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Wednesday, August 10, 2011

HOW TO PREPARE SENIORITY LIST = The law is clear that seniority is an incidence of service and where the service rules prescribe the method of its computation, it is squarely governed by such rules. In the absence of a provision ordinarily the length of service is taken into account


                                                       REPORTABLE





                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION





                 CIVIL APPEAL NOs.7002 OF 2004





D.P. Das                                          ..Appellant(s)





                             - Versus -





Union of India and Ors.                         ..Respondent(s)





                         J U D G M E N T




GANGULY, J.





1.    This   appeal   has   been   preferred   from   the   final



      judgment   and   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   of



      Madhya   Pradesh   at   Jabalpur   in   Writ   Petition



      No.5238 of 2000 dated 30th June, 2003.





                                  1


2. The   facts   and   circumstances   giving   rise   to   this



  appeal are that in the year 1983, the first batch



  of   the   Specialist   Medical   Officer   (SMO)   in   the



  Ordnance   Factories   Organization   was   recruited   in



  the   category   of   Obstetrics,   Gynecology,   Medicine



  and   Surgery.   The   appellant   was   one   of   the   five



  recruited persons and he belonged to the category



  of Surgery.





3. In   the   year   1991,   on   the   recommendation   of   the



  Fourth   Pay   Commission,   one   post   in   the   Indian



  Ordnance   Factories   Health   Services   (Group   A,



  grade of Rs.5900-6700) was sanctioned for filling



  up   amongst  the   SMOs  cadre.   The  specialists   cadre



  was in different disciplines and hence, there was



  necessity   of   preparing   a   combined   gradation   list



  in   the   SMOs   cadre.   The   respondent   No.1   referred



  the   matter   to   the   UPSC   for   preparation   of   the



  common   seniority   list.   Further,   the   SMOs   were



  recommended by the UPSC by three different lists,



  two   of   which   were   made   on   the   same   date   and




                               2


  therefore   the   UPSC   was   requested   to   furnish   the



  relative order of seniority of those SMOs who are



  recommended on the same date.





4. Accordingly,   the   seniority   list   of   SMOs   in   the



  grade   of   Rs.4500-5700/-   was   prepared   on   1.7.1992



  and   published  vide   order  dated   21.8.1992.  In   the



  seniority   list   respondent   Nos.   4,   5   and   6   were



  placed above the appellant.





5. As         the         appellant         felt         aggrieved         by         the



  publication   of   the   said   seniority   list,   he   made



  representations   in   the   year   1992,   1993   and   1995



  before the respondent No.1. However, no reply was



  received   by   the   appellant   from   the   respondent



  No.1.





6. Being   aggrieved,   the   appellant   preferred   an



  original   application   (O.A.No.457   of   1995)   before



  the   Central   Administrative   Tribunal,   Jabalpur



  Bench   (`the   Tribunal')   and   prayed   to   quash   the




                                            3


said   seniority   list   and   also   for   maintenance   of



discipline wise seniority list initially prepared



by   the  UPSC   and  for   keeping  Confidential   Reports



as   criteria   for   selection   to   the   next   higher



grade and also to rearrange the seniority of the



candidates   on   the   basis   of   age   of   candidates   by



placing   the   oldest   candidate   on   top   of   the



seniority   list   followed   by   juniors   in   age.   The



appellant   contended,   inter   alia,   before   the



Tribunal that the:





  a)     The   relative   seniority   of   SMOs   was

         not  determined by UPSC, at the time of

         selection



  b)     The   Department   should   have   requested

         the  UPSC   to   recommend   candidates   for

         such       posts   on   the   basis   of   a                

         consolidated             order of merit               and

         not  subject wise



  c)     The   Department   never   requested   the

         UPSC       to         prepare         a         combined    

         seniority list as                per  merit   on   the

         basis of performance in the interview.

         It was     therefore not                   possible   for

         the UPSC to  prepare                  a         combined    

         seniority list in the year 1992.





                                  4


7. The   UPSC   before   the   Tribunal   contended,   inter



  alia,         that         the         interview                   for          different



  disciplines   viz   specialists   I   medicine,   surgery



  and gynecology in Ordnance Factories Organization



  were   conducted   on   different   dates.   Before   the



  Tribunal UPSC further contended that:





(i)        As  far as  the Specialist  (Obstetrics

           and  Gynecologist)   is   concerned   the

           date of advertisement was 13.11.1982,

           date of  interview   was   28.2.1983   and

           date of UPSC recommendation letter was

           16.3.1983.



(ii)       Insofar   as   the   Specialist   (Medicine)

           is concerned the date of advertisement

           was    6.11.1983, date of interview was

           15/16.03.1983   and   date   of   UPSC                                  

           recommendation letter was 14.4.1983.



(iii)      And so far as the Specialist (Surgery)

           is     concerned,                       the         date         of      

           advertisement was                              13.11.1982,   date

           of     interview   was   22/24.03.1983   and

           date   of   UPSC   recommendation   letter

           was  14.4.1983.





8. The   UPSC   also   filed   the   extracts   of   its   file



  which contain the note sheets from Page 2 to Page



  13. From those extracts the basis of arriving at




                                              5


  the   methodology   adopted   for   fixing   the   seniority



  of         two                        different                            disciplines,                       whose



  recommendations   were   made   on   the   same   date   were



  available.





