whether requisite leave should or should not be granted, the High Court must apply its mind, consider whether a prima 5 facie case has been made out or arguable points have been raised and not whether the order of acquittal would or would not be set aside. 21. It cannot be laid down as an abstract proposition of law of universal application that each and every petition seeking leave to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal recorded by a trial court must be allowed by the appellate court and every appeal must be admitted and decided on merits. But it also cannot be overlooked that at that stage, the court would not enter into minute details of the prosecution evidence and refuse leave observing that the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court could not be said to be “perverse” and, hence, no leave should be granted. 24. We may hasten to clarify that we may not be understood to have laid down an inviolable rule that no leave should be refused by the appellate court against an order of acquittal recorded by the trial court. We only state that in such cases, the appellate court must consider the relevant material, sworn testimonies of prosecution witnesses and record reasons why leave sought by the State should not be granted and the order of acquittal recorded by the trial court should not be disturbed. Where there is application of mind by the appellate court and reasons (may be in brief) in support of such view are recorded, the order of the court may not be said to be illegal or objectionable. At the same time, however, if arguable points have been raised, if the material on record discloses deeper scrutiny and reappreciation, review or reconsideration of evidence, the appellate court must grant leave as sought and decide the appeal on merits. In the case 6 on hand, the High Court, with respect, did neither. In the opinion of the High Court, the case did not require grant of leave. But it also failed to record reasons for refusal of such leave.” 12) Coming now to the facts of this case, it is apposite to reproduce the impugned order in verbatim infra: “On a careful perusal of the judgment and record, it cannot be said that the view taken by the trial judge is perverse or unreasonable. Simply because another view might have been taken of the evidence provides no ground for interfering with the order of acquittal unless the view taken by the trial judge is not a possible view. On the evidence available on record, it cannot be said that the view taken by the trial judge was not a reasonably possible view. In this view of the matter, there is no merit in the application for leave to appeal which is rejected and consequently, the Government Appeal is also dismissed.” 13) We are constrained to observe that the High Court grossly erred in passing the impugned order without assigning any reason. In our considered opinion, it was a clear case of total non­application of mind to the case by the learned Judges because 7 the order impugned neither sets out the facts nor the submissions of the parties nor the findings and nor the reasons as to why the leave to file appeal is declined to the appellant. We, therefore, disapprove the casual approach of the High Court in deciding the application which, in our view, is against the law laid down by this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Sujay Mangesh Poyarekar (supra).

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1094  OF 2018
(Arising out of S.L.P.(Criminal) No.5528 of 2015)
State of Uttar Pradesh             Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Anil Kumar @ Badka & Ors. Respondent(s)
               
