Citation: 2025 INSC 1107
Court: Supreme Court of India
Bench: J.B. Pardiwala, J. & R. Mahadevan, J.
Date of Judgment: 12 September 2025
Jurisdiction: Criminal Appellate
1. Facts of the Case
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The appellant Maniklal Sahu, along with three co-accused, allegedly trespassed into the house of Rekhchand Verma, dragged him to the terrace, and flung him down.
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After throwing him from the terrace, they assaulted him with sticks and fists.
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Rekhchand survived for about 9 months after the incident but eventually died on 08.11.2022 due to septicemia and pneumonia, arising from spinal cord injury, paraplegia, and infected bedsores.
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Initially, FIR under Sections 458, 294, 506(B), 323 IPC was registered; after his death, Section 302 IPC (murder) was added.
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Trial Court convicted all accused under Section 302 IPC and sentenced them to life imprisonment.
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On appeal, the High Court of Chhattisgarh altered conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) and imposed 7 years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine.
2. Arguments
Appellant (Accused – Maniklal Sahu):
-
Death after 9 months was not linked to injuries.
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Doctors recorded septicemia/pneumonia, not direct cause of spinal injury.
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Eyewitnesses were interested witnesses (family members of the deceased).
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High Court should have acquitted instead of altering conviction.
Respondent (State of Chhattisgarh):
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High Court erred in reducing conviction to Section 307.
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Medical and ocular evidence clearly linked death to injuries.
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However, no State appeal filed against reduction, so conviction under 307 IPC may remain.
3. Issues Before the Court
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Whether the High Court erred in altering conviction from Section 302 IPC (murder) to Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder).
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Whether the delay in death (9 months after incident) broke the chain of causation, thereby ruling out murder.
4. Supreme Court’s Analysis
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Medical Evidence:
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Doctors confirmed spinal cord injury caused paraplegia → led to infected bedsores → septic shock → multi-organ failure.
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Pneumonia and septicemia were natural consequences of initial injury.
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Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC: Even if proper treatment could have prevented death, the accused is still deemed to have caused death.
-
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On Section 307 IPC:
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Section 307 requires intention/knowledge to kill even if death does not occur.
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Here, actual death occurred, and injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
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Therefore, Section 302 IPC squarely applied, not Section 307 IPC.
-
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Theory of Causation:
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Courts must assess whether complications (like pneumonia, septicemia) were natural/probable consequences of injury.
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If yes → causal chain remains intact → murder is made out.
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Only if complications were remote/unforeseeable → lesser offence considered.
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In this case, death was a direct and foreseeable consequence of injuries.
-
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Error by High Court:
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Wrongly concluded that death was due to lack of proper treatment.
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No evidence of negligent treatment was presented.
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Thus, altering conviction to Section 307 was a gross error.
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5. Ratio Decidendi
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Where death occurs after a long delay, but is medically traced back to injuries inflicted, the offence remains murder (Section 302 IPC).
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Septicemia, pneumonia, or other medical complications arising naturally from original injuries do not break the chain of causation.
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The High Court erred in reducing conviction to Section 307 IPC.
6. Decision
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Appeal Dismissed.
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Supreme Court upheld High Court’s final order only because the State had not filed appeal against reduction.
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However, it categorically held that the correct conviction should have been under Section 302 IPC (murder), not Section 307 IPC.
2025 INSC 1107 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 5578 OF 2024
MANIKLAL SAHU …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH …RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
Page 1 of 42
J.B. PARDIWALA, J.
For the convenience of exposition, this judgment is divided into the following
parts:-
INDEX
A. FACTUAL MATRIX.....................................................................2
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT .......................3
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE ...............................4
D. ANALYSIS..................................................................................5
i. When is an offence said to be made under Section 307 of the IPC........12
ii. Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues after some delay
..............................................................................................................23
E. CONCLUSION...........................................................................39
Page 2 of 42
1. This appeal is at the instance of a convict accused and is directed
against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of
Chhattisgarh dated 30.07.2024 in Criminal Appeal No. 607 of
2023 (hereinafter referred to as “Impugned Judgment”) by which
the High Court partly allowed the Criminal Appeal filed by the
appellant herein and altered the conviction of the appellant under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, “the IPC”) into
one under Section 307 of the IPC.
2. It appears from the materials on record that four persons
including the appellant herein were put to trial for the offence of
murder of one Rekhchand Verma in the Sessions Case No. 21 of
2022 arising from the First Information Report bearing No. 0061
of 2022 dated 22.02.2022 registered with the Saja Police Station,
District Bemetara, State of Chhattisgarh for the offence
punishable under Sections 458, 294, 506(B) and 323 of the IPC
respectively.
A. FACTUAL MATRIX
3. It is the case of the prosecution that on the fateful day of the
incident the appellant herein along with three other co-accused
trespassed into the house of the deceased and dragged him upto
the terrace of the house and flung him down. After the deceased
was thrown down from the terrace, the appellant and other coaccused assaulted him with sticks and fisticuffs. The injured was
shifted to the hospital in a very critical condition. Dying
declaration of the deceased was recorded vide Ex. P-22 in which
he named the appellant herein and the other co-accused. The
deceased also made oral dying declarations before the doctors who
attended him medically in the hospital.
Page 3 of 42
4. It appears that the injured Rekhchand Verma survived for about
nine months from the date of the alleged incident. Ultimately, he
died on 08.11.2022 on account of septicemia and pneumonia
leading to cardiorespiratory arrest. In such circumstances,
Section 302 of the IPC came to be added. The case was committed
to the Court of Session. At the end of the trial, the appellant and
the three co-accused came to be convicted of the offence of murder
and were sentenced to life imprisonment.
5. The appellant herein along with co-accused, namely, Rupesh
Kumar Sahu preferred Criminal Appeal No. 607 of 2023 in the
High Court whereas the Criminal Appeal No. 866 of 2023 was
preferred by Gulsan Sinha and Criminal Appeal No. 1151 of 2024
was preferred by one Chavendra Patel.
6. All the three criminal appeals referred to above were heard by the
High Court and those were partly allowed vide the Impugned
Judgment and order passed by the High Court. As stated above,
the High Court altered the conviction of the appellant herein and
the other co-accused from Section 302 of the IPC to one under
Section 307 of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo 7 years of
rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 1,000/-.
7. In such circumstances referred to above, the appellant Maniklal
Sahu is here before us with the present appeal.
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
vehemently submitted that the High Court ought to have acquitted
the appellant herein of all charges rather than altering the
conviction from one under Section 302 IPC to Section 307 IPC.
Page 4 of 42
The principal contention canvassed on behalf of the appellant
herein is that the cause of death has no nexus with the injuries
suffered by the deceased at the time of the alleged assault on him.
In other words, the learned counsel laid much stress on the fact
that the injured died after about nine months from the date of the
incident. Second argument canvassed on behalf of the appellant
is, that the eyewitnesses are not reliable witnesses. They are
interested witnesses being PW-1 Satish Verma, brother of the
deceased; PW-11 Vikas Verma, another brother of the deceased;
and PW-12 Gautahiri Bai Verma, mother of the deceased. It was
argued that they had no occasion to witness the alleged assault.
9. In such circumstances referred to above, the learned counsel
appearing for the appellant would submit that there being merit
in his appeal, the same may be allowed and the appellant may be
acquitted of all the charges.
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
10. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the State,
while vehemently opposing this appeal, submitted that the High
Court committed a serious error in altering the conviction under
Section 302 of the IPC into one of attempt to commit murder
punishable under Section 307 of the IPC.
11. However, the learned counsel fairly submitted that the State has
not preferred any acquittal appeal in this regard. In such
circumstances, he submitted that let the conviction of the
appellant herein for the offence punishable under Section 307 of
the IPC be maintained.