9. By   a   judgment   and   order   dated   26.7.2000,   the



  Tribunal   dismissed   the   O.A.457   of   1995   and   in



  paragraph 8.4 held as under:





    "8.4                It              is              fact                 that             date          of

    recommendation                                 of             the             applicant                who

    belongs   to   surgery   discipline   and   the

    private   respondents   belonging   to   medicine

    discipline   was   same   i.e.14.4.1983.     Also

    that   the   rules   provide   for   fixing   the

    seniority                           based                     on         the              date          of

    recommendations   of   the   UPSC   maintaining

    inter   se   merit   as   per   the   recommendation.

    It   is   also   fact   that   respondent   did   not

    approach the UPSC for preparing a combined

    merit   list   of   such   specialist   which   they

    should have done as per DOPTs instructions

    for   seeing   future   promotion   prospects   for

    these   specialists   and   also   the   fact   that

    separate   seniority   list   for   number   of

    specialist                          disciplines                                    and         separate

    promotion   prospects   thereof   were   not

    feasible.   From   the   extract   of   note   sheet

    filed   by   the   respondent,   it   is   seen   that

    the                Commission,                           based                      on         detailed

    examination   decided   to   fix   the   seniority

    in   such   case,   based   on   date   of   interview

    i.e.   candidates   interviewed   on   an   early


                                                                  6


    date   to  be   senior  to   those  interviewed   on

    a   later   date.   The   contention   of   learned

    counsel for applicant that their seniority

    should   have   been   fixed   based   on   the   date

    of         birth         cannot         be         accepted         since

    presuming   this   criteria   was   to   be   adopted

    then   very   purpose   of   preparation   of   merit

    list of the candidates, will get defeated.

    The   reckoning   of   seniority   based   on   age

    may   be   relevant   in   cases   of   recruitment

    where   no   merit   list   is   made   and   the

    selection   criteria   is   for   qualifying   the

    test   along   or   where   the   recommendations

    are only as `fit' of `unfit'."





10.Being   aggrieved,   the   appellant   filed   a   writ



  petition before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.





11.By   the   impugned   judgment   dated   30.6.2003,   the



  High Court dismissed the writ petition, affirming



  the   methodology   adopted   by   the   UPSC   for   fixing



  the   seniority   of   two   different   disciplines   whose



  recommendations were made on the same date.





12.The High Court in para 15 held that:





    "15. ..................... What is reasonable to be seen

    in   the   obtaining   factual   matrix   is   that

    under   regrettable   circumstances   the   inter


                                            7


se   merit   list   was   not   available   as   there

was   no   requisition   for   fixing   such

seniority. However, the UPSC had evolved a

base   which   indicates   that   the   date   of

interview would be the criteria for fixing

the   seniority,   in   such   a   case.   Ordinarily

this may look quite peculiar but it has to

be         borne                  in                        mind                     that               peculiar

circumstances                               are                   solved                      by             taking

recourse                   to               innovative                                 methods.                        The

tribunal   in   paragraph   6.1   has   reproduced

the   date  of   advertisement  and   the  date   of

recommendation   letter   of   UPSC.   We   have

also   reproduced   the   same   above.   The   date

of         advertisement                                         for                 the               post             of

Specialist   (Surgery)   was   13.11.1982.   The

date            of          advertisement                                              for             post             of

Specialist                        (Medicine)                                      was              6.11.1983.

Definitely there was advertisement for the

post   of   Specialist   (Surgery)   earlier   than

Specialist (Medicine) but the interview of

Specialist   (Medicine)   was   on   15/16.3.83

whereas                    the               date                     of               interview                        of

Specialist   (Surgery)   was   on   22/24.3.93.

The   Tribunal   has   taken   note   of   the   fact

that   from  the   note  sheets,   which  has   been

produced   by   the   UPSC,   it   was   perceivable

that recommendations were made on the date

of   interview.   Thus,   selection   was   made   on

that            date.                       It              is               noticeable                           that

recommendations were sent on the same date

i.e.            14.4.1983.                                  Thus,                      the             date             of

interview has earned the status of date of

selection. Submission of Mr. Gupta is that

it   can   be   fortuitous   circumstances   as   the

interview   in   one   subject   may   take   place

earlier   than   the   other.   The   aforesaid

submission   may  appear   on  a   first  blush   to

be   quite   attractive   but   on   a   closer

scrutiny   of   the   same   it   has   to   be

repelled.............   The   UPSC   has   determined   the

seniority   on   the   basis   of   the   date   of


                                                             8


    interview   and   the   date   when   selection   had

    taken   place.   In   the   absence   of   any

    document   on   record,   in   the   absence   any

    preparation   of   merit   list,   in   the   absence

    of   drawing   of   the   seniority   list   at   the

    initial   stage   and   taking   note   of   the

    peculiar   facts   and   circumstances   of   the

    case,   we   are   of   the   considered   view   that

    the   UPSC   has   adopted   a   rational   approach

    and   the   Tribunal   has   not   flawed   in

    accepting the same......."





13.It  is  pertinent  to  note  here  that  on  28.8.1946,



  the   Government   of   India,   Department   of   Home



  issued         an         Office         Memorandum         (O.M.)         for



  determination of seniority of direct recruits





14.Clause 2(iv) thereof provides as under:





    "When   a   number   of   vacancies   for   direct


    recruits   are   filled   simultaneously   without


    candidates   first   being   placed   in   order   of


    merit   or   preference,   seniority   should   be


    determined   by   age   provided   a   candidate


    joins within such period not exceeding one


    month   from   the   date   of   appointment   as   may


    be   fixed   by   the   appointing   authority.   A


    candidate   who   does   not   join   within   the



                                      9


       time   so   specified   will   rank   below   those


       who   did   so   join,   and   seniority   among   the


       later   arrivals   will   be   according   to   the


       date of joining.




