REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 732 OF 2008
Ramachandran …..Appellant
Versus
State of Kerala ....Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Madan B. Lokur, J.
1. The question before us is whether the appellant murdered his wife
Remani or whether she committed suicide. We are in agreement with the view
taken by the Trial Judge and affirmed by the High Court that the case was
one of murder and not of suicide.
The facts:
2. The appellant and Remani had been married for about four years. They
had two children, the second child having been born just about three months
before the murder of Remani.
3. There was a history of matrimonial discord between the parties.
Remani believed that the appellant was having illicit relations with the
wife of his elder brother which seems to have been the cause of conflict.
At one stage Remani had even left the matrimonial home. However, on an
application having been filed by the appellant for restitution of conjugal
rights, the matter was settled between the parties and Remani went back to
the matrimonial home. Unfortunately, it appears that even thereafter,
matrimonial disputes took place between the parties.
4. According to the prosecution, on the intervening night of 10th and
11th March, 1998 at about 1.00 a.m. there was a quarrel between the
appellant and Remani. Subsequent to the quarrel, the appellant forcibly
administered to Remani a highly toxic carbonate compound called Furadan
which is a strong pesticide used for plantain cultivation and was kept in a
bottle in the house.
5. On being forcibly administered the poison, Remani ran out of her
house and fell down on the eastern side where it is alleged that the
appellant smothered her by closing her nose and mouth with his hands. The
poison and smothering of Remani resulted in her death.
6. Early morning, Remani’s parents were called and her father lodged a
First Information Report at about 12.30 p.m. in which he stated that the
appellant used to inflict physical torture on Remani and due to the
continuous harassment she consumed poison and committed suicide.
7. After investigations, the police filed a report in which it was
concluded that the appellant had murdered Remani. On committal, the
appellant denied the charge, pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.
8. The prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses and produced several
documents and material objects in support of its case including a bottle
containing Furadan.
Decision of the Trial Court:
9. The material witnesses for the prosecution before the Trial Court
were PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-7 and PW-10.
10. PW-1 Bhaskaran stated that Remani was his daughter and that her
husband used to beat her up everyday and scold her. Remani had told him
that the appellant was having illicit relations with the wife of his elder
brother. The witness was not specifically questioned about the FIR given by
him in which he had stated that Remani had committed suicide by consuming
poison. He, however, stated that he had informed the police that Remani was
administered poison by her husband, that is, the appellant.
11. PW-2 Thankamalu, mother of Remani, confirmed that there were frequent
and daily quarrels between the appellant and Remani. She stated that Remani
told her that the appellant would get drunk and beat her up. She also
stated that Remani told her that the appellant was having illicit relations
with the wife of his elder brother. According to this witness, Remani was
capable of doing some typing jobs and bringing up her children. As such,
there was no doubt that, if need be, Remani could look after herself and
would not commit suicide.
12. PW-3 Ragini is the sister of Remani. She also confirmed the frequent
if not daily physical abuse inflicted by the appellant on Remani.
13. PW-7 Hamza is a neighbour of the appellant and Remani. He too
confirmed the physical abuse that Remani was subjected to by the appellant.
14. PW-8 Kumhadi is the father of the appellant. He stated that on the
intervening night of 10th and 11th March, 1998 he and the appellant had
gone to the temple to watch a ‘Koothu’ program. They came back at about 5
or 5.30 a.m. in the morning and that is when they discovered the body of
Remani. This witness was declared hostile and cross-examined. The Trial
Court did not give much credence to the testimony of this witness and did
not accept the alibi.
15. The most important witness is PW-10 Dr. Rajaram. He is an Associate
Professor of Forensic Medicine, Medical College, Kozhikode and he conducted
the post mortem examination on the body of Remani. He stated that she had
as many as 22 abrasions and contusions on various parts of her body. He
stated, on the basis of the chemical examination report, that Remani died
due to the combined effect of smothering and carbofuran poisoning. He was
cross-examined and asked whether the abrasions on Remani’s body could have
been caused on her falling down on a hard surface and struggling for
existence. He replied that in view of the injuries on the back of her
body, the possibility was highly remote. He also stated that if her back
had come in contact with a hard object, her clothes would have had a tear.
He further stated that the nature of injuries including one on the back of
the elbow clearly suggested that Remani had offered some resistance.
16. On the above material, the Trial Court was of the opinion that even
though the case was one of circumstantial evidence, there was enough
material on record to show that it was only the appellant who had murdered
Remani by forcibly administering Furadan and then smothering her. It may
be mentioned that Furadan is a carbofuran and its ingestion can cause death
within 10 minutes.
17. The Trial Court was also of the view that the appellant had a motive
for murdering Remani in as much as they would have frequent quarrels on the
suspicion of Remani that the appellant had illicit relations with the wife
of his elder brother who was residing in the same house.
18. The Trial Court discounted the theory that the appellant and his
father had gone to the temple to witness ‘Koothu’. It was noted that there
was nothing to support such a statement. In this context, it was observed
by the Trial Court that Remani was in hospital from 08.03.1998 till
10.03.1998 due to some vomiting and illness and it was very unlikely that
immediately after her discharge from hospital on 10.03.1998 the appellant
would have left her alone in the house and gone to the temple where he
stayed overnight, if indeed he cared for her.
19. On the basis of the above facts, the Trial Court held the appellant
guilty of having committed the murder of Remani and sentenced him to
imprisonment for life.
Decision of the High Court:
20. Feeling aggrieved, by the conviction and sentence awarded by the
Trial Court, the appellant preferred Criminal Appeal No. 663 of 2003 which
was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala by Judgment
and Order dated 30.11.2004.
21. The High Court took into consideration the evidence of the witnesses,
the strained matrimonial relations between the appellant and Remani as also
the medical evidence for affirming the conviction and sentence.
