the prohibition to carry luggage of the passengers on the roof of the vehicle is an unreasonable restriction and, therefore, violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In our view, the restriction imposed by the Rule is a reasonable restriction keeping in view the safety of the passengers in a tourist vehicle. Therefore, the Rule cannot be said either arbitrary or unreasonable or violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. At the time of hearing of the appeals, reference was made to AIS specifications to contend that specification so provided support the interpretation given by the Karnataka High Court to Rule 128(a) of the Rules.

                                                      REPORTABLE




                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

          CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION


                  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1507 OF 2007





M/s Sharma Transports                               .............. Appellant




                                    Versus




The State of Maharashtra & Ors.                 ..............Respondents




                                    WITH




                  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1508 OF 2007





M/s Sangita Travel Agency & Ors.                   ..............Appellants




                                    Versus




The State of Maharashtra & Ors.                        ........Respondents





                                                                     1


                                    WITH




                  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1492 OF 2007



M/s N.T. Zameer Ahamed Khan Associates, Bangalore ........... Appellant




                                    Versus




The State of Maharashtra & Ors.                 ..............Respondents




                                    WITH




                  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1509 OF 2007



K. Srinivas                                         .............. Appellant




                                    Versus




The State of Maharashtra & Ors.                 ..............Respondents




                                    WITH




                  CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1493 OF 2007



Southern Carriers, Bangalore                        .............. Appellant




                                    Versus




The State of Maharashtra & Ors.                 ..............Respondents





                                                                  2


                                    WITH




                     CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1494 OF 2007





M/s. N.T. Zameer Ahamed Khan Associates,

Bangalore & Anr.                                     .............. Appellants


                                    Versus




The State of Maharashtra & Ors.                       ..............Respondents




                                    WITH




                WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 100 OF 2007



Ishwar Lal Sharma                                   .............. Petitioner




                                    Versus




State of Maharashtra & Ors.                           ..............Respondents




                                    WITH




                WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 668 OF 2007



VRL Logistics Limited                                   .............. Petitioner




                                    Versus




State of Maharashtra & Ors.                           ..............Respondents





                                                                          3


                                          WITH




                   WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 566 OF 2009



Anand, Managing Director

VRL Logistics Ltd.                                                   .............. Petitioner


                                          Versus




State of Karnataka & Ors.                                         ..............Respondents




                                     J U D G M E N T




H.L. Dattu, J.




1.             These appeals and writ petitions are directed against the order


       of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.3 of


       1996   dated   21.07.2006,   whereby   the   High   Court   has   held   that


       transporters   (writ   petitioners   before   the   High   Court)   could   only


       provide luggage space at the rear or the sides of a tourist vehicle as


       mandated by Rule 128(9) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989


       [hereinafter   referred   to   as   "the   Rules"],   and   no   luggage   could   be


       carried on the roof of the vehicle. The prayer in the writ petitions is


       to   direct   the   respondents   therein   not   to   check,   levy   and   collect   the


       compounding fee from the vehicles of the petitioners.





                                                                                              4


2.            The   transport   operators   [hereinafter   referred   to   as   the


      "transporters"] are in appeal by special leave before us, claiming that


      they have the right to carry luggage of the passengers on the roof of


      their vehicles.    In all, there are six appeals  and three writ petitions


      before us, but for the sake of convenience, we will refer to the factual


      scenario   in   C.A.   No.   1507   of   2007,   as   the   same   dicta   will   also   be


      applicable to the rest of the matters.




3.            The transporters operate tourist vehicles between the States of


      Karnataka and Maharashtra and have been granted tourist permits by


      the State Transport Authority of Karnataka under Section 88 of the


      Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 [hereinafter referred to as "the Act"].  The


      respondents,   by   their   communication/circular   dated   15.12.1995  had


      issued instructions to all the subordinate authorities under the Act to


      ensure that there was no luggage carried on the roof of the vehicles,


      as the same was not permissible under law. Due to this instruction,


      the checking authorities had started imposing and collecting fines to


      the tune of  `1500/- for each entry and exit from the transporters for


      carrying goods on the roof of vehicles with tourist permits.





                                                                                              5


4.            Aggrieved   by   this   imposition   and   collection   of   fine,   the


      transporters preferred a writ petition before the Bombay High Court


      inter-alia seeking the following relief/(s):




                     "i)   Writ   of    Mandamus   or  any  other   appropriate

                     Writ, Order or Direction and prohibit the 3rd  and

                     4th  Respondents   and   their   sub-ordinate   checking

                     officers  from checking, levying and collecting the

                     compounding   fee   from   the   vehicles   of   the

                     Petitioners   on   the   alleged   offence   of   carriage   of

                     goods on the top of the vehicle.


                     ii) A Writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other

                     appropriate   Writ,   Order,   Direction   and   quash

                     memo   receipts   issued   to   several   vehicles   of   the

                     Petitioners   vide   Annexure   `C'   produced   in   the

                     Writ Petition.


                     iii)   A   Writ   in   the   nature   of   Declaration   or   any

                     other   appropriate   Writ,   Order   or   Direction   and

                     direct   the   Respondent   not   to   levy   and   collect

                     illegal compounding fee for carriage of goods on

                     the top of the Petitioners vehicles as per the limits

                     prescribed.


                     iv) Direct the 3rd and 4th Respondents to refund the

                     compound   fee   already   collected   from   the

                     Petitioners."





5.            The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissed the


      writ   petition   holding   that   by   virtue   of   Rule   128   (9)   of   the   Rules,


      luggage of the passengers could be stored only in the rear and side of


      the vehicle and not on the roof of the vehicle. The High Court held:





                                                                                             6


"15...   The   specifications   are   aimed   at   securing

safety   and   security   of   the   passengers   so   also   the

luggage   and   thus   the   same   needs   to   be

meticulously adhered to. It has been stated in the

affidavit in reply that on account of the loading of

the   luggage   on   the   roof   of   the   vehicle   in   huge

quantities   or   weights,   unevenly   kept,   is   likely   to

result in exposing the vehicle to accidents and as

such   the   respondents   insistence   in   not   permitting

keeping of the luggage on the roof of the vehicles

is justified.