             The   orders   in   this   paragraph   will   be


       of general application. "





15.Vide   an   Office   Memorandum   dated   22.12.1959,   the



  Government   of   India,   Ministry   of   Home   Affairs



  issued   general   principles   for   the   determination



  of seniority in Central Civil Services





16.It   is   pertinent   to   note   that   the   O.M.   dated



  22.12.1959   does   not   supersedes   Office   Memorandum



  of         1946         but         expressly         discontinues         the



  application   of     some   previous   Office   Memorandum



  cited below:





  7    Office   Memorandum   No.   30/44/48-   Apptts,   dated
       the 22nd June, 1949.



  7    Office   Memorandum   No.   65/28/49   -   DGS.(Appts.)
       dated   the   3rd               Feburary,   1950   and   other

       subsequent Office Memorandum regarding fixation





                                         10


       of   seniority   of   ex-employees   of   the   Government

       of Burma



  7    Office   Memorandum   No.   31/223/50   -   DGS,   dated
       the 27th April, 1951 and other subsequent Office

       Memorandum   regarding   fixation   of   seniority   of

       displace Government Servants.



  7    Office   Memorandum   No.   9/59/56   -   RPS   dated   the
       4th August, 1956.



  7    Office   Memorandum   No.   32/10/49   -   CS   dated   the
       31st March, 1950



  7    Office Memorandum No. 32/49/CS(C) dated the 20th
       September, 1952.





17.Para 4 of the Annexure attached to the said O.M.



  dated   22.12.1959   specifically   provides   that   ".....



  the   relative   seniority   of   all   direct   recruits



  shall   be   determined   by   the   order   of   merit   in



  which   they   are   selected   for   such   appointment   on



  the   recommendations   of   the   UPSC   or   other



  selecting   authority,   persons   appointed   as   a



  result of subsequent selection."





18.But   this   circular   fails   to   address   the



  situation,   where   no   combined   merit   list   is





                                11


  prepared   in   the   order   of   merit   in   which   the



  candidates   are   appointed   and   their   date   of



  recommendation   being  the   same,  as   in  the   present



  case.





19.The   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant   contended



  that   the   O.M.   dated   22.12.1959   has   not   repealed



  O.M.   dated   28.8.1946   and   therefore   the   O.M.   of



  1946 shall be applicable in this situation.





20.The         learned         counsel         for         the         respondents



  contended   that   the   intention   of   the   authorities



  was   clear   in   O.M.   of   1959,   so   as   to   repeal   all



  the   prior  O.Ms.   in  relation   to  the   determination



  of seniority, which is expressed in para 2 of the



  O.M. which reads as under:





    ".....It   has   therefore,   been   decided   in

    consultation  with the  UPSC, that  hereafter

    the   seniority   of   all   persons   appointed   to

    the   various   Central   Services   after   the

    date   of   these   instructions   should   be

    determined   in   accordance   with   the   General

    Principles annexed here to."



                                    12


21.However   as   noted   above,   office   memorandum   of



  1959 does not answer the problems arising in this



  case.





22.The  law  is  clear  that  seniority  is  an  incidence



  of   service  and   where  the   service  rules   prescribe



  the   method   of   its   computation,   it   is   squarely



  governed   by   such   rules.   In   the   absence   of   a



  provision   ordinarily   the   length   of   service   is



  taken into account





23. The   Supreme   Court   in  M.B.   Joshi   &   others.  V.



  Satish   Kumar   Pandey   &   Ors.,  AIR   1993   SC   267   has



  laid   down   that   it   is   the   well   settled   principle



  of   service   jurisprudence   then   in   the   absence   of



  any   specific   rule   the   seniority   amongst   persons



  holding similar posts in the same cadre has to be



  determined   on   the   basis   of   the   length   of   the



  service   and   not   on   any   other   fortuitous



  circumstances.




                               13


24.Determination   of   seniority   is   a   vital   aspect   in



   the   service   career   of   an   employee.   His   future



   promotion   is   dependent   on   this.   Therefore,   the



   determination   of  seniority   must  be   based  on   some



   principles, which are just and fair. This is the



   mandate of Articles 14 and 16.





25. In     The   Manager,   Government,   Branch   Press   and



   another  v.  D.B.   Belliappa  reported   AIR   1979   SC



   429, a three-Judge Bench of this Court construing



   Articles   14   and   16   interpreted   the   equality



   clause of the Constitution as follows:-





     "...The          executive,         no         less         than         the

     judiciary,   is   under   a   general   duty   to   act

     fairly.  Indeed, fairness  founded on  reason

     is the essence of the guarantee epitomized

     in   Articles   14   &   16(1)."   (see   para   24   at

     page 434)





26. Another   three-Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in



   Bimlesh   Tanwar        v.     State   of   Haryana   &   other,




                                       14


  (2003) 5 SCC 604, while dealing with the question



  of   absence   of   a   rule   governing   seniority   held



  that an executive order may be issued to fill up



  the   gap.   Only   in   the   absence   of   a   rule   or



  executive   instructions,   the   court   may   have   to



  evolve   a   fair   and   just   principle   of   seniority,



  which   could   be   applied   in   the   facts   and



  circumstances   of   the   case.   (see   para   47   at   page



  619)





27.In  the  instant  case,  no  record  has  been  brought



  before the Court to ascertain merit wise position



  of   the   persons   who   were   directly   recruited.



  Except   the   office   memorandum   of   1946,   which   is



  still   in   force,   no   other   rule   or   executive



  instruction has been shown to apply to the facts



  of the case.





