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Tuesday, September 22, 2015

The factual scenario in these Appeals is different from Civil Appeal No. 318 of 2011, in that compensation has been paid to the Contesting Respondents, whose land is now in the possession of Haryana Urban Development Authority. Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 makes it clear that the three requirements for an acquisition to attain finality are the passing of an award, payment of compensation and taking of possession, all of which are met here. Furthermore, the Contesting Respondents in these Appeals had not been parties before the Division Bench in its Judgment dated 12.3.2008. As that Judgment did not explicitly state that it would apply to all the landowners affected by the impugned acquisition process, it was limited in scope to the parties before it, for reasons that we have already discussed herein. It would also be pertinent to note that the Contesting Respondents in these Appeals only filed writ petitions challenging the acquisition after the Judgment dated 12.3.2008 was passed. We find that till the date of the 12.3.2008 Judgment, these Respondents had acquiesced to the acquisition and had allowed it to become final, and therefore they could not seek to challenge it by placing reliance on a Judgment that did not enure to their benefit. 14 A number of Proforma Respondents were impleaded in Civil Appeal No. 462 vide order dated 12.4.2013, and we are not aware of whether the acquisitions with regard to their land has become final. However, these Proforma Respondents first challenged the acquisition by filing a writ petition in 2010, well after the Judgment dated 12.3.2008. It is thus clear that these Respondents, too, initially consented to the acquisition process and only challenged it belatedly by seeking to rely upon a favourable Judgment that did not relate or pertain to them. The impugned Orders dated 12.5.2008 in C.W.P. No 7066 of 2008 and 13.5.2008 in C.W.P. No. 7353 of 2008 as well as Order dated 19.1.2010 in C.W.P. No. 163 of 2010 are therefore set aside, and these Appeals are accordingly allowed.

                                                                  REPORTABLE



                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL No. 318 OF 2011


STATE OF HARYANA & ANR.                        .…..APPELLANTS

      Versus

DEVANDER SAGAR & ORS.                      …..RESPONDENTS


                                    WITH


                          C.A. Nos. 459-462 of 2011


HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT
AUTHOIRTY& ORS.                              .…..APPELLANTS

      Versus

P.K. DHAWAN & ORS.                               …..RESPONDENTS



                           J  U  D  G  M  E  N  T



VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

CIVIL APPEAL No. 318 OF 2011



1     This Appeal questions the correctness of the Judgment dated  12.3.2008
delivered by the Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and  Haryana  in
C.W.P. No. 1123 of 2006, on the basis of  which  the  High  Court  had  also
allowed C.W.P. No. 1465 of 2006, C.W.P. No. 2166 of 2007,  C.W.P.  No.  7066
of 2008 and C.W.P. No. 7353 of 2008.   Civil Appeal  No.  318  of  2011  and
Civil Appeal Nos. 459-462 of 2011 respectively assail these Judgments.    It
merits to mention that the connected Civil Appeal No. 535 of  2011  was,  on
the  unrefuted  submission   made   by   the   learned   counsel   for   the
Respondents/Landowners in that Appeal, dismissed as infructuous by an  Order
dated 11.3.2015 of this Court; the submission was  that  the  Public  Notice
dated 8.4.2010 had released the subject land from acquisition.

2     The State of Haryana had issued a Notification under Section 4 of  the
Land Acquisition Act, 1984 (‘L.A. Act’ for brevity) on 18.1.2001 to  acquire
12.18 acres of land falling in Village Khera Markanda  and  11.64  acres  of
land falling in Village Ratgal as mentioned in the Schedule thereto for  the
construction  of  a  fell-storm  sewer,  a  sewage-treatment  plant  and   a
crematorium (Shamshan Ghat) at Kurukshetra.  Simultaneous with the  issuance
of this Notification, the Appellant  State  had  also  invoked  the  urgency
provisions contained in Sections 17(1) and 17(4),  thereby  denying  to  the
landowners (some of whom are the Respondents before us) the  opportunity  to
file Objections under Section 5A of the  L.A.  Act.    A  Declaration  under
Section 6 of the L.A. Act was issued the very next day, i.e. 19.1.2001.   It
was at this juncture that the Respondents/Landowners filed C.W.P.  No.  2503
of 2002 and C.W.P. No. 8696 of  2002,  (along  with  a  third  party  namely
Neelam Ram, the petitioner in C.W.P.  No.  4887  of  2002)  challenging  the
Section 4 Notification dated 18.1.2001 and the Section 6  Declaration  dated
19.1.2001.

