1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO._______OF 2021
[Arising out of SLP (CIVIL No.) ______of 2021)
(Diary No. 24414/2020)
STATE OF ODISHA & ORS. … APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
KAMALINI KHILAR & ANR. … RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
K.M. JOSEPH, J.
1.There is a delay of 247 days in filing the SLP.
Having considered the matter, we are inclined to
condone delay but on condition that a sum of Rs.
50,000 is paid as costs to the Respondent No. 1.
Accordingly, the application to condone delay is
allowed subject to payment of Rs. 50,000 to the
Respondent No. 1 by the Appellant depositing the
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same in the Registry within 4 weeks from today.
Leave granted.
2.The Appellant No. 1, namely the State of Odisha,
passed a resolution dated 12.03.1996 prescribing
the procedure for recruitment of Government
teachers in primary schools. The Appellant No. 3
namely the District Inspector of Schools, BhadrakII, Bhadrak had to determine the number of
vacancies to be filled up through direct
recruitment. Appellant No. 3 had to also determine
the number of vacancies which were required to be
reserved for each reserved category. It is the case
of the Appellants that based on the same, on
29.07.1996 by letter dated 29.07.1996, it was
communicated to the Respondent No. 1 that her name
was sponsored by the District Employment Exchange
for the post of primary school teacher. She was
called upon to submit her application along with
her documents. The Respondent No. 1 was directed
to attend the viva-voce examination. A merit list
was made. The Respondent No. 1 secured the 22nd
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position in the SEBC (Women) Category. There were
only 16 vacancies which were to be filled by SEBC
(Women) Category candidates. Respondent No. 1 was
favoured with an order of appointment dated
04.04.1998. She was issued such appointment
according to the Appellants on the basis that one
of the successful candidates, namely the
Respondent No. 2 who secured the 16th position
could not join within time. The Respondent No. 1
joined based on the joining letter dated
20.04.1998.
3. While so complaining that she was not served with
the appointment order and that order was issued in
a wrong name, Respondent No. 2 filed
representation which based on an order in an
application before the Tribunal was disposed of
with certain directions by the 1
st Appellant O.A
No. 650 of 2000 was thereafter filed by Respondent
No. 2 before the Hon’ble Orissa Administrative
Tribunal. The Tribunal allowed the O.A. by order
dated 21.09.2001.
4
The operative part reads as follows:-
“For the reasons indicated above, we allow the
Original Application with the direction to the
State Respondent in General and D.I of Schools
(O.P. No. 3) in particular to issue appointment
order in favour of the applicant within one month
from the date of receipt of the copy of this order
and if the post has been filled up by the D.I of
Schools is to carry out direction issued by
Respondent No. 1 under Annexure-6 in dispensing
with the service of the candidate who had been
appointed in place of Minati Pradhan, the
applicant.”
4. This led to order dated 16.04.2002 which was an
order of appointment of Respondent No. 2 by the
Appellant No. 3 and another order of the same date
by which the services of the Respondent No. 1 came
to be terminated. This led to the present round of
litigation, namely O.A. No. 917 (C) of 2002 filed
by the Respondent No. 1 before the tribunal. The
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Tribunal after exchange of pleadings allowed the
application filed by the Respondent No. 1.
5. We may refer to the following part of the order:-
“In so far as, it is obvious that Smt. Snehalata
Nayak who has secured less marks and did not figure
in the physically handicapped list, has been given
appointment under the “physically handicapped”
quota and has been allowed to continue along with
several others, including S.E.B.C (male) and
General (male) candidates who have secured less
mark than the applicant, (Ref. Letter No. 3235 dtd.
22.10.2001 or D.I. of Schools, Bhadrak-II).
Moreover, at least a show-cause notice should have
been issued and an opportunity to show-cause before
discharge allowed to the applicant even if for
argument sake only it is accepted that her service
can be terminated, as decided by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case on Basudeo Tiwari-Vrs-Sido Kandhu
University and others (AIR,1998 SC 3261). As no
show-cause notice was issued and no opportunity to
be heard was allowed and the principle of ‘Audi
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alteram partum’ was not observed, even if the
applicant is deemed to be the junior most in the
S.E.B.C (Women) list, her termination is illegal.
Hence, Annexure-6, i.e., her termination order
vide office No. 981 dtd. 14.4.2002, is quashed.
