advocatemmmohan

My photo

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN -  Practicing both IN CIVIL, CRIMINAL AND FAMILY LAWS,Etc.,

WELCOME TO LEGAL WORLD

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - FOR KNOWLEDGE IN LAW & FOR LEGAL OPINIONS - SHARE THIS

Tuesday, September 15, 2015

LA Act - Acquisition of Sold Evacuee Properties - The subject land, admittedly, was evacuee property. It was acquired under Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (in short ‘the DPCR Act’). Thereafter the property was transferred to the compensation pool under Section 14 of the said Act. A decision was taken to transfer the subject property out of the compensation pool to displaced persons. In an auction held on 6.8.1958 the predecessors of the respondents (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) offered the highest bid which was accepted on 15.10.1958. After adjustment of the verified claims, the respondents were asked to deposit the balance price within 15 days which was so done. On 10.3.1959, the respondents were informed by the appellant that their bid has been accepted and provisional possession of the property is being handed over to them.=In view of the above it has to be held that the subject land ceased to be evacuee property after publication of the notification of acquisition under Section 12 of the DPCR Act. Consequently the exemption clause in the notification issued under Section 4 exempting from its purview evacuee land will have no application to the present case. This will bring us to the second question that has been formulated for an answer in the present appeal. In Saraswati Devi (supra) on an exhaustive consideration of the issue with regard to the effect of delivery of provisional possession, which in the present case was handed over to the respondents on approval of the highest bid, it was held that such provisional possession gives the auction purchaser possessory rights as distinguished from proprietary rights in the auctioned property. The above proposition culled out in a judgment of the Punjab High Court in Roshan Lal Goswami vs. Gobind Raj[4] was approved by this Court to further hold that such proprietary rights occasioned by the delivery of provisional possession creates an encumbrance on the property which can be the subject of acquisition under the LA Act. In the present case also the facts being identical, we have to hold that an encumbrance had been created in the subject property, which, as held in Saraswati Devi (supra), could be acquired under the LA Act although the ownership in the land vested in the Central Government. In this regard we must also take note of the manner in which the earlier decision of this Court in Sharda Devi vs. State of Bihar[5] has been understood in Saraswati Devi (supra), namely, it is only such land in respect of which the entirety of the rights vests in the State and on which land there are no private rights or encumbrances which would be outside the purview of the LA Act. In view of the above discussions we arrive at the conclusion that the judgment and order of the High Court under challenge in the present appeal is not sustainable in law. We, therefore, set aside the same and allow this appeal.

                                 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                       CIVIL APPEAL  NO. 3971 OF 2006


Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.                       ...   Appellant (s)

                                   Versus
Matwal Chand (D) Thr. LRs.                       ...    Respondent(s)


                               J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

The challenge in this appeal is to an order dated 15.04.2004 passed  by  the
High Court of Delhi in two writ petitions  raising  identical  questions  of
law on similar facts. The writ petitions filed by the respondent  have  been
allowed and the acquisition proceedings  under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,
1894 (in short ‘the LA Act’) have been declared null and  void.   Aggrieved,
the Delhi Administration has filed the instant appeal.
The core facts lie in a short compass and are as follows:
The subject land, admittedly, was evacuee property. It  was  acquired  under
Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and  Rehabilitation)  Act,
1954 (in short ‘the DPCR Act’). Thereafter the property was  transferred  to
the compensation pool under Section 14 of  the  said  Act.  A  decision  was
taken to transfer the subject property  out  of  the  compensation  pool  to
displaced persons.  In an auction held on 6.8.1958 the predecessors  of  the
respondents  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  respondents)  offered  the
highest bid which was  accepted  on  15.10.1958.  After  adjustment  of  the
verified claims, the respondents were asked to  deposit  the  balance  price
within 15 days which  was  so  done.  On  10.3.1959,  the  respondents  were
informed by the appellant that their bid has been accepted  and  provisional
possession of the property is being handed over to them.