3     It will be pertinent to point out that  by  the  time  interim  orders
came to be passed in the Writ Petitions by the Division Bench  on  7.2.2002,
the one year period prescribed in the statute to advance  from  Notification
to Declaration stage had already elapsed.  It is  also  relevant  to  record
that notwithstanding the interim order dated 7.2.2002, the  Appellant  State
passed an Award on the next day, namely  8.2.2002,  obviously  oblivious  of
those interim orders.   It also took possession  of  certain  parts  of  the
Scheduled lands.   The one year prescription having been  transgressed,  the
subject acquisition would have met its statutory death but for  the  feature
that the urgency provisions had been invoked  by  the  State  in  the  event
without legal propriety.  The time table  established  under  the  L.A.  Act
requires to be recalled.  Upon the publication of a  Notification,  affected
landowners are required to file Objections within thirty days.  Although  no
period has been prescribed for disposal  of  Objections  by  the  Collector,
this  exercise  must  reach  its  culmination  within  one   year   of   the
Notification’s issuance.  If these actions are so done, the Government  must
direct the Collector to “take order for the acquisition of the  land”  which
is a statutory provision which smacks superficiality.   The  Collector  must
also mark and measure the land in question, cause public notice to be  given
of the Government’s intention to take possession  of  the  land  and  invite
claims  for   compensation   etc.    After   deciding   any   objection   or
representation received from the interested parties,  an  Award  has  to  be
made  within  two  years  of  the  Declaration,  failing  which  the  entire
acquisition proceedings would lapse.  Of course the period covered  by  stay
orders granted by  a  Court  would  be  excluded.   Parliament  was,  as  is
manifestly evident, alive to the injury  that  would  inexorably  visit  the
landowners if acquisition proceedings were not  circumscribed  by  time,  as
compensation is  pegged  to  the  date  of  the  Notification.   The  entire
exercise has to be completed within three years.  This time prescription  is
thus obviously intended to ensure that the landowners whose lands have  been
expropriated on the State’s continuing powers of eminent domain receive  the
market  price  for  their  property  in  close  proximity  of  the  time  of
acquisition.  These  persons  would  thus  be  in  a  position  to  purchase
alternate  property,  which  indubitably  would  not  be  possible  if   the
compensation  award  is  implemented  after  delay.   Courts  must  be  ever
vigilant and resolute in protecting these persons from unfair  treatment  by
the State.  Thankfully, Parliament has,  in  terms  of  the  Right  to  Fair
Compensation  and  Transparency  in  Land  Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and
Resettlement Act 2013, provided amelioration  against  Governmental  apathy.


