W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (C) NO.55 OF 2019
Janhit Abhiyan …..Petitioner
Versus
Union of India & Ors. …..Respondents
W I T H
WRIT PETITION (C) NO.73 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.72 OF
2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.76 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C)
NO.69 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.80 OF 2019; WRIT
PETITION (C) NO.122 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.106 OF 2019;
WRIT PETITION (C) NO.95 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.222 OF
2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.133 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C)
NO.178 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.182 OF 2019; WRIT
PETITION (C) NO.249 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.146 OF 2019;
WRIT PETITION (C) NO.168 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.212 OF
2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.162 OF 2019; TRANSFER PETITION
(C) NO.341 OF 2019; TRANSFER PETITION (C) NO.323 OF 2019;
WRIT PETITION (C) NO.331 OF 2019; TRANSFER PETITION (C)
NO.357 OF 2019; TRANSFER PETITION (C) NO.539 OF 2019;
TRANSFER PETITION (C) NO.630 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C)
NO.341 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.343 OF 2019; TRANSFER
PETITION (C) NO.675 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.419 OF 2019;
WRIT PETITION (C) NO.427 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.446 OF
2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.493 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C)
NO.854 OF 2019; WRIT PETITION (C) NO.596 OF 2019; WRIT
PETITION (C) NO.732 OF 2019; AND WRIT PETITION (C) NO.798 OF
2019.
1
W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
O R D E R
Writ Petition(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
1. In this batch of writ petitions, petitioners have challenged the
constitutional validity of, The Constitution (One Hundred and Third
Amendment) Act, 2019 [for short, ‘the Amendment Act’]. By the
aforesaid amendment, Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India
were amended by inserting clause (6), after clause (5), in Article 15 and
by inserting clause (6) after clause (5), in Article 16. The newly inserted
Articles 15(6) and 16(6) read as under :
“15(6). Nothing in this article or sub-clause (g) of
clause (1) of article 19 or clause (2) of article 29 shall
prevent the State from making, -
(a) any special provision for the advancement of any
economically weaker sections of citizens other than
the classes mentioned in clauses (4) and (5); and
(b) any special provision for the advancement of any
economically weaker sections of citizens other than
the classes mentioned in clauses (4) and (5) in so
far as such special provisions relate to their
admission to educational institutions including
private educational institutions, whether aided or
unaided by the State, other than the minority
educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of
article 30, which in the case of reservation would be
in addition to the existing reservations and subject
to a maximum of ten per cent. of the total seats in
each category.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this article and
article 16, “economically weaker sections” shall be
such as may be notified by the State from time to
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W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
time on the basis of family income and other
indicators of economic disadvantage.
16(6). Nothing in this article shall prevent the State
from making any provision for the reservation of
appointments or posts in favour of any economically
weaker sections of citizens other than the classes
mentioned in clause (4), in addition to the existing
reservation and subject to a maximum of ten per cent.
of the posts in each category.”
2. By virtue of Article 15(6) of the Constitution, States are
empowered to make a special provision for the advancement of any
economically weaker sections of citizens other than the classes
mentioned in clauses (4) and (5) and to make a special provision
relating to their admission to educational institutions including private
educational institutions, whether aided or unaided by the State, other
than the minority educational institutions referred to in clause (1) of
Article 30, in addition to existing reservations and subject to a maximum
of ten per cent of the total seats in each category. Similarly, Article 16(6)
empowers the State to make any provision for the reservation of
appointments or posts in favour of any economically weaker sections of
citizens other than the classes mentioned in clause (4), in addition to the
existing reservation and subject to a maximum of ten per cent of the
posts in each category.
3. The above said impugned constitutional amendments are
questioned in this batch of cases mainly on the ground that the
impugned amendments are ultra vires as they alter the basic structure of
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W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
the Constitution of India. Further, it is also the case of the petitioners
that the impugned amendments run contrary to the dictum in the
majority judgment, in the case of Indra Sawhney & Ors. V. Union of
India & Ors.1
. It is the case of the petitioners that a backward class
cannot be determined only and exclusively with reference to economic
criterion. Petitioners have also pleaded that the reservation of ten per
cent of vacancies, in available vacancies/posts, in open competition on
the basis of economic criterion will exclude all other classes of those
above the demarcating line of such ten per cent seats. It is further
pleaded that reservation in unaided institutions violates the fundamental
right under under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It is their case that
the State cannot insist on private educational institutions which receive
no aid from the State to implement the State policy on reservation for
granting admission on lesser percentage of marks, i.e., on any criterion
except merit.
