his committing further crimes.
Considering the above fact, the Review Board did not
find any reason to recommend premature release of
the life convict now on parole.”
It is seen that after careful consideration of all the aspects,
the Review Board in its meeting held on 27.01.2011 did not
recommend the petitioner for his premature release. The
recommendation of the Review Board was placed before the
State Government and the State Government accepted the
recommendation of the State Sentence Review Board.  The
decision of the State Government was communicated to the
petitioner vide letter No. 790-J dated 09.02.2012.  
19) In view of the decision of the State Sentence Review
Board, approval by the State Government and the principles
enunciated in various decisions of this Court including the
decision  of  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Gopal  Vinayak
Godse’s  case (supra), we find no merit in the contempt
petition, consequently, the same is dismissed.  
21Page 22
………….…………………………J.
                (P. SATHASIVAM)                                
        ………….…………………………J.
               (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 13, 2013.
22

reinstated in service- The Doctrine of Equality applies to all who are equally placed; even among persons who are found guilty. The persons who have been found guilty can also claim equality of treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing punishment when all of them are involved in the same incident. Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when punishment is being imposed. Punishment should not be disproportionate while comparing the involvement of codelinquents who are parties to the same transaction or incident. The Disciplinary Authority cannot impose punishment which is disproportionate, i.e., lesser punishment for serious offences and stringent punishment for lesser offences. We have already indicated that the action of the Disciplinary Authority imposing a comparatively lighter punishment to the co-delinquent Arjun Pathak and at the same time, harsher punishment to the appellant cannot be permitted in law, since they were all involved in the same incident. Consequently, we are inclined to allow the appeal by setting aside the punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the appellant and order that he be reinstated in service forthwith. Appellant is, therefore, to be re-instated from the date on which Arjun Pathak was re-instated and be given all consequent benefits as was given to Arjun Pathak. Ordered accordingly. However, there will be no order as to costs.

Page 1
1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1334   OF  2013
[Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 2070 of 2012]
Rajendra Yadav .. Appellant
Versus
State of M.P. & Others .. Respondents
J U D G M E N T
K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. Appellant, a Police Constable, while he was working in the
police station Rahatgarh, District Sagar along with A.S.I. Lakhan
Tiwari and Head Constable Jagdish Prasad Tiwari stated to have
received  an  amount  of  Rs.3,000  for  not  implicating  certain
persons  involved  in  Crime  No.  4  of  2002  charged  under
Sections 341, 294, 323, 506(B), 34 IPC.  A complaint to that
effect was filed by one Kundan Rajak, a resident of VillagePage 2
2
Sothia, PS Rahatgarh.  Acting on that complaint, the appellant
was charge-sheeted, along with two others, vide proceedings
dated 6.5.2002 by the Superintendant of Police, Sagar. The
following are the charges levelled against the appellant:
(1)    He  demonstrated  gross  negligence  and  lack  of
interest in discharge of his duty by not implicating all
the persons involved in the crime.
(2)    He demonstrated misconduct by accepting Rs.3,000
from the complainant Kundan Rajak for lodging a report
in the police station.
3. Appellant filed a detailed reply to the charge-sheet by his
letter dated NIL and denied all the allegations.
4. A detailed inquiry was conducted through the Additional
Superintendant of Police, Sagar against the appellant and other
two  persons  –  A.S.I.  Lakhan  Tiwari  and  H.C.  Jagdish  Prasad
Yadav.   During the course of the inquiry, the charge against
Lakhan Tiwari was found not proved, but his role was found to
be doubtful.  So  far as appellant Rajendra Prasad Yadav is
concerned, it was held that one of the charges could not be
proved  for  want  of  evidence.   The  inquiry  report  datedPage 3
3
8.9.2004,  so  far  as  the  appellant  is  concerned,  states  as
follows:
“Against  the  delinquent  No.  2,  H.C.  1104
Rajendra Prasad, one of the charges imputed could not
be proved for want of evidence.  During the course of
departmental inquiry, the inquiry has noted that the
charge No. 2 was also not proved from the statement of
prosecution witness and documents of the prosecution
but one cannot deny the participation of the delinquent
and his tacit approval.”
5. The  Superintendant  of  Police,  Sagar,  however,  vide  his
proceedings dated 26.3.2004, disagreed with the remarks of
the Inquiry Officer and held that the charge No. 2 as against the
appellant  was  found  to  be  proved.   Consequently,  a
supplementary charge-sheet was also given to the appellant.
Later, a final order was passed by the Deputy Inspector General
of Police, Sagar stating as follows:
“With respect to the delinquent HC No. 1104 Rajendra
Yadav, the Inquiry Officer has stated vide his said letter
that the delinquent HC was present in the police station
during the report of the Crime No. 4/02.  As per the
evidence,  the  money  was  demanded  by  Ct.  Arjun
Pathak.   The report has been  recorded by HC 1104
Rajendra Yadav whereas Rs.3,000/- was paid to Const.Page 4
4
Arjun  Pathak.   Therefore,  with  regard  to  receiving
money, the participation of HC Rajendra Yadav and his
tacit approval are proved with respect to the charge No.
2.  At the same time, he could not exercise his control
over  his  subordinate.  The  money  was  demanded  by
Arjun Pathak and upon receipt of the money by Arjun
Pathak,  HC  1104  Rajendra  Yadav  lodged  the  report.
Therefore, I am in disagreement with the view of the
Inquiry  Officer  given  in  the  inquiry  report  of  the
department  inquiry  that  the  charge  is  not  proved
against the delinquent HC Rajendra Prasad Yadav.   As
per  the  remark  of  the  Inquiry  Officer,  the  above
mentioned charge No. 2 imputed against HC No. 1104
Rajendra Prasad is found to be proved.”
6. On  the  basis  of  the  above  finding,  Lakhan  Tiwari  was
demoted  for  three  years  from  the  post  of  A.S.I.  to  Head
Constable.  But the appellant and Jagdish Prasad Tiwari were
dismissed from service.
7. Aggrieved  by  the  same,  appellant  preferred  an  appeal
before the Inspector General of Police (appellate authority), who
dismissed the appeal vide his order dated 9.12.2004.
8. Appellant  then  filed a  Writ Petition  No.  10696  of  2007
before  the  High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh,  Jabalpur  Bench,Page 5
5
which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by his order
dated 3.5.2007, against which a Writ Appeal No. 11 of 2007 was
also preferred, which was also dismissed by the Division Bench
vide its impugned judgment dated 6.9.2011.
9. Mr.  Rakesh  Khanna,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the
appellant,  submitted  that  since  both  the  charges  levelled
against the appellant were not proved fully, the respondent
Department  was  not  justified  in  dismissing  him  from  the
service, which is grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the
offence.  Further, it was pointed out that there is nothing on the
record to show that the appellant had demanded or accepted
the alleged sum of Rs.3,000 and it was proved in the inquiry
that it was Constable  Arjun  Pathak who  had demanded the
above mentioned amount and he was, even though, inflicted
with  the  punishment  of  compulsory  retirement  was,  later,
reinstated by imposing punishment of reduction of increment
with cumulative effect for one year.  The inquiry has clearly
established that it was Arjun Pathak who had demanded and
accepted the illegal gratification from the complainant, but he
has been given a lighter punishment while the appellant was
imposed a harsher punishment, which is clearly arbitrary andPage 6
6
discriminatory.  Learned counsel placed considerable reliance
on the judgment of this Court in  Anand Regional Coop.  Oil
Seedsgrowers’ Union Ltd. V. Shaileshkumr Harshadbhai
Shah (2006)  6  SCC  548  and  claimed  parity,  if  not  fully
exonerated.  
10. Shri  Arjun  Garg,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the
respondent State, submitted that there is no illegality in the
views expressed by the learned single Judge and the Division
Bench calling for any interference.   Further, it was pointed out
that since the appellant, being a member of a disciplined force,
should  not  have  involved  in  such  an  incident  and  his  tacit
approval could not be brushed aside because it had taken place
in his presence.
11. We have gone through the inquiry report placed before us
in respect of the appellant as well as Constable Arjun Pathak.
The inquiry clearly reveals the role of Arjun Pathak.  It was Arjun
Pathak who had demanded and received the money, though the
tacit approval of the appellant was proved in the inquiry.  The
charge levelled against Arjun Pathak was more serious than the
one charged against the appellant.  Both appellants and otherPage 7
7
two persons as well as Arjun Pathak were involved in the same
incident.  After having found that Arjun Pathak had a more
serious role and, in fact, it was he who had demanded and
received the money, he was inflicted comparatively a lighter
punishment.  At the same time, appellant who had played a
passive role was inflicted with a more serious punishment of
dismissal from service which, in our view, cannot be sustained.
 
