IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8514-8515 OF 2012
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 19707-19708 of 2009)
Bhupendra Nath Hazarika and another ... Appellants
Versus
State of Assam and others ... Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.8516 OF 2012
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 963 of 2010)
Bibekananda Das ... Appellant
Versus
State of Assam and others ... Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
Leave granted.
2. In these appeals, the challenge is to the common judgment and order
dated 9.9.2008 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Gauhati,
Assam in WA Nos. 448 of 2004, 459 of 2004 and 465 of 2004 whereby stamp of
approval has been given to the judgment and order dated 19.11.2004 passed
by the learned single Judge in WP(C) Nos. 7482 of 2002, 7843 of 2002, 7564
of 2002, 8081 of 2002 and 298 of 2003 whereunder the learned single Judge
had maintained the order dated 11.10.2002 passed by the Assam
Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati (for short “the tribunal”) in Appeal Case
No. 79ATA of 1999, and dismissed WP(C) Nos. 4028 of 2003, 4129 of 2003 and
1031 of 2003 which were preferred directly
for issuance of mandamus
commanding the respondent authorities to consider
the previous services
rendered by the petitioners therein prior to their appointments in the
Assam Police Service (Junior Grade) in the year 1993 and
to determine their
inter se seniority in the promotional cadre accordingly and
further
disposed of WP(C) 69 of 2003 preferred by an Additional Superintendent of
Police, Guwahati for quashing of the appointment to the promotional post of
the private respondents therein on the foundation that they had been
promoted in violation of the provisions of the Assam Police Service Rules,
1966 (for brevity “the 1966 Rules”).
3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts which are requisite to be
stated are that
the Assam Public Service Commission (for short “the
Commission”) issued an advertisement No. 9/92 dated 23.6.1992 inviting
applications for preliminary examination for the Combined Competitive
Examination, 1992-93 for selecting candidates for various posts and
services including thirty vacancies in the Assam Police Service (Junior
Grade) (for short “the APS”) as requisitioned by the Commissioner-cum-
Secretary to the Government of Assam in the Department of Personnel on
5.9.1992.
On 29.8.1992, the Commission published another advertisement No.
12/92 inviting applications for filling up of 20 posts in the APS under
Rule 5(1)(c) of the 1966 Rules.
There is no dispute that the initial 30
vacancies were put in the compartment of “regular batch” or “direct
recruitment” and
the other 20 vacancies, which were sought to be filled up
by way of special drive, were kept in the category of “special batch” or
“promotional recruits”.
The main examination for the regular batch was
held on 15.11.1992 for total marks of 1400.
The examination for the
special batch was held on 22.11.1992 for 650 marks.
The Commission
declared the result in respect of regular batch on 23.4.1993 and, vide
letter dated 24.4.1993, recommended 30 candidates for appointment in order
of merit.
Despite the recommendation by the Commission, no appointment was
made till 13.8.1993.
At this juncture,
the Commissioner-cum-Secretary to
the Government of Assam in the Department of Home requested the Commission
to furnish the select list of the special recruits at the earliest.
On the
basis of the aforesaid letter of request, the Commission sent its
recommendations in respect of the candidates belonging to the special batch
and on the basis of the said recommendation, vide notification No.
HMA.478/86/Pt-I/17 dated 3.7.1993,
the respondent Nos. 6 to 24 before the
tribunal were appointed.
The respondent No. 25 was appointed on 31.81994.
Thereafter, the Competent Authority, vide notification No. HMA.110/93/43
dated 13.8.1993, appointed 28 persons from the regular batch.
As the
recruits of the special batch were appointed earlier, they were treated
senior to the recruits belonging to the regular batch.
4. The facts, as further uncurtained, are
that the determination of
seniority came to the notice of the recruits of the regular batch at the
time of their confirmation of service in the year 1999.
Being dissatisfied
with the action of the authorities, they immediately submitted a
representation.
When the representation was pending consideration,
a
provisional gradation list showing the inter se seniority as on 31.12.1992
was published on 12.3.1999.
In the said provisional gradation list,
the
recruits of the special batch were shown as senior to the recruits of the
regular batch.
As warranted,
the recruits belonging to the regular batch
filed their objections to the fixation of seniority on 24.9.1999,
but
without publishing the final gradation list,
the respondent No. 3, namely,
the Secretary in the Department of Home,
promoted
14 officers belonging to
the special batch and
16 officers belonging to the regular batch to the
Senior Scale of APS (Grade-II).
In the promotional order,
the officers
belonging to the regular batch were shown below the officers belonging to
the special batch.
Because of the aforesaid situation,
the direct recruits
invoked the jurisdiction of the tribunal for the apposite determination of
seniority claiming to be senior to the respondent Nos. 6 to 24.
5. The claim of the appellants before the tribunal was resisted by the
respondent-State and the private respondents therein on many a ground
including the one that the appeal was barred by limitation.
It is worthy
to note that in an affidavit, the Secretary to the Commission asseverated
that
the Government had not consulted the Commission before publishing the
provisional gradation list;
that when the selection process for the regular
batch was already underway, there was no justification whatsoever to go for
special recruitment;
that the recourse taken to fill up the posts by way of
special recruitment was in gross violation of the rules and procedure
inasmuch as all vacancies could have been filled up by resorting to the
usual and regular procedure of recruitment;
that the Competent Authority of
the State Government should have acted on the list sent by the Commission
relating to the regular candidates in quite promptitude but delayed it for
no apparent reason and called for the recommendation for the special batch
and issued letters of appointment in their favour which exhibited
unwarranted interest; and
that the inter se seniority deserved to be
refixed and the regular batch should be treated to be senior to the special
batch.
6. The tribunal dealt with the issue of limitation and observed that the
appeal did not concern itself with the validity or propriety of the
appointments of the respondent Nos. 6 to 25 but fixation of inter se
seniority and hence, the appeal was not barred under the provisions of the
Assam Administrative Tribunals Act, 1977.
It further opined that it was
curious that despite the fact that the recommendation in respect of the
regular batch had already been forwarded to the Government by the
Commission, no steps were taken.
The aforesaid act of the authority,
observed the tribunal, on one hand, exposited lackadaisical attitude in
dealing with the case of the regular batch and,
on the other, unreasonable
alacrity in the appointment of the special batch.
