Constitutional Law — Article 31-A (second proviso) — Consolidation of holdings — distinction between land reserved/used for common purposes under a consolidation scheme and surplus/unutilized “bachat” land contributed on pro rata basis but not earmarked for any specific common purpose — where land remains unutilized and not earmarked under the scheme it does not vest in the Gram Panchayat/State and continues to belong to proprietors in proportion to their contribution; legislative re-characterisation of such bachat land as shamilat deh without observance of proviso safeguards impermissible. (Paras 2.1, 2.3–2.6, 52–53, 63.)
Statute — Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (as amended by Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992) — insertion of sub-clause (6) to s.2(g) and Explanation — object and effect — amendment held to be clarificatory in some respects but could not be applied so as to divest proprietors of bachat lands which were not reserved/earmarked for common purposes and had not been put to common use in derogation of Article 31-A protections. (Paras 2.1–2.6, 6–9, 53.)
Property — Deprivation without compensation — where reservation is effectively for the income of a Panchayat (which is an instrumentality of the State within Article 12), such reservation may amount to “acquisition by the State” within the meaning of the second proviso to Art.31-A and attract the proviso’s protection; the State cannot evade proviso safeguards by mechanical record entries or by legislation that treats all contributed but unutilized lands as common property. (Paras 44–51, 63.)
Consolidation law — Sections 23-A and 24, East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation & Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 — management and control of lands assigned/reserved for common purposes vests in Panchayat on coming into force of scheme and upon persons entering into possession; mere finalization or entry in record without change of possession does not necessarily amount to acquisition within second proviso. (Paras 50–51.)
Precedent — Ajit Singh, Bhagat Ram and Ranjit Singh (Constitution Bench jurisprudence) — interpretation and application — Ajit Singh distinguishes categories under Art.31-A (acquisition of estate; acquisition of rights; extinguishment; modification) and recognises that substance and practical result determine whether there is acquisition; Bhagat Ram holds that reservation for Panchayat income may be acquisition under second proviso because Panchayat is within Art.12; Ranjit Singh discussed but not treated as determinative where later amendment changed constitutional context. The instant decision applies these principles and follows established ratios. (Paras 24–46, 48–51.)
Stare decisis — applicability — where a long, consistent line of decisions of the High Court and this Court has been applied for many years (more than 100 decisions in regional practice), the doctrine of stare decisis furnishes stability and predictability; courts will not lightly depart from such settled view unless it is manifestly erroneous or produces injustice. The Full Bench’s reliance on consistent High Court precedents (including Gurjant Singh and related Division/Full Bench cases) was justified. (Paras 58–62, 56–57.)
Revenue practice and relief — mutation entries and record-corrections executed pursuant to the amending provisions which purport to vest bachat land in the State/Gram Panchayat in contravention of the legal distinction recognised in Bhagat Ram/Ajit Singh are liable to be set aside; where land remains unutilized and not earmarked for specific common purposes, it must be re-distributed among proprietors proportionately in accordance with established practice and judicial directions. (Paras 2.3–2.6, 52–53.)
Equity and vested expectations — where bachat lands have been in uninterrupted possession and cultivation by proprietors for long periods, and bona fide transactions and partitions have occurred, disturbing such settled possession would cause manifest injustice; courts should effect relief that balances legal correctness with protection of long-settled proprietary expectations consistent with precedent. (Paras 21–22, 63.)
Held— Appeal dismissed; Full Bench judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court upheld to the extent that bachat/unutilized lands not earmarked for common purposes do not vest in State/Gram Panchayat and proprietors’ proportionate rights survive; no order as to costs; pending applications disposed of. (Paras 63–64.)
2025 INSC 1122
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6990 OF 2014
THE STATE OF HARYANA …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
JAI SINGH AND OTHERS …RESPONDENT(S)
INDEX
I. BACKGROUND Paras 1 to 3
II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES Paras 4 to 23
III. CONSIDERATION Paras 24 to 62
(a) Consideration of the Constitution Bench
Judgments of this Court in Ranjit Singh,
Ajit Singh and Bhagat Ram
Para 24 to 53
(b) Consideration of the judgment of the Full
Bench of the High Court in impugned
judgment and final order referring its
earlier judgment in Gurjant Singh and
several other judgments
Para 54 to 57
(c) Applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis
to the facts of the present case.
Para 58 to 62
IV. CONCLUSIONS Para 63 to 64
2
J U D G M E N T
B.R. GAVAI, CJI.
I. BACKGROUND
1. This appeal takes exception to the judgment and final
order passed by a Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana at Chandigarh1 in Civil Writ Petition No. 5877 of 1992
wherein the High Court partly allowed the writ petition
preferred by the proprietors/landowners, (Respondents
herein), challenging the amendments carried out in the Punjab
Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 19612, as inserted by
the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992, published on 11th February
1992 after the assent of the President of India.
2. The facts which give rise to the present proceedings are
as follows:
2.1 The State of Haryana, by way of Government Gazette
Notification dated 11th February 1992 inserted sub-clause (6)
to Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act along with an Explanation to
1 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘High Court’.
2 Hereinafter referred to as ‘1961 Act’.
3
the said sub-clause, which received the assent of the President
on 14th January 1992. Sub-clause (6) to Section 2(g) of the
1961 Act reads thus:
“2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requiresxxx xxx xxx
(g) “shamilat deh” includesxxx xxx xxx
(6) lands reserved for the common
purposes of a village under Section 18 of
the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation
and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act,
1948 (East Punjab Act 50 of 1948), the
management and control whereof vests in
the Gram Panchayat under section 23-A of
the aforesaid Act.
Explanation - Lands entered in the
column of ownership of record of rights as
“Jumla Malkan Wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi
Hassab Rasad”, “Jumla Malkan” or
“Mushtarka Malkan” shall be shamilat
deh within the meaning of this section.”
2.2 The respondent-landowners along with several other
similarly-situated landowners who held land in various villages
and had contributed a share of their holdings to form a
common pool of land called ‘shamilat deh’, which was meant
exclusively for the common purposes of the village inhabitants,
filed Writ Petitions before the High Court being aggrieved by
the aforementioned amendment.
4
2.3 When the batch of Writ Petitions first came up before the
High Court, upon considering the important questions of law
involved in the matter, which were likely to arise in a large
number of cases and affect a huge chunk of land, the Division
Bench which was seized of the matter vide order dated 1st
June, 1993 directed the papers of the case to be placed before
the Hon’ble Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench of the
High Court for determination of the vires of the Haryana Act
No. 9 of 1992. Thereafter, a Full Bench of the High Court heard
the matter at length and vide judgment dated 18th January
1995, reported as Jai Singh and Others v. State of
Haryana3, allowed the writ petitions and struck down the
amendments carried out by way of the Haryana Act No. 9 of
1992.
2.4 The State of Haryana4, Appellant herein, challenged the
decision of the Full Bench of the High Court before this Court
vide Civil Appeal No. 5480 of 1995 titled as State of Haryana
v. Jai Singh5. This Court by order dated 6th August, 1998 held
that certain essentials of Article 31-A of the Constitution of
3 CWP No. 5877 of 1992.
4 Hereinafter referred to as ‘appellant-State’.
5 1998 SCC OnLine SC 8
5
India had been overlooked and accordingly, the civil appeal
came to be allowed and the matter was remanded to the High
Court for reconsideration of the issues in light of Article 31-A
of the Constitution of India.