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This appeal is filed by the State of U.P. against
the final judgment and order dated 02.09.2014 passed
by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at   Allahabad   in
Government   Appeal   No.3317   of   2014   whereby   the
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   dismissed   the
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application filed by the appellant herein seeking leave
to file appeal under Section 378(3) of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the
Code”)  and affirmed the judgment dated 31.05.2014
passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.3,
Kannauj acquitting the accused­respondents in S.T.
No.204 of 2012.
3) Keeping in view the short point involved in the
appeal, it is not necessary to state the facts in detail
except   few   to   appreciate   the   grievance   of   the
appellant.
4) The   respondents   (accused)   were   prosecuted
and tried for commission of   offences punishable
under  Sections   363,  366,  376 and   120­B  of  the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as
“IPC”)  pursuant to lodging of FIR No. 139/2012 in
Police Station  Gursahay Ganj, sub­District Sadar,
District Kannauj in Sessions Trial Case No. 204 of
2012 in the Court of the Additional District Judge,
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Court   No.3,   Kannauj.   The   prosecution   adduced
evidence in support of their case.
5) By judgment dated 31.05.2014, the Additional
Sessions   Judge   on   appreciating   the   evidence
adduced   by   the   prosecution   acquitted   the
respondents   (accused)   of   the   charge   of   offences
punishable under Sections 363, 366, 376, 120­B
IPC.
6) The   State   of   U.P.,   felt   aggrieved   by   the
respondents' acquittal, filed an application for leave
to appeal before the High Court under Section 378
(3) of the Code.
7) By impugned order, the High Court declined to
grant leave and accordingly rejected the application
made by the State. It is against this order, the State
has filed this appeal by way of special leave petition
in this Court.
8) Heard learned counsel for the parties.
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9) Learned   counsel   for   the   appellant­State   has
made only  one submission.  According to him, the
High   Court   while   dismissing   the   application   for
leave to appeal did not assign any reason and hence
the impugned order is rendered bad in law. It was
his   submission   that   there   were   several
discrepancies   and   errors   in   the   judgment   of   the
Sessions Judge against which the leave to appeal
was sought and, therefore, this was a fit case where
the High Court should have granted leave to appeal
for further probing into the case by the Appellate
Court.   In   support   of   his   submission,   he   placed
reliance on the decision of this Court in  State  of
Maharashtra   vs.   Sujay   Mangesh   Poyarekar,
(2008) 9 SCC 475. 
10) We   are   inclined   to   agree   in   part   with   the
submission urged by the learned counsel for the
appellant.
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11) The   question   as   to   how   the   application   for
grant of leave to appeal made under Section 378 (3)
of the Code should be decided by the High Court
and what are the parameters which the High Court
should keep in mind remains no more res integra.
This issue was examined by this Court in State of
Maharashtra   vs.   Sujay   Mangesh   Poyarekar
(supra).   Justice   C.K.   Thakker   speaking   for   the
Bench held in paras 19, 20, 21 and 24 as under:
“19.  Now,  Section  378  of  the  Code  provides
for   filing   of   appeal   by   the   State   in   case   of
acquittal.   Sub­section   (3)   declares   that   no
appeal “shall be entertained except with the
leave   of   the   High   Court”.   It   is,   therefore,
necessary for the State where it is aggrieved
by an order of acquittal recorded by a Court
of  Session  to file  an application for leave  to
appeal   as   required   by   sub­section   (3)   of
Section 378 of the Code. It is also true that
an   appeal   can   be   registered   and   heard   on
merits by the High Court only after the High
Court   grants   leave   by   allowing   the
application   filed   under   sub­section   (3)   of
Section 378 of the Code.
20.  In our opinion, however, in deciding the
question   whether   requisite   leave   should   or
should not be granted, the  High  Court must
apply   its   mind,   consider   whether   a  prima
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facie  case   has   been   made   out   or   arguable
points have been raised and not whether the
order of acquittal would or would not be set
aside.
21.  It   cannot   be   laid   down   as   an   abstract
proposition   of   law   of   universal   application
that each and every petition seeking leave to
prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal
recorded by a trial court must be allowed by
the appellate court and every appeal must be
admitted and  decided on  merits.  But  it  also
cannot be overlooked that at that stage, the
court would not enter into minute details of
the   prosecution   evidence   and   refuse   leave
observing   that   the   judgment   of   acquittal
recorded by the trial court could not be said
to be “perverse” and, hence, no leave should
be granted.
24. We may hasten to clarify that we may not
be understood to have laid down an inviolable
rule  that  no   leave  should  be  refused  by  the
appellate  court  against an  order of  acquittal
recorded   by   the   trial   court.   We   only   state
that in such cases, the appellate court must
consider   the   relevant   material,   sworn
testimonies   of   prosecution   witnesses   and
record reasons why leave sought by the State
should   not   be   granted   and   the   order   of
acquittal   recorded  by   the   trial  court   should
not be  disturbed. Where  there   is application
of  mind  by   the   appellate   court   and   reasons
(may be in brief) in support of such view are
recorded, the order of the court may not be
said   to   be   illegal   or   objectionable.   At   the
same  time, however,  if  arguable  points have
been   raised,   if   the   material   on   record
discloses deeper scrutiny and reappreciation,
review   or   reconsideration   of   evidence,   the
appellate   court  must   grant   leave   as   sought
and decide the appeal on merits. In the case
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on  hand,   the  High   Court,   with   respect,   did
neither. In the opinion of the High Court, the
case did not require grant of leave. But it also
failed   to   record   reasons   for   refusal   of   such
leave.”
12) Coming   now   to   the   facts   of   this   case,   it   is
apposite   to   reproduce   the   impugned   order   in
verbatim infra:
“On   a   careful   perusal   of   the   judgment   and
record, it cannot be said that the view taken
by the trial judge is perverse or unreasonable.
Simply   because   another   view   might   have
been   taken   of   the   evidence   provides   no
ground   for   interfering   with   the   order   of
acquittal  unless  the  view  taken  by  the  trial
judge is not a possible view.  On the evidence
available on record, it cannot be said that the
view   taken   by   the   trial   judge   was   not   a
reasonably possible view.  
In this view of the matter, there is no
merit   in   the  application   for   leave  to  appeal
which   is   rejected   and   consequently,   the
Government Appeal is also dismissed.”
13) We are constrained to observe that the High
Court grossly erred in passing the impugned order
without assigning any reason.   In our considered
opinion, it was a clear case of total non­application
of mind to the case by the learned Judges because
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the order impugned neither sets out the facts nor
the submissions of the parties nor the findings and
nor the reasons as to why the leave to file appeal is
declined to the appellant. We, therefore, disapprove
the casual approach of the High Court in deciding
the application which, in our view, is against the
law laid down by this Court in the case of State of
Maharashtra   vs.   Sujay   Mangesh   Poyarekar
(supra).
14) In the  light  of  the  foregoing discussion, the
impugned order deserves to be set aside. The appeal
thus succeeds and is accordingly allowed and the
impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded
to the High Court for deciding the application made
by the appellant for grant of leave to appeal afresh
on merits in accordance with law keeping in view
the   law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in  State   of
Maharashtra   vs.   Sujay   Mangesh   Poyarekar
(supra).
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15) It is made clear that we have not applied our
mind to the merits of the case and remanded the
case to the High Court having noticed that it was an
unreasoned order.  The High Court will accordingly
decide the application on merits uninfluenced by
any of our observations made in this order.
                                     .……...................................J.
                    [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
               
                     ………..................................J.
                     [UDAY UMESH LALIT]
New Delhi,
August 29, 2018.
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