the circumstantial evidence= “five golden principles” enunciated by this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’ established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’ as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra : (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations were made: certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a Court can convict, and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. Nobody except the accused was in the house immediately before the occurrence. The accused was seen fleeing away from the house by PW 3. Thereafter, the whereabouts of the accused were not known until he was arrested on 3.5.2003. After his arrest, the accused had made a statement (Exh. P.8) on the basis of which a knife and a blood stained shirt of the accused (M.Os. 6 and 7) were recovered. The explanation offered by the accused for his absence for a period of nearly 15 days following the death of his wife is unnatural and opposed to all cannons of acceptable human conduct and behaviour. The aforesaid circumstances which have been proved and established by prosecution,the prosecution has established beyond all reasonable doubt that it is the accused alone and nobody who had committed the offence. Accordingly, we are of the view that the conviction of the accused and the sentence imposed on him by the learned trial court as affirmed by the High Court will not justify any interference. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal and affirm the conviction of the accused under section 302 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him.

| Reportable    |

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 126 OF 2009
Vadlakonda Lenin                              …Appellant

                                   Versus

State of Andhra Pradesh                       …Respondent



                       J U D G M E N T



RANJAN GOGOI, J.



       This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  judgment  and  order  dated
29.9.2006  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh  affirming  the
conviction of the accused-appellant under Section 302 IPC and  the  sentence
of life imprisonment imposed on him.

2.    On 18.4.2003 at about 10.30 a.m. PW  1,  Ponnam  Pedda  Sathaiah,  the
father of the deceased, filed a FIR in the Maripeda police  station  stating
that he had given  his  daughter,  Vadlakonda  Radha,  in  marriage  to  the
accused-appellant in the year 1999.  At  the  time  of  marriage  a  sum  of
Rs.50,000 was claimed to have been given by the first  informant  as  dowry,
inspite of which, according to the first  informant,  the  accused-appellant
had been demanding more dowry and on that account committing  atrocities  on
his daughter. In the FIR filed it was alleged that in the early  morning  of
18.4.2003  the  accused-appellant  had  murdered  his  wife  while  she  was
sleeping and had run away. It was further alleged  by  the  first  informant
that on coming to know of the incident he rushed to  the  appellant’s  house
and saw his daughter taking her last breath. Thereafter, he had brought  her
to the Area Hospital at Mahbubabad but on the way to the hospital  she  died
at about 8.00 a.m.



3.    On the basis of the aforesaid FIR, a case under section 302  and  304B
of the IPC was registered. In the course of the  investigation  inquest  was
held on the dead body and the same was sent for post mortem  examination.  A
large number of witnesses were examined and their statements  were  recorded
under  section  161  Cr.P.C.  On  3.5.2003  the  accused-appellant  who  was
absconding was arrested from his house. On the same day at the  instance  of
the accused-appellant PW 15, M.  Laxminarayana,  the  Sub-Divisional  Police
Officer of Mahabubabad recovered a tapper knife (M.O.6) and a blood  stained
shirt of the accused (M.O.7).



4.    Charge sheet under section 302 and 498A IPC was submitted against  the
accused-appellant. However in the trial  court,  charge  under  section  302
alone was framed.  The  trial  ended  in  the  conviction  of  the  accused-
appellant who,  as  already  noticed,  was  sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous
imprisonment for life. The aforesaid conviction  and  sentence  having  been
affirmed by the High Court this appeal, by special leave, has been filed.



5.    We have heard Mr. J.M. Sharma, learned counsel for the  appellant  and
Mr. Mayur R. Shah, learned counsel for the respondent-State.



6.     Of the  15  witnesses  examined  by  the  prosecution,  the  evidence
tendered by PWs 1 and 2 (father and brother of the deceased);  the  evidence
of  PW 3, Ponnam Buchamma, who is a neighbour and who had seen the  deceased
lying on cot in her house with bleeding  injuries  from  the  neck  and  the
accused running away from the place; the evidence  of  PW  10,   who  was  a
witness to the seizure of material objects No. 6 and 7 and PW 15,  the  Sub-
Divisional Police Officer of Mahabubabad who had recovered material  objects
6 and 7 on the basis of the statement made by the accused (Exh.P8)  as  well
as the evidence  of  PW  12,  Dr.  Vaidehi,  the  Medical  Officer  who  had
performed the post  mortem,  would  be  relevant,  and  therefore,  must  be
noticed in some details.



7.    PWs 1 and 2 have deposed in the same vein. From the  evidence  of  the
said two witnesses, it transpires that the accused, though  had  received  a
sum of Rs.50,000 at  the  time  of  his  marriage,  had   been  persistently
demanding more  dowry  and  harassing  and  assaulting  his  wife  i.e.  the
deceased from time to time. It also transpires from the  evidence  of  PW  1
and 2 that in the evening  before  the  occurrence  there  was  a  betrothal
ceremony of the  brother  of  the  deceased,  which  was  attended,  amongst
others, by PWs 1, 2 as well as the accused and the deceased. A plot of  land
measuring one and half acres and Rs.30,000  was  offered  as  dowry  to  the
brother of the deceased which  had  led  to   further  renewed  demands  for
additional dowry by the accused. Immediately after the  ceremony  a  quarrel
had taken place between the accused and the deceased as a  result  of  which
the deceased went to her co-sister’s place (PW 5) to  spend  the  night.  In
the early morning, she came to her own house and was lying in  a  cot  when,
according to PWs 1 and 2, the accused caused knife injuries on the  neck  of
the deceased. According to the said witnesses though the deceased was  taken
to the hospital she died en-route.

8.    PW 3 had deposed  that  in  the  early  morning  of  the  day  of  the
occurrence while she was going to the stools side she noticed  the  deceased
lying in the cot of her house with injuries on the neck from which  she  was
bleeding. PW 3 had also deposed that she saw the accused running  away  from
the house. The co-sister of the deceased to whose  house  the  deceased  had
gone after the quarrel with the accused was examined as PW 5. She,  however,
did not support the prosecution case. PW 3 had however admitted that in  the
early morning of 18.4.2003 as the deceased had not come  out  of  her  house
she went to the house of the deceased and found her lying in  the  cot  with
injuries on the neck.  PW  10,  as  already  noticed,  had  deposed  to  the
recovery of M.O. Nos.6 and 7 on the basis  of  the  statement  made  by  the
accused (Ex.P.8) before PW 15, the Sub-Divisional Police Officer.  PW 12  is
the Doctor who had performed  the  post  mortem  on  the  deceased.  He  had
deposed that he found incised wound involving the whole of the neck  of  the
deceased  and  also  cut  wounds  of  the  hyoid  bone  and   the   trachea.
Corresponding to the  said  external  injuries,  PW  12  found  the  carotid
vessels (the major vital blood vessels supplying  blood  to  the  brain)  as
well as the wind pipe of the deceased to have been cut. PW 15  is  the  Sub-
Divisional Police Officer before whom the accused  had  made  the  statement
(Exh.P8) leading to the recovery  of  material  object  No.  6  (knife)  and
material object No. 7 (blood stained shirt). PW 15  had  also  deposed  that
the whereabouts of the accused after the incident  were  not  known  and  he
could be arrested only on 3.5.2003.



9.    Coupled with the above, from the  examination  of  the  accused  under
section 313 Cr.P.C., it transpires that the accused was not available  after
the incident. The absence of the accused has been sought to be explained  by
him by stating that he could come to know of the news of the  death  of  his
wife from the newspapers after which he had reported  the  incident  to  his
sister.



10.   A careful consideration of the evidence  adduced  by  the  prosecution
would go to show that there is no direct evidence of any eye witness to  the
crime  alleged  against  the  accused.  However,  it  transpires  from   the
depositions  of  the  prosecution  witnesses  that   certain   circumstances
inimical to the accused have been proved by the prosecution in  the  present
case. Such circumstances which have been culled out  by  the  learned  trial
court and also by the High Court can be summarised as below:

     i) The accused had been making demands for dowry and on  that  account
        was  harassing,  intimidating  and  committing  atrocities  on  the
        deceased;

    ii) the accused and the deceased alognwith PWs 1 and 2 had attended the
        betrothal function of the brother of the deceased  in  the  evening
        prior to the incident. Immediately after the incident, there was  a
        quarrel between the accused and the deceased;

   iii) in the early morning of the next day the deceased was found  by  PW
        3, lying in a cot in her own house with injuries on her neck;

    iv) the accused was found by PW 3 to be running away from the place.

     v) the whereabouts of the accused was not known after the incident and
        he could be arrested only on 3.5.2003; and

    vi) the accused had stated in his examination under section 313 Cr.P.C.
        that he came to know of the  incident  only  from  the  newspapers,
        whereafter he had explained the whole incident to his sister.



