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Friday, January 23, 2015

when a repeal of an enactment is followed by a fresh legislation such legislation does not effect the substantive rights of the parties on the date of suit or adjudication of suit unless such a legislation is retrospective and a court of appeal cannot take into consideration a new law brought into existence after the judgment appealed from has been rendered because the rights of the parties in an appeal are determined under the law in force on the date of suit. However, the position in law would be different in the matters which relate to procedural law but so far as substantive rights of parties are concerned they remain unaffected by the amendment in the enactment. We are, therefore, of the view that where a repeal of provisions of an enactment is followed by fresh legislation by an amending Act such legislation is prospective in operation and does not effect substantive or vested rights of the parties unless made retrospective either expressly or by necessary intendment.= CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION I.A. No. 8 of 2014 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.7424 OF 2013 KARNAIL KAUR & ORS. .........APPELLANTS Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. .........RESPONDENTS

                               NON-REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                             I.A. No. 8 of 2014

                                      IN

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.7424 OF 2013



   KARNAIL KAUR & ORS.                     .........APPELLANTS

                                     Vs.

   STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS.                .........RESPONDENTS


                                       with

                 I.A. No. 5 in Civil Appeal No. 7425 of 2013
                I.A. No. 19 of Civil Appeal No. 7426 of 2013
                I.A. No. 15 in Civil Appeal No. 7427 of 2013
                 I.A. No. 3 in Civil Appeal No. 7428 of 2013
                 I.A. No. 3 in Civil Appeal No. 7429 of 2013
                 I.A. No. 3 in Civil Appeal No. 7430 of 2013
                 I.A. No. 6 in Civil Appeal No. 7431 of 2013
                 I.A. No. 3 in Civil Appeal No. 7432 of 2013
                 I.A. No. 3 in Civil Appeal No. 7433 of 2013
                 I.A. No. 3 in Civil Appeal No. 7435 of 2013
       I.A.Nos.3-4 in Civil Appeal Nos.7437-7438 of 2013
       I.A. Nos.6-8 in Civil Appeal Nos.7439-7441 of 2013
 I.A. No. 5 in Civil Appeal No. 7444 of 2013
                                     and
                 I.A. No.6 in Civil Appeal No. 7445 of 2013


                               J U D G M E N T


V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.

The abovementioned applications are filed by  the  appellants  for  allowing
the concerned appeals in terms  of  Section  24(2)  of  the  Right  to  Fair
Compensation  and  Transparency  in  Land  Acquisition,  Rehabilitation  and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (in short 'the  Act  of  2013').  The  appellant-land
owners have come to this Court questioning the  correctness  of  the  common
judgment and order dated 19.04.2011 passed by the High  Court  of  Punjab  &
Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ  Petition  No.5512  of  2001  and  batch
petitions by which the High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions filed by  the
appellants herein.

As all the appeals are identical involving similar question of law, for  the
sake of brevity we will discuss the facts of the case in C.A.  No.  7424  of
2013 which are stated hereunder:

    The appellants are original residents and have their houses  along  with
their  land  in  village-Sohana,  Tehsil  Mohali  in  District  Roop   Nagar
(Punjab). The State of Punjab has framed a special Act known as 'The  Punjab
Regional and Town Planning and Development Act, 1995' (hereinafter  referred
to as 'the Act of 1995') to construct a residential urban  estate  with  the
main object  to  undertake  urban  development  and  housing  programme.  On
21.02.2000, the State  of  Punjab  through  Secretary,  Punjab  Housing  and
Development, the respondent No.1 herein, issued notification  under  Section
4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for  short  'the  L.A.  Act')  for  the
purpose of setting up a residential urban estate  in  the  area  of  revenue
estate of village Mauli Baidwan, SAS Nagar (Mohali).  The  said  acquisition
notification covered a total  extent  of  1264.84  acres  of  land  in  four
villages -Mauli Baidwan, Sohana, Raipur Khurd  and  Lakhnausr  in  Roopnagar
district of Punjab out of which the land of the appellants  in  the  present
batch of appeals constituted 102 acres of land in small pockets of the  said
1264.84 acres. Objections were raised against the  same  by  the  appellants
under Section 5A alleging that in the year 1996 the Punjab State  Government
had framed a scheme called  "Farmers  Friendly  and  Land  Pooling  Exchange
Scheme", and as per the contents of the said Scheme, for every acre of  land
transferred by  the  land  owners  to  Punjab  Urban  Development  Authority
(PUDA), the land owners will be given back approximately 1000  square  yards
after development and the land owners were advised not to sell  their  land.
Therefore, the appellants objected to the said notification under Section  4
of the L.A. Act, as the same was violative of the principles  of  promissory
estoppel. The said objections were  not  decided  by  the  Land  Acquisition
Officer. Thereafter, on 02.02.2001, the notification under Section 6 of  the
L.A. Act was published.