28.The   appellant   argued   that   the   date   of   interview



  would   have   to   be   considered   as   a   guide   for



  determination   of   seniority.   This   cannot   be




                              15


  accepted   as   such   a   date   is   wholly   fortuitous.



  Accepting   as   guideline,   something   which   is



  absolutely   fortuitous   and   based   on   chance,   is



  inherently unfair and unjust.





29.As in this case there is no rule prescribed for



  the   determination   of   seniority,   this   Court   is



  left   with   only   the   guideline   flowing   from   the



  executive instruction of 1946, in order to evolve



  a just policy, for determination of seniority.





30.From   the   analysis   of   the   executive   instructions



  referred   to   hereinabove,   it   is   clear   that   the



  1946   instruction  has   not  been   superseded  and   the



  same   refers   to   the   acceptance   of   the   age   of   the



  candidate         as         the         determining         factor         for



  seniority. Such a basis is not fortuitous and is



  otherwise just and reasonable.





                                           16


31.In   the   premises   aforesaid   the   seniority   of   the



  officers   who   were   recommended   on   the   same   date



  must be decided by their respective age.





32.The   contrary   view   taken   by   the   High   Court   of



  fixing   seniority   on   the   basis   of   date   of



  interview,   being   wholly   fortuitous,   cannot   be



  accepted.





33. The   reliance   by   the   respondent(s)   on   judgment   of



  this   Court   in  B.   Premanand   and   others  v.  Mohan



  Koikal   and   others,        (2011)   4   SCC   266,   is



  misconceived   in   the   facts   of   the   case.   In   that



  case   this   Court   was   dealing   with   Rule   27(c)   of



  the   Kerala   State   and   Subordinate   Services   Rules,



  1958.   In   the   instant   case   there   is   no   rule.



  Therefore in this case, this Court has to evolve



  a   fair   and   just   basis   of   seniority   on   the   basis



  of the office memorandum discussed herein above.





                               17


34.For   the   reasons   aforesaid   this   Court   holds   that



  for   determination   of   seniority   of   the   officers



  who were recommended on the same date, age is the



  only valid and fair basis as such their seniority



  should   be   decided   on   the   basis   of   age   of   the



  candidates who have been recommended.





35.The   appeal   is,   thus,   allowed.     The   judgment   of



  the High Court which has taken a contrary view is



  set aside.   In the facts of the case, there will



  be no orders as to costs.





                               .......................J.

                               (G.S. SINGHVI)





                               .......................J.

                               (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)



New Delhi

August 09, 2011





                              18


Sunday, August 7, 2011

suit by Hindu sister for partition of joint family - Hindu succession act amendment of 2005, amendment of plaint dismissed- withdraw of suit allowed - operates estopel - whether the amendment apply to the pending suits ?


A partition of the joint Hindu family can be effected by various modes, viz., by a family settlement, by a registered instrument of partition, by oral arrangement by the parties, or by a decree of the Court. When a suit for partition is filed in a Court, a preliminary decree is passed determining shares of the members of the family. The final decree follows, thereafter, allotting specific properties and directing the partition of the immovable properties by metes and bounds. Unless and until the final decree is passed and the allottees of the shares are put in possession of the respective property, the partition is not complete. The preliminary decree which determines shares does not bring about the final partition. For, pending the final decree the shares themselves are liable to be varied on account of the intervening events. In the instant case, there is no dispute that only a preliminary decree had been passed and before the final decree could be passed the amending Act came into force as a result of which clause (ii) of Section 29-A of the Act became applicable. This intervening event which gave shares to respondents 2 to 5 had the effect of varying shares of the parties like any supervening development. Since the legislation is beneficial and placed on the statute book with the avowed object of benefitting women which is a vulnerable section of the society in all its stratas, it is necessary to give a liberal effect to it. For this reason also, we cannot equate the concept of partition that the legislature has in mind in the present case with a mere severance of the status of the joint family which can be effected by an expression of a mere desire by a family member to do so. The partition that the legislature has in mind in the present case is undoubtedly a partition completed in all respects and which has brought about an irreversible situation. A preliminary decree which merely declares shares which are themselves liable to change does not bring about any irreversible situation. Hence, we are of the view that unless a partition of the property is effected by metes and bounds, the daughters cannot be deprived of the benefits conferred by the Act. Any other view is likely to deprive a vast section of the fair sex of the benefits conferred by the amendment. Spurious family settlements, instruments of partitions not to speak of oral partitions will spring up and nullify the beneficial effect of the legislation depriving a vast section of women of its benefits.

Saturday, August 6, 2011

The court or the Board or as the case may be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the case may be the juvenile in conflict with law, prima facie on the basis of physical appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the observation home or in jail.


                                                            REPORTABLE


                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


             CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


        CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1531            OF 2011

           (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.3361 of 2011)




Shah Nawaz                                            .... Appellant (s)



            Versus



State of U.P. & Anr.                                .... Respondent(s)





                            J U D G M E N T


P. Sathasivam, J.


1)    Leave granted.



2)    This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   final   judgment   and



order   dated   10.12.2010   passed   by   the   High   Court   of



Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 716 of 2009



whereby   the   High   Court   dismissed   the   criminal   revision   filed



by the appellant herein.  





                                                                            1


3) Brief facts:



(a)    The   appellant   claims   to   have   born   on   18.06.1989   in



Village   and   Post   Dadheru   Kala,   Police   Station   Charthawal,



District   Muzaffarnagar,   U.P.     He   was   admitted   in   Class   I  in



Nehru   Preparatory   School,   Khurd,   Muzaffarnagar   on



05.07.1994 and studied there till 20.05.1998.   Thereafter, on



04.07.1998, he got admission in Class VI in the National High



School   Dadheru,   Khurd-O-Kalan,   Muzaffarnagar   and   studied



there   till   Class   X.     The   date   of   birth   in   the   mark   sheet   is



mentioned as 18.06.1989.