11. The culpability of the accused-appellant, in the absence of  any  direct
evidence, has to be judged on the  basis  of  the  circumstances  enumerated
above. The principles of  law  governing  proof  of  a  criminal  charge  by
circumstantial evidence  would  hardly  require  any  reiteration  save  and
except that the circumstances  on  which  the  prosecution  relies  must  be
proved beyond all reasonable doubt and such circumstances  must  be  capable
of giving rise  to  an  inference  which  is  inconsistent  with  any  other
hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. It is  only  in  such  an  event
that the conviction of the accused,  on  the  basis  of  the  circumstantial
evidence brought by the prosecution, would be permissible in  law.  In  this
regard a reference to the “five golden principles” enunciated by this  Court
in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 may  be
recapitulated for which purpose para 153 of the judgment in the  above  case
may be usefully extracted below:


      “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the  following
      conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused  can  be
      said to be fully established:


      (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion  of  guilt  is  to  be
      drawn should be fully established.


      It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the  circumstances
      concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is  not
      only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and
      'must be or should be proved’ as was held by  this  Court  in  Shivaji
      Sahebrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra : (1973) 2 SCC 793  where  the
      following observations were made:

      certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and  not
      merely may be guilty before  a  Court  can  convict,  and  the  mental
      distance between 'may be' and 'must be'  is  long  and  divides  vague
      conjectures from sure conclusions.

      (2) the facts so  established  should  be  consistent  only  with  the
      hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to  say,  they  should
      not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused  is
      guilty.


      (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.


      (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be
      proved, and


      (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave  any
      reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence  of
      the accused and must show that in all human probability the  act  must
      have been done by the accused.





12.   Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued  that  in  the
present  case  the  prosecution  has  failed  to  prove   the   most   vital
circumstance of the case, namely, motive of the accused for  committing  the
alleged crime. Infact, according to the learned counsel, no  charge  against
the accused having been framed under section 498A IPC  inspite  of  specific
allegations of demand of dowry and harassment etc. of the  deceased  by  the
accused  the  motive  for  commission  of   the   alleged   offence   remain
unsubstantiated. Learned counsel has also pointed out that  the  prosecution
case to the effect that the deceased had  left  her  house  in  the  evening
prior to the incident and has spent the night in the house of co-sister,  PW
5, has not been established. It is also urged that,  in  any  case,  if  the
deceased had spent night in the house of the co-sister, as  claimed  by  the
prosecution, no explanation has been forthcoming as  to  how  she  could  be
seen by PW 3 lying injured in the cot in  her  own  house  in  the  morning.
Learned counsel has further submitted that PW 3 has contradicted herself  on
a vital part of the prosecution story, namely, the point of  time  when  she
had seen the deceased lying in the cot and the  accused  fleeing  away  from
the place. While at one place PW 3  had  claimed  to  have  seen  the  above
sequence of events while going to the stools side, in her  cross-examination
she had stated that she saw the same while returning.


13.   In reply, the learned State Counsel  has  contended  that  prosecution
case cannot fail merely on account of the absence of proof of any motive  on
the part of the accused to commit the crime. Learned counsel  has  submitted
that the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 amply demonstrates that  demand  for  dowry
was made by the accused from time to time and also the  ill-treatment  meted
out by the accused to the deceased.  The incident had  taken  place  in  the
house of the accused to  which  the  deceased  had  returned  in  the  early
morning. It is pointed out that PW 3, who had seen the accused fleeing  away
from the place of occurrence, is related to both the sides  and,  therefore,
is eminently reliable. The absence of accused for  a  period  of  nearly  15
days after the incident  and  the  recoveries  made  on  the  basis  of  the
statement of the accused has been pointed out  by  the  learned  counsel  as
sufficient proof of the involvement of the  accused  in  the  crime  alleged
against him. The contradictions in the evidence of PW 3,  according  to  the
learned counsel, are minor  and  insignificant.  Learned  counsel  has  also
pointed out that  though  PW  5  was  declared  hostile,  she  had,  infact,
supported the prosecution case to the extent that in the  early  morning  of
the day of the incident, as the deceased had not come out  from  her  house,
PW 5 had gone to the house of the deceased and found her lying  on  the  cot
with injuries on the neck.





14.   We have considered the submissions advanced on behalf of  the  parties
and the entire evidence on record. Upon  such  consideration  we  find  that
from the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 it is crystal clear that  the  accused  had
been persistently demanding additional dowry from the deceased and had  been
ill-treating her. From the evidence tendered by the said  two  witnesses  it
is also clear that immediately before  the  incident  there  was  a  quarrel
between the accused and the deceased. In the early morning of 18.4.2003  the
deceased was found lying injured in the cot in her own  house  by  PW  3  as
well as by PW 5.  Nobody except the accused was  in  the  house  immediately
before the occurrence.  The accused was seen fleeing away from the house  by
PW 3. Thereafter, the whereabouts of the accused were  not  known  until  he
was arrested  on  3.5.2003.  After  his  arrest,  the  accused  had  made  a
statement (Exh. P.8) on the basis of which  a  knife  and  a  blood  stained
shirt of the accused  (M.Os.  6  and  7)  were  recovered.  The  explanation
offered by the accused for his absence  for  a  period  of  nearly  15  days
following the death of his wife is unnatural and opposed to all  cannons  of
acceptable human conduct and behaviour. The  aforesaid  circumstances  which
have been proved and established by prosecution,  in  our  considered  view,
squarely satisfies the test laid down by this Court  in  Sharad  Birdhichand
Sarda (supra).  The principles laid down  in  the  aforesaid  decision  have
been consistently reiterated by this court and exhaustively considered in  a
very recent decision in Sathya Narayanan  v.  State  Rep.  by  Inspector  of
Police (decided on November 2, 2012). (Reported in J.T. 2012 (11) SC 57).


15.    Having considered the totality of the facts of the present  case  and
the principles of law as above, we are left with no  doubt  whatsoever  that
in the present case the prosecution has established  beyond  all  reasonable
doubt that it is  the  accused  alone  and  nobody  who  had  committed  the
offence. Accordingly, we are of the view that the conviction of the  accused
and the sentence imposed on him by the learned trial court  as  affirmed  by
the High Court will not justify any  interference.  We,  therefore,  dismiss
the appeal and affirm the conviction of the accused under  section  302  IPC
and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him.




                                                    ................J.
                                  [P. SATHASIVAM]





                                             ................J.
                                             [RANJAN GOGOI]


New Delhi,
November 22, 2012.













-----------------------
17

all the four accused moved the High Court of Rajasthan by filing an appeal which was partially allowed by the impugned order dated 8.8.2007. While the conviction of the appellant was altered from Section 302/149 IPC to Section 302 IPC, the sentence of life imprisonment imposed was maintained. The High Court, however, acquitted the other three accused of the offence under Section 302/149 IPC while maintaining the conviction under Section 323 IPC. In view of the fact that each of the said accused had undergone confinement for a period of more than six months, the High Court ordered for their release.?=The defence version is to the further effect that deceased Rooplal brought out a double barrel gun from his house to kill Ghasilal at which point of time the accused-appellant, Ram Singh, had grabbed Rooplal. In the scuffle and melee that had ensued PW 7, Satyanarayan is reported to have taken the fire arm and had fired two shots at Ghasilal which shots, however, hit Rooplal and Surajmal as a result of which Rooplal died and Surajmal was injured. The aforesaid version remains unsubstantiated. On the contrary the materials on record show that the tractor which was impounded for being involved in the incident belonged to one Prembai and not to the party of the accused. Besides, DW1, Narottam Lal who was driving the tractor was an employee of Prembai and not of the accused. The above facts clearly demonstrate the falsity of the defence version. Also in the examination of the accused-appellant under Section 313 CrPC the above defence has not been specifically taken. Though several independent persons were reportedly available none of them have been examined in order to lend credence to the defence story. On the other hand PW 19 Rajesh, who is not related to either side and had reportedly come out of his house on hearing the commotion had supported the prosecution case against the accused appellant. All the three eye witnesses examined by the prosecution, as already noted, have clearly and unequivocally deposed with regard to the involvement of the present accused-appellant in the death of Rooplal. 10. In view of the above, we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the conviction of the accused-appellant Ram Singh under Section 302 IPC and the sentence imposed thereunder is fully justified. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal and affirm the conviction and sentence

                                                    NON-REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1712 OF 2008
Ram Singh                                           …Appellant

                                   Versus

State    of    Rajasthan                                       …Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T



RANJAN GOGOI, J.


1.    Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 08.08.2007 passed  by  the
High Court of Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench affirming the  conviction  of  the
appellant under Section 302 IPC and  the  sentence  of  life  imprisonment
imposed, this appeal has been filed upon grant of special  leave  by  this
Court.