  16. Having regard to the language used in sub

  rule 9(i) which mandates that the luggage holds

  shall be provided at the rear or at the sides or

  both, what is intended is exclusion of the making

  of   a   provision   for   luggage   holds   at   any   other

  place.   Sub   rule   9(i)   is   indicative   of   the

  mandatory   nature   of   the   provisions   as   the

  phraseology   used   is   "that   the   luggage   holds

  shall be provided at the rear or at the sides or

  both   of   the   tourist   vehicle...".   `Shall'   is

  ordinarily  used to indicate the provisions to be

  mandatory. It is also settled position of law that

  if a provisions (sic.) requires a thing to be done

  in a particular manner, it has to be so done, or

  not at all. When the provision indicate place or

  places where luggage holds are to be provided,

  by   necessary   implication,   other   places   for

  luggage holds stand excluded. In this view of the

  matter   we   proceed   to   accept   the   interpretation

  of   Rule   128(9)   as   contended   by   the   learned

  counsel   for   respondents.   We   are   not   accepting

  the   submission   of   the   petitioner   that   in   the

  absence   of   a   specific   restriction   in   regard   to

  having luggage holds/carrier on the roof of the

  vehicle the petitioners cannot be prevented from

  carrying   the   goods/luggage   on   the   roof   of   the

  vehicle. On the contrary we are of the clear view

  that   luggage   has   to   be   stored   at   the   places




                                                                       7


                        specifically permitted by sub rule 9(i) viz., at the

                        rear or at sides or both, but not the roof of the

                        vehicle."





6.            The   transporters   are   represented   by   Shri.   Rakesh   Dwivedi,


      learned   senior   counsel,   and   Ms.   Madhavi   Divan,   learned   counsel


      appears for the respondent-State.




7.            The   learned   senior   counsel,   Shri.   Rakesh   Dwivedi,   submits


      that in Rule 128 (9), there is no express bar on carriage of luggage on


      the   roof   of   the   vehicles.     He   states   that   the   Rule   requires   that   the


      transporters should provide space for the luggage of the passengers at


      the rear and the sides of the vehicle, but does not prohibit carrying


      the luggage on the roof of the vehicle. On the contrary, the learned


      senior   counsel   states   that   Rule   93,   which   regulates   the   overall


      dimensions   of   motor   vehicles,   by   virtue   of   Rule   128   (1),   gets


      incorporated   into   Rule   128.     Shri.   Dwivedi   pointed   out   to   the


      Explanations   to   sub-Rule   (3)   and   sub-Rule   (3A),   where   it   is


      expressly  stated  that any  ladder  provided  for  uploading luggage on


      the roof of a vehicle shall be excluded while calculating the "overall


      length" of the vehicle. He also refers to sub rule (4), (6A) and (8) of


      Rule 93.   In view of this, the learned senior counsel would contend





                                                                                                8


      that in the absence of an express bar of carrying luggage on the roof


      of the vehicle, a vehicle could carry luggage on the roof of a vehicle.


      Shri.   Dwivedi   further   draws   our   attention   to   Rule   125C   and   the


      Automotive   Industry   Standards   Code   of   Practice   for   Bus   Body


      Design and Approval ("AIS specification" for short) to contend that


      there is no express prohibition from carrying luggage on the roof of


      the vehicle.




8.            Summing up the arguments, Shri Dwivedi would urge before


      us that on a conjoint reading of the Rules, it is clear that there was no


      prohibition for the transporters to carry luggage of the passengers on


      the roof of tourist vehicles.   It is also argued that such restriction of


      carrying the luggage on the roof of a vehicle unreasonably restricts


      the   right   of   the   transporters   to   carry   on   trade   or   business   which


      would be violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.  In aid of


      his   submissions,   Shri   Dwivedi,   learned   senior   counsel,   draws   our


      attention to a view taken by the Karnataka High Court.




9.            Per   contra,   Ms.   Madhavi   Divan,   learned   counsel   for   the


      respondent, states that Rule 128 (9) requires that sufficient space be


      provided at the rear and/or the sides of the vehicle. Ms. Divan lays





                                                                                          9


emphasis on the phrase "sufficient space and size" and contends that


the transporter is required compulsorily to provide adequate space for


the   luggage   of   the   passengers   of   a   tourist   vehicle.   She   states   that


there is a limit on how much luggage a passenger can carry and such


luggage   must   be   stored   only   in   the   luggage   compartment   provided


for   in   accordance   with   Rule   128   (9).     The   learned   counsel   further


submits that the incorporation of Rule 93 into Rule 128 is only for


the   purpose   of   complying   with   the   dimensions   of   the   vehicle   laid


down in that Rule and the reference to the ladder for loading luggage


on   the   roof   is   only   for   the   purpose   of   excluding   the   length   of   the


ladder, while calculating  the overall dimensions of the vehicle, and


does not, in any way, imply that a tourist vehicle may carry luggage


on the roof of the vehicle.   She further states that Rule 128(9) is a


special   provision   for   tourist   vehicles   only   and  they   would   override


any general provision like Rule 93, and that loading any luggage on


the roof of a vehicle is detrimental to the balance of the vehicle and


thereby  the safety of the passengers inside the vehicle.   Ms. Divan


also   states   that   the   transporters   are   duty   bound   by   Rule   128(9)   to


ensure   that   there   is   sufficient   space   to   house   the   luggage   of   the


passengers and any plea of placing the extra luggage on the roof of





                                                                                        10


       the vehicle due to insufficiency of space in the compartment at the


       rear   and/or   sides   of   the   vehicle,   would   itself   be   a   violation   of   the


       Rule.    By  placing reliance  on case  laws,  the learned  counsel  states


       that if something is provided for in a particular manner, then it must


       be done in that manner, or not at all. She further states that there is a


       clear   distinction   between   luggage   and   goods   as   defined   by   Section


       2(13) of the Act, and that the real intention of the transporters by this


       appeal is to carry goods on the roof of the tourist vehicles, as is clear


       from their prayer in the writ petition before the High Court.




       Both the learned counsel have cited some case laws before us, which


       we will deal with, as and when required.




10.            The   issue   involved   is   whether   a   transporter   can   provide


       luggage carriers on the roof of his vehicle.




11.            The transporters are the permit holders of the tourist vehicles.


       The   vehicles   are   registered   as   tourist   vehicles   and   endorsement   is


       recorded on the Registration Certificate that tourist vehicle complies


       with all the requirements of Rule 128 of the Rules.  Section 2 of the


       Act   defines   the   meaning   of   the   expression   `contract   carriage'.