4. The counter affidavit is filed on behalf of respondent-Union of
India. In the counter affidavit filed by the Under Secretary to the Ministry
of Social Justice and Empowerment, the following averments are made :
While denying various allegations made by the petitioners, it is
stated that, the Amendment Act was necessitated to benefit the
economically weaker sections of the society who are not covered
within the existing schemes of reservation, which as per statistics,
constitute a considerably large segment of Indian population. In
1 1992 Supp.(3) SCC 217
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W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
order to do justice across all the weaker sections of the society, it
was considered imperative that the Constitution be appropriately
amended to enable the State to extend various benefits, including
reservations in educational institutions and public employment, to
the economically weaker sections of the society, who are not
covered by existing schemes of reservation to enable them equal
opportunity to get access to educational institutions and also in
employment.
Subsequent to the decision of this Court in the case of Indra
Sawhney1
, the Government appointed an Expert Committee to
recommend the criteria for exclusion of advanced sections of
Socially and Educationally Backward Classes, i.e., the creamy
layer. The said Committee made certain recommendations for
exclusion of creamy layer and the Government, by accepting the
same, has issued Office Memorandum dated 08.09.1993 on the
exclusion criteria. Thereafter a Commission for Economically
Backward Classes, chaired by Maj. Gen. (Retd.) S.R. Sinho, was
constituted to suggest the criteria for identification of
Economically Backward Classes (EBC) as well as to recommend
welfare measures and quantum of reservation in education and
Government employment to the extent as appropriate. In its
report dated 02.07.2010, the Commission recommended that all
BPL (Below Poverty Line) families among general category as
notified from time to time and also all families whose annual
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W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
income from all sources is below the taxable limit should be
identified as EBCs. In view of the report submitted by Sinho
Commission, it was deemed necessary that a constitutional
amendment be brought in to promote social equality by providing
opportunity in higher education and employment to those who
have been excluded by virtue of their economic status.
While referring to the duty of the State as per directive under
Article 46 of the Constitution and in view of the recommendations
made by the Committee, The Constitution (One Hundred and
Twenty Fourth Amendment) Bill, 2019 was introduced and same
was passed in the Lok Sabha on 08.01.2019 and on 09.01.2019.
By referring to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill,
it is stated that to ensure economically weaker sections of
citizens get a fair chance of receiving higher education and
participation in employment in the service of the State, the said
amendments were brought.
While denying the allegation of the petitioners that the impugned
amendments alter the basic structure of the Constitution, it is
pleaded that, to sustain a challenge against a constitutional
amendment, it must be shown that the very identity of the
Constitution has been altered. It is stated that a mere
amendment to an Article of the Constitution, even if embodying a
basic feature, will not necessarily lead to a violation of basic
feature involved. By stating that the said newly inserted
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W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
provisions, namely, Articles 15(6) and 16(6) are enabling
provisions for advancement of economically weaker sections and
such provisions are in fact in conformity with the principle of
reservation and affirmative action which are the touchstone of
protection of equality of citizens and also the basis under Articles
15(1); 15(2); 16(1) and 16(2).
It is pleaded further that the economic criterion can be a relevant
criterion for affirmative action under the Constitution. Reference
is made in the counter affidavit, to the decision of this Court in the
case of Ashoka Kumar Thakur v. Union of India & Ors.2
.
While answering the allegation of the petitioners, that economic
backwardness cannot be the sole criterion for identifying
backward class, it is pleaded that the ratio decided by this Court
in the case of Indra Sawhney1
cannot be applied to judge the
validity of impugned amendments. It is stated that in the case of
Indra Sawhney1
memoranda issued by the Government of India
were under challenge and as much as the present challenge
relates to the constitutional amendment, said ratio decided
cannot be applied. It is also pleaded in the counter affidavit that
the limit of 50% of reservation is only applicable to reservations
made under Articles 15(4), 15(5) and 16(4) and does not apply to
Article 15(6).