Page 5 of 42
D. ANALYSIS
12. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, the only question
that falls for our consideration is whether the High Court
committed any error in passing the Impugned Judgment and
order?
13. We do not propose to reappreciate the entire oral evidence on
record. We have looked into the oral testimonies of PW-1 Satish
Verma, brother of the deceased; PW-11 Vikas Verma, another
brother of the deceased; and PW-12 Gautahiri Bai Verma, mother
of the deceased respectively. They are all eyewitnesses to the
incident. There is no good reason for us to disbelieve or discard
their evidence.
14. We only propose to examine in the present appeal whether the
High Court committed any error in bringing the case within the
ambit of “attempt to commit murder” punishable under Section
307 IPC on the ground that the deceased Rekhchand Verma died
after a period of nine months from the date of the incident.
Unfortunately, the exercise which we propose to undertake is
ultimately going to be academic as there is no acquittal appeal
filed at the instance of the State. However, we should not ignore
or overlook the gross error committed by the High Court. We must
explain, why the High Court is wrong in its view.
15. We must start with the medical evidence on record. The
prosecution examined PW-9 Dr. Sheetal Kaushal. Dr. Sheetal
Kaushal in his examination-in-chief has deposed under:-
Page 6 of 42
01- “I was posted as Medical Officer at Community
Health Centre Saja from 22.06.2020 to
16.06.2022.
02- On 22.02.2022 at 11.14 pm, the injured
Rekhachand Verma, son of Radheshyam Verma,
age 19 years, resident of Boratra, Police Station
Saja, was brought to me for examination by
constable Indraman Nishad number 274 of Police
Station Saja at Community Health Center Saja, in
which, during his examination, I found that:
1. The said injured person said that he was
pushed down from the roof and beaten up and
the condition of the said injured person was
serious and his blood pressure was very low.
The said injured person was in a semiconscious
state and the smell of alcohol was coming from
his mouth.
2. The above injured person had a lacerated
wound measuring 8 cm x 0.5 cm x 1 cm in the
temporal parietal region of his head, which was
bleeding profusely.
3. The above patient was having pain in his
throat and was having difficulty in moving his
throat. I had advised him to get an X-ray done and
also advised him to get his head checked by a
neurosurgeon.
4. The injury was very serious so the correct
opinion about the nature of the injury could have
been given only after examination by a
neurosurgeon and a radiologist. The condition of
the patient was so serious that I advised him to be
immediately taken to a higher centre.
5. The above injuries sustained by the above
victim can be caused by falling from the roof and
hitting the head with a hard or blunt object and the
nature of the said injury can be determined only
after treatment by the NCCT head and
neurosurgeon and radiologist. In this regard, the
medical examination report prepared by me is
Ex.P. 06, part of which is signed by me.
03- On 25.02.2022, I was informed by the police
station in-charge Saja by sending a memorandum
that the injured Rekhachand Verma was referred
to a higher center for advanced treatment and
NCCT Head, Neurosurgery, Cervical X-ray was
Page 7 of 42
advised, who was admitted to Mekahara Raipur
on 23.02.2022, then to DKS Hospital Raipur and
on 24.02.2022 he was admitted from DKS
Hospital to MMI Hospital Raipur, where the victim
is admitted in ICU. Whose MRI scan has been
done, the part below the waist of the injured has
become numb, due to which there is a possibility
of spinal cord fracture, so give opinion on the
following two points1. What is the nature of the injury suffered by
the victim?
2. Was it possible for the injured person to die
due to the injury?
I had written in reply to the above questions that,
1) "The nature of injury can only be determined by
a Radiologist and Neurophysician and
Neurosurgeon." and 2) "Yes, it was possible." The
Curie report prepared by me in this regard is Ex.P.
07, which bears my signatures on parts A to A.
04- On 24,03,2022, the police station in-charge
Saja sent a sealed stick along with a
memorandum for testing and asked1. Could the injury sustained by Rekhachand
Verma have been caused by the confiscated
stick?
2. Are there blood stains on the said stick?
3. Any other opinions?
I had examined the sealed stick along with the
above mentioned memorandum sent by the police
station in-charge Saja, whose length and size I
have mentioned by drawing its picture and after
examining the said stick, my opinion is that 1)
“Such injuries can be inflicted on the injured
Rekhachand with this type of stick.” and 2) “I did
not find any blood stains on the stick.” In this
regard, the query report prepared by me is Ex.P.
08, which bears my signatures on parts A to A.”
There is practically no cross examination of Dr. Sheetal
Kaushal.
16. We now look into the evidence of Dr. Twinkle Chandrakar, PW-24.
Dr. Chandrakar in her examination-in-chief has deposed as
under:-
Page 8 of 42
“01- I am posted as Assistant Professor in Sri
Sankaracharya Institute of Medical Science,
Junwani Bhilai, District-Durg (CO) for the last two
years.
02- On 21.10.2022 at 10:35 P.M. the
injured/deceased Rekhchand Lodhi father
Radheshyam Verma age 22 years resident
Boratara Tehsil Saja District Bemetara was
brought to me for treatment at Shankaracharya
Institute of Medical Science, Junwani Bhilai
Hospital. On examining him I found that01. The condition of the said injured was very
serious and he had no movement and
sensation in both his legs due to which he was
unable to walk and he had trouble breathing
and his blood pressure was very low, he was
not urinating and he was suffering from
vomiting and diarrhea and he also had fever.
The said injured had movement in both his
hands.
02. There was a wound in the hip of the injured
person which was filled with pus.
03. The injured person had weakness in both
his hands and legs. The injured person had
anaemia and there was swelling in his body.
04. The said injured person was being given
oxygen with the help of a ventilator and
medicines were being given to maintain blood
pressure and due to blood loss, blood was
transfused and antibiotics were given and the
wound on his hip was being treated.
05. The patient's condition was not
satisfactory and the patient was becoming
unstable.
03- I had admitted the said injured/ deceased on
22.10.2022 in Shankaracharya Hospital Junwani,
who died during treatment on 08.11.2022 due to
Septic shock with bilateral pneumonia with post
traumatic spinal cord injury with paraplegia with
infected bedsore with hepatic dysfunction. The
entire treatment of the said deceased Rekhachand
was done by the medicine unit of the hospital
under my guidance and his discharge summary
has been prepared by Junior Doctor Richa
Sharma, which is , Ex.P. 28, on which my
Page 9 of 42
signature is on part A and my seal and seal are on
parts B to B. Along with the said discharge
certificate, the photocopy of the entire bedhead
ticket related to the treatment of the said deceased
in our hospital is of total 137 pages and a death
certificate was issued by our hospital in relation to
the death of the above deceased, the death
certificate is Ex.P. 29, on which my signature is on
part A to A and my seal and seal are on parts B to
B.
04- On 29.11.2022, the police station in-charge of
police station Saja sent letter no. / Th.Pr. / Saja /
702-A / 2022 regarding providing opinion by
curating the discharge certificate and bedhead
ticket of deceased Rekhachand Lodhi. In crime
number 61/2022 of police station Saja and asked
the following question1. On the night of 22.02.2022 at about 8
o'clock, the accused beat up Rekhachand
Verma with sticks and fists and threw him
from the roof onto the CC road with the
intention of killing him, due to which his spine
was fractured. The deceased died during
treatment at Shankaracharya Hospital on
08.11.2022. Did the deceased die due to
fracture in his spine?
2. If deceased Rekhachand died due to some
other reason, please give your clear opinion?