       Section 2(43) defines the meaning of the expression `tourist vehicle'





                                                                                               11


to mean a contract carriage, constructed or adapted and equipped and


maintained   in   accordance   with   such   specifications   as   may   be


prescribed   in   this   behalf.     Section   110   of   the   Act   authorizes   the


Central   Government   to   make   rules   regulating   the   construction,


equipment   and   maintenance   of   motor   vehicles   and   trailers   with


respect to matters enumerated in Clause (a) to (p) of the Section.  In


exercise   of   the   power   so   conferred,   the   Central   Government   has


framed special provisions with respect to tourist vehicles other than


motor cabs, etc.   Apart from others, it provides for specification for


dimension and luggage holds for a tourist vehicle.   Rule 128(1), by


way of incorporation, provides that the dimension of a tourist vehicle


shall  conform to the dimensions  specified in Rule  93 of the Rules.


Rule 128(9) provides that the luggage holds shall be provided at the


rear or at the sides or both, of the tourist vehicle. The relevant portion


of Rule 93 of the Rules is as under:




                                 "Overall dimension

              93. Overall dimension of motor vehicles.--(1) The

              overall width of a motor vehicle, measured at right

              angles   to   the   axis   of   the   motor   vehicle   between

              perpendicular planes enclosing the extreme points,

              134 shall not exceed 2.6 metres.

              Explanation.--For   purposes   of   this   rule,   a   rear-

              view mirror, or guard rail or a direction indicator





                                                                                   12


rub-rail   (rubber   beading)   having   maximum

thickness of 20 mm on each side of the body shall

not   be   taken   into   consideration   in   measuring   the

overall width of a motor vehicle.

......

(3)   In   the   case   of   an   articulated   vehicle   or   a

tractor-trailer   combination   specially   constructed

and used for the conveyance of individual load of

exceptional length,--

(i)   if   all   the   wheels   of   the   vehicle   are   fitted   with

pneumatic tyres, or

(ii)   if   all   the   wheels   of   the   vehicle   are   not   fitted

with pneumatic tyres, so long as the vehicle is not

driven at a speed exceeding twenty-five kilometers

per   hour,   the   overall   length   shall   not   exceed   18

metres.

Explanation.--For   the   purposes   of   this   rule

"overall   length"   means   the   length   of   the   vehicle

measured between parallel planes passing through

the   extreme   projection   points   of   the   vehicle

exclusive of--

(i) a starting handle;

(ii) any hood when down;

(iii) any fire-escape fixed to a vehicle;

(iv)  any post office letter-box, the length of which

measured parallel to the axis of

the vehicle, does not exceed 30 centimeters;

(v) any ladder used for loading or unloading from

the roof of the vehicle or any

tail  or  indicator  lamp or number plate fixed to a

vehicle;

(vi)  any   spare   wheel   or   spare   wheel   bracket   or

bumper fitted to a vehicle;





                                                                              13


           (vii)  any towing hook or other fitment which does

           not project beyond any fitment covered by clauses

           (iii) to (vi).

           (3-A)The   overall   length   of   the   construction

           equipment vehicle, in travel shall not exceed 12.75

           metres:

           Provided   that   in   the   case   of   construction

           equipment   vehicle   with   more   than   two   axles,   the

           length shall not exceed 18 metres.

           Explanation.--For   the   purposes   of   this   sub-rule

           "overall   length"   means   the   length   of   the   vehicle

           measured   between   parallel   planes   through   the

           extreme projection points of the vehicle, exclusive

           of--

           (i) any fire-escape fixed to a vehicle;

           (ii)  any   ladder   used   by   the   operator   to   board   or

           alight the vehicle;

           (iii)  any   tail   or   indicator   lamp   or   number   plate

           fixed to a vehicle;

           (iv)  any sphere wheel or sphere wheel bracket or

           bumper fitted to a vehicle;

           (v) any towing hook or other fitments;

           (vi)  any   operational   attachment   on  front,   rear   or

           carrier   chassis   of   construction   equipment   vehicle

           in travel mode.

           ......"


Rule 128(9) of the Rules is as under:




           "...


           (9) Luggage.--(i) Luggage holds shall be provided

           at the rear or at the sides, or both, of the tourist

           vehicle with sufficient space and size, and shall be

           rattleproof,   dustproof   and   waterproof   with   safety

           arrangements;




                                                                                  14


                     (ii)  The   light   luggage   racks,   on   strong   brackets

                     shall   be   provided   inside   the   passenger

                     compartment running along the sides of the tourist

                     vehicle.   Except   where   nylon   netting   is   used,   the

                     under   side   of   the   rack   shall   have   padded

                     upholstery   to   protect   the   passengers   from   an

                     accidental   hit.   The   general   design   and   fitment   of

                     the   rack   shall   be   so   designed   as   to   avoid   sharp

                     corners and edges."





12.            Chapter V of the Act relates to control of transport  vehicles.


       Section  66 prescribes  the necessity  of a permit,  without which,  the


       vehicle  cannot  be  used  in any  public place.     Section  84  deals  with


       general   conditions   attaching   to   all   permits.     These   conditions   are


       deemed   to   be   incorporated   in   every   permit.   One   of   the   general


       conditions is that the vehicle is, at all times, to be so maintained as to


       comply   with   the   requirements   of   the   Act   and   the   Rules   made


       thereunder.  The authorities are empowered to cancel or suspend the


       permit   on   the   breach   of   any   of   the   general   conditions   specified   in


       Section 84 or any other condition which is contained in the permit.


       Section   86   of   the   Act   lays   down   the   power   of   cancellation   and


       suspension of permit and Section  200 of the Act confers power on


       the   State   Government   that   it   may,   by   notification   in   the   official





                                                                                            15


       gazette, specify the various compounding fees for the breach of the


       permit conditions.