The appellants filed writ petition No. 5512 of 2001 before  the  High  Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh alleging inter alia that respondent  no.
1 has started acquiring the land without complying with the  provisions  and
in  utter  violation  of  the  Act  of  1995  &  therefore  the  acquisition
proceedings are bad in law and liable to be quashed.

The High Court vide order dated 19.04.2011 dismissed writ petition No.  5512
of 2001 along with batch matters  in  CWP  No.  4981  of  2001.  Hence,  the
present appeal.

It has been contended by the learned senior counsel for the appellants  that
the L.A. Act has been replaced by the Act  of  2013,  which  has  come  into
force w.e.f. 01.01.2014 and that Section 24(2) of the Act of  2013  provides
that where an award under Section 11 of the L.A.  Act  has  been  made  five
years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 but the  physical
possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has  not  been
paid, the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed.  In  the  present
case, the proceedings under the L.A. Act have  lapsed  for  both  the  above
said reasons because the case of the appellants satisfy both the  conditions
as referred to in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The award under  Section
11 of the L.A. Act  in  respect  of  the  land  in  dispute  was  passed  on
17.05.2001. It is further contended that not  only  the  possession  of  the
said land is still with the appellants but they have also not been paid  any
compensation. Therefore, the acquisition proceedings in respect of the  land
under challenge in the present appeal have lapsed by  virtue  of  provisions
of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.

It has been further contended that the then Additional Chief  Administrator-
cum-Land  Acquisition  Collector,  GMADA,  Mohali  in  his  affidavit  dated
06.02.2008 has admitted that the possession of the land in question is  with
the appellants. Further, in the affidavit dated 19.07.2012 filed  on  behalf
of respondent no.2, it has been categorically  stated  that  the  appellants
and other land owners are using their land for  agricultural  purposes.  For
the said  reason,  the  respondent-GMADA  had  filed  an  application  dated
09.02.2012 seeking permission to complete the  remaining  development  works
in Sectors 76-80 of SAS Nagar, Mohali. The said  application  was  dismissed
by this Court on 11.11.2013.

Further, it is contended by the appellants that  no  details/calculation  of
the awarded money has been given to the appellants. Even  if  payments  have
been deposited, the  same  is  no  payment  in  the  eyes  of  law  and  the
respondent State has never offered to pay compensation of the acquired  land
in terms of the award of the appellants. No  notice,  whatsoever,  has  been
received by the appellants from any  quarter  asking  them  to  collect  the
compensation awarded in respect of their acquired land.  A  perusal  of  the
Annexure R-10 filed  by  the  State  of  Punjab  along  with  their  further
affidavit filed before this Court on 02.07.2013 would  clearly  go  to  show
that the  compensation  amount  is  lying  in  the  Treasury.  It  has  been
contended that in view of the above, the case of the appellants is  squarely
covered under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.  Therefore,  the  appellants
have filed the applications.


On the other hand, it has been contended by the  learned  Solicitor  General
Mr. Ranjit Kumar for the  respondents  that  the  issue  involved  in  these
appeals relates to the prayer for re-allotment of the land  on  the  premise
that  certain  other  housing  societies/institutions  were  re-alloted  the
acquired land. Therefore, it is no ground for the claim  of  the  appellants
to dispose of the appeal in terms of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 as  it
is not sustainable in the eyes of law and deserves to be rejected.

Further it has been contended that physical possession of the entire  extent
of the acquired land except 102 acres of the land involved in these  appeals
were not taken  by  the  respondent  no.2-PUDA  (now  GMADA)  on  17.05.2001
because of the interim order passed by both the High Court and  this  Court.
The possession of the land covered by the above batch of appeals  could  not
be taken as stay orders passed by the High Court in writ petitions filed  by
the land owners were in force.