2.    The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that at about  10.30  a.m.
on 13.09.2000, Hariram (PW-23), lodged a written complaint with the Police
Station at Baran stating that  at  about  10  a.m.  of  the  same  day  he
alongwith his nephew Ramlal and some other family members were sitting  on
the road in order to go  to  Baran.  According  to  the  complainant/first
informant there was an old enmity between him and  one  Ghasilal.  In  the
complaint filed it was specifically stated that while they were waiting to
go  to  Baran,  Ghasilal  along  with  his  sons  Ram  Singh  (appellant),
Ramswaroop, Ramshyam and son-in-law Akheraj came in a tractor  armed  with
different weapons including a firearm. Immediately on  reaching  the  spot
accused-appellant Ram Singh fired from a gun at Rooplal  as  a  result  of
which the said person died on the spot. It was alleged  that  accused  Ram
Singh had also fired at Surajmal, causing injuries on his hand. The  other
accused persons had assaulted Satyanarayan  (PW-7),  Seokaran  and  Ramlal
with Kutia and Gandasia. It was further stated by the complainant that  as
a result of the gun shot injury Rooplal died on the spot.

3.    On the basis of the aforesaid complaint,  case  No.  255/2000  (P.S.
Baran) was registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 307, 302 IPC. The
case was duly investigated and on completion of the  investigation  charge
sheet under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 307, 302 IPC  was  filed  against
Ghasilal, Ramswaroop, Ramshyam and Ram Singh (accused Akheraj  died  while
the case was under investigation). Thereafter the case was  committed  for
trial to the court of Sessions at Baran where charges under the  aforesaid
provisions of the Penal Code read with Section 149 IPC were framed against
all the accused including the accused-appellant. As  the  accused  persons
claimed innocence and wanted to be tried, a regular trial was held in  the
course of which the prosecution examined 23 witnesses and also exhibited a
large number of documents. Two witnesses  were  examined  by  the  defence
including the accused Ghasilal. The statements of the accused persons were
recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. Thereafter, at the  conclusion  of  the
trial, all  the  accused  were  convicted  under  Sections  148,  302/149,
307/149, 323/149, 324/149 IPC. Each of the accused persons  was  sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for the  offence  under  Section
302/149 IPC. For the offence under Section 323/149, 324/149  and  148  IPC
each of the accused persons were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for six
months and one year respectively. All the sentences were directed  to  run
concurrently.

4.    Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of  conviction  and  the  sentences
imposed all the four accused moved the High Court of Rajasthan  by  filing
an appeal  which  was  partially  allowed  by  the  impugned  order  dated
8.8.2007. While the conviction of the appellant was altered  from  Section
302/149 IPC to Section 302 IPC, the sentence of life imprisonment  imposed
was maintained. The High Court, however, acquitted the other three accused
of the offence under Section 302/149 IPC while maintaining the  conviction
under Section 323 IPC.  In view of the fact that each of the said  accused
had undergone confinement for a period of more than six months,  the  High
Court ordered for their release.  It is against the aforesaid order of the
High Court convicting the appellant under section 302 IPC and the sentence
of life imprisonment imposed on him  that  the  present  appeal  has  been
filed.

5.    We have heard Mr. Ramesh C.Kohli, learned counsel for the  appellant
and Mr. Jasbir Singh Malik, learned AAG for the State of Rajasthan.

6.    Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the  conviction
of the accused-appellant under section 302 IPC is wholly untenable in law.
Learned counsel has placed before the Court the  defence  version  of  the
occurrence as revealed by the cross-examination by PWs 7, 22  and  23  and
also the evidence of DW 1 Narottam Lal (driver of the tractor) and  DW  2,
Ghasilal. Learned counsel has specifically pointed out that while Ghasilal
and his sons were proceeding towards the temple they were attacked by  the
party of the complainant and the deceased Rooplal has brought out a double
barrel gun from his house to eliminate Ghasilal. At that point of time the
accused-appellant intervened and in the melee the gun was taken hold of by
PW 7 Satyanarayan who fired two shots at Ghasilal but  the  same  hit  the
deceased Rooplal  and  injured  Surajmal  (PW  17).  Learned  counsel  has
submitted that there is no material on record to disbelieve the  aforesaid
version put forth by the defence. Furthermore, according  to  the  learned
counsel, in the present case, the alleged weapon of offence had  not  been
seized/recovered and though  four  shots,  according  to  the  prosecution
witnesses, were filed in the  course  of  the  incident,  only  one  empty
cartridge was recovered from the spot by PW 20, the Investigating Officer.
It is therefore urged that in the above fact situation it cannot  be  said
that the defence version lacks authenticity and that the  prosecution  has
established its case beyond all reasonable doubt  so  as  to  warrant  the
conviction of the accused.

7.    On the other hand, learned counsel for the  State  has  pointed  out
that PW 7, Satyanarayan, PW 22 Bachibai and PW  23  Hariram  are  the  eye
witnesses to the occurrence.  The  evidence  of  the  aforesaid  witnesses
clearly brings out the details of the incident and the sequence of  events
that had taken place. From the testimony of the aforesaid witnesses it  is
clear that it is the accused-appellant, Ram Singh, who was  armed  with  a
.12 bore double barrel gun had fired first at Surajmal causing injuries on
him and, thereafter, had fired twice at the deceased Rooplal, first on the
chest  and,  thereafter,  in  the  stomach.  According  to  the  aforesaid
witnesses accused Ram Singh had fired a fourth shot in the air. The  three
eye-witnesses are clear and consistent in narrating  the  aforesaid  facts
and nothing has been elucidated in their  cross-examination  to  discredit
their statements. Learned  State  Counsel  has  also  submitted  that  the
defence version is inherently incredible  as  the  tractor  in  which  the
accused persons were traveling, which was subsequently impounded, belonged
to one Prembai and not to the accused party. If that is so,  according  to
learned counsel the starting point of the defence version  that  they  had
gone to the temple to  seek  divine  blessings  on  the  occasion  of  the
purchase of a new tractor, has been proved to be  incorrect.  It  is  also
pointed out by the learned State counsel that the defence version does not
find support from any independent witness though many  such  persons  were
reportedly present at the  time  of  the  incident.  The  failure  of  the
prosecution to recover the  weapon  of  assault  or  all  the  four  empty
cartridges from the  place  of  occurrence,  according  to  learned  State
counsel, is not fatal to the prosecution case.

8.    We have considered the arguments advanced on behalf of the  parties.
We have also perused the evidence of PW 7, 22 and 23 as well as DW  1  and
DW 2. On such consideration we find that the eye witnesses examined by the
prosecution i.e. PWs 7, 22 and 23 have been  clear  and  consistent  while
describing the sequence of events that had taken place on the day  of  the
occurrence. There is no  material  discrepancy  or  contradiction  in  the
statement of the said witness who  had  clearly  identified  the  accused-
appellant Ram Singh as being the person who had fired four shots from  the
.12 bore barrel gun that he was carrying with him. The eye witnesses  have
also been categorical in stating  that  the  accused-appellant  had  first
fired at Surajmal (PW 17)  and  thereafter  he  had  fired  twice  at  the
deceased Rooplal hitting him on the chest  and  the  stomach.  The  fourth
shot, according to the eye witnesses, was fired in the air. The  elaborate
cross-examination of the eye-witnesses on behalf of the accused has failed
to discredit their testimony in any manner whatsoever. All  the  aforesaid
witnesses have also categorically denied the defence version which was put
to them in their cross-examination.

9.    As against the above, what we find is a relatively weak and somewhat
unacceptable defence version which remains unsubstantiated in the  absence
of any acceptable evidence. According to the defence,  Ghasilal  alongwith
his sons were proceeding in  a  tractor  to  the  temple  to  seek  divine
blessings on the purchase of a new tractor by the family. On the way  they
were accosted by Rooplal, Surajmal and others who had assaulted  Ghasilal.
The defence version is to the further effect that deceased Rooplal brought
out a double barrel gun from his house to kill Ghasilal at which point  of
time the accused-appellant, Ram Singh, had grabbed Rooplal. In the scuffle
and melee that had ensued PW 7, Satyanarayan is reported to have taken the
fire arm and had fired two shots at Ghasilal  which  shots,  however,  hit
Rooplal and Surajmal as a result of which Rooplal died  and  Surajmal  was
injured. The aforesaid version remains unsubstantiated.  On  the  contrary
the materials on record show that the  tractor  which  was  impounded  for
being involved in the incident belonged to one  Prembai  and  not  to  the
party of the accused. Besides, DW1,  Narottam  Lal  who  was  driving  the
tractor was an employee of Prembai and not of the accused. The above facts
clearly demonstrate the falsity of  the  defence  version.   Also  in  the
examination of the accused-appellant under  Section  313  CrPC  the  above
defence has  not  been  specifically  taken.  Though  several  independent
persons were reportedly available none of them have been examined in order
to lend credence to the defence story. On the other hand PW 19 Rajesh, who
is not related to either side and had reportedly come out of his house  on
hearing the commotion had  supported  the  prosecution  case  against  the
accused  appellant.  All  the  three  eye  witnesses   examined   by   the
prosecution, as already noted, have clearly and unequivocally deposed with
regard to the involvement of the present accused-appellant in the death of
Rooplal.

10.   In view of  the  above,  we  have  no  difficulty  in  reaching  the
conclusion that the conviction of the accused-appellant  Ram  Singh  under
Section 302 IPC and the sentence imposed thereunder  is  fully  justified.
We, therefore, dismiss the appeal and affirm the conviction  and  sentence
imposed on the accused-appellant.