13.            Rule   128   (9)   is   a   special   provision   meant   for   laying   down


       specifications   for   a   tourist   vehicle.     The   sub-Rule   specifically


       provides   that   in   a   tourist   vehicle,   the   permit   holder   should   only


       provide luggage holds at the rear or at the sides or both, of the tourist


       vehicle with sufficient space and size.   When the Rules specifically


       make a provision in regard to the place where luggage holds shall be


       provided   by   necessary   implication,   it   goes   to   exclude   all   the   other


       places of the tourist vehicle for being used as luggage holds.  In our


       view, since the language of the Rule is clear  and unambiguous, no


       other construction need be resorted to understand the plain language


       of the sub-Rule (a) of Rule 128 of the Rules.   Rule 128 is a special


       provision for tourist vehicles which excludes General Rule 93 to the


       extent of conflict between the former and the later.




14.            On a close examination of the argument on the incorporation


       of Rule 93 into Rule 128, we find that it is not the whole Rule 93 that


       is incorporated into Rule 128. On a plain reading of Rule 93 (3) and


       (3A), on which the transporters have heavily relied upon, it is clear





                                                                                          16


       that   these   Sub-Rules   are   not   applicable   to   tourist   vehicles,   as   sub-


       Rule (3) is applicable  only to  "an articulated vehicle or a tractor-


       trailer   combination   specially   constructed   and   used   for   the


       conveyance   of individual   load  of exceptional  length"  and  sub-Rule


       (3A)   is   applicable   to  "construction   equipment   vehicle".   Only   sub-


       Rule (1) of Rule 93, which is in reference to "a motor vehicle", will


       be incorporated and read into Rule 128 by virtue of sub-Rule (1) of


       Rule 128.   In other words, the effect of Rule 128(1) with regard to


       the   conformation   to   the   dimensions   specified   in   Rule   93   are


       applicable  to tourist vehicles  and no other  sub-Rule.  Therefore, we


       are   not   inclined   to   agree   with   Shri   Dwivedi   that   Rule   93   must   be


       fully   incorporated   into   Rule   128,   thereby   implying   that   the


       transporters may load goods on the roof of a tourist vehicle due to the


       reference to a ladder to upload luggage found in sub-Rules (3) and


       (3A).   Both these sub rules specifically refer to vehicles that are for


       the purpose of carrying heavy loads and not for carrying tourists.




15.            The   cardinal   rule   of   interpretation   is   to   allow   the   general


       words to take their natural wide meaning unless the language of the


       Statute gives a different indication of such meaning and is likely to


       lead to absurd result, in which case their meaning can be restricted by




                                                                                           17


       the application of this rule and they may be required to fall in line


       with the specific things designated by the preceding  words.   When


       the language used in the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is the


       duty of the court to give effect to it.  




16.           In  Grasim   Industries   Ltd.   v.   Collector   of   Customs,   Bombay,


       (2002) 4 SCC 297, this Court took the view:




                    "10.  No words or expressions used in any statute

                    can   be   said   to   be   redundant   or   superfluous.   In

                    matters   of   interpretation   one   should   not

                    concentrate   too   much   on   one   word   and   pay   too

                    little attention to other words. No provision in the

                    statute   and   no   word   in   any   section   can   be

                    construed in isolation. Every  provision  and every

                    word   must   be   looked   at   generally   and   in   the

                    context   in   which   it   is   used.   It   is   said   that   every

                    statute   is   an   edict   of   the   legislature.   The

                    elementary   principle   of   interpreting   any   word

                    while   considering   a  statute  is   to  gather  the  mens

                    or   sententia   legis   of   the   legislature.   Where   the

                    words   are   clear   and   there   is   no   obscurity,   and

                    there   is   no   ambiguity   and   the   intention   of   the

                    legislature   is   clearly   conveyed,   there   is   no   scope

                    for   the   court   to   take   upon   itself   the   task   of

                    amending   or   alternating   the   statutory   provisions.

                    Wherever the language is clear the intention of the

                    legislature   is   to   be   gathered   from   the   language

                    used.   While   doing   so,   what   has   been   said   in   the

                    statute   as   also   what   has   not   been   said   has   to   be

                    noted.   The   construction   which   requires   for   its

                    support addition or substitution of words or which

                    results in rejection of words has to be avoided..."





                                                                                                18


17.          In  Bhavnagar   University   v.   Palitana   Sugar   Mill   (P)   Ltd.,


       (2003) 2 SCC 111, this Court held:




                   "24. True meaning of a provision of law has to be

                   determined on the basis of what it provides by its

                   clear language, with due regard to the scheme of

                   law.


                   25. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the

                   legislature cannot be enlarged when the language

                   of   the   provision   is   plain   and   unambiguous.   In

                   other  words  statutory   enactments  must  ordinarily

                   be   construed   according   to   its   plain   meaning   and

                   no   words   shall   be   added,   altered   or   modified

                   unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a

                   provision   from   being   unintelligible,   absurd,

                   unreasonable,            unworkable           or         totally

                   irreconcilable with the rest of the statute."





18.          In   the   case   of       Harshad   S.   Mehta   v.   State   of


       Maharashtra,(2001) 8 SCC 257, this Court opined:




                   "34.  There is no doubt that if the words are plain

                   and simple and call for only one construction, that

                   construction   is   to   be   adopted   whatever   be   its

                   effect..."





19.          In the case of  Union of India v. Hansoli Devi,   (2002) 7 SCC


       273, this Court observed:





                                                                                         19


                      "9...It is a cardinal principle of construction of a

                      statute   that   when   the   language   of   the   statute   is

                      plain  and unambiguous,  then  the court  must  give

                      effect to the words used in the statute and it would

                      not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical

                      construction on the ground that such construction

                      is   more   consistent   with   the   alleged   object   and

                      policy of the Act..."





20.            In the case of Patangrao Kadam v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Yadav


       Deshmukh,(2001) 3 SCC 594, this Court took the view:




                      "12. Thus when there is an ambiguity in terms of a

                      provision, one must look at well-settled principles

                      of construction but it is not open to first create an

                      ambiguity   which   does   not   exist   and   then   try   to

                      resolve   the   same   by   taking   recourse   to   some

                      general principle."





21.            In   light   of   the   above,   we   are   not   inclined   to   agree   with   the


       submissions of the learned senior counsel for the appellants that Rule


       128 (9) does  not place a prohibition on carrying of luggage on the


       roof   of   a   tourist   vehicle.     If   that   was   so,   it   would   have   to   be


       incorporated thus in the bare language of the provision. Since there is


       no ambiguity in the language of Rule 128 (9), there is no reason for


       us to read the same into the Rules.