The applicant be reinstated in service immediately
with all attendant service benefits by creating
another supernumerary post if necessary, as
termination of her service was not as per the
prescribed procedure or in accordance with the law
of the land.”
6. It is this order, which led to the passing of
the impugned order by the High Court. By the
impugned judgment, the High Court quashed the
direction of the Tribunal to reinstate the
Respondent No. 1 by creating a supernumerary post.
Thereafter, it was however ordered as follows:-
“However, since the vacancy is available, the
petitioners will give appointment to opposite
party No. 1 Smt. Kamalini Khilar against one of
such vacancies available in Bhadrak district
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within a period of four weeks hence, the writ
petition is allowed the aforesaid extent.”
7. It is feeling aggrieved by the judgment that the
present appeal has been filed. We heard Learned
Counsel for the Appellants and Respondents No. 1
and 2 as well.
Submission of Appellants
8. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants would
complain that the High Court while granting limited
relief of quashing the direction to create a
supernumerary post, erred in the issuance of the
direction to appoint the Respondent No. 1 in the
vacancy. This is after having interfered with the
order of the Tribunal as noted. The Respondent No.
1 came to be appointed only on the basis that
Respondent No. 2 who admittedly had secured higher
rank than the Respondent No. 1 had not reported
for joining. It was only in compliance with the
order of the Tribunal, that the services of
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Respondent No. 1 had to be terminated. It is
further contended that as things stand there is no
provision for making any appointment as the method
of appointment has been altered to absorption from
trained junior teachers.
9. Reliance was placed on the terms of the
Resolution dated 12th March, 1996. It is contended
that the selection was made based on the same. The
Employment Exchange sponsored eligible candidates
separately for general vacancies and for each
reserved categories. It is contended that the
sports person or physically handicapped person
from any Category could apply as much. Reference
is made to clause 8 of the Resolution. It is
contended that the maximum age as on the 1st of
January of the year of requisition was fixed as 32
years. Relaxation was however given by 5 years for
women candidates interalia. Separate list was to
be prepared for each of the reserved categories.
Separate select list of the candidates had to be
prepared for the vacancies notified in respect of
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that category of candidates under clause 16 of the
Resolution. Clause 17a provided that the District
Inspector was to make appointment against the
sanctioned posts strictly in the order in which
the names occurred in the respective select lists.
16 vacancies were notified for the category of
S.E.B.C. (Women). It is pointed out that the
Respondent was born on 15.07.1961. She was 34
years, 5 months and 17 days as on 01.01.1996. She
therefore, got the relaxation as she had applied
as S.E.B.C (Women) in the Category. She secured
the 22nd rank and the Respondent No.2 was at S.no.
16.
10. There is no challenge at any point to the
resolution dated 12.03.1996 or the selection
procedure. The last person to get an appointment
from the list of S.E.B.C (Women) Category was
Respondent No.1. In order to comply with the
directions of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 650 of 2000,
the services of the Respondent No. 1 were dispensed
with. It was only the Respondent No. 1 who got the
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appointment against one of the vacancies notified
for S.E.B.C (Women) Category because the
Respondent No.2 was not served the appointment
order. If the Respondent No.2 had been served the
appointment letter, then the Respondent no. 1 would
not have been given an appointment based on her
position in her merit list for S.E.B.C (Women)
Category. The Respondent No. 1 never objected to
the method of preparing the select lists and is
therefore not entitled to raise objection now to
the preparation of the separate list. Reference is
made to judgment of this Court in Union of India
and Ors. vs. Dalbir Singh and Ors1. The Respondent
No.1 was always aware of the separate list for each
Category. She got the benefit of relaxation of age
by applying as a S.E.B.C (Women) candidate. Her
non-inclusion in any other list or the selection
procedure interalia was never challenged by her.
It is pointed out that in the written submission
of the Respondent No. 1, a misleading statement is
made that the vacancy occurred prior to 03.06.1996
1 (2009) 7 SCC 251
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which is why the government proceeded to fill up
the vacancy by calling upon the Respondent No. 1.