It has been further  contended  that  Section  24(2)  of  the  Act  of  2013
stipulates that in relation to the land  acquisition  proceedings  initiated
under the L.A. Act where an award has been made five years or more prior  to
the commencement of the Act of 2013 and either of the two  contingencies  is
satisfied, viz; (i) physical possession of the land has not  been  taken  or
(ii) the compensation has not been  paid  to  the  owners,  the  acquisition
proceedings  shall  be  deemed  to  have  lapsed.  On  the  lapse  of   such
acquisition under the L.A. Act, it has to initiate  the  proceedings  afresh
under the Act of 2013. The proviso appended to Section 24(2)  deals  with  a
situation where in respect of the acquisition initiated under the  L.A.  Act
an award has been made and compensation in respect of  a  majority  of  land
holdings has not been deposited in the account  of  the  beneficiaries  then
all the beneficiaries specified in Section 4  notification  become  entitled
to compensation under the Act of 2013.

Further, it is contended that the acquisition  proceedings  in  relation  to
the land involved in the present appeals are a  part  of  1264.84  acres  of
land  acquired  pursuant  to  the  notification  dated  21.02.2000  and  the
compensation has already  been  paid/deposited  in  Court  in  case  of  the
affected land holders and physical possession of the  land  has  been  taken
with regard to more than 90% of the acquired land except  the  land  covered
by the present appeals where physical possession of the land  could  not  be
taken as the stay orders passed by the High Court & this Court have been  in
force. It is further contended that, however, soon after the passing of  the
impugned judgment dated 19.04.2011 the possession  of  the  land  was  taken
28.4.2011. Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the case  of
Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lt. Governor, Govt. of N.C.T.,  Delhi
& Ors.[1],  in justification of the above legal  contentions,  the  relevant
paragraph of which is extracted hereunder:-
"30. It would, thus, be seen from a  cumulative  reading  of  the  aforesaid
judgments, that while taking possession of a  large  area  of  land  with  a
large number of owners, it would be impossible  for  the  Collector  or  the
Revenue Official to enter  each  bigha  or  biswa  and  to  take  possession
thereof and that a pragmatic approach has to be adopted  by  the  Court.  It
is also clear that one of the methods of taking possession  and  handing  it
over to the beneficiary Department is the recording  of  a  Panchnama  which
can in itself constitute evidence of  the  fact  that  possession  had  been
taken and the land had vested absolutely in the Government."


Further, it is contended that this Court while  granting  special  leave  to
appeal directed to maintain "status quo" with regard to  possession.  As  is
held by this Court in a catena of judgments including Municipal  Corporation
of Delhi v. Lichho Devi and Ors.[2], and Bailamma  &  Ors.  v.  Poornaprajna
House Building Cooperative Society  &  Ors.[3],  while  dealing  with  cases
under Section 11-A  of  the  L.A.  Act  which  also  speaks  of  'lapse'  of
acquisition proceedings, if no award is made within a period  of  two  years
from the date of publication of the declaration, once an order  of  stay  is
obtained and the Government and the Collector are prevented from taking  any
further action pursuant to the declaration they cannot be  faulted  for  the
delay. Similarly, the authorities cannot be faulted for not taking  physical
possession of the land covered in the present appeals in as much  as  it  is
not that the authorities had on their own volition not taken  possession  of
the acquired land of the appellants. In fact the authorities who  had  taken
physical possession of more than 90% of the total extent  of  acquired  land
covered by the acquisition proceedings were prevented from  taking  physical
possession of the land in question in view of  the  stay  orders  passed  in
writ petitions moved by the landowners themselves in spite of the filing  of
application  by  the  authorities  seeking  permission   to   complete   the
development works on the land in issue which was adversely affected in  view
of the pending lis. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 will not be  applicable
in such a situation. Any  interpretation  to  the  contrary  would  lead  to
absurdity and anomalous results and unjust  and  unwarranted  enrichment  of
the landholders who are in physical possession of the acquired land in  view
of the stay orders  passed  in  the  writ  petitions  filed  by  them  which
prevented the authorities from taking physical possession  of  the  acquired
land when the L.A. Act was in force. Further, reliance  was  placed  on  New
India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia & Anr.[4] and Ashok Lanka  &
Anr. v. Rishi Dixit & Ors.[5] that legislature is known to avoid anomaly  or
absurdity.