                                       ...…………………………J.
                                             [P. SATHASIVAM]


                                        .........……………………J.
                                             [RANJAN GOGOI]
New Delhi,
November 22, 2012.
-----------------------
7

whether the plaintiff had properly valued the suit and the court fee paid.whether a suit filed seeking a declaration that a will and a sale deed are void, resulting their cancellation, will fall under Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, as amended by the U.P. Amendment Act (Act XIX of 1938) [for short ‘the U.P. Amendment Act’] or Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act, 1870 for the purpose of valuation. Plaintiff, in the instant case, valued the suit at Rs.30 Lakhs for the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction. However, for the purpose of court fee, the plaintiff paid a fixed court fee of Rs.200/- under Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act. Plaintiff had not noticed the fact that the above mentioned article stood amended by the State, by adding the words “not otherwise provided by this Act”. Since Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amended Act specifically provides for payment of court fee in case where the suit is for or involving cancellation or adjudging/declaring void or voidable an instrument securing property having money value, Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act shall not be applicable. 12. For the reasons abovementioned, the appeal lacks in merits and the same is dismissed, with no order as to costs.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8196  OF 2012
               [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 10958 of 2012]




Shailendra Bhardwaj & Others                       .. Appellants

                                   Versus

Chandra Pal & Another                              .. Respondents




                               J U D G M E N T




K. S. Radhakrishnan,J.



1.    Leave granted.

2.    The short question that has come up for consideration in this case  is
whether a suit filed seeking a declaration that a will and a sale  deed  are
void, resulting their cancellation, will fall under Section 7(iv-A)  of  the
Court Fees Act, 1870, as amended by the  U.P.  Amendment  Act  (Act  XIX  of
1938) [for short ‘the U.P. Amendment Act’] or Article  17(iii)  of  Schedule
II of the Court Fees Act, 1870 for the purpose of valuation.

3.    Civil Suit No. 230 of 2006 was filed before the  Court  of  the  Civil
Judge, Hathras, U.P. seeking the following reliefs:
      “(A)  Decree may be passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the
           defendants, declare null and void and invalid of the forged will
           dated 21.3.2003 and sale deed dated 12.1.2005 and cancel and its
           information sent to the office of Registrar Hathras.


      (B)   That the cost of the Suit  may  be  decreed  in  favour  of  the
           plaintiff and against the defendants.


      (C)   That any other cost which may deem fit by the Hon’ble  Court  in
           favour of the  plaintiff  and  against  the  defendants  in  the
           interest of Justice.”




4.    The suit property was valued and the cost of the  property  was  fixed
at Rs.30,00,000/- and the Court fee  of  Rs.200/-  was  paid  under  Article
17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fee Act.  The question arose before  the
trial Court
whether the plaintiff had  properly  valued  the  suit  and  the
court fee paid.  The trial Court took the view  that  the  plaintiff  should
have paid the court fee as per Section 7(iv-A) of the  U.P.  Amendment  Act.
The matter was taken up before the High Court.   The  High  Court  concurred
with the views taken  by  the  trial  Court  and  dismissed  the  appeal  on
15.12.2011, against which this appeal has been preferred.

5.    Shri Viresh Kumar Yadav, learned counsel appearing on  behalf  of  the
appellant, submitted that the  Courts  below  have  committed  an  error  in
holding that the suit be valued and an ad valorem court fee  be  paid  under
Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amendment Act.  Learned counsel  submitted  that
the plaintiff had correctly valued the suit and proper court  fee  was  paid
in accordance with Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of  the  Court  Fees  Act.
Considerable reliance was also placed on  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in
Suhrid Singh v. Randhir Singh and Others [(2010) 12 SCC  12]  and  contended
that the Court fee need be paid only on the plaint averments.

6.    Shri M. R. Shamshad, learned counsel appearing for the respondent,  on
the other hand, contended that the  High  Court  has  come  to  the  correct
conclusion that even though no consequential reliefs was prayed  for,  still
as per the U.P. Amendment Act, plaintiff will have  to  pay  the  court  fee
under Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amendment Act.  Learned counsel  submitted
that the plaintiff had valued the suit without noticing the  fact  that  the
State of U.P. had amended the Court Fee Act by Act XIX of 1938 and in  terms
of Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amendment  Act,  the  court  fee  has  to  be
commuted according to the value of the subject  matter  and  an  ad  valorem
court fee has to be paid.  Learned counsel also submitted that the  judgment
of this Court in Suhrid Singh (supra) is not applicable to the facts of  the
present case and this Court had no occasion to consider  the  scope  of  the
U.P. State amendment in that judgment.

7.    We may, for proper appreciation of the various contentions  raised  by
the parties, refer to the provisions of the Court Fees Act as well as  Court
Fees Act as amended by the U.P. Amendment Act, which  will  give  a  correct
picture of the changes made by the U.P. Amendment  Act  on  the  Court  Fees
Act.  An operative chart of the Court Fees Act and the  U.P.  Amendment  Act
is given below:

|Court Fees Act                |As per UP Amendment Act (19  |
|                              |of 1938)                     |
|“7. Computation of fees       |“7. Computation of fees      |
|payable in certain suits:     |payable in certain suits for |
|The amount of fee payable     |money:                       |
|under this Act in the suits   |The amount of fee payable    |
|next hereinafter mentioned    |under this Act in the suits  |
|shall be computed as follows: |next hereinafter mentioned   |
|....................          |shall be computed as follows:|
|....................          |....................         |
|                              |....................         |
|(iv) In Suits –               |                             |
|....................          |For declaratory decree with  |
|....................          |consequential relief – (iv)  |
|For declaratory decree and    |in Suits-                    |
|consequent relief-            |to obtain a declaratory      |
|.........(a) .....            |decree or order, where       |
|.........(b)......            |consequential relief other   |
|For a declaratory decree and  |than relief specified in     |
|consequential relief (c) to   |sub-section (iv-A) is prayed;|
|obtain a declaratory decree or|                             |
|order, where consequential    |For cancellation or adjudging|
|relief is prayed,             |void instruments and decrees |
|.................             |– (iv-A) in suit for or      |
|.................             |involving cancellation of or |
|According to the amount at    |adjudging void or voidable a |
|which the relief sought is    |decree for money or other    |
|valued in the plaint or       |property having a market     |
|memorandum of appeal.         |value, or an instrument      |
|                              |securing money or other      |
|                              |property having such value:  |
|                              |                             |
|                              |Where the plaintiff or his   |
|                              |predecessor-in-title was a   |
|                              |party to the decree or the   |
|                              |instrument, according to the |
|                              |value of the subject matter, |
|                              |and                          |
|                              |Where he or his              |
|                              |predecessor-in-title was not |
|                              |party to the decree or       |
|                              |instrument, according to     |
|                              |one-fifth of the value of the|
|                              |subject-matter, and such     |
|                              |value shall be deemed to be- |
|                              |If the whole decree or       |
|                              |instrument is involved in the|
|                              |suit, the amount for which or|
|                              |value of the property in     |
|                              |respect of which the decree  |
|                              |was passed or the instrument |
|                              |executed, and if only a part |
|                              |of the decree or instrument  |
|                              |is involved in the suit, the |
|                              |amount or value of the       |
|                              |property to which such part  |
|                              |relates.                     |
|                              |                             |
|                              |Explanation – ‘the value of  |
|                              |the property’ for the        |
|                              |purposes of this sub section,|
|                              |shall be the market-value,   |
|                              |which in the case of         |
|                              |immovable property shall be  |
|                              |deemed to be the value as    |
|                              |computed in accordance with  |
|                              |sub-section (v), (v-A) or    |
|                              |(v-B), as the case may be.”  |
|                              |                             |
|                              |                             |
|                              |-------------------------    |
|                              |“Schedule II                 |
|                              |Article 17    Plaint or      |
|                              |memorandum of appeal in each |
|                              |of the following suits:      |
|                              |..................           |
|                              |..................           |
|                              |(iii) To obtain a declaratory|
|                              |decree where no consequential|
|----------------------        |relief is prayed in any suit,|
|“Schedule II                  |not otherwise provided for by|
|Article 17    Plaint or       |this act;                    |
|memorandum of appeal in each  |                             |
|of the following suits:       |                             |
|..................            |                             |
|..................            |                             |
|(iii) To obtain a declaratory |                             |
|decree where no consequential |                             |
|relief is prayed.             |                             |