2.5 Accordingly, a Full Bench of the High Court by way of the
impugned judgment and final order, examined the legality of
sub-clause (6) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act as inserted by the
Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 and partly allowed the writ petitions
preferred by the respondent-landowners. The Full Bench of the
High Court vide the impugned judgment and final order also
issued certain consequential directions with regard to certain
mutation entries made by the Revenue Authorities.
2.6 Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant-State filed a Civil
Appeal No. 6990 of 2014 before this Court. Vide judgment and
order dated 7th April 2022, this Court allowed the civil appeal
in the following terms:
“128.Consequently, we hold that Act 9 of 1992, the
amending Act is valid and does not suffer from any
vice of constitutional infirmity. The entire land
reserved for common purposes by applying pro rata
cut had to be utilised by the Gram Panchayat for the
present and future needs of the village community
and that no part of the land can be re-partitioned
amongst the proprietors.
6
129. With the aforesaid discussion and findings, the
appeals filed by the State and Panchayats are allowed
and those filed by the proprietors are dismissed.
Consequently, the writ petitions filed before the High
Court shall also stand dismissed.”
2.7 Seeking review of the aforementioned judgment of this
Court, one Karnail Singh, being Respondent No. 28 in the
present proceedings, preferred Review Petition (C) No. 526 of
2023 before this Court.
2.8 After a thorough consideration of the issue at hand, this
Court vide order dated 16th May 2024 allowed the Review
Petition in the following terms:
“69. In the result, we pass the following order:
The Review Petition is allowed.
The judgment and order of this Court
dated 7th April 2022 in Civil Appeal No.
6990 of 2014 is recalled and the appeal is
restored to the file.
The appeal is directed to be listed for
hearing peremptorily on 7th August 2024
at Serial No.1”
2.9 After the review was allowed, we have heard the appeals
afresh.
7
3. We have heard Shri Vinay Navare, learned Senior
Counsel, appearing on behalf of the appellant-State as well as
Shri Manoj Swarup, Shri Narender Hooda and Shri
Rameshwar Singh Malik, learned Senior Counsel, appearing
on behalf of the respondent-landowners.
II. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
4. Shri Navare appearing for the appellant-State submitted
that the impugned judgment and final order of the High Court
is self-contradictory in nature. He submitted that despite
holding that lands reserved for common purposes as per the
consolidation scheme, whether utilized or not, would vest with
the State or Gram Panchayat, the High Court directed
cancellation of mutations made in favour of the appellantstate. He further submitted that in light of a categorical finding
to the effect that the amended provisions were merely
elucidations of the already existing provisions, the High Court
ought not to have cancelled or set aside the mutations which
were a necessary consequence of Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992
which amended the 1961 Act.
5. The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the
liberty granted by the High Court to the State or Gram
8
Panchayat to file an application for eviction or title suit for
those lands which had been earmarked for common purposes,
would run contrary to the very purpose and objective of the
Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 and would introduce the same
mischief which the said Act sought to do away with. He,
therefore, submitted that the impugned judgment and final
order being self-contradictory and erroneous to the above
extent deserves to be set aside and/or modified.
6. Shri Navare further submitted that the lands contributed
by the respondent-landowners on pro-rata basis during
consolidation proceedings as carried out under the East
Punjab Holdings (Consolidation And Prevention of
Fragmentation) Act, 19486 would fall within the definition of
‘shamilat deh’ under the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992. Such
lands, he submitted, would vest in the State or Gram
Panchayat, irrespective of whether they have been reserved for
common purposes or not. He submitted that vesting of such
lands in the State or Gram Panchayat is complete as soon as
the consolidation scheme attains finality and once so vested,
6 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Consolidation Act of 1948’.
9
the proprietors lose all rights and interests. Shri Navare further
submitted that once the land has been recorded as ‘shamilat
deh’, there would be no need to prove as to whether it had been
earmarked or used for common purposes.
7. Shri Navare submitted that since the Haryana Act No. 9
of 1992 did not exclude unutilized lands i.e. bachat lands, the
said lands could not be given back to the respondentlandowners. He submitted that before the High Court, the only
claim raised by the respondent-landowners was qua land
reserved for the income of the Gram Panchayat as well as land
which had been reserved for common purposes but had not
been utilized. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that all
such lands which had been reserved for common purposes
vested with the Gram Panchayat and further that, the
concomitant Rule 16(ii) of the Consolidation Rules would cover
all such lands which had been taken over for common
purposes as per the consolidation scheme under the
Consolidation Act of 1948. Therefore, Shri Navare submitted,
the High Court had erred in holding that bachat lands not
reserved for common use would remain with the proprietors in
proportion to their contribution.
10
8. Shri Navare further submitted that Haryana Act No. 9 of
1992 did not alter or affect the rights of the respondentlandowners, as their ownership had already been extinguished
under the Consolidation Act of 1948 and its concomitant Rules
upon the finalization of the consolidation proceedings
thereunder. He submitted that the Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992,
enacted as an agrarian reform to strengthen Gram Panchayat
control, is merely clarificatory and does not divest proprietors
of any ownership rights and therefore, it would not be hit by
the rigours of Articles 31-A and 300A of the Constitution of
India.
9. With regard to the decision of this Court in Bhagat Ram
and Others v. State of Punjab and Others7, Shri Navare
submitted that the judgment supports the proprietors only to
the extent that land cannot be reserved solely to generate
income for the Gram Panchayat. However, he submitted that
this Court deliberately refrained from ordering the return of
land to proprietors to avoid disrupting the consolidation
scheme under the Consolidation Act of 1948. He submitted
7 1966 SCC OnLine SC 264 : (1967) 2 SCR 165
11
that returning bachat land to the proprietors would cause
fragmentation and reverse the landholding structure to a pre1948 scenario, which the Act expressly prohibits. Therefore, he
submitted, what the Supreme Court consciously avoided in
Bhagat Ram (supra) could not have been directed by the High
Court. To substantiate his contention, Shri Navare placed
reliance on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Sarat
Chandra Mishra and Others. v. State of Orissa and
Others8, Ramesh Chand Daga v. Rameshwari Bai9 and
Gajraj Singh and Others v. State of U.P. and Others10 to
submit that a judgment cannot be read as a statute and it may
be presumed that the same has been rendered in accordance
with law.
10. In the result, Shri Navare submitted that the civil appeals
deserve to be allowed and the High Court’s order ought to be
set aside only to the extent that it directs the cancellation of
mutations made in the appellant’s favour.
8 (2006) 1 SCC 638
9 (2005) 4 SCC 772
10 (2001) 5 SCC 762
12
11. Per contra, Shri Manoj Swarup, learned Senior Counsel,
appearing on behalf of some of the respondent-landowners
submitted that the concerned land has been in their
possession and under their cultivation from the very inception.
As such, he submitted that, the respondent-landowners are
the absolute owners of the land and they could not have been
deprived of their proprietary rights without acquisition of the
land through due process of law.
12. Shri Swarup submitted that the insertion of Clause 2(g)(6)
with the Explanation in the 1961 Act, by way of the Haryana
Act No. 9 of 1992, arbitrarily expanded the definition of
‘shamilat deh’. He submitted that the land of the respondentlandowners was neither reserved under the provisions of
Section 18 of the Consolidation Act of 1948 for utilization for
common purposes nor used for common purposes, but
remained under their cultivation making them the absolute
owners of the land. He, therefore, submitted that the
amendment amounts to compulsory acquisition without
compensation, thereby violating Article 31-A of the
Constitution of India.
