1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3894 OF 2020
THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
LOVE KUSH MEENA Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. The moot point which arises for consideration is
whether a benefit of doubt resulting in acquittal of the
respondent in a case charged under Sections 302,323,341/34
of the Indian Penal Code [IPC] can create an opportunity
for the respondent to join as a constable in the Rajasthan
Police service.
2. The respondent and three others were charged with the
aforesaid provisions of the Indian Penal Code and tried
before the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Laxman
Garh, District Alwar, Rajasthan. The incident relates to
6.10.2008 at about 6 p.m. when, as per the complainant
Babulal, one Jagdish and Dayaram came in a tractor for
tilling a disputed field in jungle Patan. Tofli, mausi of
2
Babulal forbade them to till the land and apparently stayed
back in the field. At that time, the tractor driver
Jagdish drove the tractor and ran over Tofli. The
complainant Babulal along with one Raju, Om Prakash and
Dinesh rushed to her side but were beaten up and knife
injuries were inflicted upon them by Dayaram, Love Kush
(respondent), Bodan and Jagdish. Tofli was taken in a Buggi
to the hospital where the doctor declared her brought dead.
On the basis of the said report, PS Khedli registered Case
No.255 of 2008 under Sections 302,341,323,34 of the IPC and
commenced the investigation. Upon completion of the
investigation, the charge sheet against all the accused
persons vide No.1/2009 was filed in the Court of Judicial
Magistrate, Kathumar from where it was committed to the
Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Laxman Garh. The
charges were framed and all the accused denied the charges.
3. It is relevant to note that during the trial injured
persons, Babulal, Om Prakash and Raju alias Rajesh obtained
permission of the Court and filed a compromise in favour of
accused persons under Sections 341,323 of IPC which was
approved but naturally, there could not have been any
compromise qua the offences under Section 302/34 IPC. In
those charges the trial continued and it is quite obvious
that in view of the compromise, all the prosecution
witnesses, including those injured, turned hostile. On the
3
basis of the case of the prosecution, the learned Judge
opined in terms of the judgment dated 01.05.2009 that “the
prosecution had failed to prove the case against the
accused persons beyond reasonable doubt”.
4. A notification for recruitment of constable was
issued on 14.07.2013 under the provisions contained in part
III of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service
Regulations, 1989 for 12178 posts of constables setting out
the procedure for making the application. Para (ix) of the
advertisement provided for disqualification for
appointment. The relevant clause (ix) reads as under-
“(ix) As per judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Civil Appeal No.782/2004 State Government and
others v. Mohd. Salim Dated 10.12.2009, Director
General Police, Rajasthan Circular No.1687
dt.29.4.1995 is held legal. In compliance with the
said judgment, only those candidates shall be
qualified to appear in recruitment for Rajasthan
police who- have not been convicted for offence of
moral turpitude, violent activities and not
honourably acquitted by Court.”
5. The aforesaid would show that the disqualification
would operate qua conviction and “not honourably acquitted
4
by Court” for offences of moral turpitude and violent
activities. The respondent herein participated in the same
and it appears was successful in the recruitment process.
However, a letter dated 04.08.2015 was issued to him on the
basis of character antecedent verifications carried out by
the Police Superintendent. District Alwar, Dy. Inspector
General Police, Security, Rajasthan, Jaipur, whereupon the
aspect of the aforesaid case was looked into (it is an
accepted position that the respondent had disclosed this
fact and there was no concealment). The respondent was
found not eligible in view of the aforesaid. The operative
portion reads as under:
“Due to serious criminal offence against you,
police headquarter in reference to circular
No.1687 dated 29.4.1995 and also in compliance
with the orders of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil
Appeal No.782/04, you are not being appointed as
not found eligible”.
6. The aforesaid order was assailed before the Rajasthan
High Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.2391/2016 and the
Writ Petition was allowed in terms of the judgment dated
11.11.2016, remitting the matter back to the respondentSuperintendent of Police, Udaipur for passing a fresh
appropriate order with regard to the candidature of the
5
respondent in accordance with law within a period of three
months from the date of receipt of the order and
consequences would follow.