It is pointed out that the letter written by the
3
rd Appellant to the 2
nd Appellant was about
complying with the order of the Tribunal in the
application filed by the Respondent No. 2. The 3
rd
Appellant refers to the vacancy having being filled
by his predecessor. All the vacancies covered by
the selection process in question occurred prior
to 30.06.1996. It is also further contended that
the none of the decisions relied upon by the
Respondent No.1 are relevant having regard to the
circumstances surrounding the appointment of the
Respondent No.1 and the specific directions issued
by the Tribunal.
The Case Of Respondent No.1.
11. There is a violation of principles of natural
justice. The termination of her services is wholly
illegal arbitrary and capricious. The Appellants
delayed the matter. The Respondent No.1 was a
permanent employee having impeccable four years of
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continuous service record. The finding that her
services was terminated in view of the order dated
21.09.2001 is erroneous and not sustainable having
regard to the following aspects.
The Respondent No. 1 was not a party in the O.A.
filed by the Respondent No. 2. Secondly, the
Tribunal had not directed removal of the Respondent
No. 1 but only directed the removal of the person
who had taken the place of the Respondent No. 2.
It is pointed out that at Page no. 64 of the SLP
Paper Book which is the letter dt. 22.01.2001
written by the 3rd Appellant and also referring to
the list of junior most candidates of different
categories appointed as primary school teachers at
S.No. 3 the candidate is a general category male
who had secured 109.10 marks. S.No. 5 is candidate
from SEBC (Male) who secured 110.75 marks.
At S.No. 7 Jagatanand Panigrahi is specifically
earmarked as Physical Handicapped Category but
S.No. 8 named as Snehalata Nayak who is
specifically earmarked at S.no. 31 of SEBC Category
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and secured only 110.36 marks but is given
appointment as PH illegally whereas she belongs to
SEBC Category. The Respondent No. 1 belongs to SEBC
Category had secured 112.75 marks which was more
than what the above persons obtained.
Therefore, the Respondent No. 1 was not the person
whose services was to be terminated in terms of
the order of the tribunal in the earlier
proceedings, it is contended.
12. It is contended that the Respondent No. 1 was
not party to the earlier proceeding. The order
adversely affecting the Respondent No. 1 should
not have been passed and the government should have
challenged the order passed in the earlier
proceeding. There is the bar under Section 115 of
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In other words,
there is estoppel. Reliance is placed on the
judgements of this court in Delhi Transport
Corporation vs. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors.
2,
2 AIR 1991 SC 101
14
Surendra Kumar Verma and Ors. vs. Central
Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court,
New Delhi and Ors.
3 and Deepali Gundu Surwase vs.
Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D. Ed.) and
Ors.
4 . Reliance is also sought to be placed on the
judgements of this Court in Hindustan Tin Works
Pvt. Ltd. vs. The Employees of Hindustan Tin Works
Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.
5 and Basudeo Tiwary vs. Sido
Kanhu University and Ors.6
There were persons who secured lesser marks than
the Respondent No.1 who are allowed to be retained
in service and it was the Respondent No. 1 who was
harassed and victimised. The delay in litigation
is solely attributed to the government. There is a
delay of almost 7 years in filing reply by the
government. After the passing of the order by the
Tribunal to reinstate the Respondent No. 1 with
all service benefit it woke up only when contempt
proceeding was initiated and the order was
3 (1980) 4 SCC 443
4 (2013) 10 SCC 324
5 (1979) 2 SCC 80
6
AIR 1998 SC 3261
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challenged only after a lapse of two years. The
career of the Respondent No. 1 was spoiled due to
the illegal termination. She could not properly
bring up her children and spent the entire period
of litigation in distress and financial hardship.
Had she been continued she would have become head
mistress now. She being a lady and married woman
residing in rural area she could not get any
employment elsewhere due to want of the same in
the locality and affidavit is also filed indicating
that she could not get suitable employment
elsewhere.
FINDINGS
13. The Order of the Tribunal passed in O.A. No.
650 of 2000 was binding on the department. We
cannot at this stage sit in judgment over the
correctness of the order passed in the said O.A.
Apparently, though the Respondent No. 2 having
obtained higher rank than the Respondent No. 1 in
the Category of S.E.B.C (Women) had been favoured
with an appointment letter, it was not delivered
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to her as it was addressed wrongly. The Respondent
No. 2, therefore did not join as apparently, she
did not receive the appointment order. At least
these are the findings of the Tribunal.