8.    We may also indicate that the Suits Valuation Act, 1887  in  terms  of
which the suits have to be valued for the purpose  of  Court  Fees  Act  has
also been amended vide U.P.  Act  7  of  1939  (w.e.f.  16.7.1939)  and  the
difference in both the Acts are given below:

|Suits Valuation Act,        |Suits Valuation Act, 1887  |
|1887(Central Act)           |[Amended provision in the  |
|                            |State of U.P.]             |
|4. Valuation of relief in   |4. Valuation of certain    |
|certain suits relating to   |suits for the purposes of  |
|land not to exceed the value|jurisdiction – Suits       |
|of the land-                |mentioned in paragraphs IV |
|Where a suit mentioned in   |(a), IVA, IVB, V, VA, VB,  |
|the Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 |VI, VIA; VIII and X(d) of  |
|of 1870), Section 7,        |Section 7 and Articles 17, |
|paragraph IV, or Schedule   |18 and 19 of the Schedule  |
|II, Article 17, relates to  |II of the Court-Fees Act,  |
|land or an interest in land |1870, as in force for the  |
|of which the value has been |time being in the Uttar    |
|determined by rules under   |Pradesh, shall be valued   |
|the last foregoing section, |for the purposes of        |
|the amount at which for     |jurisdiction at the market |
|purposes of jurisdiction the|value of the property      |
|relief sought in the suit is|involved in or affected by |
|value shall not exceed the  |or the title to which is   |
|value of the land or        |affected by the reliefs    |
|interest as determined by   |sought, and such value     |
|those rules.                |shall, in the case of land,|
|                            |be deemed to be the value  |
|                            |as detgerminable in        |
|                            |accordance with the rules  |
|                            |framed under Section 3”.   |
|                            |[Vide U.P. Act 7 of 1939.  |
|                            |Section 3 (w.e.f.          |
|                            |16.07.1939].               |


9.    On comparing the above mentioned provisions, it is clear that  Article
17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act is applicable  in  cases  where
the  plaintiff  seeks  to  obtain   a   declaratory   decree   without   any
consequential relief and there is no  other  provision  under  the  Act  for
payment of fee relating to relief claimed.  Article 17(iii) of  Schedule  II
of the Court Fees Act makes it clear that  this  article  is  applicable  in
cases  where  plaintiff  seeks  to  obtain  a  declaratory  decree   without
consequential reliefs and there is no other  provision  under  the  Act  for
payment of fee relating to relief claimed.  If there is no  other  provision
under the Court Fees Act  in  case  of  a  suit  involving  cancellation  or
adjudging/declaring void or voidable a will or sale deed on the question  of
payment of court  fees,  then  Article  17(iii)  of  Schedule  II  shall  be
applicable.  But if such relief is covered by any other  provisions  of  the
Court Fees Act, then Article 17(iii) of Schedule II will not be  applicable.
On a comparison between the Court Fees Act and the U.P.  Amendment  Act,  it
is clear that Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amendment Act covers suits for  or
involving cancellation or  adjudging/declaring  null  and  void  decree  for
money or an instrument securing money or other property having  such  value.
 The suit, in this case, was filed after the  death  of  the  testator  and,
therefore, the suit property covered by the will  has  also  to  be  valued.
Since Section 7(iv-A) of the U.P. Amendment Act specifically  provides  that
payment  of  court  fee  in  case  where  the  suit  is  for  or   involving
cancellation or adjudging/declaring null and void decree  for  money  or  an
instrument, Article 17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act  would  not
apply.  The U.P. Amendment Act, therefore,  is  applicable  in  the  present
case, despite the fact  that  no  consequential  relief  has  been  claimed.
Consequently, in terms of Section 7(iv-A) of the  U.P.  Amendment  Act,  the
court fees have to be commuted according to the value of the subject  matter
and the trial Court as well as the High Court have correctly held so.

10.   We are of the view that the decision of this  Court  in  Suhrid  Singh
(supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case.  First  of  all,
this Court had no occasion to examine the scope of the U.P.  Amendment  Act.
That was a case in which this Court was dealing with Section  7(iv)(c),  (v)
and Schedule II Article 17(iii), as amended in the  State  of  Punjab.   The
position that we get in the State of Punjab is entirely different  from  the
State of U.P. and the effect of the U.P. Amendment  Act  was  not  an  issue
which arose for consideration in that case.  Consequently, in our view,  the
said judgment would not apply to the present case.

11.   Plaintiff, in the instant case, valued the suit  at  Rs.30  Lakhs  for
the purpose of pecuniary jurisdiction.   However, for the purpose  of  court
fee, the plaintiff paid a fixed court fee of Rs.200/- under Article  17(iii)
of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act.  Plaintiff had not  noticed  the  fact
that the above mentioned article stood amended by the State, by  adding  the
words “not otherwise provided by this Act”.  Since Section  7(iv-A)  of  the
U.P. Amended Act specifically provides for payment  of  court  fee  in  case
where the suit is for or involving cancellation or adjudging/declaring  void
or voidable an instrument securing  property  having  money  value,  Article
17(iii) of Schedule II of the Court Fees Act shall not be applicable.

12.   For the reasons abovementioned, the appeal lacks  in  merits  and  the
same is dismissed, with no order as to costs.






                                                       ………………………….........J.
                                        (K.S. Radhakrishnan)




                                                             …………………………………J.
                                         (Dipak Misra)
New Delhi,
November 21, 2012

whether the recitals in exhibit A1 concerning item No.1 of schedule No. 8 therein (item No. 1 of the plaint schedule) discloses a testamentary disposition or a settlement creating vested rights in favour of the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 though possession and enjoyment stood deferred until the death of the executants.. We, therefore, find that the right, title, interest, possession and ownership of item No.1 of 8th Schedule of Ex.A1 were with the executants and they had the full control and freedom to deal with that property as they liked unlike Schedule Nos. 1 to 6. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that so far as that item is concerned, the document in question cannot be construed as a settlement or a gift because there is no provision in the document transferring any interest in immovable property in praesenti in favour of settlees i.e. their sons. 31. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court, confirmed by the High Court, is, therefore, set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court is restored. The appeal is allowed as above and there will be no order as to costs.

                                                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8197  OF 2012
                [Arising out of SLP (Civil) NO.13385 OF 2009]



Mathai Samuel & Ors.                               .. Appellant(s)
                                   Versus
Eapen Eapen (dead) by Lrs. & Ors.                   .. Respondent(s)


                               J U D G M E N T


K. S. Radhakrishnan, J.



1.    Leave granted.

2.    We are, in this appeal, called upon to determine the question  whether
the recitals in exhibit A1 concerning item No.1 of schedule  No.  8  therein
(item No. 1 of the plaint schedule) discloses a testamentary disposition  or
a settlement  creating  vested  rights  in  favour  of  the  plaintiffs  and
defendant Nos. 1 to 3 though possession and enjoyment stood  deferred  until
the death of the executants.

3.    O.S. No. 169 of 1990 was instituted before the  court  of  Subordinate
Judge, Thiruvalla by the original plaintiffs and  one  Eapen  for  partition
and separate possession of various items of properties, of which, we are  in
this appeal concerned only with item No. 1  of  the  plaint  schedule.   The
trial court passed a preliminary decree giving various  directions,  however
with regard to the above mentioned item which relates to 3  acre  40  cents,
it was held that exhibit  A1  document  did  not  preclude  the  executants’
rights for disposing the same during  their  lifetime.    Consequently,  the
trial court held that so far as item No.1 in schedule No. 8  of  exhibit  A1
is  concerned,  the  same  has  the  characteristics   of   a   testamentary
disposition, therefore not available for partition.  The court held that  B3
sale deed executed in favour of 3rd defendant in the year  1964  by  Sosamma
Eapen was valid so also B1 sale deed executed in the year 1978  by  the  3rd
defendant in favour of 4th defendant.

4.    The plaintiffs took up the matter in appeal as A.S.  No.  62  of  1991
before the court of District Judge, Pathanamthitta, which was  allowed  vide
judgment dated 26.03.1994 and the decree and judgment  of  the  trial  court
was modified and a preliminary decree  was  passed  allowing  partition  and
possession of 3/6th share of various items including sub-item 1 of  schedule
No. 8 of exhibit A1 document.  The Appellate Court took the  view  that  the
above item was settled by exhibit A1 in favour of  the  original  plaintiffs
and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 jointly though its possession and  enjoyment  were
deferred till the death of the  executants.   It  was  also  held  that  the
assignment deed, executed  by  one  of  the  executants  and  later  by  3rd
defendant, was not binding on the plaintiffs.

5.    Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 then filed Second Appeal  No.  686/1994  before
the High  Court.   The  High  Court  affirmed  the  judgment  of  the  lower
appellate court vide  judgment  dated  12.03.2009.   While  the  appeal  was
pending before the High Court, the 3rd defendant died and  his  legal  heirs
got themselves impleaded.  The High Court took  the  view  that  disposition
with regard to the above mentioned item was not  ambulatory  in  quality  or
revocable in character during the lifetime of the executants and  held  that
the disposition of the plaint item No. 1 is a settlement  though  possession
and enjoyment were deferred.  It was held that the executants had  no  right
of disposal of that item and hence the transfer in favour of defendant  No.3
and the subsequent assignment in favour  of  defendant  No.4  were  invalid.
Aggrieved by the same, these appeals have been preferred.