7. Accordingly, fresh orders were passed by the District
Police Superintendent, Udaipur on 23.05.2017. It was opined
that the charges against the respondent were not of a
trivial nature but were serious offences and the candidate
was not acquitted by the Court honourably. In view of the
circular in question, once again the respondent was held
ineligible.
8. The second round began with assailing of the
aforesaid order dated 23.05.2017 in S.B. Civil Writ
Petition No.8323/2017. In terms of the order of the
learned Single Judge dated 14.05.2018, it was opined that
the Court was not convinced that the authority had applied
its mind in accordance with the directions given by the
Court vide order dated 11.11.2016. In this behalf,
reliance was placed on a circular dated 28.03.2017 and it
was found that the respondent is falling in the first
category.
9. We may notice that the circular is undisputedly post
the recruitment process. Be that as it may, the relevant
portion of the circular reads as under:
6
“Subject: Regarding the candidates deprived of
appointment due to concealment of facts of criminal
cases/being involved in criminal cases.
xxx xxxxxxxxx
Only those candidates of the following category are
found to be eligible to be appointed, who have
mentioned the criminal case in the application form
or character verification form (both or one of
them):-
1. Found not guilty of criminal case after
investigation, Final/closure Report submitted for
approval.
2. Acquitted by the Court (including by giving
benefit of doubt or want of evidence).
3. Acquitted/discharged on the basis of compromise.
4. Given benefit of Section 12 of the Probation of
Offenders Act, on conviction in certain sections
(the conviction is not based on any impunity/no
adverse effect on state service/future life).
5. Convicted and given benefit of Section 15(1)(a)
of Juvenile Justice Act.”
10. It is the say of the learned counsel for the
respondent that the aforesaid circular is applicable and in
terms of the said circular even cases where the acquittal
7
is by giving benefit of doubt would not disqualify a
candidate.
11. The appellant/State aggrieved by the aforesaid order
preferred an D.B.Special Appeal Writ No.373/2019 before the
Division Bench. The Division Bench opined that since no
cogent evidence connecting the accused person to commission
of offence was found, the respondent was not disentitled
for appointment to the post of a constable, notwithstanding
his involvement in a criminal case. It further opined that
since the benefit of doubt was given to the respondent and
that aspect was considered in the earlier judgment of the
learned single Judge dated 11.11.2016, the said aspect
cannot be looked into. With this, the appeal stood
dismissed.
12. In the present appeal post issuance of notice, leave
was granted on 27.11.2020 and the interim order passed on
03.02.2020 staying the operation of the impugned order was
made absolute. Learned counsel for the parties have taken
us through the aforesaid factual matrix as already penned
down by us. The question which arises is whether in the
aforesaid factual matrix and taking into consideration
various judicial pronouncements of this Court, would the
respondent be disentitled to appointment i.e. whether the
8
subsequent speaking order passed by the appellant authority
dated 23.05.2017 is liable to be interfered with or not.
13. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the
seminal judgment in Avtar Singh v. Union of India & Ors.1
where a three Judge Bench of this Court has in detail dealt
with the aspects arising from such cases and laid down
various parameters. Conclusions are summarized in para 38.
14. It would suffice to reproduce the relevant summarized
conclusion as under:
“38.xxx xxx xxx
38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the
government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to
the employee, at the time of taking the decision.
38.4.3. If acquittal had already been recorded in a
case involving moral turpitude or offence of
heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is
not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of
reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may
consider all relevant facts available as to
antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to
the continuance of the employee.”
1(2016) 8 SCC 471
9
15. It is pointed out that various nuances arising in
this judgment has been considering even in the subsequent
judgments. In Union Territory, Chandigarh Administration &
Ors. v. Pradeep Kumar & Anr.