On 13.11.1959 a notification under Section  4  of  the  LA  Act  was  issued
proposing to acquire 34070 acres  of  land  in  several  villages  including
Village Basai Darapur where the subject land was situated. The  notification
under Section 4 specifically excluded from the purview  of  the  acquisition
Government and evacuee land. After the Section  4  notification  was  issued
and prior to the declaration under Section 6  made  on  6.1.1969,  the  sale
certificate was issued in respect of the  subject  land  on  25.1.1962.  The
same which was registered on 21.2.1962 clearly recites that the  respondents
are declared as the purchasers of the property with effect from 25.1.1962.

After publication of the declaration under Section 6  on  6.1.1969,  notices
under Sections 9 and 10  of  the  LA  Act  were  issued  on  10.1.1979.  The
respondents filed their claim before the competent authority. Thereafter  on
7.1.1981 the award in respect of the subject property was passed which  came
to be challenged in the writ petitions out of which this appeal has  arisen.


By the  impugned  order  the  High  Court  on  consideration  of  the  rival
contentions and the provisions of the DPCR Act and the facts set  out  above
came to the conclusion that the subject land was  evacuee  property  on  the
date of the notification issued under Section 4 of the LA  Act  and  as  the
said  notification  had  exempted  evacuee  land   from   the   purview   of
acquisition, the proceedings for  acquisition,  including  the  award,  were
null and void.

Before us, Ms. Rachana Srivasatava learned counsel  for  the  appellant  has
urged that the subject property, though evacuee property, ceased  to  be  so
upon acquisition of the same under Section 12 of the DPCR Act.  It is  urged
that  under  Section  12(2)  of  the  said  Act,  upon  publication  of  the
notification under sub-section (1), the right, title  and  interest  of  any
evacuee  in  the  evacuee  property  stands  extinguished  and  the  evacuee
property  vests  absolutely  in  the  Central  Government  free   from   all
encumbrances. Under sub-section (4) of Section 12 all such evacuee  property
acquired becomes a part of the compensation pool which vests in the  Central
Government under Section 14(2) of the DPCR Act. Pointing out the  provisions
of the Section 20 of the DPCR Act, it is urged  that  property  included  in
the common pool may be sold, leased, allotted or otherwise transferred to  a
displaced person. It is therefore urged that upon  the  acquisition  of  the
subject property under Section 12 of the DPCR Act  the  same  had  shed  its
character as evacuee property and by operation of the provisions of the  Act
the property stood vested in the Central Government.  The  exemption  clause
contained in the notification under Section 4 of the LA Act  issued  in  the
present case on 13.11.1959, in so far  as  evacuee  property  is  concerned,
therefore, has no application to the subject land.

It is further argued that though in the present case  the  sale  certificate
in respect of the property was issued on 25.1.1962 and the property  therein
was transferred to the respondents with effect from the said date, there  is
no inherent contradiction between the transfer of title  in  favour  of  the
respondents on a subsequent date and the  acquisition  of  the  property  or
initiation of such process of acquisition on a prior date.  In  this  regard
placing reliance on a judgment of this Court in Saraswati Devi (Dead) by  LR
vs. Delhi Development Authority & Ors.,[1] it  is  contended  that  the  bid
offered by the respondent;  the  acceptance  thereof  and  the  delivery  of
provisional possession creates an encumbrance on the subject land  which  is
amenable to a process of acquisition under the LA Act as held  in  Saraswati
Devi (supra).

Reliance has also  been  placed  on  a  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Delhi
Administration & Ors. Vs. Madan Lal Nangia & Ors.[2]  to  contend  that  the
evacuee property vests in the Custodian for  the  purposes  contemplated  by
the Administration of  Evacuee  Property  Act,  1950   and  in  the  Central
Government only after the notification of acquisition under  Section  12  of
the DPCR Act is issued but not prior thereto.