The tribunal attributed
motive to such an action and proceeded to opine that there was no
administrative decision by the appropriate authority for making appointment
to the service by resorting to the process of special recruitment in
preference to general recruitment.
7. It is apt to note that the tribunal referred to various departmental
communications including the letter dated 17.8.1991 which emanated from the
Office of the DGP proposing to enlist 20 Deputy Superintendent of Police
from other departments under Rule 5(1)(c) of the 1966 Rules.
The tribunal
referred to Rules 5, 7 and 8 of the 1966 Rules and came to hold that a
close perusal of the provisions of the service Rules clearly show that
recruitment by resorting to clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 should be
made only in special cases and at all time such recruitment must be limited
only to 5 per cent of the total number of posts in the cadre and such
special recruitment must be limited only to one post in a particular year.
It further stated
that the 1966 Rules are quite silent as regards carry
forward of such posts and, therefore, there could not have been
accumulation of vacancies to be filled up by resorting to the provision
contained in clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 and
as such, the question
of selecting and appointing as many as 20 persons in a year did not arise.
The tribunal further held
that as per Rule 8(1), the Governor is required
to call for recommendations from the recommending authorities for the
purpose of recruitment to the service under clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of
Rule 5 and the recommending authorities are also required to submit
recommendations in respect of the persons having regard to the laid down
criteria but in the instant case, the said procedure was given a total go
by which is not permissible.
The tribunal further noticed that Rule 8(2),
which is mandatory, provides that all the recommendations are required to
be submitted before the selection committee constituted under Rule 7(1) and
the selection committee is required to interview the recommended candidates
and prepare the select list and, therefore, the Commission, in no
circumstance, could have been entrusted with the responsibility of
interviewing, testing, selecting and recommending any candidate for special
recruitment under clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5.
In this backdrop,
the tribunal observed that, admittedly, all the processes undertaken by the
Commission and the third respondent were in gross violation of the
mandatory provisions of the Rules and hence, the selection was not valid.
8. After so stating, the tribunal proceeded to hold
that as the
respondent Nos. 6 to 25 had been appointed in violation of the rules, they
could not be treated as regular recruits within the meaning of Rule 5(1)(a)
of the 1966 Rules.
It also stated that had the appeal been filed earlier
in a different form, the selection and appointment of the special batch
recruits could have possibly been set aside.
Eventually, the tribunal
placing reliance on State of U.P. v. Rafiquddin and others[1] and Dalilah
Sojah v. State of Kerala and others[2], came to hold
that due to
unreasonable delay and inaction on the part of the Government in notifying
the appointments, the regular batch candidates, who were earlier
recommended by the Commission, could not be put in jeopardy and lose their
seniority and accordingly directed for refixation of the seniority list.
It further directed that
the regular batch shall be allowed consequential
benefits with effect from the date on which the senior most member of the
special batch availed of any benefit even by creating supernumerary duty
post in the cadre.
9. Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the tribunal, as has been
stated earlier,
certain writ petitions were preferred and some writ
petitions were directly filed before the High Court seeking quashment of
the appointment of the private respondents as Deputy Superintendent of
Police.
The prayer in the other batch of writ petitions was to treat the
direct recruits as per the rules regard being had to their date of
appointment and to extend the benefit of earlier services as stipulated
under Rule 18 of the 1966 Rules.
10. The learned single Judge adverted to the facts in detail,
the
proposal before the Cabinet for appointment of 20 officers in the post of
Deputy Superintendent of Police by taking resort to Rule 5(1)(c) of the
1966 Rules and basically posed three questions, namely,
(i) whether the
appeal preferred before the tribunal was barred by limitation;
(ii) whether
the members of the regular batch could be treated as senior when their
appointments were violative of the recruitment process as envisaged under
the relevant recruitment rules; and
(iii) whether the tribunal was
justified in directing rectification in the gradation list when there was
no appeal seeking removal of the special batch recruits being in violation
of the rules. Be it noted, as far as question No.
(iii) is concerned, the
learned single Judge framed five ancillary questions.
11. While dealing with the facet of limitation, the learned single Judge
referred to the relevant provisions of the Act and expressed the view that
the appellants before the tribunal having the remedy which was available to
them in terms of the directions contained in the circular dated 1.4.1999
were entitled to prefer the appeal in terms of the proviso to sub-section
(2) of Section 4 of the AAT Act, 1977 and hence, the appeal was not barred
by limitation.
12. Adverting to the facet of appointment, the learned single Judge
scanned the anatomy of the 1966 Rules and came to hold that the number of
persons who got selected as members of the special batch were not eligible
for consideration for appointment in terms of Rule 5(1)(c) and further the
procedure engrafted under the said sub-rule was not followed and, in fact,
was mutilated and flouted in every conceivable manner leading, eventually,
to the appointment of the members of the special batch. Dwelling upon the
issue that the appointments were arbitrary, malafide and discriminatory vis-
à-vis the appointment of the direct batch, the learned single Judge
referred to the factual matrix pertaining to the recommendations sent for
recruitment by special drive, the Cabinet Memorandum and the Cabinet
decision and eventually held that notwithstanding the fact that the
proposal for recruitment of twenty Dy. Superintendents of Police, as a
special case, was submitted by the Home Department and the Government did
not agree to the proposal, yet the decision to make the recruitment and the
manner and modalities for holding of the interview and the test for the
purpose of recruitment of the Special Batch was taken in the chamber of the
Chairman of the Commission, on the basis of a discussion held between the
then DGP, Assam, and the Chairman of the Commission and, therefore, the
decision, so reached, could not be termed as a decision of the Government.
He also observed that the members of the Special Batch were selected
throwing over-board, in entirety, the relevant recruitment rules. Regard
being had to chronology of events leading to the appointment of the members
of the Special Batch, the learned single Judge opined that the entire
exercise for selecting the Special Batch was wholly de hors the relevant
recruitment rules. The urgency shown by the Government to obtain the
result of the examination held in respect of the Special Batch was an
indication that the Government was waiting, for no justified and valid
reason, to, first, make appointment of the members of the Special Batch,
though selected in complete disregard of the Rules, and, then, issue
appointment in respect of the members of the Direct Batch, whose process of
selection was never questioned. After so stating, the learned single Judge
held that contrary to the provisions of Rule 5(1)(c), which prescribes
upper age limit for selection to be 35 years and throwing to the wind the
very purpose for which special recruitment was sought to be made, the age
was relaxed to 45 years and persons, who were born in 1942, came to be
selected in the year 1992, and thereby many of the officers recruited under
the special drive were as old as 50 years, whereas proposal for the special
drive was made on the pretext of recruiting young officers. He also opined
that the whole process of selection of the special batch recruited was
malafide and arbitrary.