05- In order to answer the said query, after
examining the discharge certificate of deceased
Rekhachand and the bed head ticket related to his
treatment, I have given this statement that, 1) In
the history of the said injured, on 22.02.2022, due
to spinal cord injury, there was paraplegia and the
said deceased had weakness in both hands and
legs due to which the patient became bedridden
and there was infection in the wound of his hip,
due to which it is possible that the death of patient
Rekhachand was due to spinal cord injury. 2)
While answering the query question number 02 of
the police station incharge, I have written such an
opinion in my query report Ex. P. 30 which is the
memorandum of the police station in-charge dated
29.11.2022 on the page that, A-Septic shock with
Bilateral Pneumonia. B-Post traumatic Spinal Cord
Page 10 of 42
injury with Paraplegia infected bedsore hepatic
dysfunction. That is, the patient Rekhachand died
due to the same reason which I have mentioned in
the answer to query question no. 01. My signature
is on parts A to A of the query report Ex. P. 30.”
Once again, there is practically no cross examination of Dr.
Twinkle Chandrakar.
17. In the last, we should look into the oral evidence of Dr. Abhishek
Shrivastava, PW-28. Dr. Abhishek Shrivastava in his examinationin-chief has deposed as under:-
“01- I am posted as Senior Medical Officer In
Government Hospital, Supela Bhilai, District Durg
from 01.01.2021 till date.
02- On 09.11.2022 at 12:30 PM, deceased
Rekhchand Radheshyam Lodhi, age 22 years,
resident of Boratara, District Bemetara, was
presented from Shankaracharya Hospital, father
late Junwani, District Durg, for post-mortem by
constable number 484 Evan Baghel of Police
Outpost Smriti Nagar Police Station Supela, to
Government Hospital, Supela Bhilai, District Durg.
The said body was identified by Satish Lodhi,
Rajendra Yadu and constable Evan Baghel.
03- The postmortem of the said dead body was
started by me on 09.11.2022 at 12:30 P.M. The
said dead body was of a male, which was
wrapped in a white cloth and was lying straight
on the postmortem table. The body of the said
deceased was stiff and cold. There was injury on
the entire back portion of both the thighs of the
said deceased and there was injury on his left
ankle as well. There was bedsore on the entire
lower back of the said deceased, the size of which
was 4 x 3 cm.
04- The deceased was of normal height and his
skull, cranium, vertebrae, brain and spinal cord
were congested. There was fluid present in the
right and left lungs of the deceased. There was a
clot in the heart of the deceased. The diaphragm,
intestine, mouth and esophagus and pharynx of
the deceased were normal and his spleen, kidney
were pale and urinary bladder was empty and
Page 11 of 42
genitals were normal. There was half-digested
food in the stomach of the deceased and halfdigested food and stool was also present in his
small intestine and large intestine.
05- On the basis of the results and experience
obtained from the postmortem of the said
deceased Rekhachand, it is my opinion that the
said deceased died of cardiorespiratory attack due
to septic shock, which was caused by infection of
the injuries in the body of the deceased. The time
of death of the said deceased was between 18 to
36 hours and the injuries found on the body of the
said deceased were before his death
(antemortem). In this regard, the postmortem
report prepared by me is Ex.P. 34, which bears my
signatures on parts A to A, B to B and C to C.
Cross-examination by Shri Balram Sahu, Advocate
for accused Gulshan and Chavendra:-
06- On being asked whether septic shock can
occur in the absence of treatment) the witness said
that it is possible if necessary antibiotics are not
given during treatment.”
(Emphasis supplied)
There is practically no cross examination of Dr. Abhishek
Shrivastava.
18. Thus, the injured was brought to the hospital on 22.02.2022 in a
very critical condition. According to Dr. Kaushal (PW-9), the
injured was in a semi-conscious state. He was bleeding profusely
due to a very serious head injury.
19. What is discernable from the medical evidence on record, in the
form of oral testimonies of the three doctors referred to above, and
the documentary evidence in the form of postmortem report and
the injury certificate Exhibit P-34 is that the deceased died due to
complications from paraplegia following spinal cord injury which
Page 12 of 42
resulted in systemic infection and multi-organ failure. Exhibits P28, P-29 and P-34 respectively make it clear. It is ultimately the
septic shock resulting from infected pressure sores which in turn
arose from the spinal injury sustained in the incident that proved
to be fatal.
20. The deceased also suffered from pneumonia. According to the
medical experts, this pneumonia was the direct result of the long
drawn medical treatment which was given to the deceased over a
period of nine months.
21. All the three medical experts examined by the prosecution are
clear in their oral testimony that the deceased died during
treatment on 08.11.2022 due to septic shock with bilateral
pneumonia, post traumatic spinal cord injury with paraplegia and
infected bedsores leading to hepatic dysfunction. The ocular
version of the eyewitnesses corroborates with medical evidence on
record.
22. Keeping the aforesaid in mind, we now proceed to consider the
understanding of the High Court while altering the conviction.
i. When is an offence said to be made under Section 307 of
the IPC
23. The High Court while altering the conviction under Section 302 to
one under Section 307 of the IPC recorded the following findings
as contained in paragraph 35 of the Impugned Judgment. Para 35
reads thus:-
“35. No doubt, the injuries caused by the
appellants to the deceased were grievous in
nature. He died due to septic shock with bilateral
pneumonia with post traumatic spinal cord injury
with paraplegia with infected bedsore with hepatic
Page 13 of 42
dysfunction. Due to spinal cord injury, there was
paraplegia and the deceased had weakness in
both hands and legs, due to which the deceased
became bedridden and there was infection in the
wound of his hip. Due to which, it is probable that
the death of deceased Rekhchand Verma was due
to his spinal cord injury. Rekhchand Verma was
firstly referred to the Community Health Center,
Saja, the doctor there referred him to Mekahara
Hospital, Raipur and from there he was shifted to
DKS Hospital and thereafter he was again shifted
to MMI Narayan Hospital, Raipur and finally he
was shifted to Shankaracharya Hospital, Durg
where he died. As such, due to lack of proper
treatment, he died after about 9 months of the
incident. Therefore, the case of the appellants falls
within the purview of Section 307 of the IPC and
not under Section 302 of the IPC. Even otherwise,
the trial Court has already convicted the
appellants for offence under Section 307/34 of the
IPC for the same offence, therefore, there is no
necessity to convict them also for offence under
Section 302/34 of the IPC.”
24. We have noticed over a period of time that the courts get confused
while determining the exact nature of offence, more particularly,
when there is a long interval between the date the victim suffered
injuries and the date of his death.
25. We must first look into the relevant provisions of the IPC.
Sections 299, 300 and 302 of the IPC respectively read as under:-
“Section 299. Culpable homicide.—Whoever
causes death by doing an act with the intention of
causing death, or with the intention of causing
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or
with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to
cause death, commits the offence of culpable
homicide.
xxx
“Explanation 2.—Where death is caused by bodily
injury, the person who causes such bodily injury
shall be deemed to have caused the death,
Page 14 of 42
although by resorting to proper remedies and
skillful treatment the death might have been
prevented.”
Section 300. Murder.—Except in the cases
hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder,
if the act by which the death is caused is done with
the intention of causing death, or—
2ndly.—If it is done with the intention of causing
such bodily injury as the offender knows to be
likely to cause the death of the person to whom the
harm is caused, or—
3rdly.—If it is done with the intention of causing
bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, or—
4thly.—If the person committing the act knows that
it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all
probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as
is likely to cause death, and commits such act
without any excuse for incurring the risk of
causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
xxx
Section 302. Punishment for murder.—Whoever
commits murder shall be punished with death, or
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to
fine.”
26. To come within the definition of Section 299 IPC, the act of the
accused should cause death and it must be (a) with the intention
of causing death, or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily
injuries as is likely to cause death, or (c) with the knowledge that
he is likely by such act to cause death. The question when a person
could be said to have caused death by his act needs to be answered
taking into consideration the Explanations 1 and 2 respectively to
Section 299 of the IPC.