2 (2008) 6 SCC 1
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W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
While answering the allegation of the petitioners that imposing
reservation in unaided institutions is manifestly arbitrary and
illegal, it is pleaded that the impugned amendments do not violate
Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(6) of the Constitution as the
State is entitled to make any law imposing reasonable restrictions
on the exercise of right in Article 19(1)(g).
5. With the aforesaid pleadings, it is pleaded that there is no merit in
the petitions and they deserve dismissal by this Court.
6. We have heard Sri Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel; Sri
M.N. Rao, learned senior counsel; Sri Gopal Sankaranarayanan,
learned senior counsel; and Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior
counsel for the petitioners and Sri K.K. Venugopal, learned Attorney
General for India appearing for Union of India.
7. Sri Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioner in W.P.(C)No.122 of 2019 while referring to ‘Rules of Court
etc.’ under Article 145(3) of the Constitution, has submitted that as the
case involves a substantial question of law as to interpretation of the
constitutional amendment, the present batch of cases need to be heard
by a Constitution Bench of five Judges. Learned senior counsel also
placed reliance on Order XXXVIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 and
submitted that as much as it is the case of the petitioners that the
impugned Amendment Act violates the basic structure doctrine with
particular reference to right to equality, as such, it constitutes a
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W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
substantial question of law within the meaning as referred above. It is
submitted that having regard to grounds on which the impugned
amendments are questioned, a substantial question of law, namely,
whether the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act,
2019 violates the basis structure of the Constitution, insofar as it relates
to the equality provisions of the Constitution and matters relating thereto,
is to be decided. It is submitted that by applying the tests of ‘width’ and
‘identity’ of equality provisions, the impugned amendments are to be
judged. Learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of
this Court in the case of M. Nagaraj & Ors. V. Union of India & Ors.3
, in
support of his argument that for examining amendments to equality
provisions of the Constitution, such a matter is to be heard by a
Constitution Bench. On the validity of the impugned Amendment Act,
learned senior counsel has submitted that by applying the tests of ‘width’
and ‘identity’ formulated by this Court in the case of M. Nagaraj3 which is
approved in the case of I.R. Coelho (Dead) by LRs. v. State of Tamil
Nadu4
and Jarnail Singh & Ors. v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta & Ors.5
, the
impugned amendments affect the ‘width’ and ‘identify’ of equality
provisions, as such same is fit to be declared as unconstitutional. It is
submitted that by applying the above said tests, if the impugned
amendments are examined, the impugned Articles are in violation of the
basic structure of the Constitution. Further, it is submitted that the
impugned Amendment Act violates the rule of 50% quota for affirmative
3 (2006) 8 SCC 212
4 (2007) 2 SCC 1
5 (2018) 10 SCC 396
9
W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
action and reservation as enunciated by this Court in the case of Indra
Sawnhey1
. Further, it is submitted by learned senior counsel that the
two-fold test for testing the validity of fundamental right under the basic
structure doctrine is to consider whether (a) identity and (b) width of
fundamental right is affected or not. It is submitted that if identity of the
right is distorted or taken away, such action will be in violation of basic
structure.
8. Sri M.N. Rao, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners
in W.P.(C)No.95 of 2019, by referring to various articles in the draft
Constitution prepared by the constitutional adviser and by referring to
debates of Constituent Assembly and by placing reliance on
observations made by this Court in the judgment in the case of Indra
Sawhney1
, has submitted that the educational backwardness of
backward classes is on account of their social backwardness. It is
submitted that the social backwardness is the cause and not the
consequence of either of their economic or educational backwardness.
It is submitted that the reason for providing reservation under Articles
15(4) and 16(4) by carving out an exception to the equality clause is to
confine the benefits only to persons answering the description of
backward classes. It is further submitted that the economic criterion by
itself will not identify the backward class. Finally it is submitted by
learned senior counsel that if economically weaker sections are brought
within the purview of backward classes, it will destroy the ratio legis, the
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W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
very reason or foundation of law to carve out the exceptions to the
equality clause.