6.    Shri T. L. Viswanatha Iyer, learned senior counsel appearing  for  the
appellants submitted that exhibit A1 does  not  postulate  any  transfer  of
ownership or title over 8th schedule by the  executants  to  their  sons  so
also schedule Nos. 7 and 9.  Learned senior counsel submitted that items  in
schedule Nos.  7,  8  and  9  were  under  their  absolute  control  of  the
executants and they had the full freedom  to  deal  with  those  properties.
Learned senior counsel referring to  the  various  recitals  in  exhibit  A1
agreement submitted so far as schedule  Nos.  1  to  6  are  concerned,  the
transfer of interest was absolute in character and settled on all  the  sons
equally and rest of the three items of  the  schedule,  the  executants  had
retained those items to themselves and to that extent  exhibit  A1  operated
only as a Will.  Learned senior counsel pointed out that so far as  schedule
Nos. 7 and 9 are concerned, the courts found that they are  testamentary  in
character and the same reasoning should have been applied  in  the  case  of
items  in  schedule  No.  8  as  well.   Learned  senior  counsel  has  laid
considerable emphasis on the  Malayalam  words  ‘adheenadha’  (control)  and
‘swathanthryam’ (liberty/freedom).  Learned senior counsel  submitted  those
words clearly indicate that the intention was  to  keep  items  in  schedule
Nos. 7 and 9 to the executants in their control with  full  freedom  subject
to certain stipulations.  Learned  senior  counsel  also  pointed  out  that
exhibit A1 clearly indicates that items in schedule No. 8 would  devolve  on
his sons only after the executants’ lifetime, if available.  Learned  senior
counsel  submitted  that  in  the   absence   of   any   words/recitals   of
disposition/transfer of items in schedule  No.8  in  exhibit  A1  conferring
title in praesenti on the sons, the High Court was not justified in  holding
that exhibit A1 was not a Will in respect of that item.



7.    Shri Aljo K. Joseph, learned counsel appearing for the respondents  on
the other hand contended that  the  recital  in  the  document  relating  to
schedule No.8 is in the nature of a settlement bestowing  vested  rights  in
equal shares to all the children of late Shri Eapen and late  Smt.  Sosamma.
Learned counsel submitted that the specific language of the recital  in  the
agreement relating to schedule No.8 itself  clearly  indicates  that  rights
are created in praesenti and at the most  the  enjoyment  thereof  was  only
postponed.  Learned counsel submitted that while reading the agreement as  a
whole, the inevitable conclusion is that the document, particularly  recital
relating to schedule No.8, is in  the  nature  of  a  settlement  conferring
vested rights on the sons of executants equally.  Learned counsel  submitted
that the High Court was, therefore, justified in  holding  so,  which  calls
for no interference by this Court in  this  appeal.   Learned  counsel  also
made reference to the judgments of this Court in P. K. Mohans Ram v.  B.  N.
Ananthachary and Others (2010) 4 SCC 161 and Rajes Kanta Roy v. Shanti  Debi
and Another AIR 1957 SC 255.



8.    We are, in this case, concerned only with  the  question  whether  the
recitals in Exhibit A1 document concerning the disposition of  schedule  No.
8 disclosed a testamentary disposition or is a settlement of  that  item  in
favour of the original plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 1 to  3  deferring  its
possession and enjoyment until the death of the executants.



9.    Exhibit A1 is written in Malayalam language, the  English  version  of
that document is given below:

      “Agreement dated 2nd day of Thulam 1125 M.E. – Ext A1




      The agreement executed on this the 2nd day of Thulam one thousand  one
      hundred and twenty five by (1) Eapen s/o Chandapilla  aged  58  years,
      house hold affairs  of  Perumbral,  Vennikkulam  Muri  of  Kallooppara
      Pakuthi and wife  (2)  Sossamma  of  Perumbral,  Vennikkulam  Muri  of
      Kallooppara Pakuthi Christian woman, house  wife  aged  54  years,  in
      favour of (1) Cheriyan, Agriculturist aged 35 years  (2)  Chandapilla,
      Bank Job aged 30 years (3) Eapen,  Agriculturist  aged  28  years  (4)
      Geevargheese, Agriculturist aged 25 years, (5)  Chacko,  Agriculturist
      aged 22 years and (6) Mathai aged 18 years student.

      We have only the six of you as our sons and  Kunjamma,  Mariyamma  and
      Thankamma as our daughters, Kunjamma and Mariyamma have  been  married
      off as per Christian custom and had been sent to the husbands  houses.
      Accordingly, they have become members and  legal  heirs  of  the  said
      husband’s family and are residing  there.   Thankamma  remains  to  be
      married off.  No.2 and 3 among you are married and the  dowry  amounts
      received thereby have been used for the needs of the family.

      The properties described in the schedules have been  obtained  as  per
      partition deed No. 1933 of  1069  ME  of  the  Sub  Registrar  Office,
      Thiruvalla and under other documents.  They are  held,  possessed  and
      enjoyed by us jointly, with absolute  rights  (word  in  Malayalam  is
      “Swathanthryam”) and dealing with the same with all rights and  paying
      all taxes and duties thereon.  There are some amounts to be  paid  off
      by us by way of debt, incurred for conducting the family affairs.

      This agreement is executed in as much as  all  of  you  have  attained
      majority and since we are becoming old, it was felt that it will be to
      the benefit of all and to avoid future family  disputes  and  for  the
      purpose of discharging the debt, to execute this agreement  to  divide
      the properties separately subject to the conditions  specified  below.
      The parties are to act accordingly.

      The  properties  have  been  divided  into  schedule  No.  1-9.    The
      properties described as schedules 1, 2, 3,  4,  5,  6  are  absolutely
      settled respectively on numbers 1 to  6  among  you.   Schedule  7  is
      required for the marriage and dowry purposes of Thankamma, schedule  8
      for the purpose of discharging the debt due  to  Land  Mortgage  Bank.
      Schedule 9 for the purpose of meeting our  needs  of  maintenance  and
      they are retained by us in our full control (adheenadha)  and  freedom
      (swathanthryam).  You shall separately possess and enjoy item 1  to  6
      subject to the conditions specified in this  agreement,  paying  taxes
      and discharging your duties acting as per  our  desires.   Since  item
      No.2 in schedule No. 2 property and item  no.  5  in  Schedule  No.  3
      property have been added additionally in consideration of dowry amount
      received from the marriage of party  Nos.  2  and  3  among  you,  the
      responsibility for the dowry amount of the wife of the 2nd  party  has
      to be borne by the 2nd party, and the  responsibility  for  the  dowry
      amount of the wife of 3rd party is to be borne by the 3rd party  among
      you and if any default occurs on their part, the respective party  and
      the respective partitioned properties shall be liable.  The right  and
      responsibility of the dowry amount that parties Nos. 1,  4,  5  and  6
      might receive when they get married  shall  lie  on  them  only.   The
      marriage of the said Thankamma  shall  be  conducted  by  us,  in  our
      responsibility, during our life time, by creating for the purpose  any
      kind of transactions as we desire on the property in schedule  7.   If
      the said Thankamma is not  married  off  during  our  life  time,  the
      property in schedule 7 shall, after our life time,  belong  absolutely
      (word used in Malayalam is “Swathanthryam”) on Thankamma with complete
      possession, title and right, and Thankamma shall pay taxes, redeem the
      mortgage and  enjoy  the  property.   We  are  keeping  possession  of
      schedule No.8 utilizing the income  derived  by  us  directly,  or  by
      leasing out, to discharge the amounts due to the Bank without  default
      and after the clearance of  the  debt,  the  income  from  schedule  8
      property shall be utilized for our maintenance.  After our life  time,
      No. 2 in schedule 8 will below separately and absolutely (word used in
      Malayalam is “Swathanthryam”) to the 3rd among you and No.1 and 3 will
      belong  to  all  of  you  absolutely  (word  used  in   Malayalam   is
      “Swathanthryam”) in equal shares and  accordingly  you  may  hold  and
      enjoy the  properties  paying  the  taxes  thereon.   Schedule  No.  9
      property shall be possessed by us  and  income  there  from  be  taken
      directly or by leasing out and if need be, by executing such documents
      as we desire on schedule No.9 property and matters  carried  out,  and
      after our life time if the property is left, you all take it in  equal
      shares.  We  will  have  the  absolute  (word  used  in  Malayalam  is
      “Swathanthryam”) right of residence in the house situated in  schedule
      No.6 during our life time.

      If any transaction or debt  is  to  be  generated  on  the  properties
      apportioned to each of you, the same has to be done  jointly  with  us
      also, and  if  anybody  acts  contrary  to  the  aforesaid,  the  said
      transaction or debt shall not be binding on those properties,  and  we
      shall have the right and authority to act on those properties allotted
      to the person causing such  transaction.   If  any  one  of  you  dies
      issueless, if it is during our  lifetime,  that  apportioned  property
      shall be in our absolute possession with all  title  and  freedom  and
      such property shall vest in you equally if the death is after our life
      time, and if any widow  is  alive;  she  shall  have  right  only  for
      maintenance from the profits of the property,  and  if  the  widow  is
      remarried or if the dowry is received back by her, she shall  have  no
      right for any maintenance.