13. After so stating, the learned single Judge dealt with issues
whether
the appointments were ab-initio void,
whether the relevant rules of
recruitment were relaxed in respect of the special batch at the time of
making their recruitment and what was the permissible limit of relaxation
and whether there can be deemed relaxation.
Delving into the said aspects,
the learned single Judge ruled that while appointing the special batch, the
rules of recruitment were completely shelved, no order of relaxation was
passed under Rule 23 relaxing the provisions contained in Rule 5(1)(c) of
the 1966 Rules; and that there could not have been any deemed relaxation.
The learned single Judge referred to various pronouncements of this Court
with regard to relaxation and deemed relaxation and expressed the view that
the Special Batch was recruited, ostensibly, on the ground that the
department was in need of young officers in the grade of Deputy
Superintendent of Police, but the officers recruited were as old as 50
years, and, thus, the very purpose for which the proposal was mooted stood
defeated.
The writ court discussed the ratio laid down in Bachan Singh v.
Union of India[3], Narender Chadha v. Union of India[4] and J.C. Yadav v.
State of Haryana[5] and
held that contrary to the facts of the case of J.C.
Yadav (supra),
wherein the relaxation of the rules could be justified by
the Government, the State-respondent had, in the obtaining factual matrix,
miserably failed to show any justification to relax the rules and in any
case could not have relaxed the rules to such an extent to make it
nugatory. It was also observed that when the Cabinet Memorandum had
failed to receive the approval of the Cabinet, the then DGP, Assam, in
consultation with the Chairman of the Commission, could not have, through
the back-door and with the help of an authority like the Commission,
flouted the relevant rules and made the appointments.
14. The learned single Judge ruled that the appointment in the
promotional cadre was de hors the rules and, therefore, the court cannot
direct that the period of service rendered in the promotional post by
virtue of illegal promotional appointment should be counted for the purpose
of seniority.
Relying on the pronouncement in Raffiquddin (supra), the
learned single Judge
held that
the case in hand is more akin to the facts
of Raffiquddin (supra) and ruled that it is possible that without setting
aside and quashing the appointment of an irregular appointee,
the Court or
tribunal may direct the appointing authority to treat a regular appointee
in service, though appointed later in point of time than the irregular
appointee, as senior to the irregular appointee.
15. It is worthy to note that
the learned single Judge referred to Rule
18 of the 1966 Rules which clearly states that the seniority of the members
of the service shall be determined on the basis of their respective dates
of appointment to the service.
He distinguished the applicability of Rule
18 and ultimately maintained the order passed by the tribunal and dismissed
the writ petitions challenging the order of the tribunal.
It is apt to
note that in WP(C) 69 of 2003 wherein the petitioner had directly
approached the High Court for quashment of the appointments of the special
batch recruits, the learned single Judge observed that the appointments of
the special batch deserved to be set aside and quashed, but he refrained
from doing so considering the period of service which they had rendered.
16. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, the special recruits
preferred WA Nos. 448 of 2004 and 465 of 2004. WA 459 of 2004 was filed by
the recruits under Rule 5(1)(a) of the 1966 Rules.
The Division Bench
noted the facts, adverted to the orders passed by the tribunal and the
learned single Judge, dealt at length with the submissions canvassed by
the learned counsel for the parties and came to hold that the tribunal had
jurisdiction to deal with the appeals and thereafter, dealing with the
stand that the appointments having not been challenged the delineation
thereof by the tribunal and the learned single Judge was barred by the
doctrine of res judicata, repelled them on the base that the memorandum of
appeal before the tribunal had graphically challenged the appointments to
be non est being in violation of the rules though that there was no prayer
for cancellation of the appointments.
The Division Bench analysed the
scheme of the rules and stated that Rule 5(1)(c) envisages a selection in
special cases from amongst the limited categories of persons referred to
and the number of vacancies to be filled up by that procedure has also been
restricted.
The Division Bench referred to Rule 8 and regarded it as
unequivocal on the conditions of eligibility, commencement of the process
contemplated and the culmination thereof, and observed that the assessment
of eligibility by the Recommending Authority of the person is a sine qua
non for consideration of his candidature to be recruited.
The candidate,
as per the mandate of Rule 8, has to be of outstanding merit and ability,
possessing the academic qualification as prescribed by Rule 10, should not
be above 35 years of age on the first day of the year in which the
recommendations are called for and should have not less than two years of
experience in duties comparable in status and responsibility to that of the
Deputy Superintendent of Police or 8 years of experience in duties
comparable in status and responsibility to that of the Inspector of Police.
17. After so stating, the Division Bench referred to various authorities
and, eventually, came to hold that though the appointments of the special
recruits had been made in deviation of the Rules, yet the same cannot by
any means be branded as de hors any procedure whatsoever known to public
employment.
Their induction of the special recruits cannot be equated
with ad hoc, casual or temporary recruitments or an entry through the
backdoor and hence, their appointment cannot be regarded as de hors the
rules.
Dealing with the aspect of seniority it ruled that their
appointments not being in observance of the statutory provision stricto
sensu, the fixation of their batch wise seniority over the direct recruits
of the same year is impermissible and the benefit as stipulated under the
proviso to Rule 18(1) was not extendable.
18. The Division Bench further opined that at such a belated time their
appointments could not be annulled. In the ultimate analysis, the Division
Bench concurred with the view expressed by the learned single Judge on the
issue of fixation of seniority.
19. It is worthy to note that
in compliance of the judgment and order
passed by the learned single Judge, a notification No.
HMA.154/2004/Pt.1/176 was issued on 6.12.2004 wherein the direct recruits
of the 1993 batch were placed above the special recruits of the same year
in the APS Senior Grade-II.
The Bench also perused file No. H.M.A. 10/99
of the Home Department from which it transpired that the names of the
candidates to the promotional posts were recommended in order of preference
following the same seniority in which their names appeared in the
provisional gradation list dated 12.3.1999 as the Selection Committee did
not find any reason justifying supersession of a senior by a junior.