On the other hand learned counsel appearing on  behalf  of  the  respondents
has contended that the  acquisition  of  evacuee  property  by  the  Central
Government under Section 12 of the DPCR Act and the transfer  of  such  land
to the compensation pool under Section 14 does not divest the status of  the
subject land as evacuee property. Pointing out the  provisions  of  the  two
enactments i.e. the DPCR Act and  the  Administration  of  Evacuee  Property
Act, it is contended that while the object and purpose of the latter Act  is
the administration of evacuee property by the custodian in  accordance  with
the provisions thereof, acquisition of such property for  inclusion  in  the
common pool for allotment of such land to displaced persons is  contemplated
under the DPCR Act. The transfer of evacuee  land  to  the  common  pool  by
issuance of a notification under Section 12 of the DPCR Act does not  change
the character of the land which continues to remain evacuee property.  Hence
it is contended that the subject land is covered by the exemption clause  of
the Section 4 notification dated 13.11.1959.  It is also urged  that  if  by
virtue of Section 12 of the DPCR Act the property is vested in  the  Central
Government it cannot be understood how the  Central  Government  could  have
initiated  the  process  of  acquisition  of  its  own  property  under  the
provisions of the LA Act.

Learned counsel has further argued that in the present case in terms of  the
expressed stipulation in the sale certificate dated 25.1.1962  to  the  said
effect, the property stood transferred in the name of the  respondents  with
effect from the said date and not from any anterior date including the  date
of payment of the full amount due.  This is notwithstanding  the  fact  that
under Rule 90 of the Rules of 1955 for sale of properties  forming  part  of
the compensation pool, the sale certificate  only  formalises  the  transfer
which is effective from the date of payment of the full price.   Relying  on
the clear terms embodied in the sale certificate issued in the present  case
it is argued that  the  subject  land  continued  to  vest  in  the  Central
Government until 25.1.1962 and hence could not have  been  acquired  by  the
notification dated 13.11.1959 under Section 4 of the LA Act, the  said  date
being  anterior  to  the  date  of  transfer  of  title  in  favour  of  the
respondents.

Two  questions  as  set  out  below,  in  our  considered  view,  arise  for
determination in the present case.
Whether the land, after issuance of notification under  Section  12  of  the
DPCR Act, ceased to be evacuee property  so  as  to  be  excluded  from  the
purview of the notification issued under Section 4 of the LA Act?
If the subject land vested in the Central  Government  upon  publication  of
the notification under Section 12 of the DPCR Act and thereby ceased  to  be
evacuee land, could such land vested in the Central Government  be  acquired
under the provisions of the LA Act?
A reading of the provisions of the Administration of Evacuee  Property  Act,
1950 would go to show that the said Act (since  repealed  with  effect  from
5.9.2005) had been enacted for the administration of  evacuee  property  and
for matters connected therewith. While it will not be necessary to  set  out
the definition of “evacuee” and “evacuee property” as defined  in  the  said
Act regard must be had to the provisions of  Section  6  which  contemplated
appointment by the Central Government by means  of  a  notification  in  the
official gazette, a Custodian for any State for discharge  of  duties  under
the Act. Section 7 empowers the Custodian to  declare  any  property  as  an
evacuee  property  after  issuance  of  appropriate  notice  in  the  manner
prescribed and after holding an inquiry in the matter.  Under Section 8  any
property declared as evacuee property under Section  7  is  deemed  to  have
vested in the Custodian. Possession of all such properties is  to  be  taken
over by the Custodian under Section 9 of the Act. Section 10 deals with  the
powers and duties of the Custodian and  may  be  usefully  extracted  herein
below.
“10 - Powers and duties of  the  Custodian  generally-  (1) Subject  to  the
provisions of any rules that may be made in this behalf, the  Custodian  may
take such measures as he considers necessary or expedient for  the  purposes
of securing, administering, preserving and  managing  any  evacuee  property
and generally for the purpose of enabling him  satisfactorily  to  discharge
any of the duties imposed on him by or under this Act and may, for any  such
purpose as aforesaid, do all  acts  and  incur  all  expenses  necessary  or
incidental thereto.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in  sub-
section (1), the Custodian may, for any of the purposes aforesaid,--

(a) carry on the business of the evacuee;

(b) appoint a manager for the property of the evacuee  or  for  carrying  on
any business or undertaking of the evacuee  and  authorize  the  manager  to
exercise any of the powers of the Custodian under this section;

(c) enter, or authorize any other person to enter, any land or  premises  to
inspect any evacuee property;

(d) take all such measures as may be necessary to keep any evacuee  property
in good repair;

(e) complete any building which has vested in him and which requires  to  be
completed;

[***]

(i) take such action as may be necessary for the recovery of  any  debt  due
to the evacuee;