      Schedule and description omitted except Schedule No.8.

      Schedule No.8

      (1)   In the said Kavumgumprayar Mury, West of Valiyaparambu property,
      East  of  Memalpadinjattumkara  property  and  canal  and   South   of
      Memalapadi farm land and Chelakkal Canal, do type 1 acre and  64  cent
      in survey No. 689/1A do ‘B’ 1 acre and 50 cents and 26 cents in survey
      No. 689/2 totalling 3 acres and 40 cents of farm land.

      (2)   In the said Muttathukavanal farm land, that is described in  the
      3rd schedule, excluding those added  in  the  said  schedule  one  the
      southern side, 87 cents of farm land.

      (3)   In the Lakkandam Kaithapadavu land, that is described in the 4th
      schedule, half in the south part, measuring 47 cents of farm land.

                                                                        Sd/-

                                                                 Executants”




10.   Exhibit A1 document is composite in character having special  features
of a testamentary disposition and a  settlement  in  respect  of  items  and
properties  covered  in  the  Schedules.   Before  examining  those  special
features and characteristics, let us  examine  the  legal  principles  which
apply while interpreting such a composite document.

Settlement and Testamentary Disposition

11.   We have already indicated  that  exhibit  A1  document  has  both  the
characteristics of a settlement and  a  testamentary  disposition.   Let  us
examine  the  basic  and  fundamental  difference  between  a   testamentary
disposition and a settlement.  Will is an  instrument  whereunder  a  person
makes a disposition of his properties to take effect  after  his  death  and
which is in its own nature ambulatory and  revocable  during  his  lifetime.
It has three essentials:

     1) It must be a legal declaration of the testator’s intention;

     2) That declaration must be with respect to his property; and

     3) The desire of the testator that  the  said  declaration  should  be
        effectuated after his death.

12.   The essential quality of a testamentary disposition is  ambulatoriness
of revocability  during  the  executants’  lifetime.   Such  a  document  is
dependent upon executants’ death for its vigour and effect.



13.   Section 2(h) of the Indian Succession Act says “Will” means the  legal
declaration of the intention of a testator  with  respect  to  his  property
which he desires to be carried  into  effect  after  his  death”.    In  the
instant case, the executants were Indian Christians, the rules  of  law  and
the principles of construction  laid  down  in  the  Indian  Succession  Act
govern the interpretation of Will.  In the interpretation of Will in  India,
regard must be had to the rules of law and construction  contained  in  Part
VI of the Indian Succession Act and not the rules of the  Interpretation  of
Statutes.



14.   Gift/settlement is the transfer of existing property made  voluntarily
and without consideration by one person called the donor to  another  called
the donee and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.  Gift takes  effect  by
a registered instrument signed by or on behalf of the donor and attested  by
at least two witnesses.   Section  122  of  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act
defines the “gift” as a voluntary transfer of property in  consideration  of
the natural love and affection to a living person.



15.   We may point out that in the case of a Will, the crucial  circumstance
is the existence of a provision disposing of or  distributing  the  property
of the testator to take effect on his death.  On the other hand, in case  of
a gift, the provision  becomes  operative  immediately  and  a  transfer  in
praesenti is  intended  and  comes  into  effect.   A  Will  is,  therefore,
revocable because no interest is intended to pass  during  the  lifetime  of
the owner of the property.  In the case of gift,  it  comes  into  operation
immediately.  The nomenclature given by the parties to  the  transaction  in
question, as we have already indicated, is not decisive.  A  Will  need  not
be necessarily registered.  The mere registration of ‘Will’ will not  render
the document a settlement.  In other words, the real and the  only  reliable
test for the purpose of finding out whether the document constitutes a  Will
or a gift is to find out as to what exactly is  the  disposition  which  the
document has made, whether it has transferred any interest in  praesenti  in
favour of the settlees or it intended to transfer interest in favour of  the
settlees only on the death of the settlors.

Composite Document:

16.   A composite document is severable and in  part  clearly  testamentary,
such part may  take  effect  as  a  Will  and  other  part  if  it  has  the
characteristics of a settlement and that part will take effect in that  way.
 A document which operates to dispose of properly in  praesenti  in  respect
of few items of the properties is a settlement and in future in  respect  of
few other items after the deeds of the  executants,  it  is  a  testamentary
disposition.  That one part of the document has effect during the life  time
of the executant i.e. the gift and the other  part  disposing  the  property
after the death of the executant is a Will.  Reference may be made  in  this
connection to the judgment of  this  Court  in  Rev.  Fr.  M.S.  Poulose  v.
Varghese and Others.  (1995) Supp 2 SCC 294.



17.   In a composite document, which has the characteristics of  a  Will  as
well as a gift, it  may  be  necessary  to  have  that  document  registered
otherwise that part of the document which has the effect of  a  gift  cannot
be given effect to.  Therefore, it is not unusual to  register  a  composite
document which has the  characteristics  of  a  gift  as  well  as  a  Will.
Consequently, the mere registration of document cannot have any  determining
effect in arriving at a conclusion that it is  not  a  Will.   The  document
which may serve as evidence of the gift, falls within the sweep  of  Section
17 of  the  Registration  Act.   Where  an  instrument  evidences  creation,
declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any present  or  future
right, title or interest in  immovable  property  or  where  any  instrument
acknowledges  the  receipt  of  payment  of  consideration  on  account   of
creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of  such  right,
title or interest, in those cases alone the instrument or receipt  would  be
compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1) (b) or (c) of the  Registration
Act.  A ‘Will’  need  not  necessarily  be  registered.   But  the  fact  of
registration of  a  ‘Will’  will  not  render  the  document  a  settlement.
Exhibit A1  was  registered  because  of  the  composite  character  of  the
document.

Intention – Guiding Factor:

18.   The primary rule of construction of a document  is  the  intention  of
the executants, which must be found in the words used in the document.   The
question is not what may be supposed to have been  intended,  but  what  has
been  said.   We  need  to  carry  on  the  exercise  of   construction   or
interpretation of the document only if the document  is  ambiguous,  or  its
meaning is uncertain.  If the language used in the document  is  unambiguous
and the  meaning  is  clear,  evidently,  that  is  what  is  meant  by  the
executants  of  the  document.   Contemporary   events   and   circumstances
surrounding  the  execution  of  the  document  are  not  relevant  in  such
situations.



19.   Lord Hale in King v. Meling (1 Vent.  At  p.  231),  in  construing  a
testamentary disposition as well as  a  settlement,  pointed  out  that  the
prime governing principle is the “law of instrument” i.e. the  intention  of
the testator is “the law of the instrument”.  Lord Wilmot, C.J. in Doe  Long
v. Laming (2 Burr. At pp. 11-12) described the intention of the testator  as
the “pole star” and is also described as the “nectar of the instrument.   In
Re Stone, Baker v. Stone [(1895) 2 Ch. 196 at p. 200]   the  Master  of  the
Rolls said as follows: “When I see  an  intention  clearly  expressed  in  a
Will, and find no rule of law opposed to giving effect to  it,  I  disregard
previous cases.”  Coleridge, J. in Shore v. Wilson [9 Cl. & F.  355,  at  p.
525] held as follows:

          “The intention to be sought is the intention which is expressed in
          the  instrument,  not  the  intention  which  the  maker  of   the
          instrument may have had in his mind.  It  is  unquestionable  that
          the object of all expositions of written instruments  must  be  to
          ascertain the expressed meaning or intention of  the  writer;  the
          expressed meaning being equivalent to the intention …  It  is  not
          allowable …. To adduce any evidence however strong,  to  prove  an
          unexpressed intention, varying from  that  which  the  words  used
          import.  This may be open, no doubt, to the remark  that  although
          we profess to be explaining the intention of the writer, we may be
          led in many cases to decide  contrary  to  what  can  scarcely  be
          doubted to have been the intention, rejecting evidence  which  may
          be more satisfactory in the particular instance to prove it.   The
          answer is, that the interpreters have to  deal  with  the  written
          expression of the writer’s intention, and courts of law  to  carry
          into effect what he has written, not what it may be  surmised,  on
          however probable grounds, that he intended only to have written.”




20.   In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol.50, p.239, it is stated:

          “408. Leading principle of construction.- The  only  principle  of
          construction which is  applicable  without  qualification  to  all
          wills and overrides every other rule of construction, is that  the
          testator’s intention is collected  from  a  consideration  of  the
          whole  will  taken  in  connection  with  any  evidence   properly
          admissible, and the meaning of the will and of every part of it is
          determined according to that intention.”




21.   Underhill and Strahan  in  Interpretation  of  Wills  and  Settlements
(1900 Edn.), while construing a will held that “the intention to  be  sought
is the intention which is expressed in  the  instrument  not  the  intention
which the maker of  the  instrument  may  have  had  in  his  mind.   It  is
unquestionable that the object of all  expositions  of  written  instruments
must be to ascertain the expressed meaning or intention of the  writer;  the
expressed meaning being equivalent to the intention……….”