Page 15 of 42
27. The simpler case is where death results directly and immediately
from the act itself. Equally, when death ensues as a natural or
necessary consequence flowing from that act, there can be no
hesitation in holding that the act caused the death. For “Thirdly”
of Section 300 to apply the requirement is, that the injury inflicted
should be found sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, a high degree of probability, in the ordinary way of
nature, that death would ensue on the injuries. The difficulty
arises when there are recognisable contributory causes leading to
death, and the Court is called upon to consider in such case the
relative effect and strength of the different causes in bringing
about the effect i.e., the death, and then to ascertain whether the
responsibility of the death could be assigned to a particular act
which is not as proximate, or immediate.
28. Section 307 of the IPC reads as under:-
“Section 307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does
any act with such intention or knowledge, and
under such circumstances that, if he by that act
caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten
years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt
is caused to any person by such act, the offender
shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to
such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.”
29. An offence under Section 307 IPC has the following essential
ingredients:-
(i) The death of a human was attempted;
(ii) That the death was attempted to be caused, or caused
in the consequence of the act of the accused; and
Page 16 of 42
(iii) That the act was done with the intention of causing
death; or that it was done with the intention of causing such
bodily injury as:
a.the accused knew to be likely to cause death; or
b.was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death, or that the accused attempted to cause death by
doing an act known to him to be so dangerous that it must
in all probability cause:
i. death, or
ii. such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
30. Thus, from the above, the most important ingredient to constitute
the offence of attempt to commit murder punishable under Section
307 of the IPC is the intention or knowledge. To bring home guilt
against an accused under this provision, it is necessary for the
prosecution to establish that the intention of the accused was one
of the three kinds mentioned in Section 300 of the IPC. A person
commits an offence under Section 307 of the IPC when he has the
intention to commit murder and in pursuance of that intention,
does an act towards its commission irrespective of the fact whether
that act is the penultimate act or not. The provision requires that
the act must be done with such intention, or knowledge, or in such
circumstances that if death be caused by that act, the offence of
murder will emerge.
31. It is clear as noonday that causing an injury that would endanger
life is not an essential condition for the applicability of Section 307
of the IPC. Even if the injuries inflicted are simple in nature, that
by itself cannot be a ground for acquittal, if the offence otherwise
falls under Section 307 of the IPC.
Page 17 of 42
32. The word “intent” means design, or determination with which a
person acts. It presupposes knowledge. It is the purpose to use
particular means to effect certain result. The “act” referred in
Section 307 of the IPC attempted to must be with the “intention”
of killing a human. Intention is a state of mind which cannot be
proved by direct evidence as a fact; it can only ordinarily be
inferred from proved facts. It may be proved by res gestae, by acts
or events previous or subsequent to the incident or occurrence, or
on admission. We say so because it shows the presence of will in
the act which consummates a crime. The relevant circumstances
from which the intention can be gathered. We have supplied a
suggestive, and not exhaustive list:-
1. the nature of the weapon used;
2. the manner in which the weapon was used;
3. the part of the body where the injuries were inflicted;
4. the nature of the injuries caused;
5. the opportunity available which the accused gets.
33. We may quote with profit one very erudite decision of the High
Court of in the case of Sreedharan v. State of Kerala, reported
in 1969 SCC OnLine Ker 46, wherein the Court illustrated the
metrics by which intention and knowledge can be inferred. It was
held that intention can be inferred from the circumstantial
evidence of the case, such as the motive, the preparations made,
the declarations of the offender, the weapon used, the persistent
of the assault, and the nature of the injuries inflicted, and its
position. In the IPC, the word “intention” is understood in the
context of the consequences of an act, and not in relation to the
act. The Court lucidly elaborates that the presence of intention is
gathered when an act is done deliberately or purposely, it is not
Page 18 of 42
contingent on the resultant effect. Most importantly, the inference
lies in reading of the consequences from the eyes of a reasonable
man. The relevant observations read thus:-
“16. Intention and knowledge are a man's state of
mind; direct evidence thereof except through his
own confession cannot be had; and apart from a
confession they can be proved only by
circumstantial evidence. In other words, they are
matters for inference from all the circumstances of
the case such as the motive, the preparations
made, the declarations of the offender, and, in the
case of homicide, the weapon used, the
persistence of the assault, and the nature of the
injuries actually inflicted as also their location. In
the case of what are generally described as
unpremediated offences or as offences committed
on the spur of the moment, intention may be
contemporaneous with the physical act, at best of
just an instant before, and is generally to be
gathered from the nature and consequences of the
act and the attendant circumstances. It is here that
the much criticised maxim that every man is
presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his act comes into play.
17. Like most words, the word, “intention” is
capable of different shades of meaning. In the
Penal Code, 1860 it is used in relation to the
consequences of an act, the effect caused thereby,
not in relation to the act itself—the voluntariness
required to constitute an act is implied by that very
word. Thus, in the case of murder, the intention
required is (omitting clause secondly of S. 300
which rarely comes into play) the intention of
causing death or the intention of causing bodily
injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to
cause death, more or less the malice aforethought
of the English law, the former being generally
described as specific intent or malice and the latter
as implied malice or sometimes as constructive
malice, though the use of the latter term seems
open to criticism. It seems to us clear from the
illustrations to Ss. 88, 89 and 92, that the Code
uses the word, “intention” in the sense that
Page 19 of 42
something is intentionally done if it is done
deliberately or purposely, in other words, is a
willed though not necessarily a desired result or a
result which is the purpose of the deed. The
surgeon of the illustrations certainly does not
desire the harm that may be caused; nor is that
his purpose. Nevertheless, the provisions of the
sections show that he could have intended the
harm, and is saved from being a criminal only by
those provisions. Likewise a man who shoots
another in the heart and kills him in self-defence
might not desire, on the contrary might very much
dislike, causing the latter's death. His purpose is
not to cause death but to save himself. Yet his case
falls squarely within the first clause of S. 300—he
has undoubtedly caused death by doing an act
with the intention of causing death—and is saved
from being a murderer only by S.
100. Lang v. Lang(1955) A.C. 402 rather
than Rex v. Steane(1947) K.B. 997 at 1004
or Hosegood v. Hosegood66 The Times L.R. 738
illustrate the sense in which the word, “intention”
is used in S. 300 of the Penal Code, 1860—of
course none of these cases was construing that
statute. And, once you dispense with desire or
purpose, it follows that foresight of the
consequences of an act gains the upper hand in
determining whether the consequences were
intended or not. And, the foresight of a particular
person is prima facie to be gauged by the foresight
of an ordinary, reasonable man, in other words, by
what is sometimes disparagingly referred to as the
objective test or external standard—as if that were
enough to condemn it—of the reasonable and
probable consequences of the act.”
(Emphasis supplied)
34. To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC it is not essential
that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been
inflicted. Although, the nature of injury actually caused may
often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the
intention of the accused, yet such intention may also be deduced
Page 20 of 42
from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be
ascertained without any reference at all to the actual wounds.
The provision makes a distinction between an act of the accused
and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any
result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there
may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under the
provision. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to
the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary
circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What
the courts have to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result,
was done with the intention or knowledge and under
circumstances mentioned in the provision. An attempt in order
to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in
law if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in
execution thereof.
35. An offence under Section 307 IPC is made out even though death
does not ensue, more pertinently, even if no harm ensues. The
phrase employed in the provision, “if he by the act caused death”,
imports that the act in question must possess the potential to
cause death. An act intrinsically incapable of causing death
cannot constitute the offence under this provision. We had the
benefit of referring to Reg. v. Cassidy, reported in (1867) 4 Bom.
H.C. (Cr. C.) 17, which emphasizes upon the same in the following
words:-
“The first two heads are framed under S. 307. The
words of that section are:— “Whoever does any act
with such intention or knowledge, and under such
circumstances, that if he by that act caused death
he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished,
“& c. Now it appears to me, looking at the terms of
this section, as well as at the illustrations to it, that
it is necessary, in order to constitute an offence
Page 21 of 42
under it, that there must be an act done under such
circumstances that death might be caused if the
act took effect. The act must be capable of causing
death in the natural and ordinary course of things;
and if the act complained of is not of that
description, a prisoner cannot be convicted of an
attempt to murder under this section”.