(b)    On 04.06.2007, a First Information Report (in short "the



FIR")   was   lodged   by   Khatizan,   wife   of   Nawab-the   deceased,



against   the   appellant   herein   and   three   others   for   the   alleged



occurrence which culminated into Crime Case No. 215 of 2007



at   Police   Station   Charthawal,   District   Muzaffarnagar,   U.P.



under   Sections   302   and   307   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860



(in short "the IPC").  



(c)    On 12.06.2007, the mother of the appellant submitted an



application   before   the   Juvenile   Justice   Board   (in   short   "the



Board"),  Muzaffarnagar,  U.P. stating that the appellant was a




                                                                                 2


minor  at the time  of the alleged occurrence.    After examining



the   witnesses,   the   Board,   vide   judgment   and   order   dated



24.01.2008,   declared   the   appellant   juvenile   under   the



provisions   of   the   Juvenile   Justice   (Care   and   Protection   of



Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act").



(d)    Against the judgment of the Board, Khatizan - the wife of



the  deceased filed  Criminal   Appeal  No.  11  of  2008  before  the



Additional Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar, U.P. under Section



52   of   the   Act.     The   State   -   respondent   No.1   did   not   file   any



appeal.     Vide   judgment   dated   13.01.2009,   the   Additional



Sessions   Judge   allowed   the   appeal   and   set   aside   the   order



dated 24.01.2008 passed by the Board.  



(e)    Challenging   the   judgment   dated   13.01.2009   passed   by



the   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   the   appellant   filed   Criminal



Revision No. 716 of 2009 before the High Court of  Allahabad.



The High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 10.12.2010,



dismissed the criminal revision.   Hence this appeal by way of



special leave.



4)     Heard   Mr.   Dinesh   Kumar   Garg,   learned   counsel   for   the



appellant   and   Mr.   R.K.   Gupta,   learned   counsel   for   the   State.




                                                                                  3


Despite   notice,   no   one   has   entered   appearance   on   behalf   of



respondent No.2.



5)    Before   considering   the   merits   of   the   claim   of   the



appellant and the stand of the State, let us consider Rule 12 of



the   Juvenile   Justice   (Care   and   Protection   of   Children)   Rules,



2007   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   `the   Rules')   which   reads   as



under:-


      "12. Procedure to be followed in determination of Age.

      (1) In every case concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict

      with law, the court or the Board or as the case may be the

      Committee   referred   to   in   rule   19   of   these   rules   shall

      determine   the   age   of   such   juvenile   or   child   or   a   juvenile   in

      conflict with law within a period of thirty days from the date

      of making of the application for that purpose.  



      (2)   The   court   or   the   Board   or   as   the   case   may   be   the

      Committee   shall   decide   the   juvenility   or   otherwise   of   the

      juvenile   or   the   child   or   as   the   case   may   be   the   juvenile   in

      conflict   with   law,  prima   facie  on   the   basis   of   physical

      appearance or documents, if available, and send him to the

      observation home or in jail.



      (3)   In   every   case   concerning   a   child   or   juvenile   in   conflict

      with   law,   the   age   determination   inquiry   shall   be   conducted

      by   the   court   or   the   Board   or,   as   the   case   may   be,   the

      Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining -



      (a)     (i)   the   matriculation   or   equivalent   certificates,   if

              available; and in the absence whereof;



              (ii)   the   date   of   birth   certificate   from   the   school   (other

              than a play school) first attended; and in the absence

              whereof;



              (iii)   the   birth   certificate   given   by   a   corporation   or   a

              municipal authority or a panchayat;





                                                                                              4


(b)     and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause

        (a)   above,   the   medical   opinion   will   be   sought   from   a

        duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the

        age  of the juvenile  or child. In  case  exact assessment

        of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or,

        as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to

        be   recorded   by   them,   may,   if   considered   necessary,

        give   benefit   to   the   child   or   juvenile   by   considering

        his/her   age   on   lower   side   within   the   margin   of   one

        year.



and,   while   passing   orders   in   such   case   shall,   after   taking

into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the

medical   opinion,   as   the   case   may   be,   record   a   finding   in

respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any

of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause

(b) shall  be the  conclusive proof  of the age  as regards  such

child or the juvenile in conflict with law.



(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile in conflict

with law is found to be below 18 years on the date of offence,

on the basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-

rule   (3),   the   court   or   the   Board   or   as   the   case   may   be   the

Committee shall in writing pass an order stating the age and

declaring   the   status   of   juvenility   or   otherwise,   for   the

purpose of  the  Act  and  these  rules  and a  copy of  the  order

shall be given to such juvenile or the person concerned.



(5)   Save   and   except   where,   further   inquiry   or   otherwise   is

required, inter alia, in terms of section 7A, section 64 of the

Act and these rules,  no further  inquiry  shall be conducted

by the court or the Board after examining and obtaining the

certificate   or   any   other   documentary   proof   referred   to   in

sub-rule (3) of this rule.



(6)  The  provisions  contained   in  this  rule   shall  also  apply to

those   disposed   off   cases,   where   the   status   of   juvenility   has

not   been   determined   in   accordance   with   the   provisions

contained in sub-rule (3) and the Act, requiring dispensation

of the sentence under the Act for passing appropriate order

in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with law."