                                                                                               20


22.            In the case of  Taylor v. Taylor, (1875-76) L.R. 1 Ch. D. 426,


       the   Court   took   a   view   that   if   a   particular   method   is   prescribed   for


       doing  a certain   thing by  the Statute,   it  rules   out any  other  method.


       This view has been adopted by the Privy Council in the case of Nazir


       Ahmed   v.  King   Emperor,   AIR   1936   PC   253.  By   this   logic,  we   are


       inclined to accept the argument of Ms. Divan that the luggage of the


       passengers may only be stored in the compartments provided at the


       sides   and/or   at   the   rear   of   the   bus,   as   the   buses   are   mandated   to


       provide sufficient space for the storage of luggage.




23.            There   is   another   argument   advanced   on   behalf   of   the


       transporters   before   us,   who   claim   that   the   prohibition   to   carry


       luggage   of   the   passengers   on   the   roof   of   the   vehicle   is   an


       unreasonable restriction and, therefore, violative of Article 19(1)(g)


       of the Constitution.  In our view, the restriction imposed by the Rule


       is   a   reasonable   restriction   keeping   in   view   the   safety   of   the


       passengers in a tourist vehicle.   Therefore, the Rule cannot be said


       either arbitrary or unreasonable or violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the


       Constitution.     At  the  time   of hearing  of  the  appeals,   reference  was


       made to AIS specifications to contend that specification so provided


       support the interpretation given by the Karnataka High Court to Rule




                                                                                              21


            128(a)   of   the   Rules.     In   our   view,   this   submission   of   the   learned


            counsel for the appellants has no merit and is, therefore, rejected.




24.                     In   the   result,   the   appeals   and   writ   petitions   fail.       They   are


            dismissed.  Costs are made easy.





                                                                                              ..............................J.

                                                                                                      [ G. S. SINGHVI ]





                                                                                                  ...........................

                                                                                                                     ...J.

                                                                                                            [ H. L. DATTU ]

          New Delhi,

          August 02, 2011.





                                                                                                                       22

the canal affected persons cannot be put at par with the submergence affected persons, thus, it is not possible for the court to put the canal affected persons at par with the submergence affected persons.

                                                                   Reportable


             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA


              CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                    Civil Appeal No.6229  of 2011

             (Arising out of SLP(C) No.34065 of 2009)




State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.                                        


..Appellants





                                     Versus


Medha Patkar & Ors.                                                   ..Respondents





                              J U D G M E N T





Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.




1.     Leave granted.




2.     This appeal has been preferred by the State of Madhya Pradesh


and instrumentality of the State against the judgment   and order dated


11.11.2009 in Writ Petition (C) No.6056 of 2009 of the High Court of


Madhya   Pradesh   at   Jabalpur,   whereby   the   High   Court   has   restrained


the State of Madhya Pradesh or any other statutory authority of further


acquisition   of   land   or   for   any   excavation   or   any   construction   of   the


canal   network   for   the   command   areas   of   the   Indira   Sagar   and


Omkareshwar   projects   till   the   Command   Area   Development   plans


(hereinafter called CAD Plans) submitted to the Government of India,


Ministry   of   Environment   and   Forest   (hereinafter   called   MoEF)   are


scrutinized by the committee of experts and clearance is granted by the


said   Ministry.     The   appellant-State   Government   has   further   been


directed  to provide rehabilitation and resettlement benefits   under the


Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy (hereinafter called R&R Policy)


for Narmada Valley Projects to the canal affected persons/families of


Indira   Sagar   and   Omkareshwar   projects   and   the     Narmada   Control


Authority   (hereinafter   called   NCA)   has   been   directed   to   ensure


implementation of the aforesaid directions.




3.      The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are:


A.      That after completing the procedure prescribed for establishment


of dams and irrigation projects, the project reports for Indira Sagar and


Omkareshwar projects were prepared and submitted for clearance.  The


environmental clearance for Indira Sagar project was granted by MoEF


on   24.6.1987   by   an   administrative   order.   The   Planning   Commission




                                                                                     2


also   approved   investment   to   be   made   in   Indira   Sagar   project   on


6.9.1989.




B.     The   R   &   R   Policy   of   1989   was   introduced   by   the   State   of


Madhya Pradesh for the oustees of submerged area in Narmada Valley


projects.  Land acquisition proceedings were initiated  in year 1991 for


canal construction under Indira Sagar project.  A comprehensive CAD


plans   for   Omkareshwar   project   were   sent   to   MoEF   for   clearance.


Environment   Impact   Assessment   and  Environment   Management   Plan


reports were also submitted for Omkareshwar project to MoEF which


also   contained   the   R   &   R   plan   for   the   affected   persons   of   the


Omkareshwar project.  It provided that the persons whose land was to


be acquired for establishment of canals were not to be included in R &


R plans.




C.     The   Ministry   of   Welfare,   Government   of   India   accorded


clearance   to   the   R   &   R   plan   of   Omkareshwar   project   on   8.10.1993.


Similarly,   by   an   administrative   order   environmental   clearance   for


Omkareshwar project was granted by MoEF on 13.10.1993.




D.     The   MoEF   issued   statutory   notification   under   Section   3(2)   of


Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (hereinafter called the Act 1986)




                                                                                 3


read   with   Rule   5(3)   of   the   Environment   (Protection)   Rules   1986


requiring   environmental   clearance   for   development   of   project   on


27.1.1994.     The   canal   construction   in   Indira   Sagar   project   started   on


30.5.1999.     The   NVDD   vide   order   dated   14.8.2000   amended   the


definition   of   "Displaced   person"   adding   in   clause   1(a)   the   following


words:


            ".....or   is   required   for   the   project-related   canal

            construction   and   construction   of   the   Government

            Project Colony."




                      The   Planning   Commission   granted   approval   in   respect   of


Omkareshwar   project   on   15.5.2001.     The   R   &   R   policy   stood


materially   changed   vide   amendment   dated   1.9.2003   as   from   the


definition   of   "displaced   person"   the   words   "which   is   required   for


project   related   construction   of   canals   or   the   Government   project


colony" stood deleted.


                    The Amendment to the Rehabilitation Policy was made


by the Narmada Control Board (NCB) on the recommendation of the


NVDA on 2.7.2003 as per Business Rules of Narmada Control Board


Part   II   Special   Procedure   for   Emergency   Sanction   and   not   under   the


Government of Madhya Pradeh Business Rules.