13
13. He further submitted that the unutilized land i.e. bachat
land ought to be revested with the respondent-landowners as
such land does not fall within the ambit of ‘shamilat deh’. He
submitted that the management and control of the bachat land
would also not vest with the Gram Panchayat under the
provisions of Sections 18 and 23-A of the Consolidation Act of
1948 and Rule 16(ii) of the Concomitant Consolidation Rules.
The learned Senior Counsel further clarified that before the
High Court, the respondent-landowners had only joined issues
with regard to unutilized lands, since after an exchange of
affidavits, the appellant-State had taken a similar stance. He,
therefore, submitted that since the land has neither been
utilized nor reserved for any specific common purpose, it ought
to revest with the proprietors. To bolster his submission, Shri
Swarup placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the
case of Bhagat Ram (supra) which has been relied upon by
the High Court in the impugned judgment and final order.
14. Even insofar as the direction of the High Court with
regard to vesting of utilized or unutilized land with the Gram
Panchayat is concerned, Shri Swarup submitted that it has
been set aside by a judgment passed by a 5-Judge Bench of
14
the High Court dated 22nd July 2016 in Suraj Bhan and
Others v. State of Haryana and Another in CWP No. 314 of
2001, which has otherwise upheld the judgment of the Full
Bench impugned before us, in toto.
15. Shri Swarup, in the result, submitted that decision of the
High Court be upheld and the civil appeals be dismissed with
costs.
16. Shri Narender Hooda, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of some of the respondent-landowners submitted
that though the right to property is no more a fundamental
right, it is still a constitutional right. It is submitted that in
view of the law laid down by this Court in the cases of Ajit
Singh v. State of Punjab and Another11 and Bhagat Ram
(supra), the land cannot be acquired where the beneficiary is
the State. He submits that where the reservation of land is for
the purpose of generating revenue for the State, it constitutes
taking away the land for the State and attracts protection
granted under the second proviso to Article 31A of the
Constitution mandating payment of compensation at market
11 1966 SCC OnLine SC 192 : (1967) 2 SCR 143
15
value. It is, therefore, submitted that the High Court has
rightly considered this legal position and held that the lands
which are not earmarked for a particular purpose would revest
in the proprietors.
17. Shri Hooda further submitted that the Constitution
Bench of this Court in the case of K.T. Plantation Private
Limited and Another v. State of Karnataka12 has
reaffirmed the legal position that even after the deletion of
Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(2) of the Constitution of India, the
deprivation of a property of a citizen must conform to
foundational constitutional requirements. He submits that the
Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly held that the
public purpose is a precondition for deprivation of a person
from his property under Article 300-A and that the State has
to justify both - the public purpose as well as compensation for
such deprivation.
18. He submits that the Constitution Bench has further held
that the statutes authorizing deprivation of property are
amenable to judicial review, and must satisfy constitutional
12 (2011) 9 SCC 1
16
standards of non-arbitrariness, proportionality, and the rule of
law.
19. Shri Hooda further submitted that the Constitution
Bench held that though a full market value compensation may
be no longer a constitutional mandate, the obligation to pay
compensation - whether nominal, partial or otherwise - still
exists. He further submitted that such a compensation has to
be “just, fair and reasonable” within the meaning of Articles 14
and 21 of the Constitution of India.
20. Shri Hooda further submitted that this Court in the
Constitution Bench Judgments in the cases of Ranjit Singh
and Others v. State of Punjab and Others13
, Ajit Singh
(supra) and Bhagat Ram (supra) on an interpretation of the
Consolidation Act of 1948, in unequivocal terms, held that the
lands whose possession was never given in implementation of
the Consolidation Scheme do not vest in the Gram Panchayat
but continue to belong to the original proprietors. It has further
been held that such lands which have not been earmarked for
any specific purpose under the Scheme, which are commonly
13 1964 SCC OnLine SC 182 : (1965) 1 SCR 82
17
known as bachat lands, must revert to the proprietors. He
submitted that the doctrine of stare decisis, when the aforesaid
legal position has been in vogue for a long period, would not
permit the same to be reversed.
21. Shri Hooda further submitted that the Consolidation
proceedings in the State of Haryana happened in and around
1960. It is submitted that, over the past 65 years, the
possession of the bachat land remained undisturbed, despite
earmarking, with the proprietors. He submitted that in some
instances, the original proprietors remained in settled
occupation. In many cases, bona fide transactions have taken
place through registered sale deeds. In several other instances,
statutory authorities have effected partitions between joint
owners and/or vendees. It is submitted that these persons
have invested labour, capital and generations of time on the
footing that their possession was lawful and secure. He
submitted that, disturbing such long-settled rights would be
manifestly unjust. He, therefore, submits that it would be just
and necessary in the interests of justice that even if such
bachat lands are earmarked for some purposes but their
possession has not been taken for long years, they need to be
18
protected, and such lands need to be revested in the
proprietors.
22. Shri Rameshwar Singh Malik, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of some of the other respondentproprietors submitted that, the case of the respondentproprietors is squarely covered by the decisions of this Court
in the cases of Ajit Singh (supra), Bhagat Ram (supra) and
State of Punjab v. Gurjant Singh14.
23. In light of the same, he submitted that the civil appeals
be dismissed and the States of Punjab and Haryana and the
UT of Chandigarh be directed to re-partition the bachat land
amongst the respondent-proprietors in the same proportion in
which they had contributed their land during the consolidation
proceedings.
III. CONSIDERATIONS
(a) Consideration of the Constitution Bench Judgments
of this Court in Ranjit Singh (supra), Ajit Singh
(supra) and Bhagat Ram (supra)
24. For considering the controversy, a reference to three
Constitution Bench Judgments of this Court would be
14 Civil Appeal Nos. 5709-5714 of 2001
19
necessary.
25. The first one is in the case of Ranjit Singh (supra). In the
said case, the Constitution Bench of this Court was concerned
with the consolidation proceedings in which portions of land
from those commonly owned by the appellants therein as
proprietors, had been reserved for the village Panchayat and
handed over to it for diverse purposes; whereas, other portions
had been reserved either for non-proprietors or for the common
purposes of the villages. In the said case, in the village Virk
Kalan, 270 kanals and 13 marlas had been given to the village
Panchayat for management and realization of income, even
though the ownership was still shown in village papers as
‘shamilat deh’ in the names of the proprietors; 10 kanals and
3 marlas had been reserved for abadi to be distributed among
persons entitled thereto, and 3 kanals and 7 marlas had been
reserved for manure pits. Similarly, in village Sewana, certain
lands were set apart for the village Panchayat for extension of
the abadi and to enable grants of certain land to be made to
each family of non-proprietors and certain lands had been
reserved for a primary school and some more for a phirni.
Similarly, in village Mehnd, land had been reserved for the
20
village Panchayat, a school, tanning ground, hospital,
cremation ground and for non-proprietors. The proprietors
were not paid compensation for the lands and as such, taking
away and allotment of the lands was the subject matter of
challenge in those appeals in the said case.