4     By a brief Order delivered on 12.1.2004, that is in the era  of  Padma
Sundara Rao vs. State of Tamil Nadu (2002) 3 SCC 533, the Division Bench  of
the  Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court,  noting  the  contentions  that  the
Appellant State had not adhered to the mandatory requirement of  payment  of
80 per cent compensation to the landowners and that it did not qualify as  a
case of urgency since the Appellant State passed had failed  to  publish  an
Award within one year after the Section 6 Declaration, quashed  the  latter.
However, for reasons recondite, the Division Bench simultaneously  permitted
the petitioners before it to file Section 5A Objections within  thirty  days
and permitted the Appellant State to issue a fresh Section 6 Declaration  in
the event that it found no substance in those  Objections.   The  directions
could not have been given by  the  Division  Bench.  Instead,  the  Division
Bench should have simply quashed the Section 6 Declaration, at  which  point
the Section 4 Notification would have lapsed, due to the fact that  the  one
year period for filing a Declaration had already elapsed.  In Greater  Noida
Industrial Development Authority vs. Devendra Kumar (2011)  12  SCC  375  it
has been clarified that it is impermissible for the  Government  to  proceed
with the acquisition from the stage of Section 4.   Applying  the  ratio  of
Kiran Singh vs. Chaman Paswan (1955) 1 SCR 117 which has  been  followed  in
Dr. Jogmittar Sain Bhagat vs. Dir. Health Services, Haryana  (2013)  10  SCC
136 to the effect that a decree without jurisdiction is a  nullity  and  its
invalidity could be a subject at any stage in any proceedings  and  even  at
the stage of execution,  the  said  Order  of  the  Division  Bench  can  be
ignored.    We think it appropriate to reproduce the operative part of  this
Order for reasons that will become apparent later:-
“In the facts and circumstances of the case,  as  mentioned  above,  in  our
view, interest of justice would be served, if  we  quash  declaration  under
Section 6 of the Act dated 19.1.2001, and all  subsequent  proceedings  that
might have been taken thereafter with liberty to  the  petitioners  to  file
objections under Section 5-A of the Act within 30  days  from  the  date  of
receipt of a certified copy of the order, which, naturally  shall  be  heard
by the State or the authority constituted by the State for that purpose,  in
accordance  with  law  and  after  giving  an  appropriate  hearing  to  the
petitioners if the objections are rejected, naturally, the  Government  will
be in its power to issue declaration under Section 6 of the Act.
      Petition is disposed of accordingly.  However,  parties  are  left  to
bear their own costs.”          (emphasis supplied)


5     We must highlight the lapses by the Appellant State in the  manner  in
which  it  conducted  the  acquisition.   Significantly,   no   compensation
whatsoever, leave alone the 80 per cent  postulated  by  the  Statute  under
Section 17(3), was given at  the  time  that  the  urgency  provisions  were
invoked. This  exercise  ought  to  have  been  carried  out  by  passing  a
provisional or ad hoc Award containing the  Collector’s  estimation  of  the
compensation to be paid to the landowners.  The State seems to be  oblivious
of the law and impervious to the plight of the landowners  whose  livelihood
is virtually deracinated.    Section 6 requires particular  perusal  and  we
are extracting its relevant portions for convenience.   Also,  for  facility
of reference, Sections 17(3A) is  reproduced  in  order  to  emphasize  that
those provisions could be correctly and properly resorted  to  only  if  the
State Government, through its Collector, had tendered 80  per  cent  of  the
compensation estimated by him.

      Section 6 – Declaration that land is required for a public  purpose  –
(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the  appropriate
Government is satisfied, after considering the report, it  any,  made  under
section 5A, sub-section (2), that  any  particular  land  is  needed  for  a
public purpose, or for a Company,  a  declaration  shall  be  made  to  that
effect under the signature of a Secretary to  such  Government  or  of  some
officer duly authorized to certify its orders,  and  different  declarations
may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels  of  any  land
covered  by  the  same  notification  under  section  4,   sub-section   (1)
irrespective of whether one report or different reports  has  or  have  been
made (wherever required) under section 5A, sub-section (2):

      Provided that  no  declaration  in  respect  of  any  particular  land
covered by a notification under section 4, sub-section (1),_

xxx   xxx   xxx

Published after the commencement of the Land  Acquisition  (Amendment)  Act,
1984, shall be made after the expiry of  one  year  from  the  date  of  the
publication of the notification:

  17. Special powers in cases of urgency —
            xxx        xxx        xxx
      (3A)  Before taking possession of any land under sub-section (1) or
sub-section (2), the Collector shall, without prejudice to the provisions
of sub-section (3), —

tender payment of eighty per centum of the compensation  for  such  land  as
estimated by him to the persons interested entitled thereto, and
pay it to them, unless prevented by some one or more  of  the  contingencies
mentioned in section 31, sub-section (2),
and where the Collector is so prevented, the provisions of section 31,  sub-
section (2) (except the second  provision  thereto),  shall  apply  as  they
apply to the payment of compensation under that section.


