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Tuesday, March 2, 2021

Applying the law laid down by this Court, referred to hereinabove, to the facts of the case on hand, subsequent FIR filed by the respondent – original complainant can be said to be an abuse of process of law and the same to be bringing pressure on the accused, which can be demonstrated from the following facts: i) cheque no. 038611 was presented for encashment and the same came to be dishonoured by the banker of the complainant due to “insufficient funds”; ii) that the company – VBL served statutory legal notices upon the complainant under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act; iii) that thereafter complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been filed by the company against the respondent-original complainant on 7.11.2014; 16 iv) that thereafter, after a period of three months, respondent no.1 filed an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. seeking registration of FIR against the appellants herein, i.e., in the month of February, 2015; v) the learned Magistrate declined to order registration of FIR, but decided to inquire into the matter by treating the same as complaint case and granted respondent no.1 – original complainant an opportunity of recording solemn affirmation under Section 200 Cr.P.C. (order dated 23.03.2015). Order dated 23.03.2015 came to be set aside by the learned Sessions Judge vide order dated 8.7.2015 and the matter was remanded to the learned Magistrate with directions to pass a speaking order. The same is pending before the learned Magistrate; vi) that thereafter after a period of two years, R1 lodged the impugned FIR against the appellants with police station Loni Border, District Ghaziabad with the similar contents and allegations which were levelled in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. In the FIR, the date of occurrence of the offence has been shown as 26.07.2017; vii) it appears that R1 is not proceeding further with his application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., which is pending before the learned Magistrate since last five years; viii) in the FIR, neither there is any reference to the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. which is pending before the learned Magistrate, nor there is a reference of the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act. Under the circumstances, the impugned FIR is nothing but an abuse of process of law and can be said to be filed with a view to harass the appellants.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 142 OF 2021

Kapil Agarwal and others …Appellants

Versus

Sanjay Sharma and others …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

M.R. SHAH, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order

dated 08.09.2017 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in

Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 18308 of 2017, by which the High

Court has dismissed the said writ petition preferred by the appellants herein,

filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for quashing the first

information report registered as Case Crime No. 790 of 2017, under Sections

420/406 IPC, Police Station Loni Border, District Ghaziabad, the original writ

petitioners/accused have preferred the present appeal.

2. The relevant facts necessary for deciding the present appeal are as under:

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That one M/s Varun Beverages Ltd. (for short, ‘VBL’) is a licensed

franchisee of PepsiCo India Pvt. Ltd. and engaged in the manufacture and sale

of carbonated sweetened water, fruit juice, packaged drinking water under the

PepsiCo brand. That in the year 2013, the VBL appointed the firm of the

complainant – Sanjay Sharma as a Distributor in the area of Loni, District

Ghaziabad to sell and distribute the products manufactured by the company.

That in the year 2014, the company terminated the contract of distributorship,

which according to the appellants was due to non-payment of dues by

respondent no.1 herein – original complainant. According to the appellants,

thereafter on reconciliation of accounts and as per the statement of accounts

maintained by the company, after adjusting of all claims and security deposit, a

sum of Rs.9,46,280/- was found to be outstanding upon the complainant,

towards the material supplied to him. The complainant issued a cheque dated

15.09.2014 in favour of the company – VBL. The said cheque was presented

for encashment on 22.09.2014. The same was dishonoured and returned unpaid

by the banker of the complainant due to “insufficient funds”. That thereafter,

due to non-payment after the issuance of the statutory legal notices, appellants

herein filed a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act on 07.11.2014 against R1 and his company Thakur Trading, in

the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad being Complaint Case No.

7652/2014. R1 has been summoned to face the trial. The said complaint is

presently pending for disposal. R1 filed a complaint against one of the officers

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of the company-VBL being FIR No. 1565/2014 dated 15.09.2014 alleging

misappropriation of Rs.6,00,000/- by one of the officers of the company,

namely, Vipul Verma. That after investigation by the police, the investigating

officer submitted a negative final report No. 47/2015 dated 20.01.2015.