26. The appeals before this Court were heard and closed for
judgment on 27th April 1964. The judgment had to be
postponed till after the vacation. However, before the Court
could reassemble after the vacation on 20th July 1964, the
Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964 received the
assent of the President i.e. on 20th June, 1964. Vide the said
Amendment, a new sub-clause (a) in clause (2) of Article 31-A
was substituted retrospectively and added a proviso to clause
(1). The appeals were set down to be mentioned on July 20/23,
1964, and counsel were asked if, in view of the amendment,
they wished to say anything. However, neither of parties
wished to argue. The appeals were thus decided on the old
arguments, though it was clear to the Court that the
amendment of Article 31-A, which had a far-reaching effect,
and it must have affected one or other of the parties. The
Constitution Bench upheld the judgment of the High Court
21
which had held that the transfer of ‘shamilat deh’ owned by the
proprietors to the village Panchayat for the purposes of
management and the conferral of proprietary rights on nonproprietors in respect of lands in abadi deh was not ultra vires
of Article 31 inasmuch as, no compensation was payable.
27. It must be noted that the judgment of the High Court was
rendered by interpreting Article 31-A as it existed prior to the
Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964. This Court
though called upon the parties to address the Court on the
effect of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964,
no arguments were advanced. As such, in Ranjit Singh
(supra), this Court did not have the occasion to consider the
effect of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964
by which the second proviso was added to Article 31-A of the
Constitution of India. In that view of the matter, the judgment
of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Ranjit Singh (supra)
will not have a bearing on the present matter.
28. In the case of Ajit Singh (supra), again the challenge was
to the scheme made under the provisions of the Consolidation
Act of 1948. One of the grounds raised before the High Court
22
as well as this Court was that the compensation must be paid
to the appellant for the land reserved in the scheme for various
purposes in accordance with the second proviso to Article 31-
A(1) inserted by the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)
Act, 1964.
29. It will be relevant to refer to the following paragraphs in
Ajit Singh (supra):
“6. Coming now to the third point raised by Mr
Iyenger, we may first mention that it was held by this
Court in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab [(1965) 1 SCR
82] that the Act was protected from challenge by
Article 31-A. It is necessary to set out the relevant
constitutional provisions. The relevant portion of
Article 31-A reads as under:
“31-A. (1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in Article 13, no law providing
for—
(a) the acquisition by the State of any
estate or of any rights therein or the
extinguishment or modification of
any such rights……….
shall be deemed to be void on the
ground that it is inconsistent with, or
takes away or abridges any of the
rights conferred by Article 14, Article
19 or Article 31:
Provided that * * *
Provided further that where any
law makes any provision for the
acquisition by the State of any estate
and where any land comprised
therein is held by a person under his
23
personal cultivation, it shall not be
lawful for the State to acquire any
portion of such land as is within the
ceiling limit applicable to him under
any law for the time being in force or
any building or structure standing
thereon or appurtenant thereto,
unless the law relating to the
acquisition of such land, building or
structure, provides for payment of
compensation at a rate which shall
not be less than the market value
thereof.
(2)(b) the expression ‘rights’ in
relation to an estate shall include any
rights vesting in a proprietor, subproprietor, under-proprietor, tenureholder, raiyat, under-raiyat or other
intermediary and any rights or
privileges in respect of land revenue.”
Relevant portions of Articles 19
and 31 may also be set out because
the learned counsel have laid stress
on the language employed therein.
“19. (1) All citizens shall have the right—
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of
property.
31. (1) No person shall be deprived of
his property save by authority of law.
(2) No property shall be compulsorily
acquired or requisitioned save for a
public purpose and save by authority
of a law which provides for
compensation for the property so
acquired or requisitioned and either
fixes the amount of the
compensation or specifies the
principles on which, and the manner
in which, the compensation is to be
24
determined and given; and no such
law shall be called in question in any
court on the ground that the
compensation provided by that law is
not adequate.
(2-A) Where a law does not provide
for the transfer of the ownership or
right to possession of any property to
the State or to a corporation owned
or controlled by the State, it shall not
be deemed to provide for the
compulsory acquisition or
requisitioning of property,
notwithstanding that it deprives any
person of his property.”
7. It would be noticed that Article 31-A(1)(a)
mentions four categories; first acquisition by the
State of an estate; second, acquisition by the State of
rights in an estate; third, the extinguishment of
rights in an estate, and, fourthly, the modification of
rights in an estate. These four categories are
mentioned separately and are different. In the first
two categories the State “acquires” either an estate or
rights in an estate. In other words, there is a
transference of an estate or the rights in an estate to
the State. When there is a transference of an estate
to the State, it could be said that all the rights of the
holder of the estate have been extinguished. But if
the result in the case of the extinguishment is the
transference of all the rights in an estate to the State,
it would properly fall within the expression
“acquisition by the State of an estate”. Similarly, in
the case of an acquisition by the State of a right in an
estate it could also be said that the rights of the
owner have been modified since one of the rights of
the owner has been acquired.
8. It seems to us that there is this essential difference
between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand
and “modification or extinguishment of rights” on the
other that in the first case the beneficiary is the State
25
while in the latter case the beneficiary of the
modification or the extinguishment is not the State.
For example, suppose the State is the landlord of an
estate and there is a lease of that property, and a law
provides for the extinguishment of leases held in an
estate. In one sense it would be an extinguishment of
the rights of a lessee, but it would properly fall under
the category of acquisition by the State because the
beneficiary of the extinguishment would be the State.
9. Coming now to the second proviso to Article 31-A,
it would be noticed that only one category is
mentioned in the proviso, the category being
“acquisition by the State of an estate”. It means that
the law must make a provision for the acquisition by
the State of an estate. But what is the true meaning
of the expression “acquisition by the State of an
estate”. In the context of Article 31-A, the expression
“acquisition by the State of an estate” in the second
proviso to Article 31-A(1) must have the same
meaning as it has in clause (1)(a) to Article 31-A. It is
urged on behalf of the respondents before us that the
expression “acquisition by the State of any estate” in
Article 31-A(1)(a) has the same meaning as it has in
Article 31(2-A). In other words, it is urged that the
expression “acquisition by the State of any estate”
means transfer of the ownership or right to
possession of an estate to the State. Mr. Iyengar on
the other hand urges that the expression “acquisition
by the State” has a very wide meaning and it would
bear the same meaning as was given by this Court
in State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose [(1964)
SCR 587] , Dwarkadas Shrinivas of
Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co.
Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791 : (1954) SCR 674] Saghir
Ahmad v. State of U.P. [(1955) 1 SCR 707]
and Bombay Dyeing and Manufacturing Co.
Ltd. v. State of Bombay [(1958) SCR 1122] . In these
cases this Court had given a wide meaning to the
word “acquisition”. In Dwarkadas Shrinivas of
Bombay v. Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co.
26
Ltd. [(1953) 2 SCC 791 : (1954) SCR 674] Mahajan,
J., observed at p. 704 as follows:
“The word ‘acquisition’ has quite a wide
concept, meaning the procuring of
property or the taking of it permanently or
temporarily. It does not necessarily imply
the acquisition of legal title by the State in
the property taken possession of.”
He further observed at p. 705:
“I prefer to follow the view of the
majority of the Court, because it
seems to me that it is more in
consonance with juridical principle
that possession after all is ninetenths of ownership, and once
possession is taken away, practically
everything is taken away, and that in
construing the Constitution it is the
substance and the practical result of
the act of the State that should be
considered rather than its purely
legal aspect.”