The
Division Bench noticed that as the inter se seniority of promotees was a
replication of that in the provisional gradation list which has been
unsettled, the challenge to the notification dated 6.12.2004 was
unsustainable. Being of this view, the Division Bench dismissed all the
appeals.
20. We have heard Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel representing the
special batch recruits, and Mr. V. Shekhar, learned senior counsel
appearing for the direct recruits in all the appeals.
21. The fundamental questions that emanate for consideration before this
Court are, namely,
whether the appointments have been made in violation of
the rules;
whether the selection of the special batch recruits if accepted
to be in violation of the rules, can be treated to be de hors the rules;
and whether the concept of relaxation has been extended to them or is
extendable to them and further
whether they can avail the benefit under the
second proviso to Rule 18 of the Rules and
whether the tribunal as well as
the High Court is justified in refixing the seniority without quashing the
appointment of the special batch recruits.
22. Regard being had to the aforesaid issues, we think it seemly to refer
to certain authorities in the field. In Roshan Lal and others v.
International Airport Authority of India and others[6], a two-Judge Bench,
while entertaining a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, held
that
when the appointments were made in 1975 and the writ petition was
filed in 1978, it would not be justified in reopening the question of
legality of the appointments of the respondents therein. The Bench also
noticed that the prayer in the writ petition was also confined primarily to
the seniority list and the consequences flowing from the seniority list.
23. We have referred to the said pronouncement only for the purpose
that
before the tribunal, the challenge was not for the quashment of the
appointments on the foundation that they were made in violation of the
rules and the propriety in the matter of appointment of the special
recruits was not maintained and that apart, the appeal was filed after a
span of nine years after the selection and appointment and hence, the
principle stated therein is squarely applicable to the case at hand.
24. Be it noted, the tribunal as well as the High Court has placed
reliance on Rafiquddin and others (supra) to refix the seniority and
justify the direction for refixation of seniority by putting the direct
recruits over and above the special recruits on the foundation that it was
necessitous to strike the balance.
In Rafiquddin case (supra), the U.P.
Public Service Commission published a notification on September 3, 1970
inviting applications for recruitment to 85 posts of Munsifs.
It
recommended names of 46 candidates for appointment on October 25, 1971.
The State Government requested the Commission to recommend some more
candidates by suggesting that minimum of 40% marks may be reduced to 35%.
Considering the said request, the Commission forwarded another list of 33
candidates on April 25, 1972.
All the 79 candidates were appointed between
May 1972 to June 12, 1973.
Thereafter, on July 17, 1973, a notification
was issued determining the inter se seniority of all the 79 candidates
under Rule 19 of the U.P. Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951. In
the meantime, the UP Public Service Commission held another competitive
examination for appointment to the posts of 150 Munsifs and, eventually,
they were appointed on different dates between 1975 to 1977.
As the
factual narration would show, a proposal was sent by the State Government
to the Commission requesting it to reconsider the result of the
examinations of 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970 for appointment to the service of
persons/candidates who might have obtained 40% of marks or more in the
aggregate even if they had failed to secure the minimum marks in the viva
voce test.
The Commission declined to accede to the said request. A
meeting was held by the High Level Committee and, eventually, a third list
of 37 candidates was sent by the Commission for the aforementioned years in
which list the name of Rafiquddin featured. As out of 37 candidates, 16
had already appeared in the 1972 examination and had been selected, the
Government requested the Commission to select 16 more candidates from the
1972 examination. In pursuance of the Government’s request, the Commission
forwarded the list of 16 candidates for appointment. In this factual
matrix, in March, 1977, the State Government published a seniority list of
successful candidates of the competitive examination of 1970. The
candidates belonging to the third list made a representation to the High
Court for determining their seniority in accordance with Rule 22 of the
Rules on the footing that they were recruited to service in pursuance of
the 1970 examination and, therefore, they were entitled to the seniority as
candidates belonging to that examination irrespective of their appointment
made in 1975. They claimed seniority above the recruits of the 1972
examination. As the representation was rejected, a writ petition was filed
and the High Court allowed the same on the ground that as the third
category candidates were appointed on the basis of the result of the 1970
examination, they were to be treated as senior in accordance with the
stipulates engrafted under Rule 22 of the Rules. While dealing with such a
situation, this Court scanned the anatomy of the Rules and its purport, the
role of the Commission and held that the selection and appointment of 21
Munsifs at the later stage was invalid. However, it declined to strike
down their appointments in view of the fact that they had already rendered
12 years of service.
25. After so holding, the Bench proceeded to deal with the issue as to
what seniority should be assigned to the unplaced candidates who were
appointed. In that context, the Bench came to hold that as they were
appointed not in accordance with the rules, they could not be treated as
selectees under the 1970 examination for the purpose of determining their
seniority under Rule 22 of the Rules and, accordingly, the Bench directed
that the said candidates have been placed below the candidates of recruits
of the 1972 examination. In the 1972 examination, 16 candidates were
appointed to the service on the basis of the result of the 1972 examination
and their appointment did not suffer from any legal infirmity and they were
entitled to seniority of the recruits of the 1972 examination on the basis
of their position in the merit list but they were not entitled to be
treated as senior on the basis of the 1970 examination.
26. We have referred to the facts in detail and what this Court had
ultimately held only for the purpose that where recruitment of service is
regulated by the statutory rules, the recruitment must be made in
accordance with those rules and if any appointment is made in breach of the
rules, the same would be illegal and the persons so appointed have to be
put in a different class and they cannot claim seniority.
27. In The Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers’ Association and
others v. State of Maharashtra and others[7], the Constitution Bench was
dealing with the issue of seniority between direct recruits and the
promotees under the Maharashtra Service of Engineers (Regulation of
Seniority and Preparation and Revision of Seniority Lists for Specified
Period) Rules, 1982. The Constitution Bench referred to the decision in
A.K. Subraman v. Union of India[8] and ruled that if a rule fixing the
ratio for recruitment from different sources is framed, it is meant to be
respected and not violated at the whims of the authority. It ought to be
strictly followed and not arbitrarily ignored. A deviation may be
permissible to meet the exigencies. The Constitution Bench posed the
question as to what would be the consideration if the quota rule is not
followed at all continuously for a number of years and it becomes
impossible to adhere to the same. The Constitution Bench opined that if
the rule fixes the quota and it becomes impracticable to act upon, it is of
no use insisting that the authorities must continue to give effect to it.