22. The High Court noted that the unnatural death of Remani was not in
dispute. The principal question before the High Court was whether her death
was due to homicide or suicide. In this regard, the High Court placed great
emphasis on the unambiguous evidence of Dr. Rajaram to the effect that
Remani’s death was caused by smothering and administration of toxic Furadan
which was found in her mouth and pharynx. As testified by the doctor, the
various injuries on Remani, though minor, indicated that the administration
of Furadan was forcible and that she had resisted this.
23. In view of the fact that the appellant had a motive to murder Remani
and there was clear medical evidence suggesting smothering and poisoning of
Remani, the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence.
Discussion and conclusions:
24. In Sudama Pandey v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 679 this Court
considered the scope of interference in a criminal appeal with concurrent
findings of fact. It was observed as follows:
We are not unmindful of the fact that this Court under Article 136 of
the Constitution seldom interferes with the factual findings recorded
by two concurring Courts but if this Court is satisfied that the High
Court has committed a serious error of law and that there was
substantial miscarriage of justice, this Court could interfere with
the concurring findings of the High Court and that of the Trial Court.
This Court also does not normally enter into a reappraisal or review
of the evidence unless the assessment of the evidence by the High
Court is vitiated by an error of law or procedure or there was
misreading of evidence.”
25. Similarly in Dalbir Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 158 the
principles for interference were culled out and stated by S. Murtaza Fazal
Ali, J as follows:
“Thus the principles governing interference by this Court in a
criminal appeal by special leave may be summarised as follows:
(1) that this Court would not interfere with the concurrent finding of
fact based on pure appreciation of evidence even if it were to take a
different view on the evidence;
(2) that the Court will not normally enter into a reappraisement or
review of the evidence, unless the assessment of the High Court is
vitiated by an error of law or procedure or is based on error of
record, misreading of evidence or is inconsistent with the evidence,
for instance, where the ocular evidence is totally inconsistent with
the medical evidence and so on;
(3) that the Court would not enter into credibility of the evidence
with a view to substitute its own opinion for that of the High Court;
(4) that the Court would interfere where the High Court has arrived at
a finding of fact in disregard of a judicial process, principles of
natural justice or a fair hearing or has acted in violation of a
mandatory provision of law or procedure resulting in serious prejudice
or injustice to the accused;
(5) this Court might also interfere where on the proved facts wrong
inferences of law have been drawn or where the conclusions of the High
Court are manifestly perverse and based on no evidence.”
26. In the same decision, A.C. Gupta, J concurred but cautioned as
follows:
“The decisions of this Court referred to in the Judgment of my learned
brother lay down that this Court does not interfere with the findings
of fact unless it is shown that "substantial and grave injustice has
been done". But whether such injustice has been done in a given case
depends on the circumstances of the case, and I do not think one could
catalogue exhaustively all possible circumstances in which it can be
said that there has been grave and substantial injustice done in any
case.”
27. Keeping these principles in mind, we have considered the evidence on
record and find no exceptional circumstance or reason to disturb a
concurrent finding of fact by both the Courts.
28. However, we need to deal with the contentions urged by learned
counsel for the appellant. His first contention was that even though there
may have been strained matrimonial relations between the appellant and
Remani, those differences were patched up when Remani came back to live
with the appellant in the matrimonial home. His second contention was that
the appellant had no ill will towards Remani in as much as when she was
hospitalized from 8.03.1998 to 10.03.1998, he had looked after and paid the
medical bills. Under these circumstances, there was no reason for him to
have murdered Remani.
29. We are of the view that there is no substance in either of the
submissions made by learned counsel. There is ample evidence on record not
only from the immediate family of Remani but also from her neighbour that
she was subjected to physical violence almost on a daily basis. The cause
of discord between the appellant and Remani appears to be her belief that
the appellant had illicit relations with the wife of his elder brother.
This may or may not be true but the fact of the matter is that relations
between the parties were terribly strained and Remani was subjected to
physical abuse almost on a daily basis. These strained relations, coupled
with the allegations made by Remani, provided a motive for the appellant to
murder her.
30. The fact that the appellant may have looked after Remani during her
illness for a couple of days is neither here nor there. He was expected to
do so.
31. However, what is clinching in the present case is the medical
evidence which clearly indicates that Remani was forcibly administered
Furadan; she had resisted this forcible administration; as a result of her
resistance, she received several minor injuries on her body. Eventually,
with a view to overcome her resistance, she was smothered and ultimately
she died as a result of the forcible administration of Furadan and
smothering. No person other than her husband could have possibly caused
Remani’s death, especially considering the motive or grudge that he
harboured against her.
32. Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that Remani’s father
had himself stated in the FIR that she had committed suicide by consuming
poison. This seems to have been the first impression gathered by Bhaskaran.
Learned counsel for the State pointed out that the reason could possibly
have been to save the appellant from imprisonment keeping the welfare of
their two children in mind. It is not necessary for us to make any guesses
in this regard.
33. The fact is that investigations into the matter, particularly the
injuries suffered by Remani and presence of Furadan in her mouth suggested
that the case was not one of suicide. When the matter was taken to trial
the truth eventually came out, which is that Remani had not committed
suicide but had in fact been murdered. Bhaskaran’s hypothesis proved to be
only an assumption.
34. We are conscious that the case is one of circumstantial evidence but
we are not able to find any break in the chain of evidence which could
possibly throw up some other possibility. Under these circumstances, we
find no reason to interfere with the conviction and sentence awarded to the
appellant by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court.
35. There is no merit in the appeal and it is accordingly dismissed.
….…….……………………..J.
(Swatanter Kumar)
….…….……………………..J.
(Madan B. Lokur)
New Delhi;
October 30, 2012