                                                                                     4


E.      The dam construction of Indira Sagar project stood completed in


year   2005   and   the   High   Court,   in   a   pending   litigation,   permitted   the


State of Madhya Pradesh to raise water level of Indira Sagar Dam upto


260 meter against the full reservoir level of 262.13 meters vide order


dated 8.9.2006.  The High Court further clarified that NCA had no role


to play regarding the Indira Sagar project i.e. intra-State project as its


role was confined to inter-State Project, i.e. Sardar Sarovar Project.




F.      The Omkareshwar dam  stood completed in year 2007.  In order


to   set   up   canals,   land   acquisition   proceedings   were   initiated   in   year


2009   and   in   some   cases   after   conclusion   of   the   proceedings,


compensation   under   the   provisions   of   Land   Acquisition   Act,   1894


(hereinafter   called   the   Act   1894)   has   been   paid.   However,   in   some


cases acquisition proceedings are still in progress.




G.      The   respondents   preferred   Writ   Petition   (C)   No.6056   of   2009


before   the   High   Court   of   Madhya   Pradesh   at   Jabalpur   on   18.6.2009


challenging the acquisition of land for excavation of canals; execution,


excavation   and   construction   of   canal   on   various   grounds,  inter-alia;


the CAD Plans had not been submitted by the State and not approved


by the MoEF; there had been no compliance of Panchayats (Extension





                                                                                     5


of   Scheduled   Areas)   Act,   1996   (hereinafter   called   PESA   Act)   which


required   consultation   with   office   bearers   of   Panchayats   before


initiation   of   land   acquisition   proceedings;   the   canal   affected   persons


were  also   entitled   for   the   full   benefit   of  R   &   R   Policy   including   the


allotment   of   land   in   lieu   of   the   land   acquired   as   per   R   &   R   policy,


which had not been provided for.    




H.      The   State   of   M.P.,   appellant   herein   contested   the   case


contending that land acquisition proceedings could not be challenged at


a belated stage i.e. after dispossession of the tenure holders; authorities


had   submitted   the   CAD   Plans   and   acted   on   the   same   after   being


approved by the MoEF. Canal affected person could not be treated at


par with an oustee of the submerged area of the dam, rather he would


be   given   benefit   as   per   the   policy   prescribed   for   such   a   class   of


persons.




4.      The High Court after considering the rival submissions held as


under:


(I)     The CAD Plans of Indira Sagar and Omkareshwar projects were


required  to be prepared and submitted to the authority entrusted with


the   responsibility   of   monitoring,   planning   and   implementation   of





                                                                                          6


environmental   safeguards   and   this   was   to   be   done   before   the


commencement of the canals so that such authority could ensure that


the   environmental   safeguards   and   mitigative   measures   had   been


properly   planned   and   could   be   implemented  pari   passu  with   the


construction of the canal project.  


(II)     If   land   is   acquired   and   excavated   before   preparation   and


submission of CAD Plans to such monitoring authority, environmental


safeguards could not  be implemented pari passu with the construction


of   canal   project.   Rather,   if   the   main   canals   and   branch   canals   are


constructed   without   keeping   in   mind   the   environmental   requirements


then   there   may   be   immense   problem   of   water   logging   and   salinity


disturbing   the   environmental   plans   and   the   authority   entrusted   to


ensure   the   environmental   safeguards   may   not   be   able   to   reverse   the


acquisition of land.


(III)    There was an intelligible differentia in making the classification


between the oustees of  submerged areas of dam and canals but have no


rationale  nexus  with  the object  to achieve  so  far  as  the  rehabilitation


was concerned. Thus, the persons affected by canal work were entitled


to the same benefit as that of submergence affected persons.





                                                                                   7


 (IV)    In view of the   provisions of Sections 3 and 4(i) of PESA Act,


 the State Legislature was not competent to make any law under Part IX


 of the Constitution of India inconsistent with the basic features of the


 Gram   Sabha   or   Panchayats   at   the   appropriate   level     requiring


 consultation   for   land   acquisition   in   the   scheduled   area   for   the


 development projects.   Therefore, it was not permissible for the court


 to   issue   direction   to   the   authorities   to   consult   Gram   Sabha   before


 acquisition of land.


 (V)     Challenge to the acquisition of land could not be entertained at a


 belated stage as the possession of the land had been taken long back.


 (VI)    The   clearance   from   MoEF   requires   the   agents   to   monitor   the


 environmental protection measures.  


               In view of the above, the High Court issued directions   as


explained in para 2  hereinabove.  Hence, this appeal.




5.             Shri   T.R.   Andhyarujina,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing


for the appellants has submitted that CAD Plans have been submitted by


the   authorities   from   time   to   time   to   the   ministries   of   the   Central


Government   and   have   got   the   clearances   and   the   work   had   been


executed giving strict adherence to those clearances. Even at present, the


revised CAD Plans have been submitted and are being considered by the




                                                                                   8


Expert   Committee   of   the   MoEF,   wherein   the   respondent-Ms.   Medha


Patkar   has   also   been   heard.   As   voluminous   documents   have   been


submitted by her and this Court had been issuing directions from time to


time, the MoEF has yet to take the final decision. The State authorities


are bound to proceed in accordance with the final decision taken by the


MoEF   and   in   case   the   CAD   Plans   are   not   found   to   be   appropriate   or


complete   and   the   MoEF   issues   certain   directions   or   asks   for   some


variations   etc.   the   State   Government   would   proceed   accordingly.


Therefore, according to Mr. Andhyarujina, the issue of submission and


clearance of CAD Plans should not be decided at this stage by the court.


It   is   further   submitted   by   Mr.   Andhyarujina   that   in   case   a   party   is


aggrieved by the order to be passed by MoEF, it would  be open to it to


challenge the said order before the appropriate forum.




                So far as the issue of rehabilitation is concerned, it has been


canvassed   on   behalf   of   the   State   that   question   of   putting   the   canal


affected   persons   at   par   with   submergence   affected   persons   does   not


arise. This Court in  Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India &


Ors.,      (2000)   10   SCC   664,   (hereinafter   called   "Narmada   Bachao


Andolan  I") has  categorically  held  that  both  classes  are  different   and


cannot be put on equal footings. The canal affected people may rather be




                                                                                      9


benefited because of the canals while the submergence affected persons


may   suffer   permanently   or   temporarily.   Therefore,   to   that   effect,   the


High Court was not justified in issuing direction to treat both the classes


at par.          