It is further contended that the settled principle of  law  based  upon  the
legal maxim 'Actus  Curiae  Neminem  Gravabit'  that  has  also  been  given
statutory flavour in terms of  Section  144  of  the  Civil  Procedure  Code
(Restitution) must be read  into  Section  24(2)  of  the  Act  of  2013  in
conjunction with Section 6 of the General Clauses Act and Section  11(A)  of
the L.A. Act.

The learned Attorney General has further  submitted  that  the  judgment  of
this Court in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association v.  State  of  Tamil
Nadu[6] is per incuriam in as much as the above crucial legal  aspects  have
not been considered therein.  Further, he has placed reliance upon the  case
of Nand Kishore Gupta & Ors. v.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  &  Ors.[7]  this
Court held thus:-
"46.The learned counsel appearing on behalf  of  the  appellants  could  not
deny the fact that the  total  number  of  petitioners  concerned  in  these
acquisition proceedings, coming up before  the  High  Court,  was  extremely
insignificant as compared to those who had  accepted  the  compensation.  Of
course, that by itself may not be  the  only  reason  to  hold  against  the
appellants (the petitioners), however, that fact will have  to  be  kept  in
mind while deciding the issues which cover the  whole  acquisition  process,
which acquisition is for the purpose of development of 25 million  sq  m  of
land. The High Court has also noticed this aspect. We  have  mentioned  this
aspect only with a limited objective of showing that the  criticism  against
the whole scheme which would invalidate the acquisition would  be  difficult
to be accepted, particularly  in  this  case,  in  view  of  the  fact  that
majority  of  the  landowners  have  parted  with  possession,   taken   the
compensation and thus, the whole scheme  has  progressed  to  a  substantial
level, wherefrom it will be extremely difficult now to turn back  to  square
one."


With reference to the above decision, he has further contended that  in  the
above circumstances, Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 cannot  be  applicable
to the fact situation in the present  appeals  and  the  above  applications
deserve to  be  dismissed  in  the  interest  of  justice  and  also  public
interest.

We have carefully gone through the legal submissions  made  by  the  learned
senior counsel on behalf of the appellants with respect to  the  application
filed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 and the  objections  raised  by
the respondents to the same. In our considered view, respondent  No.2  GMADA
has admitted that the possession of the land in  question  (i.e.  about  102
acres) is with the appellants and  the  appellants  have  not  received  the
compensation for the said land being acquired by GMADA. Therefore, the  case
of Nand Kishore Gupta referred to supra is not  applicable  to  the  present
case on hand. In fact, the present case is squarely covered by the law  laid
down in the matter of Pune Municipal  Corporation  and  Anr.  v.  Harakchand
Misirimal Solanki & Ors.[8], Union of India & Ors. v. Shiv  Raj  &  Ors.[9],
Bimla Devi & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors.[10], Bharat Kumar v.  State  of
Haryana & Anr.[11] and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra).



The above said provisions of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 quoted  above
has been interpreted by the three Judge Bench of this Court in the  case  of
Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), the relevant paras 20 and  21  from  the
case are extracted hereunder:-

"20......it is clear that the award pertaining to the subject land has  been
made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer more than five years  prior  to
the commencement of  the  2013  Act.  It  is  also  admitted  position  that
compensation so awarded has neither  been  paid  to  the  landowners/persons
interested nor deposited in the court. The deposit  of  compensation  amount
in the Government treasury  is  of  no  avail  and  cannot  be  held  to  be
equivalent to compensation paid to  the  landowners/persons  interested.  We
have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the subject land  acquisition
proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of  the  2013
Act.

21. The argument  on  behalf  of  the  Corporation  that  the  subject  land
acquisition proceedings have been concluded in all respects under  the  1894
Act and that they are not affected at all in view of Section 114(2)  of  the
2013 Act, has no merit at all, and is noted to be rejected.  Section  114(1)
of the 2013 Act repeals the  1894  Act.  Sub-section  (2)  of  Section  114,
however, makes Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,  1897  applicable  with
regard to the effect of repeal but this is subject to the provisions in  the
2013 Act. Under Section 24(2) land acquisition proceedings  initiated  under
the 1894 Act, by legal fiction, are deemed to have lapsed  where  award  has
been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013  Act  and
possession of the land is not taken or compensation has not been  paid.  The
legal  fiction  under  Section  24(2)  comes  into  operation  as  soon   as
conditions stated therein are satisfied. The applicability of Section  6  of
the General Clauses Act being subject to Section 24(2), there  is  no  merit
in the contention of the Corporation.