2.1 R1 also filed one another case on 09.02.2015 for misappropriation of

Rs.31,12,375/- by the appellants. That thereafter R1 filed a

complaint/application under Section 156(3) Cr. P.C. in the Court of learned

Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate-I, Ghaziabad for issuance of direction to

the Police Station Loni to register FIR against the appellants herein and two

other officers of the company alleging misappropriation of an amount of

Rs.31,12,375/-. The learned Magistrate, instead of directing the police to

register FIR, decided to enquire into the matter by treating the same as a

complaint case. That vide order dated 23.03.2015, the learned Magistrate

treated the application of R1 under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint case

and an opportunity was granted to R1 to record his statement under Section 200

Cr.P.C.

2.2 Feeling aggrieved by order dated 23.03.2015 treating the application

under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint case, R1 filed a criminal revision

application No. 70/2015 before the learned Sessions Court, Ghaziabad. That the

learned Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad allowed the said revision application and

quashed and set aside order dated 23.03.2015 passed by the learned Magistrate

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and remanded the matter back to the learned Magistrate to consider the material

on record and pass speaking order afresh for assigning reasons for considering

application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as a complaint case. That thereafter

the learned Magistrate sought an action report from the concerned police

station. That the concerned police officer submitted the report before the

learned Magistrate on 09.08.2015. That the said proceedings are pending before

the learned Magistrate.

2.3 That after a period of approximately two years, R1 lodged the impugned

FIR against the appellants for the offences under Sections 406/420 IPC at Police

Station Loni, District Ghaziabad, dated 4.8.2017. The allegations in the said

FIR are same/similar to the allegations levelled in the application under Section

156(3) Cr.P.C., which is pending consideration before the learned Magistrate

since 2015.

At this stage, it is required to be noted that the said FIR is filed against

Kapil Agarwal, appellant No.1 – Director, Sharad Garg, appellant No.2 – Multi

Unit Manager and Deepak Sharma, appellant No.3 – Sales Head. That

thereafter the appellants approached the High Court under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India being Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 18308 of

2017 for quashing the aforesaid FIR being Case Crime No. 790 of 2017, under

Sections 420/406 IPC, Police Station Loni Border, District Ghaziabad. By the

impugned judgment and order, the High Court has refused to quash the FIR

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observing that the impugned FIR, prima facie, discloses commission of

cognizable offence.

2.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order

passed by the High Court refusing to quash the FIR being Case Crime No. 790

of 2017, under Sections 420/406 IPC, Police Station Loni Border, District

Ghaziabad, the original accused have preferred the present appeal.

3. Shri K.V. Vishwanathan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of

the appellants has vehemently submitted that the impugned FIR is an abuse of

process of law to harass the appellants by converting a purely civil dispute into

a criminal case.

3.1 It is submitted that the contents of the FIR show that it has been

registered for recovery of commission and discounts on sale which alleged to

have taken in the regular business transactions place over a period of 15 months

between the parties. Hence, it is a purely contractual dispute on the face of it.

3.2 It is submitted that no civil proceedings have been filed by the

complainant for recovery of the alleged due amount. It is submitted that the

impugned FIR has been lodged solely with a view to arm twist and extort

money from the appellants.

3.3 It is further submitted that there is not even a whisper about the pendency

of the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. pending before the learned

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Magisterial Court, in the FIR. Nor is there any mention of the fact that there is

an ongoing case under Section 138 of the NI Act.

3.4 It is submitted that the police report in respect of Section 156(3)

application has gone against him, R1 has left the earlier proceedings lying

pending for two years without participating in it and has filed a fresh FIR with

the same allegations. It is submitted that the fresh FIR on the same allegations

has been filed only with a view to get the appellants arrested and extort the

money from the appellants.