2 a two Judge Bench of this
Court dealt with the expression “honourable acquittal”. It
was opined that acquittal in a criminal case was not
conclusive for suitability of the candidate concerned and
it could not always be inferred from an acquittal or
discharge that the person was falsely involved or has no
criminal antecedents. Thus, unless it is an honourable
acquittal, the candidate cannot claim the benefit of the
case. No doubt, it was mentioned by relying on the earlier
judgment of this Court in Inspector General of Police v. S.
Samuthiram3 that while it was difficult to define precisely
what is meant by the expression “honourable acquittal”, an
accused who is acquitted after full consideration of the
prosecution evidence and prosecution has miserably failed
to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can
possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted.
In this context, it has been specifically noticed by this
Court that entry into the police service required a
candidate to be of good character, integrity and clean
antecedents. Finally, it was opined that the acquittal in
a criminal case does not automatically entitle a candidate
2(2018) 1 SCC 797
3(2013) 1 SCC 598
10
for appointment to the post, as a person having criminal
antecedents will not fit in this category.
16. In a similar factual scenario to the extent of
recruitment to the posts of Subedars, Platoon Commandants
and Inspectors of Police in pursuance to an advertisement
and disqualification of one of the candidates being
assailed resulted in a judgment of this Court in State of
Madhya Pradesh &Ors. v. Abhijit Singh Pawar4 by a two Judge
Bench. Suffice to say, in the factual context, a case
registered in the year 2006 was pending on the date when
affidavit was tendered and within four days the compromise
was entered into between the original complainant and the
respondent. An application for compounding was filed. The
compounding was found to be permissible as it dealt with
offences under Sections 294,325/34,323,506 Part II of the
IPC and on discussion of the legal principle enunciated in
the earlier judgments, it was opined that the earlier
judgment in the case of Commissioner of Police v Mehar
Singh5 it was opined that there is no doubt about the
proposition that even after the disclosure is made by a
candidate, the employer would be well within his rights to
consider the antecedent and suitability of the candidate.
In this context, it was held, the employer is entitled to
4(2018) 18 SCC 733
5(2013) 7 SCC 685
11
take into account the job profile for which the selection
is undertaken, the severity of the charge levelled against
the candidate and whether acquittal in question was an
honourable acquittal or was merely on the ground of benefit
of doubt as a result of composition. We may also add that
one aspect which was noticed which is common with the
present case is the absence of any suggestion that the
decision was actuated by malafide or suffered on other
accounts except the issue raised of the subsequent circular
applicable.
17. A reference was also made to Anil Bharadwaj v. High
Court of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.6 where once again a two Judge
Bench of this Court found that a criminal case against the
candidate under Sections 498A, 406, 34 of the IPC was
pending consideration on a complaint filed by the wife and
thus, the rejection of candidature could not be said to be
unsustainable. While saying so, the Court also opined that
the plea that the deletion of the name would result in
stigma against the candidate was not sustainable since the
candidate already stood acquitted.
18. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent
sought to distinguish some of the judgments on the factual
matrix while also referring to certain other
62020 SCC Online SC 832
12
pronouncements. In this behalf, she referred to the
judgment in Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram
(supra) expounding as to what is meant by “honourable
acquittal” in para 24 to contend that it is difficult to
define precisely what is meant by the expression
“honourable acquittal”. Counsel also sought to make a
reference to a judgment in Joginder Singh v. State (UT of
Chandigarh & Ors.)7. The charges against the candidate in
this case were under Sections 148, 149, 323, 325 and 307 of
IPC where it was held by the Trial Court that the
prosecution had miserably failed to prove charges levelled
against him since the complainant as well as injured
eyewitnesses failed to identify the assailants. It was
opined to be a case of honourable acquittal and thus,
relief was granted to the candidate.
19. The respondent also referred to a judgment of this
Court in Mohammed Imran v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.8
decided on 12.10.2018 where the candidate had been charged
under Sections 363, 366, 34, IPC much prior to the
clearance of examination. In that context, it was observed
that since employment opportunity were a scarce commodity
in our country, with large numbers of aspirants applying,
there could not be any mechanical or rhetorical incantation
7(2015) 2 SCC 377
8Civil Appeal No.10571/2018
13
of moral turpitude to deny appointment in judicial service
simplicitor but much would depend on the facts of a case.