 Further, this Court vide its order dated  05.09.2011  requested  the  State
Government to consider the submissions of the appellants regarding  the  re-
allotment  of  the  acquired  land  without  admitting  any  right  in   the
appellants  and  place  the  issue  before  the  State  Government  for  its
consideration. Therefore, the learned Solicitor General contends  that  this
Court found reasonable  ground  for  its  interference  in  the  matter  and
granted leave for the same to be re-examined  and  reconsidered.  The  above
contention is not tenable in law particularly  having  regard  to  the  fact
that after the above said date leave was granted by this Court  by  allowing
the Special Leave Petition that means this Court has to  consider  the  case
of the appellants on merits. However, this does not  deprive  the  right  of
the appellants to apply for relief under Section 24(2) of the  Act  of  2013
as they have  acquired  a  valid  statutory  right.  The  learned  Solicitor
General has  also placed reliance upon the case of  A.R.  Antulay   v.  R.S.
Nayak & Anr[12], in support of his legal submission that in  the  said  case
the majority  view  of  this  Court  have  succinctly  laid  down  that  the
elementary rule of justice is that no party should suffer by  mistake/action
of the Court. What the  court  does  ought  not  prejudice  a  litigant  and
therefore, respondents herein shall not be made to suffer or be deprived  of
their right by the reliance being placed by the land owners upon Section  24
(2) of the Act of 2013 due to the interim orders of the High Court and  this
Court as they have been in possession  of  the  acquired  land.   The  above
contentions of the learned Solicitor General cannot be  accepted  by  us  as
the said principle of law laid down by this  Court  in  the  above  referred
case has no application to the fact situation on hand in view of  the  clear
statement of law laid down by this Court in the above referred  cases  after
interpreting the provisions of the Act of 2013 and therefore,  the  reliance
placed upon the said decision is misplaced.

In Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Association (supra),  it  was  opined  that
after adverting to the decisions of the Privy Council and this  Court,  that
Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not exclude any  period  during  which
the land acquisition proceedings might have remained stayed  on  account  of
stay or injunction or "status quo" order regarding possession  of  the  land
granted by any court. It was conclusively  held  that  the  Legislature  has
consciously omitted to extend the period of five years indicated in  Section
24(2) of the Act of 2013, even  if  the  proceedings  had  been  delayed  on
account of an order of stay or injunction granted by a court of law  or  for
any reason.

Further, so far as the judgment cited by the  respondents  in  Civil  Appeal
No.331 of 2014, we are of the view that the same has no application  on  the
facts of the present case because the appellants in that matter are  nowhere
connected or concerned with the appellants in the present batch of cases  as
contended by the appellants. In that matter, the aggrieved persons have  not
challenged  the  acquisition   proceedings   rather   they   accepted   that
acquisition but  filed  references  for  enhancement  of  compensation.  The
appellants therein have accepted the compensation in the  year  2001  itself
after the passing of the award and their possession have been taken  in  the
year 2001 itself by the authorities concerned. Whereas in the present  batch
of appeals the  appellants  are  still  in  possession  and  they  have  not
accepted any compensation for their acquired land.  Secondly,  the  impugned
judgment in the present appeals is two years after passing of  the  impugned
order in C.A. No.331 of 2014. Therefore, the impugned judgment of  C.A.  No.
331 of 2014 is totally different from the impugned judgment in  the  present
batch of matters and are in no way connected to each other.

After referring to the aforesaid decisions with reference to the  facts  and
circumstances of the case  on  hand,  we  are  of  the  view  that  physical
possession of the land belonging to the appellants have neither  been  taken
by the respondents nor compensation paid to them even though the  award  was
passed on  06.08.2007, and more than five years have lapsed  prior  to  date
on which the  Act  of  2013  came  into  force.  Therefore,  the  conditions
mentioned in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 are  satisfied  in  this  case
for  allowing  the  plea  of  the  appellants  that  the  land   acquisition
proceedings are deemed to have lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of  the  Act
of 2013. The said legal principle laid down by this Court  in  the  case  of
Pune Municipal Corporation and other cases referred to supra with regard  to
the interpretation of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, with all  fours  are
applicable to the fact situation in respect of the  land  covered  in  these
appeals for  granting  the  relief  as  prayed  by  the  appellants  in  the
applications.