(j) institute, defend or continue any  legal  proceeding  in  any  Civil  or
Revenue Court on behalf of the evacuee or  refer  any  dispute  between  the
evacuee and any other person to arbitration or compromise any claims,  debts
or liabilities on behalf of the evacuee;

(l) in any  case  where  the  evacuee  property  which  has  vested  in  the
Custodian  consists  of  a  share  or  shares  in   a   company,   exercise,
notwithstanding  anything  to  the  contrary   contained   in   the 3 Indian
Companies Act, 1913 (7 of 1913 ), or in the articles of association  of  the
company, the same rights in the matter  of  making  a  requisition  for  the
convening of a meeting or of presenting a petition to the  Court  under  the
provisions  of  the  Indian  Companies  Act,  1913  ,  or  the  articles  of
association  of  the  company  or  in  any  other  matter  as  the   evacuee
shareholder himself could have done had he been present, although  the  name
of the Custodian does not appear in the register of members of the company;

(ll)  in any case where  the  evacuee  property  which  has  vested  in  the
Custodian consists of fifty- one per cent.  or  more  of  the  shares  in  a
company, the Custodian may take  charge  of  the  management  of  the  whole
affairs of the company and exercise,  in  addition  to  any  of  the  powers
vested in him under this Act, all or any of the powers of the  directors  of
the company, notwithstanding that the registered office of such  company  is
situate in any part of the  territories  to  which  this  Act  extends,  and
notwithstanding anything to the  contrary  contained  in  this  Act  or  the
Indian Companies Act, 1913 (7 of 1913 ), or in the articles  of  association
of the company:
Provided that the Custodian shall not take charge of such management of  the
company except with the previous approval of the Central Government;

(m) incur any expenditure, including the payment of  taxes,  duties,  cesses
and rates to Government or to any local authority  ;

(n) pay to the evacuee, or to any member of  his  family  or  to  any  other
person as in the opinion of the Custodian is entitled thereto, any  sums  of
money out of the funds in his possession;

(o) transfer in any manner whatsoever any evacuee property,  notwithstanding
anything to  the  contrary  contained  in  any  law  or  agreement  relating
thereto:
Provided that the Custodian shall not sell any  immovable  property  or  any
business or other undertaking of  the  evacuee,  except  with  the  previous
approval of the Custodian- General;

(p)  acquire any non- evacuee interest in evacuee property, whether  by  way
of purchase or otherwise:
Provided that no such acquisition shall be made  except  with  the  previous
approval of the Custodian- General;

(q) delegate, by general or special order,  all  or  any  of  his  functions
under this Act to such officers or persons as he thinks fit.”