(Emphasis supplied)
36. This decision was criticised by Beaumont, C.J. in Emperor v.
Vasudeo Balwant Gogte reported in 1932 SCC OnLine Bom 1,
but the learned Judge’s conclusion expressed in the following
words seems to us much the same:-
“But if you have an act done with a sufficiently
guilty intention and knowledge and in
circumstances which do not from their nature
afford a defence to a charge of murder, and if the
act is of such a nature as would have caused
death in the usual course of events but for
something beyond the accused's control which
prevented that result, then it seems to me that the
case falls within S. 337.”
37. From the above exposition of law, there is no gainsaying that the
assault shall be capable of causing death. In R. v. Whybrow
(1951-35-Crl. Appl. 141) the accused by a device constructed by
him administered electric shocks to his wife while she was in a
bath. Parker, J. directed the jury that if he did so, intending to kill
his wife or to do her grievous bodily harm he would be guilty of
attempt at murder. The Court of Appeal held that this was a wrong
direction. Observing that if the charge is one of attempt at murder,
the intention to kill is the principal ingredient of the crime. Lord
Goddard C.J., expressed himself thus:-
“Therefore, if one person attacks another, inflicting
a wound in such a way that an ordinary,
reasonable person must know that atleast
grievous bodily harm will result and death results,
there is the malice aforethought sufficient to
Page 22 of 42
support the charge of murder. But, if the charge is
one of attempted murder, the intent becomes the
principal ingredient of the crime. It may be said
that the law which is not always logical, is
somewhat illogical in saying that, if one attacks a
person intending to do grievous bodily harm and
death results, that is murder; but if one attacks a
person and only intends to do grievous bodily
harm, and death does not result, it is not
attempted murder, but wounding with intent to do
grievous bodily harm. It is not really illogical
because, in that particular case, the intent is the
essence of the crime while, where the death of
another is caused, the necessity is to prove malice
aforethought, which is supplied in law by proving
intent to do grievous bodily harm.”
(Emphasis supplied)
38. In R v. Grimwood (1962-(3)-AER. 285), the accused had been
convicted by the Central Criminal Court of attempt to strangle his
wife with intent to murder her. No verdict was taken from the jury
on two other counts, namely, attempt to suffocate his wife with
intent to murder and assault occasioning her actual bodily harm.
In the course of his direction to the jury the learned Judge, relying
on Director of Public Prosecutions v. Smith (1961-AC. 290),
observed:-
“He is put before you by his counsel as an ordinary
normal minded man, and so you should take it in
this case that he is an ordinary normal-minded
man. The Law is that in the case of an ordinary
normal man it does not matter what that man
contemplates at the moment at all. The test is
whether what he did was of a kind where death
might well have been the natural and probable
result of what he did.”
(Emphasis supplied)
39. On appeal from the above conviction, Lord Parker, C.J. delivering
the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal observed that the
Page 23 of 42
Court was clearly of the opinion that nothing that was said
in Smith (supra) had any application to the offence of attempted
murder. Adverting in particular, to the direction to the jury
extracted supra, the Lord Chief Justice observed:-
“One further matter should be mentioned, and that
is that certainly in regard to the first passage
which I have quoted in the summing up it might
well have led the jury to suppose that, even if they
were satisfied that all that the appellant intended
to do was to cause grievous bodily harm, yet if
death might well result from such grievous bodily
harm an intent to murder had been proved. That
again, if that impression was conveyed, was quite
clearly a wrong direction. In R. v. Whybrow1951-
35-Crl. Appl. 141 Lord Goddard, C.J. dealt with
that very point.”
ii. Application of Theory of Causation where death ensues
after some delay
40. The theory of causation should be kept within reasonable limits at
both ends. The question when there are latter complications would
be, whether such complications are the natural or likely
consequences of the injury, the ordinary course it takes before
death causes. That the consequences are labelled as a supervening
condition or disease, given a name and shown as the immediate
cause of death will not efface from the chain of events and causes
the original injury, if death is its ultimate result. At the end, all
death is brought about by coma, syncope or asphyxia, the
synchronised and interdependent functioning of the brain; the
heart and the lungs maintaining life. Death may properly be
attributed to coma, syncope and asphyxia, but the cause cannot
stop there. The stoppage of one of them will be quickly followed by
the stoppage of the action of others and by cessation of life. In
Brintons Ltd. v. Turvey, 1905 AC 230, 233, the Earl of Halsbury
L.C. while considering the phrase “accident causing injury”
Page 24 of 42
observing that “we must be on our guard that we are not misled
by medical phrases to alter the proper application of the phrase,
because the injury inflicted by accident sets up a condition of
things which medical men describe as disease” stated:-
“An injury to the head has been known to set up
septic pneumonia, and many years ago I
remember when that incident had in fact occurred
it was sought to excuse the person who inflicted
the blow on the head from the consequences of his
crime because his victim had died of pneumonia
and not as it was contended, of the blow on the
head. It does not appear to me that by calling the
consequences of an accidental injury a disease
one alters the nature or the consequential results
of the injury that has been inflicted.”
41. In the same case at p. 234, Lord Mac-naghten observed:-
“The accidental character of the injury is not, I
think, removed or displaced by the fact that, like
many other accidental injuries, it set up a well
known disease, which was immediately the cause
of death, and would no doubt be certified as such
in the usual death certificate.”
42. However, for culpability, as stated in Mayne's Criminal Law of
India, 4th Edn., at p. 477 “it is indispensable that death should be
connected with the act of violence not merely by a chain of causes
and effects but by such direct influence as is calculated to produce
the effect without the intervention of any considerable change of
circumstances.” The learned commentator referring to R. v.
Holland, (1841) 2 M and Rob 351; (1904) 1 Cri LJ 909, observed
at page 476:-
“The real question was whether in the end the
wound was the cause of death.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Page 25 of 42
43. He refers to Explanation 2 to Section 299 as substantially
producing the rule enunciated in Male's Pleas of the Crown,
Volume I, page 28, to the following effect:-
“If a man receives a wound, which is not in itself
mortal, but either for want of helpful applications
or neglect thereof it turns to a gangrene or a fever,
and that gangrene or fever be the immediate cause
of death, yet this is murder or manslaughter in him
that gave the stroke or wound, though it were not
the immediate cause of his death, yet if it were the
immediate cause thereof, and the fever or
gangrene was the immediate cause of his death,
yet the wound was the cause of the gangrene or
fever, and so consequently is causa causans.”
(Emphasis supplied)
44. The learned author observes at p. 475:-
“Where an injury of a dangerous character has
been inflicted, which might possibly not have been
fatal, but the sufferer declines to follow proper
treatment, or is injudiciously treated, or sinks
under an operation which might possibly have
been avoided, the person who inflicted the injury
is considered in law to have caused the death
which results.”
(Emphasis supplied)
45. In R. v. Holland (supra), the deceased who had received a cut on
the finger did not follow the advice of the surgeon to have it
amputated. Subsequently, lock-jaw set in because of which he
died. Evidence was let in that if he had submitted to an operation,
his life would probably have been saved. But Maule, J. held that
that was no defence.
46. In Russel on Crime, 12th Edn., Vol. 1 at page 28 it is stated:-
“There is however, the different, although allied,
point that a particular man's conduct may not have
been the sole cause of the actus reus, it may have
been a contributory cause. In such circumstances,
Page 26 of 42
it would seem that a safeguard against injustice
should take the form of a direction to the jury that
they should not convict unless they are satisfied
that actus reus would not have occurred but for the
accused man's participation in the matter.”