22.    Theobald  on  Wills  (17th  Edn.  2010)  examined   at   length   the
characteristics of testamentary instruments.  Chapter 15 of that book  deals
with the General Principles of Construction.  Referring to Lindley  L.J.  in
Musther, Re (1889) 43 Ch.D. 569 at p.572, the author stated that  the  first
rule of will construction is that every will is  different  and  that  prior
cases are of little assistance.  Referring to  Sammut  v.  Manzxi  [2009]  1
W.T.L.R. 1834, the author notices that the Privy Council  had  approved  the
approach of considering wording of the will first without initial  reference
to authority, and commented that “little assistance in construing a will  is
likely to be gained by consideration of how other  judges  have  interpreted
similar wording in other cases.

Golden Rule

23.   We, therefore, have to examine the composite character of  exhibit  A1
document and interpret the same in accordance with the  normal  and  natural
meaning which is discernible from that document.  In order to ascertain  the
intention of the testator, the point  for  consideration  is  not  what  the
testator meant but what that which he has written means.  It is  often  said
that the expressed intentions are assumed to  be  actual  intentions.   This
Court in A. Sreenivasa Pai and Anr. v.  Saraswathi  Ammal  alias  G.  Kamala
Bai   (1985) 4 SCC 85  held  that  in  construing  a  document,  whether  in
English or in any Indian language, the fundamental rule to be adopted is  to
ascertain the intention adopted from the words employed  in  it.   Reference
may also be made to the judgment of the Privy  Council  in  Rajendra  Prasad
Bose and Anr. v. Gopal Prasad Sen   AIR 1930 PC 242 and C. Cheriathan v.  P.
Narayanan Embranthiri and Ors.   (2009) 2 SCC 673.

Exhibit A1 - Meaning and Effect

24.   We may now examine the meaning and  effect  of  exhibit  A1  document.
Some of  the  expressions  used  in  exhibit  A1  need  emphasis  which  are
“absolutely settled”, “our lifetime”, “separately and  absolutely”  and  the
Malyalam     words     “adheenadha     (control)”     and     “swathanthryam
(liberty/freedom)”.  The words which are used  in  a  document  have  to  be
understood in its normal and natural meaning with reference to the  language
employed.  The words and phrases used in a document are to  be  given  their
ordinary meaning.  When the document is made, the ordinary  meaning  has  to
be given to the document, which  is  relevant.   Executants  have  used  the
Malyalam words ‘adheendha’ and ‘swathanthryam’ which must  be  referable  to
the ordinary usage of Malayalam language at the time when the  document  was
executed.  Words of usage, in Malyalam language, therefore  be  given  their
usual, ordinary and  natural  meaning  or  signification  according  to  the
approved usage because primarily the language employed is the  determinative
factor of legislative intention.  Consequently, the word ‘adheenadha’  means
control, domination, command, manage etc.   ‘Swathanthryam’  means  liberty,
freedom,  independence  etc.   Those  words  emphasize  the  fact  that  the
executants had retained the entire rights over the property in question  and
not parted with.



25.   We have indicated that exhibit A1 document is  divided  into  schedule
Nos. 1 to 9.  Properties described in schedule Nos. 1 to 6 as per the  terms
of the  document  stood  absolutely  vested  in  praesenti  and  undoubtedly
settled in favour of the executants sons.  Evidently, therefore,  that  part
of the document has the  characteristics  of  a  settlement.   Rest  of  the
schedule   Nos.   7,   8   and   9   have   different   characteristics   in
contradistinction with schedule Nos. 1 to 6.    Schedule No.  7  of  exhibit
A1 document clearly indicates that the same is  required  for  the  marriage
and dowry purposes of the daughter of the  executants,  by  name  Thankamma.
The document clearly indicates that the marriage of their daughter would  be
conducted by the executants since it is their responsibility.   Further,  it
is also stipulated that if the daughter does not get  married  during  their
lifetime, the property in schedule No. 7 shall after their  lifetime  belong
absolutely to their daughter.



26.   So far as schedule No. 9 is concerned, the same would be  retained  by
the   executants   in   their   full   control   (adheendha)   and   freedom
(swathanthryam).  In other words, schedule No. 9 shall be possessed  by  the
executants and the income therefrom be taken directly  by  leasing  out,  if
need be, by executing such  documents  as  desired.   Further,  it  is  also
stated with regard to schedule No.  9  that  after  “our  lifetime”  if  the
property is left, “you all” (all the sons) may take it in equal shares.



27.   We are now to examine the crucial issue i.e. with regard  to  sub-item
1 of schedule No. 8 in exhibit A1.  With regard to that item,  it  has  been
stated in the document that the executants are keeping possession and  would
utilize the income derived from them  directly  or  by  leasing  it  out  to
discharge the amounts due to the bank and after its  clearance,  the  income
from schedule No. 8 would be utilized for “our  maintenance”.   Further,  it
is also stated that after “our lifetime”, item No. 2 in schedule No. 8  will
belong absolutely to third party and item Nos. 1 and 3 would belong  to  you
“absolutely” and “separately” in equal shares and accordingly they may  hold
and enjoy the properties by paying tax thereof.  No  rights,  in  praesenti,
were created, on the other hand all the  rights  including  possession  were
retained by the executants.   In  other  words,  so  far  as  item  No.1  in
schedule No. 8 of exhibit A1  is  concerned,  the  executants  had  retained
possession,  full  control  as  well  as  freedom  to  deal  with  it.   The
contention of the respondent that the  executants  had  consciously  omitted
the power of alienation with regard to Schedule No.8, unlike Schedule  No.7,
is not correct: The question is not whether the executants had retained  any
right  but  whether  the  executants  had  conferred  any   right   on   the
beneficiaries.   Right,  title,  interest,  ownership  and  the   power   of
alienation of the executants  were  never  in  doubt  and  they  had  always
retained those rights, the point in dispute  was  whether  the  property  in
question had been settled on the sons absolutely  during  their  life  time;
barring possession and enjoyment. In our view, no  right,  title,  interest,
or ownership had been conferred when the document  was  executed  or  during
the life time of the executants to their sons in respect  of  item  No.1  of
Schedule 8 of exhibit A1.   We have noticed that there is marked  difference
in the language used in respect of properties covered by Schedule Nos. 1  to
6 and rest of  the  Schedules.   Admittedly,  Schedule  Nos.  7  and  9  are
testamentary in character and in our view, Schedule 8 also, when we  examine
the meaning ascribed to the various words used and  the  language  employed.
The judgments in K. Balakrishnan v. K. Kamalam and Ors.   (2004) 1 SCC  581,
Kale and Ors. v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and Ors.    (1976)  3  SCC
119 are, therefore, inapplicable to the facts of this case.

Subsequent events:

28.   Subsequent events or conduct of parties after  the  execution  of  the
document shall not be taken into consideration in  interpreting  a  document
especially when there is no ambiguity in the language of the document.   But
we may refer to those events also only to re-enforce the fact that there  is
no ambiguity in the language employed in the document.

29.    Subsequent  conduct  of  Eapen  and  Sosamma  has   no   bearing   in
understanding the scope of exhibit A1 document. The executants,  it  may  be
noted, had jointly executed a mortgage on 12.11.1955  (exhibit  B2)  to  one
Mathew in which they had affirmed their right to  execute  such  a  mortgage
and traced it to exhibit A1  document.   Further,  the  executants  had  not
parted with possession of item No.1 of 8th Schedule of exhibit A1  to  their
sons, at any point of time and retained ownership.  Exhibit B3 document  was
executed in favour of 3rd defendant on 18.07.1964  and  later  he  sold  the
property to 4th  defendant  on  23.01.1978  (exhibit  B1).   Now  from  1978
onwards, the 4th defendant, a stranger to the family, has been in  exclusive
possession and ownership of the property.    We  may  also  point  out  even
though Ext.B3 was executed  on  18.07.1964,  the  suit  was  filed  only  on
6.2.1978, that is, after more than thirteen years.  It will also  be  unjust
to deprive him of his ownership and possession at this distance of time.

30.   We, therefore, find that the right, title,  interest,  possession  and
ownership of item No.1 of 8th Schedule of Ex.A1  were  with  the  executants
and they had the full control and freedom to  deal  with  that  property  as
they liked unlike Schedule Nos. 1 to 6.  We have, therefore,  no  hesitation
in holding that so far as that item is concerned, the document  in  question
cannot be construed as a settlement or a gift because there is no  provision
in  the  document  transferring  any  interest  in  immovable  property   in
praesenti in favour of settlees i.e. their sons.

31.    The judgment and decree of the lower appellate  court,  confirmed  by
the High Court, is, therefore, set aside and the judgment and decree of  the
trial court is restored.  The appeal is allowed as above and there  will  be
no order as to costs.





                                        …………………………………..J.
                                        (K.S. Radhakrishnan)






                                        …………………………………..J.
                                        (Dipak Misra)
New Delhi,
November 21, 2012