6     Even though the holding of property is no longer a  fundamental  right
guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India, it  has  been  given
constitutional protection under Article 300A which came to be inserted  into
the Constitution by the  Constitution  (Forty-fourth  Amendment)  Act,  1978
which omitted Article 19(1)(f), viz.,  “to  acquire,  hold  and  dispose  of
property”.    The Constitution  now  guarantees  that  no  person  shall  be
deprived of his property save by authority of law.  We have  mentioned  this
for the reason that if the Union or the  State  Government  is  desirous  of
depriving any person of his property it can only do so by authority of  law.
 That authority, as is facially evident, inter alia,  is  the  necessity  to
tend the payment of 80  per  cent  of  the  compensation  estimated  by  the
Collector in the event that Section 17 is to be pressed into  service,  with
the objective of denying  the  landowners  remonstration  rights  by  filing
Objections in consonance with Section 5A of the L.A.  Act.     Expropriatory
legislation, such as the L.A. Act, must compulsorily be construed  strictly.
  The Appellant State cannot be permitted to invoke one part of  Section  17
while  discarding  another.     Sections  17(3A)  and  17(3B),  which   were
inserted by the Act 68  of  1964  with  effect  from  24.9.1994,  cannot  be
rendered nugatory.  In this regard, we are reminded of the Judgment of  this
Court in Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 422 which  held
that: “It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the  manner  of
doing a particular act is prescribed under any  statute,  the  act  must  be
done in that manner or not at all.”  The origin of this  rule  is  traceable
to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor (1875) 1 Ch D 426 which was followed  by
Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor AIR 1936  PC  253,  and  has  been
upheld in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya  Pradesh  AIR  1954  SC
322, State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh AIR 1964 SC 358 and  Hussein  Ghadially
v. State of Gujarat (2014) 8 SCC 425.

7     Prima facie, time for  filing  of  5A  Objections  would  have  to  be
computed to have commenced on the date of the  Order,  i.e.  12.1.2004,  and
further there seems to be no alternative but to deem  the  issuance  of  the
Section 4 Notification for the same date.   Hence the Section 6  Declaration
would have to be made at the latest by  11.1.2005.   However,  we  reiterate
that the High Court ought to have simply quashed the Section  4  Declaration
in personam, or if circumstances so commanded, in rem.   By  permitting  nay
enjoining the petitioners to file Objections, the High Court  has  caused  a
piquant position to come into place.   But, as is trite,  no  party  can  be
made to  suffer  any  disadvantage  due  to  an  act  of  the  Court.    The
Respondents filed Objections on 11.2.2004 which were dismissed in  September
2004 paving the way for the passing of a  fresh  Section  6  Declaration  on
30.12.2004.    The  Respondents   thereupon   challenged   the   Section   4
Notification dated 18.1.2002 and the Section 6 Declaration dated  30.12.2004
in terms of C.W.P. No. 1123 of 2006, C.W.P. No. 1465 of 2006 and C.W.P.  No.
2166 of 2007.