But the Government, before departing from the rule, must make every effort
to respect it and only when it ceases to be feasible to enforce it, then it
has to be ignored. In such a situation, if appointments from one source
are made in excess of the quota but in a regular manner and after following
the prescribed procedure, there is no reason to push down the appointees
below the recruits from other sources who are inducted in the service
subsequently. A reference was made to the rules that permitted the
Government to relax the provisions fixing the ratio. In the said case, the
Court observed that there was no justification to urge lack of bona fide on
the part of the State. Eventually, the Bench summed up its conclusions and
we proceed to reproduce some of them which are relevant for our purpose: -
“(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to
rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his
appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation.
The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial
appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made
as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot
be taken into account for considering the seniority.
(B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the
procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in
the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service
in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service
will be counted.
xxx xxx xxx
(D) If it becomes impossible to adhere to the existing quota
rule, it should be substituted by an appropriate rule to meet
the needs of the situation. In case, however, the quota rule is
not followed continuously for a number of years because it was
impossible to do so the inference is irresistible that the quota
rule had broken down.
(E) Where the quota rule has broken down and the appointments
are made from one source in excess of the quota, but are made
after following the procedure prescribed by the rules for the
appointment, the appointees should not be pushed down below the
appointees from the other source inducted in the service at a
later date.”
28. In Madan Gopal Garg v. State of Punjab and others[9], the controversy
related to inter se seniority of promotees and direct recruits in respect
of the posts, namely, District Food and Supplies Controller and Deputy
Director, Food and Supplies in the State of Punjab governed by the Punjab
Food and Supplies Department (State Service Class II) Rules, 1966. After
analyzing the facts and the appointments in excess of quota, the Court
observed that the appointment of the controller was in excess of the quota
and it continued to be so till the respondent No. 2 therein was appointed
by direct recruitment. In that context, the Bench opined: -
“Once it is held that the appointment of the appellant was in
excess of the quota fixed for promotees and officers appointed
by transfer, the said appointment has to be treated as an
invalid appointment and it can be treated as a regular
appointment only when a vacancy is available against the
promotion quota against which the said appointment can be
regularized. In other words, any such appointment in excess of
the quota has to be pushed down to a later year when it can be
regularized as per the quota and such an appointment prior to
regularization cannot confer any right as against a person who
is directly appointed within the quota prescribed for direct
recruits.”
29. In Maharashtra Vikrikar Karamchari Sangathan v. State of Maharashtra
and another[10], a two-Judge Bench took note of the fact that when
promotions are made in excess of the prescribed quota and the Government
had not taken any conscious decision in accordance with law to treat the
promotions of excess promotees on regular basis, it would be wrong to
assert that such promotions were on regular basis. In that context, the
Bench further proceeded to state thus: -
“Lastly, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that some
of the appellants have put in more than 17 years of service when
a few of the direct recruits were either schooling and/or not
born in the cadre. If the appellants were to be pushed down, it
would cause great hardship to them. We are unable to subscribe
to this contention because if there is patent violation of the
quota rule, the result must follow and the appellants who
remained in the office for all these years cannot take the
advantage of this situation. This submission is, therefore,
devoid of any substance.”
30. In D. Ganesh Rao Patnaik and others v. State of Jharkhand and
others[11], a three-Judge Bench was dealing with inter se seniority between
the direct recruits and the promotees under the Bihar Superior Judicial
Service Rules, 1946. The Bench also dealt with the concept of temporary
posts and the computation of posts under Rule 6 therein, the definition of
cadre and posed a question whether the temporary posts of Additional
District and Sessions Judges are to be included in the cadre. After
referring to various decisions, the Court opined that for determining the
quota of direct recruits, both the temporary and permanent posts have to be
counted and taken into consideration and their quota cannot be confined to
permanent posts alone. In the said case, the promotees had exceeded their
quota and entrenched into the quota of direct recruits and, in that
context, the Court held that the promotion given to the promotees was not
in accordance with law. The Court further proceeded to state that it did
not lie in the mouth of the respondent therein to contend that the quota
rule had broken down or that though their promotions were made beyond the
quota fixed for promotees, yet the same should be treated not only
perfectly valid but also in a manner so as to give them the benefit of
seniority over the direct recruits. Eventually, the Bench ruled that the
inevitable conclusion was that the contesting respondent could not claim
seniority over the appellant.
31. We have referred to the aforesaid pronouncements to restate the legal
principle that if the quota rule has been broken down, the appointee should
not be pushed down below the appointees from other source; but, the
Government before departing from the rule must make every effort to respect
it and then only it may proceed to appoint from other source.
32. At this juncture, it is necessary to state that the decision in The
Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association (supra) was
clarified by a three-Judge Bench in State of W.B. and others v. Aghore Nath
Dey and others[12] as the later Bench perceived an apparent contradiction
in conclusions (A) and (B). While clarifying, the Bench has stated thus: -
“19. The constitution bench in Maharashtra Engineers case
(supra), while dealing with Narender Chadha (supra) emphasised
the unusual fact that the promotees in question had worked
continuously for long periods of nearly fifteen to twenty years
on the posts without being reverted, and then proceeded to state
the principle thus: (SCC p. 726, para 13)
“We, therefore, confirm the principle of counting towards
seniority the period of continuous officiation following an
appointment made in accordance with the rules prescribed
for regular substantive appointments in the service.”
20. The constitution bench having dealt with Narender Chadha
(supra) in this manner, to indicate the above principle, that
decision cannot be construed to apply to cases where the initial
appointment was not according to rules.
xxx xxx xxx
22. There can be no doubt that these two conclusions have to be
read harmoniously, and conclusion (B) cannot cover cases which
are expressly excluded by conclusion (A). We may, therefore,
first refer to conclusion (A). It is clear from conclusion (A)
that to enable seniority to be counted from the date of initial
appointment and not according to the date of confirmation, the
incumbent of the post has to be initially appointed ‘according
to rules’. The corollary set out in conclusion (A), then is,
that ‘where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not
according to rules and made as a stopgap arrangement, the
officiation in such posts cannot be taken into account for
considering the seniority’. Thus, the corollary in conclusion
(A) expressly excludes the category of cases where the initial
appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules, being
made only as a stopgap arrangement. The case of the writ
petitioners squarely falls within this corollary in conclusion
(A), which says that the officiation in such posts cannot be
taken into account for counting the seniority.”
Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to state as follows: -
“Admittedly, this express requirement in Rule 11 was not
followed or fulfilled subsequently, and, therefore, the initial
ad hoc appointments cannot be treated to have been made
according to the applicable rules. These ad hoc appointments
were clearly not in accordance with the rules, and were made
only as a stopgap arrangement for fixed period, as expressly
stated in the appointment order itself.”
[Emphasis supplied]
33. Recently, in State of Haryana and others v. Vijay Singh and
others[13], the question arose with regard to the fixation of seniority in
the backdrop of ad hoc initial appointment made de hors the statutory rules
but later on services were regularized by the State Government. The Court
took note of the fact that the respondents therein were neither appointed
by the competent authority on the recommendations made by the Board which
was constituted by the Governor of Haryana nor were they placed on
probation as required under the rules and, therefore, their ad hoc period
could not be counted for the purpose of fixation of seniority. Thus,
emphasis was laid that when appointment is made without following the
procedure prescribed under the rules, the appointees are not entitled to
have the seniority fixed on the basis of the total length of service. In
essence, it has been ruled that when the appointment is made de hors the
rules, the appointee cannot claim seniority even if his appointment is
later on regularized.
34. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law pertaining to
fixation of seniority when the initial appointment is made in breach of
rules and further departure from provision pertaining to quota in their
essential nature, it is apposite to refer to the relevant rules of the
1966 Rules. Rule 4 defines the ‘Cadre’. Rule 4(1)(a) deals with the
categories of posts in the junior grade and Rule 4(1)(b) deals with the
senior grade posts. Rule 5 provides for the recruitment and procedure of
selection, etc. Rule 5(1), being pertinent, is reproduced below: -
“5. Methods of recruitment to the service. (1) Recruitment to
the service, after the commencement of these rules, shall be by
the following methods, namely:
(a) by a competitive examination conducted by the Commission;
(b) by promotion of confirmed Inspectors of Police; and
(c) by selection, in special case, from amongst –
(i) persons other than Inspectors of Police serving in
connection with the affairs of the Government; and
(ii) other persons having qualifications and experiences
eminently suitable for service in the Police
Department in the rank of Deputy Superintendent of
Police :
Provided that fifty per cent of the total number of posts
in the cadre shall be filled up by recruitment under Cls. (a)
and (c) and the other fifty per cent exclusively under Cl. (b),
and that the number of posts filled up under Cl. (c) above shall
not at any time exceed five per cent of the total number of
posts in the cadre and one post in any particular year.”
35. On scanning of Rule 5(1), it is evident that various methods have
been stipulated for recruitment. In the case at hand, the direct recruits
have been recruited by way of competitive examination conducted by the
Commission. The special batch has been selected under Rule 5(1)(c). In
that context, the proviso to Rule 5(1) of the 1966 Rules is significant.
It clearly lays a postulate that the number of posts filled up under clause
(c) shall not, at any time, exceed five per cent of the total number of
posts in the cadre and one post in any particular year. As has been stated
hereinabove, there was a requisition for 20 posts to be filled up by
special drive. On a query being made during hearing, it was fairly
conceded before us that five per cent in the cadre could not have exceeded
four posts. Thus, there has been selection in excess of the quota provided
in the Rule and nothing had been shown to justify the departure since
nothing really could have been demonstrated as the commission had already
recommended the names of the candidates meant for direct recruits.
36. Rule 8 deals with recruitment by selection. It is reproduced
hereunder: -
“8. Recruitment by selection. (1) The Governor may, from time
to time, for the purpose of recruitment to the service under Cl.
(c) of sub-R. (1) of R. 5, call upon the recommending
authorities to submit recommendations in respect of persons who-
a) are of outstanding merit and ability;
b) have to their credit not less than 2 years of experience in
duties comparable in status and responsibility to that of
Deputy Superintendent of Police or 8 years of experience in
duties comparable in status and responsibility to that of
Inspectors of Police;
c) possess the academic qualification prescribed under R.10;
d) are not above the age of 35 years on the 1st day of the
year in which the recommendations are called for; and
e) are otherwise eligible, in the opinion of recommending
authorities to be appointed to the service.
(2) On receipt of the recommendations, the Governor shall
refer them and also simultaneously send the character rolls/
testimonials of character and service records/other relevant
records of the persons recommended to the committee which will,
after examination of the records forwarded to it and
interviewing, such of the persons recommended as it considers
necessary, draw up a list of persons in order of the preference
who are considered suitable for appointment to the service. The
procedure details in sub-Rr. (4) to (7) of R. 7, mutatis
mutandis be followed in regard to the list of persons prepared
under this sub-rule.
(3) For every recruitment a separate list shall be drawn up
and the list once approved by the Commission shall lapse
immediately on the year’s quota of posts for persons under Cl.
(c) of sub-R. (1) of R. 5 having been filled up from the list.”
37. On a perusal of the aforesaid Rule, it is graphically clear that the
recommending authority has to submit the recommendations to the Governor
regard being had to certain aspects which have been prescribed under Rule
8(1). Rule 8(1)(d) prescribes the age limit on the first date of the year
in which the recommendations are called for. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8
stipulates that the procedure detailed in sub-rules (4) to (7) of Rule 7
mutatis mutandis be followed in regard to the list of persons prepared. In
this context, it is necessary to reproduce sub-rules (4) to (7) of Rule 7
which are as follows: -
“(4) The list prepared by the Committee shall give the names in
order of preference and the total number of such names shall not
be more than double the number of vacancies that may arise in
the promotion quota of the cadre and the ex-cadre temporary
posts of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police during a
period of approximately one year thereafter. In every case,
where in drawing up the list the committee changes the order of
seniority of any person in the rank of Inspector of Police or
supersedes any one in that rank by omission of his name, the
Committee shall record in writing the reason for such change or
supersession.
(5) The Committee shall forward the list to the Governor and
on receipt of the list the Governor shall forward the same to
the Commission together with the character rolls and other
relevant papers.