9. Sri Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioners in W.P.(C)No.73 of 2019 submitted that the
fundamental balancing factor of the reservation policies has been the
ceiling limit of 50%. It is submitted that it has been consistently held by
this Court that if the reservations exceed such percentage the equality
code of the Constitution would be breached. It is submitted by learned
senior counsel that the ratio of 50% which is initially laid down in the
judgment of this Court in the case of M.R. Balaji & Ors. v. State of
Mysore6
is finally approved in the judgment of this Court in the case of
Indra Sawhney1
. By referring to the aforesaid judgments of this Court,
it is submitted by learned senior counsel that the impugned Amendment
Act breaches the 50% ceiling limit and runs contrary to the judgments of
this Court as referred above. It is submitted that the petitioners have no
quarrel with the introduction of reservation for economically weaker
sections but at the same time the equality code of the Constitution ought
to be strictly observed and breach of 50% ceiling limit should not be
allowed. Learned senior counsel also submitted that as the questions
involved in this batch of cases amount to substantial questions of law
within the meaning of Article 145(3) of the Constitution, these cases
need to be heard by a Bench of five Judges.
6 (1963) Supp. 1 SCR 439
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W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
10. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioners in W.P.(C)No.182 of 2019 has submitted that the impugned
Amendment Act violates the basic structure doctrine and also crosses
the limit of 50% which runs contrary to several judgments of this Court.
11. On the other hand, learned Attorney General for India – Sri K.K.
Venugopal – by referring to Preamble of the Constitution and Article 46
of the Constitution of India, submitted that an affirmative action by
making a provision for reservation can be made to the economically
weaker sections of society. It is submitted that to secure justice to all
citizens based on social, economic and political, as referred to in the
Preamble, it is always open for the State to bring a constitutional
amendment so as to promote such economically weaker sections, in
relation to admissions to educational institutions and also in making
appointments in public services. Learned Attorney General has
submitted that a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Society
for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India & Anr.7
has approved the classification based on economic criteria as provided
under provisions of Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education
Act, 2009. He has further submitted that in view of the same the
impugned Amendment Act cannot be said to be either illegal or in
violation of the basic structure of the Constitution. It is submitted that as
observed by this Court in the case of Indra Sawhney1 while 50% shall
be the rule but at the same time in a situation like this, which is an
7 (2012) 6 SCC 1
12
W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
extraordinary situation, such limit can be exceeded. Learned Attorney
General has brought to our notice certain observations made in the
aforesaid judgment. Learned Attorney General, in support of his
argument that such percentage can be exceeded, placed reliance on a
judgment of this Court in the case of Voice (Consumer Care) Council
v. State of Tamil Nadu8
. In the State of Tamil Nadu, the Tamil Nadu
Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Reservation of Seats in Educational Institutions and of Appointments or
Posts in the Services under the State) Act, 1993 was brought into force
providing 69% reservation for BC, SC and ST. When the said Act was
upheld by the High Court, matter is carried to the Supreme Court and
this Court has passed interim order to create additional seats for general
category candidates, with a view to remove the grievance of the general
category candidates. The State of Tamil Nadu has filed application
requesting for modification of the order dated 22.07.1996. This Court
declined to modify such order and dismissed the interlocutory
application. At the same time it is kept open to the State of Tamil Nadu
to take steps for listing of the matters which have been referred to
Constitution Bench. Further relying on the judgment of this Court in the
case of Society of Unaided Private Schools for Rajasthan7
, the
learned Attorney General, has submitted that the questions raised by the
petitioners can no more be considered as substantial questions of law
for being referred to a Bench of five Judges. It is submitted that there is
8 (1996) 11 SCC 740
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W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
no basis for the plea of the petitioners that the impugned Amendment
Act violates the basic structure doctrine. It is submitted by learned
Attorney General that the basic structure comprises of many features
like several pillars in a foundation some of which are enumerated in the
opinions rendered by this Court in the case of His Holiness
Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala & Anr.9
. It is
submitted that the significance of these pillars is that if one of them is
removed the entire edifice of the Constitution will fall. Hence, it is
submitted that in judging the constitutional amendment, the question to
be addressed is whether the said amendment would lead to a collapse
of the edifice of the Constitution. It is submitted that to sustain a
challenge against a constitutional amendment, it must be shown that the
very identity of the Constitution has been altered. It is stated that as no
such grounds exist to show that the identity of the Constitution has been
altered by virtue of the impugned amendment, the plea of the petitioners
that the impugned amendment is in violation of basic structure doctrine
also has no legs to stand.