We have noticed the Gazette of India published by the Ministry  of  Law  and
Justice in respect of the "Right to Fair Compensation  and  Transparency  in
Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation  and  Resettlement  (Amendment)  Ordinance,
2014", in which a second proviso to Section 24(2) has  been  inserted  which
reads as follows:-
"Provided further that in computing the period  referred  to  in  this  sub-
section, any period or periods during which the proceedings for  acquisition
of the land were held up on account of any stay or injunction issued by  any
stay or injunction issued by any court or the period specified in the  award
of a Tribunal for taking possession or  such  period  where  possession  has
been taken but the compensation  lying  deposited  in  a  court  or  in  any
account maintained for this purpose shall be excluded."


The above said amendment has come into force  w.e.f.  01.01.2015.  With  due
regard to the same, we are of the view  that  the  amendment  would  not  be
applicable to the case on hand  for  the  reason  that  these  appeals  were
pending much prior to the ordinance and also the applications under  Section
24(2) of the Act of 2013 were filed prior to the amendment to Section  24(2)
by Ordinance and the same were heard and reserved for orders  on  28.10.2014
and therefore the Ordinance in so far as insertion of proviso to  the  above
Section by way of an amendment is  prospective.  Further,  keeping  in  mind
the principles laid down by this Court in the case of Garikapati Veeraya  v.
N. Subbiah Choudhry and Ors.[13], wherein it was held thus:

"23...(iv)The right of appeal is a vested right and such a  right  to  enter
the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as  on  and  from  the
date the lis commences and although it may be actually  exercised  when  the
adverse judgment is pronounced such right is  to  be  governed  by  the  law
prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and  not
by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date  of  the
filing of the appeal.


(v) This vested right of appeal can be  taken  away  only  by  a  subsequent
enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary  intendment  and  not
otherwise.

25.In construing the articles of the  Constitution  we  must  bear  in  mind
certain cardinal rules of  construction.  It  has  been  said  in  Hough  v.
Windus [1884] 12 Q.B.D.  224,  that  "statutes  should  be  interpreted,  if
possible, so as to respect vested right." The golden  rule  of  construction
is that, in the absence of anything in the enactment to show that it  is  to
have retrospective operation, it cannot be so constructed  as  to  have  the
effect of altering the law applicable to a claim in litigation at  the  time
when the Act was passed [Leeds and County  Bank  Ltd.  v.  Walker (1883)  11
Q.B.D. 84; Moon v. Durden (1848) 2  Ex.  22;  76  R.R.  479.  The  following
observation of Rankin C.J. in Sadar Ali v. Dalimuddin (supra)  at  page  520
is also apposite and helpful  :  "Unless  the  contrary  can  be  shown  the
provision which takes  away  the  jurisdiction  is  itself  subject  to  the
implied saving of the litigant's right."  In  Janardan  Reddy  v. The  State
[1950]1SCR940 Kania C.J. in delivering the judgment of  the  Court  observed
that our Constitution is generally speaking  prospective  in  its  operation
and is not to have retroactive operation  in  the  absence  of  any  express
provision to that effect. The same  principle  was  reiterated  in  Keshavan
Madhava Menon v. The State of Bombay 1951CriLJ680 and finally  in  Dajisaheb
Mane and Others v. Shankar Rao Vithal Rao [1955]2SCR872 to  which  reference
will be made in greater detail hereafter."
                                               (emphasis laid by this Court)

Further  in  the  case  of  Shyam  Sunder  v.  Ram  Kumar  &  Anr.[14],  the
Constitution Bench of this Court held thus:
"26. In Hitendra Vishnu  Tahkur  &  ors. vs. State  of  Maharashtra  &  ors.
1995CriLJ517 this Court laid down the ambit and scope  of  an  amending  act
and its retrospective option as follows:

'(i)A  statute  which  affects  substantive  rights  is   presumed   to   be
prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly  or  by
necessary intendment, whereas a  statute  which  merely  affects  procedure,
unless such as construction is  textually  impossible,  is  presumed  to  be
retrospective in its application, should not be given  an  extended  meaning
and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits.