3.5 Relying upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of G. Sagar Suri v.

State of U.P. (2000) 2 SCC 636 and Jetking Infotrain Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2015)

11 SCC 730, it is submitted that in view of the pendency of the complaint under

Section 138 of the NI Act and the subsequent FIR is a counter-blast to the same,

the present prosecution would be clearly an abuse of process of law and

therefore the impugned FIR deserves to be quashed and set aside.

3.6 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Uma Shankar

Gopalika v. State of Bihar (2005) 10 SCC 336, it is submitted that as the dispute

can be said to be a purely civil dispute, which has been given a criminal colour,

the same deserves to be quashed and set aside.

3.7 It is further submitted that even taking the allegations in the impugned

FIR at the face value, no offence under Sections 406/420 IPC is made out

against the appellants. It is submitted that at best, the impugned FIR alleges that

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R1 entrusted certain monies to the company which the company did not pay to

him at his request. It is submitted that the company – VBL is not even made an

accused and the appellants are joined as an accused in their individual capacity

as Director, Multi Unit Manager and Sales Head. It is submitted that in order to

make out a case under Section 406 IPC against the appellants, there must be an

allegation that R1 entrusted the appellants in their personal capacities, not as

VBL officers, with the relevant commissions/benefits.

3.8 It is further submitted that even from the bare perusal of the contents of

the impugned FIR, the essential ingredients of offence of cheating under Section

420 IPC are completely missing. It is submitted that there is no allegation that

the appellants either, (a) deceived R1 by making any false or misleading

representation; or dishonestly concealed some matter from R1; or by any other

act or omission; (b) fraudulently or dishonestly induced R1 to deliver the

cheques allegedly handed over as security, or to agree to entrust the claimed

commissions/benefits to VBL; or to do or omit to do anything which R1 would

not have done or omitted to have done if he were not deceived. Reliance is

placed on the decisions of this Court in the case of Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of

Bihar (2009) 8 SCC 751; in the case of Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of

Kerala (2015) 8 SCC 293; in the case of Robert John D’Souza v. Stephen V.

Gomes (2015) 9 SCC 96; and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1)

SCC 33.

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3.9 It is further submitted that even as per the allegations in the FIR, the

amount is due from the company and not from the appellants. There is no

entrustment or retention personally by any of the appellants. It is submitted that

as held by this Court in the cases of S.K. Alagh v. State of U.P. (2008) 5 SCC

662, Sardar Singh v. State of Haryana (1977) 1 SCC 463 and Maksud Saiyed v.

State of Gujarat (2008) 5 SCC 688, even when a case under Section 406 IPC is

made out against a company, vicarious liability cannot be extended to the

Directors or officers of a company.

3.10 It is submitted that as the main allegations are against the company and

the company had not been made as an accused in the FIR, the same deserves to

be quashed and set aside. Reliance is placed upon the decision of this Court in

the case of Sushil Sethi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh (2020) 3 SCC 240.

3.11 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid decisions,

it is prayed to allow the present appeal and quash and set aside the criminal

proceedings and FIR being Case Crime No. 790 of 2017, under Sections

420/406 IPC, Police Station Loni Border, District Ghaziabad, as the same is

nothing but an abuse of process of law.

4. The present appeal is opposed by Shri M.C. Dhingra, learned Advocate

appearing on behalf of the respondent – original complainant.

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4.1 It is submitted that as the FIR discloses commission of cognizable

offence, the High Court has rightly refused to quash the FIR, in exercise of

powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

4.2 It is submitted that initially having failed to get the money due and

payable to the complainant, the complainant was constrained to make an

application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. before the learned Chief Judicial

Magistrate at Ghaziabad. However, without referring to the allegations of the

offences under Sections 420, 406, 467, 468, 471, 34/120-B IPC, the learned

Magistrate vide a very cryptic order dated 23.03.2015 directed for treating the

application under Section 156(3) as a complaint case under Section 200 Cr.P.C.