12. We have heard learned senior counsel for the petitioners and the
learned Attorney General for India for the Union of India.
13. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners at first instance argued
by seeking reference to a larger Bench of five Judges by placing
reliance on Article 145(3) of the Constitution and Order XXXVIII of the
Supreme Court Rules, 2013, which is opposed by learned Attorney
9 (1973) 4 SCC 225
14
W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
General appearing for the Union of India on the ground that in view of
the decisions relied on by him no reference need be made.
14. Although we have heard learned senior counsels for the
petitioners and learned Attorney General appearing for the Union of
India, on the issue of reference, as well as on merits of the matter, as we
are in agreement with the submissions made by the learned counsels
appearing for the petitioners that these matters involve substantial
questions of law, as such, they are required to be heard by a Bench of
five Judges in view of the provision under Article 145(3) of the
Constitution of India and Order XXXVIII of the Supreme Court Rules,
2013, we are not entering into the merits of the matter on the validity of
impugned Amendment Act.
15. To refer the matter to a Bench of five Judges, we deem it
appropriate to refer to the provision under Article 145(3) as well as Order
XXXVIII Rule 1(1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. The said relevant
provisions read as under :
“145. Rules of Court, etc.-(1) … … …
(2) … … …
(3) The minimum number of Judges who are to sit for
the purpose of deciding any case involving a
substantial question of law as to the interpretation of
this Constitution or for the purpose of hearing any
reference under article 143 shall be five:
Provided that, where the Court hearing an appeal
under any of the provisions of this Chapter other than
article 132 consists of less than five Judges and in the
course of the hearing of the appeal the Court is
satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial question
of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution the
determination of which is necessary for the disposal of
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W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
the appeal, such Court shall refer the question for
opinion to a Court constituted as required by this
clause for the purpose of deciding any case involving
such a question and shall on receipt of the opinion
dispose of the appeal in conformity with such opinion.”
Similarly, Order XXXVIII Rule 1(1) of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013
reads as under :
“1(1). Every petition under article 32 of the Constitution
shall be in writing and shall be heard by a Division
Court of not less than five Judges provided that a
petition which does not raise a substantial question of
law as to the interpretation of the Constitution may be
heard and decided by a Division Court of less than five
Judges, and, during vacation, by a Vacation Judge
sitting singly.”
16. In view of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that for the purpose
of deciding any case involving a substantial question of law as to
interpretation of the Constitution it is to be heard by a Bench of five
Judges. Thus it is to be examined whether the question raised in the
writ petitions will involve a substantial question of law or not. It is the
case of the petitioners that the impugned amendments violate the basic
structure of the Constitution mainly on the ground that the existing
provisions of the Constitution empower to provide affirmative action only
in favour of socially backward classes. It is for the first time that by the
impugned amendments in the Constitution itself the new clauses are
incorporated enabling the State to provide affirmative action by way of
reservation to the extent of 10% in educational institutions and for
appointment in services to economically weaker sections of society. The
main plank of the argument from the side of the petitioners is that the
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W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
economic criteria alone cannot be the basis to determine backwardness.