(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in  nature,  whereas
law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial  is
substantive in nature.

(iii) Every litigant has a vested right  in  substantive  law  but  no  such
right exists in procedural law.

(iv)  a  procedural  statute  should  not  generally  speaking  be   applied
retrospective where the result  would  be  to  create  new  disabilities  or
obligations or to impose new duties in respect of  of  transactions  already
accomplished.

(v) a statute which not only changes the  procedure  but  also  creates  new
rights and liabilities shall be construed to  be  prospective  in  operation
unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication.'

27. In K.S. Paripoornan vs. State of Kerala &  others   AIR1995SC1012,  this
Court while considering the effect of amendment in the Land Acquisition  Act
in pending proceedings held thus:

"... In the instant case we  are  concerned  with  the  application  of  the
provisions of sub-section 1(1-A) of S. 23 as introduced by the Amending  Act
of acquisition proceedings which were pending on the  date  of  commencement
of the Amending act. In relation pending proceedings, the  approach  of  the
courts in England is that the same are unaffected by  the  changers  in  the
law so far as they relate to the determination  of  the  substantive  rights
and in the absence of a clear indication  of  a  contrary  intention  in  an
amending enactment, the substantive rights of the parties to an action  fall
to the determined by the law as it existed when  the  action  was  commenced
and this is so whether the law is change before the hearing of the  case  at
the first instance or while an appeal is pending  (See  Halsbury's  Laws  of
England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, para 922).'
28. From the aforesaid decisions the legal position  that  emerges  is  that
when a repeal of an enactment  is  followed  by  a  fresh  legislation  such
legislation does not effect the substantive rights of  the  parties  on  the
date  of  suit  or  adjudication  of  suit  unless  such  a  legislation  is
retrospective and a court of appeal cannot take  into  consideration  a  new
law brought into  existence  after  the  judgment  appealed  from  has  been
rendered because the rights of the  parties  in  an  appeal  are  determined
under the law in force on the date of suit. However,  the  position  in  law
would be different in the matters which relate to procedural law but so  far
as substantive rights of parties are concerned  they  remain  unaffected  by
the amendment in the enactment. We are, therefore, of the view that where  a
repeal of provisions of an enactment is followed by fresh legislation by  an
amending Act such legislation is  prospective  in  operation  and  does  not
effect  substantive  or  vested  rights   of   the   parties   unless   made
retrospective either expressly or by necessary intendment.  We  are  further
of the view that there is a presumption against the retrospective  operation
of a statue and further a statute is not to be construed t  have  a  greater
retrospective  operation  than  its  language  renders  necessary,  but   an
amending act which affects the procedure is presumed  to  be  retrospective,
unless amending act provides otherwise. ......."
                                               (emphasis laid by this Court)


In  view  of  the  aforesaid  findings  and  reasons  recorded  by  us,  the
acquisition proceedings in respect of the appellants' land have lapsed.

     The aforesaid applications are allowed in  the  above  said  terms  and
consequently, the appeals referred to above are  also  allowed  by  quashing
the land acquisition proceedings notification in so far as the land  of  the
appellants are concerned. No costs.







    I.A. No. 6 in C.A. No.7424 of 2013 for  impleadment  is  dismissed  with
liberty to approach the appropriate forum in accordance with law.

      I.A. Nos. 9 and 10 in C.A. No.  7424  of  2013  for  intervention  and
direction are dismissed as not maintainable.


.....................................................................J.
                          [V. GOPALA GOWDA]



    .....................................................................J.

    [C. NAGAPPAN]


New Delhi,
January 22, 2015
-----------------------
[1]    (2009) 10 SCC 501
[2]    (1997) 7 SCC 430
[3]    (2006) 2 SCC 416
[4]    (2008) 3 SCC 279
[5]    (2005) 5 SCC 598
[6]    2014(10)SCALE388
[7]    (2010) 10 SCC 282
[8]    (2014) 3 SCC 183
[9]    (2014) 6 SCC 564
[10]   (2014) 6 SCC 583
[11]   (2014) 6 SCC 586
[12]   (1988) 2 SCC 602
[13]   AIR 1957 SC 540
[14]   (2001)8 SCC 24

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