47. Proceeding it is observed:-
“The actus reus, on the above definition is an
event, and any particular event may be found to
have been produced by the combined effect of a
number of factors any one of which may be
regarded as a cause of the event provided that this
event would not have taken place had that factor
not existed. In such a situation a man may be held
to have caused the actus reus of a crime if that
actus would not have occurred without his
participation in what led upto it.”
(Emphasis supplied)
48. Referring to indirect causation, it was observed by the Madras
High Court In re, Maragatham:-
“But how far can indirect causation to be
recognised as operative, in criminal jurisprudence?
A glimmer of light is thrown upon this problem in
the case law relating to explanation 2 to Section
299, I. P. C. If, after the blow or act of injury
impugned as homicidal, a distinct set of
circumstances arises causing. a new mischief,
then the new mischief will be regarded as the
causa causans and not the original blow: R. v.
Flynn. (1867) 16 WR 319 IR, cited in Ratan's
Culpable homicide p. 8". But the question is hardly
free from subtle difficulties.”
(Emphasis supplied)
49. The difficulty of deciding between proximate and remote cause or
for finding out causa causans was cut through by the rule of
English common law that a man who had received injury from
another was not considered to have been killed by him, unless
Page 27 of 42
death followed within a year and a day after the injury. But there
is no such rule in the Indian Penal Code. While referring to the
theory of causation which provided the simple test of guilty in the
early period of criminal law, in Russel on Crimes, 12th Edn.,
Volume 1, the learned author observes at page 28 that the drawing
of a line between proximate causes and remote consequences is
unscientific, but appeared to be the only way of avoiding decisions
of a cruelty offensive to moral feelings before the doctrine of mens
rea as a legally essentially ingredient in criminal liability
appeared.” The learned author states at p. 40:-
“The new test (foresight of consequences) is found
in the requirement that the accused person, when
pursuing the line of active conduct (or passive) in
cases where there is a legal duty to action which
resulted in the harm for which he is charged (i.e.,
the actus reus) must have been aware that certain
sped fled harmful consequences would or could
follow. Such a test arises naturally from the
adoption of the ethical approach to the problem of
crime, since in many minds it is hard to see any
moral blame, meriting the infliction of punishment,
in a man who has pursued a line of conduct
without appreciating that it would produce
mischievous results.”
(Emphasis supplied)
50. In the footnote at page 412, the learned author observes that the
unscientific differentiation between proximate and remote
consequences of a man's conduct was probably due to the lack of
clear definition of mens rea which would have rendered innocuous
a remote claim of causation; since the more remote the cause the
less possible it would be to establish that the prisoner intended or
realised the result.
Page 28 of 42
51. The problem of supervening cause intervening arose for
consideration In re, Periaswami, C.A. 166 of 1961 (Mad). In that
case, the accused whipped out his knife and stabbed the deceased
in his abdomen in the course of a sudden quarrel. The deceased
had a tear in his stomach and an incised cut in the liver. He was
under treatment for 17 days and was having a sinus through
which he was discharging bile and some pus. Due to the constant
discharge of bile and pus, the abdomen suddenly burst. The
abdomen was sutured, but he did not recover. In the opinion of
the doctor, the deceased would appear to have died of septic
peritonitis as a result of the injuries to the stomach, liver and
pancreas. It was contended for the accused that the deceased died
not as a result of the wounds inflicted by the accused, but on
account of some other causes, which intervened, in the course of
treatment. After examining the case law, it is observed that the
accused inflicted the injury on the vital part of the body, and that
there was no definite evidence that death was due to other
independent supervening causes. It was held that death was due
to an injury which was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature
to cause death, and that death was ultimately due to the
supervening of septic peritonitis and the accused was directly
responsible for causing death. It was found on the evidence, that,
though there was culpable homicide, yet it was a case falling under
Part II of Section 304 of the IPC.
52. The decision in Nga Moe v. The King, AIR 1941 Rang 141, is again
illustrative:-
“The injury indicted by the accused on deceased's
head was not such as to entail any serious
consequences to a person in normal health. The
wound had healed up to the end of seven days in
the hospital but the deceased had temperature
Page 29 of 42
and on this account was advised to remain in
hospital until temperature had subsided. Contrary
to medical advice, the deceased left hospital.
Subsequently as a result of the formation of an
abscess on the brain the deceased died. But no
death would have resulted, if he had not insisted
on leaving the hospital against medical advice. His
death really ensued because of his weak physical
condition due to his suffering from chronic malaria
and because his powers of resistance to infection
had been much lowered by that disease. No
abscess would have formed on the brain if the
deceased had been in normal state of health and
he died from abscess and not from the injury
which had only a remote connection with the
abscess. The immediate cause of the deceased's
death was his debilitated condition for which the
injury was in no way responsible.”
53. It was held in the circumstances that the accused was guilty of
causing simple hurt punishable under Section 324 of the IPC.
Dunkley, J. observed at P. 144:-
“Therefore, it cannot be held that the act of the
appellant caused the death of the deceased. The
only case in which the infliction of an injury of this
nature under similar circumstances could be held
to amount to culpable homicide or murder is a case
falling within Clause 2 of Section 300, I. P. C.
namely, if the act is done with the intention of
causing such bodily injury as the offender knows
to be likely to cause the death of the person to
whom the harm is caused. If there had been
evidence to show that the appellant was at the
time aware of the state of the deceased's health
and therefore knew that even a slight injury was
likely to result in his death, his act might have
been brought under this clause, but there is no
such evidence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Page 30 of 42
54. The following observations of Roberts, C.J. in the case are apposite
in the circumstances of the present case. The learned Judge
observed:-
“It really is plain common sense that, if a man
strikes another such a blow as will not in the
ordinary course of events cause more than simple
hurt, he is answerable for causing simple hurt
and, for no more. No doubt, the natural effect of
some grave wounds, if not medically treated, is
septic inflammation, if death proceeds from this in
the ordinary course the offender is prima facie
guilty of murder; if death is merely the likely result
of such an injury, it is culpable homicide. But here
the dangerous condition which supervened was
an unlikely consequence of a blow comparatively
trivial in character although the weapon was a
dangerous one. The fact that a dangerous weapon
is used is often and may be indeed generally, a
matter to be taken into account in deciding
questions of intention; but circumstances after
cases, and, having regard to the medical evidence
here as to the wound itself it is impossible to say
that there was an intention to cause death. The
offence could not therefore amount even to
culpable homicide.”
(Emphasis supplied)
55. The leading old case is In re, Doraswami, reported in 1943 SCC
OnLine Mad 208, where the principle is thus enunciated:-
“In my view, the test is whether the cause of death
is to be directly associated with the act. Whether it
be a deliberate act in criminal cases or an accident
in cases of workmen’s compensation it is, I think,
well known that the ultimate cause of death in a
large number of cases is pneumonia. It would be a
strange position if a man who inflicts a wound
causing almost immediate death should be guilty
of murder, whilst a man who inflicts a very similar
wound from which pneumonia supervenes should
not. On the facts of this case, it is clear to me that
the deceased man, in spite of his physique which
Page 31 of 42
is said to have been exceptionally robust, died as
a direct result of the injuries inflicted upon him by
the appellant; and that the appellant intended his
death is evident from the facts. The result was not
as immediate as he intended and not perhaps
quite in the manner that he intended. But in the
process of nature, in spite of medical attention, one
of the well known perils from a wound
supervened, namely, blood poisoning, and the
deceased died. The chain of causation is in my
view direct.”