Bose, J., observed at p. 734 as follows:
“In my opinion, the possession and
acquisition referred to in clause (2)
mean the sort of ‘possession’ and
‘acquisition’ that amounts to
‘deprivation’ within the meaning of
clause (1). No hard and fast rule can
be laid down. Each case must
depend on its own facts. But if there
is substantial deprivation, then
clause (2) is, in my judgment,
attracted. By substantial deprivation
I mean the sort of deprivation that
substantially robs a man of those
attributes of enjoyment which
normally accompany rights to, or an
interest in, property. The form is
27
unessential. It is the substance that
we must seek.”
10. Let us now see whether the other part of the
second proviso throws any light on this question. It
would be noticed that it refers to ceiling limits. It is
well known that under various laws dealing with land
reforms, no person apart from certain exceptions can
hold land beyond a ceiling fixed under the law.
Secondly, the proviso says that not only the land
exempted from acquisition should be within the
ceiling limit but it also must be under personal
cultivation. The underlying idea of this proviso seems
to be that a person who is cultivating land personally,
which is his source of livelihood, should not be
deprived of that land under any law protected by
Article 31-A unless at least compensation at the
market rate is given. In various States most of the
persons have already been deprived of land beyond
the ceiling limit on compensation which was less
than the market value. It seems to us that in the light
of all the considerations mentioned above the words
“acquisition by the State” in the second proviso do
not have a technical meaning, as contended by the
learned counsel for the respondent. If the State has
in substance acquired all the rights in the land for its
own purposes, even if the title remains with the
owner, it cannot be said that it is not acquisition
within the second proviso to Article 31-A.
11. But the question still remains whether even if a
wider meaning is given to the word “acquisition” what
has been done by the scheme and the Act is
acquisition or not within the meaning of the second
proviso. In other words, does the scheme only modify
rights or does it amount to acquisition of land? The
scheme is not part of the record, but it appears that
89B-18B-11B (Pukhta) of land was owned by the
Gram Panchayat prior to consolidation, which was
used for common purposes. Some further area was
reserved for common purposes as khals, paths,
khurrahs, panchayat ghars and schools etc. after
28
applying cut upon the rightholders on pro-rata basis.
It does not appear that any land, apart from what was
already owned by the Panchayat, was reserved for
providing income to the Panchayat. Therefore, in this
case we are not concerned with the validity of
acquisition for such a purpose.”
30. A perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs would reveal that
in paragraph 6, this Court reproduced the provisions of Article
31-A, as amended.
31. In paragraph 7, this Court carved out 4 categories
covered by Article 31-A as under:
(i) acquisition by the State of an estate;
(ii) acquisition by the State of rights in an estate;
(iii) the extinguishment of rights in an estate; and
(iv) the modification of rights in an estate.
32. Analysing the said provision, the Constitution Bench held
that, in the first two categories, the State “acquires” either an
estate or rights in an estate i.e., there is a transference of an
estate or the rights in an estate to the State. The Constitution
Bench held that when there is a transference of an estate to
the State, it could be said that all the rights of the holder of the
estate have been extinguished. It further held that, if the result
29
in the case of the extinguishment is the transference of all the
rights in an estate to the State, it would properly fall within the
expression “acquisition by the State of an estate”. It further
held that, in the case of an acquisition by the State of a right
in an estate it could also be said that the rights of the owner
have been modified since one of the rights of the owner has
been acquired.
33. In paragraph 8, the Constitution Bench carved out the
difference between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand
and “modification or extinguishment of rights” on the other. It
held that in the first case, the beneficiary is the State while in
the latter case the beneficiary of the modification or the
extinguishment is not the State.
34. In paragraph 9, this Court recorded that in the second
proviso to Article 31-A, only one category is mentioned i.e.,
“acquisition by the State of an estate”. It observed that the law
must make a provision for the acquisition by the State of an
estate. It went on to analyze the true meaning of the expression
“acquisition by the State of an estate”. It was sought to be
urged before this Court, that the expression “acquisition by the
30
State” has a very wide meaning and it would bear the same
meaning as was given by this Court in a catena of judgments.
35. In paragraph 10, this Court recorded that the second
proviso to Article 31-A refers to ceiling limits. It was further
observed that the proviso provides that, not only the land
exempted from acquisition should be within the ceiling limit
but it also must be under personal cultivation. The Court held
that the underlying idea of this proviso was that a person who
is cultivating land personally, which is his source of livelihood,
should not be deprived of that land under any law protected by
Article 31-A unless at least compensation at the market rate is
given. The Court held that the words “acquisition by the State”
in the second proviso cannot be given a technical meaning, as
was contended on behalf of the State. It held that, if the State
has in substance acquired all the rights in the land for its own
purposes, even if the title remains with the owner, it cannot be
said that it is not acquisition within the second proviso to
Article 31-A.
36. In paragraph 11, this Court recorded the facts in the said
case. It recorded that some of the lands were owned by the
31
Gram Panchayat prior to consolidation, which was used for
common purposes. Some further area was reserved for
common purposes as khals, paths, khurrahs, panchayat ghars
and schools etc., after applying a cut upon the rightholders on
pro-rata basis. It observed that apart from what was already
owned by the Panchayat, no other land was reserved for
providing income to the Panchayat. As such, the Court was
not concerned with the validity of acquisition for such a
purpose.
37. It will also be relevant to refer to the following paragraphs
of the said judgment in Ajit Singh (supra):
“12. Rule 16 (ii) of the Punjab Holdings
(Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation)
Rules, 1949, provides:
“In an estate or estates where during
consolidation proceedings there is
no shamlat Deh land or such land is
considered inadequate, land shall be
reserved for the Village panchayat and for
other common purposes, under Section
18(c) of the Act, out of the common pool of
the village at a scale prescribed by the
Government from time to time.
Proprietary rights in respect of land so
reserved (except the area reserved for the
extension of abadi of proprietors and nonproprietors) shall vest in the proprietary
body of estate or estates concerned and it
shall be entered in the column of
32
ownership of record of rights as (Jumla
Malkan wa Digar Haqdaran Arazi Hasab
Rasad Raqba). The management of such
land shall be done by the Panchayat of the
estate or estates concerned on behalf of
the village proprietary body and the
panchayat shall have the right to utilise
the income derived from the land so
reserved for the common needs and
benefits of the estate or estates
concerned.”
It will be noticed that the title still vests in
the property body (sic), the management
of the land is done on behalf of the
proprietary body, and the land is used for
the common needs and benefits of the
estate or estates concerned. In other
words a fraction of each proprietor's land
is taken and formed into a common pool
so that the whole may be used for the
common needs and benefits of the estate,
mentioned above. The proprietors
naturally would also share in the benefits
along with others.
13. In Attar Singh v. State of U.P. [(1959) Supp 1 SCR
928 at p 938] Wanchoo J., speaking for the Court,
said this of the similar proviso in a similar Act,
namely, the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act (U.P.
Act 5 of 1954) as amended by the U.P. Act 16 of 1957:
“Thus the land which is taken over is a
small bit, which sold by itself would
hardly fetch anything. These small bits of
land are collected from various
tenureholders and consolidated in one
place and added to the land which might
be lying vacant so that it may be used for
the purposes of Section 14(1)(ee). A
compact area is thus created and it is
used for the purposes of the tenureholders themselves and other villagers.