In fact, the matter had engaged the attention of
the 1st Appellant (govt) and it took a decision
dated 24.02.2000 therein. The decision of the
Government as extracted in the order of the
Tribunal reads as follows:-
“I am desired to invite a reference to the
Order Memo No. 106/OAT, dated 07.01.2000 of the
Hon’ble OAT, Bhubaneswar on the subject noted
above. It had been reported by the D.I. of Schools,
Bhadrak-II in his letter No. 388, dated 31.01.2000
with copy to you in Memo No. 389, dated 31.01.2000
that though one Minati Pradhan was selected and is
to be appointed, but the appointment order was
dispatched in the name of Minakhi Pradhan. Hence,
before taking steps to comply with the order of
the Tribunal to appoint Minati Pradhan, please
check the fact in the Office of D.I. of Schools,
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Bhadrak-II to ascertain whether any other person
named Minakhi Pradhan has been appointed on the
basis of incorrectly addressed letter. If yes, the
applicant in the writ petition will join in her
place if not the junior most candidate will be
removed to let her join unless if Government
decides to permit the applicant to join in a post
subsequently fallen vacant.”
The Tribunal directed as already noted that if the
post had been filled up the District Inspector of
schools was to carry out the direction of the
Respondent No. 1 which we have extracted that is
dispense with the service of the candidate who had
been appointed in place of Respondent No. 2.
Interestingly, we may notice that the Government
had directed that the junior most candidate will
be removed in order to enable the Respondent No. 2
to join. The direction of the Tribunal has become
final.
14. While it may be true the Respondent No. 2 was
not a party to the O.A. in law nothing prevented
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her from challenging the said order. It may not be
open to her to contend that as she was not a party,
the said order cannot be and should not be
implemented in letter and spirit. It is an order
passed by a Tribunal which had jurisdiction in the
matter. The finding that the Respondent No. 2 could
not join because of the letter of appointment being
issued in the wrong name cannot be open to
challenge. The Tribunal was therefore, setting
right an illegality and injustice caused to
Respondent No. 2. There is no dispute that there
were only 16 vacancies to be filled up of the
category of S.E.B.C. (Women). For complying with
the order of the Tribunal the Appellants had to
dispense with the service of the person appointed
in place of Respondent No. 2. Therefore, the only
question which survived for consideration is
whether it is the Respondent No. 1 who was
appointed in place of the Respondent No. 2.
15. It would appear to be clear that under the
resolution and procedure adopted, separate lists
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were prepared for various categories. Vacancies
were earmarked for different groups. Merit list
was also based on this classification. The
Respondent No. 1 figured in the merit list at S.no.
22 for the category S.E.B.C. Women. The surest way
to find out whether the termination of service of
Respondent No. 1 was in tune with the direction
issued by the tribunal in the earlier O.A. filed
by the Respondent No. 2 is to find out as to whether
the Respondent No. 1 would have secured the
appointment, if the appointment letter was issued
in the name correctly of the Respondent No. 2 and
she had joined on the said basis. If the Respondent
No. 1 would not secure the appointment if the
Respondent No. 2 had so joined and in other words,
the appointment of the Respondent No. 1 was only
because of the non-joining of the Respondent No.2,
then it is the Respondent No. 1 who is the person
who was appointed in place of the Respondent No. 2
within the meaning of the order passed in O.A. No.
650 of 2000.
20
This is not a case involving disciplinary
proceedings against Respondent No. 1. No stigma is
attached to the Respondent No. 1. The whole
exercise was necessitated no doubt as a result of
a mistake committed by the Appellants in not
sending the appointment letter at the correct
address to Respondent No. 2. In view of the fact
that order O.A. No. 650 of 2000 had become final
the Appellants were obliged to comply with the
order. If they had nothing to offer by explanation
to the case of the Respondent No. 2 that she was
not served with the letter of appointment, the
Respondent No. 1 would not be justified in
contending that the Appellant should have
challenged the order of the Tribunal.
16. We find merit also in the contention of the
Appellants that having regard to the Resolution
under which the entire appointment were carried
out, the matter is to be governed by the separate
merit lists which were prepared. In the nature of
the facts which make up the dispute in this case,
21
it only means that the Respondent No. 1 was the
junior most in the category of S.E.B.C (Women).
The order of the Tribunal to be complied with
contemplated dispensing the service of the
candidate who was appointed in place of the
Respondent No. 2.