(6) The Commission shall consider the list prepared by the
Committee along with other documents received from the Governor
or on receipt of other documents as may be called for by the
Commission unless it considers any change necessary, approve the
list. If the Commission considers any change necessary, it
shall inform the Governor of the changes proposed and after
taking into account the comments, if any, by the Governor, may
approve the list finally with such modification, if any, as may
in its opinion be just and proper.
(7) The list, as finally approved by the Commission, shall be
forwarded to the Governor along with all the papers received
under sub-Rr. (5) and (6).”
38. It needs to be noted that under Rule 8(2), the Governor is required
to send the character rolls/testimonials of the character and service
records/other relevant records of the persons recommended to the Committee
which would, after examination of the records forwarded to it and
interviewing such of the persons recommended as it considers necessary,
draw up a list of persons in order of the preference who are considered
suitable for appointment to the service. “Committee” has been defined in
Rule 2(c) and it reads as follows: -
“(c) “Committee” means a committee constituted in accordance
with sub-R. (1) of R. 7.”
The aforesaid definition makes sub-rule (1) of Rule 7 important. The said
sub-rule reads as follows: -
“7. Recruitment by promotion. (1) There shall be a Selection
Committee consisting of the following, namely :
(a) Chairman, Assam Public Service Commission, or, where the
Chairman is unable to attend, a Member, Assam Public
Service Commission nominated by him;
(b) Chief Secretary to the Government;
(c) Inspector-General of Police;
(d) A Senior Deputy Inspector General of Police to be
nominated by Chief Secretary;
(e) Secretary to the Government of Assam in the Home
Department or any other officer of the Home Department
nominated in this behalf by the Chief Secretary. The
Chairman, Assam Public Commission or the Member, Assam
Public Service Commission, as the case may be, shall
preside at the meeting of the Selection Committee at which
he is present.”
In the obtaining factual matrix, the Selection Committee had not
recommended the case of the special batch recruits to the Commission. As
the affidavit filed by the Secretary to the Commission before the tribunal
clearly stated that the procedure was not followed and the same has been
accepted by the tribunal and concurred with by the High Court, there is no
reason to differ with the same. Therefore, we give the seal of imprimatur
to the said conclusion. At the risk of repetition, we state that the
selection has been made in excess of the quota and in the absence of a
recommendation of the Selection Committee as prescribed under the rules.
Plainly speaking, a maladroit effort was made to appoint the special batch
recruits first despite the recommendation of the direct recruits pending
before the State Government. It is also disturbing that though the Cabinet
had not approved the proposal for special drive to appoint from other
source yet the Director General of Police impressed upon the Commission to
recommend 20 names. It is also equally perplexing that the concept of the
special drive was meant to have young officers but in the ultimate
eventuate, officers were nearing fifty got the appointment. It is obvious
that it was totally arbitrary and exhibits indecent enthusiasm to confer
benefits on the special batch by making the rules comatosed.
39. At this stage, it is requisite to clarify one aspect. The learned
single Judge has treated the selection of the special batch recruits
totally de hors the rules and the Division Bench has opined that it is not
de hors the rules on the foundation that they were not casual appointees
and their recommendation had been made by the Commission and further they
had not played any overt act in getting their selection done.
40. In University of Kashmir and others v. Dr. Mohd. Yasin and
others[14], this Court expressed the view that an equitable ground does not
clothe an appointment with a legal status. Similar view was also expressed
in Swapan Kumar Pal and others v. Samitabhar Chakraborty and others[15].
41. In State of Haryana v. Haryana Veterninary and AHTS Association and
another[16], a three-Judge Bench, after x-ray of the relevant rules, came
to hold that when appointments are made in violation of the recruitment
rules, the said appointments cannot be treated to be regular.
42. The aforesaid authorities clearly lay down the principle that when
there is violation of the recruitment rules, the recruitment is
unsustainable. Whether any active part is played by a selectee or not has
nothing to do with the appointment made in contravention of the rules. In
the case at hand, the special batch recruits have encroached into the quota
of the direct recruits. The whole selection process is in violation of the
rules and, therefore, we are inclined to concur with the opinion expressed
by the learned single Judge that the selection was made de hors the rules.
The Division Bench was not justified in stating that the selection could
not be said to be de hors the rules. However, we accept the conclusion of
the tribunal as well as the High Court that as there had been long delay in
challenging the selection of the special batch recruits and some of them
have already retired, it would not be apposite to annul their appointments.
43. Presently, we shall refer to Rule 18 which deals with seniority. Mr.
Prashant Bhushan, during the course of hearing, has laid immense emphasis
on the said Rule to buttress the stance that if the service rendered in the
previous posts by the special batch recruits are taken into consideration
on the anvil of Rule 18, they should be treated as senior to the direct
recruits. Regard being had to the said submission, it becomes necessitous
to refer to the said Rule in entirety. It reads as follows: -
“18. Seniority. (1) The seniority of a member of the service
shall be determined on the basis of his date of appointment to
the service :
Provided that inter se seniority of the persons recruited
under Rr. 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b) and 5(2) on the same date shall be
according to the following order :
(i) Persons recruited under R. 5(2);
(ii) Persons recruited under R. 5(1)(b);
(iii) Persons recruited under R. 5(1)(a);
Provided further that in the case of a person recruited
under R.5(1)(c) the Governor may, in consideration of his
previous service and/or experience, fix a deemed date of
appointment for the purpose of seniority after taking into
consideration half the period of continuous service in completed
years subject to a maximum of 4 years rendered in previous
service.
(2) Inter se seniority of persons appointed under any of the
three clauses of R. 5(1), shall be in the order in which their
names appear in the list from which the appointment is made.
(3) The date of appointment for the purposes of this rule
shall be, if a date is specified in the notification of
appointment, such date, or if no such date is specified, the
date on which such notification is issued.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Rr. (1) to (3)
the seniority of a person who does not join the service within
three months of the date of appointment as defined in sub-R.(3),
shall be determined on the basis of the actual date of his
joining the service.
(5) If the confirmation of a member of the service is delayed
on account of his failure to qualify for such confirmation, he
shall lose his post in the order of seniority vis-à-vis such of
his juniors as may be confirmed earlier than he. His original
position shall, however, be restored on his confirmation
subsequently but any benefits of promotion, etc., shall not
accrue to him with retrospective effect on such confirmation.
(6) Inter se seniority of persons promoted to the senior grade
of the service shall be in the order in which their names appear
in the list from which the promotion is made.”