                                                                                         5


6)   In   the   light   of   the   above   procedure   to   be   followed   in



determining   the   age   of   the   child   or   juvenile,   let   us   consider



various decisions of this Court.



7)       In  Raju   and   Anr.   vs.  State   of   Haryana  (2010)   3   SCC



235, this Court had admitted "mark sheet" as one of the proof



in   determining   the   age   of   the   accused   person.     In   that   case,



the   appellants   therein   Raju   and   Mangli   along   with   Anil   alias



Balli   and   Sucha   Singh   were   sent   up   for   trial   for   allegedly



having   committed   an   offence   punishable   under   Section   302



read   with   Section   34   of   the   IPC.     Accused   Sucha   Singh   was



found to be a juvenile and his case was separated for separate



trial under the Act.   Others were convicted under Section 302



read   with   Section   34   of   the   IPC   and   were   sentenced   to



imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-.   Apart



from contending on the merits of the prosecution case, insofar



as appellant No. 1, Raju, is concerned, the counsel appearing



for  him  submitted that  on  the  date  of  the  incident  that  is  on



(31.03.1994),   he   was   a   juvenile   and   as   per   his   mark   sheet,



wherein   his   date   of   birth   was   recorded   as   1977,   he   was   less



than   17   years   of   age   on   the   date   of   the   incident.     Learned




                                                                              6


counsel submitted that having regard to the recent decision of



this   Court   in  Hari   Ram  vs.  State   of   Rajasthan   &   Anr.,



(2009) 13 SCC 211, appellant No. 1 must be held to have been



a minor on the date of the incident and the provisions  of the



Act   would   apply   in   his   case.     Learned   counsel   further



contended that the appellant No. 1 would have to be dealt with



under   the   provisions   of   the   said   Act   in   keeping   with   the



decision in the aforesaid case.  On merits, while accepting the



claim of the learned counsel for accused-appellant, this Court



altered   the   conviction   and   sentence   and   convicted   under



Section 304 Part I read with Section 34 IPC instead of Section



302   read   with   Section   34   IPC.     As   far   as   appellant   No.   1,



namely,   Raju   was   concerned,   while   accepting   the   entry



relating to date of birth in the mark sheet referred  his case to



the Board in terms of Section 20 of the Act to be dealt under



the provisions of the said Act in keeping with the provision of



Section 15 thereof.   It is clear from the said decision that this



Court   has   accepted   mark   sheet   as   one   of   the   proof   for



determining the age of an accused person.





                                                                             7


8)     Similarly,   this   Court   has   treated   the   date   of   birth   in



School Leaving Certificate as valid proof in determining the age



of an accused person.  In Bhoop Ram vs. State of U.P. (1989)



3 SCC 1, this Court considered whether the appellant therein



is entitled lesser imprisonment than imprisonment for life and



should   have   been   treated   as   a   "child"   within   the   meaning   of



Section   2(4)   of   the   U.P.   Children   Act,   1951   (1   of   1952).     The



following   conclusion   in   para   7   is   relevant   which   reads   as



under:-



       "7.....The   first   is   that   the   appellant   has   produced   a   school

       certificate   which   carries   the   date   24-6-1960   against   the

       column "date of birth". There is no material before us to hold

       that the school certificate does not relate to the appellant or

       that the entries therein are not correct in their particulars....

       "

 



It is clear from the above decision that this Court relied on the



entry made in the column "date of birth" in the School Leaving



Certificate.



9)     In  Rajinder   Chandra  vs.  State   of   Chhattisgarh   and


Anr. (2002) 2 SCC 287, this Court once again considered the


entry relating to date of birth in the mark sheet and concluded



as under:





                                                                                        8


       "5. It is true that the age of the accused is just on the border

       of sixteen years and on the date of the offence and his arrest

       he was less than 16 years by a few months only. In Arnit Das

       v.  State   of   Bihar  this   Court   has,   on   a   review   of   judicial

       opinion,   held   that   while   dealing   with   the   question   of

       determination   of   the   age   of   the   accused   for   the   purpose   of

       finding out whether he is a juvenile or not, a hypertechnical

       approach   should   not   be   adopted   while   appreciating   the

       evidence adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the

       plea that he was a juvenile and if two views may be possible

       on   the   said   evidence,   the   court   should   lean   in   favour   of

       holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. The

       law, so laid down by this Court, squarely applies to the facts

       of the present case.



10)    In Arnit Das vs. State of Bihar, (2000) 5 SCC 488, this



Court held that while dealing with a question of determination



of   the   age   of   an   accused,   for   the   purpose   of   finding   out



whether   he   is   a   juvenile   or   not,   a   hyper-technical   approach



should   not   be   adopted   while   appreciating   the   evidence



adduced on behalf  of the  accused  in support of the  plea  that



he is a juvenile and if two views may be possible on the same



evidence,   the   court   should   lean   in   favour   of   holding   the



accused to be juvenile in borderline cases.