8     In the second salvo of writ petitions, the Division  Bench  has  found
in  the  impugned  Judgment  dated  12.3.2008  that  the  second  Section  6
Declaration had been made after the passing of the period prescribed in  the
L.A. Act, as the Section 4 Notification was issued on 18.1.2001.   It  noted
that this Court had held in Padma Sundara Rao  that  the  subject  statutory
period has to be  imparted  a  strict  construction;  the  period  could  be
increased only in the circumstances postulated and provided for in  the  Act
itself.   The Division Bench also observed that even if the  second  Section
6 Declaration were to be accepted  as  valid  by  construing  the  one  year
period from the date of the Order  of  the  previous  Division  Bench  dated
12.1.2004, the Appellant State had  failed  to  pass  an  Award  within  two
years, thus falling foul of Section 11A of the  L.A.  Act.   The  Section  4
Notification,  the  Section  6  Declaration  and  all  proceedings  pursuant
thereto were therefore quashed. We find it apposite to  note  the  error  in
the latter observation. According to Section 11A of the L.A. Act, the  award
has to be made within two years  of  the  date  of  the  Declaration,  which
requirement was met in this case. There was no basis on which  to  calculate
this period from the date of the previous Order, as the Division  Bench  has
done.

9     It would be pertinent to clarify  that  the  quashing  of  the  entire
acquisition proceeding has to be explicitly expressed.  This  Court  has  in
Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1993) 4 SCC 255,   Abhey  Ram,  Delhi
Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban (1999) 7 SCC  44,  Delhi  Administration
v. Gurdip Singh Uban (2000) 7 SCC 296 and The Chairman and M.D., TNHB v.  S.
Saraswathy (Judgment delivered on 11.5.2015 in Civil Appeal Nos. 736-737  of
2008) reiterated and restated  the  established  and  consistent  view  that
quashing  of  acquisition  proceedings  at  the  instance  of  one  or   two
landowners does not have the effect of nullifying  the  entire  acquisition.
In A.P.  Industrial  Infrastructure  Corporation  Limited  v.  Chinthamaneni
Narasimha Rao (2012) 12 SCC 797, this Court has reiterated  the  established
proposition  that  landowners  who  are   aggrieved   by   the   acquisition
proceedings would have to lay a challenge to them at least before  an  Award
is pronounced and possession of the land is taken over  by  the  Government.
Numerous decisions of this Court have been discussed obviating the  need  to
analyze all of them once again.   However, generally speaking,  Courts  come
to the succour of those who approach it.  In  some  instances  equities  are
equalized  by  allowing  subsequent  slothful  petitioners,  belatedly   and
conveniently  jumping  on  the  bandwagons,  to  receive,  at  the  highest,
compensation granted to others sans interest.

10    The Appellant State has filed this Appeal contending that the  parties
are bound by the Division Bench Order dated  12.1.2004,  which  allowed  for
filing of a fresh Section 6 Declaration.   This  is  a  specious  submission
because the State ought to have assailed that Order  since  its  conclusions
were contrary to the ratio of the Constitution Bench of this Court in  Padma
Sundara Rao.   It may be contended that the landowners  could  equally  have
challenged this Order.   However, given the  resources  available  virtually
at the beck and call of the State, it cannot be excused for its  neglect  or
jural folly and  must  be  held  responsible  for  its  failures.   This  is
especially so since the concerned citizens face the  draconian  consequences
of expropriation of their land with  its  attendant  loss  of  income.   The
Appellant State further contended that the  initial  Section  6  Declaration
was within the statutory time  period  and  upon  the  curing  of  technical
defects, the original Section  6  Declaration  continued.     The  Appellant
State also argued that the possession of  certain  lands  has  already  been
taken by the Haryana Urban Development Authority (HUDA) and therefore  those
matters have acquired  finality  in  accordance  with  the  ratio  of  Padma
Sundara Rao, which is available in these extracted paragraphs:
11. It may be pointed out that the  stipulation  regarding  the  urgency  in
terms of Section 5-A of the Act has no role  to  play  when  the  period  of
limitation under Section 6  is  reckoned.  The  purpose  for  providing  the
period of limitation seems to be the avoidance of inconvenience to a  person
whose land is sought to be acquired. Compensation gets pegged from the  date
of notification under Section 4(1). Section 11 provides that  the  valuation
of the land has to be done on the date of publication of notification  under
Section 4(1). Section 23 deals with matters to be considered in  determining
the compensation. It provides that the market value of the  land  is  to  be
fixed with reference to the date of publication of  the  notification  under
Section 4(1) of the Act. The prescription of time-limit in  that  background
is, therefore, peremptory in nature. In Ram Chand v. Union of  India  (1994)
1 SCC 44 it was held by this Court that though  no  period  was  prescribed,
action within a reasonable time was warranted. The said case  related  to  a
dispute which arose before  prescription  of  specific  periods.  After  the
quashing of declaration, the same became non est  and  was  effaced.  It  is
fairly conceded by learned counsel for the respondents that there is no  bar
on issuing a fresh declaration after following the  due  procedure.  It  is,
however, contended that in case a fresh notification is to  be  issued,  the
market value has to be determined on the basis  of  the  fresh  notification
under Section 4(1) of the Act and it may be a costly affair for  the  State.
Even if it is so, the interest of the person whose  land  is  sought  to  be
acquired, cannot be lost sight of. He is to be compensated  for  acquisition
of his land. If the acquisition sought to be made is done in  an  illogical,
illegal or irregular manner, he cannot be made to suffer on that count.