20. In the instant case the aspect of there being a time
lapse between the alleged offence and the recruitment
process was emphasised to contend that the respondent
herein was about 19 years of age when the incident occurred
and had now carried his life further by being successful in
a competitive examination some years down the line.
21. A reference was also made in the counter affidavit to
certain judgments of the Rajasthan High Court granting
relief to the candidates based on acquittal obtained on
benefit of doubt.
22. Lastly, a reference was made of an order passed by
this Court in SLP[C]No.15351/2020 dated 21.01.2020 wherein
an SLP was dismissed against a direction for appointment of
a candidate where the order was giving benefit of doubt to
the candidates in a criminal case. We may, however, note
that firstly, that this is an order and not a judgment and
secondly, it has been clearly stated that the dismissal was
“in the given facts and circumstances of the case”.
23. Examining the controversy in the present case in the
conspectus of the aforesaid legal position, what is
14
important to note is the fact that the view of this Court
has depended on the nature of offence charged and the
result of the same. The mere fact of an acquittal would
not suffice but rather it would depend on whether it is a
clean acquittal based on total absence of evidence or in
the criminal jurisprudence requiring the case to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt, that parameter having not been
met, benefit of doubt has been granted to the accused. No
doubt, in that facts of the present case, the person who
ran the tractor over the deceased lady was one of the other
co-accused but the role assigned to the others including
the respondent herein was not of a mere bystander or being
present at site. The attack with knives was alleged against
all the other co-accused including the respondent.
24. We may also notice this is a clear case where the
endeavour was to settle the dispute, albeit not with the
job in mind. This is obvious from the recital in the
judgment of the Trial Court that the compoundable offences
were first compounded during trial but since the offence
under Section 302/34 IPC could not be compounded, the Trial
Court continued and qua those offences the witnesses turned
hostile. We are of the view that this can hardly fall
under the category of a clean acquittal and the Judge was
thus right in using the terminology of benefit of doubt in
respect of such acquittal.
15
25. The judgment in Avtar Singh’s case (supra) on the
relevant parameter extracted aforesaid clearly stipulates
that where in respect of a heinous or serious nature of
crime the acquittal is based on a benefit of reasonable
doubt, that cannot make the candidate eligible.
26. We may also note the submission of learned counsel
for the respondent that as per para 38.3 in Avtar Singh’s
case (supra), the employer has to take into consideration
the Government orders/instructions/rules applicable to the
employee at the time of taking a decision. It is her say
that the issue whether the circular dated 28.03.2017 would
apply or not was res integra in view of the earlier order
of the learned Judge dated 14.05.2018. She has further
contended that, in any case, the circular had come into
force and as per the judgment in Avtar Singh’s case (supra)
para 38.4, it is the date of decision which is material and
as on the date of decision dated 23.05.2017, the said
circular was applicable.
27. We may note here that the circular dated 28.03.2017
is undoubtedly very wide in its application. It seeks to
give the benefit to candidates including those acquitted by
the Court by giving benefit of doubt. However, such
circular has to be read in the context of the judicial
16
pronouncements and when this Court has repeatedly opined
that giving benefit of doubt would not entitle candidate
for appointment, despite the circular, the impugned
decision of the competent authority dated 23.05.2017 cannot
be said to suffer from infirmity as being in violation of
the circular when it is in conformity with the law laid
down by this Court.
28. We are, thus, of the view that the impugned orders
cannot be sustained and the appellants are well within
their rights to have issued the order dated 23.05.2017.
29. The consequence is that the appeal is allowed and the
impugned judgment of the Division Bench dated 16.07.2019
and learned Single Judge dated 14.05.2018 are set aside
leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
.....................J.
[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]
.....................J.
[R. SUBHASH REDDY]
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 24, 2021.