17. It may not be possible to find that any person
other than the Respondent No. 1 was the candidate
who was appointed in place of the Respondent No.
2. Both the Respondent No. 2 and the Respondent
No. 1 were considered for appointment from the
Category of S.E.B.C (Women) for which Category, 16
vacancies were earmarked. The merit list of SEBC
(female) (page 49) shows that the Respondent No. 2
with 117.46 marks was at the 16th position.
Snehalata Nayak is no doubt at Serial No. 31 of
SEBC (Women) list. But she is shown in the category
of P.H in the list of junior most of different
categories in letter dt. 22.11.2001 sent by the
Appellant No. 3. The person at Serial No.7
Jagatanand Panigrahi is shown P.H. has secured
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lesser marks than Snehalata Nayak. It is not clear
how in the letter dt. 22.11.2001, persons at Serial
No. 7, and 8 are both mentioned under the category
as P.H. and as being the junior most candidates.
No doubt under the name of Snehalata Nayak, it is
shown S.no. 31 of SEBC Category. Does it mean that
Snehalata was appointed from SEBC but under the
category of physically handicapped? The office
order terminating the service of the Respondent
No.1 refers to the letter no. 7119 dated 16.03.2002
sent by the 2
nd Appellant Director. It is not
produced. However, what is clear is that the person
appointed in place of the Respondent No.2 was the
Respondent No. 1.
18. In such circumstances we cannot possibly hold
that other candidates who may have secured lesser
marks but who it must be noted were treated as
falling in different categories for which separate
list were prepared, should have been shown the door
to comply with the order of the Tribunal. The
Respondent No. 1 was considered under the SEBC
23
(Women) as being a woman, she could aspire with
the age relaxation.
19. We may incidentally notice that the Respondent
No. 1 has only a few months for attaining the age
of superannuation. It may be true that she has not
secured any alternative employment as stated in
her affidavit and also projected in the written
submissions. She has also not been able to work
based on the direction of the Tribunal or of the
High Court.
20. The decisions relied upon by the Respondent
No. 1 may not assist her.
As far as the decision in the Delhi Transport
Corporation (supra) is concerned, the Court was
dealing with constitutionality of the power under
the regulation to dispense with the service of a
permanent employee without holding any enquiry.
This Court took the view that dispensing with the
service of the permanent and confirmed employee by
merely issuing a notice without assigning reasons
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could not be countenanced. The decision clearly
cannot apply in a situation where the Appellants
being under the legal obligation to implement the
order of the Tribunal dispensed with the services
of the employee in accordance with the directions.
The decisions in Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd.
(supra) and Surendra Kumar Verma (supra) relate to
Industrial Law and the effect of illegal
termination of a workman. An order which is passed
pursuant to a direction which is binding on the
employer cannot possibly be described as illegal.
Therefore, the said case law cannot advance the
case of the Respondent.
21. In Basudeo Tiwary (supra) the services of the
Appellant had been terminated. The Appellant was
appointed as a lecturer. The college was taken over
by the University. The services was terminated on
the basis that the appointment was not made
validly. One of the contentions taken was there
was violation of principles of natural justice.
Though reliance was undoubtedly placed on Section
25
35 (3) of the Bihar University Act, 1951, and the
same purported to provide that any appointment
interalia contrary to the act statutes rules or
regulation or in any regular or unauthorised manner
shall be terminated at any time without any notice,
we do notice para 12 of the said judgment: -
“The said provision provides that an appointment
could be terminated at any time without notice if
the same had been made contrary to the provisions
of the Act, statutes, rules or regulations or in
any irregular or unauthorised manner. The
condition precedent for exercise of this power is
that an appointment had been made contrary to Act,
Rules, Statutes and Regulations or otherwise. In
order to arrive at a conclusion that an appointment
is contrary to the provisions of the Act, statutes,
rules or regulations etc. a finding has to be
recorded and unless such a finding is recorded,
the termination cannot be made but to arrive at
such a conclusion necessarily an enquiry will have
to be made as to whether such appointment was
contrary to the provisions of the Act etc. If in a
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given case such exercise is absent, the condition
precedent stands unfulfilled. To arrive at such a
finding necessarily enquiry will have to be held
and in holding such an enquiry the person whose
appointment is under enquiry will have to be issued
to him. If notice is not given to him then it is
like playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark,
that is, if the employee concerned whose rights
are affected, is not given notice of such a
proceeding and a conclusion is drawn in his
absence, such a conclusion would not be just, fair
or reasonable as noticed by this Court in D.T.C.