44. The two facets which emerge from the scanning of the aforesaid Rule
are that the seniority of a member of the service is to be determined on
the basis of the date of appointment to the service and the seniority has
to follow a particular order as has been stipulated therein. The other
significant aspect is that power has been conferred on the Governor to
consider the previous service of an incumbent and fix a deemed date of
appointment for the purpose of seniority by adopting a specific method. As
far as the first part is concerned, the tribunal as well as the High Court
has not accepted the stipulation that in the present case the seniority
should be determined on the basis of the date of appointment as the same
has been made in flagrant violation of the rules and we have already
concurred with the same. As far as the computation of the previous
service is concerned, the learned single Judge as well as the Division
Bench, after adequate ratiocination, has expressed the view that the
appointments had been made in contravention of the rules, the question of
conferment of the benefit under the second proviso to Rule 18(1) did not
arise. In our considered view, the said conclusion is absolutely
defensible for the simon pure reason when the infrastructure is founded on
total illegal edifice, the endeavour to put forth a claim for counting the
previous service to build a pyramid is bound to founder.
45. Another specious contention has been urged that
power is vested with
the Governor to dispense with or relax any rule and in the case at hand, it
should be treated that the authority by its conduct has relaxed the rules.
In this context, it is appropriate to refer to
Rule 23 which reads as
follows: -
“Power of the Governor to dispense with or relax any rule. Where
the Governor is satisfied that the operation of any of these rules
may cause undue hardship in any particular case, he may order to
dispense with or relax the requirements of that rule to such an
extent and subject to such conditions as he may consider necessary
for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner :
Provided that the case of any person shall not be dealt with in
any manner less favourable to him than that provided by any of
these rules.”
46. As has been observed by the learned single Judge which has been
accepted by the Division Bench,
there was no decision to relax the rules in
favour of the special batch recruits.
That apart, whenever there has to be
relaxation about the operation of any of the rules, regard has to be given
to the test of causation of undue hardship in any particular case.
That
apart, the authority is required to record satisfaction while dispensing or
relaxing the requirements of any rule to such an extent and subject to such
conditions as he may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just
and equitable manner.
The language of the Rule really casts a number of
conditions.
It provides guidance. It cannot be exercised in an arbitrary
manner so as to dispense with the procedure of selection in entirety in
respect of a particular class, for it has to be strictly construed and
there has to be apposite foundation for exercise of such power.
It is to
be borne in mind that if a particular rule empowers the authority to throw
all the rules overboard in all possibility, it may not withstand close
scrutiny of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Be that it may, no decision
was taken to relax the rules and, the concept of deemed relaxation is not
attracted and, therefore, the relief claimed by the special batch recruits
has no legs to stand upon.
47. From the aforesaid analysis,
there can be no scintilla of doubt that
the selection of the special batch recruits was totally de hors the Rules;
that
there was a maladroit effort to go for a special drive when there was
no need for the same by the State which is supposed to be a model employer;
that
neither the concept of relaxation nor the conception of benefit of
Rule 18 would be attracted for grant on conferring any privilege to the
special batch recruits;
that
their seniority has to be pushed down and,
hence, the directions given by the tribunal and the High Court in that
regard are absolutely flawless; and that regard being had to the delayed
challenge and long rendering of service in the posts and further promotions
having been effected, it would be inapposite to quash their appointments.
48. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to reiterate the oft-stated principle that
the State is a model employer and it is required to
act fairly giving due regard and respect to the rules framed by it. But in
the present case, the State has atrophied the rules. Hence, the need for
hammering the concept.
49. Almost a quarter century back, this Court in Balram Gupta vs Union of
India & Anr. [1987 (Supp) SCC 228] had observed thus:
“As a model employer the Government must conduct itself with
high probity and candour with its employees.”
50. In State of Haryana v. Piara Singh and Ors.[(1992)4SCC118], the Court
had clearly stated:
“The main concern of the court in such matters is to ensure the
rule of law and to see that the Executive acts fairly and gives
a fair deal to its employees consistent with the requirements of
Articles 14 and 16”.
51. In Secretary, State Of Karnataka And vs. Umadevi And Others
[(2006)4SCC1], the Constitution Bench, while discussing the role of state
in recruitment procedure,
stated that if rules have been made under Article
309 of the Constitution, then the Government can make appointments only in
accordance with the rules, for the State is meant to be a model employer.
52. In Mehar Chand Polytechnic & Anr. vs. Anu Lamba & Ors. [(2006) 7 SCC
161] the Court observed that
public employment is a facet of right to
equality envisaged under Article 16 of the Constitution of India and that
the recruitment rules are framed with a view to give equal opportunity to
all the citizens of India entitled for being considered for recruitment in
the vacant posts.
53. We have stated
the role of the State as a model employer
with the
fond hope that in future a deliberate disregard is not taken recourse to
and deviancy of such magnitude is not adopted to frustrate the claims of
the employees.
It should always be borne in mind that legitimate
aspirations of the employees are not guillotined and a situation is not
created where hopes end in despair.
Hope for everyone is gloriously
precious and a model employer should not convert it to be deceitful and
treacherous by playing a game of chess with their seniority.
A sense of
calm sensibility and concerned sincerity should be reflected in every step.
An atmosphere of trust has to prevail and when the employees are absolutely
sure that their trust shall not be betrayed and they shall be treated with
dignified fairness then only the concept of good governance can be
concretized.
We say no more.
54. Consequently, all the appeals are dismissed leaving the parties to
bear their respective costs.
……………………………….J.
[K. S. Radhakrishnan]
……………………………….J.
[Dipak Misra]
New Delhi;
November 30, 2012.
-----------------------
[1] AIR 1988 SC 162
[2] (1998) 9 SCC 641
[3] (1972) 3 SCC 489
[4] (1986) 6 SCC 157
[5] (1990) 2 SCC 189
[6] 1980 (Supp) SCC 449
[7] AIR 1990 SC 1607
[8] AIR 1975 SC 483
[9] 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 366
[10] (2000) 2 SCC 552
[11] (2005) 8 SCC 454
[12] (1993) 3 SCC 371
[13] (2012) 8 SCC 633
[14] (1974) 3 SCC 546
[15] (2001) 5 SCC 581
[16] (2000) 8 SCC 4
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48