(Emphasis supplied)
56. In Taylor's Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence,
11th Edn. Vol. 1, at page 232, it is stated:-
“A wound may cause death either directly or
Indirectly. A wound operates as a direct cause of
death when the wounded person dies either
immediately or very soon after its infliction, and
there is no other cause of death. In wounds which
cause death indirectly the deceased survives for a
certain period, and the wound is complicated by
inflammation embolism, pneumonia, tetanus, or
some other mortal disease which is a consequence
of the injury. Cases which prove fatal by reason of
surgical operation rendered imperatively
necessary for the treatment of injuries presuming
that these operations have been performed with
ordinary skill and care, also fall into this
category.... It would be no answer to a charge of
death from violence to say that there was disease
in the body of the victim unless the disease was
the sole cause of death.”
(Emphasis supplied)
57. At page 238, the learned author observes:-
“Certain kinds of injuries are not immediately
followed by various consequences: but an injured
person may die after a long or shorter period and
his death may be as much a consequence of the
injury as if it had taken place on the spot. An
aggressor is as responsible as if the deceased had
been directly killed by his violence provided the
fatal result can be traced to probable
Page 32 of 42
consequences of the injury....Death may follow a
wound, and be a consequence of that wound, at
almost any period after its infliction. It is necessary
however, in order to maintain a charge of
homicide, that death should be strictly and clearly
traceable to the injury. A doubt on this point must
of course lead to an acquittal of the accused.”
(Emphasis supplied)
58. Septicemia is described by the medical experts as the condition
which results where the circulation becomes flooded with bacteria,
either due to the failure of local defensive reactions at the site of
infection or to delayed or inadequate treatment. According to the
learned author, every penetrating wound except those inflicted by
the surgeon is potentially infected, though a certain period elapsed
before invading organisms actually establish themselves become
embedded in the tissues to multiply and form toxins. [See: The
Essentials of Modern Surgery by Handfield Jones and Pokitt,
V Edn]
59. In one of the recent pronouncements of this Court in Prasad
Pradhan & Anr. v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in (2023)
11 SCC 320, this Court stated in paragraphs 30 and 31
respectively as under:-
“30. During the hearing, the appellants' counsel
had urged that Vrindawan died 20 days after the
attack, and the lapse of such a time shows that the
injuries were not sufficient to cause death in the
ordinary course of nature. On this aspect, there are
several judgments, which emphasise that such a
lapse of time, would not per se constitute a
determinative factor as to diminish the offender's
liability from the offence of murder to that of
culpable homicide, not amounting to murder.[…]
Page 33 of 42
31. There can be no stereotypical assumption or
formula that where death occurs after a lapse of
some time, the injuries (which might have caused
the death), the offence is one of culpable homicide.
Every case has its unique fact situation. However,
what is important is the nature of injury, and
whether it is sufficient in the ordinary course to
lead to death. The adequacy or otherwise of
medical attention is not a relevant factor in this
case, because the doctor who conducted the postmortem clearly deposed that death was caused
due to cardiorespiratory failures, as a result of the
injuries inflicted upon the deceased. Thus, the
injuries and the death were closely and directly
linked.”
(Emphasis supplied)
60. In the case of Sudershan Kumar v. State of Delhi, reported in
(1975) 3 SCC 831, this Court dealt with the case of acid pouring.
In the said case, this Court was called upon to consider the
question as regards the nature of the offence committed by the
appellant therein in causing death of one Maya Devi by pouring
acid on her body. After 12 days from the date of incident the victim
therein died. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that death
of Maya Devi was not the direct result of the injuries caused by
the acid burns but was on account of some supervening
circumstances not resulting from the injuries and, therefore, the
appellant therein could not be held guilty of murder. This Court
while negativizing such contention observed that the injuries
caused by the appellant therein were sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death and the appellant was accordingly
held guilty of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC.
61. In Patel Hiralal Joitaram v. State of Gujarat, reported in
(2002) 1 SCC 22, the interval between the date of the incident
when the deceased sustained burns and the date of her death was
Page 34 of 42
a fortnight. It was argued on behalf of the appellant therein that
the death of the deceased had no direct nexus with the burn
injuries as during the interregnum period some other
complications cropped up as a result of which the victim
succumbed. While negativizing such contention, this Court
observed as under:-
“16. Harping on an answer given by PW 12 in
cross-examination that death of the deceased had
occurred due to “septic” learned Senior Counsel
made out an argument that such septic condition
could have developed on account of other causes.
Mere possibility of other causes supervening
during her hospitalisation is not a safe premise for
deciding whether she would not have died due to
the burns sustained on 21-10-1988. The cause of
death can be determined on broad probabilities. In
this context we may refer to a passage from Modi's
Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, dealing
with death by burns:
“As already mentioned, death may occur
within 24 to 48 hours, but usually the first
week is the most fatal. In suppurative cases,
death may occur after five or six weeks or even
longer.”
17. In Om Parkash v. State of Punjab [(1992) 4
SCC 212] the victim was set ablaze on 17-03-1979
and she sustained burns with which she died only
13 days thereafter. The assailant was convicted of
murder and the conviction was confirmed by this
Court.
18. It is preposterous to say that the deceased in
this case would have been healed of the burn
injuries and that she would have contracted
infection through some other causes and
developed septicemia and died of that on 15-11-
1988. Court of law need not countenance mere
academic possibilities when the prosecution case
regarding death of the deceased was established
on broad probabilities as a sequel to the burns
sustained by her. Hence we repel the contention of
the learned counsel on that score.”
(Emphasis supplied)
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62. In State of Haryana v. Pala & Ors., reported in (1996) 8 SCC
51, this Court had the occasion to explain the difference between
the primary effect of the injuries and the secondary effect of the
injuries. In the said case, the victim was hit on his head three
times and after the victim had fallen the other accused had beaten
him thrice on his chest and abdomen. The victim was taken to the
hospital; he died several days later in the hospital. In the said case
the doctor’s opinion as regards the cause of death was as follows:-
“Cause of the death was due to Septicemia, which
resulted as a result of the head injury and was
sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of
nature”
63. It was contended on behalf of the accused before this Court that
the offence would not fall under any of the limbs of Section 300 of
the IPC. This question was considered in the light of further
information given by the doctors which is as follows:-
“Septicemia is the direct result of the head-injury.
This is not a disease. In other words, head injury
is the cause of death.”
64. The trial court convicted the accused applying Clause 3 of Section
300 under Section 302 of the IPC. On appeal the High Court
applied Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC and altered the offence of
murder into culpable homicide not amounting to murder and
convicted the accused under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. In
appeal before this Court, in paragraphs 3 and 4 respectively, of
the judgment the Court held as follows:-
“3. On the other hand he contended that when
death was due to septicemia, it cannot be referable
to the cause of the death in the ordinary course of
nature due to ante-mortem injuries and that,
therefore, the offence of murder has not been made
out. In support thereof, he sought to place reliance
on Lyon's Medical Jurisprudence for India (Tenth
Page 36 of 42
Edition) at page 222. It is stated therein that
“Danger to life depends, primarily, on the amount
of haemorrhage, on the organ wounded, and on
the extent of shock; secondarily, on secondary
haemorrhage, on the occurrence of septicemia,
erysipelas, tetanus, or other complications. In
answering the question whether a wound is
dangerous to life, the danger must be assessed on
the probable primary effects of the injury. Such
possibilities as the occurrence of tetanus or
septicemia, later on, are not to be taken into
consideration”. Though the learned counsel had
not read the latter part of the opinion, the medical
evidence on record do clearly establish that
septicemia is not the primary cause and the death
was due to injuries caused to the deceased and
they are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature. Septicemia would, therefore, not
be taken into account.
4. Clause 3rdly of Section 300 IPC envisages that
if the act is done with the intention of causing
bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury
intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary
course of nature to cause death, it would be
murder coming under Section 300 IPC and that,
therefore, it would not be culpable homicide under
Section 299 IPC. When the accused emerged from
their house and beat with deadly weapon on the
head and other parts of the body and death
occurred as a result of the injuries, it must be
inferred that the attack on vital parts of the body
was intended to be caused with an intention to
cause death. Intention is locked up in the heart of
the assailant and the inference is to be drawn from
acts and attending circumstances.”