On the other hand, the DPCR Act  has  been  enacted,  inter  alia,  for  the
purpose of making payment  of  compensation  and  rehabilitation  grants  to
displaced persons. Section 12 contained in  Chapter  III  of  the  DPCR  Act
confers power in the Central Government  to  acquire  evacuee  property  for
rehabilitation of displaced persons. The provisions of Sections 12,  14  and
20 which are relevant have already been noticed and  will  not  require  any
further mention. The effect and interplay between the  two  enactments  have
been noticed in Delhi Administration & Ors. vs.  Madan  Lal  Nangia  &  Ors.
(supra) wherein it has been held that under the  Administration  of  Evacuee
Property Act,  1950,  the  evacuee  property  vests  in  the  Custodian  for
purposes  of  administration  of  such  property  in  accordance  with   the
provisions of the Act and at that stage the property does not vest   in  the
Central Government.  However, after the issuance of the  notification  under
Section 12 of the DPCR Act the property vests  in  the  Central  Government.
This is, in fact, abundantly clear from the provisions of Section  12(2)  of
the DPCR Act which clearly provides that on publication  of  a  notification
under sub-section (1) of Section 12 “the right, title and  interest  of  any
evacuee in the evacuee property specified in the notification shall, on  and
from the beginning of the date on which the notification is so published  be
extinguished and the evacuee property shall vest absolutely in  the  Central
Government free from all encumbrances.” Under sub-section (4) of Section  12
all such evacuee property acquired  forms  part  of  the  compensation  pool
which under Section 14 vests  in  the  Central  Government  “free  from  all
encumbrances and shall be utilised in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of
this Act and the rules made thereunder”. The vesting of the property in  the
Custodian under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act (Section  8)  and
in the Central Government (after issuance of Section 12  notification  under
the DPCR Act) are two distinct and different phases which  are  contemplated
to be brought into effect  by  specific  acts  and  conscious  decisions  as
contemplated by the provisions of the two enactments. The clear language  of
Section 8 of Administration of Evacuee Property Act  and  Sections  12(2)  &
(4) and 14 of the DPCR Act makes it abundantly  clear  that  the  transition
from the vesting of the evacuee property in the  Custodian  to  the  Central
Government is a  distinct  and  identifiable  process  under  the  law.  The
acquisition of the land under Section 12 of the DPCR Act brings the  evacuee
property into a common pool which is to be utilised in accordance  with  the
provisions of the Act. Specifically, once the property is  included  in  the
common pool and vests in the Central Government, under  Section  16  of  the
DPCR Act, the Central Government may take  such  measures  as  it  considers
necessary or expedient for the custody,  management  and  disposal  of  such
property including transfer of the property out of the compensation pool  to
a displaced person.  In  the  face  of  the  clear  provisions  of  the  two
enactments  and  the  respective  schemes  contemplated  thereunder,  it  is
difficult to hold that the evacuee property continues to retain such  status
after issuance of the notification under Section 12 of the  DPCR  Act.    In
fact the above view would find resonance  in  an  old  vintage  decision  in
Major Gopal Singh and Others vs.  Custodian,  Evacuee  Property,  Punjab  an
Others[3] though rendered in a somewhat  different  context.   The  relevant
details thereof in para 9 may be extracted below.
“9.   Section 12 of the 1954 Act empowers the Central Government to  acquire
evacuee property for rehabilitation of displaced persons  by  publishing  in
the official gazette a notification to the effect that  it  has  decided  to
acquire such evacuee property in pursuance of this provision. ……………………………
Sub-section 2 of s.12 of the Act provides that on  the  publication  of  the
notification under sub-s. 1 the right, title or interest of any  evacuee  in
the  property  specified  in  the  notification  shall   immediately   stand
extinguished  and  that  property  shall  vest  absolutely  in  the  Central
Government free from all encumbrances. The power of the Custodian under  the
Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, to allot  any  property  to  a
person or to cancel an allotment existing in favour of  a  person  rests  on
the fact that the  property  vests  in  him.  But  the  consequence  of  the
publication of the notification by the Central Government under s.  12(1) of
the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act with respect  to
any property or a class  of  property  would  be  to  divest  the  Custodian
completely  of  his  right  in  the  property  flowing   from   s.8 of   the
Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, and vest that property in  the
Central Government. He would, therefore, not be competent to deal  with  the
property in any manner in the absence of any provision in  either  of  these
two enactments permitting him to do so. No provision was,  however,  pointed
out to us in either of these Acts whereunder  despite  the  vesting  of  the
property in the Central Government the Custodian was empowered to deal  with
it. Sub-s. 4 of s. 12 of the 1954 Act provides  that  all  evacuee  property
acquired under that section shall form part of the compensation pool.  Under
s. 16(1) of this Act the  Central  Government  is  empowered  to  take  such
measures as it considers necessary or expedient for the custody,  management
and disposal of the compensation  pool.  Sub-s.  2  of  s.  16 empowers  the
Central  Government  to  appoint  such  officers  as  it  deems  fit  or  to
constitute such authority or corporation as it deems fit for the purpose  of
managing and disposing of the properties forming part  of  the  compensation
pool.  Section  19 of  the  Act  provides  that   notwithstanding   anything
contained in any contract or any other law for the time being in  force  but
subject to the rules that may be made under the Act the managing officer  or
managing corporation may cancel any allotment etc., under which any  evacuee
property acquired under the Act is held or  occupied  by  a  person  whether
such allotment or lease was granted before or after the commencement of  the
Act. This provision thus confers the power to  deal  with  evacuee  property
acquired under the Act only on a  managing  officer  appointed  or  managing
corporation constituted under the Act and makes  no  mention  whatsoever  of
the Custodian appointed under the Administration of  Evacuee  Property  Act.
No doubt, under s.10 of the  Administration  of  Evacuee  Property  Act  the
Custodian is empowered to manage evacuee property and  in  exercise  of  his
power he will be competent to allot  such  property  to  any  person  or  to
cancel an allotment or lease made in favour of  a  person.  Apart  from  the
fact that subsequent to the issue of the notification under s. 12(1) of  the
Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, the property  would
cease to be evacuee property, the aforesaid powers of  the  Custodian  would
be in conflict with those conferred by s.19 of the 1954 Act  on  a  managing
officer or a managing corporation constituted under that Act.”