11)    In  Ravinder   Singh   Gorkhi  vs.  State   of   U.P.  (2006)   5



SCC   584   with   regard   to   the   entries   made   in   School   Leaving



Certificate, this Court has observed as under:-  









                                                                                          9


       "17.  The   school-leaving   certificate   was   said   to   have   been

       issued in the year 1998. A bare perusal of the said certificate

       would   show   that   the   appellant   was   said   to   have   been

       admitted on 1-8-1967 and his name was struck off from the

       roll   of   the   institution   on   6-5-1972.   The   said   school-leaving

       certificate was not issued in the ordinary course of business

       of   the   school.   There   is   nothing   on   record   to   show   that   the

       said   date   of  birth   was   recorded   in   a  register   maintained   by

       the school in terms of the requirements of law as contained

       in Section 35 of the Evidence Act. No statement has further

       been made by the said Headmaster that either of the parents

       of  the  appellant   who  accompanied  him  to   the  school  at  the

       time   of   his   admission   therein   made   any   statement   or

       submitted  any   proof   in  regard   thereto.   The   entries   made   in

       the   school-leaving   certificate,   evidently   had   been   prepared

       for the purpose of the case. All the necessary columns were

       filled up including the character of the appellant. It was not

       the   case   of   the   said   Headmaster   that   before   he   had   made

       entries   in   the   register,   age   was   verified.   If   any   register   in

       regular   course   of   business   was   maintained   in   the   school,

       there   was   no   reason   as   to   why   the   same   had   not   been

       produced."



12)    In Pradeep Kumar vs. State of U.P. 1995 Supp (4) SCC



419,   this   Court   considered   the   commission   of   offence   by



persons   below   16   years   of   age.     The   question   before   a  three-



Judge   Bench   was   whether   each   of   the   appellants   in   those



appeals was a child within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the



U.P.   Children   Act,   1951   and   as   such   on   conviction   under



Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC should have been sent to



an   approved   school   for   detention   till   the   age   of   18   years.     At



the time of granting special leave, appellant, by name, Jagdish



produced   High   School   Certificate,   according   to   which   he   was




                                                                                             10


about  15  years  of  age  at  the  time  of  occurrence.   Appellant  -



Krishan Kant produced horoscope which showed that he was



13 years of age at the time of occurrence.  So far as appellant -



Pradeep was concerned, a medical report was called for by this



Court which disclosed that his date of birth as 07.01.1959 was



acceptable   on   the   basis   of   various   tests   conducted   by   the



medical authorities.  In the above factual scenario/details, this



Court concluded as under:-



       "3. It is thus proved to the satisfaction of this Court that on

       the date of occurrence, the appellants had not completed 16

       years  of  age  and  as  such they  should  have  been  dealt   with

       under   the   U.P.   Children   Act   instead   of   being   sentenced   to

       imprisonment   on   conviction   under   Section   302/34   of   the

       Act"



After saying so and after finding that the appellants were aged



more   than   30   years,   this   Court   directed   not  to   send   them   to



an approved school under the U.P. Children Act for detention,



while sustaining the conviction of the appellants under all the



charges framed against them, quashed the sentences awarded



to them and ordered their release forthwith.



13)    The   applicability   of   the   Act   and   the   Rules   in   respect   of



"Juvenile"   and   "Juvenile   in   conflict   with   law"   have   been



elaborately   considered   by   this   Court   in  Hari   Ram  (supra).




                                                                                       11


After   analyzing   the   Scheme   of   the   Act   and   various   Rules



including Rule 12 and earlier decisions of this Court laid down



various   principles   to   be   followed.     After   applying   those



principles and finding that the appellant therein was 16 years



of age on the date of the commission of the alleged offence and



had not been completed 18 years of age, remitted the matter to



the Board for disposal in accordance with law.  


Discussion on merits:


14)    In   the   light   of   the   above   principles,   now   let   us   consider



the claim of the appellant.   According to him, on 18.06.1989,



he was born in Village and Post Dadheru Kala, Police Station



Charthawal,   District   Muzaffarnagar,   U.P.     On  05.07.1994,  he



was admitted  in Class I in  Nehru  Preparatory  School, Khurd,



Muzaffarnagar.     The   appellant   left   the   said   school   on



20.05.1998.     On  04.07.1998,   he   was  admitted  in   Class   VI   in



the   National   High   School   Dadheru,   Khurd-O-Kalan,



Muzaffarnagar,   U.P.     On   21.05.2004,   he   left   the   said   school,



namely,   National   High   School   as   he   failed   in   High   School.



From Class VI till Class X the appellant remained and studied



continuously in the aforesaid school.   The date of birth in the




                                                                                 12


mark   sheet   is   mentioned   as   18.06.1989.     The   alleged



occurrence took place on 04.06.2007.   The FIR was lodged on



04.06.2007   which   culminated   into   Crime   Case   No.   215   of



2007   at   Police   Station   Charthawal,   District   Muzaffarnagar,



U.P. under Sections 302 and 307 of the IPC.   On 12.06.2007,



the   mother   of   the   appellant   submitted   an   application   before



the   Board   at   Muzaffarnagar   stating   that   the   appellant   was   a



minor   at   the   time   of   alleged   occurrence.     The   appellant   was



provided   a   School   Leaving   Certificate   dated   11.07.2007   from



Nehru Preparatory School, Khurd, Muzaffarnagar.  The mother



of the appellant made a statement dated 26.07.2007 regarding



the   age   of   her   son.     She   was   cross-examined   at   length.     On



16.10.2007,   the   statement   of   clerk   of   Nehru   Preparatory



School was recorded by the Board.  The said clerk brought the



entire  records   maintained   by  the  School.    The  said  clerk was



also cross-examined at length.



15)    The   Board,   vide   judgment   and   order   dated   24.01.2008,



declared   the   appellant   juvenile   under   the   Act.     Against   the



judgment of the Board, the complainant Smt. Khatizan, wife of



deceased   Nawab   filed   Criminal   Appeal   No.   11   of   2008   under




                                                                             13


Section   52   of   the   Act   before   the   learned   Additional   Sessions



Judge,   Muzaffarnagar.     It   is   relevant   to   point   out   that   the



State,   who   is   the   prosecuting   agency   did   not   file   any   appeal.