12. The Doctrine of Equality applies to all who are equally
placed; even among persons who are found guilty.  The persons
who  have  been  found  guilty  can  also  claim  equality  of
treatment, if they can establish discrimination while imposing
punishment when all of them are involved in the same incident.
Parity among co-delinquents has also to be maintained when
punishment  is  being  imposed.   Punishment  should  not  be
disproportionate  while  comparing  the  involvement  of  codelinquents who are parties to the same transaction or incident.
The Disciplinary Authority cannot impose punishment which is
disproportionate,  i.e.,  lesser  punishment for  serious offences
and stringent punishment for lesser offences.
Page 8
8
13. The  principle  stated  above  is  seen  applied  in  few
judgments of this Court.  The earliest one is Director General
of  Police  and  Others  v.  G.  Dasayan (1998)  2  SCC  407,
wherein one Dasayan, a Police Constable, along with two other
constables and one Head Constable were charged for the same
acts of misconduct.  The Disciplinary Authority exonerated two
other constables, but imposed the punishment of dismissal from
service on Dasayan and that of compulsory retirement on Head
Constable.   This Court, in order to meet the ends of justice,
substituted the order of compulsory retirement in place of the
order  of  dismissal  from  service  on  Dasayan,  applying  the
principle of parity in punishment among co-delinquents.  This
Court  held  that  it  may,  otherwise,  violate  Article  14  of  the
Constitution of India.  In Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah
case  (supra),  the  workman  was  dismissed  from  service  for
proved  misconduct.   However,  few  other  workmen,  against
whom there were identical allegations, were allowed to avail of
the  benefit  of  voluntary  retirement  scheme.   In  such
circumstances, this Court directed that the workman also be
treated  on  the  same  footing  and  be  given  the  benefit  ofPage 9
9
voluntary retirement from service from the month on which the
others were given the benefit.
14. We are of the view the principle laid down in the above
mentioned  judgments  also  would  apply  to  the  facts  of  the
present case.  We have already indicated that the action of the
Disciplinary  Authority  imposing  a  comparatively  lighter
punishment to the co-delinquent Arjun Pathak and at the same
time, harsher punishment to the appellant cannot be permitted
in  law,  since  they  were  all  involved  in  the  same  incident.
Consequently, we are inclined to allow the appeal by setting
aside the punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the
appellant and order that he be reinstated in service forthwith.
Appellant is, therefore, to be re-instated from the date on which
Arjun  Pathak  was  re-instated  and  be  given  all  consequent
benefits as was given to Arjun Pathak.  Ordered accordingly.
However, there will be no order as to costs.
............................................J.
(K. S. RADHAKRISHNAN)
............................................J.
(DIPAK MISRA)Page 10
10
New Delhi,
February 13, 2013