******

14.   While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the  law  and
cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected  to  the
abuse of process of law, it is for  the  legislature  to  amend,  modify  or
repeal it, if deemed  necessary.   (See  Rishabh  Agro  Industries  Ltd.  v.
P.N.B. Capital Services  Ltd.)  The  legislative  casus  omissus  cannot  be
supplied by judicial interpretative process.  Language of  Section  6(1)  is
plain and unambiguous.  There is no scope for reading something into it,  as
was done in Narsimhaiah case. In Nanjudaiah  case  the  period  was  further
stretched to have the time period run from  date  of  service  of  the  High
Court’s order. Such a  view  cannot  be  reconciled  with  the  language  of
Section 6(1).  If the view is accepted it would mean  that  a  case  can  be
covered by not only clause (i) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to  Section
6(1),  but  also  by  a  non-prescribed  period.   Same  can  never  be  the
legislative intent.

.* * * * *

16. The plea relating to applicability of the stare  decisis  principles  is
clearly unacceptable. The decision in K. Chinnathambi Gounder v.  Government
of Tamil Nadu AIR 1980 Mad 251 : (1980) 2 MLJ 269 (FB)was rendered on  22-6-
1979 i.e. much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act.  If  the  legislature
intended to give a new lease of life in those cases  where  the  declaration
under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could  not  have  done
so  by  specifically  providing  for  it.  The  fact  that  the  legislature
specifically provided for periods covered by orders of  stay  or  injunction
clearly shows that no other period was intended  to  be  excluded  and  that
there is no scope for providing any other period of  limitation.  The  maxim
actus curiae neminem gravabit highlighted by the Full Bench  of  the  Madras
High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case.