33
Form CH-21 framed under Rule 41(a)
shows the purposes to which this land
would be applied, namely, (1) plantation
of trees, (2) pasture land, (3) manure pits,
(4) threshing floor, (5) cremation ground,
(6) graveyards, (7) primary or other school,
(8) playground, (9) Panchayatghar, and
(10) such other objects. These small bits
of land thus acquired from tenure-holders
are consolidated and used for these
purposes, which are directly for the
benefit of the tenure-holders. They are
deprived of a small bit and in place of it
they are given advantages in a much
larger area of land made up of these small
bits and also of vacant land.”
In other words, a proprietor gets
advantages which he could never have got
apart from the scheme. For example, if he
wanted a threshing floor, a manure pit,
land for pasture, khal etc. he would not
have been able to have them on the
fraction of his land reserved for common
purposes.
14. Does such taking away of property then amount
to acquisition by the State of any land? Who is the
real beneficiary? Is it the Panchayat? It is clear that
the title remains in the proprietary body and in the
revenue records the land would be shown as
belonging to “all the owners and other right holders
in proportion to their areas”. The Panchayat will
manage it on behalf of the proprietors and use it for
common purposes; it cannot use it for any other
purpose. The proprietors enjoy the benefits derived
from the use of land for common purposes. It is true
that the non-proprietors also derive benefit but their
satisfaction and advancement enures in the end to
the advantage of the proprietors in the form of a more
efficient agricultural community. The Panchayat as
such does not enjoy any benefit. On the facts of this
34
case it seems to us that the beneficiary of the
modification of rights is not the State, and therefore
there is no acquisition by the State within the second
proviso.
15. In the context of the 2nd proviso, which is trying
to preserve the rights of a person holding land under
his personal cultivation, it is impossible to conceive
that such adjustment of the rights of persons holding
land under their personal cultivation in the interest
of village economy was regarded as something to be
compensated for in cash.”
38. In paragraph 12, after reproducing Rule 16(ii) of the
Consolidation Rules, this Court observed that the title still
vests in the proprietary body. However, the management of
the land is done on behalf of the proprietary body, and the land
is used for the common needs and benefits of the estate or
estates concerned. It further held that a fraction of each
proprietor's land is taken and formed into a common pool so
that the whole area may be used for the common needs and
benefits of the estate, mentioned above. It further held that the
proprietors naturally would also share in the benefits along
with others.
39. In paragraph 14, this Court held that it was clear that the
title remains in the proprietary body and in the revenue
records the land would be shown as belonging to “all the
35
owners and other right holders in proportion to their areas”.
This Court held that the Panchayat would manage it on behalf
of the proprietors and use it for common purposes and that it
cannot use it for any other purpose. This Court held that the
proprietors also enjoy the benefits derived from the use of land
for common purposes. It observed that the non-proprietors
also derive benefit but their satisfaction and advancement
enures in the end to the advantage of the proprietors in the
form of a more efficient agricultural community. The
Panchayat as such does not enjoy any benefit. This Court held,
in light of the facts of the said case, that the beneficiary of the
modification of rights was not the State, and therefore there
was no acquisition by the State within the meaning of the
second proviso.
40. In paragraph 15, this Court, referring to second proviso,
held that it is impossible to conceive that such adjustment of
the rights of persons holding land under their personal
cultivation in the interest of village economy was regarded as
something to be compensated for in cash.
36
41. It can thus be seen that in Ajit Singh (supra), this Court
was considering the portion of lands which was taken from the
proprietors; formed into a common pool and used for common
needs and benefits of the estate or estates concerned. It was
held that the said land could not be used for any other
purpose. It has further affirmed that the proprietors also enjoy
the benefits derived from the use of land for common purposes.
42. It is further pertinent to note that in Ajit Singh (supra),
this Court held that the words “acquisition by the State” in the
second proviso cannot be given a technical meaning. It has
been held that if the State has in substance acquired all the
rights in the land for its own purposes, even if the title remains
with the owner, it cannot be said that it is not acquisition
within the ambit of the second proviso to Article 31-A.
43. Justice M. Hidayatullah (as his Lordship then was) in his
minority judgment disagreed with the majority view. He held
that when the State acquires almost the entire bundle of rights,
it is acquisition within the meaning of the second proviso and
compensation at market rates must be given.
37
44. The third judgment of the Constitution Bench of this
Court is in the case of Bhagat Ram (supra), which would be
the most relevant for the present purpose.
45. It will be relevant to note that judgments in both Ajit
Singh (supra) and Bhagat Ram (supra) were delivered on the
very same day.
46. In the said case i.e. Bhagat Ram (supra), the Court was
considering the question, as to whether the reservation of land
for income of the Panchayat is acquisition of land by the State
within the ambit of the second proviso to Article 31-A?
47. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of
the Constitution Bench of this Court in Bhagat Ram (supra)
in the judgment delivered by S.M. Sikri, J (as his Lordship then
was):
“2. The first question that arises is whether the
scheme insofar as it makes reservations of land for
income of the Panchayat is hit by the second proviso
to Article 31-A. The scheme reserves lands for phirni,
paths, agricultural paths, manure pits, cremation
grounds, etc., and also reserves an area of 100
kanals 2 marlas (standard kanals) for income of the
Panchayat. We have already held in Ajit Singh
case [(1967) 2 SCR 143] that acquisition for the
common purposes such as phirnis, paths, etc., is not
acquisition by the State within the second proviso to
Article 31-A. But this does not dispose of the
38
question whether the reservation of land for income
of the Panchayat is acquisition of land by the state
within the second proviso to Article 31-A. We held in
that case that there was this essential difference
between “acquisition by the State” on the one hand
and “modification or extinguishment of rights” on the
other that in the first case the beneficiary is the State
while in the latter case the beneficiary of the
modification or the extinguishment is not the State.
Here it seems to us that the beneficiary is the
Panchayat which falls within the definition of the
word “State” under Article 12 of the Constitution. The
income derived by the Panchayat is in no way
different from its any other income. It is true that
Section 2(bb) of the East Punjab Holdings
(Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act,
1948, defines “common purpose” to include the
following purposes:
“… providing income for the Panchayat of
the village concerned for the benefit of the
village community.”
Therefore, the income can only be used for the benefit
of the village community. But so is any other income
of the Panchayat of a village to be used. The income
is the income of the Panchayat and it would defeat
the whole object of the second proviso if we were to
give any other construction. The Consolidation
Officer could easily defeat the object of the second
proviso to Article 31-A by reserving for the income of
the Panchayat a major portion of the land belonging
to a person holding land within the ceiling limit.
Therefore, in our opinion, the reservation of 100
kanals 2 marlas for the income of the Panchayat in
the scheme is contrary to the second proviso and the
scheme must be modified by the competent authority
accordingly.”
39
48. It can thus be seen that, this Court held that there was
an essential difference between “acquisition by the State” on
the one hand and “modification or extinguishment of rights”
on the other hand. It was held that in the first case, the
beneficiary was the State while in the latter case, the
beneficiary of the modification or the extinguishment was not
the State. This Court held that since the Panchayat would fall
within the definition of the word “State” under Article 12 of the
Constitution, if the acquisition is for the purposes of providing
income to the Panchayat, it would defeat the whole object of
the second proviso. This Court held that the Consolidation
Officer could easily defeat the object of the second proviso to
Article 31-A by reserving for the income of the Panchayat a
major portion of the land belonging to a person holding land
within the ceiling limit.