In view of the above it has to be held that the subject land  ceased  to  be
evacuee property after publication of the notification of acquisition  under
Section 12 of the DPCR  Act.   Consequently  the  exemption  clause  in  the
notification issued under Section 4 exempting from its purview evacuee  land
will have no application to the present case.

This will bring us to the second question that has been  formulated  for  an
answer in the present appeal. In Saraswati Devi  (supra)  on  an  exhaustive
consideration of the  issue  with  regard  to  the  effect  of  delivery  of
provisional possession, which in the present case was  handed  over  to  the
respondents  on  approval  of  the  highest  bid,  it  was  held  that  such
provisional possession gives the  auction  purchaser  possessory  rights  as
distinguished from proprietary rights in the auctioned property.  The  above
proposition culled out in a judgment of the Punjab High Court in Roshan  Lal
Goswami vs. Gobind Raj[4] was approved by this Court to  further  hold  that
such  proprietary  rights  occasioned  by  the   delivery   of   provisional
possession creates an encumbrance on the property  which can be the  subject
of acquisition under the LA Act. In the present case also  the  facts  being
identical, we have to hold that an  encumbrance  had  been  created  in  the
subject property, which,  as  held  in  Saraswati  Devi  (supra),  could  be
acquired under the LA Act although the ownership in the land vested  in  the
Central Government. In this regard we must also take note of the  manner  in
which the earlier decision of  this  Court  in  Sharda  Devi  vs.  State  of
Bihar[5] has been understood in Saraswati Devi (supra), namely, it  is  only
such land in respect of which the entirety of the rights vests in the  State
and on which land there are no private rights or  encumbrances  which  would
be outside the purview of the LA Act.

In view of the above discussions  we  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  the
judgment and order of the High Court under challenge in the  present  appeal
is not sustainable in law.  We, therefore, set  aside  the  same  and  allow
this appeal.


                                            ..……..……......................J.
                                                    (RANJAN GOGOI)


                                             ….……..…….....................J.
                                                    (PRAFULLA C. PANT)
NEW DELHI
SEPTEMBER 04, 2015.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                             I.A. NO. 12 OF 2015
                                     IN
                       CIVIL APPEAL  NO. 3971 OF 2006

Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.                       ...Appellant (s)/
                                                            Non-Applicants

                                   Versus
Matwal Chand (D) Thr. LRs.                       ...Respondent/(s)
                                                            Applicant(s)

                                  O R D E R

This  application  seeks  directions  that  the  subject  land   acquisition
proceedings are deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of  the  Right  to
Fair Compensation & Transparency in  Land  Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and
Resettlement Act, 2013.
      In view of the issues raised and the consistent orders of  this  Court
on similar applications, we leave it open to  the  respondents  to  approach
the appropriate forum, if they  are  so  advised,  to  initiate  appropriate
proceedings  under  Section  24  of  the  Right  to  Fair   Compensation   &
Transparency in  Land  Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and  Resettlement  Act,
2013.  Any such approach, if made,  shall be within eight weeks from today.

      The I.A. stands disposed of in the above terms.




                                           ...……..……......................J.
                                                     (RANJAN GOGOI)



                                             ….……..…….....................J.
                                                      (PRAFULLA C. PANT)
NEW DELHI
SEPTEMBER 04, 2015.

-----------------------
[1]

       2013 (3) SCC 571
[2]    2003 (10) SCC 321
[3]    AIR 1961 SC 1320
[4]    AIR 1963 Punj 532
[5]    2003 (3) SCC 128

No comments:

Post a Comment

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.