11    The Division Bench has  predicated  its  decision  to  set  aside  the
Notification as  well  as  the  Declaration  on  Padma  Sundara  Rao,  which
ironically the previous Division Bench had failed to follow.   The  decision
of the Constitutional Bench in Padma Sundara Rao held that the  language  in
Section 6(1) is clear  and  unambiguous,  and  the  time  period  cannot  be
stretched as this would not be in keeping with the legislative  intent.  The
contention of the Appellant State that the Declaration dated  30.12.2004  is
a continuation of the initial Declaration  is  thus  clearly  erroneous,  as
such a finding would be in the face of the  strict  interpretation  of  time
prescribed by Padma Sundara Rao and the unambiguous language of  Section  6.
Had the Legislature intended to allow for  such  a  continuation,  it  would
have done so by specifically providing for it, as it has  done  for  periods
covered by orders of stay and injunction. Furthermore, the  Appellant  State
cannot place reliance on an erroneous Order which caused grave prejudice  to
the rights of the  Respondents.  It  would  be  apt  to  mention  the  legal
principle that no party should suffer for the mistake of  the  Court.  Since
compensation is calculated based on the value of the land  on  the  date  of
the Section 4 Notification, the Order of the Division Bench dated  12.1.2004
resulted in the landowners getting compensation at 2001  rates  even  though
the Award was finally passed in 2006 and the compensation is yet to be  paid
to the Respondents. Had the  Division  Bench  Order  struck  down  only  the
Declaration, which in turn would have resulted  in  the  entire  acquisition
lapsing, the Appellant  State  would  have  had  to  reinitiate  acquisition
proceedings, resulting in the  Respondents  receiving  compensation  at  the
market rates current at the time of the fresh  Notification.   We  therefore
find that the Declaration  dated  30.12.2004  cannot  be  upheld  merely  by
virtue of the previous Division Bench’s  erroneous  and  prejudicial  Order.
We are in agreement with the decision of the  High  Court  in  the  impugned
Judgment and consequently dismiss the Appeal.

C.A. Nos. 459-460 of 2011
12    We are of the opinion that the substance of the issues in question  in
this batch of petitions are analogous to those in Civil  Writ  Petition  No.
1123 of 2006 which has been assailed in Civil Appeal No. 318 of  2011,  save
for the difference that it is the Haryana Urban Development Authority  which
has filed the Appeal.  In that light, the findings  made  in  the  preceding
Appeal apply squarely to this batch of Appeals as well, and are  decided  in
the same terms.

C.A. Nos. 461-462 of 2011
13    The factual scenario in these Appeals is different from  Civil  Appeal
No. 318 of 2011, in that  compensation  has  been  paid  to  the  Contesting
Respondents,  whose  land  is  now  in  the  possession  of  Haryana   Urban
Development Authority.   Section 24 of the Right to  Fair  Compensation  and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,  2013
makes it clear that the three requirements  for  an  acquisition  to  attain
finality are the passing of an award, payment of compensation and taking  of
possession,  all  of  which  are  met  here.   Furthermore,  the  Contesting
Respondents in these Appeals had not been parties before the Division

 Bench in its Judgment dated 12.3.2008. As that Judgment did not  explicitly
state that it would apply to all the landowners  affected  by  the  impugned
acquisition process, it was limited in scope to the parties before  it,  for
reasons that we have already discussed herein.  It would also  be  pertinent
to note that the Contesting Respondents in these  Appeals  only  filed  writ
petitions challenging the acquisition after  the  Judgment  dated  12.3.2008
was passed. We find that till the date  of  the  12.3.2008  Judgment,  these
Respondents had acquiesced to the acquisition and had allowed it  to  become
final, and therefore  they  could  not  seek  to  challenge  it  by  placing
reliance on a Judgment that did not enure to their benefit.
14    A number of Proforma Respondents were impleaded in  Civil  Appeal  No.
462 vide order dated  12.4.2013,  and  we  are  not  aware  of  whether  the
acquisitions with regard to their land has  become  final.   However,  these
Proforma Respondents first challenged  the  acquisition  by  filing  a  writ
petition in 2010, well after the  Judgment  dated  12.3.2008.   It  is  thus
clear that these Respondents, too, initially consented  to  the  acquisition
process and  only  challenged  it  belatedly  by  seeking  to  rely  upon  a
favourable Judgment that did not relate or pertain  to  them.  The  impugned
Orders dated 12.5.2008 in C.W.P. No 7066 of 2008  and  13.5.2008  in  C.W.P.
No. 7353 of 2008 as well as Order dated  19.1.2010  in  C.W.P.  No.  163  of
2010 are therefore set aside, and these Appeals are accordingly allowed.


                        ..................................................J.
                                      [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]




....................................................J.
                                    [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
New Delhi;
September 7, 2015.
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