49. The second argument which was advanced before this
Court in Bhagat Ram (supra) was that acquisition had already
taken place before the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment)
Act, 1964 came into force and therefore the scheme was not
hit by the second proviso to Article 31-A. It was sought to be
argued that the requirements as contemplated under Sections
40
23, 24 and 21(2) of the Consolidation Act of 1948 were already
complete and as such, the acquisition had already taken place
before the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964.
50. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of
this Court, in the majority judgment in Bhagat Ram (supra)
while rejecting the aforesaid submissions:
“4. It is clear from this affidavit that possession has
not been transferred in pursuance of the repartition.
The learned Counsel for the petitioners relies on this
fact and says that in view of Section 23-A and Section
24 the “acquisition” does not take place till all the
persons entitled to possession of holdings under the
Act have entered into possession of the holdings.
Sections 23-A and 24 read as follows:
“23-A. As soon as a scheme comes into
force, the management and control of all
lands assigned or reserved for common
purposes of the village under Section 18,
shall vest in the Panchayat of that village
which shall also be entitled to appropriate
the income accruing therefrom for the
benefit of the village community, and the
rights and interest of the owners of such
lands shall stand modified and
extinguished accordingly.
24. (1) As soon as the persons entitled to
possession of holdings under this Act
have entered into possession of the
holdings respectively allotted to them, the
scheme shall be deemed to have come into
force and the possession of the allottees
affected by the scheme of consolidation,
or, as the case may be, by repartition,
shall remain undisturbed until a fresh
41
scheme is brought into force or a change
is ordered in pursuance of provisions of
sub-section (2), (3) and (4) of Section 21 or
an order passed under Section 36 or 42 of
this Act.
(2) A Consolidation Officer shall be
competent to exercise all or any of the
powers of a Revenue Officer under the
Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Act 17 of
1887), for purposes of compliance with
the provisions of sub-section (1).”
5. It seems to us clear from these provisions that till
possession has changed under Section 24, the
management and control does not vest in the
Panchayat under Section 23-A. Not only does the
management and control not vest but the rights of
the holders are not modified or extinguished till
persons have changed possession and entered into
the possession of the holdings allotted to them under
the scheme. Mr Gossain, the learned Counsel for the
State, tried to meet this point by urging that by virtue
of repartition under Section 21, the rights to
possession of the new holdings were finalised and
could be enforced. This may be so; but this cannot
be equivalent to “acquisition” within the second
proviso to Article 31-A.
6. In the result we hold that the scheme is hit by the
second proviso to Article 31 A insofar as it reserves
100 kanals 2 marlas for the income of the Panchayat.
We direct the State to modify the scheme to bring it
into accord with the second proviso as interpreted by
us, proceed according to law. There would be an
order as to costs.”
51. It can thus clearly be seen that the Constitution Bench of
this Court in Bhagat Ram (supra) held that, upon reading of
Sections 23-A and 24 of the Consolidation Act of 1948 it was
42
clear that, till possession has changed under Section 24, the
management and control does not vest in the Panchayat under
Section 23-A of the Consolidation Act of 1948. It further held that
not only does the management and control not vest but the rights
of the holders are not modified or extinguished till persons have
changed possession and entered into the possession of the
holdings allotted to them under the scheme. Though the counsel
for the State tried to urge that, by virtue of repartition under
Section 21, the rights to possession of the new holdings were
finalized and could be enforced, this Court held that this cannot
be equivalent to “acquisition” within the second proviso to Article
31-A of the Constitution of India.
52. The Full Bench of the High Court in the impugned
judgment and final order attempted to draw a distinction
between the land reserved for common purposes under Section
18(c) of the Consolidation Act of 1948 which might become part
and parcel of a Scheme framed under Section 14, for the areas
reserved for common purposes, though they have actually not
been put to any common use and may be put to common use
in a later point of time on one hand and the lands which might
have been contributed by the proprietors on pro-rata basis but
43
have not been reserved or earmarked for common purposes in
the Scheme. It will be relevant to refer to the following
observations of the Full Bench of the High Court:
“The land reserved for common purposes under
Section 18(c), which might become part and
parcel of a scheme framed under Section 14, for
the areas reserved for common purposes, vests
with the Government or Gram Panchayat, as
the case may be, and the proprietors are left
with no right or interest in such lands meant for
common purposes under the scheme. There is
nothing at all mentioned either in the Act or the
rules or the scheme, that came to be framed,
that the proprietors will lose right only with
regard to land which was actually put to any use
and not the land which may be put to common
use later in point of time. In none of the sections
or Rules, which have been referred to by us in
the earlier part of scheme envisages only such
lands which have been utilized. That apart, in
all the relevant sections and the rules, words
mentioned are ‘reserved or assigned’. Reference
in this connection may be made to sub-section
(3) of Section 18 and Section 23-A. The
provisions of the statute, as referred to above,
would, thus, further fortify that reference is to
land reserved or assigned for common use,
whether utilized or not.
*** *** ***
The lands which, however, might have been
contributed by the proprietors on pro-rata
basis, but have not been reserved or earmarked
for common purposes in a scheme, known as
Bachat land, it is equally true, would not vest
either with the State or the Gram Panchayat
and instead continue to be owned by the
proprietors of the village in the same proportion
44
in which they contribute the land owned by
them. The Bachat land, which is not used for
common purposes under the scheme, in view of
provisions contained in Section 22 of the Act of
1948, is recorded as Jumla Mustarka Malkan
Wa Digar Haqdaran Hasab Rasad Arazi Khewat
but the significant differences is that in the
column of ownership proprietors are shown in
possession in contrast to the land which vests
with the Gram Panchayat which is shown as
being used for some or the other common
purposes as per the scheme.
We might have gone into this issue in all
its details but in as much as the point in issue
is not res-integra and in fact stands clinched by
string of judicial pronouncements of this Court
as well as Hon’ble Supreme Court, there is no
necessity at all to interpret the provisions of the
Act and the rules any further on this issue.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhagat
Ram and ors. Vs. State of Punjab and ors. AIR
1967 Supreme Court 927, dealt with
reservation of certain area in the consolidation
scheme for income of the Panchayat. Brief facts
of the case aforesaid would reveal that a scheme
made in respect of consolidation of village
Dolike Sunderpur was questioned on the
ground that in as much as it makes reservation
of land for income of the Gram Panchayat, it is
hit by second proviso to Article 31-A of the
Constitution of India. The scheme in question
reserved lands for phirni, paths, agricultural
paths, manure pits, cremation grounds etc. and
also reserved an area of 100 kanals 2 marlas
(standard kanals) for income of the Panchayat.
It was held as under:
“The income derived by the Panchayat is in no
way different from its any other income. It is
true that Section 2(bb) of the East Punjab
Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of
45
Fragmentation) Act, 1948, defines “common
purpose” to include the following purposes:
“… providing income for the
Panchayat of the village concerned
for the benefit of the village
community.”
Therefore, the income can only be used for the
benefit of the village community. But so is any
other income of the Panchayat of a village to be
used. The income is the income of the
Panchayat and it would defeat the whole object
of the second proviso if we were to give any other
construction. The Consolidation Officer could
easily defeat the object of the second proviso to
Article 31-A by reserving for the income of the
Panchayat a major portion of the land belonging
to a person holding land within the ceiling limit.
Therefore, in our opinion, the reservation of 100
kanals 2 marlas for the income of the Panchayat
in the scheme is contrary to the second proviso
and the scheme must be modified by the
competent authority accordingly.”