Aggrieved, the complainant preferred criminal revision before the learned

Sessions Court, which on 8.7.2015 set aside order dated 23.03.2015 and

remanded the case back to the learned Magistrate to consider the material on

record and decide the complainant’s application under Section 156(3) afresh by

a reasoned order. It is submitted that once again a closure report was submitted

by the very same investigating officer who earlier submitted the closure report.

It is submitted that as the learned Magistrate did not pass any order on the

closure report and kept the application under Section 156(3) under consideration

for long, much to the agony of the complainant craving justice, the complainant

was constrained to file the impugned FIR, making serious allegations against

the company and its officers – appellants herein. It is submitted that, however,

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the police arrayed the appellants as an accused for the offences under Sections

420/406 IPC, although the facts therein disclosed commission of offences under

Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC for forging complainant’s blank cheque No. 038611,

out of five blank cheques lying with the company as security and sought to

encash it but could not succeed as the cheque was dishonoured. It is submitted

that the company owed Rs.31,12,375.06 towards commission to be paid to the

complainant – respondent which was lying in trust with it, but did not pay to

him and thus by cheating him also committed breach of trust. It is submitted

that in the FIR, it was also alleged that on demanding money they extended

threats to get him killed and therefore the impugned FIR also discloses

commission of an offence under Section 506 IPC as well.

4.3 Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants that there is an

unexplained delay of two years in lodging the impugned FIR, it is submitted

that as such there is no delay in registration of the FIR. It is submitted that

delay is a mixed question of fact and law and a plea of defence. It can be

explained at the trial. It is submitted that belated registration of FIR is always

not fatal to the prosecution in every case as it is explainable at the trial. It is

submitted that it is not a thumb rule to quash FIR for delayed registration, which

can be explained at the trial.

4.4 Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants that FIR could

not be registered during the pendency of the application under Section 156(3)

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Cr.P.C. on the same set of allegations, it is submitted that Section 210 Cr.P.C.

leaves no doubt that FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. can be registered during the

pendency of the complaint case on the very same set of facts/allegations. It is

submitted that quashing of FIR will lead to demolition of complaint under

Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. pending consideration before the learned Magistrate.

4.5 It is further submitted that despite the fact that the FIR discloses

commission of offences under Sections 467, 468, 471, 34/120-B IPC also, the

police have registered FIR under Sections 420/406 IPC only. It is submitted

that the trial Court can add charges under Sections 467, 468, 471, 34/120-B IPC

in exercise of powers under Section 216 Cr.P.C. at any time before rendering

judgment.

4.6 Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants for nondisclosure of the pending application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. in the FIR is

concerned, it is submitted that it is a settled law that FIR is not an

encyclopaedia. It is submitted that even otherwise non-mentioning of the

pendency of the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. does not prejudice the

appellants in any manner. It is submitted that even otherwise as per Section 210

Cr.P.C., the proceedings before the Magistrate during pendency of the

investigation by the police in the FIR are required to be stayed by the learned

Magistrate. It is submitted that the subsequent registration of FIR on the very

same set of allegations, as in the pending complaint, does not confront any law.

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4.7 Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants that the

company is not joined as an accused in the FIR is concerned, it is submitted

that, as such, police ought to have included the company as an accused with the

appellants in the FIR. It is submitted that the appellants named in the FIR have

not disputed that they are principal functionaries of the company and had been

responsible for the operations of complainant’s dealership in all respects. It is

submitted that the appellants cannot draw any benefit for absence of company

as their co-accused. Company can be arrayed as an accused by the police in the

chargesheet after collecting evidence. It is submitted that even if by any chance

the police omit to do so, the trial Court has powers under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to

summon the company to stand trial as co-accused.

4.8 It is further submitted that the accused did not get immunity for the

offence committed by them merely because they have made complaint against

the complainant under Section 138 NI Act. It is submitted that otherwise all

cross criminal cases would be rebuffed if such contention is accepted.