Mazdoor Sabha's case. In such an event, we have to
hold that in the provision there is an implied
requirement of hearing for the purpose of arriving
at a conclusion that an appointment had been made
contrary to the Act, statute, rule or regulation
eta and it is only on such a conclusion being
drawn, the services of the person could be
terminated without further notice. That is how
Section 35(3) in this case will have to be read.”
27
22. Finding that there was no notice issued to the
Appellant therein and further noticing that the
Appellant, had died during the pendency of the
proceedings it was to be deemed that the Appellant
had died in harness. He was allowed the benefit of
payment of arrears of salary from the date of
termination of the service till the date of his
death.
23. We may notice the decision would appear to the
distinguishable in terms of the facts in this case.
It is no doubt true that the Respondent No. 1 was
offered appointment and was appointed. However,
the Appellants suffered an order by a competent
Tribunal which it was duty bound to implement. We
would be remiss if we were to discard the
principles of natural justice as inapplicable. No
doubt there was no need to hold any enquiry as the
termination was not on disciplinary grounds. No
stigma is attached to Respondent No. 1. But a
notice given to the Respondent No. 1 as to why in
terms of the order of the Tribunal the Respondent
28
No. 1 should be treated as the person whose
services was to be dispensed with should have been
issued. However, we would think that on the
materials placed before the Court, with 16
vacancies alone earmarked for S.E.B.C (Women), and
the Respondent No. 2 being the 16th and the last of
the candidates entitled in the said Category, not
joining in the circumstances resulting in the
Respondent No. 1 being appointed and the order of
the Tribunal being binding on the Appellants, we
would think that in the present case, the failure
to afford an opportunity to the Respondent No.1 to
show cause as to why her services should not be
terminated cannot be held to be fatal. We also
cannot loose sight of the fact nearly two decades
have gone by and only for the reason that the
Respondent was not offered an opportunity of being
heard in the facts of this case, we cannot support
the order of the High Court in directing the
appointment of the Respondent No. 1. It is not as
if the High Court has found that the termination
of the service of the Respondent No. 1 was ab
29
initio void or illegal as such. The Court in fact
set aside the direction of the Tribunal to
reinstate by creating a supernumerary post. This
is not challenged by Respondent No. 1. It directed
only that the appointment of the Respondent No. 1
be made in the vacancy. Therefore, the claim of
Respondent No. 1 for back wages from the date of
termination is at any rate clearly untenable.
24. Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), the matter
arose under the Maharashtra Employees of Private
Schools (condition of service) Regulation Act,
1977. This Court undoubtedly laid down that in the
case of wrongful termination of service
reinstatement with the continuity of service and
back wages is the normal rule. It was subject to
the qualification that the Court may interalia take
into consideration the length of service and the
nature of misconduct if any proved, the financial
condition of the employer and similar other
factors. For the reasons which we have indicated
in the facts of this case Respondent No. 1 cannot
30
be permitted to draw any benefit from the said
pronouncement.
The High Court rightly set aside the direction for
creation of the supernumerary post. We find that
there is no basis for the High Court to have
thereafter directed the appointment of the
Respondent No. 1 in any vacancy available.
25. The upshot of the above discussion is that the
termination of the service of the Respondent No. 1
was unavoidable in the light of the binding order
of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 650 of 2000.
Consequently, the order of the High Court to the
extent impugned is to be set aside. Resultantly,
we allow the appeal and the order of the High Court
impugned is set aside and the order passed in the
O.A. no. 917 of 2002 filed by the Respondent No. 1
will stand set aside.
26. No order as to costs in the appeal. We make it
clear that if the cost of Rs. 50,000 ordered as
31
condition to condone delay in filing the SLP is
not paid as aforesaid the impugned judgment will
stand, the application for condoning delay will
stand dismissed and the leave granted will stand
revoked and this judgment will stand recalled. If
the cost is deposited, the same can be withdrawn
by the Respondent No. 1.
......................J.
(UDAY UMESH LALIT)
......................J.
(K.M. JOSEPH)
New Delhi,
April 28, 2021.