The ratio of the judgment aforesaid would
clearly suggest that it is the land reserved for
common purposes under the scheme which
would be saved, which, otherwise, would be hit
by second proviso to Article 31-A of the
Constitution of India. Surely, if the land, which
has not been reserved for common purposes
under the scheme and is Bachat or surplus
land, i.e., the one which is still left out after
providing the land in scheme for common
purposes, if it is to vest with the State or Gram
Panchayat, the same would be nothing but
compulsory acquisition within the ceiling limit
of an individual without payment of
compensation and would offend second proviso
to Article 31-A of the Constitution of India.”
46
53. We have therefore no hesitation in holding that no error
could be noticed in the impugned judgment and final order of
the Full Bench of the High Court to the extent that it holds that
the lands which have not been earmarked for any specific
purpose do not vest in the Gram Panchayat or the State.
(b) Consideration of the judgment of the Full Bench of
the High Court in the impugned judgment and final
order referring its earlier judgment in Gurjant Singh
(supra) and several other judgments.
54. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of
the Full Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment
and final order:
“Division Bench of this Court, in which one of us
(V.K. Bali, J.) was a member, after referring to case
law on the subject from 1967 to 1997 in Bhagat Ram
vs. State of Punjab, (1967) 69, PLR, 287, Des Raj vs.
Gram sabha of Village Ladhot, 1981 PLJ, 300,
Chhajju Ram vs. The Joint Director, Panchayats,
(1986-1) 89, PLR, 586, Gram Panchayat, Gunia Majri
vs. Director Consolidation of Holdings, (1991-1) 99
PLR, 342, Gram Panchayat Sahara (formerly Dhuma)
vs. Baldev Singh, 1977 PLJ, 276, Baj Singh vs. State
of Punjab (1992-1) 101 RLR, 10, Kala Singh vs.
Commissioner, Hisar Division, 1984 PLJ, 169,
Joginder Singh vs. The Director Consolidation of
Holdings (1997-2) 116 PLR 116, Bhagwan Singh vs.
The Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab,
(1997-2) 116 PLR, 472 and Gram Panchayat, Village
Bhedpura vs. The Additional Director, Consolidation,
(1997-1) 115 PLR, 391, held that the Bachat land,
47
i.e., land which remains unutilized after utilizing the
land for the common purposes so provided under the
consolidation scheme vests with the proprietors and
not with the Gram Panchayat”. It was further held
that “the unutilized land after utilizing the land
earmarked for the common purposes, has to be
redistributed amongst the proprietors according to
the share in which they had contributed the land
belonging to them for common purposes”. There is
no need to give facts of the judicial precedents relied
upon in Gurjant Singh’s case (supra) as the same
stand mentioned already therein and reiteration
thereof would necessarily burden this judgment.
The decision of Division Bench of this Court in
Gurjant Singh’s case (supra) was tested, at the
instance of the State of Punjab, in Civil Appeal No.
5709-5714 of 2001. Only, the general directions
given in the judgment recorded in Gurjant Singh’s
case (supra) for distribution of land to the proprietors
were set aside and that too on the concession of
learned counsel, who represented the Respondents
in the case aforesaid. Order passed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court on August 27, 2001, reads thus:-
“Leave granted.
Mr. Harsh N. Salve, learned Solicitor
General, submitted that the State of
Punjab takes objection only in regard to
the following observations made in the
impugned judgment:-
“This exercise, it appears, has not
been done throughout the State of
Punjab and Haryana and villages
forming part of Union Territory,
Chandigarh, even though there is a
specific provision for doing that.
This exercise be done as
expeditiously as possible and
preferably within six months
proceedings for repartition must
48
commence. Liberty to apply in the
event of non-compliance of directions
referred to above.”
Learned counsel for the Respondent
submits that they had no objection in
deleting the aforesaid portions from the
impugned judgment. We allow these
appeals to be extent of deleting of the
above said passage from the impugned
judgment.
These appeals are disposed of
accordingly.”
55. It is thus clear that the Full Bench of the High Court has
referred to the judgment of the Division Bench of the said Court
in the case of Gurjant Singh (supra).
56. It is pertinent to note that in the case of Gurjant Singh
(supra), the Division Bench of the High Court had noted a
series of judgments delivered by the said High Court relying on
the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in
Bhagat Ram (supra). All these decisions had held that the
land which remains unutilized after utilizing the land for the
common purposes so provided under the consolidation scheme
vests with the proprietors and not with the Gram Panchayat.
It was further held that the unutilized land i.e., the bachat
land, left after utilizing the land earmarked for the common
49
purposes, has to be redistributed amongst the proprietors
according to the share in which they had contributed the land
belonging to them for common purposes.
57. It is to be noted that in Civil Appeal Nos. 5709-5714 of
2001, which was preferred by the State challenging the
judgment in the case of Gurjant Singh (supra), the State had
objected only with regard to the observations wherein the time
limit was provided for effecting redistribution of bachat land
amongst the proprietors according to their share. It would thus
be clear that the State itself did not press the appeals with
regard to the directions for redistribution of the bachat land
amongst the proprietors according to their share. It appears
that the only grievance of the State was with regard to the
directions to do it within a specified period of time.
(c) Applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis to the
facts of the present case.
58. The Full Bench of the High Court in the impugned
judgment and final order in the alternative held that, a
consistent view has been taken in more than 100 judgments
by the Punjab and Haryana High Court and applying the
doctrine of stare decisis, such a view cannot be upset.
50
59. The doctrine of stare decisis lays importance on stability
and predictability in the legal system and mandates that a view
consistently upheld by courts over a long period must be
followed, unless it is manifestly erroneous, unjust or
mischievous.
60. In the case of Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v.
Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay15, this Court
observed thus:
“A view which has been accepted for a long period of
time should not be disturbed unless the Court can
say positively that it was wrong or unreasonable or
that it is productive of public hardship or
inconvenience.”
61. Similarly, in the case of Waman Rao v. Union of India16,
this Court observed thus:
“40. It is also true to say that for the application of
the rule of stare decisis, it is not necessary that the
earlier decision or decisions of longstanding should
have considered and either accepted or rejected the
particular argument which is advanced in the case
on hand. Were it so, the previous decisions could
more easily be treated as binding by applying the law
of precedent and it will be unnecessary to take resort
to the principle of stare decisis. It is, therefore,
sufficient for invoking the rule of stare decisis that a
certain decision was arrived at on a question which
arose or was argued, no matter on what reason the
decision rests or what is the basis of the decision. In
15 (1974) 2 SCC 402
16 AIR 1981 SC 271
51
other words, for the purpose of applying the rule of
stare decisis, it is unnecessary to enquire or
determine as to what was the rationale of the earlier
decision which is said to operate as stare decisis.
Therefore, the reason why Article 31-A was upheld in
the earlier decisions, if indeed it was, are not
germane for the purpose of deciding whether this is
a fit and proper case in which to apply that rule.”
62. We find no error in the judgment of the Full Bench of the
High Court in applying the doctrine of stare decisis to the facts
of the present case inasmuch as it followed the law which was
consistently applied in more than 100 judgments.
IV. CONCLUSION
63. In the result we find no merit in the appeal of the State.
The same is accordingly dismissed.
64. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be
no order as to costs. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
..............................CJI
(B.R. GAVAI)
……..……..............................J
(PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)
……..……..............................J
(K.V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 16, 2025