4.9 It is further submitted that as such the appellants have acknowledged

through emails as also through duly signed hard copies that Rs. 34,50,418/- is

payable to the respondent by way of commission, incentives and discounts etc.

This amount was retained by the appellants and the company in trust upon

conclusion of the dealership. The company and the appellants have not paid the

said amount and thereby have cheated the respondent and also committed

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breach of trust. It is submitted that the appellants are now speciously disputing

the said acknowledgement. It is submitted that merely because the

acknowledgements through emails and hard copies are now disputed by the

appellants, it will not result in quashing the FIR.

4.10 Making the above submissions and submitted that as the FIR discloses

commission of cognizable offences, the same may not be quashed at the

threshold in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

It is submitted that as held by this Court in catena of decisions that the power

under Article 226 of the Constitution and/or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash

the FIR at the threshold is required to be exercised sparingly. It is submitted

that it is not a fit case to exercise the power under Article 226 of the

Constitution to quash the FIR when the FIR discloses commission of cognizable

offences.

5. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at length.

It is the case on behalf of the appellants that as on the same allegations,

the private respondent-complainant has filed an application under Section

156(3) Cr.P.C., which is pending before the learned Magistrate, the impugned

FIR with the same allegations and averments would not be maintainable, and

therefore, the FIR lodged with the police station Loni Border, District

Ghaziabad deserves to be quashed and set aside. The aforesaid cannot be

accepted for the simple reason that Code of Criminal Procedure permits such an

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eventuality of a complaint case and enquiry or trial by the Magistrate in a

complaint case and an investigation by the police pursuant to the FIR. At this

stage, Section 210 Cr.P.C. is required to be referred to, which reads as under:

“210. Procedure to be followed when there is a complaint case and police

investigation in respect of the same offence – (1) When in a case instituted

otherwise than on a police report (hereinafter referred to as a complaint case),

it is made to appear to the Magistrate, during the course of the inquiry or trial

held by him, that an investigation by the police is in progress in relation to the

offence which is the subject- matter of the inquiry or trial held by him, the

Magistrate shall stay the proceedings of such inquiry or trial and call for a

report on the matter from the police officer conducting the investigation.

(2) If a report is made by the investigating police officer under section 173 and

on such report cognizance of any offence is taken by the Magistrate against

any person who is an accused in the complaint case, the Magistrate shall

inquire into or try together the complaint case and the case arising out of the

police report as if both the cases were instituted on a police report.

(3) If the police report does not relate to any accused in the complaint case or

if the Magistrate does not take cognizance of any offence on the police report,

he shall proceed with the inquiry or trial, which was stayed by him, in

accordance with the provisions of this Code.”

Thus, as per Section 210 Cr.P.C., when in a case instituted otherwise than

on a police report, i.e., in a complaint case, during the course of the inquiry or

trial held by the Magistrate, it appears to the Magistrate that an investigation by

the police is in progress in relation to the offence which is the subject matter of

the inquiry or trial held by him, the Magistrate shall stay the proceedings of

such inquiry or trial and call for a report on the matter from the police officer

conducting the investigation. It also provides that if a report is made by the

investigating police officer under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and on such report

cognizance of any offence is taken by the Magistrate against any person who is

an accused in the complaint case, the Magistrate shall inquire into or try

14

together the complaint case and the case arising out of the police report as if

both the cases were instituted on a police report. It also further provides that if

the police report does not relate to any accused in the complaint case or if the

Magistrate does not take cognizance of any offence on the police report, he shall

proceed with the inquiry or trial, which was stayed by him, in accordance with

the provisions of Cr.P.C.

Thus, merely because on the same set of facts with the same allegations

and averments earlier the complaint is filed, there is no bar to lodge the FIR

with the police station with the same allegations and averments.

6. However, at the same time, if it is found that the subsequent FIR is an

abuse of process of law and/or the same has been lodged only to harass the

accused, the same can be quashed in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the

Constitution or in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In that case, the

complaint case will proceed further in accordance with the provisions of the

Cr.P.C.