In support of the same, learned counsels for the petitioners strongly rely
on nine-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Indra
Sawhney1
. Thus it is pleaded that the impugned amendments run
contrary to the above said judgment. It is also the case of the petitioners
that exceeding the ceiling cap of 50% is also in violation of the very
same judgment of this Court. Though learned Attorney General
appearing for the Union of India has strongly relied on the judgment of
this Court in the case of Society for Unaided Private Schools of
Rajasthan7
where the provisions of Right of Children to Free and
Compulsory Education Act, 2009 are upheld. By virtue of the impugned
amendments, very Constitution is amended by inserting new clauses in
Articles 15 and 16 thereof, which empower the State to make
reservations by way of affirmative action to the extent of 10% to
economically weaker sections. It is the case of the petitioners, that the
very amendments run contrary to the constitutional scheme, and no
segment of available seats/posts can be reserved, only on the basis of
economic criterion. As such, we are of the view that such questions do
constitute substantial questions of law to be considered by a Bench of
five Judges. It is clear from the language of Article 145(3) of the
Constitution and Order XXXVIII Rule 1(1) of the Supreme Court Rules,
2013, the matters which involve substantial questions of law as to
interpretation of constitutional provisions they are required to be heard a
Bench of five Judges. Whether the impugned Amendment Act violates
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W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
basic structure of the Constitution, by applying the tests of ‘width’ and
‘identity’ with reference to equality provisions of the Constitution, is a
matter which constitutes substantial question of law within the meaning
of the provisions as referred above. Further, on the plea of ceiling of
50% for affirmative action, it is the case of the respondent-Union of India
that though ordinarily 50% is the rule but same will not prevent to amend
the Constitution itself in view of the existing special circumstances to
uplift the members of the society belonging to economically weaker
sections. Even such questions also constitute as substantial questions
of law to be examined by a Bench of five Judges as per Article 145(3) of
the Constitution read with Order XXXVIII Rule 1(1) of the Supreme Court
of Rules, 2013.
T.P.(C)Nos.341 of 2019; 323 of 2019; 357 of 2019;
539 of 2019; 630 of 2019; and 675 of 2019
17. These transfer petitions are filed by and/or on behalf of Union of
India, under Article 139A(1) of the Constitution of India read with Order
XLI Rules 1 to 5 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 seeking transfer of
writ petitions filed before various High Courts to this Court. Writ Petition
involving the very same question, i.e., challenge to the validity of The
Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019 has been
filed before this Court in W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 titled, ‘Janhit Abhiyan v.
Union of India & Ors.’ and this Court, by order dated 25.01.2019, has
already issued notice in such writ petition. It is submitted by learned
Attorney General that, as the very same amendment is subject matter of
18
W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
challenge in the writ petitions pending before various High Courts and to
avoid conflicting findings by different High Courts, such writ petitions are
required to be transferred to this Court. As much as this Court has
already issued notice in a writ petition wherein validity of very same
Amendment Act is questioned before this Court, we deem it appropriate
that these transfer petitions are fit to be allowed. Accordingly, transfer
petitions are allowed and W.P.(C)|No.1475/2019 titled as ‘R.S. Bharati v.
Union of India’; W.P.(C)No.2099/2019 titled as ‘Desiya Makkal Sakthi
Katchi v. Principal Secretary & Ors.’; W.P.(C)No.1629/2019 titled as ‘Kali
Poongundran v. Union of India & Ors.’; W.P.No.3209/2019 titled as
‘A.S.A. Umar Farooq v. Union of India & Ors.’ pending before High Court
of Madras; W.P.(C)No.884/2019 titled as ‘Telangana State Backward
Classes Welfare Association & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.’ pending
before the High Court for the State of Telangana; and
C.W.P.No.3220/2019 titled as ‘Rakesh Dhundhara v. Union of India &
Ors.’ pending before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at
Chandigarh are ordered to be transferred to this Court for being listed
along with W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc. Registry to take necessary steps
by requesting the concerned High Courts to transmit the record of the
abovementioned writ petitions.
All the matters
18. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the transfer petitions and
refer this batch of cases, including the cases covered by transfer
applications, to a Bench of five Judges. Registry to place the matter
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W.P.(C)No.55 of 2019 etc.
before Hon’ble the Chief Justice, for obtaining appropriate orders in this
regard.
………….………………………………CJI.
[S.A. BOBDE]
….…………………………………………J.
[R. SUBHASH REDDY]
….…………………………………………J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
New Delhi.
August 05, 2020.
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