(Emphasis supplied)
65. In Jagtar Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, reported in (1999)
2 SCC 174, this Court was called upon to decide as to whether
the offence would fall within the scope of Section 302 of the IPC
when the death was due to septicemia. It was argued on behalf of
the accused persons that septicemia had occurred because of the
improper treatment given. It was further contended that if there
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had been proper treatment the deceased would not have died. This
contention was negatived by the Court referring to Explanation 2
to Section 299 of IPC which reads as follows:-
“Explanation 2.—Where death is caused by bodily
injury, the person who causes such bodily injury
shall be deemed to have caused the death,
although by resorting to proper remedies and
skillful treatment the death might have been
prevented.”
66. In paragraph 7 of the judgment this Court held as follows:-
“7. Having given our anxious consideration to the
first contention of Mr. Gujral, we do not find any
substance in it. It is true that Naib Singh died 16
days after the incident due to septicemia, but Dr
M.P. Singh (PW 1), who held the post-mortem
examination, categorically stated that the
septicemia was due to the head injury sustained
by Naib Singh and that the injury was sufficient in
the ordinary course of nature to cause death. From
the impugned judgment, we find that the above
contention was raised on behalf of the appellants
and in rejecting the same, the High Court
observed:
“It is well settled that culpable homicide is not
murder when the case is brought within the
five exceptions to Section 300 Penal Code,
1860. But even though none of the said five
exceptions is pleaded or prima facie
established on the evidence on record, the
prosecution must still be required under the
law to bring the case under any of the four
clauses, firstly to fourthly, of Section 300 Penal
Code, 1860, to sustain the charge of murder.
Injury 1 was the fatal injury. When this injury
is judged objectively from the nature of it and
other evidence including the medical opinion of
Dr M.P. Singh (PW 1), we are of the considered
view that the injury was intended to be caused
with the intention of causing such a bodily
injury by Harbans Singh, the appellant on the
person of Naib Singh which was sufficient in
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the ordinary course of nature to cause
death….”
On a perusal of the evidence of PW 1 in the light of
Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC, we are in
complete agreement with the above-quoted
observations of the High Court.”
(Emphasis supplied)
67. In the present case, as per the oral testimony of the three doctors
referred to above, the cause of death of deceased Rekhchand was
cardiorespiratory failure. The injuries suffered by him at the time
of assault lead to septic shock with bilateral pneumonia, post
traumatic spinal cord injury with paraplegia and infected bedsore
hepatic dysfunction. The injuries suffered by the deceased were
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and
would come under clause “Thirdly” of Section 300 of the IPC. The
deceased ultimately died having not recovered from the injuries.
The presence of the supervening cause in the circumstances will
not, in our view, alter the culpability. In the case in hand, there
had been no such considerable change of circumstances as to
snap the chain of causation. It would have been quite a different
matter if the original injuries had healed meanwhile or ceased to
be dangerous to life and the fatal complications had set in
unexpectedly. If that would have been so, the appellant herein
would then at any rate be entitled to the benefit of doubt as to the
cause of death.
68. We are taken by surprise as to on what basis the High Court has
recorded a finding that the deceased succumbed to the injuries
suffered by him due to lack of proper treatment. There is
absolutely no evidence in this regard. Not a single suggestion in
this regard was put by the defence counsel in the crossexamination of the doctors. Even otherwise this aspect is wholly
Page 39 of 42
irrelevant in view of Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC. In other
words, according to the High Court, since, the deceased died after
about nine months from the date of the incident due to lack of
proper treatment the case is not one of murder. This finding in our
opinion is erroneous. On one hand, the High Court believes that
the cause of death was due to injuries suffered by the deceased,
and on the other hand, takes the view that as he died after nine
months due to lack of proper treatment the offence would fall
within Section 307 of the IPC.
E. CONCLUSION
69. We may highlight few broad principles that the courts must keep
in mind.
a. If it is proved that the injury was fatal and the intention was to
cause death, though the death occurred after several days of
septicaemia or other complications having supervened, yet it is
undoubtedly a murder as it falls within the first limb of Section
300 of the IPC.
b. If it is proved that the injuries by themselves were sufficient to
cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and if it is
established that those injuries were the intended injuries,
though the death might have occurred after septicaemia or other
complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would
squarely fall under the third limb of Section 300 of the IPC and
the accused is therefore liable to be punished under Section 302
of the IPC.
c. If it is proved that the injuries were imminently dangerous to
life, though the death had occurred after septicaemia or other
complications had supervened, yet the act of the accused would
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squarely fall under the fourth limb of Section 300 of the IPC,
provided, the other requirements like knowledge on the part of
the accused, etc. are satisfied and so the accused would be liable
to be punished under Section 302 of the IPC. Here also, the
primary cause of the death is the injuries and septicaemia.
d. In judging whether the injuries inflicted were sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause death, the possibility that
skilful and efficient medical treatment might prevent the fatal
result is wholly irrelevant.
e. If the supervening causes are attributable to the injuries caused,
then the person inflicting the injuries is liable for causing death,
even if death was not the direct result of the injuries.
f. Broadly speaking, the courts would have to undertake the
exercise to distinguish between two types of cases; first, where
the intervening cause of death, like peritonitis, is only a remote
and a rather improbable consequence of the injury; then it can
be said that the injury is one which may, in particular
circumstances, result in death, but which may not in ordinary
course of nature be likely to lead to it. Secondly, where the
complication which is the intervening cause of death is itself a
practically inevitable sequence to the injury. In that event, the
probability is very high indeed, amounting to practical certainty
i.e., death is a result in due course of natural events. A deep
abdominal thrust with a knife followed by injury to the internal
organs is practically certain to result in acute peritonitis causing
death. It is clearly a case of murder under Section 302 and not
merely of culpable homicide.
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g. Even when the medical evidence does not say that any one of
the injuries on the body of the deceased was sufficient to cause
death in the ordinary course of nature, yet it is open to the Court
to look into the nature of the injuries found on the body of the
deceased and infer from them that the assailants intended to
cause death of the deceased. If none of the injuries alone were
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of
the deceased, cumulatively, they may be sufficient in the
ordinary course of nature to cause his death.
h. What the courts must see is whether the injuries were sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or to cause such
bodily injuries as the accused knew to be likely to cause death
although death was ultimately due to supervention of some
other cause. An intervening cause or complication is by itself not
of such significance. What is significant is whether death was
only a remote possibility, or is one which would have occurred
in due course.
i. To sum it up, where death is delayed due to later complications
or developments, the courts should consider the nature of the
injury, complications or the attending circumstances. If the
complications or developments are the natural, or probable, or
necessary consequence of the injury, and if it is reasonably
contemplated as its result, the injury could be said to have
caused death. If on the other hand, the chain of consequences
is broken, or if there is unexpected complication causing new
mischief, the relation of cause and effect is not established, or
the causal connection is too remote then the injury cannot be
said to have caused death. If the original injury itself is of a fatal
nature, it makes no difference that death is actually caused by
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a complication naturally flowing from the injury and not the
injury itself, since causal connection is proximate.
70. In view of the aforesaid, all that we can say is that the High Court
committed a serious error in bringing the case within the ambit of
attempt to commit murder punishable under Section 307 of the
IPC on the ground that the victim survived for almost nine months
from the date of the incident, and died on account of pneumonia
and other complications during the course of treatment and not
due to the injuries suffered at the time of assault. We do not agree
with the view expressed by the High Court in the Impugned
Judgment and order.
71. In the circumstances referred to above, we reach the conclusion
that there is no merit in the appeal and the same is accordingly
dismissed.
72. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
…………………………………………J
(J.B. PARDIWALA)
…………………………………………J
(R. MAHADEVAN)
New Delhi;
12th September, 2025.