6.1 As observed and held by this Court in catena of decisions, inherent

jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the

Constitution is designed to achieve salutary purpose that criminal proceedings

ought not to be permitted to degenerate into weapon of harassment. When the

Court is satisfied that criminal proceedings amount to an abuse of process of

15

law or that it amounts to bringing pressure upon accused, in exercise of inherent

powers, such proceedings can be quashed.

6.2 As held by this Court in the case of Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat

(2017) 9 SCC 641, Section 482 Cr.P.C. is prefaced with an overriding provision.

The statute saves the inherent power of the High Court, as a superior court, to

make such orders as are necessary (i) to prevent an abuse of the process of any

Court; or (ii) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Same are the powers with

the High Court, when it exercises the powers under Article 226 of the

Constitution.

7. Applying the law laid down by this Court, referred to hereinabove, to the

facts of the case on hand, subsequent FIR filed by the respondent – original

complainant can be said to be an abuse of process of law and the same to be

bringing pressure on the accused, which can be demonstrated from the

following facts:

i) cheque no. 038611 was presented for encashment and the same came to

be dishonoured by the banker of the complainant due to “insufficient funds”;

ii) that the company – VBL served statutory legal notices upon the

complainant under the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act;

iii) that thereafter complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments

Act has been filed by the company against the respondent-original complainant

on 7.11.2014;

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iv) that thereafter, after a period of three months, respondent no.1 filed an

application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. seeking registration of FIR against the

appellants herein, i.e., in the month of February, 2015;

v) the learned Magistrate declined to order registration of FIR, but decided

to inquire into the matter by treating the same as complaint case and granted

respondent no.1 – original complainant an opportunity of recording solemn

affirmation under Section 200 Cr.P.C. (order dated 23.03.2015). Order dated

23.03.2015 came to be set aside by the learned Sessions Judge vide order dated

8.7.2015 and the matter was remanded to the learned Magistrate with directions

to pass a speaking order. The same is pending before the learned Magistrate;

vi) that thereafter after a period of two years, R1 lodged the impugned FIR

against the appellants with police station Loni Border, District Ghaziabad with

the similar contents and allegations which were levelled in the application under

Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. In the FIR, the date of occurrence of the offence has

been shown as 26.07.2017;

vii) it appears that R1 is not proceeding further with his application under

Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., which is pending before the learned Magistrate since

last five years;

viii) in the FIR, neither there is any reference to the application under Section

156(3) Cr.P.C. which is pending before the learned Magistrate, nor there is a

reference of the complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act.

Under the circumstances, the impugned FIR is nothing but an abuse of

process of law and can be said to be filed with a view to harass the appellants.

8. We are not expressing anything on merits whether, any case is made out

against the appellants for the offences alleged in 156(3) Cr.P.C. application as

the same is pending before the learned Magistrate and the learned Magistrate is

17

to take call on the same. Therefore, when the impugned FIR is nothing but an

abuse of process of law and to harass the appellants-accused, we are of the

opinion that the High Court ought to have exercised the powers under Article

226 of the Constitution of India/482 Cr.P.C. and ought to have quashed the

impugned FIR to secure the ends of justice.

9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present appeal

is allowed. The impugned criminal proceedings/FIR registered as Case Crime

No. 790 of 2017, under Sections 420/406 IPC, with the police station Loni

Border, District Ghaziabad are hereby quashed and set aside on the aforesaid

grounds. We make it clear that we have not expressed anything on merits on the

allegations made by respondent no.1 against the appellants as the proceedings in

the form of 156(3) Cr.P.C application are pending before the learned Magistrate.

The learned Magistrate shall now proceed further with the said application, in

accordance with law and on its own merits. Respondent No.1 may proceed

further with the said proceedings, if he so chooses and is advised.

10. With these observations, the present appeal is allowed.

………………………………J.

[Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud]

New Delhi; ……………………………….J.

March 01, 2021. [M.R. Shah]

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