6.               On the other hand, Ms. Medha Patkar, respondent-in-person


and   Mr.   Sanjay   Parikh,   learned   counsel   for   the   respondents   have


submitted   that   there   is   no   difference   in   the   sufferings   of   the   persons,


whether   they   are   submergence   affected   persons   or   canal   affected


persons.   No   rationale   nexus   can   be   found   to   treat   them   differently.


Therefore, the High Court's finding to that extent does not require any


interference. The CAD Plans submitted by the State authorities are not


complete   and   are   being   examined   by   the   Expert   Committee   of   the


MoEF. Therefore, the High Court has rightly directed the authority not


to proceed with excavation or establishment of canals etc.  The facts of


the   case   do   not   warrant   any   interference   by   this   Court.   Appeal   lacks


merit and is liable to be dismissed.




7.               We have considered the rival submissions made by learned


counsel  for the parties and perused the record.








                                                                                        10


8.             Though, a large number of issues have been agitated before


the   High   Court   and   dealt   with,   some   of   them   have   not   been   agitated


before us. The issue of consultation with the Gram Sabha or Panchayats


before   acquisition   of   land   and   validity   of   the   acquisition   proceedings


had been dealt with by the High Court against the writ petitioners and


the   same     has   not   been   challenged   before   us.   Thus,   only   two   issues


survive,     i.e.   submission   of   CAD   Plans   before   the   MoEF   and


requirements   of   its   clearance;   and   entitlement   of   the   canal   affected


persons.  




9.             So far as the first issue is concerned, this Court vide order


dated 25.2.2010 after taking note  of the directions  issued by the  High


Court   and   in   view   of   the   fact   that   the   CAD   Plans   etc.   were   being


considered by   the Expert Committee of the MoEF and for many years


excavation  and  construction   of canal   work  and  acquisition   of  land  for


that purpose had been done to a   great extent and the High Court order


brought the same to a standstill, passed the following order:


                  "In   the   above   circumstances,   excavation   or

          construction   of   the   canal   work   and   acquisition   of

          land may go on for the time being, however, it would

          be   subject   to   approval   of   the   MoEF   of   the   revised

          plans   submitted   on   16th  October,   2009.   The   State

          would be at liberty  to file  further  details regarding

          the Command Area Development Plans to the MoEF




                                                                                     11


         and   if   such   details   regarding   the   Command   Area

         Development   Plans   are   filed,   the   same   may   be

         referred to the Expert Committee for consideration.

         The   Expert   Committee   to   take   a   decision   within   a

         period   of   six   weeks   and   as   soon   as   the   Report   is

         available   to   MoEF,   the   MoEF   to   take   decision

         within a further period of four weeks thereafter."




10.    Mr. Mohan Jain, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing


for the MoEF has supported the case of the State contending that the


State authorities had always been submitting the CAD Plans from time


to time and the same had also been cleared by the statutory authorities.


References have been made  to the decision dated 10.2.2011 taken by


Dr.   Pandey's   Committee   on   CAD   Plans   and   all   other   subsequent


decisions taken on 29th/30th April, 2011 on the CAD Plans submitted by


the   State   Government.   Mr.   Jain   assured   the   Court   that   the   decisions


would   be   taken   by   the   MoEF   strictly   in   accordance   with   law


considering the report of the Expert Committee. Time is being taken in


view of the order dated 11.5.2011 passed by this Court directing MoEF


to   proceed   with   the   draft   minutes     prepared     by   the   Environment


Appraisal   Committee   after   providing   the   opportunity   of   personal


hearing to the writ petitioner- Ms. Medha Patkar. Though the hearing


stood   concluded,   a   large   number   of   documents   submitted   by   Ms.





                                                                                   12


Patkar yet require to be considered. The final decision shall be taken


within 4 weeks.




11.    While considering the reliefs, which could be given to the canal


affected persons, this court on 5.5.2010 passed the following  order :


             "The State of Madhya Pradesh shall consider the

        "hardship   cases";   those   cases   wherein   land   of   a

        Khatedar  is  in  excess  of 60% or  above  is  acquired

        for  canal, those  affected  parties   may be  given  land

        as far as possible in the near vicinity or in the canal

        command area of the project and if it is not possible,

        the   land   may   be   given   from   the   Land   Bank.   The

        Khatedars who have already received compensation,

        should   return   the   Government   50%   of   the

        compensation amount already taken by them as land

        value and the remaining amount may be refunded to

        the   Government   in   20   interest   free   annual

        installments. If the Khatedars are not willing to take

        land   from   the   land   bank,   they   may   be   given   the

        compensation   as   per   the   present   market   value   plus

        30% solatium thereof.  Those who are not coming in

        the   category   of   hardship   cases,   compensation   is   to

        be   paid   under   the   Land   Acquisition   Act   with   30%

        solatium.

       

               Any   grievance     in   respect   of   these   affected

        parties   may   be   placed   before   the   Grievance

        Redressal   Authority   for   Narmada   Water   Basin

        Project   which   has   been   set   up   by   the   State

        Government. Land Bank should, as far as possible,

        give   cultivable   land   and   also   basic   infrastructure

        such   as   school,   primary   health   centre,

        communication facilities etc. shall be provided."





                                                                              13


 12.       While entertaining I.A. No.9 of 2011, on 21.7.2011 the aforesaid


 order was modified as under:


            "50% of the cash compensation already received by

            the   Khatedars   have   to   be   refunded   to   the

            Government   as   land   value   of   land   allotted   and   the

            remaining cost of the land will be paid in 20 interest

            free annual installments."




                 While hearing the matter, this court further clarified the order


dated   5.5.2010   to   the   extent     that   30%   solatium   as   mentioned   in   the


order dated 5.5.2010 meant as provided under the Act 1894 and not over


and above the same to make it 60%.


         Therefore, the question remains as what are the other reliefs that


 can be granted to the canal affected persons and as to whether they can


 be put at par with the oustees of submergence area.