The   Additional   Sessions   Judge,   Muzaffarnagar   recorded   the



statement   of   Guljar   Hussain,   Principal   of   Nehru   Preparatory



School,   Dadheru,   Khurd-O-Kalan,   Muzaffarnagar   on



07.08.2008.     By   order   dated   13.01.2009,   the   Additional



Sessions   Judge   allowed   the   said   appeal   filed   by   the



complainant and set aside the order dated 24.01.2008 passed



by the Board.



16)    Aggrieved by the order of the Additional Sessions Judge,



the   appellant   filed   Criminal   Revision   No.   716   of   2009   before



the High Court.   The High Court  dismissed  the said  Revision



mainly on the ground that in the absence of any matriculation



or equivalent certificate and considering the language used in



Rule   12   with   reference   to   only   "Certificate"   and   not   "mark



sheet", dismissed the Revision petition.



17)    We   have   already   referred   to   the   decision   of   this   Court



about the entry relating to the date of birth made in the mark



sheet   of   High   School   examination.     The   appellant   has




                                                                              14


produced   mark   sheet   of   High   School   examination   issued   by



the school authority, namely, National High School, Dadheru,



Khurd-O-Kalan,   Muzaffarnagar.     A   perusal   of   the   above   said



certificate   makes   reference   to   appellant's   Roll   No.,   his   name,



Date   of   Birth,   name   of   the   school,   details   regarding   various



subjects,   maximum   marks,   marks   obtained   and   ultimate



result in the examination.   The certificate contained signature



of   the   Clerk   Salim   Ahmed,   who   prepared   the   same,   the



signature of the examiner and signature and seal of the Head



Master.  It is dated 21.05.2004.



18)    Another   document   relied   on   by   the   appellant   is   School



Leaving   Certificate   dated   11.07.2007   issued   by   Nehru



Preparatory   School,   Khurd,   Muzaffarnagar   wherein   it   noted



the registration no., name of the school, student's name, date



of   birth   (18.06.1989)   written   in   words   also,   Father's   name,



occupation,   caste,   residential   address,   date   of   admission   in



school, date of leaving of school.  The certificate contained the



signature and seal of the Head Master and the same is dated



11.07.2007.





                                                                            15


19)    The   documents   furnished   above   clearly   show   that   the



date  of  birth   of  the   appellant   had   been  noted   as  18.06.1989.



Rule   12   of   the   Rules   categorically   envisages   that   the   medical



opinion   from   the   medical   board   should   be   sought   only   when



the   matriculation   certificate   or   school   certificate   or   any   birth



certificate   issued   by   a   corporation   or   by   any   Panchayat   or



municipality is not available.   We are of the view that though



the Board has correctly accepted the entry relating to the date



of birth in the mark sheet and school certificate, the Additional



Sessions Judge and the High Court committed a grave error in



determining the age of the appellant ignoring the date of birth



mentioned in those documents which is illegal, erroneous and



contrary to the Rules.



20)    We   are   satisfied   that   the   entry   relating   to   date   of   birth



entered in the mark sheet is one of the valid proof of evidence



for   determination   of   age   of   an   accused   person.     The   School



Leaving Certificate is also a valid proof in determining the age



of the accused person.  Further, the date of birth mentioned in



the   High   School   mark   sheet   produced   by   the   appellant   has



duly been corroborated by the School Leaving Certificate of the




                                                                                 16


appellant   of   Class   X   and   has   also   been   proved   by   the



statement of the clerk of Nehru High School, Dadheru, Khurd-



O-Kalan and recorded by the Board.   The date of birth of the



appellant   has   also   been   recorded   as   18.06.1989   in   School



Leaving   Certificate   issued   by   the   Principal   of   Nehru



Preparatory   School,   Dadheru,   Khurd-O-Kalan,   Muzaffarnagar



as   well   as   the   said   date   of   birth   mentioned   in   the   school



register   of   the   said   school   at   S.   No.   1382   which   have   been



proved   by   the   statement   of   the   Principal   of   that   school



recorded   before   the   Board.     Apart   from   the   clerk   and   the



Principal   of   the   school,   the   mother   of   the   appellant   has



categorically   stated   on   oath   that   the   appellant   was   born   on



18.06.1989 and his date of birth in his academic records from



preparatory to Class X is the same, namely, 18.06.1989, hence



her statement corroborated his academic records which clearly



depose   his   date   of   birth   as   18.06.1989.     Accordingly,   the



appellant   was   a   juvenile   on   the   date   of   occurrence   that   is



04.06.2007 as alleged in the FIR dated 04.06.2007.





                                                                             17


21)    We are also satisfied that Rule 12 of the Rules which was



brought   in   pursuance   of   the   Act   describes   four   categories   of



evidence   which   have   been   provided   in   which   preference   has



been given to school certificate over the medical report.



22)    In the light of the above discussion, we hold that from the



acceptable   records,   the   date   of   birth   of   the   appellant   is



18.06.1989, the Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court



committed   an   error   in   taking   contrary   view.   While   upholding



the   decision   of   the   Board,   we   set   aside   the   orders   of   the



Additional   Sessions   Judge   dated   13.01.2009   and   the   High



Court   dated   10.12.2010.     Accordingly,   the   appellant   is



declared to be a juvenile on the date of commission of offence



and may be proceeded in accordance with law.   The appeal is



allowed.              





                                        ..........................................J.

                                             (P. SATHASIVAM)





                                        ..........................................J.

                                           (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 05, 2011.            





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