 13.The Narmada Water Dispute Tribunal Award 1979 defined `oustee'


        as well as provided for rehabilitation:




            "Oustee- An "Oustee shall mean any person who since at

            least   one   year   prior   to   the   date   of   publication   of   the

            notification   under   section   4   of   the   Act,   has   been

            ordinarily residing or cultivating land or carrying on any

            trade,   occupation   or   calling   or   working   for   gain   in   the

            area   likely   to   be          submerged         permanently   or

            temporarily."





                                                                                           14


         Provision  for Rehabilitation:  According  to  the  present

         estimates the number of oustee families would be 7,366

         spread   over   173   villages   in   Madhya   Pradesh,   467

         families spread over 27 villages in Maharashtra. Gujarat

         shall   establish   rehabilitation   villages   in   Gujarat   in   the

         irrigation command of the Sardar Sarovar Project on the

         norms   hereinafter   mentioned   for   rehabilitation   of   the

         families who are willing to migrate to Gujarat. For oustee

         families  who are unwilling to migrate to Gujarat, Gujarat

         shall  pay  to  Madhya  Pradesh  and  Maharashtra  the cost,

         charges and expenses for establishment of such villages

         in their respective territories on the norms as hereinafter

         provided."




                Thus,   it   is   evident   from   the   above   that   the   definition   of


`oustee'   does   not   take   within   its   ambit   the   "canal   affected   person".


However,   the   said   award   does   not   apply   to   the   present   projects   as   it


was meant only for Inter-State projects like Sardar Sarovar Project.




14.     So   far   as   the   Indira   Sagar   Project   is   concerned,   it   was   given


clearance   on   24.6.1987   and   did   not   have   any   specific   direction   for


rehabilitation.   Similarly,   for   Omkareshwar   Project,   clearance   was


granted   on   13.10.1993   and   part   (vii)   thereof,   provided   that   the


rehabilitation programme would be extended to landless labourers and


people   affected   due   to   canal  by   identifying   and   allocating   suitable


land "as permissible".





                                                                                        15


        The words "as permissible" have been interpreted by this Court


in  Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of M.P., AIR 2011 SC 1989,


that   addition   of  such   terms   while   granting   clearance   did   not   create   a


right  in favour  of such  persons as   the rehabilitation  is  to  be made  in


accordance with the terms of R & R Policy. Thus, we do not see any


reason to reconsider the issue afresh.  




15.     The   general   R   &   R   Policy   of   the   State   of   Madhya   Pradesh


defines `displaced person' in para 1.1 as a person in an area likely to


come under submergence  because of  project or which is required by


the project.  The R & R Policy was amended by the State of Madhya


Pradesh   on   14.8.2000   which   included   the   persons   whose   land   was


likely   to   come   under   submergence   or   was   required  for   the   project


related canal construction.




16.     This Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan I (supra) considered a


similar issue, but made the distinction between canal affected persons


and persons affected by submergence in para 169 which reads as under:





         "Dealing with the contention of the petitioners that

         there will be 23,500 canal-affected families and they

         should   be   treated   on   a   par   with   the   oustees   in   the

         submergence   area,   the   respondents   have   broadly

         submitted   that   there   is   a   basic   difference   in   the



                                                                                     16


         impacts of the projects in the upstream submergence

         area   and   its   impacts   in   the   beneficiary   zone   of   the

         command   area.  While   people,   who   were   oustees

         from   the   submergence   zone,   required   resettlement

         and rehabilitation, on the other hand, most of the

         people   falling   under   the   command   area   were   in

         fact   beneficiaries   of   the   projects   and   their

         remaining   land   would   now   get   relocated   with   the

         construction   of   the   canal   leading   to   greater

         agricultural   output.   We   agree   with   this   view  and

         that is why, in the award of the Tribunal, the State of

         Gujarat   was   not   required   to   give   to   the   canal-

         affected  people  the  same  relief   which  was  required

         to be given to the oustees of the submergence area."

         (Emphasis added)





17.     In view of the above, the State of Madhya Pradesh amended R &


R Policy on 1.9.2003 deleting the words "which is required for project


related constructions of canal or government project colony." Thus, in


view  of   the   above,   the   State   of  M.P.   does   not   give   the   same   R   &  R


package   to   the   canal   affected   persons   as   those   affected   by


submergence.




18.     This   Court   has   taken   a   view   that   the   canal   affected   persons


cannot be put at par with the submergence affected persons, thus, it is


not possible for the court to put the canal affected persons at par with


the submergence affected persons.





                                                                                       17


        In view of the fact-situation, it was not permissible for the High


Court   to   take   a   view   contrary   to   the   view   taken   by   this   Court,


particularly,   when   the   High   Court   came   to   the   conclusion   that   there


was a reasonable differentia between the two.




19.     Be that as it may, this Court vide an interim order dated 5.5.2010


has also taken care of "hardship cases" in canal affected areas.




                Mr.   Andhyarujina,   learned   senior   counsel   appearing   for


the   State   has   graciously   agreed   that   in   order   to   give   more   benefit   to


canal affected persons, the court may award some more benefits.   The


State has suggested that in order to achieve the purpose, date of Section


4 Notification in all the cases, irrespective of the actual date of Section


4   Notification   in   relation   to   all   canal   affected   persons   be   shifted


(postponed)  to the date of this judgment and direct to re-determine the


market value according to the provisions of the   Act 1894 as early as


possible making the supplementary awards and giving the opportunity


to such oustees further for filing reference under Section 18 of the Act


1894.  




20.     The State has come forward with most appropriate and valuable


suggestion,   thus,   we   accept   the   same.     In   view   of   the   above,   Land




                                                                                        18


Acquisition   Collector   is   directed   to   reconsider   the   market   value   of


canal   affected   persons   as   if   Section   4   Notification   in   respect   of   the


same   has   been   issued   on   date,   i.e.   2.8.2011   and   make   the


supplementary   Awards   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the   Act


1894.  Such concession extended by the State would be over and above


the   relief   granted   by   this   Court   vide   order   dated   5.5.2010   as


clarified/modified   subsequently,   as   explained   hereinabove   and   it   is


further   clarified   that   further   canal   work   would   be   subject   to


clearance/direction which may be given by MoEF.


21.         In view of the above, appeal stands disposed of. No order as to


costs.





                                                        .............................J.

                                                         (J.M. PANCHAL)




                                                         .............................J.

                                                         (DEEPAK VERMA)




                                                         .............................J.

New Delhi,                                               (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

August 2,  2011





                                                                                      19


20